Observations on Local Insurgents and Foreign Fighters in Iraq: an Interview with Mark Edmond Clark

Mark Edmond Clark
Interviewed by Columbia International Affairs Online
Columbia International Affairs Online
May 2005

 

CIAO: There has been considerable discussion lately among analysts of U.S. foreign policy on the insurgency in Iraq. Although you have not dealt with the local insurgents or foreign fighters operating in Iraq, previously you managed to observe up close the preparations made by Serbian nationalist groups in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by Yugoslav military, security services, and Serbian nationalist paramilitary groups in the Kosovo-Metohija province of Serbia for long-term insurgencies against the U.S. and NATO. Using that expertise, and your knowledge of events in Iraq, could you share some thoughts on the insurgency in Iraq?

Mark Clark: To some degree, I am familiar with how leaders of modern day insurgencies plan in advance to operate on their own home ground against a high-tech, highly-mobile military force with the firepower and capabilities of the U.S. military. In discussing the matter, I will try to get beyond the usual analysis of what is happening in Iraq as something along the lines of the classic, Maoist type insurgency, although I keep such tactics in mind. As in the Balkans, it appears the Iraqi insurgency's main concept is to utilize the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures of guerilla warfare. I believe the manner in which leaders of insurgent cells of local fighters keep their men fighting in spite of high losses, and the tremendous combat power brought to bear on them by U.S. and coalition forces, requires real consideration.

The leaders of the local insurgent cells may themselves be former Iraqi military commanders, security service officers, and Baathist paramilitary officials and are motivated and dedicated to the fight by nationalism, the Baathist political ideology, and hatred of the U.S. and coalition forces and civilian personnel in their country. However, the fighters, in the many insurgent cells that they lead, are not all former military and security service professionals. They are mostly ordinary Iraqi citizens, likely possessing some prior military service. They are not driven to fight by all of the same nationalist and political causes of their leaders. Thus, the leaders' approach to managing the insurgent fighters is not only tactical, but includes a significant focus on the human elements. The local insurgent fighter in these situations is not simply viewed by his leaders as one fighter among a guerilla force of many. He is likely recognized as a "freedom fighter" by his leaders, his family, and, he hopes, by his community. The fighter believes in what he or she is doing. These elements are at the center of the insurgent's willingness to fight and very likely die for the cause. Leaders must ensure that the fighters' emotional linkage to their families, communities, their society, and their state is not broken. Indeed, great care and concern must be given to the human element of the fight.

Just as the bombings in Belgrade and other cities and towns throughout Yugoslavia during Operation ALLIED FORCE motivated and dedicated Serbian civilians to join the paramilitary units and to get into a fight with NATO forces, early morning raids of homes in the insurgents' communities, imprisonment of Iraqis without probable cause or due process, and abuses of Iraqis in detention centers like Abu Ghraib and in the street of their towns, contributes to the insurgent fighters' sense of purpose, anger, and anguish. The extremist Islamic views driving foreign fighters, jihadists, and their leaders in Iraq is a different matter, well-covered in analyses on political violence.

CIAO: Attacks against coalition military and Iraqi military and security services have intensified lately (approximately fifty-five per day). A volatile mix of tactics has been used, from guerrilla style hit and run attacks, attempts to secure towns and territory through fighting, and more recently somewhat conventional force-on-force attacks. How do you account for this varied pattern?

MC: I do not believe that there is a single cohesive logic for the insurgents' approach. Among other very experienced hands at counter-insurgency, as Col. Walter P. Lang (USA, Ret.), former head of Middle East Affairs at the Defense Intelligence Agency thinks "the insurgents are developing a strategy to see how far they can ratchet up the size of their forces before [U.S.] airpower vanquishes them." Rather, I agree with those who explain that the U.S. has too much firepower for the insurgents and foreign fighters to attempt to take it head on. The insurgents undoubtedly recognize this and would never adopt force on force engagements as a single new approach.

