From the CIAO Atlas Map of Europe 

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Core, Periphery and Security in Europe 

Dr. Richard G. Whitman

International Studies Association

March 18-21, 1998

Securing Europe's southern flank? A comparison of NATO, EU and WEU policies and objectives

Abstract

The paper focuses on the trans-Mediterranean security challenges that confront the Atlantic Alliance and other European security organisations in the late twentieth century. The paper asserts that the primary threats that impact upon European security from the Mediterranean region are not derived from the malevolent use of state power but, rather, there are a more diffuse set of security challenges.

The paper will identify how security challenges in the Mediterranean region are currently defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) and the policies that have been adopted by the respective organisations to counter such challenges. The EU is identified as having the most developed policy towards the region and being in the best position to counter the non-military security threats identified by each of the three organisations under examination.

The paper will conclude by exploring the extent to which security policies pursued by the EU and the WEU in the Mediterranean are compatible with those implemented by the Atlantic Alliance and whether these policies in combination are adequate to maintain Mediterranean security. 1

Trans-Mediterranean Security Challenges

In a wide-ranging survey on the security aspects of European integration in 1991 Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, defined Europe's 'Southern flank' as encompassing the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the Middle East and the requirement for economic development by the states of the region as a pre-requisite for the peace and stability of the region. 2 In February 1995, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary General, launched a new NATO initiative for the Mediterranean by identifying Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to European security comparable to communism. 3 These very public declarations, identifying a concern with trans-Mediterranean threats, represented manifestations of the re-formulation of the European security order, and security concerns, in the aftermath of the Cold and Gulf Wars. 4

In focusing upon the potential security threats, that impact upon Europe from the Mediterranean region, commentators have noted the interdependent relationship that exists with the region. The suggestion is that the primary threats to European security in the region are not derived from the malevolent use of state power directed against continental Europe but rather from the partial, or full, collapse of the existing political authorities in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. 5 Furthermore, the southern and eastern Mediterranean appears to be replete with the security threats identified by the re-definers, or 'wideners' of the concept of security. 6 Interrelated sources of instability that have been identified encompass poor economic performance, control of key energy supplies, demographic change and population movements, Islamic revivalism and cultural difference, terrorism, drugs trafficking, depletion of natural resources, and conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation. 7

A common analysis of the potential security threats to Europe in the Mediterranean is shared by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU) as will be illustrated below.Each of these organisations has defined a security interest in the region, identified the Mediterranean as a region with which it is interdependent, and adopted a Mediterranean dimension to its policies. However, the different remits and realms of activity for the three organisations ensure that there are divergent responses and different first-order concerns. This paper commences by assessing, in turn, the cluster of the security challenges identified by NATO, the WEU and the EU, and identifying the response of each organisation to the challenges perceived to be presented by the region. The analysis is structured to illustrate that, although NATO, the WEU and the EU all share a common analysis of potential security threats that may emanate from the region, the raison d'être  of each organisation has led to a different response to the security challenges of the region.

The primary determinants for an interest in the Mediterranean by NATO, the WEU and EU are proximity and divergence. The proximity of North Africa and the Middle East to Europe ensures that the region cannot be easily ignored - although other proximate regions, notably Central and Eastern Europe, are prioritised. Secondly, the measurement of socio-economic development across the Mediterranean basin illustrates that the disparities, or more accurately divergences, are to be found between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean (excluding Israel). 8

As will become clear in this paper, each of the three organisations under examination have a different conception of the geographical content of the Mediterranean. The EU's policy excludes the Balkans (for which it has developed a separate policy); the WEU's also excludes the Balkans and concerns the Eastern and Southern littoral; and NATO's policy and command structure takes its concerns beyond the Mediterranean basin. However, NATO activities and policies in the Balkans will not be examined in this paper. This uncertainty as to where the Mediterranean as a regional entity begins and ends is apparent in any attempt to conceptualise a region and, in particular, the difficulty in separating out the Mediterranean from Europe and the Middle East. 9 For the purpose of this paper 'southern flank' is adopted as a label to cover the existence of an intention on the part of the three organisations under examination to develop policies to cover relations with non-member states on the southern and eastern littoral of the Mediterranean sea, Mauritania and Jordan. 10

NATO and the Mediterranean

The primary concern for the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean during the Cold War was the development of a Soviet maritime capability developed for deployment in the region (the Sovmedron or Fifth Eskadra), the deployment of Soviet military personnel and equipment in friendly states around the littoral and the deployment of Soviet forces on the Greek-Turkish borders. 11 The primary US military presence in the region has been the Sixth Fleet based permanently in the Mediterranean since 1946.

A number of factors define a significant concern for the Alliance with developments in the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral post-Cold War. First, the shift by the Alliance beyond a primary concern with military security to a concern with multiple security threats as manifest in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. 12 The proximity of North Africa to Alliance member states - there are only 12 kilometres between the Maghreb and Europe across the Strait of Gibraltar and 150 kilometres between Italy and Tunisia - has informed the analysis of the Alliance. NATO made clear its view as to the potential threats that could emanate from the Mediterranean in the New Strategic Concept of 1991;

'The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance'. 13

NATO's response to the security challenges it has identified in the region have been two-fold: i) identify risks and threats of a military nature emerging in the region and create appropriate responses ii) engage with NATO friendly states in the region through a dialogue structure to mitigate concerns about the Alliance's intentions in the region. However, intra-Alliance disputes and NATO's restructuring have hindered the development of Alliance policy.

NATO does face a particular problem in formulating and implementing policy in the Mediterranean. Intra-Alliance disputes, most notably between Greece and Turkey (over Cyprus, airspace, seabed and maritime boundaries) have hindered Alliance policy in the Mediterranean. Greek-Turkish disputes have long complicated NATO planning and furthermore the individual defence policies of a number of NATO states in the region - Spain, France, Greece and Turkey - have remained largely autonomous. Furthermore, there is also a bifurcation of views within the Alliance on Mediterranean security. 14 For US. policy-makers the primary focus is the Eastern Mediterranean. In contrast, European policy-makers focus primarily on the Western Mediterranean.

