

3 Reappraising a “New” Kind of Terrorism

Are we to fundamentally revise our conception of the terrorism paradigm because a considerable number of analyses of contemporary terrorism argue that “different motives, different actors, different sponsors, ...and demonstrably greater lethality” exemplify this supposed new breed of political violence?³¹

Probably it is not wise to accept the “New Terrorism” at face value. Upon closer inspection, the so-called “New Terrorism” is not as deserving of the designation “new,” as may appear to be the case on first sight; and a skeptical treatment of the “New Terrorist” paradigm is required – it is suggested here – for a number of reasons. The most important argument militating against the reviewed conception of the “New Terrorism” is the simple fact that it is potentially distorted, in that it almost invariably conveys an impressionist image of post-Cold War PVMs.

By way of introduction, it must be clearly understood that the mere existence of weapons of mass destruction, even the knowledge of how to construct, and the perceived possibility of acquiring weapons grade materials illegally in order to build crude atomic, biological and chemical devices (ABC), are not new phenomena and by themselves do certainly not justify the appellation of the “New Terrorism.” The awareness among government analysts of the danger of ABC weapons in the hands of substate actors may be as recent as the end of the Cold War, but calling the problem novel for this reason is to confuse its appearance on the perceptive radar with its actual inception; or to think that “terrorists” are as a rule slow-witted dullards and uncreative, chronic underachievers.

31 Ian O. Lesser, “Changing Terrorism in a Changing World,” in *Countering the New Terrorism*, pp. 1–5, p. 1.

Nor is modern history marked by an absence of religious fanaticism. In the light of the historical track record of religious militancy, its recent recrudescence as embodied in Islamism therefore fails to surprise those sensitive to the currents of the past. Finally, on the score of advanced organizational principles among the “New Terrorists,” it remains to be said that the terrorist groups of the 1970’s were exemplars of highly sophisticated organizational structures and, if anything, have proven resourceful, inventive, resilient and *sufficiently flexible* in the face of the combined repressive force applied by the governments they opposed.

To recall additional characteristics put forward by its proponents in the media and academia: The recent and widespread evocation of this new breed of PVM is suggestive of terrorist groups operating free from previously valid motivational constraints, with an unprecedented potential for access to ABC weaponry and/or advanced military-grade hardware, all of which are – ostensibly – all the sudden unleashed upon a defenseless public in pursuit of some obscure, irrational and utterly arcane agenda. The problem with this image of the “New Terrorism” is that it conveys an undifferentiated and incomplete perspective of the matter at hand. To date, one of the more convincing (and partially implied) explanations for the appearance and mushrooming of the “New Terrorist” industry is the following by Martha Crenshaw:

Both the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policy have been event-driven. Why has the notion of a “new,” dangerous, and uncontrollable terrorism become so compelling? Is the perception driven by the shock of a series of events closely related in time but not necessarily caused by the same factors? Is the perception of threat driven by public opinion, the news media, or elites in the government and scientific community?³²

32 Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” 415.

If Crenshaw's assumption of the driving factors behind the "New Terrorism" is valid, which appears plausible, then the circumstance that research on terrorism is event-driven could conceivably give rise to a more disquieting question; namely, whether the definitional debate is the only one suffering from likely instrumentalization by vested interests from among the powers that be. Should the response be in the negative, this would also seriously call into doubt the academic quality of the "New Terrorism" paradigm, and raise the issue of whose interests it serves. More generally, to what extent can the perception of a threat be generated, induced and manipulated? Even if terrorism by insurgents of all stamps is only partially based on the precepts of psychological warfare, it follows that the means to combat it are probably not dissimilar. Unfortunately, it lies in the nature of such questions that they are not only instrumental, but also highly political.

