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CIAO DATE: 3/99
Re-distribution of Authority: The South African Case *
Eleanor E. Zeff
Drake University
Department of Political Science
and
Ellen B. Pirro
Pirro Research
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Not for quotation except with permission of the authors.
Introduction
In a number of respects, South Africa’s redistribution of authority has made headlines more often and more dramatically than contemporary alterations of power in other parts of the world, even Eastern Europe. High voter turnout, relatively peaceful majority elections in 1994, and the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk made the whole world take notice of South African politics. South Africa has recently, and profoundly changed its whole political system. Few could have imagined, even in the 1980s, that this deeply divided country would have been able to move so smoothly from rule by an “ascriptive racial minority”, the whites (Friedman 1995, 531), to a majority elected government which is mainly African. 1
The previous government used a racial segregation system, apartheid, which literally means “separateness” to maintain control over the majority of non-white South Africans. Ethnic divisions among the non-whites further compounded the complexity of the situation, leading many to fear that the only way to change authority would be through violence. Yet this did not happen. The 1990s have seen steady change and progress toward a racially integrated country with a new government representing the entire society. It is the task of this chapter to examine and recount the many changes which have occurred in South Africa, and to answer the questions of why the changes occurred, what major factors are involved and most importantly, where these changes are leading.
There are four major ways in which South Africa is different, both from the countries examined in this volume, and from other evolving nations around the world. First, unlike Russia, Spain, Portugal, India and other countries where authority increasingly resides in entities both above and below the central state, in South Africa, the central government and the dominant African National Congress Party (the ANC) control most political authority at all levels. The new leaders in South Africa appear to be consolidating power into the central state and within the dominant party in contrast to trends in other countries around the world where power is more likely to be decentralized.
Second, the South African case is so new, that there are few results to evaluate. It is very difficult at this stage to attribute any outcomes to the new government or even to understand what direction the final re-distribution of authority will take. The present constitution went into effect in January 1997. The 1999 elections will provide the first real test of South Africa’s new democratic institutions. They will be the first elections since 1994 and the first elections under the new constitution. Because Nelson Mandela is retiring from the presidency, and the top levels of government will change personnel, these elections will also provide a first test of the system’s ability to change leaders.
Third, as analysts examine various countries around the world which have been undergoing significant changes during the past ten years, they find that the majority of countries are moving from a centralized, statist or unitary system to a more democratic, participatory form of government (Huntington 1996). This picture does not fit the South African case. Even before the recent changes, South Africa had a democratic model of government. Although the majority of South Africans had few freedoms and rights, white South African citizens enjoyed a well developed democracy with regular and fair elections and just courts (Friedman 1995, 531). White South Africans have had the Westminster form of parliamentary government since the early days of this century. Even when excluded from participation, most South Africans had some familiarity with this democratic government and had seen how democracy worked.
Fourth, the South African situation is unique because the country is redistributing authority by enfranchising a whole new group of people rather than, as in other countries, changing leadership, governmental structures or institutions. This re-distribution of authority occurred in the 1990s when President de Klerk and the National Party dissolved the apartheid system and removed the old constitution, recognized the ANC political party, freed Nelson Mandela and other black political leaders, and opened elections to all South Africans including the formerly disenfranchised two-thirds of the population.
The major research question is why did this re-distribution occur? What are the explanatory factors for South Africa? Will this great experiment succeed or will South Africa disintegrate into civil war or worse? Is South Africa’s democracy following the Western parliamentary model or a more typically African version? Does democracy have a chance in this new setting? To answer these questions, we will first review the changes which have occurred throughout South Africa and then turn to explanatory theories and factors. Finally we look to the future in the nature of South Africa’s democracy and the results of authority changes.
The introduction to this volume identifies several ways in which states consolidate, integrate different “parts” of the state, prevent conflict, maintain a balance between the central state and the sub-states and interact with forces outside the state, in order to offer an explanation of the distribution and re-distribution of authority that spans both geographical and analytical boundaries. The theories which the editors apply to the study of the countries in this book include: Interdependence (as a condition of the international system, or as a description of that system); Interdependence (as causing characteristics or outcomes in the international system); Multi-level governance; Decentralization/regionalism; Federalism; Territoriality/political geography; Identity and Conflict resolution. Contrary to many of the other studies in this volume, the Multi-level governance literature does not explain the re-distribution of authority in the South African case, nor does the Territoriality/political geography literature nor the Decentralization/regionalism studies nor even the Federalism literature despite the fact that South Africa claims to be a federal state. In fact, South Africa has made a “Federal compromise” in order to keep most power within the central government.
This chapter will utilize the literature on Interdependence, Identity and Conflict Resolution to describe the South African situation. It will discuss how economic conditions and structures outside the state as well as the general level of economic development within the state have affected the re-distribution of authority. Astute political leadership, a democratic legacy and successful conflict resolution contributed greatly to the high voter turnout of all South Africans in 1994, for the first genuinely democratic elections, and to the peaceful transition of power from the white-dominated, minority government of the National Party to a freely elected, transitional government of national unity (GNU). What are the possibilities that this kind of leadership and unity will continue? Finally, this chapter will describe the many different identity groups (racial, ethnic and class) in South Africa and discuss how much identity matters in the re-distribution of authority in South Africa.
Background
The new South African Constitution of 1996, designates eleven official languages including Afrikaans, English, Xhosa, Zulu, Sesotho, Northern Sotho, siSwati, Ndebele, Tsonga, Venda and Tswana. This large number of languages and the ethnic groups who use them are a good indication of the complexity of the history and current politics of the country. The first known people in South Africa were the nomadic Khoikoi herdsmen and San foragers. The Dutch (Boers) arrived in 1652 and ruled the Cape Colony until 1806 when the Colony became British. At the same time Bantu tribes were moving southward. In 1834, the Boers began their Great Trek north into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal in an attempt to separate from British rule. Their hope of independence ended when gold and diamonds were discovered near Johannesburg in the 1860s. The British won the Boer War (1899-1902), gained control of South Africa’s vast mineral wealth, and established the Union of South Africa in 1910 following the Westminister model of parliamentary government.
The infamous apartheid (separateness) system, came into effect only in 1948 when the Afrikaner-dominated National Party gained the Parliamentary majority. Throughout the 1950s and until the late 1980s, this party continued its de-facto single-party rule, using the police and the military to enforce separation of the races, repression and censorship. This harsh system disenfranchised the majority of the non-white population 2 who were required to live in restricted areas, outside the city centers and carry passes at all times. White South Africans alone had the vote despite numbering less than a third of the total population. Apartheid, like socialism, was an ambitious experiment in social engineering (Ottaway 1993, 18). It permeated all aspects of life in South Africa. Dismantling the apartheid system would entail major changes throughout the entire social, economic and political arena in South Africa. These changes would include: restructuring black education, alleviating economic grievances, addressing the land issue, dismantling the segregated cities and implementing affirmative action programs (Ottaway 1993: 85).