There has been a geographical re-orientation of NATO resources towards the Southern Region post-Cold War. This is as a consequence of the reduction of military forces in Germany and through the reinforcement of Turkish and Greek military capabilities as permitted and facilitated by the CFE Treaty. 15 The area covered by the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) extends beyond the Mediterranean basin. AFSOUTH covers approximately 1.5 million square miles from the Strait of Gibraltar to the north-eastern coast of Turkey on the Black Sea in the east and from the North African littoral in the south to the Alps and Crimea in the north. It encompasses the Balkan regions of Albania and the Former Yugoslavia. Consequently, NATO used to have to plan for the defence of three isolated land theatres through a defensive mission carried out by national forces defending national borders with NATO acting to connect the national commands. As an analyst has noted;

'In a crisis, the United States role would be tested, particularly as difficult questions of allied command and control could eclipse other issues, as might possibly happen in the Aegean. The presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet has been an important instrument fulfilling this task and acts as a vital force integrator'. 16

The primary concern for the Commander of AFSOUTH has, in recent years, been operations in the former-Yugoslavia. The currently debated NATO command structure reform to merge AFCENT and AFNORTH to form a single entity would keep (a renamed) AFSOUTH in existence. Agreement has been reached to create two Strategic Commands (SC) one each for the Atlantic and Europe. Within SC Europe, two Regional Commands (RC) - RC North and RC South (based at Naples) - are envisaged. RC South will command two component commands (CC) - CC Air and CC Nav (both based at Naples) - and four Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRCs) - JSRC Southeast (Izmir), JSRC Southcentre (Larissa), JSRC South (Verona) and JSRC Southwest (Madrid). This comes at the same time that Spain has announced its intention to join the Alliance's military structure and the new command structure is a reflection of this new situation. This process has not been without dispute as differences between Greece and Turkey over sub-regional commands and disputes over Gibraltar demonstrate. One of the most potent on-going NATO disputes generated by this restructuring concerns the French desire that AFSOUTH should be held by a European commander. President Jacques Chirac has made France's return to NATO's integrated military command dependant upon a favourable resolution of this particular issue. 17

Dealing with military security threats - the NATO response

The presence in the Mediterranean of both U.S. and European armed forces, including a NATO permanent fleet (Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean) with Spanish, Italian, US and British vessels, together with European and American nuclear weapons, contrasts heavily with the reduced levels of weapons deployed in Europe as a consequence of arms control agreements.

The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region is the largest arms importing region in the world as the final destination of 39.5% of all arms imports. 18 Defence spending in the southern and eastern Mediterranean is difficult to assess, but Algerian, Israeli, Mauritanian spending has certainly increased (as a proportion of GDP) since 1995. NATO and WEU member states' military expenditure (with the exception of Greece and Turkey) has declined as proportion of GDP since 1995. 19 The security and defence policies of the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean are focused upon internal security threats and potential conflicts with neighbouring countries and not directed against NATO, EU or WEU member states. 20 A regional arms control process, underway within the context of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process and initiated by the Madrid summit in 1991 through the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), is currently stymied.

Concerns about the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery represents the primary military security threat to Europe identified by analysts as emanating from the southern and eastern Mediterranean. 21 The capacity for ballistic missiles to represent a direct threat to European countries was demonstrated by the firing by Libya of a missile at a LORAN station on the Italian island of Lampedusa in April 1986. Currently none of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states that possess ballistic missiles (Egypt, Israel, Libya and Syria) has missile systems capable of reaching the shores of Southern Europe. 22

The desire by states in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is apparent in the cases of Algeria, Libya and Syria, and possibly Egypt (a chemical weapons programme) who all possess the necessary weapons delivery systems. 23 In particular, Libya's possession of chemical weapons and its unwillingness to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention has attracted attention. 24

The Alliance is concerned with horizontal weapons proliferation and away from a predominant concern with vertical proliferation post-Cold War. Furthermore, the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and hardware, that permit the delivery of conventional and weapon of mass destruction payloads, have become a heightened concern for the Alliance. 25 In response to the WMD and ballistic missile challenges, NATO has developed a number of new policy initiatives. On proliferation, there was the adoption, in June 1994, of an 'Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'. 26 The heart of this policy is to prevent proliferation occurring and if it should occur to seek a reversal through diplomatic means.In addition the policy contains the commitment for the Alliance to develop the military capabilities necessary to discourage WMD and, if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations and forces. In response, the Senior Politico-Military Support Group on Proliferation (SGP) was established by the North Atlantic Council to address the political dimension of proliferation issues. The Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP) has been established to address the military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation, deter threats and develop appropriate capabilities. The latter aspect of the policy has gained least consensus although theatre anti-nuclear systems have attracted support.

Engaging in Dialogue

In December 1994 NATO Foreign Ministers stated their willingness 'to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability'. 27 On 8 February 1995, the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session invited Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to participate in the initial round of dialogue, In November 1995 Jordan was also invited to join. The dialogue is conducted bilaterally. As a consequence, and unlike the EU's Euro-Mediterranean process detailed below, the dialogue has been less disrupted due to political developments elsewhere in the region. All partners are offered the same basis for co-operative activities and discussion - the principle is non-discrimination. The dialogue consists of two dimensions: a political dialogue and participation in specific activities. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions which provide briefings on NATO activities and an exchange of views on stability and security in the Mediterranean.

On the basis of the recommendation of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Sintra, Portugal in May 1997, the Heads of State and Government meeting in Madrid during July 1997 agreed to establish a new committee to have overall responsibility for the Mediterranean dialogue and to both widen the scope and enhance the dialogue. 28 Consequently, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) was created at the Madrid Summit and has overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue under the authority of the North Atlantic Council. At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels in December 1997 the Council in Permanent session has been tasked to provide a progress report on the co-operation on security-related issues intended to act as confidence building measures. 29 The MCG held its first consultations in November 1997.

The MCG conducts the dialogue in a 16+1 format with third parties: with whom discussions are envisaged as taking place once a year but with additional meeting possible on an ad hoc  basis. Prior to the creation of the MCG the dialogue was the responsibility of the NATO Political Committee. The MCG is to meet at the level of Political Advisors. The specific activities open to non-NATO dialogue partners allow for participation in science, information, civil emergency planning and attendance of courses at NATO schools. More recently co-operation activities have been added in the military domain. The dialogue takes place on a self-funded basis. At present the nature of these activities are being considered by the NATO military committee. Furthermore, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco co-operate with the Alliance through their participation in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.