A dimension of terrorism research that is also disadvantaged due to the sensationalist value of terrorist attacks, and the mass media-shaped perception of the threat represented by PVMs, as well as governments' manic occupation with defensive measures at the expense of preventive endeavors, is the terrorist actor himself, his organization, his motives and the cosmology and physical environment that spawned them. Once actor-centered and actor-related issues replace the highly visible blood and gore of terrorist attacks, there is very little that is authentically novel concerning the agenda and the motivational, organizational and even elements of the methodical aspect of the "New Terrorism".

First, the supposed novelty of the "New Terrorist" political, religious or social program is also largely dependant on the time frame involved in an analysis of terrorism, "terrorists" and terrorist acts. For what, except time and place, distinguishes the objectives (or methods) of the Sicarii of the Jewish Zealot movement from the ends pursued (and means used) more recently by supporters of the relatively obscure MAK (Maktab al-Khidamat, the Mujahedeen "Office of Services," which subsequently gained notoriety in the

guise of al-Qaida)?³³ In principle, and to some extent even in practice, there are similarities, for both movements have stated their aim to cleanse hallowed soil of foreign desecrators by forcefully ejecting all unbelievers.

In the first example, the Romans under the emperors Nero and Vespasian occupied parts of biblical Israel, thereby provoking the second of three Jewish revolts from c. 66–73 A.D. The militant Zealot movement, whose corps of knife-wielding Sicarii publicly slaughtered legionaries and their officers in bloodcurdling and spectacular ways, ambushed Roman patrols in the countryside, poisoned wells with rotting animal corpses and, more generally, fiercely resisted the vastly superior Roman war machine as irregular combatants using irregular, “asymmetric” tactics. The second example concerns the Western coalition troops after the Second Gulf War (1990–1991), who had made their presence felt in the Saudi peninsula – “the land of the two Holy Places” (Medina and Mecca) – and in due course became subject to attack by radical Islamist forces, for instance at Al-Khobar in 1998.³⁴

33 For one of the better essays on the development and use of terrorism throughout the ages, cf. Wheeler, “Terrorism and Military Theory: An Historical Perspective.” The Maktab al-Khidamat has been described by a former member of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations as “a holy-war clearinghouse for several thousand ragtag Arab volunteers in the Soviet-Afghan War...” Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Gospel According to Osama Bin Laden,” *The Atlantic Monthly Online*, (January 2002), p. 1. The article can be found in the January 2002 issue of the online version at <http://www.theatlantic.com>.

34 To be more precise, bin Laden clearly states that it is “the inability of the [Saudi] regime to protect the country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah, the American Crusader forces, to occupy the land for the longest of years,” which constitutes a core grievance against the West. Usama bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” (23 August 1996), p. 3. The full document is available at [http://www.meij.or.jp/new/Osama bin Laden/jihad1.htm](http://www.meij.or.jp/new/Osama%20bin%20Laden/jihad1.htm). For the Zealots, cf. Flavius Josephus, transl. by G.A. Williamson, *The Jewish War*, (New York: Viking Press, 1984).

Neither case is illustrative of a PVM motive that is in any manner diffuse or new. Nor, for that matter, does Usama bin Laden's religio-irredentist objective of resurrecting the splendor of the Caliphate of the 7th and 8th centuries, including the reestablishment of its geographic boundaries, in place of the present regimes in the Arab world exactly serve for an illustrative example of a *revolutionary* enterprise.³⁵ Judged by any standard, Bin Laden's vision of the future is *reactionary* to an extent that is rare indeed.

By extension, it could be argued that Islamism merely seeks to succeed at an undertaking in the present (i.e. uniting Islam) in pursuit of conservative ideals, at which Pan-Arabism has demonstrably failed in the past for revolutionary ideals (i.e. uniting the Arab world and freeing it from Western dominance). The point is that ideologies employed to mobilize social forces in each of these two cases might differ (religious radicalism, as opposed to secular nationalism), but the mechanism underlying both historical processes – the structural component, as it were – is essentially the same, and therefore not unprecedented. The purpose of the exercise in both cases is to rally the people around the flag by violently proposing a new social or political order by means of sabotaging and impugning the old system; and to evoke the magnificence of a bygone golden age as an emotive harbinger of a desired near future.

