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Relations Between Japan and Other Late-Developing Countries in the Context of the Westphalian System

Rebecca Spyke
University of South Carolina

International Studies Association

March 18-21, 1998

The world as it has existed since the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century has developed in a manner that differs from previous periods of history in several ways. It is composed of a system of an increasing number of sovereign states. These states were first established in the West and, through the spread of the system, the cultures of Africa, Latin America, and Asia have also formed into these sovereign state units. Japan provides an interesting case for it was never colonized by the West yet has struggled since its reopening to the world in the 19th century to become like a Western state yet maintain its unique Japanese culture.

A culture is, as Clifford Geertz explains, a "web of significance." 1 It is a people who find shared meaning in, as Donald Puchala writes, the "utilitarian, social, political, moral, aesthetic, mystical or sacred -- in the artefacts, institutions, ideas, symbols, myths, and rituals that enter their lives." 2 A civilization contains a culture. By culture, we usually mean high culture, or that contained in the elite group of the people. Civilizations are similar to each other in structure, for they structure their economic resources and divisions of labor to make urban dwelling possible and that enable elites to separate themselves from daily subsistence activities and concentrate on intellectual and creative activities. 3 Civilizations exist in space, as they typically are centered in a certain geographical location, and in time, usually a long period of time, over which they rise and ebb, sometimes to rise again, and eventually fall apart.

Although civilizations are structurally similar to one another, their elites have world views and histories conceived by them that usually portray the civilization as unique, as morally superior, as sophisticated. These aspects of civilizations, as explored by Edward Said and others, and as will be examined later in this paper, have pushed more powerful civilizations in the modern era to colonize and subsume others, both in terms of culture and geographical location. 4 The culture of the Western civilization has in its philosophy and sense of purpose been one where it has considered itself morally obligated to spread what it has learned to other, more ignorant cultures. Western civilization has also been internally divisive and conflictual, and its countries in the form of states have competed against one another by attempting to conquest foreign parts of the world before other states of the West and convert these cultures to the ways of the West.

The Western civilization has been in the modern era the most powerful, and its culture breeds a mentality of expansion converting others to its ways and subsuming others under its power. Other cultures have had to assume the form of sovereign states, the world unit conceived by the West, in order to keep from being excluded from the world system or subsumed by those more powerful cultures in the West. As Hedley Bull and Adam Watson write, "The very conception of the entry of non-European states into international society, conceived as a process whereby candidates were accepted by the original members, prepared and finally deemed to have graduated, took for granted a world directorate of European states." 5

Japan provides a unique example. After its reopening to the West in the 19th century, Japan did everything possible to become similar to the West. Instead of adapting the unit of state after being colonized by the West, it tried to become as Western as possible purposely. Certainly, the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry was a demonstration of US strength and might, but Japan was not utilized as a trading post as China was, nor was it divided up amongst Western powers as Africa and Latin America. Japan was not forced to assume the unit of state in its international dealings. Rather, it saw that becoming like the West was the best means of joining the world as a great power rather than being overtaken by the world.

Assuming the form of a state, however, was not enough. Sovereignty, or recognition of the power and independence of the state by both the domestic constituency and the international society, was required. Japan, as will be seen, had difficulty gaining acceptance as a sovereign state on par with the West. Try as it might, Japan was seen as non-West, as lower on the international hierarchy than Europe and the United States, and this experience combined with Japan's history and culture to create a state apparatus and world view that inevitably differed from those of the West. The case of Japan therefore affirms that a state is not a state try as it might to conform to the conceptualization of state in the West. A state comes from the culture and history of the place where it is born, and grows and develops according to this culture as well as how it is perceived and treated by both the international system and by the West.

Japanese international relations also became expansive and imperialistic in the late 19thand early 20th centuries in order to become like the West, but its lack of acceptance into the Great Power club incurred wrath rather than acceptance. Its post-World War II international relations are greatly affected by these events. Japan continues to strive for acceptance by the powers of the United States and Europe while at the same time attempting to maintain its uniqueness. Japan's experience with imperialism was a failure, and so it has striven for great power through economic rather than military means. Yet, Japan has tried to show that it is actively striving towards the same goals in the world as the West, those of anti-communism, free trade, and the maintenance of world peace under the umbrella of international organizations and the United States. These aspects of Japan's world goals greatly affect the context of Japanese international relations both with Western and non-Western countries.