The policy of the Atlantic Alliance towards the Mediterranean has been a second-order strategic concern for the Alliance. Although NATO has expressed an interest and concern with developments in the Mediterranean the primary concerns for the Alliance in recent years have been in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Furthermore, as a Member of the Mediterranean Special Group of the North Atlantic Assembly has noted there is a central ambiguity in NATO's Mediterranean policy; for the non-NATO member state partners dialogue is in progress whilst other measures are being undertaken which seem directly threatening, such as the reconfiguration of NATO forces for the Mediterranean and NATO's non-proliferation strategy. 30

The Western European Union and the Mediterranean

The WEU, reactivated in 1984 as a forum in which to pursue closer European collaboration within NATO, permitted the Western European members to act collectively outside the NATO area of operations as was undertaken in the Persian Gulf from 1985. 31 In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia 32 the WEU Council of Ministers, signalled, in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, their intent to expand the operations of the WEU to encompass 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management...' - now known as the 'Petersberg tasks'. 33 In the interim, the Treaty on European Union established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union and widened the extent of the EU States efforts at foreign policy harmonisation to `include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence', and designated the WEU as the body which would `elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'. 34 In a declaration attached to the TEU, the, then, nine members of the WEU, spelled out their proposals for relationship of the WEU and NATO which was to be developed as both the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 35

The development of capabilities by the WEU to match its aspirations was given a boost at the NATO summit of January 1994 with the endorsement of the principle that NATO assets and capabilities could be made available for WEU operations, and in particular, through the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). Alongside this endorsement, the WEU Planning Cell developed an inventory of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) to identify forces available to carry-out WEU tasks and a framework for the development of a WEU Maritime Force. The WEU has also made a commitment to create an independent European satellite system and to further develop the WEU capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes by enhancing the WEU Satellite centre at Torrejon, Spain. 36 In the future a WEU strategic transport capability may be enhanced through the Future Large Aircraft project (FLA). 37 However, FAWEU, as the WEU's Defence Committee pointed out '...should be interpreted as "at the disposal of WEU" or "available on demand" and not "assigned to", as is the case in NATO with the national armed forces of its member states.' 38 Therefore, below the level of the WEU Headquarters in Brussels, no permanent WEU military structures exist. The development of a WEU policy towards the Mediterranean has been overshadowed by attempts to achieve an operational capability for the WEU to undertake Petersberg tasks. The extent of the WEU's involvement in the Mediterranean has been to indicate an interest in the region and to open a dialogue with non-Member partner states parallel with the NATO Mediterranean dialogue.

The WEU has produced a preliminary document outlining the objectives, scope and means of a common European defence policy (CEDP) and described by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands as 'the acquis ' as it were - which have already been developed in the WEU, in the European Union and in NATO'. 39 The preliminary work details four levels of responsibilities and interests. One of these directly addresses the Mediterranean stating; 'WEU governments have an interest, in order to reinforce European security, in fostering stability in the southern Mediterranean countries'. 40 The sources of instability identified being common to those identified by NATO are economic, social and demographic change, political Islam, terrorism, military expenditure and the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems. 41

In the Petersberg Declaration the Council of Ministers entrusted the WEU with the task of establishing a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into account the political developments both in these countries and in the region. 42 This dialogue began with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Approval for the extension of the dialogue to Egypt, Mauritania and Israelwas given at the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Kirchberg in May 1994. 43 'The main purpose of the meetings with these countries... was to conduct an exchange of views on developments in security and defence issues affecting the Mediterranean region, with a view to establishing transparency and bolstering confidence on both sides.' 44 The dialogue is conducted between the WEU Secretariat General and the non-member countries.

The WEU Ministers stressed the importance of better co-ordination with the EU and the NATO's Mediterranean initiatives at their Birmingham meeting on 7 May 1996. They tasked the Permanent Council to reflect on how to improve the content of the dialogue and to submit a progress report at their Ostend meeting on 19 November 1996 of which they merely took note.

The activities of the WEU Mediterranean Group, co-ordinating the dialogue for the WEU, have been to meet three times in the first six months of 1997. The work of the group is focused upon the content and substance of the dialogue with the non-WEU Mediterranean countries.

The substance of the dialogue with the non-WEU dialogue partners to date has been exchanges of information on crisis management (including humanitarian aid), early warning, training in peacekeeping and humanitarian land mine clearance. 45 This is through half-yearly information meetings between the WEU Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of the Presidency and each of the Ambassadors on the non-WEU Mediterranean dialogue partners. However, as the WEU Assembly has noted '...the limited dialogue on which it has embarked with these countries has not produced any tangible results...' 46

The issue of a potential WEU military involvement in the Mediterranean is raised by FAWEU. The European Maritime Force (Euromarfor) and the European Rapid Operational Force (Eurofor), established by Italy, Spain, France, and Portugal through the Lisbon Declaration of 15 May 1995 for peace-keeping and crisis management operations, became active on 24 April 1996. Eurofor has about 4,000 troops committed. The question which arises for the southern Mediterranean countries is what FAWEU are for and, in particular, the rationale for Eurofor and Euromarfor. To allay suspicions of the function of Eurofor and Euromarfor the participating governments have proposed developing co-operation with the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue partners to facilitate the participation of these countries in some Petersberg Operations. 47

The Western European Union has both defined military interests in the Mediterranean and embarked upon the creation of an infrastructure to facilitate any such intervention. However, the WEU concern to develop its own capabilities as a part of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and its ability to draw on NATO resources through CJTF have overshadowed any possibility for a development of activities in the Mediterranean.

The EU and the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean region lacks the proliferation of institutions that can be identified in Europe. The proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) proposed by Italy and Spain in September 1990 and that would extend beyond the Mediterranean basin to encompass the Middle East has not been realised. A dialogue encompassing a more limited range of states, the West Mediterranean Forum (Five + Five) bringing together the states of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain was launched at ministerial level in Rome in December 1990 but has not progressed.