Indeed, the present day U.S. military possesses firepower and uses tactics, techniques, and procedures that would obviate many of the advantages that even the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army had in Vietnam. U.S. forces could easily devastate insurgent cells in engagements, the result of which would be an unsustainable attrition rate of their numbers and materiel and the rapid end to their effectiveness. The insurgents would hardly be able to mass for attacks and never escape the hot pursuit of U.S. forces. The use of force-on-force tactics would also require insurgent leaders to develop larger numbers of fighters and provide them with more complex training to implement operational plans. Security would also be an issue for large-scale operations would require a greater number of insurgent leaders to coordinate and know overall plans. Successful efforts conducted by coalition forces to capture insurgency leaders and plans would yield most of the information needed to identify and destroy the insurgents at their gathering points and command centers. Without leadership, the insurgents would lose their effectiveness and their struggle would be stifled.

Having stated that, please also consider the following. In military operations, there is an action-reaction cycle. In that cycle each commander attempts to act in a manner which would disrupt an opposing commander's plan of action and cause that commander to act in a manner that is not in his or her interest.

In Iraq, U.S. and coalition military forces, local insurgents, and the foreign fighters have their own plans of action. The insurgents and foreign fighters will not easily allow their plans to be disrupted or allow themselves to be diverted by the U.S. and coalition military.

Clearly, U.S. forces themselves, have shifted their tactics in response to the resistance of the insurgents and foreign fighters and political concern over a possible backlash from the U.S. public over rising numbers of U.S. casualties. Patrol activity, which initially was a major part of security and stability operations, has been reduced due to concerns over force protection. U.S. troops now spend a greater amount of time in base camps, which in Iraq, due to insurgent mortaring, is not a completely risk adverse decision.

The insurgents may have discovered themselves to be "victims" of their own success: It may very well be that some actions taken by the insurgents, particularly their recent, more conventional, force-on-force attacks, may be designed to convince senior U.S. policy makers and coalition military leaders that they may be better able to engage the insurgents and that the troops should move out of their base camps and again engage in heavy patrol activity. That would allow for a new, perhaps more intense set of improvised explosive device attacks, car bombings, suicide bombings and other attacks by the insurgent and foreign fighters with the goal to increase U.S. casualties. The insurgents need more targets. They want to get at U.S. troops any way that they can.

Please also note that the use of such tactics by the insurgents has been made possible because in Iraq, the U.S. has fought in a limited fashion. This is especially true when one considers that the requirements set for current troop levels are still far lower than those recommended by several senior military leaders following their initial assessments of what would be needed to succeed. Whenever the U.S. fights in a limited fashion, it tends to cut itself down to a size that allows its opponent to find some advantages and raise U.S. costs. Those were, in part, the cases in both Korea and Vietnam.

CIAO: Do you think that the April 2nd attack on Abu Ghraib was a diversionary tactic designed to cause U.S. policy-makers and military commanders to believe a more conventional force-on-force conflict was developing, thereby putting pressure on U.S. forces to leave their base camps to engage in large scale security and stability operations in Iraq?

MC: I sense that there were at least three likely causes for the attack.

First, it may have very well been an attempt to divert U.S. policy makers and military commanders to bring their forces out of their base camps. As I stated before, the insurgents and foreign fighters want more U.S. targets to be made available to them.

Second, I will not adamantly refute the ideas of experts such as Col. Lang. It just might have been the test of a new concept for the operations of the insurgents and foreign fighters. Consider that in spite of the low likelihood of achieving any real success using the tactic, the choice to use it may very well have been a manifestation of the leaders' and fighters' decision making mechanism. Indeed, leaders and planners against the operation, recognizing its potential costs in terms of men and materiel, may have reached some compromise position that supported it in exchange for their future support on other plans and ideas. Insurgent cells usually learn that they must work together and even compromise or their efforts become fragmented and they become subject to destruction in a piece-meal fashion by their larger opponents.

Third, perhaps the attack did serve some propaganda purpose. Many analysts have asserted that the insurgents may have wanted to be seen as forcefully attacking at the heart of the source of one of the ill of the occupation which has been atrocities committed upon Iraqis by the U.S. as a result of controversial interrogation activity. However, I do not subscribe to this particular position. One attack of this type or even a handful of them (Abu Ghraib has been placed under fire before.) would not be enough to create a new picture of the local insurgents' and foreign fighters' activities among many ordinary Iraqis who themselves have suffered from their improvised explosive devices, car bombs, and suicide bombings.