Similar to Japan, the cultures of Africa have had great difficulty attaining respect and legitimacy in this international system established by the West. In contrast with Japan, Africa has had to assume a low place in the international hierarchy. If Keohane and Nye's definition of power is used where power is possessing a large amount of fungible resources as well as intangible aspects such as the ability to make the rules of the game and persuade others to follow those rules, then Africa has very little power and Japan has the power of wealth but not the power to persuade.

Both Japan and Africa have assumed the form of the state. Some of the cultures of Africa have assumed the form of state unproblematically, but many others have had great difficulty managing their political systems domestically and in the international system. The manner in which the unit of state has been manifested in these countries is quite different from the West due to different cultures and historical experiences. It is difficult to focus on Africa without discussing its relations with the West. Much can also be learned by focusing on relations between Africa and another non-Western culture to determine whether these cultures interacting with one another in the modern form of state still manifest their own histories and cultures and therefore interact with another differently than they do with the West or as the West deals with them.

Japanese relations with Africa will be the focus for these relations are rarely considered in previous literature and therefore attention is merited. These are relations between two non-Western civilizations who throughout the 19th and 20th centuries have been on different paths of development with cultures that both differ from those of the West. These civilizations are two quite different examples of development of non-Western civilizations within the context of the world domination of the Westphalian state system established by the West. Although several studies have examined relations between the West and Japan and between the West and Africa, few have looked at the relations between Africa and Japan. Both Africa and Japan have been greatly affected by the world system as constructed by the West, and in their international relations they have assumed the structures of states. We can examine their relations with one another to see how their cultures manifest themselves in these state units.

The main question to be answered in this paper is, how does Japan fit into the current world system that was established by the West, and how can interactions between Japan and other non-Western cultures, particularly Africa, help us deepen our understanding of the world system?

It will be argued by examining Japan and Africa that the cultures of the non-Western world have adapted the unit of the state as a matter of necessity, for the expansion of Western society also brought the concept of state to other cultures. These newer states superimposed the state on top of existing political and cultural units, and the state then melded with these non-Western cultures to form non-Western types of states. Japan will be seen as a unique example of a non-Western culture that actively adopted the unit of state to become similar to a Western power while maintaining its own unique heritage. Through the examination of Japan and Africa, it will be shown that a state is not a homogeneous unit that is similar across space and time, but rather, the conception that many cultures took on in order to be able to interact with the international system. 6

First, we must examine the world as structured by the dominant Western civilization. Then, we shall explore the rise of the Japanese civilization and how it interacts with the developing or re-emerging civilizations of Africa within this context established by the West.

 

The Rise of the Modern State System

The units of the present world order are states, and these units were defined and the world perceived as constructed of these units by the Western civilization. States are defined as entities marked by specific borders and thereby having defined territory, having a system of government which oversees this territory, having a people whose identity becomes that of members of a group that lays claim to this territory, and whose borders are acknowledged by the other states around them. 7 The Peace of Westphalia created an international system in which these states recognized each other as such, and therefore the concept of sovereignty was born.

Structuralists such as Waltz argue that late-developing societies became states like those in the West through a process of socialization that encourages cultures to become similar to one another in their political forms so that they can interact in the world state system. 8 What is not mentioned by the structuralists is that states may not always act in similar ways in their international relations because the concept of state cannot be divorced from the culture and history from which it sprung.

The seventeenth century, if one examines the art, the intellectual writings, and the institutions that were formed, was the beginning of the Golden Era of Western civilization. 9 The civilization was reaching its height as urban centers were created and the elite were able to produce intellectual and aesthetic works that were perceived by the culture as so wondrous that the ideas of the culture must be spread to others. The major institutional creation produced was the system of sovereign states.

This institutional creation was supported by the intellectual conceptions of natural law and social contract. The concept of natural law, if it is understood literally, means that all humans have certain rights merely by the fact that they were born as human until they do something that justifies the authoritative taking away of those rights. 10 Yet, natural law was thought before the twentieth century to not apply to those non-Christian peoples of Africa and Asia. For, since these peoples were never educated about the existence of natural law, this justified the expansion of the countries of the West into these regions to bring them into the fold of civilized society.