The European Union's proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) - its centrepiece launched in 1995 - represents a redefinition of the conception of the Mediterranean for the EU. Furthermore, the EU policy towards the Mediterranean has been developed to a much greater extent than NATO and WEU policies. One perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is that it represents an updating of existing policy towards the region. This paper suggests that the EMEA is the consequence of the re-definition of the concept of security on the part of the EU and the Union's identification of a security threat emanating from the region.

The EEC began to develop its relations with the existing non-Members in the region in 1963 with the signing of an Association Agreement with Turkey. Association Agreements between Cyprus and Malta and the Community followed and both, like Turkey, were to subsequently submit applications for membership of the Union. From 1965 to 1993 the EC provided 672.5 million ecu from the EC budget and 262 million ecu in European Investment Bank (EIB) loans for the three associates. 48

Between 1976 and 1977 the Community established co-operation agreements with certain countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and Israel. These agreements provided for trade concessions, quotas for access to the EC market and economic aid. 49 Between 1973 and 1991 the Union provided 1,337 million ecu in aid and 1,965 million ecu in loans from the EIB. 50

With the 1982 review of the EC's Mediterranean policy the Community launched a policy revision towards the Mediterranean region intended to assist in the diversification of agricultural production and to promote food production. This policy was not entirely consistent with the large volume of EC agricultural exports to the region and further adjustments were required by the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Community in 1986. The new Mediterranean policy, introduced in December 1990, intended to support economic liberalisation and democratisation. 51 Financial protocols covering the years 1992-1996 under the new Mediterranean Policy adopted in December 1990 allocated 1,075 million ecu in aid and 1,300 million ecu in EIB loans together with 300 million ecu in support of structural adjustment. 52

In the interim the Commission also detailed specific strategies for the Maghreb, Mashreq and Israel and for support of the Middle East Peace process. 53 For the latter, the Community has provided 500 million ecu in grants and EIB loans. The Commission's own assessment of the New Mediterranean policy was mixed noting that dependence upon Community agricultural exports remained, co-operation among the partners had not substantively increased and that aid from the Community budget only represented an average of 3% of the total aid to the region between 1989 and 1992. 54

The Lisbon European Council meeting in June 1992, anticipating the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by 1 January 1993, illustrates an early attempt by the Union to draw together both the external relations of the Community and the CFSP within the context of the putative European Union. The Mediterranean was dealt with under both the Community's external relations and under a CFSP heading with the breakdown of the region between the Maghreb and the Middle East (meaning the countries of the Mashreq and Israel) maintained across both processes. The Presidency's conclusions on the Community's external relations focused upon both the Maghreb and the Middle East - a distinction that was followed in the report approved by the European Council from the Foreign Ministers on the likely development of the CFSP and detailing the areas for possible joint action under the CFSP. 55

As was noted above, NATO, the WEU and EU share a common analysis on the potential security threats in the Mediterranean basin. However, the range of policy areas, encompassed by the EU, and the range of instruments, available at its disposal, have ensured that the EU has developed the most ambitious policy towards the region. Beyond military security concerns, which do not fall within the EU's remit, there are a number of concerns that the EU and its Member States have with respect to the Mediterranean basin and which the EU's policy is intended to address. This paper will now, briefly, examine a number of these concerns.

Economic contrast

The economic contrast between the northern and southern Mediterranean can be noted by the contrasting figures of average GDP per head with a figure of $19,242 for the European Union member states and $1,589 for southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. 56

In the last decade the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffered the largest per capita income decline of any developing region (approximately 2% a year) and a 0.2% annual decline in productivity. An IMF report of November 1995 noted that between 1980-1995 MENA per capita growth fell by 0.5% a year. Jordan, Morocco, and Syria are designated as severely indebted countries. Egypt, Algeria, Greece, Tunisia and Turkey are moderately indebted. 57

The general shift that has taken place since the 1980s in the global political economy towards a greater reliance on the market has by-passed many countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean basin. Liberalisation, privatisation and de-regulation of markets has been gradual and piecemeal in contrast to many other regions of the globe. In particular trade and market liberalisation in the region lags behind developments in Central and Eastern Europe.

Energy supply

The Mediterranean countries provide 24% of the total EU member state energy imports, 32% of the imports of natural gas, and 27% of oil imports. However, there is a disproportion between the EU Member States who are reliant upon the producers of the southern and eastern Mediterranean; Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal derive 24% of their oil supplies from the region; Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal and Greece derive 42% of their gas supplies from the region. 58 Europe is linked to supply from the region via the Transmed pipeline carrying Algerian gas to Italy, via Tunisia, and the Maghreb-Europe pipeline to carry Algerian gas, via Morocco, to Spain and Portugal. An electricity interconnection has also been on stream between Morocco and Spain since 1995.

The volume of future energy exports from the region to Europe, and their relative share of total European energy imports, is dependent upon the increase of the southern Mediterranean countries population and economic growth and consequent enhanced domestic energy demand together with the ability to attract sufficient investment to enhance production and distribution infrastructure. 59 The European Commission has sought enhance the energy relationship through the SYNERGY programme promoting energy co-operation. Subsequently a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum was created and first meeting on 13 May 1997.

Demographic change and population movements

Projected global population growth and its impact upon both the natural environment and human societies has been noted as a future determinant of global affairs. 60 Europe abuts onto a region that is projected to have considerable population growth in contrast to its own projected population decline. 61 World Bank projections suggest a 58% increase in population across the Partnership countries between 1990 and 2010, and even with a doubling of GDP by 2010, the wealth gap between EU Europe and the Maghreb and Mashreq countries would increase from the present one to ten to a level of one to twenty. 62 However, considerable differences exist in population growth across the region with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia having declining rates of population growth. 63 The EU Member States are home to 4.6 million immigrants from the Mediterranean non-members and the distribution of these immigrants across the Member States of the Union has generated a stronger concern for a Mediterranean policy in some quarters than in others. 64 Of particular note is the fact that both Spain and Italy have moved from a situation of being net emigrant/migrant states to a net immigrant situation.

