The Saviour and Other Europes

Identity, Interests, and Geopolitical Images of Europe in Estonia

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PAMI AALTO
MSocSc, Researcher
Department of European Studies (Baltic Research Unit), University of Bradford, UK/
Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland
E-mail: P.K.Aalto@bradford.ac.uk

1. The Geopolitics of Constructing Europe

It is no secret that research on integration within the European Union (EU) is not any more limited to the traditional dispute between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. The debate between these two branches of research is now joined by International Relations (IR) constructivism, comparative politics approaches, and approaches treating the EU as "new governance" (Christiansen et al. 1999: 537). The issue of EU enlargement, moreover, enforces us to enlarge the research agenda horizontally, too, in order to make EU integration comprehensible. One of the metaphors depicting this enlarged research agenda is the "Europe of concentric circles", with Brussels and EU institutions as the centre (Joenniemi 1993: 209-12). For Ola Tunander (1997: 32), the emerging perception in the EU centre is that it represents a "Cosmos" of order and peace. This "Cosmos" is surrounded by a concentric circle of less integrated EU members, then a circle of relatively stable states eager for joining the EU, an outer circle of states less prepared to do so, and finally, a periphery representing "Chaos"; a final frontier of Europe which is definitely not about to join the EU in the foreseeable future. Ole Wæver (1997), for his part, speaks of a "Europe of three empires". The EU is the most important empire, but it is accompanied by the "empire of the Tsars" -- Russia and its sphere of interests -- and the "empire of the Ottomans" -- Turkey with its sphere of interests.

It is no secret either that the "Prince" in the centre of the EU empire is rather Huntingtonian (1993) in his enlargement policies. He is willing to incorporate into the "Cosmos" only those who can convincingly demonstrate their belonging to "Western" or "European" value system and civilization. But, the Prince might, concomitantly, be interested in Wæver's (1997: 80-85) notion that his and the other two empires are not likely to make war with each other. The reasons for this include: the EU is occupied with establishing itself in the global agenda and not interested in promoting "regional" conflicts, while Russia's main interest is in the former FSU territory, and Turkey's in the middle East. There are also several structural factors that make such a clash even more unlikely.[1]

That the more or less stable states currently on the fringes of Europe's three empires wish to *integrate* into the EU, requires them to accept the EU's definition of common identity. This is specified in the Copenhagen criteria[2] and the Agenda 2000 process[3] (cf. Moisio 1999). What the EU wants to take place, is nicely spelled out in Alexander Wendt's (1994) work and related research that can be broadly mapped under the label of "mainstream IR constructivism" (e.g. Katzenstein 1996; Onuf 1989; Ruggie 1998; cf. Buzan et al. 1998).[4] Indeed, this research does not outrightly resist the call for advising the Prince (cf. Wæver 1999: 9-10). Wendt argues that interaction with international structures can change state identities

and interests because they are endogenous to interaction. That is to say, structural level interaction can lead into co-operation and the evolution of a community, as state-agents learn gradually to identify with each other and perceive common interests. The EU treats for instance the Baltic states within the framework of a "politics of inclusion". The EU promotes economic, judicial, political, and other reforms in the Baltic states, but also various types of interaction with the Balts in order to cause identity shifts towards "Europeanisation". These shifts would, in turn, facilitate their inclusion into the Union (Wennersten 1999). In order to elucidate some aspects of these processes, in this paper, I examine the interaction between the EU and Estonia. In particular, I examine how Estonia -- a country among the first-order candidates -- takes part in this identity political game.

