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Ideas, Interaction and the Political Intrusion of the Internet: The Unease of Non-Democratic Regimes and the Construction of China's "Golden Bridge"

Geoffrey L. Taubman

Columbia University
Department of Political Science

International Studies Association

March 1998

Can the Internet and non-democratic rule coexist? The global erosion of non-democratic rule has been one of the striking trends of the late twentieth century, as more than half of the world's population lives under the rule of popularly-elected governments. The widespread ownership of the basic instruments of the Information Age, like television sets and radios, has been cited as responsible for this turn of events. Presently, an even more powerful information and communication tool, the Internet, is spreading rapidly across the globe. 1

Non-democratic and democratic regimes alike have been attracted to the economic and technological promise of the global information superhighway. However, while enthusiasm may be high among all nations who view the Internet as the key to development, prosperity and influence, non-democratic regimes have exhibited more concerted efforts to control this new medium even as they simultaneously expand the presence of the Internet within their borders.

Has the diffusion of potent information and communication technologies like the Internet facilitated democratization or at least made the maintenance of non-democratic regimes more difficult? Can the domestic political consequences of this technology be allayed and can the spread of the Internet even be turned to the advantage of non-democratic regimes?

I argue that the Internet contains a number of key features that are corrosive to the rule of non-democracies. In particular, the scope and ease in obtaining information on the Web, along with the communication capabilities available to users, provides the means for undermining the pillars of non-democratic political power. Despite these risks, non-democratic regimes have not shunned this alluring technology but the measures which they have devised to neutralize the Internet must contend with the decentralized nature of the medium as well as the exploding growth in on-line content providers.

After exploring the incompatibility which exists between non-democratic rule and the Internet, the policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - whose current leader has stated that China's ongoing modernization efforts cannot succeed without the utilization of modern information technologies - will be analyzed in order to illustrate the opportunities and problems which exist for non-democratic rulers interested in obtaining the benefits of the Internet while protecting their incumbency (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], 1996, February 22a, 22b). Nevertheless, despite a keen interest in this powerful information and communication tool, the Chinese government has not fully embraced this new technology. Because of this concern about an influx of ideas, information and images and its effect upon the continued incumbency of the CCP, the government has implemented measures which are meant to tame the Internet but may be ineffective and even hamper a full utilization of the Internet.

Cyber-Hazards to Non-Democratic Rule

The Internet is a powerful and perhaps vital economic, educational and political resource, but it can also be a double-edged sword. All nations with an Internet presence, regardless of regime type, have identified negative consequences which are associated with the technology. For instance, government measures against cyberspace pornography are wide-spread and officials in countries including the United States, Germany, Singapore and China have devised efforts to regulate, with varying levels of intensity, the content available to its citizens on the Internet. 2

Yet while all countries, democracies and non-democracies alike, may fear that the moral climate will be harmed by societal interaction with the Internet, non-democracies are more likely to intervene into cyberspace due to broader concerns about the political consequences of unfettered domestic access to the World Wide Web and email. As will be shown, it is not only the content which can be found on the Web but the vast communication capabilities available to Internet users which drive non-democracies to adopt proactive measures.

Unfortunately for concerned regimes, designing solutions to the sanitize the Internet is hampered by the fact that those features of the Internet which cause problems for non-democratic rulers are also the same features which make the technology so attractive. Thus, to disentangle the "positive" and "negative" aspects of Internet participation represents a challenging task for non-democratic leaderships.

The Facilitation and Threat of Ideational Pluralism

One of the defining characteristics of the Internet is the vast quantity of information located on the global computer network. Not only does an almost limitless amount of content exist in cyberspace - and the amount of on-line content is increasing at a dizzying pace - but users generally have easy passage to explore a realm where the credo is openness, variety and transparency. Numerous countries have tied their economic development programs to the Internet because of the availability of this immense amount of data.

For instance, Malaysia has formulated ambitious multibillion dollar plans to create a "Multimedia Super Corridor" in its efforts to become an Asian Silicon Valley. The appeal of downloading large quantities of economic information, the relative simplicity of establishing contacts with scientists scattered around the planet and the potential for commerce via the Internet have even attracted the participation of poor and isolated countries like Vietnam and Syria (FBIS, 1995, May 5; 1997, January 30; Malaysian Cybercity Taking Shape, Despite Crisis, 1998; Virtually Fantastic, 1997; Global Bridge to Information Age, 1997; Iritani, 1997).

While the Internet is viewed as a prime tool for obtaining national wealth and power in the Information Age, not all of the content which one can find on the Web has been seen by governments as desirable. Much as Bernard Lewis' study of the modernization and literacy drive of the late Ottoman Empire noted that "the young artillery cadet who had learnt French to read his gunnery manual could find other reading matter, more explosive and more penetrating," the computer literate individual in today's society could also discover more politically explosive material (Lewis, 1964, 33).

In fact, the content-saturated Internet creates conditions of ideational pluralism - defined as a situation in which multiple sources of ideas, images and news are widely accessible to the public. When it becomes commonplace for the citizens of a particular state to have access to a greatly expanded quantity of news, facts and ideas, governments will face greater difficulties in maintaining their hegemony over the distribution of information and ideologies in the domestic arena. The existence of ideational pluralism and the subsequent loss of hegemony represents a significant political threat to non-democratic regimes whose legitimacy and hold on power depend upon a placid domestic ideational climate. Governments of this regime type are more likely to justify their continued rule based upon an exclusivist mandate and self-serving ideological rationales rather than from some form of public accountability and are less tolerant of dissent to ruling norms and values than democracies. Since non-democratic regimes often rely upon particular interpretations of some canon and/or current events as the basis of their legitimacy, the presence of information and theories which can call into question the foundations of their authority must be viewed as threatening (Linz, 1975; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991, Walt, 1987).