Conflicts of a bewildering variety have at some stage in their development followed this template in the course of human history. But to also give an example of an increasingly probable new motive, not only for PVMs, but also for other actors in international politics, we may want to imagine the opening stages in an unfolding future drama, at the heart of which will be the long-term risks of *absolute* resource depletion.³⁶ In its entire history, the human race has never

35 Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam, *Usama bin Laden's Al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network*, (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001), p. 2.

36 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 166–167.

had to face planetary overpopulation or resource scarcity equally affecting all parts of the globe as an existential threat.

That the goals of the “New Terrorists” are not as diffuse as they are made out to be can even be seen in instances of extreme motive. For example, in the case of apocalyptic cults with a predilection for terrorist tactics, it is possible to identify not only the motive but also the objective. If the stated motive and/or the objective of a PVM happen to be to end the world as we know it, the trick is not to get sidetracked by debating the sanity of such a position and plan, but to take it seriously and make it part of the strategic deliberations on counter-terrorist measures. This understanding is vital if the means by which such a group attempts to bring about the end of days involve ABC weapons. Today, the destruction of the world, or large parts of it, by substate actors for whatever reason is no longer the exclusive preserve of science fiction; it has become an international security political risk that will stop at no door.

Millenarian fanatics, eschatological sects and other kinds of apocalyptical movements have been around for a long time. Their frame of reference is very different from the mainstream perception of reality, indeed. But to believe that this makes them any less rational and calculating in pursuit of their goals, or determined to realize their objective, is a grave mistake. The history of the past thirty-odd years bears this out and requires no further explanation. While they certainly do not abound, there have been precedents for such events including attempted, but largely foiled or otherwise unsuccessful, mass casualty attacks by apocalyptic (and in the United States also by right-wing) groups.³⁷

37 Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 60–68. Paul de Armond, “Right Wing Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Motives, Strategies and Movements,” in Brad Roberts, ed., *Hype or Reality? The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks*, (Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 49–68.

Second, the proposition that the “New Terrorist” groups are organized along innovative lines cannot be upheld in the face of a past record that flatly contradicts it. Even the role model of the “New Terrorist” organizations, the operationally decentralized cell structure with its independent commands that has been successfully applied in the shape of Active Service Units (ASUs) by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) against the British armed forces and intelligence services in the past three decades is still predicated upon the principle of a traditional hierarchical military chain of command.³⁸ Louis Beam’s idea of “leaderless resistance” as an organizing principle of PVMs might indeed apply to exceptions to the rule – as has been apprehended by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in relation to right-wing and religious Christian fundamentalist groups in the United States –, but it certainly does not apply to an alliance system of PVMs based on a culturally ingrained pecking order originating in a quintessentially hierarchic Islamic creed, such as al-Qaida.³⁹

As David Tucker has shown, the “striking thing about the networked structure of the new terrorism is that it differs little from the structure of the old terrorism,” and goes on to cite the well-known example of the PLO, the exemplar of a terrorist umbrella organization, if there ever was one, drawing together a multiplicity of Palestinian secular political movements and their respective military wings.⁴⁰ More generally, terrorist alliance systems in the shape of stable and ephemeral marriages of convenience, instrumental and ideological coalitions, umbrella organization and other forms of organizational superstructures are not at all new to PVMs.

38 John Bowyer Bell, *IRA Tactics & Targets*, (Swords, Co. Dublin: Poolbeg, 1993), pp. 11–17; *Ibid.*, *The IRA 1968–2000. Analysis of a Secret Army*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 126–147.

39 Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” *The Seditonist* 12 (February 1992), available at www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.html.