If anything, the attack may have better served some "global recruitment" purpose for the foreign fighters. My own sources in the Balkans, for example, have informed me that Al Qaeda operatives have been very active in Central Bosnia and Southern Montenegro, attempting to recruit Muslim veterans of the Bosnia War and the fight in Kosovo, particularly former unit commanders who may even have had training and service in the Yugoslav People's Army, to become mujahedeen for the jihad in Iraq. Muslims in the Balkans would be logical targets for recruitment. The Muslims remember well how the mujahedeen from many Islamic countries came to their aid to fight nationalist Serbian and Croatian forces in Bosnia and the Yugoslav military and security services, and Serbian nationalist paramilitaries in Kosovo.

Of course, the name Abu Ghraib alone can still strike an emotional cord among Muslim men everywhere who, through the media, observed how "innocent" Muslim civilians were dehumanized by U.S. forces, and leading them to accept that the Iraqis need this help in their struggle. Yet, I sense that prospective recruits from other parts of the world have been quite reluctant to serve in a jihad and within a force that uses suicide bombers and car bombs against Iraqi civilians. That would not appeal to the best of them to be the right way to defend Islam against the "Western infidels." Prospective recruits would more favorably view the idea of fighting in a force that would stage the type of conventional force on force attacks at Abu Ghraib against the U.S. and coalition forces using tactics similar to those in which they were trained and had used in combat. They would be able to see clearly how they could use their capabilities to support and enhance the insurgents' struggle. From this perspective, it becomes more evident how the April 2nd attack on Abu Ghraib conceivably could have been conducted to paint a new picture of the insurgency and make their effort more palatable for them.

CIAO: Those questions concerned the intensification of fighting. How do you account for the lull in fighting that occurred from January to March?

MC: The president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Leslie Gelb, has offered many observations on Iraq following his visit there in April. In an interview, he stated "One of the main conclusions I came away with from the trip was that we hardly know what is going on." He further explained, "the people I spoke with there, in the U.S. embassy, and Iraqis, they couldn't figure out why there has been a lull in violence for the past few months, and then an eruption, what was going on with the various insurgent cells, and when it would end, or why it would end. They were guessing, too."

Some likely reasons for the break in fighting do exist:

First, the Iraqi insurgents have proven very elusive and determined. We must be honest. They have fought very hard against a vastly superior force. They have managed to disrupt and delay coalition plans for the social, economic, and political development of Iraq. However, the insurgents are also people. These Iraqis also need to enjoy the very family and social lives which they feel they are defending by attempting to push out the U.S. and coalition military forces. Please recall what I mentioned earlier about the importance for insurgent leaders to prevent any break of their fighters' emotional linkage to their families, communities, their society, and their state. Further, note that in their families' lives, few times are more important than the time of preparation and celebration of holy holidays and the Sunni and Shiite Muslim New Year's days which occurred from February to March.

Second, successes in U.S. intelligence gathering and the discovery of where many cells have been assembling as well as efforts by ordinary Iraqis to turn them in have hurt their effort. In spite of their anger toward the U.S. and its coalition partners for failing to provide security, stability, and services, there is also hatred toward the insurgents and foreign fighters over what they have done to ordinary Iraqis with their improvised explosive devices, car bombs, and suicide bombings. Allowing the insurgent fighters to spend more time in their communities creates opportunities for them to interact with their families, neighbors and friends on a non-operational level. The fighters can again be seen as part of their communities.

Third, a break allowed the leaders of the insurgents and foreign fighters to take inventory of their respective cells and assess their successes and failures in their struggle. They could consider the strengths and weaknesses in their opponent's operations, and consider any new approaches that they would take in the "new season" after the New Year.