Terrorism

The concern of the Member States with the location of terrorism in Western Europe as an emergent common threat to security was reflected in the creation of the Trevi group in 1976 and the burgeoning intergovernmental infrastructure that was codified in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 65 With Western Europe as the location of 272 international terrorist incidents in 1995 and 121 in 1996 - the greatest of any region - the concern of the Member States to combat terrorism represents a perennial security concern. 66 In particular, the operations of groups originating in the Mediterranean and directing violence against the citizens or property of the Member States in 1995 and 1996 encompassed Hizballah in the Lebanon, the Turkish-based left-wing group Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol), and its successor the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (AIG) and the Egyptian-based Islamic Group (IG). 67 The AIG claiming responsibility for the bombing campaign in Paris in 1995 and were the prime suspects for the bombing of a rush hour commuter train in Paris on 3 December 1996.

Islamic revivalism and difference

The act of defining Europe is a problematic and perilous exercise especially when used to reinforce a notion of difference or to delineate boundaries or frontiers. 'Europe' can be explored from many perspectives and through divergent methodologies. The definition and identity of Europe has been explored, for example, through the mythology  of Europa, defined through the process  of historical expansion of Europe's frontiers across the continent and beyond, from the Otherness  to the Orientalism immediately beyond Europe, or the manner in which Europe has been represented through language or cartography. 68 In short, the western peninsula of Asia has generated a particular resonance and distinctiveness whilst its essence remains uncertain.

Questions of European identity are central to the self-definition of the European Union. Article O of the TEU states 'Any European State may apply to become a member of the Union'. Taken together with the assertion in the TEU that the Member States governments are 'founded on the principles of democracy' and the acceptance of the acquis communitaire , the primary conditions for consideration as a member are only rendered problematic by the definition of 'European' state. The relationship of Turkey to the Union, with the prospect of future membership, together with the rejection of the Moroccan application, keeps a definitive answer to the question of Europeaness defined through Union membership in abeyance.

The emergence of the 'New Europe' with the end of the cold war in Europe has seen the enlargement of the Union to encompass three former EFTAN's, created a substantial increase in the possible membership of the Union with former Warsaw Pact countries looking for the earliest possible entry to the Union and Western European states who remain outside the Union contemplating membership. If Membership in the foreseeable future is to encompasses only Malta and Cyprus then a challenge for the Union would appear to be to cultivate and structure relationships Mediterranean states who will remain outside the Union.

The legacy of colonialism takes the territories encompassed by the European Union beyond the geographical extent of Europe and within the Mediterranean. The autonomous or semi-autonomous regions with special relations with Spain (the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco), Portugal's Madeira and Gibraltar, for the United Kingdom, each have varying degrees of relationship with the Union in accordance with relevant provisions in respective Acts of Accession to the Community. These territories, together with the former colonial possessions of Italy and France in the region create ties of history that impact upon Union policy.

Samuel Huntington delineated the Mediterranean as one of the faultlines of the new era of the clash of civilisations intended to take the place of the Cold War with Western and Islamic civilisations opposed to one another. 69 Drawing the inference that Islamic revivalism has political implications for the EU does not equate with an acceptance of the Clash of Civilisations hypothesis. Rather, from the perspective of the security of the Union three elements would appear pertinent; the uncertainty generated by Islamic revivalist movements and their challenges to existing regimes; the compatibility of Islam to modernity, and in particular, capitalism; and the extent to which Islamicist regimes would represent a direct threat to the Union. However, 'coming to terms with political Islam' has been adopted as a strategic policy issue. The notion that the South represents the most serious contemporary threat to Europe is particularly evident in France. 70

The EU response

By the Corfu European Council meeting in June 1994 the range of relations with Mediterranean countries were subsumed under a CFSP heading and a mandate was given to the Council, together with the Commission, to evaluate 'the global policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean region and possible initiatives to strengthen this policy in the short and medium term, bearing in mind the possibility of convening a conference attended by the European Union and its Mediterranean partners'. 71

Subsequently, initiatives and responses to the region, under the instruments of the CFSP, have been less well developed. The Member States have created a Joint Action in support of the Middle East peace process (April 1994) which has included involvement in the monitoring of the Palestinian Autonomous Authority (PAA) elections, financial support for the PAA, and the creation of an EU special envoy (Angel Morantinos). They have also created a Common Position maintaining an economic embargo in Libya (Decision no. 93/614/CFSP) and issued a number of declarations on the region. However, it is the silences which are, perhaps, more interesting than the actions. For example, to date there has been no Common Position or Joint Action on Algeria despite the conflagration there.

The Commission's response to the challenges presented by the Mediterranean basin was a proposal for a new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched by the Commission in a communication to the Council in October 1994. 72 Interestingly, in introducing its proposal the Commission drew its rationale from the CFSP annex of the Lisbon European Council conclusions reiterating; 'the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean as well as the Middle East are geographical areas in relation to which the Union has strong interests both in terms of security and social stability'. 73

The Commission Communication can be viewed both as a response to the invitation of the European Council and also as a contribution to any discussions at a possible conference of EU and Mediterranean partners. In proposing such a Conference, the Commission view was that such a forum could create an appropriate institutional framework to give effect to the partnership. The Commission Communication explicitly excluded a focus upon the countries of the former Yugoslavia. 74 Its primary focus was upon relations with countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria) and Israel and noting the existent relations with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. 75 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership was intended to encompass all of these states of the Mediterranean basin and the EU. The approach proposed by the Commission was for a strategy of variable geometry progressively updating the existing agreements that exist with the states of the region and also creating sustained support through a programme comparable to PHARE, thereby replacing eleven independent financial protocols and costing the Union 5,500 million ecu between 1995-1999. 76 This Commission figure of 5.5 billion ecu was subsequently reduced following significant disagreement at the Cannes European Council in June 1995. A disagreement between Kohl and Gonzalez on the appropriate distribution of resources committed to Eastern Europe and the South represented a classic North-South EU state disagreement. The Commission proposal for 5.5 billion ecu for the Mediterranean and 7 billion ecu for eastern Europe was opposed by the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark which wanted to maintain a the ration of aid distribution of 5:1 that had existed from 1992-1996. The final result was a shift to a ratio of 3.5:5. The increase of resources for the Mediterranean was equivalent to an increase of 22% and for Eastern Europe 8%.