By the late 1970s, it became apparent that the National Party, with its fear of losing power to majority rule by the ANC, would not voluntarily abandon the apartheid system. The world became familiar with South African atrocities such as the Sharpeville and Langa killings, the Church Street bombings, the Soweto uprising, the killing of Steve Biko and the so-called “black on black” violence. After a generation of international, verbal condemnation, which appeared to have little effect on the South African government, the United Nations and most of the nations around the world, with a few exceptions, joined together to condemn South Africa and to enforce economic sanctions against it. In general, the international community ostracized South Africa, and also prohibited its athletes from international competition and its artists and performers from international showings. These sanctions were effective in isolating South Africa and slowing down its economy.
Bowing to this intense international pressure, the National Party, under first President P.W. Botha (1983-1989) 3 and later President F.W. de Klerk (1989-1994), began to modify the apartheid system and made overtures to the West and to the banned parties existing in South Africa, namely the African National Congress (the ANC), the Pan Africanist Party (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In February 1990, de Klerk unbanned all political parties and released Nelson Mandela, the ANC’s acknowledged political leader as well as the founder of its military wing the Umkhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation or the MK). He had been in prison for 27 years. De Klerk wanted to negotiate for a power-sharing form of government in which the National Party could still play a part. He proposed various consociational schemes 4 and forms of PR voting to assure representation for all groups. The IFP was also interested in power-sharing and submitted its own proposals. Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi as leader of the IFP insisted that KwaZulu nationalism be given special recognition in any new governmental scheme, and many acts of ethnic violence occurred over this issue. Rivalry between the ANC and Inkatha in the Natal province increased as negotiations for a new constitution began. The ANC wanted a stronger central government, whereas the IFP wanted more power for the individual provinces, especially KwaZulu/Natal.
Further dissension over the re-distribution of authority soon developed. This struggle involved not only the National Party and the ANC, which both had strong statist inclinations, but also the IFP, and other political parties 5 as well as labor unions and business and civic groups. For the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), economic restructuring was of vital importance to the transition process and needed to be included as part of any political agreement (Ottaway 1993, 86). Despite the disparity in the viewpoints of these various groups, enough compromise occurred to allow the adoption of the Interim Constitution ( in December, 1993) in time for the 1994 elections. These elections were fair by international standards, and voter turn-out was high with violence held to a minimum. Thus, South Africa began its re-distribution of authority peacefully.
Once elected, and in order to complete the transition of power, the new government immediately began work on a permanent constitution, which was passed and adopted in 1996. In January 1997, implementation of the new Constitution began with full compliance expected by 1999. The year, 1998, was dominated by news of the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was the new Government’s attempt to deal with South Africa’s violent history and reconcile all the disparate groups so that they could live together peacefully. In January 1998, Nelson Mandela stepped down as head of the ANC, and Thabo Mbeki succeeded him as President of the party. Mandela stated that he would not stand for re-election again, and that he would retire from politics with the next elections. The Government called for the first elections under the new Constitution to be held in 1999. As leader of the majority party, Mbeki is widely expected to become the next President of South Africa and to bring with this change a new and more technocratic leadership style.
Changes in South Africa since 1989
The contemporary era in South Africa, which began in 1989, has seen a re-distribution of authority similar to re-distributions in many sites throughout the world. As in many other countries, South Africa’s changes were not widely predicted. Indeed, the prognosis for South Africa into the late 1980s, was a continuation of the harshest aspects of apartheid, strongly enforced with repressive measures and on-going protests, leading to further violence. If a change of government was foreseen at all, most thought it would occur as the final stage after a great deal of bloodshed. Instead, major changes have occurred with a minimum of violence and without causing a national bloodbath. This section seeks first to relate what specifically has changed in South Africa, and how authority patterns have altered, and then to examine why these changes have occurred.
The changes hinge on the elimination of apartheid and the acknowledgement that all individuals permanently inhabiting the country have become fully enfranchised citizens of South Africa. Authority which was vested in the few (the white elite) was greatly expanded to encompass the many. The entire legal and political structures, which were based on the separation of the races, changed, replaced by legal equality and political enfranchisement. A provisional and later an entirely new Constitution set forth nonracial principles of governing the country and revised the former institutions of government.
Political Changes
Although there have been major changes in the governmental sector, there have been some surprising “holdovers” as well. Because apartheid policies so thoroughly regulated the political, economic and social aspects of South African life, to abandon this policy meant that most parts of the system would have to undergo change. From one perspective it seems that the entire, old regime was discarded and a new regime created. A further look indicates, however, that while there were significant changes: in voting, in representation and in a variety of laws, many of the structures of government and much of the civil service remained in operation. For example, the parliamentary government that existed under the old system continued under the new, though significantly altered constitution. There were a lot of other “holdovers” from the apartheid era as well, especially in the civil service. Because of promises made to the former leadership and in order to persuade White South Africans not to leave the country, the new government promised to retain the jobs of many former bureaucrats. Under the new, altered and merged system these workers could not be fired or laid off. Also the military remained largely unchanged. Indeed, as one examines the nature of the new government, there were far fewer changes than anticipated.
Elections and Political Participation.
The de Klerk regime faced considerable potential difficulties when dealing with the issues of elections and political participation. A majority rule system would mean that “black” Africans who have the largest number of people would become the controlling force in any government, and this dominance was greatly feared by the existing white leaders. No fewer than nineteen political parties as well as business and civic groups participated in various stages of the discussions on these issues. Major and sometimes conflicting considerations were: how to divide the existing power among the many diverse groups in South Africa; how to fairly share power with these different groups while retaining the expertise of the people who had previously been in power; and how to peacefully enfranchise two-thirds of the population. To solve these problems, the constitutional working groups suggested that voting for representatives to the South African Parliament be changed from direct voting to proportional representational voting in order to account for the more diverse opinions and parties in the greatly, enlarged electorate. A proportional representational voting system would allow white and other ethnic minority parties to have representation in both the legislature and even in the cabinet. The 1994 elections successfully used this system to elect a “Government of National Unity” (GNU) which included not only the majority ANC party representatives but also representatives from the National Party, the South African Communist Party (allied with the ANC along with COSATU) and the Inkatha Freedom Party. The party lists were closed, and each voter had two votes, one for a single party or organization on the national lists and one for a single party or organization on the provincial lists ( Africa Research Bulletin, 1994, 11385). Voter turnout for this first election under the new system was exceptionally high and relatively peaceful considering that many people had never before voted and often had to wait in lines, for hours, to cast their votes.
Political Parties.