In 2004, they fought through the holiday season. Yet, the leaders of the local insurgent cells and foreign fighters were focused more on Fallujah and other hot spots in Al Anbar Province as well as Najaf and other hot spots in Diyala Province. They had drawn the attention and considerable resources of U.S. and coalition forces to those areas and likely wanted to continue operations in an effort to exploit any possible advantages achieving that may have created.

CIAO: It has been alleged that Iraqi organized crime groups have acted to support the insurgents and foreign fighters. Why would they feel compelled to work with groups that are trying to destabilize society, thereby muddying the waters for their illicit operations?

MC: In the August 2003 update of Columbia International Affairs Online we discussed the prospects for Iraqi organized crime groups. In keeping with my comments then, it would seem Iraqi organized crime has gone through a period of transition. During Saddam Hussein's regime, organized crime groups worked alongside the military, state security, intelligence, and the Baath Party and brought goods from outside Iraq in spite of sanctions, and provided services to Iraqis the government could not or would not provide. Once Saddam's regime ended, organized crime groups had to establish a new dynamic for survival. Certainly, they would attempt to create linkages with the new government beyond the view of the international community. However, much worse, the newest consumers of the goods and services that the organized crime groups could provide are the insurgent cells and foreign fighters.

Interestingly enough, organized crime groups, through their interaction with the insurgents and foreign fighters, could easily cross intercommunal lines in Iraq. Shiite gangs could support Sunni insurgents, and Sunni gangs could provide services to Shiite fighters. It could be said that through their activity, they have "positively" influenced intercommunal relations in Iraq. However, their actions do not qualify them as engines for positive change in Iraq or positive models of any type for the society. Their goal is to create large profits for themselves. No consideration would ever be made for the good of the society by them. In the Balkans, at the height of the fighting in the Bosnia War, as well as afterward, Serb, Croat, and Muslim organized crime groups cooperated across battle lines and later across the Inter-entity Boundary Lines in support of their illicit activities.

CIAO: Do you believe that organized crime groups, though it would be anathema to society, could be utilized to help stop insurgent attacks and help drive foreign fighters from Iraq?

MC: Organized crime groups, no matter how deadly they might be, tend to respect the capabilities of the insurgents and foreign fighters. The insurgents and foreign fighters could easily retaliate against them with car bombs or suicide bombers on martyrdom operations. They are driven by their faith and their belief in their movement. Whereas organized crime groups might negotiate out a dispute when reasonable force is not an option, the insurgents and foreign fighters might be willing to sacrifice their lives as part of an act of retaliation or a means to settle a dispute. The reason for this is that no matter how deadly the organized crime groups themselves might be, they would prefer to live to enjoy the goods they have secured. As individuals, members of organized crime groups would prefer to be viewed as survivors, not martyrs.

Organized crime groups would be nearly helpless against the insurgents and foreign fighters in a power struggle. When one considers this issue, it become clear that car bomb and suicide bomber attacks against military and police recruits, and business and religious centers have had a sound educational effect on organized crime groups. Their members would not like to have the insurgents or the foreign fighters attack them personally or attack their interests in this manner. These acts help to establish boundaries between the fighters and the criminals.

This is really critical to understanding the status of organized crime in Iraq. If there is one service that organized crime groups worldwide claim to be able to provide in societies it is protection. Organized crime groups in Iraq are currently viewed among Iraqis as being unable to protect their own communities. It would be interesting to more fully consider what this portends for the future of Iraqi society.

CIAO: It has been noted that U.S. military officers have had some difficulty in gaining the confidence of Iraqi military and law enforcement officers. Often the Iraqis fall prey to corruption and coercion to the extent that they have turned and supported the insurgents and foreign fighters. How would you suggest they deal with this problem?

MC: When a U.S. military officer who has worked with Iraqi military or law enforcement commander discovers, perhaps through tactical intelligence, that his Iraqi counterpart has "turned," it is probably emotionally devastating to the officer. Yet, painful as it may be, in spite of the best efforts of U.S. military officers to train and equip and gain the confidence of Iraqi military and law enforcement officers these difficulties must be expected given the environment in which they work and in which the Iraqis live.