One of the big policy relevant questions that the Prince might want to ask his advisors -- for example "mainstream IR constructivists" -- is the following: how is Estonia's state identity changing in EU interaction, and how does it resonate with the EU's core values and the notion of "European identity"? Put otherwise, the question is: what is Estonia "learning" in EU interaction?[5] In this paper, I argue that this kind of a question, though important to the Prince it may be, is a somewhat misplaced one. It is, concomitantly, very well illustrative of certain tendencies in "mainstream IR constructivism" that delimit its ability to tackle with EU enlargement.[6] In short, "mainstream IR constructivism" aims at establishing a middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism, and treats the EU as a social structure with a material dimension (Christiansen et al. 1999). This social structure connotes co-operative rather than anarchic aspects, but, the key point is that it is something made up by states. They, in turn, are treated as having relatively stable identities that mostly resist change. But, it is granted that during "critical junctures", such as Estonia's state-building process after the regaining of independence in 1991, identities are more likely to be subject to change than normally (e.g., Marcussen et al. 1999: 615-7).

Thus, "mainstream IR constructivism" seems to avoid the mistake of positing relatively stable identities in the case of Estonia and other post-communist states that are undergoing a crucial state building process (cf. Aalto 2000). But, in the next section and in the resulting empirical analysis, I argue that this is not quite the case. "Mainstream IR constructivism" is prone to conceal the *politics* in identity construction that is taking place in the EU applicant countries (S. Smith 2000: 162; cf. Luoma-Aho 2000).

2. Identity, Interests, and Images

In his "mainstream IR constructivism" that assumes relatively stable state identities, Wendt makes a distinction between "corporate" and "social" aspects of state identity. Corporate identity is singular and refers to the "intrinsic, self-organising qualities that constitute actor individuality". It generates four basic corporate interests: physical security including differentiation from other actors, ontological security or predictability in relationship to the world, recognition as an actor by others, and the ability to meet the domestic public's demands for development and better life. For Wendt, state's *corporate identity* is something rather stable and largely prior to interaction with other states. The satisfaction of the *corporate interests* that the corporate identity generates is, however, dependent on the state's *social identities*, i.e., how the state defines itself and what roles it plays in relation to others. Consequently, social identities are multiple, and have both "individual" and "structural" properties as they link state agency and international structure (Wendt 1994: 385). For Wendt, interests thus emerge as a meeting point between state's corporate and social identities. Or, in other words, the formation of interests is dependent on both corporate and social identities. This causal model[7] reproduces Erik Ringmar's (1996) argument that identities are prior to interests.

True, it is a persuasive argument to privilege identity as an analytical category, since in his criticism of Ringmar's work, Iver Neumann (1997: 324) notes that "identity politics is always afoot. It may be more or less central, more or less overt, but it is always there". But, for Neumann, identity and interests are mutually constituted: we do not only want what we are, but we also are what we want (p. 323). In his more recent work, Wendt (1999: 231) accepts, in spite of his ultimate privileging of identity in relation to interests, that identity and interests "play complementary explanatory roles, and so rather than define them as rivals we should explore how they work in tandem". In this paper, I claim that *both* identity and interests should occupy a central place in the study of interaction between the EU and Estonia. This is, quite simply, the best way of making this interaction intelligible (cf. McSweeney 1999: 127). Empirical study alone cannot, however, tell us whether the ontology proposed by Wendt (1994) and Ringmar (1996), or the alternative one I put forth in this paper, is the most appropriate, because ontological disputes cannot be solved by empirical means (Hay 1999).

First, I suggest that Wendt's distinction between "corporate" and "social" aspects of state identity is counterintuitive. Wendt remains rooted in rationalism in assuming a stable corporate identity that resists change in international interaction, whilst allowing multiple and open social identities. By contrast, from a "constitutive" constructionist perspective (S. Smith 2000: 690-1), one that I employ here, corporate and social identities are analytical categories that are best conceived of not as different sides of the same coin, but, to borrow from Colin Hay (1999), as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged. Therefore, I suggest taking identity simply as a relational concept: it mediates the internal and external aspects of the social entity under examination. There is no need to postulate anything "intrinsic" in the identity/interests relationship. This conceptual move opens up the *politics* in identity and interest construction. On the one hand, identity construction processes may become politicised and agents may end up invoking certain interests, while on the other hand, disputes over the definition of interests may give rise for identity shifts. The precise relationship between identity and interests is a matter of case-specific empirical study (Marcussen et al. 1999: 617).