Although the political party system in South Africa is currently undergoing a period of great change, its roots extend back to the beginning of the Republic in 1910. At the end of the apartheid era, there were already several established political parties which took part in the early negotiations for the Interim Constitution. The National Party controlled the South African Government from 1948 until the 1994 elections and was responsible for the apartheid policies. It was and still remains largely a party for white Afrikaners with a current power base in the Western Cape. The African National Party (ANC) is also more than eighty years old, and although it was banned by the Government in the 1960s, it continued to exist in exile. By the end of the 1980s, most of the black electorate with the exception of various Zulu groups, supported the ANC (Giliomee 1998, 131). It received 62.55% of the vote in the 1994 elections and its popular support under President Mandela remains high. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which had originated as a Zulu cultural movement in the 1920s, was another big player in the constitutional negotiations. It continues as a powerful force under Chief Buthelezi in the KwaZulu Natal province. Other parties which have played or continue to play important roles in the history of South Africa include the Freedom Front, a largely white and very right wing party; the more liberal Democratic Party which is a middle-class white party; the Pan African Congress, a left-wing, black African party, the African Christian Democratic Party and the New Movement, which just began in 1994 and is trying to become a type of “rainbow” party. These latter parties are quite small 6 and their future is uncertain given the centralizing tendencies of the new Government and the ANC party. Because of the current strength of the ANC and despite the use of proportional representational voting, which is supposed to prevent single party domination in the Government, the South African regime is moving towards a dominant-party system similar to India and Mexico (Giliomee 1998, 128).
Executive
From the very outset, there has been a strong commitment to power-sharing at the executive level which has made the creation of the new state possible without bloodshed. The original government (the GNU), established after the 1994 elections, had a combined executive with Mandela as President and de Klerk as Co-President. De Klerk resigned in May 1996 to lead the National Party into the Opposition. The GNU Government fell apart after the initial passage of the Constitutional Bill. The new Constitution provided that the President be elected by a joint session of both the National Assembly and the Senate, and that he/she in turn would select the Deputy President and the various cabinet members, no more than two of whom could be from outside the National Assembly (see the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Chapter 5).
This Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by Nelson Mandela, was a symbol of unification and reconciliation in the post-apartheid South Africa. Mandela retains enormous popularity as a charismatic leader and a symbol of the long struggle against oppression. The polls of 1998 still give him an excellent job approval rating, and his personal popularity remains high among all racial groups. The major question will come after 1999, when Mandela steps down and retires from politics. He has already resigned as head of the ANC and Thabo Mbeki has taken over the leadership of the party. Although it is assumed that Mbeki will be the next president, he has a very different and more technocratic style than Mandela. It is thought that he will be a more aloof and professional leader. Despite the fact that he does not seem to have the charisma of Mandela, there is hope that he can continue the policies and direction established for the nation and that the change in Presidents will only signal a change in governing style and not in policy direction (Bratton, 1997, 215).
Bureaucracy
Until the mid 1980s, South Africa was known for its developed infrastructure system, its well-trained bureaucrats, its relatively efficient bureaucracy and its wide administrative reach (Good 1997, 547 and Lodge 1996, 196). However, since 1994, there has been a noticeable decline in the capacity of the state administration both at the national and especially at the provincial levels of government, and administrative corruption has grown (Ibid.). The major problems with the bureaucracy are only beginning to emerge. How can South Africa “rainbow” its bureaucracy without losing its well trained and senior white bureaucrats? As a part of the moves to gain support for a new constitution, to allay the fears of the white population (who constitute much of the bureaucracy) about massive layoffs, and to avoid resulting unrest, a promise was made before the 1994 elections to retain all former bureaucrats in the new government. Because of the large numbers of “leftovers” it has become difficult to find room for any new, ethnically diverse bureaucrats. Currently, there is also a lack of newly trained and ethnically diverse individuals to fill the jobs of those civil servants who leave their government positions, especially at the higher and more technical levels. The end results have been inflated bureaucracies, with more people than work, inability to restructure and eliminate waste, higher civil service wages and a lot of other problems. The worst results are occurring in the provincial governments. (Lodge 1996, 1997)
Military and Police.
The military and the police under the National Party Government had two major occupations: repression of other than white racial groups and protecting the national borders. The government and the South African Defense Force (SADF) became involved in the many wars and rebellions in Southern Africa from Angola and South-West Africa to Mozambique and used violence to achieve regional hegemony. Both the police and the military were highly trained with up-to-date equipment and had large salaries. Although both units retained their equipment, prestige and centralized organization under the GNU, the division between military units and police units became more distinct. ANC Ministers took over the portfolios of both units. The military elite also agreed to ANC proposals to amalgamate the former armed forces of the liberation movements and the Homelands into the newly formed, regular defense forces 7 now known as the South African National Defense Force, or SANDF (Kynoch 1996, 441). Since the number of people involved was small, they were easily absorbed into this new force. Despite some protests about the integration of the various military and police forces, the whole process progressed peacefully and without a right-wing backlash. The new government has not yet reduced the military or cut its budget significantly, although it has stated that it intends to do so. These issues will become significant in the upcoming years. South Africa is now trying to turn its once para-military police force into a service group which is also friendly and efficient ( Economist, Feb. 14, 1997, 44). Both organizations still have top heavy and highly centralized bureaucratic organizations.
Constitution
An Interim Constitution was enacted to allow the elections of 1994, prevent a power vacuum from occurring between the passage of the Constitution and the elections, and ensure continuity from one parliament to the next. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was responsible for the legality of this Interim Constitution which established 34 constitutional principles leading to the changes in the governing system of the country. These constitutional principles specified the establishment of a single, nonracial, nonsexist, democratic sovereign state which would follow a code of fundamental human rights and ensure protection and equal opportunity for all citizens under an accepted constitution (Davenport 1998, 54). It also established the standards for electing the National Assembly of 1994 which along with the Senate became the Constitutional Assembly for the purposes of writing and passing the permanent Constitution. A second version of this new Constitution was signed by President Mandela in 1996, after the Constitutional Court had rejected the first version on the grounds that nine points failed to meet the multi-party guiding principles laid down during the transitional period ( Africa Review 1998, 235). The final amendments were approved on October 11, 1996, and the new Constitution went into effect January 1, 1997. More South Africans today enjoy freedom and constitutional protections than at any previous time. The new Constitution, however, specifically limited some rights such as free speech in order to prohibit “hate speech” and war propaganda, and it also limited some property rights in order to redress past discrimination (Handley and Herbst 1997, 223).
Provinces
The new Constitution changed the boundaries of the provinces, abolished the “Homelands” and merged various “old” provinces into nine new provinces, with only two similar to what they were under the apartheid system (Lyman 1996, 110). Part of the constitutional debate involved the question of how the provinces should relate to the center and how much power and independence they should have. Chief Buthelezi wanted the Zulu areas to be as independent of the central government as possible. A three-tiered “Federal Compromise” replaced the NP Government’s republic and black “Homelands” policy for administering the country. The three tiers consist of the central government, the newly created, nine provinces and hundreds of local governments. The “1996 Constitution” lists the provinces of the Republic as: The Eastern Cape, the Free State, Gauteng, KwaZu lu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province, North West and Western Cape (34). The ANC Party presently controls seven of these provinces. The compromise gave the provincial governments joint responsibility with the central government for managing education, health, roads and welfare issues but no power ( the Economist, Feb. 28, 1998, 49). Although Federalism is one theory used to describe the re-distribution of authority in many states, it does not explain power distribution in South Africa because the provinces have very little actual power and are also restricted in their ability to raise revenues. Through their Constitution, South Africans established a relatively unitary state.