Some of the U.S. trained Iraqis commanders, might very well have unilaterally decided, for whatever reason (profit or animus toward the U.S. and coalition forces would likely be the most common), to turn and support the insurgents and foreign fighters. In such cases, the likely cause would be a failure to gain the confidence of the Iraqis. However, a decision by an Iraqi commander, who has worked well with U.S. and coalition forces to provide support for the insurgents and foreign fighters in the form of information or material support, would more likely be the result of coercion through threats of violence against the Iraqis and their families.

Given the unique circumstances of their work in Iraq, U.S. military officers must accept that when such a problem occurs it should not be recognized as a failure, but rather the creation of an opportunity to be exploited. Once the turned Iraqis have been identified by intelligence they could be intercepted by providing them with evidence that U.S. forces are aware of their activity. U.S. military officers could work in coordination with U.S. intelligence services or law enforcement organizations could take over by neutralizing the Iraqi as an operative of the insurgents and foreign fighters, and recruit the Iraqi to serve as a counter-espionage or double agent for the U.S. The Iraqi would from then on, while serving in his military or law enforcement position, be handled by U.S. intelligence services or law enforcement in a manner that would allow for penetration and eventual destruction of the group of insurgents or foreign fighters with which the Iraqi is in contact.

Perhaps I should explain what that might entail. For example, U.S. intelligence services or law enforcement could allow the Iraqi to maintain contact, place him under surveillance, and observe the insurgents and foreign fighters with whom he meets with the goal of identifying them for capture. If the Iraqi is providing equipment acquired from the U.S., such as small arms and protective vests, to the insurgents and foreign fighters, he could be provided with similar equipment but with serious concealed defects to hand over them or could be provided with equipment possessing some type of "transponder" or other device that would allow the U.S. to track their movements.

CIAO: What do you make of reports that U.S. military officers have communicated with insurgent groups to effect stability in their areas of responsibility?

MC: I think the decision to make contact with the insurgents was a brilliant one. A very capable U.S. commander, Col. Dana J.H. Pittard, of the 3rd Brigade of the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division, initially recruited 41 for Saddam Hussein loyalists as advisors and encouraged them to stay in contact with the insurgents. He managed to create a line of communication with the insurgent cells in his unit's area of responsibility. Col. Pittard sought and found a balance between lethal and non-lethal action. His approach was unorthodox, but allowed for success. I understand that the effort was halted by USCENTCOM. I suppose it was not politically feasible for Gen. John Abizaid to allow his troops to communicate with the insurgents given the attitudes of U.S. policy makers on the issue of negotiating with "terrorists." When you think about it, to some degree, the initiative placed a human face on the insurgency.

It is really hard to say what might have come of that initiative. I understand that it achieved some real results. I would like to believe that in terms of the long-term effort against the insurgency, something positive would have resulted. On the other hand, the Iraqi officials that Col. Pittard worked with came from a morally bankrupt system, with networks between organized crime and government similar to those in the Balkans. That system allowed those Iraqis to create profits and protect their interests. It would not be difficult to imagine those Iraqis, coming from such a system, while supposedly helping Col. Pittard, would not opportunistically attempt to develop new or support old illicit interests. I could see why some might find it difficult to accept that they started behaving differently solely to satisfy a U.S. Army officer.

CIAO: Do you think the U.S. could pull out a significant portion of its forces from Iraq in the near future without destabilizing the situation? What would be the likely result of a withdrawal of forces?

MC: It has been reported that the Pentagon, under political pressure from policy makers in the Administration, could pull as many as one-third of its 142,000 troops from Iraq within the next year. I can think of a few likely positive results of an early withdrawal. None are positive with regard to the overall U.S. effort. Indeed, the withdrawal of those forces would have a dramatically negative effect on the entire Iraq campaign.

To begin, there would be less of a chance that the goals set by the U.S. of defeating the insurgents and foreign fighters would be met. It is likely the U.S. forces would begin to "tread water" in Iraq and efforts to create security and stability there would be degraded. Iraqi forces, replacing U.S. forces in the field, would probably suffer far higher losses in their engagements with the insurgents for they are considerably less qualified than U.S. troops. With less U.S. firepower immediately available on the ground, there would be a great reduction in the ability of the U.S. to support Iraqi forces. There would be a reduction in the ability of the U.S. forces themselves to respond to insurgent attacks against foreign and Iraqi civilian targets such as embassies, humanitarian aid organizations and NGOs, and infrastructure facilities.