However, challenges to government claims are harder to establish when few sources of information and interpretation exist outside of those controlled by the ruling leadership. Government plans to mobilize societal resources, suspend personal liberties or initiate some kind of unpopular policy are easier to rationalize to the public if the leadership can claim evidence of a tangible threat emanating from some demonized domestic group, foreign state or international organization.

Government information monopolies permit leaders to declare that life under their jurisdiction is better, safer, more prosperous, etc., than for citizens living in other countries or under different leaders, economic systems or political arrangements. For instance, the Stalin and Kim Il Sung regimes declared life under their rule to be a "socialist paradise." The statement may sound ludicrous to those who could contrast life in the Soviet Union or North Korea with somewhere else, but opportunities to make such socioeconomic comparisons did not exist for most Soviet and North Korean citizens during their (and their successors') reigns.

Therefore, governments which can regulate and filter the available supply of ideas, images and information are better equipped to preserve political stability and quell potential discontent within the polity. Unfortunately for non-democratic regimes, the political benefits mentioned above become compromised when societal actors acquire the capacity to breach the state's monopoly on information and procure knowledge of ideological alternatives and socioeconomic comparisons.

The ability to form comparisons of one's economic and political lifestyle with that of citizens in other countries or eras can be problematic when they call into question the supposed success of policies undertaken by the incumbent regime. Deriving comparisons - claims of "better" or "worse" - can only be formulated when one possesses knowledge (not necessarily accurate) of other cases. This awareness of relative deficiencies of material goods or political freedoms, and so forth, compared with counterparts living under different administrations, eras or countries can provide the stimulus for political delegitimation. As Lawrence Stone concludes in his study of the causes of internal political violence, "Human satisfaction is related not to existing conditions but to the condition of a social group against which the individual measures his situation" (Urry, 1973, 86).

Dissatisfaction with one's material or political well-being - highlighted by cross-national comparisons made via images, reports or outsider accounts found on the Web or from email - has provoked domestic elements into questioning the prerogatives, policy direction and even the legitimacy of the ruling regime. The situation for incumbent governments becomes more volatile once alternative political and economic frameworks become well-circulated throughout the polity. As Adam Przeworski and Alfred Stepan have stressed, internal regime change requires not only the collapse of the incumbent's legitimacy but the existence of alternative ideas to mobilize and guide an opposition against a sitting government (Przeworski, 1986; Przeworski, 1991; Stepan, 1990, 47-48; Bova, 1991, 123). Giovanni Sartori makes a similar point, noting that political change is less likely in societies comprised of, people who have never been offered alternatives, that is, anything to compare....Innumerable people cannot prefer something to something else because they have no "else" in sight; they simply live with and encapsulated within, the human (or inhumane) condition they find (Sartori, 1993, 103). For instance in the U.S.S.R., despite the growing problems associated with the Stalinist system of economics, governmental and academic interest or even awareness of the dynamic "East Asian" model was discouraged by Soviet Communist Party practices (Moltz, 1993). Only after considerable changes in the political climate resulting from Gorbachev's accession to power took place were radically different economic models examined by Soviet officials and somewhat instituted by the post-Soviet leadership.

Political elites often play the pivotal role in hindering or encouraging the awareness of alternatives and comparisons, but the nationwide diffusion of basic information tools like the Internet reduces the importance of government officials as "transmission belts." The availability of differing viewpoints and alternative data from sources like CNN.com or China News Digest can prompt those modem-equipped citizens into questioning the supposed necessity of certain state policies, reconsider ruling values and norms as well as highlight credibility gaps in government explanations. In this more skeptical domestic climate, the incumbent regime may come to be widely viewed as illegitimate and in need of replacement by new political actors. The government can end up weakened by this internal struggle, its power circumscribed and, ultimately, ousted from power by opposition forces.

The creation of a more ideationally-rich domestic setting is more conducive for the installation of democratic regimes, as has been argued by the growing literature on the "third wave" of global democratization, an era which has seen the replacement of non-democratic regimes with democracies over the past two decades. Samuel Huntington argues that non-democratic rule is difficult to sustain in societies where ideational pluralism exist, particularly when those less restricted flows of information result in their subjects becoming alerted to the success - or at least the emergence - of pro-democracy movements elsewhere. (Huntington, 1991, ch. 2; Huntington, 1993, 6-8). Once political entrepreneurs become cognizant of the existence and feasibility of attractive alternative political and social models, non-democratic regimes will eventually engage in destabilizing and often losing battles with popular local imitators, according to Huntington.

Likewise, Huntington and Guillermo O'Donnell have noted how "performance legitimacy" can spur political unrest and regime change when the economic achievements of non-democratic regimes are called into question by societal actors. If economic performance has become a principle source of justification for the continued rule for many of these governments, domestic perceptions of economic distress then can be quite corrosive to regimes that have little else upon which to base their continued incumbency (Huntington, 1991, 45-46, 50-53; Huntington, 1993, 4-5; O'Donnell, 1986, 15). Furthermore, economic-grounded demands for regime change have promoted political democratization, as illustrated in the case of Eastern Europe, where lifestyle comparisons were being made with the superior living standards of democratic, prosperous Western Europe and the United States.

