US CIA Estimate of Indian Force Developments as of September 2001
India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment will benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.
India continues to rely on foreign assistance for key missile technologies, where it still lacks engineering or production expertise. Entities in Russia and Western Europe remained the primary conduits of missile-related and dual-use technology transfers during the latter half of 2000.
India continues an across-the-board modernization of its armed forces through ACW acquisitions, mostly from Russia, although many of its key programs have been plagued by delays. During the reporting period, New Delhi concluded a $3 billion contract with Russia to produce under license 140 Su-30 multirole fighters and continued negotiations with Moscow for 310 T-90S main battle tanks, A-50 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-22M Backfire maritime strike bombers, and an aircraft carrier. India also continues to explore options for leasing or purchasing several AWACS systems from other entities. India also signed a contract with France for 10 additional Mirage 2000H multirole fighters and is considering offers for jet trainer aircraft from France and the United Kingdom. In addition to helping India with the development of its indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, Russia is negotiating with India the possible lease of a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine.
Russian entities continue to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian assistance likely supports Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.
Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms. It is the primary source of ACW for China and India, it continues to supply ACW to Iran and Syria, and it has negotiated new contracts with Libya and North Korea. Russia continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia has discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.
The Russian Government's commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain. The export control bureaucracy was reorganized again as part of President Putin's broader government reorganization in May 2000. The Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) was abolished and its functions assumed by a new department in the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. VEK had been tasked with drafting the implementing decrees for Russia's July 1999 export control law; the status of these decrees is not known. Export enforcement continues to need improvement. In February 2000, Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of Russia's Security Council, said that during 1998-99 the government had obtained convictions for unauthorized technology transfers in three cases. The Russian press has reported on cases where advanced equipment is simply described as something else in the export documentation and is exported. Enterprises sometimes falsely declare goods to avoid government taxes.
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