The notion of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was intended to be an objective, rather than an immediately attainable project. The process of achieving such a partnership was to come through a twin track approach of the progressive development of a free trade relationship alongside the increased, and enhanced, provision of financial aid. Through this twin-track approach, accompanied by enhanced political co-operation, there would be a move 'towards a close association, the content of which will be defined at a later stage.' 77

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was intended to meld a close political dialogue, extending to security issues, with an enhanced economic relationship. In particular, the provision of Community aid was to be furnished for the purposes of structural adjustment and economic restructuring. In signing up to the programme the participants were committing themselves to a comprehensive liberalisation of their trade systems and a restructuring of their economies - thereby the EU was actively promoting the Washington consensus.

The economic dimension of the Partnership was to result in the long-term in a Euro-Mediteranean Economic Area (EMEA) providing for a free-trade area that encompasses the Member States of the Union, the Mediterranean non-Members and any Central and Eastern European country that had not, at that time, acceded to the Union. The free-trade area would provide for reciprocal free-trade in manufactured products and preferential and reciprocal access for agricultural products 'of interest to both sides'. 78 The co-operation was also intended to extend beyond free trade to encompass areas including energy, the environment, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. 79

The multilateral structure envisaged for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to be achieved alongside, and through, a set of bilateral agreements. The Commission envisaged creating a series of Euro-Mediterranean Agreements - association agreements with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon - as soon as possible to replace the existing co-operation agreements in place. 80 In the short term, five objectives were detailed; the conclusion of, the then, current negotiations with Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey; an increase in technical and financial assistance and, in particular, through the creation of a MED aid programme; the encouragement of private investment; an 'economic policy dialogue' under the auspices of the Association Agreements; and measures to promote regional co-operation amongst the Mediterranean states.

The Commission defined two primary challenges to the potential to peace and stability in the region to be faced by the Union; ' - to support political reform, respect for human rights and freedom of expression as a means to contain extremism; - to promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of migratory pressures.'

The Commission also acknowledged the interdependent relationship between the Union and the other states of the region detailed above through the environment, energy supply, migration, trade and investment and the production and smuggling of narcotics. The European Council meeting in Essen approved the recommendation of the Council supporting the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and endorsed the proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in the latter half of 1995 for 'a permanent regular dialogue on all subjects of common interest.' 81

Several difficulties arose in the preparatory work for the Barcelona Conference. These included the unwillingness of Syria and Lebanon to participate in a ministerial meeting with Israel and Moroccan doubts that were based on a desire to maintain privileged relations with the EU especially with the negotiations for an Association Agreement well underway. The Spanish attempted to mediate on the latter difficulty by making clear that Morocco would be a favoured location for the location of permanent bodies, organiser of the second ministerial meeting etc. Morocco's attitude indicated the failure of the idea of regional integration in the Maghreb. Then the US, Russia and the Gulf countries expressed an interest in the conference. Finally, in June 1995 the Arab Maghreb Union adopted a common position that it wanted Libya to be associated with the process. The majority of EU states were opposed and Libya withdrew its request to participate in October. The General Affairs Council reached a general position on the conference on 31 October 1996 on the basis of the Spanish proposal that the conference should be limited to 27 countries.

Work on the Barcelona Declaration preceded on the basis of a succession of 15+12 meetings based on an EU draft of the declaration. Hostility arose from Arab countries from the treatment of subjects of a social nature (terrorism, drugs, immigration) as `security' issues and more specific issues, such as Egypt's desire to see the NPT specifically referred to, the Palestinians wish for a mention of the right to self-determination and the Syrian-Lebanese insistence on a distinction between terrorism and the right to defend one's territory.

A number of issues remained unresolved when the conference commenced: self determination, non-proliferation, dialogue on debt, formulating the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (agricultural products and freedom of movement), and re-admission for illegal immigrants. Even the final declaration was delayed by two hours because of disagreement over the political and security section of the document.

The Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona between 27-28 November 1995 brought together the EU and twelve Mediterranean countries. Libya remained uninvited. The Union's position at the conference was somewhat contrastive to the other states of the region who lack a collective common position. As a Jordanian diplomat noted prior to the conference, 'Barcelona will be the European Union facing 12 countries, each with its own agenda and not listening to the others'. 82 The two-day Barcelona conference was the first occasion in which Israel, Syria and the Lebanon attended the same multilateral forum. The conference illustrated differences between the EU and the Mediterranean non-Members with the latter preferring a greater stress on the economic, rather than the political, and Tunisia and Algeria favouring Libya's participation.

For its part the Union has proposed two main elements to form the basis of the partnership established through the conference. 83 Firstly, a political and security partnership; described as establishing a common area of peace and stability and founded upon the adoption of a declaration of principles by all the partners setting objectives for internal and external security in two broad areas; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; and stability, security and good-neighbourly relations. Secondly, an economic and financial partnership, building a zone of shared prosperity, through the trade and aid relationship detailed above. The first of these objectives has yet to be achieved, the second is a somewhat longer term aspiration that is unlikely to ever be truly realised.

The Barcelona Declaration

The 26 page Declaration agreed at Barcelona comprised four Chapters and an annex which set out the priorities for the work programme. Three main pillars, strands, or baskets have been established as elements of the Barcelona partnership and as part of an attempt to regionalise co-operation: 1) Political and Security Partnership: establishing agroup-to-group dialogue starting with a list of confidence building measures and a list of principles including respect for international law, democracy and the rule of law; 2) Economic and Security Partnership: developing the free trade area for establishment by 2010 through process of negotiation of bilateral association agreements encouraging the right climate for investment, and co-operation on shared problems such as the environment and the use of energy resources; and 3) Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs.

The overall tasks of co-ordination, management of the work programme and preparation of the follow-up Conference of Foreign Ministers was handled by a Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process composed of representatives of the EU Troika and of the Mediterranean Partners. The Commission has been responsible for the preparatory and follow-up work of the Barcelona process. Progress within the three pillars has been patchy to date. 84

The Second Conference at Foreign Minister level envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration to occur in the first half of 1997 highlighted the problematic nature of the EU's position in seeking to keep the Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process as separable. Disagreement over the location for the meeting illustrated the inseparability. Syria refused to participate in any meeting with Israel on Arab territory. Despite staunch efforts on the part of Morocco to host the event, Syria's position was immovable and Malta was finally selected as the location.