When states permit - and, in many cases, directly assist in - the penetration of information-gathering and interactive Internet technology into the domestic sphere, the politically hazardous circumstances described by Huntington and O'Donnell are more likely to unfold. The Internet not only contains scientific and business information but is also a global repository of banned texts, a forum for wide-ranging political discussions with unlike thinkers and a vast source of news and opinions accessible to any user (Lewis, 1994; Kantrowitz, 1994; Taubman, 1995). Furthermore, national censorship rules are generally not respected by the open culture of this international computer network. As one observer of this technology has noted,

Access to alternate forms of information and, most importantly, the power to reach others with your own alternatives to the official view of events are, by their nature, political phenomena...Undeniably, cyberspace has great subversive potential (Swett, 1995). 3 Thus, the Internet provides the means for the creation of information pluralism in well-connected societies with easy links to ideological alternatives and socioeconomic comparisons.

The Interactive Internet and the Foundation of Autonomous Societal Networks

In addition to functioning as a repository of ideologies, images and information, the Internet possesses communication capabilities which permit interaction between modem-equipped users by way of email, chat rooms and Usenet groups. Additionally, Internet users experience no geographic barriers or cost differential whether conversing with someone next door, across the country or halfway across the globe.

Subsequently, a wide range of countries along the economic spectrum have devised plans to take advantage of this attribute of the Internet in order to improve government and business services, increase information flows to administrative agencies and facilitate scientific research. For example, Chinese officials expressed great interest in utilizing the Internet to connect government researchers with colleagues at foreign scientific establishments with the expectation of producing scientific leaps at reduced cost and delay. Institute for High Energy Physics (IHEP) director Xu Rongsheng stated that because of the Internet, "[Chinese scientists] are now able to send messages, publish papers, prepare for conferences and exchange ideas with their foreign colleagues in a faster and more reliable way" (FBIS, 1994, September 16).

Despite these benefits, the establishment of additional and enhanced lines of multidirectional communication has proven to be troublesome for non-democratic rulers. The same communications infrastructure which states have invested billions in order to satisfy leadership goals can also be utilized by the public for purposes which may be detrimental to the continuation of non-democratic rule. For instance, S. Frederick Starr has observed that in the late Soviet period, basic devices like telephones, radio and photocopiers, which were installed by the regime, not only enabled Soviet citizens to evade state information and communication barriers but provided them with organizational tools which could be utilized for creating informal social networks (1990).

These societies and clubs, many of which were apolitical in nature, possessed great political significance nonetheless because they were outside the realm of Party control and direction. This helped to lay the groundwork for the creation of a sphere where "society is distinct from the state" and the government is but one of several institutions coexisting in a pluralistic social fabric (Starr, 1990). Subsequently, it was in this technology-constructed "public space" where the diminishment of the Party's overweening control over Soviet life occurred as well as an ultimately fatal disintegration of the regime's authority. Similarly, there is nothing to assure non-democratic leaders that the effects stemming from the societal diffusion of information and communication tools like the Internet can be controlled by the authorities.

Where such societal autonomy (or what some social scientists term "civil society") does emerge, the power and influence of non-democratic authorities often becomes circumscribed and greatly eroded. Even if the creation of an autonomous public sphere does not result in the institutionalization of democratic practices, incumbent regimes may be threatened with irrelevance as a greater number of issue areas fall out of the purview of national authorities and into the realm of non-governmental actors. Thus, Martin Whyte argues that "Leninist political systems dedicated to a totalitarian program will try insofar as possible to prevent or limit the emergence of a civil society" (1992, 78).

The Internet possesses even greater potential than the technologies analyzed by Starr to create politically consequential public spaces which challenge the preeminence of incumbent non-democratic regimes. For instance, in late 1996, the Internet played an important facilitating role in large-scale public protests against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's decision to annul the unfavorable results of local elections. Despite the regime's control over the national media, as well as heavy-handed tactics employed against anti-government protesters, popular unrest against Milosevic emerged and persisted, due in part to the efforts of a small number of Internet-savvy activists (Bennahum, 1997).

Soon after the elections were invalidated, students and scientists in Belgrade, who comprised the bulk of the country's approximately 10,000 users, began to issue calls on local university networks for protests against the regime. In contrast to previous student-led protests against the regime, a web site was quickly established to coordinate anti-Milosevic activities. Not only did the Internet represent a key and unfettered organizational tool for regime protesters but it provided Milosevic opponents with an alternative source of reporting on the unfolding events. Cyberspace was also a safe haven for the opposition radio station B92, which had been forced off of state-run radio but was able to continue broadcasting on the Internet. 3 authorities often becomes circum

The Internet also proved to be an effective link with Western media outlets and spark overseas coverage of the uprising, which was viewed by the student protest leaders as necessary for placing additional pressure on Milosevic's authoritarian regime. 4 Furthermore, as one observer of the uprising noted, "the experience of using the Internet bolsters the idea that people can be trusted to mind their own affairs and govern themselves," which would help to undermine non-democratic rule over time (Bennahum, 1997). 5

The ease with which one can create informal social networks outside of government channels and communicate with sizable audiences via the Internet also holds for the logistics of disseminating text and literature. The political consequences of this feature of the Internet are considerable since much of the power of non-democracies stems from their tight control of the printing press and distribution networks.