40 David Tucker, “What is New About the New Terrorism,” pp. 3–4.

One cluster of terrorist organizations, featuring complex, conflictive, hierarchical and decentralized interrelationships, and which has been active in the greater Middle East since the early 1980s, may here serve as a contemporaneous example; it is here proposed as an alternative to the lurid conception of the ostensibly novel “global terrorist network.” According to the intelligence sources that are largely in line with a historically recurring terrorist alliance-thesis, it is the Islamic Republic of Iran (specifically its secret services MOIS/VEVAK, the successor to the Shah’s dreaded SAVAK, and the elite Jerusalem Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the Pasdaran) that is expanding its managerial and leadership role in the coordination of PVMs in the greater Middle East.

Through the good offices of Imad Fayez Mugniyah, whose occupation is that of Hezbollah’s director of foreign operations, the Iran connection links al-Qaida to the Shiite militia organization Hezbollah, and – in an unholy coalition – to the predominantly Sunni Palestinian group Harakat al-Muqwananah al-Islamiyya (HAMAS), Jihad al Islami, and the Sunni radical group Usbat al Ansar (“Federation of Partisans”) operating in southern Lebanon. The alliance of PVMs supported by Iran has also gained notoriety as an accessory to the smuggling of military contraband on behalf of Yassir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) aboard the freighter *Karine-A* in the Red Sea of January 2002.⁴¹

41 Yoni Figchel and Yael Shahr, “The Al-Qaida-Hizballah Connection,” available at www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDET.cfm?articleid+425; Rolf Tophoven, “Iran koordiniert offenbar Terrorkoalition in Nahost,” *Die Welt*, (25 March 2002); *Ibid.*,”Im Libanon formiert sich die Al Qaida neu,” *Die Welt*, 1 February 2002; *Ibid.*,”Geheimdienste: Teheran bildet Palästinenser an Raketen aus,” *Die Welt*, (28 February 2002); Isabel Kershner,”The Changing Colors of Imad Mughniyah,” *The Jerusalem Report Magazine*, (25 March 2002), available at www.jrep.com/Mideast/Article-2.html. Rolf Tophoven,”Mann ohne Gesicht: Topterrorist Imad Fayez Mugniyah,” *Die Welt*, (9 September 2002). The following article is tendentious, but interesting: Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Lebanese Madman Leaves Trail of Terror,” available at <http://www.vfw.org/magazine/apr02/hezbollah.htm>.

An alliance of sub-state actors employing terrorist tactics, supported by a state-sponsor and operating out of a defined region is a far cry from the aggressively promoted image of a global conspiratorial network, such as al-Qaida. But at least it exists. Conversely, even if Al-Qaida encompasses the occidental and oriental civilizations in terms of its documented operational reach, this at best makes it a “trans-regional terrorist network” in Southeast and Central Asia, the Mediterranean including North Africa, the greater Middle East, Western Europe and the US. And that is still a long way from being an organization that is active on a truly global scale, which, in turn, indicates that the net of its deployable operatives does not (yet) span the globe.

Third, if there are indeed substantive differences between the older kind of terrorism and the “New Terrorism,” as it has been described by its proponents, they are, if anything, not qualitative, but quantitative – with exclusive reference to the dimensions of an attack and its consequences. The ability to inflict greater casualties by deploying ABC weapons can be understood as constituting a quality all by itself, but, again, the point is that this is not a new phenomenon in the history of armed conflict; only the potential scale of the destructivity of modern ABC weaponry in the hands of PVMs itself is truly unprecedented. For example, the conscious deployment of biological weapons, resulting in mass casualties has precedents in the later Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Early Modern period in Europe and the Americas.⁴²

Admittedly, in the centuries prior to the twentieth century the efficiency of non-conventional warfare and weapons, such as the premeditated spread of endemic pathogens was, to cite only one example, nowhere close to the ghastly death toll exacted by mustard

42 Mark Wheelis, “Biological Warfare Before 1914,” in Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., *Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945*, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 8–34.