Second, I suggest that the concept of *image* provides us a useful reference point for examining the politics in the mutual constitution of identity and interests. For Boulding (1956), individuals have both factual and value images of the world, ones which interact with experienced events, and function as filters for the individual's view of the world. Boulding has applied this image conceptualisation into international politics (1959), but somewhat departing from his work, I postulate that *there are groups within the state that may invoke different images of "Europe" because of both identity and interest based reasons that are subject to change in both domestic and international interaction*. That is to say, I study *different* images of "Europe" that *different* elite groups put forth in their geopolitical rhetoric in post-Soviet Estonia.[8] This is in contrast to "mainstream IR constructivists", who tend to ignore the domestic political battle. The source material includes thirty-nine in-depth interviews with Estonians and Estonia's Russophones, material from a Q-methodological study, newspaper excerpts, speeches and governmental documents, and previous both pamphlet and scholarly literature (for a more detailed methodological discussion, see Aalto 1997; 1999; forthcoming).

3. Three Images of "Europe" in Post-Soviet Estonia

(i) *Europe As the Saviour*. This image emerged gradually in the early 1990s, in a time when Estonia's relations with the local Russophone minority and Russia were particularly conflictual.[9] Russia initially refused to withdraw the former Soviet troops from Estonia as a response to Estonia's exclusionist policies towards the large Russophone minority residing in the country. In particular, Russia insisted that the 1992 Law on Citizenship and the 1993 Aliens Law, and the related language legislation are discriminatory and compromise the human rights of the Russophone minority.[10] The troops withdrawal issue, which was finally resolved in 1994 after a considerable US and European pressure, only worked to intensify Russia's confrontational rhetoric, and was followed by economic sanctions in the form of doubling of tariffs on imports from Estonia (Smith 1998: 12). To be sure, Estonia's rhetoric and actual policies were not lacking confrontational aspects either (Haab 1995: 39; Zhuryari-Ossipova 1993: 129). The resulting conflict cycle, in addition to the weight of negative historical experience, gave grounds for the majority of Estonian elites to perceive Russia, or the "East", as a potential "Enemy". After the vanishing of the vague hopes that the Nordic countries could guarantee Estonia's independence and security, "Europe" became the "Saviour" in Estonia's identity politics. Thus, the saviour image was invoked as an object of contra-identification to Russia (Ruutsoo 1998a: 16; 1998b: 23).

Estonian foreign and security policy makers displayed passionate efforts of linking with organisations that they perceived as connected with "Europe" and promoting "European values", and which might rescue Estonia from its geopolitical entrapment. In 1993, Estonia joined the Council of Europe, and in 1994, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Also, Estonia obtained an associate partner status in the Western European Union (WEU). Estonia submitted an application for NATO membership, too, and advocated NATO's policies publicly. This resulted in warnings by the then Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Krylov, that Estonia's joining of NATO would enforce Russia to respond by economic, political, and even military measures (*OMRI* 1995). As regards the EU, Estonia signed the Association Agreement in June 1995 and submitted an application for membership later in the same year. The Estonian President Lennart Meri justified these policy choices by identifying Estonia very strongly with "European" values:

> "We have belonged to Europe for more than 700 years..." (Meri 1995)

the

> "Estonia has been part of the Roman-Germanic legal system for over 700 years...This legal basis...is a nursery from which everything else springs up; it is the prerequisite, the basis and very guarantor of the survival, the development and the success of our modern state..." (Meri 1996)[11]