For instance, during the 1978-1979 "Democracy Wall" movement in China, a number of opposition journals were printed by democratic reformers but the reach of their publications - and their longevity in the political arena - was limited by a shortage of supplies and an inability to distribute their materials to a wide audience (Kane 1981). Today, electronic underground journals like Mirror and Tunnel, which are not subject to these state-imposed barriers, have begun to appear in China and can reach a potential domestic audience of several hundred thousands as well as the larger international on-line community (Laris, 1997; Tunnel Vision On-Line, 1997). Similarly, banned publications in Indonesia have been able to skirt government press laws and have reappeared in the country via the Internet (Ismartono, 1996).

Additionally, the lack of difficulty with which Internet-based international communication is achieved can directly challenge the xenophobic rationales which many regimes have utilized to justify their continued incumbency, particularly when rulers cannot stake their legitimacy upon economic performance or universalist ideologies (like Communism). For instance, Chinese rulers have often relied upon "us-versus-them" rhetoric and "the Chinese leadership has, in the past, thrived on existing within a closed society," particularly as the current leadership has been confronted with a crisis of faith in Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought. (Rusciano, Rusciano & Wang, 1997, 19). The ability to paint images of foreign devils - and therefore the need for the incumbent regime to protect the nation against these alien forces - is compromised when citizens can formulate own assessments of foreigners via the modem.

Thus, the Internet can provide the means for ideational pluralism in the domestic arena. Incumbent non-democratic regimes often feel threatened by the availability of comparisons and alternatives which can spark unrest and demands for political change. Thus, non-democratic regimes, whose continued rule depends upon a tame political climate, have a vested interest in dealing with technologies like the Internet so as to limit the domestic repercussions of ideational pluralism.

And the proactive behavior of authorities in Beijing demonstrates their concern with unchecked societal access to the Internet. In the next section, the policies of China will be surveyed to understand how the CCP has attempted to balance its enthusiasm for the Internet with leadership concerns of how the technology could impact upon its continued rule. Furthermore, government Internet policies will demonstrate how non-democratic regimes are still learning how to manage a technology which can foster ideational pluralism and societal autonomy along the same computer networks which assist economic and scientific growth.

Creating a "China World Web": Measures and Counter-measures

Chinese interest in a domestic microelectronics-based "information revolution" had been articulated by a wide spectrum of government and Party officials in the 1980s (Hamrin, 1990). Despite the factional divisions which existed within the political leadership over the pace and political consequences of Deng Xiaoping's "Open Door" economic reform program, both conservatives and reformers could agree that if the country was to rapidly close the economic and technological gap with their East Asian neighbors as well as with the leading Western states, they would have to utilize this "class neutral technology" (Baum, 1994, 166). As then-Premier Zhao Ziyang stated in 1983, "The new technological revolution or information revolution…may help China skip over some of the stages which have been experienced by other developing countries" (Hamrin, 1990, 213).

Nonetheless, experiences with some of the basic tools of the information revolution have demonstrated the incumbent leadership's discomfort with the diffusion of technologies which permit greatly increased inflows of information into China. For instance, television had been a secure communications medium, which had been utilized by Communist authorities to beam a comfortable "socially constructed reality" to the populace. Until the mid-1980s, no private or foreign competitors existed to Chinese state programming, which was designed to reinforce and inculcate an "ideological hegemony" consistent with regime needs (Chu, 1978; Chang, Wang & Chen, 1994; Lee, 1990).

However, as Chinese television ownership grew in the 1980s as a consequence of the country's economic boom, satellite dishes began to flood into the country, subsequently expanding the number of options for Chinese viewers beyond bland state-run television (Taubman, 1997). 6 With the advent of services like STAR TV, an Asian satellite broadcasting network owned by media magnate Rupert Murdoch, Western programming became accessible to a new and intrigued audience. The Chinese government feared that losing control over the content of this formerly secure medium could lead to the diffusion of unfavorable socioeconomic comparisons and provocative ideological alternatives to the populace. And a study conducted by Chu and Ju identified that by the late 1980s, not only had foreign cultural influences become more prevalent, due in part to imported televised programming, but that those Chinese who had experienced greater exposure to Western influences were more likely to possess attitudes more critical of the CCP (1993).

The regime regarded the control of satellite reception as a "struggle against subversion," Communist authorities banned unauthorized reception and redistribution of imported programming like that offered on STAR TV. To forestall challenges to the CCP's legitimacy and policy rationales, the regime initially reacted by issuing a series of edicts banning private dish ownership but those efforts failed miserably (Chan, 1994a; Tyler, 1993; China Refuses to Switch Off, 1994).

Eventually recognizing the futility of that strategy, the government shifted its focus to working with - or pressuring - foreign content providers into removing programming deemed by the Chinese Communist Party as upsetting to their ideational hegemony. In one notable case, the Chinese government reached an agreement with Murdoch to transmit state-backed Chinese television programs on STAR TV's satellite network and to collaborate on a satellite-television venture (Brauchli, Kahn & Witcher, 1996, A4; Chan, 1994b). 7 Thus, the CCP was able to forestall to some degree a potentially dangerous influx of foreign programming onto the Chinese airwaves but government officials were uncomfortable with the heightened degree of ideational pluralism which satellite dish technology had caused.