gas in the course of the First World War. But in essence crudely weaponized pathogens did exist in the past and they were applied by a variety of actors. The “political terrorists” of the 1970s and 1980s prevalent in the Western world were also sensitized toward the potential uses of non-conventional weapons; those having shown an interest in chemical and biological weapons include a staggering variety of PVMs, from the Weather Underground, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) to the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA).⁴³

Therefore, the threat of “loose nukes,” and that posed by other poorly protected non-weaponized, but weapons-grade nuclear materials has been *exacerbated and not initiated* by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Equally, more recent apprehensions about the deployment of radiological bombs can be traced to the growing awareness of states and, hence, substate actors of the crude weapons-potential inherent in low-enriched uranium and spent fuel, and to the knowledge of how inadequately such materials are currently protected against theft.⁴⁴

What does set the PVMs of the 21st century apart from their predecessors, I will argue, is not the threatened, or even the effective, use of ABC warfare agents. Instead, it is the scale and, more

43 Jonathan B. Tucker, introduction to Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., *Toxic Terror. Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 1. For the individual groups cited in the text see the pertinent essays in this volume; Kenneth Alibek, “Testimony of Dr. Kenneth Alibek,” available at www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/00-05-23alibek.htm, p. 2.

44 Stern, *Ultimate Terrorists*, 98; Robert W. Ahrens, “No One Knows How Much Nuclear Material is Missing Around the World,” *USA Today*, 27 February 2003, p. 1A et seq.; Log In Productions, “Nuclear Nightmares for Sale – History,” available at www.logtv.com/tv/nuclear1.htm; Mansoor Ijaz and R. James Woolsey, “How Secure is Pakistan’s Plutonium?” 28 November, 2001 available at www.house.gov/markey/iss_nuclear_taskforce_ed011128.htm; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs,” available at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

critically, the *scalability*, of conventional and unconventional mass destruction and disruption by PVMs, and how this threatened or actual use of it *translates into psychological leverage*. Put differently, and rather more pertinent to our present times, the combination of, on the one hand, the technology to inflict mass casualties measured in the hundreds of thousands, or even in the millions, and, on the other, the increasing likelihood of the acquisition of the means to bring about such a massive destruction of life by sub-state actors, constitutes the only evident innovative aspect in the development of contemporary terrorism.

This last point is especially relevant when juxtaposed with the often-repeated assertion that the objectives of the “New Terrorists” are less clearly delineated than those pursued by their predecessors. Flatly contradictory to such a view, the desire and the will to hasten the coming of Armageddon exhibited by some millenarian cults (e.g. Aum) in the age of ABC weapons proliferation has in the course of the 1990s been transformed into a very concrete course of action in pursuit of a final objective: It therefore represents an immediate threat.⁴⁵ Ultimately, the means and ends of even the most radical PVMs are as clear today as was the case some twenty years ago. But today’s PVMs are even more dangerous than their antecedents, precisely because they have *not* changed their values in relevant ways, i.e. their outlook, their motives and their interpretation of their religious, political and social environments.

If we accept the proposed criticism made so far vis-à-vis the conception of the “New Terrorism,” it may at the first glance appear as if only the perpetrators’ “tools of the trade” have undergone change – their arsenal having grown from automatic rifles, explosives and grenades to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also conventional heavy military-grade equipment –, but not

45 Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “The Terror,” *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 4, (Winter 2001–02), pp. 5–18, p. 5. An interesting case is made by Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, pp. 274–275. Also see Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 94–95, 208.

the terrorists themselves.⁴⁶ Admittedly, in some instances, terrorist target selection has become bolder in the last few years, as was evidenced by the incidents of 11 September 2001; in other cases, their objectives have become more ambitious, such as the acceleration of Armageddon. Simultaneously, this can be at least partially explained by the circumstance that the potential to inflict a higher quantity of casualties also gives them more leverage to realize their respective demands, or to achieve their objectives in the face of, and despite, overwhelming incumbent military superiority, as exemplified by the US' conventional military forces.