Courts
Some of the agreed tasks of the Constitutional Assembly were to free the judicial system from executive and legislative dominance, from its whiteness and from influences that interfered with the rule of law. The former Supreme Court of South Africa had blended Roman, Dutch and English legal systems, but was discredited because it had supported and enforced the legal code of apartheid. A Constitutional Court, consisting of eleven South African citizens (four of whom had to have previously been judges) and a Supreme Court of Appeal were established to revitalize the Court system. The Supreme Court of Appeal was to have final jurisdiction in all but constitutional cases (Davenport 1998, 73-74).
The Constitution also established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the supervision of Archbishop Desmond Tutu in order to confront the country’s violent past. The Commission was to try to uncover the truth about human rights abuses of the apartheid era by promising amnesty to those people who confessed. At the same time victims could receive compensation without further dividing the country. The purpose of this commission was to reveal the truth and provide information rather than revenge. This process would allow many people to find out what had happened to loved ones and let the world see the full horror of apartheid.
Economic Changes
In the economic sphere, there have also been profound changes. The state of the South African economy remains a major impetus for many of these changes. The picture in the 1970s was rosy. South Africa, alone among the African states, had moved into the modern era with multiple technological advances. South Africa supplied most of the rest of Africa with the products of modernity. Many of the large multi-national companies created South African branches.
South Africa’s exports were also important especially in the area of minerals. In the 1970s and 1980s, the price of gold on the world market stayed high and diamonds were in demand. South Africa supplied the major portion of both of these products to the rest of the world. In addition, South Africa also mined a number of specialized metals such as chrome and argon, which were greatly needed by the Western Powers for their super weaponry as they fought the later stages of the Cold War. Much of the West, including the United States under the Reagan and Bush administrations turned a blind eye to the excesses of South Africa’s apartheid policies and argued that the need for the minerals South Africa could supply outweighed any political considerations.
This picture changed in the 1980s. International pressure on South Africa increased with the imposition of UN sanctions. Many international companies pulled out of South Africa, closing their shops and selling off their factories and plants. The price of gold fell in the mild recession of the early 1980s and did not recover. With the downslide of the Soviet Union, the need for strategic minerals declined as well, and the US finally joined the boycott of South African goods and services. South Africa became a pariah nation, cast out of the UN and the Commonwealth, unable to compete in international sporting activities, and finding difficulty exporting and selling its mineral wealth. Self-sufficiency was a part of South African style, but it became apparent during these troubled times that South Africa needed world access to oil, the one commodity it could not supply domestically. The sanctions took a heavy toll on the South African economy. The years 1990 until 1992 saw negative economic growth in the country. Over 50% of the population lived below the poverty line, and most of these were black Africans. There were calls for food handouts for the many needy people. Over a ten year period, a significant amount of capital fled South Africa. In the tense atmosphere, a number of white South Africans, including many skilled and valuable technocrats also left the country. It was in this serious atmosphere that the country and its leaders recognized the need and the inevitability of change.
After the elections of 1994, the government put the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) into effect. This program addressed some of the major national needs and focused on the formerly disenfranchised Africans. In 1996 a newer program, GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) began and sought to move the nation more quickly along the development path. South Africa faces great difficulties in its efforts to “catch up” with the rest of the world in technology and to redistribute its wealth to the entire population. The gap between the rich and the poor is extremely wide in South Africa today. Under RDP, growth rates averaged 3% per year. The projected growth for 1998 was also 3% despite a published goal of 5-6%. At the lower growth rates, economic gains are wiped away by population growth and inflation.
Nevertheless, the new Government made some advances since 1994 and has begun to fulfill at least some of its promises. Under RDP, 3 million children had school lunches, 1.7 million people got water benefits, 1.2 million citizens were connected to electricity for the first time, and a great number of houses were built (Handley and Herbst 1997, 225, and Bratton 1998, 216). However, within a short period of time, the enactment of the GEAR program turned national focus away from the social needs of people to face the overall economic development of the nation. GEAR is economically conservative which has alienated the major labor unions. It is also fiscally cautious, partially in response to the fluctuations of the rand in 1996 and 1998, to limited foreign investment and to the restricted budget. Hoping to improve the levels of foreign investment, GEAR seeks to recreate the booming times of the 1960s and 1970s.
Jobs and Promotions
Under apartheid, one of the major considerations was to restrict managerial and supervisory jobs for whites only. This policy never worked even when business was growing because there was a constant need for skilled individuals. Unfortuneately, even under the new government, with no restrictions on jobs and promotions, there are only a limited number of individuals throughout South African society with the skills and training necessary for such promotions. Throughout the entire economy, there is a major need for training. Training from “basic skills” to “management”, is necessary in order to expand South Africa’s industrial output, yet training is still not a priority in the government’s current development programs. South Africa has lost ground in two critical ways. The era of “the struggle” included school boycotts, which led to today’s “lost generation” of uneducated young people without the training necessary to get jobs. Furthermore, during the boycott, the world moved ahead of South Africa and began a new era of communications and technological growth. South Africa now needs large amounts of technology transfer, among other things, just to catch up with other industrialized nations.
Trade
There was an assumption that when the government changed, South Africa would be “back in business” and involved in the high levels of trade it had enjoyed in the past. This situation did not develop. The interval of about ten years that South Africa lost, meant that former buyers had found alternative supplies and suppliers and, thus, South Africa is having to start from the beginning to build up its trade. This past year alone, South Africa targeted growth with former partners, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union and the United States. Currently, South Africa has a negative balance of trade with many countries such as Germany. It hopes to redress this current trade imbalance with its recent trade initiatives. As in the past, the South African government is a major player in negotiating trade deals, stimulating trade and being generally involved in the management of its economy. In the economic sphere South Africa’s governments expect to take a more active role than is usual in many other capitalist countries. In South Africa, the Government’s role in economics is vital to the expansion and balance of trade, but its active regulation uses resources which the country can ill afford to spend.
Land/Agriculture.
A major area of concern in South Africa remains land. Under apartheid Africans could not own property. Now Africans are demanding restoration of property, division of property, etc. These demands range all the way from Bushmen suing for traditional tribal lands to residents of Soweto purchasing their shanties. The worst problems come with the distribution of agricultural land. There are well documented accounts of black Africans being moved off their land and into “Bantu homelands,” but now the Government cannot easily remove Afrikaner farmers from land where their families have lived for several generations and which they consider to be their ancestral homes. The Mandela administration has been moving very slowly in this area, allocating funds to purchase lands from those willing to sell and reforming legislation on home ownership in the towns. Very few Africans have benefited to date and there are many pressures to move land redistribution forward at a more rapid pace.