It was thought that, as Western civilization had this superior knowledge, it could be spread to the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa as a matter of course. If all of humankind existed under natural law, once these other peoples were educated in its tenets, a universal international society could exist, with those who first saw the light the true way of the world, the West, as its leaders.

Additionally, those societies such as Japan that had their own form of government associated with a territory not only had no idea about natural law, but their governments were formed separate from the idea of a social contract. The members of the society did not agree to give up the rights given them under natural law to form a state because they did not know about the existence of this natural law. Therefore, the governments could not be considered by the West to be legitimate and sovereign, and these Western societies were justified in overtaking these native governments and establishing just, right governments that developed the correct way, by Western, civilized peoples.

These peoples could only join the international system if they somewhat resembled those already in it. The world's cultures therefore had to become states to interact with the world. As the world was not all in the form of states with sovereignty recognized by the West, the colonization of these non-Western peoples proceeded. Under colonization, the concepts of state and of sovereignty were spread. Cultures necessarily changed under colonization, both in the West and in the Third World, into ones in which the unit of the state became the dominant paradigm. Those peoples who were eventually decolonized therefore began to assume the form of states in order to participate in an international system formed in the 17th century.

China did have a well-formed set of shared meanings within its elite, but these meanings did not contain the conceptions of state and sovereignty as in the West. China exported its culture to the peoples in Asia, as it was at a much higher stage of cultural development, but its perspective included the view of China as the center of the world, with no centralized state as an institution in the 17th century.

India dispersed much of its cultural thoughts and artefacts to South and Southeast Asia where the cultures combined with the Chinese to begin to form a hybridized Asian culture in these regions. These maturing cultures in Asia, then, had views of the world in which China was at the center and therefore interacting with the non-Asian world was not part of their perspective, or, like India, there was no desire at that time to establish a world system.

It was the culture of the Western civilization that was at its height with an institution that would change the world forever. The conviction that the "civilized" or Western world could be divided into states and these states could trade with one another and aid each other in battle was so convincing that it was thought, rightly, that the entire world would eventually be that way. These institutions were backed by the tenet of first natural law and then social contract, two ideas that also seemed so right to the West that other conceptions of the nature of and interactions between humans were not even considered.

India due to lack of centralized authority and elites who were divided amongst different cultures within India was unable to resist colonization by the West. After decolonization, the indigenous cultures re-emerged, changed by their influence from the West, but the core kernels of their cultures were intact with suppressed aspects coming back to life. Unfortunately, the divisions amongst the elite due to the many cultures existing in India also re-emerged, causing violent clashes up to the present day. 11

The Western redrawing of the political map in India and elsewhere is often pointed out as one of the major reasons why in India, Africa, and elsewhere troubles exist today. What this paper will hopefully add to the debate is that relations between non-Western cultures can be better understood within the context of the Western state system as this system and the non-Western cultures themselves have changed through time and space. The concentration in international relations has been so much on the West that the fact that these non-Western cultures are both actors and reactors, that they are entities separate yet profoundly influenced by Western civilization is hardly mentioned.

Interaction between the West and Japan and China at this time was quite interesting. China was a civilization with quite different and well-formed conceptions of authority, institutions, and aestheticism than the West. When China encountered the West, the different conceptions clashed. As the West was a proselytizing culture that thought of others unlike them as less sophisticated, they attempted to overtake China and absorb it. China's well-developed culture rebelled against this notion and war resulted, leading to its partial colonization by the West. However, after decolonization, the unique conceptions previously designed in China re-emerged, albeit in a world system of states established by the Western civilization.

Japanese encounters with the West will be considered in the next section. It will be argued that Japan presents a special civilizational case, for it closed itself off from encounters with the West from the 17th to the 19th centuries, allowing it to develop in a manner only indirectly influenced by the West. After its reopening, its brushes with the West caused conflict as well as growth in a manner different from the rest of the developing world, leading to its current role in the international system. As this role is examined, its relations with the non-Western world particularly with Africa from a cultural perspective will be discussed.