Here, Europe becomes "semi-us" with which Estonia never really parted ways despite the more than fifty years of Soviet rule. This is the dominant claim among Estonian political elites (cf. Haab 1998: 109). Moreover, it is not entirely alien to Estonian academics either. In their contribution to the book *Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*, Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm (1997) portray Estonia, among other things, as a frontier state and a last resort of West European cultural tradition. Rein Ruutsoo (1998a: 18) also accentuates Estonia's "European" history. This kind of an identity claim needs to resonate with the broader public's embedded views in order to become publicly accepted (Marcussen et al. 1999: 617). That is in evidence: for example in the early 1990s, 82% of the Estonians identified themselves with "European" culture (Geistlinger and Kirch 1995: 74). Is identity, hence, the main reason for the invoking of the saviour image? To claim so would be to conceal the role of interests. For example, the Estonian futurologist Erik Terk (1995) says that remaining outside the EU's enlargement process would not be in Estonia's interests, but threaten its *survival*, and that close ties with the EU are the only means of promoting development and growth in Estonia. President Meri (1997) himself, too, expresses how identity reasons alone fail to explain the need for the saviour of "Europe": "We do not need the EU for its own sake. We need the Estonian Republic; a state that the Estonians would feel as one that guarantees them the prerequisites for raising their standard of living and for educating their children. For this end we need to join Europe." Here, the "semi-us" becomes an instrument for protecting the interests of the "us".

The geopolitical rhetoric employing the saviour image became increasingly pragmatic in the late 1990s. Estonian foreign and security policy makers started to perceive that the explicit securitisation of NATO membership in the saviour image was not leading into a rapid invitation, but into a security trap. Remaining outside the first wave of enlargement left them more insecure than ever (Medvedev 1998; Wæver 1994). Yet, they still cling to the securitisation element, but perceive increasingly that Estonia's interest is to make it more implicit, and instead of NATO, direct it at the EU. Now, the EU is becoming silently treated as a provider of a "semi-hard" security solution. The new tactics of the key elites is not to say the word "security" aloud. They keep it in the backseat and portray Estonia as a normal and democratic Western state that can easily, undramatically, and unproblematically be included into the EU (cf. Wæver 1997: 313-4). They depict Estonia as a "gateway state" with partners in all directions, a state that can mediate trade and other relations between, for instance, Finland and Central Europe, on the one hand, and Russia and Europe, on the other (Berg 2000). However, it is a mistake to think that the key elites have abandoned the saviour. Their experience from EU interaction rather suggests that the "semi-us", the potential guarantor of Estonia's independence, in the end, is probably more about the "semi" than the "us". Consequently, they perceive that it is in their and Estonia's interests to highlight the everyday and economic aspects of the integration process in place of the often-heard identity narrative.

(ii) *Federal Europe As a Threatening "Other"*. The relative opening up of the Estonian-Russian conflict in the late 1990s created room for a more visible emergence of alternative images that were suppressed in a crucial state-building period. These images do not necessarily rely on a perception of Russia as a potential "Enemy". Resultantly, they do not need to invoke "Europe" as a saviour either. Their common denominator is Estonia-centredness. Several elite persons who participated to a greater or lesser extent in the construction of the saviour image, are now turning more critical towards the current developments within the EU. They are afraid that the "good old" intergovernmentalist focus on a mere economic co-operation alone is in the decline. Some of these people, like Edgar Savisaar, the chairman of Estonia's biggest and probably best organised political grouping and the leading opposition party -- Estonia's Centre Party (*Eesti Keskerakond*) -- still perceive "Europe" as a "semi-us". Moreover, Savisaar himself was in the cabinet when Estonia ratified the EU Association Agreement, and as a matter of principle, he finds several positive aspects in close ties between "Europe" and Estonia. But, he says now that Estonia should not integrate into the EU by sacrificing any of its national interests, and that that integration process may be far more fateful than the Estonians think. The EU may develop into a federal state, in which internal contradictions may burst into wars, or perhaps more likely, in which Estonia may lose its sovereignty. He is critical of NATO membership as well, albeit in a slightly different tone, and says that substantial membership in the form of bringing NATO bases to Estonia is not a good idea at all, since it only provokes confrontation with Russia (Savisaar 1999: 74-99; 196). With more involvement and experience in European affairs, the outsider's image of the "good old Europe" as a "semi-us" is turning into a more cynical image of an emerging federal Europe as the "other".