Social Changes
There have also been significant changes in the social aspects of life in South Africa since the early 1990s. All laws have been changed so that there are no longer any racial designations. The new government’s goal is a nonracial, nonsexist society. However, there are many problems which may limit the country’s ability to achieve these social goals. Poverty is a pervasive problem among black South Africans with 74% of black households in rural areas living in poverty (Simkins 1996, 91). South Africa also has one of the largest gaps of any country in the world between its rich citizens and its poor ones. Its population is growing by over 2% a year, and it has had to deal with the difficult question of how to come to terms with past human rights abuses while achieving some kind of national reconciliation. These problems will be difficult to solve especially since finances are extremely limited, but the important Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been an innovative attempt by the South African leadership to come to terms with its violent past in a way which brings the country together. It concluded its investigations at the end of 1998.
Education/Healthcare
he new regime inherited an education system which was very good for the majority of white children, but which was inadequate for the majority of black students. Furthermore, in order to protest this poor educational system, many black students had boycotted their schools for several years, leaving them with a very limited education at a time when well trained personnel are very important for the economic and political development of the country. In the 1980s over 90% of the white students were literate, but over one-third of black students were illiterate (1980 Census). The ending of segregation in schools has meant that black students can now attend the well-financed formerly white state institutions. The former NP governments spent about 24% of their budgets on education (Lodge 1994, 12). Although the new government cannot afford to raise its education expenditures, it is spreading its budgeted money more equally throughout the system so that all South African children can benefit. The ANC would also like to limit provincial control over education policies, so that the central government can allocate its limited funds and deliver its education program more equally and efficiently.
The health care system was much like the education system in that some people had access to excellent care while others had very limited care. Ending the discrimination of the previous system has meant that better health care facilities are now available to the entire South African population. Under the new government, the Ministers of Health, Education and Welfare have been attempting to integrate the numerous race-based ministries which existed under the previous regime. There were 19 previous ministries of health and 19 ministries of education, and none of the bureaucrats who worked for these ministries could be fired. Making these ministries less white and eliminating redundancy without spending too much money has become a major challenge. Yet, there have been some important advances in state-sponsored health programs, such as free care for children under six and for pregnant mothers and new campaigns to promote safe sex and prevent AIDS, and the government would like to propose compulsory and universal “core health insurance” if it could find the money to do so (Simkins 1996, 82-95). By 1995, the Ministry of Health, alone, was spending about a quarter of South Africa’s budget on health related issues ( Africa Review 1996, 183). Despite these improvements, however, progress in this area has been slow, and too many South African still receive very inadequate health care.
Water/Garbage/Electricity — services
Although the new Government has been able to deliver on some of its promises to build houses, improve services and get better water delivery to the rural areas, progress in many areas of service has been slower than expected. Rapid change in building houses and hospitals, etc. has been beyond the financial capacity of the government. Nevertheless, electrical connections have been increased by Eskom, the national power utility, thereby improving living standards for many people in the rural townships. Corruption in the administration of services for the government is increasing, and irregularities in spending and in allocating scarce jobs are on the rise (Lodge 1997).
Crime/unemployment
Increased levels of crime and very high unemployment (above 30%) are some of the biggest problems facing the South African government. Johannesburg has the highest murder rate of any city in the world which is not involved in a war. Over 19,000 people were murdered in South Africa during 1995, and this rate had increased to 71 murders a day by 1996 (Good 1997, 549). The number of car hijackings, rape and armed robberies have also increased and severely threaten the country’s political and economic development. Many educated and talented people, whom the country can ill-afford to lose, are moving to other countries because of their fear of crime. The inability of the government to fire former bureaucrats from their civil service jobs and the lack of education of many people seeking work have combined with the sluggish economy and other structural problems to increase unemployment levels to all-time highs. High unemployment has increased the gap between the rich and the poor and has been a contributing factor in the rising crime rates.
Why Did these Changes Occur?
Theoretical Analysis
Why did these changes occur? There are a number of theories which offer some explanation for what many people term the “South African miracle” as well as for other current events in South Africa. This section of the chapter proposes and reviews three of these theories: Interdependence theory, Conflict theory and Identity theory.
Interdependence Theory.
In several respects, Interdependence theory provides a useful explanation for what has happened in South Africa. However, there are significant difficulties with the nature of interdependence theory itself. Interdependence is based on the idea that the ties of modern life bind the world’s nations so tightly together that whatever happens to one affects the others. The basic application to South Africa suggests that pressure from the world community was the major causal factor leading to the end of the apartheid system and the big change. However, there are many different Interdependence theories, and these theories have many different aspects as suggested in the literature ( Viotti and Kauppi, eds., 1993). Three major concerns apply to the discussion about South Africa. First, there are many different levels of interdependence, ranging from the international system to local barter economies. Second, there are different kinds of interdependence. Much of the literature is devoted to economic interdependence, but there is also policy interdependence. Third, interdependence implies cooperative interaction among different states on a somewhat equal basis which does not always occur (Keohane and Nye, in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, 363-377). Many states are interdependent because they are vulnerable. Vulnerability of a nation involves close economic connections, so that events occurring in other states will have an impact on economics or policies. Vulnerability implies an unwanted or unavoidable result fo a country. One example, which involved South Africa, concerned the price of gold. Gold is one of South Africa’s main commodities. When gold prices dropped on the international exchange, as they did in the 1980s, for reasons having little or nothing to do with the actions of South Africa, the country’s income from gold sales fell, and the impact was felt throughout South Africa’s national economy.
Turning to South Africa’s political changes, on the surface it appears that the nations of the world created sufficient pressure to stimulate the complete change of the South African government. As a group, the world’s nations created this pressure in three ways. First, the United Nations voted a series of sanctions against South Africa, sanctions which would isolate South Africa economically and socially. Second, and partially in line with the sanctions, the United Nations and the British Commonwealth expelled South Africa from membership in these international groups. South Africa was also excluded from most major international, cultural and sporting activities. Third, a number of groups, such as US labor unions, various churches and the NAACP, began campaigns against the current South African government, seeking change by having corporations divest themselves of their South African holdings. Members of these groups attended the stockholder meetings of large businesses and solicited proxies for divestiture. They pressured colleges and universities to prove their divestment from South Africa. As a result of all these steps, South Africa became more isolated from other nations in the world and experienced a strong economic downswing.