The issue of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem raised in March 1997 and the call by the Arab League for a boycott of relations with Israel ensured that the Malta meeting held between 15-16 April 1997 was dominated by the Arab-Israeli dispute. Disagreement was such that the participants failed to agree on a set of conclusions for the meeting. Conclusions were eventually agreed, and publicly released, almost one month later, after an agreement on a form of words to cover the Middle East Peace Process and on the contentious issues of human rights, illegal immigration and terrorism.

The Union itself explicitly acknowledged the linkage of the Middle East peace process and the Barcelona process by hosting a meeting between Yasser Arafat and the then Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levy, in Valetta during the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in the presence of the Dutch President of the Union, the EU envoy for the Middle East Moratinos, and the Egyptian and French Foreign Ministers. 85

Eventual agreement on the Conclusions of the Malta Conference, the agreement to continue the three multilateral strands of the process, and agreement to hold a Ministerial Meeting in the first half of 1999 illustrate that the participants do not find the continuation of the process intolerable. However, the lack of new substantive areas of co-operation to come from the Malta meeting illustrate that the perpetuation of the multilateral strand of the process is contingent upon the continuation of the Oslo process. However, this is not the exclusive reason, as confirmed by a spokesman of the Arab-Mediterranean group, who summarised the situation for each of the pillars one and two prior to the conference as, respectively, one 'remains fragile', and two should be 'specified' and pillar three, on social and cultural aspects, as 'impasse'. 86

The bilateral strand of the Barcelona process has been more successful. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been signed with Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and there has been an interim association agreement with the Palestinian Authority.Agreements are being ensured that the Malta meeting held between 15currently negotiated with Egypt and Lebanon. Negotiations with Algeria opened on 4 March 1997 (the Union has maintained its engagement with the governing regime in Algeria and has granted financial aid of 200 million ecu 87 ) and exploratory talks are under way with Syria.

A Customs Union Agreement is in force with Turkey and the Union has committed itself to opening accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. 88 The decision to set a date for the negotiations was a quid pro quo  required by Greece for the conclusion of the Turkey Customs Union Agreement. 89 The commitment to open membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus and the decision to exclude Turkey from the list of candidates for the next wave of enlargement for the EU has led to a subsequent down-turn in EU-Turkey relations.

The Consequences of Barcelona: creating a security problematic?

The EU market is the most significant for the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean basin and for those countries who do not enjoy the same form of preferential trading agreements (PTAs) negotiated by the EU with Central and Eastern Europe. The EMEA will end the non-reciprocal industrial preferences enjoyed by the Euro-Med partners within the framework of their past agreements with the EU. EU agricultural protectionism will not be eliminated. The EMEA will therefore bring about extensive exposure to EU competition without providing any significant additional market. Furthermore entering into a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the EU will mean that the Mediterranean Partner countries will lose tariff revenue presently collected from EU imports - currently estimated at almost 50% of imports. 90 The Mediterranean Partners will not gain free population movement and thereby not solve one of their most pressing problems through the migration of labour.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership envisages a number of measures to assist the partnership countries to get the supply side of their economies in order. Increased financial aid to 4,685 billion ecu for the period 1995-99 (3.425 million ecu under MEDA and unused funds from the 4th financial protocols) through the MEDA programme came into force on 2 August 1996 following the lifting of the Greek veto on 15 July 1996 and a similar amount in EIB loans. 91 This figure measured in per capita terms is about three times lower than that devoted to Central-Eastern European countries. The aid disbursement is different from that which existed previously towards the region in that is not assigned country by country but on the basis of the ability to perform and succeed in reaching assigned targets. Financial aid will also be devoted to supporting regional economic co-operation and development - especially considering that the free trade area will be extended to all the EU's partners.

The impact of a policy pursued through free trade agreements can be illustrated by scenarios for Morocco and Tunisia as the two star performers (measured in terms of growth) in the MENA region. Analysis by economists suggest that the GDP of Morocco and Tunisia may rise by 1.5% and 1.7% of GDP respectively. To put this into perspective, the increase in the cumulative per capita income over ten years would be $25 per person in Morocco and $40 per person in Tunisia. 92 This would hardly re-dress the differentials that are of current concern to the EU and does not imply equitable income distribution.

The hope that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may flow from liberalisation may be a forlorn one. FDI has been declining in the region except for Morocco, Turkey & Tunisia. 93 Despite Tunisia's average GDP growth of 5% FDI flows were only $180 million in 1994 as opposed to $240 million in 1993. Furthermore an EU study has predicted that the increased competition could see 2,000 local companies go out of business and the status of a further 2,000 is questionable. 94 Moroccan economists have argued that the overnight removal of tariff levels of 30-35% will wipe out some 50-60% of the Moroccan industrial sector immediately. 95 The realisation of these scenarios would generate the social unrest, political instability and migration pressures that the EU Euro-Med policy purports to counter.

Conclusion

The European Union has embarked upon a new strategic partnership for the Mediterranean as a counterpoint to its strategy towards central and eastern Europe. The depth and extent of this policy is contrastive to the measures undertaken by NATO and the WEU. The essential cause of this difference in the level of response is that the EU is best equipped to cope with predominant security challenges that emanate from the region. In contrast to Europe the Mediterranean region lacks the proliferation of institutions that can be identified in Europe. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) proposed by Italy and Spain in September 1990 that would extend beyond the Mediterranean basin to encompass the Middle East has not yet been realised. The assertion of this paper is that, in the absence of such a multilateral structure the EU's EMP represents an attempt by the Union to play the leading role in the pacification of sources of potential instability in the region.

Each of the three organisations discussed above have not engaged in a co-ordinated response towards the region, or created the mechanisms or structures to avoid duplicated efforts or wasted energies. NATO policy towards the region has been an adjunct to its own discussions about restructuring, out-of-area activities and enlargement. The WEU has not been involved with either the EU or the NATO initiatives. In particular the WEU was not invited to attend the Barcelona conference and has not been involved in any of the actions resulting from the Barcelona Declaration. The primary concern for the WEU remains its own development of doctrine and operational capabilities.