Despite this experience, the Deng regime formulated plans to connect China with the Internet, attracted by the economic, scientific and educational potential of the medium. The "route to development in the future world" was going to be tied to the Internet, which was envisioned as becoming integral to the functioning of a modern economy. As Li Xeng, the lead architect of the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) has stated, "If China doesn't have this information technology that we are developing here, then China cannot develop" (Johnson & Liu, 1995). Government officials eagerly expected that their investment in computers, modems and high-speed connections would permit China "to share information freely and enable the country to fully join in the worldwide sharing of information and high technology" (FBIS, 1994, September 16, November 30). 8

China's experience with the Internet began in earnest in May 1994, when they became the 71st country to register onto the global computer network (FBIS, 1994, May 9, September 16; December 28). 9 Few public expressions of concern were expressed during this "early" era of the Internet, though one Chinese official did note that the country would need to "find a suitable road with Chinese characteristics" (FBIS, 1994, November 30).

Over the next twelve months, the government enthusiastically supported the creation and rapid expansion of the information superhighway into China as a growing number of educational institutions, urban centers and scientific establishments were linked to this global computer network (FBIS, 1994, August 31; September 6; October 12; October 30; 1995, March 29). The growth of the Internet (and government funding for its expansion) continued apace with the launch of Chinanet in mid-1995, a new Chinese Internet service provider which was the product of a joint venture between the CCP and Sprint.

The extension of the country's first nationwide network, CERNET, to a growing number of academic institutions also occurred during this time. Beijing authorities estimated that there were 2,000 users via the country's one international connection by early mid-1995 and the number of Internet users had increased to at least 40,000 by 1996. 10

However, China's relaxed attitude towards the diffusion of Internet technology into the country dissipated by mid-1995. The CCP began to consider the consequences of decreased state control over the domestic supply of information and political dialogue which broadened societal access to this technology could foster. As with other forms of telecommunication and media, the government felt that their incumbency would be more secure if they possessed greater influence over the content which could be viewed by the Chinese citizenry on the Internet.

Thus, in response to the potential advent of ideational pluralism - made possible by the government's own investment in Internet-related infrastructure - central and regional authorities began to issue directives requiring that those Chinese interested in logging onto cyberspace obtain approval by various government agencies. The tone of government officials shifted to more ominous pronouncements about the necessity to restrict societal access to this technology, particularly as worries grew about the ability of Chinese dissidents to utilize the Internet to agitate against the government (FBIS, 1995, March 20). As Wu Jichuan, minister of Post and Telecommunications, stated in reference to the Internet in June 1995, "networking does not mean that all information will be allowed to flow in. As a sovereign nation, China must strengthen information management" (FBIS, 1995, June 21).

An additional and unexpected problem confronted the CCP due to their aggressive efforts to expand Internet connections to Chinese campuses as scholars have identified the appearance and strengthening of autonomous societal networks relatively independent of CCP control, a significant change from more than four decades of Communist practice. This autonomy has primarily been located in the economic sphere, stemming from the economic reforms initiated by the Deng regime. While the CCP has deliberately tried to reduce the role of the state in domestic economic matters, they (like their pre-revolutionary predecessors) have not been so apt to cede political or cultural influence to non-state actors (Strand, 1990; Keyser, 1997; Whyte, 1992; Chamberlain 1993).

Communist Party authorities have been confronted with evidence of how the Internet could facilitate a diminishing of their political influence over Chinese society. For example, a Chinese student had posted a message on a computer bulletin board calling for a demonstration at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to protest Japanese actions concerning the Diaoyu Islands (or what Japan refers to as the Senkaku Islands), a chain of small islands whose possession is disputed. The electronic message, which was posted at 200 Chinese universities, quickly spread and lead to a petition drive on numerous campuses as well as demonstrations in Hong Kong. While CCP authorities may have agreed with the sentiments of the Diaoyu activists, they were taken aback by the independent show of protest arranged by computer means (Mufson, 1996).

Therefore, the Internet is a tool which possesses great potential for societal entrepreneurs to reach and mobilize sizable audiences without government assistance or forewarning. 11 Given that students and scientists, who have a long history of challenging the status quo and the Chinese political leadership, are the most likely groupings in the country to have access to the Internet, improving the organizational capacity of these politically-active elements represents a potentially dangerous situation (Spence, 1990; Phillips, 1996).

While Beijing formulated no plans to impose a complete ban on public access to the Web or email, government policy since 1995 has engaged in a delicate balancing act by attempting to filter objectionable content from the Internet while simultaneously increasing Chinese access to the medium. A broad range of strategies were employed or under consideration by regional and national authorities in their efforts to prevent Internet-based ideational pluralism from appearing.

As an example of this somewhat paradoxical strategy, plans to expand Internet connections to all provincial capitals in February 1996 coincided with a revived government campaign to restrict the flow of pornographic and political information via these domestic conduits (FBIS, 1996, February 7; February 14b; February 15; March 6; May 7; May 22). 12 Contradictory policies of fang and shou - reform and retrenchment - have been simultaneously pursued as the government has attempted to regulate Chinese access to the Internet which would allows the state to curb the influx of provocative alternatives and comparisons without denying China the fruits of this new technology.