Savisaar's cynical vision is turned into a pure geopolitical threat image in the rhetoric of the now defunct Estonian Future Party (*Tuleviku Eesti Erakond*)[12] and the people continuing its work. One of them is Vello Leito, politically perhaps a marginalised figure, but one who might command sympathies among those who are deeply disillusioned with the recent course of events in post-Soviet Estonia. In their book, which carries a sub-title translating into something like "the most important fact is being covered up" ("*Kõige tähtsamat varjatakse*"), Vello Leito and Uno Silberg (1998) identify the emerging EU with the former Soviet Union and deny any positive identity or interest association with it:

> "There is no such thing as the common destiny of nations. Abolishing the borders between ethnic nation-states leads to the so-called Americanisation process: whole nations will assimilate into the most expansive-minded group. From our point of view, this is simple: the big nations stay, small ones disappear" (p. 32)

Leito and Silberg claim that the Maastricht Treaty contains totalitarianist elements, which may even give rise to fascist tendencies (p. 40). They criticise EU enlargement, too, for being about a new division of spheres of influence. In this game, Estonia is in danger of falling into Germany's bridgehead. The 1997 NATO-Russia Charter, for its part, was in fact a "second Yalta", and included a secret protocol establishing a union between the USA, Russia, and Germany. The only way in which Estonia could protect itself is by trying to play these power centres against each other and offer the world a balance, without concomitantly slipping towards "finlandisation" (pp. 51-9). These authors, departing from Savisaar's merely suspicious EU vision, do not perceive "Europe" as a "semi-us": for them, EU enlargement is a threatening expansion of a federal super-state. They perceive Estonia's state identity as a unique one, and fear that it may become contamined in EU interaction. These fears lead them to conclude that both for identity and interest based reasons, Estonia should preserve maximum sovereignty and not participate in EU enlargement. That is the only means of ensuring the survival of the Estonians and Estonia.

(iii) *Europe As a Friendly "Other"*. This image, too, presents an alternative to the still dominant saviour image. However, in contradistinction to the image of federal Europe as a threatening "other", this one is put forth by Estonia's *Russophone* elites. Their primary focus in the early 1990s was in criticising Estonia's citizenship and language laws that they, alongside with Russian foreign policy makers, perceived to be discriminatory. The EU's 1997 invitation to Estonia for starting membership negotiations led the Russophone elites to view the EU, among other things, as a possible lever in their campaign to liberalise these laws (Berg 2000). For example, they took a note of the criticism in the EU's 1999 Regular Report towards Accession, which was directed at Estonia's recent, stricter language legislation.[13] The Russophone elites' agenda is still largely dominated by these issues, and consequently, they have come to see an explicit interest in promoting close ties with the EU.[14] Also, they perceive that EU membership might provide the Russophone population new employment opportunities, as the Russophones often feel themselves disadvantaged in the Estonian labour market. The Russophone population on the whole is rather supportive of EU membership.[15] Although the Russophones do not advocate NATO membership,[16] it is important to point out that in most cases they do not view NATO as an expansionist organisation in the way it is sometimes depicted in the revanchist branch of the Russian press. Estonia's current Russophone elites simply wish to get more opportunities by linking with Europe, but they do not want Estonia to get involved in any big games that NATO membership might bring with it. Estonia should stay neutral and cultivate good-neighbourly relations with Russia (e.g., Ivanov 1998; *Sõnumileht* 19 April 1998).