 

The Development of Japan

Japan met all the qualifications of being a state. In the 16th and 17th centuries Japan had well-defined borders because of its island nation status, it had a people who identified themselves as Japanese and belonging to this territory, and the Japanese recognized the shogunate as their leaders. The other geographical entities of Asia such as China also acknowledged the identity of Japan as a distinct country. However, Japan could not be called a state until it was specifically recognized as such by those nations that controlled the world system. As the international system was forming under the Peace of Westphalia, Japan was closing itself off from the Western world. It was then reopened in the nineteenth century and became so linked to the West that its repudiation by Europe and the US was part of the reason it pursued its policies of expansion into Asia in the early twentieth century.

Many current authors of Japanese international relations and foreign policy ignore this history of Japan. They begin their studies after World War II and implicitly assume that the structure of government as formed after 1945 can be examined and explanations of the making and policies of Japanese international relations can be found. It will be shown that a large factor that enters into Japan's current international relations and aid policy is its history in which it was first closed off to the West, then forcibly opened by the West, then as it struggled to become a powerful part of the international system it did not create but in which it grew to desire a rightful place. Japan's experience with the Western world of states has developed its particular distrustful view of the world while also influencing its desire to be recognized by the West as powerful and able enough to be a member of it. Japan's particular view of the world and its place in it has formed its relations with other late-developing countries, which is manifested in its distancing itself politically and diplomatically from these regions and in the quite large amount of aid it disperses selectively to these countries.

It will be shown that Japan's relations are formed by the Western system differently from most other developing countries, and therefore Japan's international relations with both the West and the Third World are international encounters of a third, hybridized kind. 12 Japan's world view and actions are informed by its history, its culture, and consequently by its view of and treatment by the world.

Seizaburo Sato explains that Japanese foreign policy is characterized by the following traits:

  1. A strong sense of belonging to the Japan and the Japanese race, coupled with deep-rooted feelings of inferiority;
  2. An intense concern with improving the country's international status;
  3. A deep anxiety over being isolated internationally;
  4. A desire to conform to world trends;
  5. An emotional commitment to Asia, which has resulted in a focusing of attention on that region. 13

As Sato explains, Japan has never been subjugated by another culture except during the post-World War II occupation, therefore its indigenous culture has remained relatively intact, with other cultures supplementing it but not replacing it. Not only the cultural relics but the people themselves have remained to the present day ethnically homogeneous demonstrating the very limited melding of cultures on the Japanese archipelago. Japan was able to remain relatively isolated from the world due to its geographical position separate from mainland Asia yet close enough to China that, when Western powers had to use limited resources to conquer Asia, they chose the richer country of China rather than small, resource-poor Japan. The two hundred years in which Japan was closed off from the West enabled it to continue in its cultural development without being subsumed by the greater powers. This period was vital in the formation of the Japanese culture along a path diverging from the West.

Yet, Japan has been well aware of the existence of other cultures throughout its history, and has striven to become as advanced as them. Since it has never been subjugated under another culture except during the post-World War II occupation, it was able to study and adopt what it saw as desirable from others, without becoming too close to that culture for fear of losing both its cultural independence and uniqueness. This process of selective borrowing from admired cultures that were acknowledged as more highly advanced than Japan while maintaining a safe distance from them to preserve Japanese uniqueness has led to the Japanese sense of cultural pride while at the same time feeling inferior to others.

Japan has attempted to resolve this contradiction. As Sato writes, Japan strives to, "separate an advanced culture from the society that had produced it--and to elevate culture to a universal principle transcending both time and place, and to use that principle as a standard by which to relativize existing conditions in the advanced nations; or alternatively, to pay attention only to specific parts of the advanced cultures and to catch up with them in that particular area." 14 Japan therefore attempted in some instances to separate the things produced by a culture from the people who produced the cultural artefacts, thereby utilizing what it needed from the culture without giving credit due to the intellectuals within the more advanced culture for their wondrous productions. Japan also in other instances focused on one particular area of an advanced culture with which Japan wanted to catch up. By dissecting other cultures, Japan did not need to deal with its inferiority; it just dealt with certain tangible aspects of other cultures for which it could strive.