Although these pressures for change were strong, they did not yield significant results. There were several reasons for this lack of response to international pressure. First, South Africa reacted with a siege mentality, claiming it could be self-sufficient. And in many respects, South Africans were able to continue leading normal lives. Major needs such as oil, which South Africa could not produce, were partially supplied by countries like Iran, which violated international trade sanctions. The second reason these pressures did not result in change, was that the United States and its friends and allies in Western Europe did not, at first, support them. Under the Reagan administration, the official policy toward South Africa was titled “constructive engagement” which meant continuing to interact with the country both economically and politically while trying to push for changes internally. President Reagan pointed to events such as the recognition of black labor unions by American-based companies in South Africa as helping to make progress toward their recognition by the South African Government. By the beginning of Reagan’s second term, however, it was evident that South Africa was not moving away from its apartheid system and that US policies were not promoting an enlarged democracy. Despite opposition from the President, a bipartisan coalition in the United States Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. The became a major foreign policy defeat for Reagan and, as directed by Congress the United States finally cut off trade and communications with South Africa. Even though the Bush administration tried to continue the idea of “constructive engagement”, in a practical sense, the policy was dead.
It became apparent that South Africa had low, but significant levels of economic interdependence with the rest of the world, but almost no policy interdependence. Thus, South Africa was able to resist world-wide pressure for some time, although it was “vulnerable” in critical economic ways. After 1986, international and US policies began to use South Africa’s international vulnerability to achieve change. Once the United States was firmly committed to the sanctions against South Africa, the apartheid regime led by the National Party could not last for long.
As the Cold War ended, it became obvious that the United States and the Western World no longer needed South Africa as an ally against “Communist aggression”, and that African nations could no longer be used by one side against the other. The end of the Cold War meant that many African conflicts could be and were resolved. The fact that South Africa fought “Communist aggression” had previously allowed the South African military to intervene in many of the conflicts of its neighbors. South Africa fought in Angola since the beginning of that conflict in 1981. In 1986, South Africa used force to change the government of Lesotho. In its efforts to eliminate the guerrilla camps of the ANC, South Africa launched attacks against Zimbabwe, Botswanna and Zambia. It was also known that South Africa’s military played major roles in Namibia and Mozambique. The price tag for these adventures was high. To finance its military operations, South Africa contracted a large amount of short-term debt, placed by one source at around $22 billion ( Wall Street Journal, September 5, 1985, 26).
The pressure increased internationally through the late 1980s. International corporations closed operations in South Africa. Vital capital fled the country, estimated by one author as worth $2 billion a year (Lewis 1989: 167). But it was the action of the United States’ banks which probably turned the tide against South Africa. Despite large trade surpluses, the financial markets became concerned about the safety of investments and loans. US banks decided to cease their lending in 1985. They demanded that the South African Government make major concessions toward the black population to turn around the economic crisis. Instead, the Botha regime reaffirmed strict apartheid principles. The banks began to ask for loan repayment, and refused to extend further credit and loans. This lack of confidence spread to financial institutions throughout the world. The South African economy went into a downward spiral, where change was necessary to avert disaster. Change in 1989, came with the forced resignation of Botha and the takeover by de Klerk, who removed apartheid and unbanned all political parties in 1990.
It appears that South Africa’s vulnerability and the combination of various international pressures on its economy meant that South Africa had to change its political situation to avert economic collapse. Thus, interdependence lends at least a partial explanation for the re-distribution of authority in South Africa. However, interdependence does not explain why South Africa’s transition was largely peaceful. Why was violence averted, and why did the apartheid government simply capitulate? These questions are not fully answered by Interdependence theories alone. Nor does interdependence explain why a democratic government was the end result of the South African struggle. Given the ANC’s revolutionary rhetoric throughout the years, especially since the 1960s, and the socialist principles that were part of ANC doctrine, the move to democracy and a conservative style of free enterprise capitalism have come as a surprise to many, and as a delight to the international financial system.
If interdependence provided sufficient explanation, the South African economy should have greatly improved when the apartheid system ended, and the new Government came into office. However, significant economic recovery has not yet occurred. South Africa continues to have trouble attracting capital and is still losing some of its highly trained workforce as well. International corporations have not been eager to re-open operations or to expand their businesses in South Africa. Although the economy was growing by about 3% in 1996-98, inflation was also increasing, and most experts feel that for South Africa to recover and expand, the economy needs to grow by 7% or even by 8% ( Africa Review 1996, 179, and 1998, 234). This kind of recovery will be difficult because of the severe structural problems, that currently exist in South Africa, such as high levels of unemployment and crime. Echoing these continued economic troubles, there was a crisis with the rand in 1998. Thus, although interdependence remains one logical explanatory theory for South African change, its limitations outweigh its explanatory capacity.
Conflict Theory.
A first glance suggests that conflict theory might be a useful explanation for the changes in authority patterns in South Africa, because the basis for conflict theory lies in the application of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. In the South African case, there was widespread frustration among the black population who were in the numerical majority but were oppressed politically, socially and economically by the minority white population. Certainly frustration accounted for the sentiments of many, especially the young Africans within the nation, and helped recruit supporters to the cause of change. Thus, to some extent, conflict theory does help explain the South African experience. However, a closer examination reveals some critical flaws with the application of this hypothesis in South Africa.
Before the change of government in 1994, South Africa under apartheid had many of the suggested characteristics which lead to conflict. Looking at the Feierabends’ definitions (non-participant society; absence of constructive outlets for frustration; highly coercive government able to prevent hostile actions; displacement of frustration against minority groups or other nations; abundant individual acts of aggression), South Africa met most of them. The society was non-participant for non-whites who were a majority of the population. There were few outlets for frustration among the non-whites. The government was coercive, and effectively eliminated most outbursts of hostility and opposition against itself. Major police and military operations controlled the non-white population (Feierabends, September 1966, 250-256). The frequent end result of this type of situation is massive conflict. Instead in South Africa, much of the resistance was passive, including boycotts, strikes, and non-participatory actions among renters and students. Despite all these elements, conflict did not occur at sufficient levels to account for the major changes. Where conflict erupted, it was mainly between various African groups such as between the Inkatha Party and members of the ANC. A major conflagration did not and has not occurred.
There are two possible explanations, which have evidence to back them, for why major conflict did not occur. First of all, the earlier South African governments created a “siege mentality” internally and provided an external outlet for people’s aggressive tendencies by engaging in many conflicts on its various borders. Most South Africans believed their country was under attack from communist neighbors, and that the nation had to be strong in the face of this foreign aggression. Even among the internal African communities these border wars generated fears. South Africans feared, among other things, that a large influx of Africans from the poorer neighboring countries would mean a loss of jobs and decreased wages for themselves.
Second, according to the polls ( Mattes and Thiel 1998, 102), when most South Africans thought of the political system, they defined government and politics in economic ways. Indeed, much of the frustration experienced by South Africans came from their low wages, their inability to get education, training and promotions as well as their lack of the basic amenities of housing, clean water, electricity and garbage collection. However, at the same time, most Africans realized that living in South Africa meant having a standard of living far exceeding other Africans in the neighboring nations. Despite massive poverty, the potential for growth and prosperity within South Africa has traditionally been far greater than it is outside of the country, and most South Africans have appreciated this fact. Thus, the system has always maintained some outlets for frustration among blacks by providing the means for limited economic well-being, and limited access to modern amenities.