The crucial way in which the current Russophone elite persons differ from their ethnic Estonian counterparts is, however, their tendency to see themselves as located farther away from "Europe" in identity terms. This also applies to the broader Russophone public. Yes, it is true that the Russophones do not constitute a unified diaspora, and that there are various social, political and economic factions among them (Brednikova 1999; Smith 1998). But, in rough terms, the bulk of them conceive of themselves as representatives of a big Russian nation with a strong and well-established culture, one that has its roots in the "East", and is connected to the present Russian state (Aalto 1999). Concomitantly, they are in various degrees integrated into the Estonian culture and society (Kirch 1997), and claim to be the most "Europeanised" Russians, since they have been living in the "Soviet West" and now live in independent Estonia (Aalto forthcoming). In the end, however, that is not tantamount to conceiving of Europe as a "semi-us". But for the Russophones, Europe is not a threatening "other" either. In other words, it is neither a "semi-hard" security solution (Europe as the saviour), nor a threat (federal Europe as

the prevalence of competing identities (Vetik 1999). It also allows them to promote an image of Europe as a friendly "other" since that is in their interests; "Europe" is *for them*.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I tried to show that the Prince may not find the best possible advice from "mainstream IR constructivists" in thinking of EU enlargement issues. In particular, I argued that the tendency in "mainstream IR constructivism" to assume a relatively stable corporate identity alongside more dynamic social identities, is counterintuitive, and conceals the politics in identity and interest construction that is taking place in the EU applicant countries like Estonia. The three different images of "Europe" that I discussed above, rely each on different identity and interest constructions and do not necessarily contain any shared conception of corporate identity. It could well be that those Estonians who still support the now somewhat altered, but still recognisable saviour image, are the ones whose conceptions start to resonate rather well with "European identity". Initially, they wanted to play with the same rules as the "true" Europeans, and after a misguided securitisation venture, they are now learning European codes of conduct. The Prince, however, might be interested in knowing that some other groups learn different things. The eurosceptism in the image of federal Europe as a threatening "other" may be due to genuine threat perceptions of supranational developments, but also due to domestic opportunism and electoral calculations. The Russophones, for their part, are just beginning to "learn".

Thus, by putting forth these arguments, I wish to note that despite their methodological strengths, "mainstream IR constructivists" may fail to see that identity and interest based reasons are involved in very complex and political ways in geopolitical argumentation in the EU applicant countries. Consequently, "mainstream IR constructivists" very easily end up enhancing and sedimenting dominant images that are results of political struggle, like the saviour image in Estonia. This political act may inch Estonia rhetorically closer towards the ordered, and, presumably de-politicised centre of the EU empire. Concomitantly, it paradoxically hides the politics within the state that is so well described by Roxanne Lynn Doty (2000: 139), and which might prevail not only in the "Chaos", but also in the "Cosmos" itself:

> "Subjects acting in the name of the state are pulled by numerous opposing forces and in many contradictory directions. The overall effect of this is an abstract, conceptual entity, 'the state', that is in fact not unitary, but split, contradictory, and even schizophrenic"

Notes

1. These include: 1) global political economy is more and more about indirect and not direct territorial rule; 2) the exact centres of the three "empires" are rather difficult to locate and have various degrees of legitimacy, so they do not compete with each other in equal terms; 3) with contemporary information technology, interaction capacity is not always linked to geographical proximity; 4) there is a declining desire for territory (Wæver 1997: 80-5).
2. The 1993 Copenhagen criteria specify that achieving EU membership is dependent on the following criteria: 1) that the candidate has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; 3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union; 4) the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration (European Council 1993: 11-12).
3. Agenda 2000 examines the candidate countries along political, economic, and judicial criteria and specifies who is best prepared to take on the duties of membership.
4. Buzan et al. (1998: 212) use the term "mainstream" constructionism, and Krause (1998: 224) uses the term "thin" constructionism to denote constructionist research characterised by deliberate state-centrism and an aim to distance itself from poststructuralist philosophy of science, especially at the