This conflict between a sense of inferiority and an intense sense of national pride has been at the center of Japanese foreign relations throughout history. As will be shown in the next chapter, the conflict has also helped paint the context of Japanese relations with the developing world.

Japanese society has also been established according to a relatively rigid hierarchy, with groups ranked socially and the government at the top, removed from society. This view has led to a view of the state not at the center of society, but positioned on top of it, guiding it from that point. 15 International relations were also viewed hierarchically, with Japan well aware of its position in it. This extreme sensitivity to Japan's international status has also greatly affected how it interacts with the world. As Sato explains, to raise Japan's international status, it had to be seen as a recognized member of the group of states, as a civilized country on par with the West that could participate in international organizations and meetings and could enter treaties equally with the West. 16 Therefore, revision of the unequal treaties that had been concluded with the West in the 1850's and 1860's became imperative, as did Japan's defeat against a European country in the Russo-Japanese War, making it number eight out of the eight great powers of the world. Even the Washington Naval Treaty, with terms unfavorable to Japan, still showed that Japan had the third most powerful navy in the world. 17

This drive to improve its international status combined with the Japanese sense of inferiority pushed Japan after World War II to develop so quickly and to reattain a position of power in the world. Japan of course was greatly helped in this endeavor by its usefulness to the United States during the Cold War and the need internationally for inexpensive manufactured goods. However, for Japan to take advantage of this favorable situation, the drive to develop had to exist, and due to the reasons established above, it did. Japan's concern with its international ranking also has contributed to its relations with the developing world as will be explained in the following section.

This extreme awareness of its position in the world has also led to Japan's fears of being isolated internationally. Japan's geographic marginality with relation to Asia and the world has protected it against subsumation, but as Japan has striven to attain great power status, it has also led to perceptions that the world has ignored it. Japan's efforts to become part of the great power club have often met with ambiguous results, with Japan never fully part of the group of powerful, mostly white nations. Japan has continued to attempt to join this club for fear of being isolated, and also because of perceived persecution by these nations since Japan will always be anon-white non-European country.

Japan's fear of isolation and awareness of its status as a non-white country have led to the intense cultural borrowing of things Western to attempt to become more similar to them and perhaps more accepted. At the same time, the Japanese sense of uniqueness has kept Japan from fully altering its culture to fit into the Western club. These two contradictory endeavors have led to feelings of camaraderie with yet distance from other countries of the developing world.

Before World War II, this feeling of racial persecution coupled with the identity crisis caused by the rapid inflow of Western cultures led to an intense feeling of Asian-ness by the Japanese, leading to its expansion into Asia to bring it under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan therefore could become a world power by attaining other parts of Asia while also being a thoroughly Asian one. After World War II, its defeat greatly stigmatized feelings of Asianism as it implied Japanese warlike imperialism. Also, the Cold War divided Asia into Eastern and Western camps, making pan-Asianism nearly impossible. Japan's rapid development also pushed it to focus on the world, not just on Asia. Yet, Japan continues to have an ambivalent relationship with the Asian continent, at times stressing its Asian-ness, at times emphasizing its great power status as different and ahead of other Asian countries.

These five aspects of Japanese culture, as formed through Japan's unique interactions with the Western civilization, have greatly affected its view of the world and therefore its foreign policy. These factors have structured the context of Japanese encounters with non-Western cultures as well. Japanese Relations with Africa

Japanese relations with Africa have been shaped by the aspects of Japanese culture as described in the previous section. It will be shown that this is because of Japan's particular set of cultural traits, as well as that Western civilization for much of this time period was more powerful than Japan. As Japan pursued rapid development and the West declined in strength, its unique relationship with the West as well as its ambivalent identity prevented it from pressing its culture on Africa. Yet, Japan in the latter half of the 20th century gives large amounts of aid and is increasing trade. Its attempts at political and diplomatic leadership have, particularly in recent years, been refused. 18 This again may be because of both the world experiences and manner of development of both Japan and the African civilization have been such that there is little trust between the two cultures. Additionally, Japan has exhibited little diplomatic and political world leadership because of its history and culture. Africa as well has experienced little positive input from other developed cultures, and therefore is likely to be wary of attempts by Japan as well.