Further examination of the Barcelona Process would appear to require explanations operating at a variety of levels and for research beyond this paper. Firstly, changes in the international system and the re-definition of security onto a terrain with which the EU feels it more easy to engaged and the increase economic diplomacy. Secondly, the regional context with a paucity of region-side organisations creates a vacuum for the EU, the most homogenous political grouping of states in the region, to view as a situation malleable through the exportation of security but complicated by an on-going search for a Middle Eastern Peace Process in which the EU and its Member States are second order actors (and indeed for Mediterranean security in general). Thirdly, processes both within the EU institutions, between and within EU Member States and pre-existing state and non-state relationships with the Mediterranean Partners. All of these represent fruitful avenues for future research.

Note 1: Back.

Note 2: J. Delors, 'European integration and security' Survival vol. XXXIII, no.2, March/April 1991, pp.99-109. Back.

Note 3: Agence Europe 9 February 1995. Back.

Note 4: As an illustrative survey of these shifting concerns see: E. Mortimer, European Security after the Cold War Adelphi Paper 271 Summer 1992. Back.

Note 5: E. Mortimer, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension' in; P.Ludlow (ed.), Europe and the Mediterranean (London, Brassey's for CEPS, 1994). I.O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges (Santa Monica, RAND, 1993). Back.

Note 6: See for example; Richard H. Ullman, 'Redefining Security' International Security 8, 1 (1983). pp.129-153. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era Second Edition (1991). For a discussion of the positions of 'traditionalists' versus 'wideners' see: B. Buzan, O. W¾ver & J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner, 1998). Chapter One. Back.

Note 7: M. Blunden, 'Insecurity on Europe's Southern Flank' Survival 36, 2. pp.134-148. F. Stephen Larrabee & C. Thorson, Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges (Santa Monica, RAND, 1996). Back.

Note 8: This disparity can be clearly measured through the Human Development Index; see: M. Benyaklef, 'Socio-economic Disparities in the Mediterranean' Mediterranean Politics 2, 1 (Summer 1997). pp.93-112. Back.

Note 9: For the problematic nature of the concept of the Mediterranean as a separate and separable region see: S.C. Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997). Back.

Note 10: There is a disjuncture between NATO, EU and WEU memberships in the region. Turkey has full membership of NATO but only Associate membership of the EU and the WEU. Back.

Note 11: For studies illustrating this agenda see: L.S. Kaplan, R.W. Clawson & R.Luraghi, NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, Delaware, Scholarly Resources, 1985). J. Chipman (ed.), NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London, Routledge, 1988). Back.

Note 12: 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept' http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm Back.

Note 13: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991. Back.

Note 14: R.D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee & I.O. Lesser, 'Mediterranean Security: new challenges, new tasks' NATO Review 44, 3 (May 1996). pp.25-31. Back.

Note 15: Aliboni, European Security Across the Mediterranean Chaillot Paper 2 (Institute for Security Studies. Western European Union, Paris, 1991). Back.

Note 16: J.C. Snyder, 'Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO's Southern Region' Mediterranean Quarterly 4, 1 (Winter 1993). pp.102-119. p.106. Back.

Note 17: Interview given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, to the German magazine 'Focus' Munch, 15 September 1997. Statements, Ambassade de France ˆ Londres, Service de Presse et d'Information, SAC/97/209. Back.

Note 18: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98 (OUP for IISS, 1997). p.265. Back.

Note 19: op.cit., pp.293-294. Back.

Note 20: F. Faria & A. Vasconcelos, Security in North Africa: Ambiguity and Reality Chaillot Paper 25, (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, 1996). Back.

Note 21: As illustrative see; J.C. Snyder, 'Arms and Security in the Mediterranean Region' in: R. Aliboni, G. JoffŽ, T. Niblock (eds.), Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region (London, Frank Cass, 1996). Back.

Note 22: Turkey does, of course, fall within the range of ballistic missiles possessed by its neighbours. Back.

Note 23: For a full analysis country-by-country see: I.O. Lesser & A.J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996). Back.

Note 24: See as illustrative: Proliferation: Threat and Response (Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996). Neither Syria nor Egypt are considered in this study although both are confirmed as possessing both ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. Back.

Note 25: J.C. Snyder, 'Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO's Southern Region' Mediterranean Quarterly 4, 1 (Winter 1993). pp.102-119. p.106. Back.

Note 26: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm Back.

Note 27: Final CommuniquŽ, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 1 December 1994. Press Release M-NAC-2 (94) 116. Point 19. Back.

Note 28: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Madrid, 8 July 1997 in NATO Review July-August 1997. Back.

Note 29: Final CommuniquŽ, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 16 December 1997. Press Release M-NAC-2 (97)155. Point 13 Back.

Note 30: P. Moya, 'NATO's Role in the Mediterranean', Mediterranean Special Group Draft General Report, AP245 GSM (97). Back.

Note 31: P. Tsakaloyannis, The Reactivation of the Western European Union and its effects on the European Community and its Institutions (Brussels, EIPA, 1985). Back.

Note 32: For an account of the history of the WEU from 1985-1992 see; T. Salmon,'Testing Times for European political cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992' International Affairs 68, 2 (1992) pp.233-253. Back.

Note 33: Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration Bonn, 19 June 1992. II.4. Back.

Note 34: TEU, Articles J.4.1 & J.4.2. Back.

Note 35: TEU, Declaration No. 30. Back.

Note 36: Western European Union Council of Ministers Kirchberg Declaration, 9 May 1994, I.6. Back.

Note 37: The UK government disputes that proposed aircraft is large enough to be considered strategic: 'Britain relents on common defence' Financial Times 15 May 1995, p.2 Back.

Note 38: 'The WEU Military Committee' , Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee, Assembly of the Western European Union, Document 1591, 1 December 1997. Part II (c) (i). Back.

Note 39: Hans van Mierlo, NATO Review March 1995. p.8. Back.

Note 40: Preliminary Conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy
The document was endorsed by the WEU Council of Ministers under the Noordwijk Declaration 14 November 1994.
The other three elements were;