This explanation of how frustration has been appeased in South Africa does, however, suggest a future danger. Studies of developing nations show that the population expects governmental and political changes will result in rapid and major economic changes. But, in most developing nations it is necessary to have had a period of continued and in some cases increased deprivation, in order to put development into effect (Shils, April, 1960, 329-68). Although South Africa has long positioned itself as “developed” and not part of the “third world”, the majority of black Africans, who make up about two-thirds of the population, have a standard of living more in line with people in other third world countries. While all South African citizens are now able to share fully in the nation’s economy, that economy is not growing very fast. The system itself has been slow to change and continued high unemployment, lack of capital investment and sluggish foreign trade may forecast upcoming frustrations and potential internal conflict.
A third explanation, concerning the nature of South African leadership, also arises as a possibility for why conflict did not occur, but it is more difficult to find supporting evidence. Many observers feel that South African leaders, and in particular Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, played important roles in preventing conflict and in influencing the changes which did occur. It is widely believed that the charismatic leadership of Mandela helped create peaceful and so-far successful governmental change. He has also been widely praised for his forgiveness of the apartheid leaders and others who were the oppressors. If one examines the entire ANC movement, it is characterized by people who preferred to seek peaceful solutions to problems, including Bishop Tutu, Reverend Boesak and other religious leaders. The ANC did not have a massive guerrilla unit. The Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Spear of the People was relatively small, and it did not ever seriously seek to overthrow the government with violence. Instead the pressure has been for change to be achieved peacefully.
Identity Theory.
There is a general sentiment that South Africa under apartheid was a deeply divided society. According to Gibson “The hypothesis that strong identities give rise to great group antipathy, high perceived levels of threat and great intolerance quite logically flow from the social identity literature” (April 23 - 26, 1998, 1). Although South Africa was a country with many acknowledged “strong identities”, the question is whether these elements of identity led to the changes which have occurred.
South Africa has been divided along racial, ethnic and linguistic lines since its very beginning. Most people are reminded of the strong apartheid policies which legislated differences between the white, African and Coloured groups. It is important to note that there are other intra-racial divisions as well, between English and Boer whites and among the many different African tribal heritages. The basics of this theoretical framework suggest that instead of thinking of themselves as “South African” most citizens think of themselves in terms of some subcultural group, such as the Xhosa, Zulu or English. The stronger this identification, the more likely an individual is to feel threatened by those outside the group, especially by others within the polity. This hypothesis is important not simply in terms of precipitating change but in the long run to predict the success of the nation. If South Africa is to move into the modern world of nation-states and maintain a democratic form of government, its citizens must be able to see themselves as being South African first, before belonging to any subgroup.
Gibson’s research, based on polls taken in 1996, reports that one third of the Africans think of themselves as “South African” and another third prefer “African” while the remaining third utilize some tribal name. Among the other groups, “White” is often rejected and “South African” is preferred by over half the respondents. Similarly over half of the Coloureds and Asians see themselves as “South African” (8). He finds that most of the groups, especially the white groups, feel threatened by other groups. This finding does not bode well for the strength and the future of the democratic Republic of South Africa (1). Similar studies by Idasa in 1994 and 1995 found that only 13% and 22% respectively identify themselves as “South African” rather than with a racial or tribal grouping. Yet an amazing 92% said they were proud to be called South African (Mattes and Thiel 1998, 97). This answer suggests a much stronger consolidated identity than other questions have indicated. It also suggests that there is some basic commitment to a democratic form of government and to living under the rule of this South African state, regardless of ethnic identities. Still, there is no easy path ahead for the government as it seeks to promote legitimacy, democratic consolidation and economic development. Using Identity Theory seems to explain the South African situation better than using some other theories, yet it too falls short of a full explanation for the recent re-distribution of power. All this discussion suggests that Identity, while very important within South African society contributed little to the nature and fact of political change. It may become more significant as South Africa seeks to develop its civil society in the next decade.
Democracy
In the South African case, it appears that the Interdependence, Identity and Conflict Theories can only partially explain the recent re-distribution of power. Are there any other possible explanations for South Africa’s peaceful transfer of power to a new government? What are the chances of survival for the new government? This section explores three additional explanatory elements: the idea of democracy and the depth of its existence in South Africa, the primacy of economics and the nature of leadership. These three elements, although not a part of the five posited theories offer good explanation for the current political situation and play a significant role in South Africa.
So far South Africa appears to have successfully redistributed authority under its new government and to have accomplished this feat in a democratic fashion. With the help of its religious, ethnic and political leaders, the major governing bodies, the executive and the legislature, have been totally recreated. While the military, police and civil service remain largely the same in structure, they have incorporated major new elements or been re-organized and merged in various ways. South Africa’s leaders have worked hard to ensure that all these bodies, the new and the continuing, will reflect the whole spectrum of South African society. What remains is for the new South African government to establish its political legitimacy, and create a civic society for all its citizens, something which it needs time to achieve.
Political power in South Africa seems intricately connected to the process of democratization. (Maphai 1996). The democratic re-distribution of power, came as a complete surprise to most observers. At the top levels, power was distributed among the various groups and factions of all ethnic backgrounds in a power-sharing arrangement described by Lipjhart as consociational. At the mass levels, whole new groups of people were peacefully enfranchised and participated in record numbers in the elections of 1994.
It is logical to ask why this power redistribution was so peacefully accomplished. Emery theorizes that economic modernization accompanied by structural changes undermined many of the former social divisions because they put blacks and whites together in interdependent positions in a capitalist economy (1997, 16). Thus, economics, along with democracy and leadership have all combined to help achieve this remarkable and peaceful re-distribution of authority, from the elite to the masses and from one political group to another.
Leadership
Much has been written about the leadership of Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk. Mandela is prasied for his “forgiving nature”, his extraordinary push for reconciliation and his willingness to compromise. He did not seek revenge on those who imprisoned him for 27 years, nor did he seek wide-scale retribution on the police and military who were the arms of the repression. He embraced power-sharing in government, in order to give the former white rulers a continuing role. De Klerk also deserves his share of praise for his willingness to abandon the past, his power to convince other members of his party to create change and his ability to work together with his former “enemy.”