The PRC Interim Regulations Governing the Management of International Computer Networks, the first comprehensive set of rules issued by the Deng government, attempted to strike that balance by aiming for the "healthy development of international computer information exchanges." Criminal activities on the Internet were defined as activities "prejudicial to state security…or public order" (FBIS, 1996, February 8). 13 The official definition of "criminal" activities provided for in the regulations captures the broader CCP concerns of the use of the technology, encompassing not only the leakage of state secrets and the dissemination of pornographic materials by way of the Internet but of broader ideational considerations.

Soon after the regulations were promulgated, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications was (publicly) assigned the task of "closely monitoring" activity along international channels (FBIS, 1996, February 15). As disapproving articles were being written in the Chinese press about "information invasions" and "information warfare," regional and national authorities embarked upon expanded efforts to require Internet users and electronic publishers to register with the authorities or face criminal penalties (FBIS, 1996, February 14b; February 20a; February 20b; Beijing Seeks Control over Electronic Information Flow, 1995).

The creation of a more intimidating climate for Web surfers and emailers, according to one public security official, represented "the first step that China is taking to bring the Internet under proper control. It will be followed by a number of more comprehensive regulations." (FBIS, 1996, February 15). And coupled with policies to encourage greater self-censorship among Chinese Internet users, the regime allocated resources towards the development of technical measures - hardware and software - designed to enhance state capacity to delimit the amount of information available to Chinese Internet users.

These efforts to combat ideational pluralism with technical measures, however, had to bear in mind that the Internet is a decentralized medium. The Internet was originally designed by the U.S. Department of Defense to survive military attacks and was constructed with features of redundancy (or "dynamic routing"). Due to this design feature, information can be transmitted on the Internet along multiple channels, enabling the system to function if some links becomes inoperable.

However, centralized entry points to the Internet do exist where governments can concentrate their containment efforts. An initial strategy considered by the CCP focused upon restricting the supply of international telephone lines needed to log onto the system, with a particular emphasis on connections with the United States, the main Internet hub (FBIS, 1995, May 25). That approach proved to be problematic and the Chinese government shifted its focus upon the nation's Internet service providers (which had increased to 32 as of mid-1997) which represent the "bridge" for most local users to the global computer network (Barmé and Ye, 1997).

In a tactic similar to what some parents have employed on their home computers, governments attempting to block access to particular sites or remove taboo topics have installed software onto the service providers located within national borders. Filter software blocks individual requests to specific addresses containing state-designated undesirable pornographic and political material. 14

Sites which have been targetted by the Chinese authorities have included English-language sites sponsored by the American news media, Chinese-language sites featuring news and commentaries from Taiwan, overseas dissident and Free Tibet sites and other locations suspected of carrying "spiritual pollution," the Party term for unapproved foreign ideas and information (Chen, 1996). To ensure that the routes which all Chinese web surfers and emailers employed to join the information superhighway contained these necessary safeguards, the Deng regime banned private Internet service providers, thus "steering the flow of electronic information through officially controlled ports" (Fluendy, 1996; Barmé and Ye, 1997; FBIS, 1996, February 8).

The Chinese regime initiated an additional line of defense, analogous to systems employed by private companies, by developing a self-contained Intranet national computer network with firewalls - or NetWall as it is more popularly known in the country - which would keep out unapproved computer links. According to this novel strategy of content control, Chinese users would have relatively unrestricted - though monitored - access to each other but closely screened links with the world beyond (Barmé and Ye, 1997; Kahn, Chen & Brauchli, 1996; FBIS, 1997, April 21).

With some fanfare the China World Web (CWW) was introduced in October 1996 as "China's first nationwide Intranet" that was designated to be a "golden bridge" for Chinese businesses to the information superhighway. Built with the assistance of Sun Microsystems and other foreign commercial suppliers, the Xinhua news agency (the official government news agency and a part-owner in the venture) lauded the CWW as "an economic information network with Chinese characteristics designed for Chinese users."

The CWW was described as being able to "effectively control information passing in and out of China including selected content from the Internet translated into Chinese," which would satisfy government hopes of sharing in the commercial benefits of this new technology without provocative material slipping in (FBIS, 1996, October 22a; October 22b; October 29; 1997, January 14). More recently, the same developers of the CWW have announced plans for an additional "National Intranet," which will link 50 Chinese cities (FBIS, 1997, May 5). Thus, the regime seems to be committed to expanding the presence of the Intranet as a means of protecting the domestic arena from spiritual pollution without shunning the technology altogether. 15

However, none of these measures adopted by the CCP can be considered foolproof given the decentralized nature of the Internet. A number of computer experts have noted that while the routes to the Internet can be controlled to some degree by the government, "…you only need one (unauthorized entrant) and the damage will be done" (FBIS, 1995, May 25). Moreover, the technical measures described above can be circumvented by computer users possessing some programming expertise (Fluendy, 1996). 16

Once someone is logged onto the Internet, he or she can access information banned locally by entering into a foreign computer network where similar prohibitions do not apply. To make matters worse for a concerned government, that individual could download any interesting information onto his or her home computer and transmit that material with little difficulty to a large and dispersed number of fellow computer-equipped Chinese.

Furthermore, at least 70,000 different routes around the major nodes of the Internet exist and when one is blocked, messages are automatically channelled onto a different route. If the Chinese authorities program large numbers of routers - the computers or programs that steer data requests from a user to a host computer where the data is stored - to block certain addresses, bottlenecks could be created that could dramatically slow the flow of all data, "good" and "bad" (Fluendy, 1996).

