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Observations on U.S. Strategies in the Persian Gulf Region, 1941-2005: From the Atlantic Charter, the Twin Pillars and Dual Containment, to the “Axis of Evil” and BeyondChristopher D. O'Sullivan*
Columbia International Affairs Online
January 2005
Introduction
Neoconservative supporters of President Bush are supposedly fond of the notion that, while Baghdad is for "men," "real men" go to Tehran. But are there larger implications of this notion beyond the swagger implied? What is the link between the war in Iraq and future US policy toward Iran? Is the war in Iraq perceived in neoconservative—or "Vulcan"— circles as a mere stepping stone to a confrontation with Iran? Where do Iraq and Iran fit into the larger historical framework of US interests in the Persian Gulf?
The March 2003 invasion of Iraq was a turning point in the history of the United States in the Persian Gulf region. It was the second large-scale military intervention in the region by the United States in 12 years, and those two were the first massive outside interventions since the British and Soviet invasion and partition of Iran in 1941. The consequences of the US invasion and occupation will be felt in the Middle East and beyond for decades to come. On the one hand, the invasion of Iraq seemed a stark confirmation of a more militarist attitude in the United States in the wake of September 11. On the other hand, the very commitment of so many troops has rendered the United States, in Richard Nixon's once famous lamentation about the slog of Vietnam, a helpless, pitiful, giant. As Fred Kaplan has mused in the New York Times, Iraq may teach the United States that it will "find that it can no longer afford a globe-spanning military. The war in Iraq has already stretched America's forces to the limit. In the 1970's and 1980's, when Pentagon strategists spoke of a two-front war, they envisioned having to fight simultaneously in, say, Germany and Korea. Today, they mean Mosul and Falluja." The US has now made significant and longterm commitments of national wealth and manpower to Iraq, but the implications and consequences of this commitment are not at all clear.
* Dr. Christopher D. O'Sullivan is currently a Fulbright Visiting Professor of International Relations and US Foreign Policy at the University of Jordan in Amman. In 2003-2004 he was a Visiting Research Fellow with the Centre for International Studies at the London School of Economics. His most recent book, Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order (Columbia University Press, 2003) was awarded the American Historical Association's Gutenberg-e Prize.