As for the insurgents, they would likely view the withdrawal as recognition of the unwillingness or inability of the U.S. to sustain its efforts in Iraq and a manifestation of the frustration their efforts have caused U.S. policy makers and military commanders. It would give them a psychological advantage. Indeed, the insurgents and foreign fighters would very likely go as far as to view the withdrawal as a victory and intensify their respective recruiting efforts in Iraq and globally for the Iraq fight. Additionally, they would likely intensify the fighting. The insurgents and foreign fighters would certainly feel far more confident fighting the Iraqis than the U.S. forces.

CIAO: Without getting into too much detail on parties and personalities, what conditions do you believe would need to be created in Iraq to weaken the base of support for the insurgents and foreign fighters and truly bring the Iraqi people to support the efforts of their elected government and the coalition to rebuild their nation?

MC: Answering that question requires me to shift gears. Let us look at the situation on the ground.

There is a correlation between the future of the insurgency and the quality of life in the society. In Iraq, a considerable framework for governance has been successfully developed, with written instruments and representative government institutions, and government regulatory organs which, while still under development, have established a pathway toward the ethnically integrated state. Democratization efforts such as elections apparently have great meaning for average citizens of Iraq. However the January 30th elections, endorsed by the international community, may very well have only placed political leaders in power as bosses in the society who may very well prove unwilling to act without pressure from the international community. Political leaders and political parties must prove themselves able to provide appropriate governance, by utilizing the authority bestowed to them by the people. Indeed, success in developing a multiethnic, integrated, kind of Western-style democracy in Iraq will rely upon the ability of the international community to help the Iraqis put their state in a condition in which its people will be ready to accept democracy. The existing political framework at the national, municipal, and local levels of government must be maintained for eventual use by capable, democratically minded political leaders in the future.

The first step in putting the development process on the right track is instilling among the people a real understanding of government for the people, by the people, based on the rule of law. Political leaders must be viewed as their representatives and not as their bosses. Representative government in a democracy does not entail government control of the state through a nationalist-authoritarian system. Political leaders, who sit atop systems that use nationalist symbols and statements, stand reluctant to move toward reconciliation, engage in corrupt practices, allow a substantial gray economy to exist, and are unlikely to support efforts to help the people understand the principles of democracy. People in Iraq, with few opportunities to develop a future, remain dependent on such political leaders, mainly through some form of patronage for gains such as employment, sufficient salaries, housing, health care, pension payments, and other basics of normal societies. The international community must collaborate chiefly with political leaders to inculcate among the Iraqis an understanding of democracy. A new linkage between the people and those that govern must be established.

Placing the Iraqis on solid footing toward democracy would also include helping its leaders recognize that the people of Iraq are the center of gravity for such efforts. A mindset must be developed among them that will cause them to desire positive change for a better future. Establishing that mindset among the people begins with eliminating the lingering trauma caused not only by Iraq's wars, but the ills of Saddam Hussein's regime that continue to plague the society as the following: unemployment, shortages of affordable housing, unpaid pensions, low wages, high prices for goods and services, corruption, and strained inter-ethnic cooperation. Islamic extremism now looms large as an additional threat to secular Iraqis, and the country could possibly even be governed under Islamic or Shari 'a law.

Iraqis need to enjoy the benefits of acquiring employment, earning better wages, and developing the ability to provide for families and improve the future for their children. That will create a desire among the people to really end the violence and move forward. After achieving that, it is hoped that the people will turn toward even more moderate political leaders, if available, who could represent their interest in further enhancing a positive society. The new political leaders could make use of the existing political framework at the national, municipal, and local levels. Such moderate leaders should also expect a very strong helping hand from the international community and their own business community. In an improved environment, the Iraqis will discover that they can rely upon themselves for their society's development.