constrained or transformed in their international agency because of the functioning of international social structures. It is, of course, somewhat misleading to classify Wendt, Onuf, Ruggie, and Katzenstein into the same category, since as Wæver (2000: ftn 7) notes, Wendt derives more from social psychology and theory of science, than the others, who derive from sociological classics such as Weber and Durkheim. I use the term "mainstream IR constructionism" for strictly analytical purposes to denote research that deals with the construction of the states system and is therefore different in focus from Berger & Luckmann's (1967) classical constructionism that deals with the construction of society.
5. This compares to Iver Neumann's argument of how the EU, or "Europe" treats Russia as a "learner" (Neumann 1999).
6. My purpose in this paper is to examine critically one particular aspect of "mainstream IR constructivism": the formation of collective identity in EU enlargement. My criticism is directed at the ability of "mainstream IR constructivism" to tackle with this issue, and not at refuting "mainstream IR constructivism" on the whole.
7. Wendt's causal reasoning accommodates also many "constitutive" arguments. See especially Wendt (1999)
8. In this paper, I largely bracket EU discourses and concentrate mainly on Estonia's input into EU interaction. For the relationship between elite conceptions and the broader public, see Putnam (1976).
9. This image was preceded by ideas of multiculturality in Estonia and neutrality in foreign relations in the late 1980s (Berg 2000; Haab 1998: 114-115). Estonian-Russian relations freezed considerably after Estonia distanced itself from the commitments made in the 1991 talks between the Russian Federation and the then Estonian SSR. Russia committed itself to withdrawing troops from Estonia and Estonia declared its intent of protecting the rights of the Russophone minority.
10. Russia interpreted the 1991 talks as legally binding Estonia to introduce a "zero option" citizenship law, which would grant citizenship to all those residing in the country at the time of the regaining of independence. In 1992, Estonia introduced a citizenship law which states that citizens are only those who were citizens in the First Republic in 1918-1940 and their descendants. The Aliens' Law states that those do not have Estonian citizenship -- in 1993 the majority of the Russophones in Estonia -- have to apply for a residence permit. The 1989 and the 1995 language laws define Estonian as the only official state language. The use of e.g., Russian is, however, allowed in Russian-dominated regions during a transition period.
11. President Meri's rhetoric on connections between West European and Estonian legislation is interesting, since for example Peeter Järvelaid, Professor of Legal History in the University of Tartu, claims that Estonian criminal law derives directly from Russian tradition (*Eesti Päevaleht* 11 April 1996).
12. The Future Party was the only political party to enter the 1995 Parliamentary elections on an anti-EU platform. They did not, however, get any seats.
13. These are the amendments to the 1995 Law on Language and the new Parliamentary and Local Elections Law (European Commission...).
14. Slightly paradoxically, it seems that Estonia's EU membership might also persuade the Russophones to identify more strongly with Estonia. One of my Russophone interviewees said to me in late 1998 that "When Estonia joins the EU, the Russians have to accept a lot of things. They have to take the Estonians as a nation" (!).
15. Despite different polls produce somewhat different results, I claim that the support basis for accepting EU membership in a possible referendum seems to exist. In a poll representing the whole population in Estonia in November 1997, support for EU membership was 40%, whilst 12% of the respondents were against, 36% undecided, and 12% would not note at all. When the figures were calculated for Estonian citizens only, the basic picture did not change notably at all. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the Russophones, of whom about two thirds are not Estonian citizens, are broadly supportive of, rather than against EU membership, just like the Estonians. This similarity in support patterns is also reflected in another poll in June 1996 (Kirch et al.: 59; 87). In the end of 1998, 27% of the whole population would vote for membership, but again, only 12% would vote against. Although unequivocal support for EU membership has been in the decline throughout the 1990s, it has rather consistently been higher than resistance.
16. The support for NATO membership among Estonia's Russophone population was a mere 11% in 1996 (Proos 1997). The exception to the rule here is Igor Gräzin, who was MP in 1995-1999 session in the Reform Party faction, which advocates both EU and NATO membership.

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