Additionally, according to Chris Kern, a computer expert at the Voice of America (VOA), an organization whose web site has been targetted by the Chinese government, such measures have been circumvented by foreign universities and other institutions. These organizations simply copy the contents of the VOA web site and make it available on the Internet through their own sites. Thus, even if the CCP blocks the address of the VOA web site, Chinese users can view the forbidden material at a different and perhaps uncensored site (Mufson 1996).

An added problem for government censors is the sheer volume of content available on the Internet to oversee, particularly with the number of web sites doubling every 53 days (The Accidental Superhighway, 1995). 17 Just between December 1996 and mid-February 1997, the size of the World Wide Web doubled from one trillion to two trillion bytes of data, according to Markoff (1997a). Meanwhile it is estimated that a staggering 6.9 trillion e-mail messages will be sent in the year 2000, a sharp increase from the already large 2.7 trillion messages that were sent in 1997. 18 Efforts to expand and improve Chinese access to the Internet have produced the desired results - as many as 600,000 Chinese were estimated to have accounts by the end of 1997 (FBIS, 1997, December 29; Long Road Ahead for Internet Access to Gain Popularity in China, 1997). 19

The growth in the number of Chinese users and the subsequent increase in cyber-traffic threatens to outstrip the regime's capacity to monitor users and observe whether they are visiting forbidden sites or emailing "disruptive" individuals. Internet control-minded countries like Singapore - whose methods have been studied by PRC officials - have quickly discovered that it is a trying task to keep up with the number of new sites being established and even innocuous sites which pass the muster of the government could contain links to sites containing taboo material or act as a gateway to those sites (FBIS, 1996, July 13; Mufson, 1996, Rodan, 1996). As one Chinese user pointed out, [I]f you really want to find stuff, then you'll get through the wall…and it's easy to get access through sites in northern Europe or Japan. Once you hit upon one, you just take a trip round the neighborhood through links they provide and you've got yourself a gold mine (Barmé and Ye, 174). Thus, even as the government has engaged in a multi-pronged effort to contain the negative consequences of the Internet, the state-funded diffusion of Internet connections continued briskly, which is partly a function of the expansion concurrently promoted by national and regional government bodies.

Not only have more regions acquired connections to the global computer network, but the development of a Chinese-English translation system has made it easier for Chinese users to understand the English-language dominated Web, which also happens to be the primary language of many of the forbidden sites and emailers on the system (FBIS, 1998, February 9; To Make the Net Speak Chinese: Emerging Chinese-Language Information Services, 1997). The government has also established a number of joint ventures (with American companies such as Microsoft, ATT and Hayes) in order to overcome some of the technical difficulties afflicting local users such as low speeds in information transmission and a lack of high-quality information services offered in Chinese (New PRC Internet Regulation, 1998; FBIS, 1997, September 11; 1996, June 28; July 8; October 25; November 12; November 15; November 21).

While the CCP generally adopted an aggressive, bullish posture towards the Internet in 1997, the tone of Chinese pronouncements by the end of the year had become uncertain. Discussions once more reappeared in the official press about the need "to establish laws, rules and ethics in accordance with its own social background to govern the use of the Internet" even as the government was holding conferences to implement measures to increase the use of information technology and development (FBIS, 1997, November 4, December 16). Even as an assistant minister of Public Security was terming the Internet as an indispensable tool for China's development and national defense, he also announced the promulgation of new state regulations - "Administrative Measures for Ensuring the Security of Computer Information Network, the Internet" - to ensure the "safe and effective management of computer information networks." The new rules banned the use of the Internet to "split the country" (CCP terminology applied to supporters of the Dalai Lama or for Taiwanese independence), "defaming governent agencies" or "damage state interests." Some site bans were renewed, criminal punishments were strengthened and on-line dissident journals were expected to face increased scrutiny by goverment security organs (FBIS, 1997, December 29, December 30; Laris, 1997; Eckholm, 1997).

Hong Kong's director general of telecommunications stated that the new regulations would not apply to the special administrative region, but Chinese treatment of Hong Kong's dynamic Internet network represents a telling case of the CCP's efforts to reconcile the goals of maintaining political stability and exploiting the dynamism of this global computer network. Hong Kong possesses a greater level of interconnectivity and more service providers than the mainland and, before the 1997 handover, liberal rules on telecommunications (Lovelock, 1996).

The economy of Hong Kong is heavily dependent upon its access to international data and communication links. And, according to the managers of several local service providers, Chinese censors would face a daunting technical challenge to monitor all of the Internet traffic passing through the new special administrative region.

So far, the pattern with Hong Kong has been similar with that of the rest of the country. Telecommunication links have rapidly expanded between Hong Kong and the mainland, particularly with southern China, highlighted by the addition of the first high-speed Internet backbone connection in mid-1997 between the regions (FBIS, 1997, June 19, July 10). However, there has also been evidence of government action against Hong Kong Internet service providers and concerns that changes in local laws pertaining to civil protest, privacy and rights to maintain links with foreign organizations could have a chilling effect on the Internet (Nameth, 1997). Chinese policy in highly-wired society could also be tested by the actions of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong, who have already established a cyberspace presence (FBIS, 1997, June 18).