What are some of the major elements of leadership style which have contributed to the shaping of redistribution of authority in South Africa? First, both leaders emerge as highly pragmatic. They recognized that the country’s success depended on maintaining levels of economic development and relatively high standards of living for the citizens of South Africa. Revolution, bloodshed, revenge, and even a series of legal trials or a lengthy legal process would disrupt the economy. Furthermore, unrest would probably exacerbate the flight of capital investment from abroad and the emigration of white South Africans, who are the most skilled and technically advanced people in the country. The leaders recognized that they badly needed both these elements to keep the nation on course, and they have worked to entice both money and people to remain in South Africa. Second, neither leader wished to fight. With numerical superiority on one side and superiority in weaponry on the other, both foresaw a huge bloodbath, should change be attempted through conflict. The outbreaks of violence which did occur convinced both men that fighting was not the pathway to success. Third, both leaders are somewhat authoritarian and view government as a strong central force which should take decisive action for the nation as a whole. Thus, both before and during the Government of National Unity, there was agreement on many of the basic principles of the new Constitution. Even today with the National Party in opposition, there is still widespread agreement among all the leadership on the basic structure and principles for government, and democracy is at the heart of these beliefs.
Democracy and the Democratic Legacy.
The democratic legacy of South Africa is a major element underpinning the entire nature of the changes which have occurred. In part because of its long history of Westminster style parliamentary democracy and its assocations with the creator of the Westminster model, Great Britain, it was unthinkable, to the leadership and to the majority of the people, to choose any other system of government. Furthermore, at the very time South Africa was developing its constitution and opting for democracy, there was an international wave of democratization throughout the world. Thus, the leaders established a Westminister style democracy, but left many unanswered questions. These questions persist: what is the nature of the democracy that South Africa has crafted, and will this democracy continue to be successful? Utilizing the many theoretical definitions and characteristics of democracy, a number of researchers are attempting to establish the answers to these questions. This section presents only a limited analysis of these questions based on two major democractic models.
First, there is the creation of a western style democracy, with a popularly elected parliament. Under this type of system, the population participates widely in governing activities. As suggested in the introduction to this volume, this model often leads to the re-distribution of authority to entities above and below the nation-state. The second model is an “African” one based on the creation of a strong, centralized system, with a single party and strong personal leadership. Elements of both models currently exist in South Africa. As described earlier, the new government uses the Westminster Parliamentary system.
In 1994, a power-sharing arrangement brought the various political parties together in the same government. The government was widely heralded as “consociational” because of its recognition and incorporation of minorities (Lijphart 1977) in leadership and cabinet positions. However, this system barely lasted two years. In 1996, the Government of National Unity fell apart with the resignation of de Klerk and the departure of the National Party. Since then the political system has been attempting to move from a unitary, power-sharing government to a more typical Westminster model, with a majority party and “loyal opposition“, but none of the opposing parties hold enough seats in the Parliament to effectively challenge the governing ANC. Furthermore, the system of proportional representation (PR) voting, which is supposed to give minority parties a voice in the government, is actually allowing the ANC to dominate the government. The use of PR voting in South Africa is leading the country toward a one-party dominant system. Observers of South African politics worry about the safeguarding of minority rights and the continued participation of such groups in governing the country. On the positive side, recent polls indicate that voters are moving away from race as a basis for voting. More important considerations were: ideology, policy and past and present performance of their parties (Gibson 1998). Despite peaceful voting in 1994 and a significantly enlarged electorate, other observers have argued that the present government is actually less democratic than its predecessor, if one disregards apartheid (Lodge 1996). The ANC now, has an absolute majority in the Parliament and has concentrated its power in the central government and away from the provinces and local governments. It also appears that the ANC is taking over certain governmental functions and might be re-distributing power from the state itself, to the party (Giliomee 1998; Lodge 1997; see also the Economist 1997-98). Thus, it appears that the second model, the African style democracy may be emerging as the dominant model for South Africa.
The Primacy of Economics.
Third, throughout South Africa’s history the economic sphere and economic well-being have been dominant considerations. South Africa has enjoyed a more prosperous economy than any other African nation, and Africans living within the country have had better standards of living than elsewhere on the continent. One of the major reasons for the population’s tolerance of the previous government was this relatively high level of economic well-being, despite inequalities due to apartheid.
Government and the economy have always been closely linked. Most of the population defines democracy in terms of economic advancement. “The key liberation organizations subscribed to and spread to their poverty-stricken followers an economic as opposed to a procedural view of democracy” (Mattes and Thiel 102). One of the major roles of all South African governments has been economic stimulation. Today, South African leaders from the different parties are united in their recognition that integrated economic development would help strengthen democracy, but that a strong state is necessary to enforce policies which would lessen poverty. Free market forces can not alone undo decades of state supported inequalities. Although the new government has been invovled in trade, in commodity regulation, and in agricultural support, the looked-for economic bonanza has not yet occurred. Unemployment remains high and crime is rampant. Unfortunately, for the people and also in order to strengthen their democracy, most South Africans have not yet seen the benefits of majority rule democracy in economic terms. Because of the close link between economics and democracy, the failure so far of the current government to improve the economy does not seem to portend well for the continued development of democracy in the country.
Conclusion
The jury is still out on the success or failure of the new government. Just because the country successfully held elections in 1994 and peacefully changed its constitution in 1996, does not mean that the country’s political system is stable or secure or that the new institutions will last. South Africa has not succeeded long enough as a nation under its new system for observers to come to any definite conclusions. It has barely begun on its new pathway, and there are both promising signs and dangerous tendencies. On the horizon are economic instability and new elections. Consideration of these last three elements along with the three theories of development have indicated the complexity of South African’s re-distribution of authority in recent years. No one theory can fully explain either the “miracle” of the transition of power or predict the future of this unique and so-far surprising system. Recent data and common sense, based on what has happened in other countries under similar circumstances, indicates less distribution of authority outside of the central government and the majority party, more friction and less visionary leadership in the near future. More optimistic researchers hope that South Africa continues to surprise, that the economy improves, and that the nonracial, nonsexist, non-divisive and democratic tendencies existing in the system keep influencing the leadership and the direction of the country.
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Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 16–20, 1999. Back.
Note 1: The authors would like to thank Clayton J. Cleveland for his help in preparing this manuscript. Back.
Note 2: Out of a population of around 38 million people (1996 Census) 29 million were Black Africans, and about 60.5% of them were living below the poverty line (Sisk 1995: 12). There were also several million Asians and “Coloureds” who were also disenfranchised under the apartheid system. Back.
Note 3: Some researchers would dispute that Botha modified the apartheid system since his regime harshly punished people who violated existing apartheid laws. Nevertheless, he did initiate reforms in the government, such as creating a third House of Representatives to seat the “Coloureds”, and so might be said to have begun the process of changing the system. Back.
Note 4: Consociational democracy is a form of governing in divided societies where power at the upper levels of government is shared among the contending groups, i.e. the President comes from one group, and the Prime Minister comes from another group, etc. See Lijphart, 1977. Back.
Note 5: Nineteen political parties with 238 delegates were present at the first plenary meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), (Sisk 1995, 204). Back.
Note 6: The Pan African Congress only won 5 seats in the 400-seat National Assembly in 1994 (Davenport 1998, 43). Back.
Note 7: By 1995, 11 former MK (ANC military forces) had been appointed generals in the new integrated army and one out of five army officers came from the ANC (Maphai 1996 6). Back.
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