Hence, it is a potentially costly misconception to assume that PVMs themselves are fundamentally changed, that they have substantially revised their psychological make-up and reshaped their motivational landscape; or even to question that they do remain organized in groups, albeit more or less immediately subject to central control, and all of this because of accessibility of ABC weapons following the end of the Cold War and the recrudescence of religious fervor after 1979. This analysis holds true, if only because the PVMs of our own day and age remain subject to the restraints imposed by the bounds of their own rationality, whatever they may be. That a rational system of thought, including highly idiosyncratic, radical variants thereof, is also subject to change over time is not disputed here, nor is it denied that PVM decision-making processes and factors did very likely undergo some change under the impact of the exacerbation of ABC weapons proliferation.

Conversely, PVMs are indubitably products of their own environment. It follows that they are not alien to the reality we share with them and that their reasoning is therefore also not beyond comprehension. The PVM perception of reality represents a valu-

46 The exclusion of scalable weapons of mass disruption, such as electronic attacks on computer networks, various types of information operations and high-energy pulse, blast, or focal weapons, is intentional.

able inferential basis for actor-centered analysis.⁴⁷ While calling terrorists and their organizations “new” or irrational will not make them go away or attenuate the threat they represent, the challenge rests in second-guessing them on their own intellectual turf. This is a feasible course of action, but only if we commit resources to qualitative research with a view to achieve some measure of understanding of what makes them “tick” – of investigating what Martha Crenshaw referred to as an “autonomous logic that is comprehensible, however unconventional.”⁴⁸ And if PVMs’ motives, objectives and *modi operandi* can be fathomed, then they can be defeated.

In the light of the centuries-old historical record covering both insurgent and incumbent use of terrorist tactics, the distinction between the older terrorism and the “New Terrorism” is artificial at best, and the conception itself tautological and probably quite otiose. On the one hand, this is because the differentiation it seeks to create is a matter of perspective and in some cases, as has been pointed out previously, may serve as a definitional “Trojan Horse” to an instrumental set of values advocated by insurgents or incumbents. It is therefore potentially interest-driven, and hence not beyond suspicion. On the other hand, if we scrutinize some of the key arguments quoted in support of the “New Terrorist” thesis, i.e. the absence of clearly identifiable groups among new actors on the international stage of terrorism, unclear or new motives, diffuse objectives and a high frequency of greater lethality in recent attacks, then the attempted delineation from earlier variants of

47 Laila Bokhari, Magnus Norell, and Doron Zimmermann, “Actor-Centered Analysis and Profiling in Terrorism Research: Challenges, Methods and Possibilities,” unpublished slide presentation presented on the occasion of the *5th International Security Forum*, Zurich, 14–16 October 2002.

48 Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” 410; Jean-Francois Meyer, “Cults, Violence and Religious Terrorism: An International Perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 24, (2001), pp. 361–376, p. 372.

terrorism is also not convincing in terms of the evidential basis provided in support thereof.⁴⁹

Aside from its evocative force, the “New Terrorism” concept does not offer an added value to the way we think about terrorism. Moreover, the circumstances that gave rise to the concept are problematic. The issue of vested interests as a driving force behind the propositioning of the “New Terrorism” has also been addressed by the late Ehud Sprinzak, who bluntly contended that “the threat of superterrorism is likely to make a few defense contractors very rich and a larger number of specialists moderately rich as well as famous.” To Sprinzak, “the debate [on the “New Terrorism”] boils down to money.”⁵⁰

49 David Tucker is a strident critic of the lethality-proposition. David Tucker, “What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?,” pp. 3–9. For another proponent of the differential criteria of a new kind of terrorism, cf. Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Ian O. Lesser, et al., *Countering the New Terrorism*, pp. 7–38, pp. 8–10; and Bruce Hoffman, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (November-December 2001), pp. 417–428; Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” pp. 411, 415.

50 Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1998), pp. 6, 7. I used a version of this article available at www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m1181/1998_Fall/56021078/print.jhtml