Conclusion

While non-democratic governments have exhibited considerable interest in the Internet, they have also been keenly aware of the havoc that this information and communication tool can introduce into the domestic arena by providing the technical means for societal forces to gain access to destabilizing alternatives and comparisons. Non-democracies whose continued incumbency relies upon maintaining hegemony over the domestic supply of information and preempting political pluralism have shown a penchant towards adopting proactive measures to limit the diffusion of information technology and/or shape the content available via these devices.

The Chinese government has tried to square the circle, by expanding the presence of the Internet in the country while continuing to develop measures to control what and who their citizens can and cannot access in cyberspace. However, considering the rapid pace of the diffusion of the Internet and related tools, the growth in on-line content providers as well as the decentralized and increasingly inexpensive nature of the technology, governments like the CCP will have a trying time preventing Internet-driven information pluralism without incurring significant economic and political problems in the process.

Given that they have not fully solved the domestic political problems associated with greater Internet access, the temptation for the Chinese regime to intervene in the realm of cyberspace will never cease. Despite the intentions of regimes like the CCP, though, non-democratic sway over the ideational and organizational character of domestic affairs will be diminished as a result of the Internet.

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NOTES

Note 1: A survey conducted in September 1997 found that the number of host computers connected to the Internet had grown to 26 million, from 14.7 million a year earlier. The number of computers connected to the Internet is expected to expand to 100 million computers by 2000. See Markoff 1997b and Swett 1995. Back.

Note 2: For assorted government efforts against Internet pornography, see Lewis 1996, Andrews 1997, Bensley 1996 and Joshi 1996. Back.

Note 3: For similar arguments, see Kedzie, 1996, 1-3, 10-11. B-92 can be heard at "http://www.b92eng.opennet.org/". Back.

Note 4: As Milan Bozic, a university professor and member of the Serbian political opposition, observed, Media is the main issue of our political struggle," he says. "The people in the street know that they must get Western media attention. Without CNN, no doubt we would fail. That the media is here is one of our best successes. The Internet has helped get them here, and bring us more attention (Bennahun, 1997). Back.

Note 5: Similarly, a Serbian activist viewed the Internet as a key element for "emboldening the protests by showing, once and for all, that the regime no longer has a monopoly on information, or on people's thoughts." Back.

Note 6: TV ownership in China increased from less than 1 set per 100 individuals in 1978 to 16.2 in 1990 (Chan, 1994a, 71). Back.

Note 7: Murdoch had stated, soon after purchasing STAR TV in 1993 that "satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels." A few years later in response to Chinese pressure, Murdoch dropped BBC programming from STAR TV's broadcasting menu into China, due to CCP concerns about societal access to alternative (i.e. critical) British interpretations of news events (Brauchli et al., 1996). Back.

Note 8: In addition to the potential economic benefits which the government expected to accrue from hooking in to the Internet, non-democratic regimes have regarded the Internet as another potential channel of influence into the individual computer-equipped households located in their realm. Much as non-democratic rulers have viewed the radio and television as opportunities to champion particular values and norms, as well as propaganda, to society, an Internet under secure government control can be used for similar purposes. Back.

Note 9: China did have a limited connection with the Internet, resulting from the establishment of a linkage between IHEP and the European Center on Nuclear Research in 1988 (FBIS, 1994, September 16). Back.

Note 10: Those figures do not include unregistered Internet users. Schmetzer (1996) cites estimates that up to five times as many people are pirating the system. Back.

Note 11: Furthermore, given the unimportance of geography in cyberspace communication, Chinese leaders cannot as effectively utilize the strategy of exiling domestic trouble-makers. A number of Chinese activists living abroad have established sites on the Internet which are now accessible on the mainland and emailing with the locals is a simple task compared to other forms of contact (FBIS, 1995, March 20). Back.

Note 12: It is interesting to note that parallels were drawn in the Chinese press between CCP efforts to control pornographic material on the Internet with that of American and British strategies. See FBIS, 1996, February 14a, July 11. Back.

Note 13: Slightly amended Internet management regulations were issued by the government in May 1997. See FBIS, 1997, May 30. Back.

Note 14: Microsoft's Chinese-version of Window NT 4.0 software, launched in January 1997, allowed further controls on access to particular sites on the Internet (China Internet Censorship, 1996; Dickie, 1997). Microsoft Regional Marketing Director Fernando de Sousa defended the software version, claiming that "You could call it censorship...(but) there's nothing different in our Chinese product than in our English versions" and that ways to control Internet access existed in Western markets as well. Back.

Note 15: The government has also devoted resources towards the creation of the "Yinghaiwei Cyberspace" network, a Chinese-language Intranet service described as a "brand new means of communications and style of life" whose content, subscribers and connections are limited to eight Chinese cities. See FBIS, 1996, November 4. Back.

Note 16: For a discussion on the use of encryption techniques and steganography (hiding messages in innocuous text) for evading government Internet controls in China and Singapore, see Internet Censorship Likely to Fail, 1996. Back.

Note 17: The Wall Street Journal estimated in September 1997 that 125,000 new web addresses are created each month. Back.

Note 18: See the Internet Index, "www.openmarket.com" for estimates on Internet volume. Back.

Note 19: The growth is Internet access is matched by the growth in computer ownership by the Chinese population. See China Home Computer Use Seen Swelling in Future, 1997 and Tefft, 1996. Back.