Relations between Japan and African nations have never been close. 19 Yet, interactions between African states and Japan have existed after World War II. Relations between Japan and Africa have been shaped by three main factors: first, the influence of Western civilization on Japan and Africa; second, the Japanese culture's world view, which spurred the nation to become a major superpower through nonmilitary means, and, third, Japan's view of itself as a nonwhite power which has through its strength overcome the adversity of a hostile world system and therefore has little understanding of those countries of Black Africa that have remained in the world's periphery.

The African civilization's particular role in the global political and economic structure also affects international relations and thought, particularly with respect to alternative conceptions of the state, the nation, and economic and political development. Africa is an area of the world which was first ravaged by colonial division and dependency and then by civil and regional wars and by international debt. It has been and remains tied to the international system established by the Western civilization which utilizes its natural resources, supports or overthrows its political leaders, and dictates structural adjustment measures which often are not compatible with its history and present political and economic systems. Africa and Japan have had different experiences that are related to their interactions with the international system created and led by the United States and Europe, but both areas have been and continue to be strongly tied to this world system.

In order to examine the nature of Japan's interactions with Africa, it is important to analyze both their direct interactions and their indirect relations as affected by their dealings with the international political and economic system, their world views, and their views of themselves. Their ties to the Western civilization and their particular cultural developments and world views affect their dealings with each other. It can be argued that this type of encounter is one of a particularly Japanese kind, in which Japan utilizes other cultures economically and symbolically for its own economic benefit and to enhance its status with the powerful nations of the West.

Relations between Africa and Japan were extremely distant in the late 19th and early 20thcenturies. The African cultures were subsumed by the West and their own development put on hold as Western culture was thrust upon them. Japan was urbanizing, industrializing, and was well on its way to becoming a mature civilization. The main interest of Japan was establishing itself of a level on par with the West. Africa was left to the US and Europe as their interests, while Japan began its imperial expansion into Asia which was closer in proximity and more attainable.

Japan's drive to become like the West and join the state system impelled it to do as the West and become an imperial nation in the early 20th century. Being a state does not mean that one must expand and colonize others, but a vital aspect of being a state was being recognized as such by the Western civilization. To be acknowledged, a country had to be similar enough to the West that its state seemed legitimate. Japan tried to establish this legitimacy by being like the West in its international relations as well, colonizing those less advanced countries around it.

Africa's development into Western-style states was pushed upon it by the colonizing powers. Because the formation of states did not happen through the slow development process that civilizations usually take, but was speeded up by its encounters with the West, the Western-style state apparatus caused more problems than benefits for Africa. It was in this context that Japanese relations with Africa began to increase after World War II. This time period will therefore be the major focus of this section.

 

The Cold War Framework

From directly after World War II until the mid-1960's, relations between Africa and Japan were almost nonexistent. Yet, this period is still vital to the study of Japanese-African relations. The independence and nationalist movements in Africa began to form the structure and course of intra-African relations, relations with present and soon-to-be-former European imperial powers, and Africa's role in and perspective on the world. In Japan, defeat in World War II and post-war occupation by the United States combined with a continuation of some of the pre-war attitudes towards the world and the push for postwar reconstruction worked together to begin the formulation of postwar Japanese foreign policy.

The drive for African independence and the resulting post colonial entities left Africa with the huge task of determining its future course while attempting to deal with the colonial legacy. As Europe and the United States became embroiled in the East-West battle of the Cold War, the power struggle had great effects on an Africa pushing towards development. The demand in the West for inexpensive primary commodities as well as strategic strongholds against the USSR contributed greatly to the continuing political and economic instability of many areas in the region. The establishment of the franc zone in the former French colonies, keeping these countries tied to France, limited their economic expansion. 20 Yet, for African economic and at points political survival, these relations were often seen as necessary by African entities. Often, African countries had little choice whether or not to accept the aid and influence of countries which were so large militarily and economically. 21

These events spurred several movements in Africa calling for African continental or regional unity and independence from these still overly influential former colonial powers. Yet, the struggle to survive while attempting to stabilize their political and economic situations made it difficult for Africa to close itself off from the pressures of the West. Africa maintained commodity trade with the former colonial powers and with the US and received aid from these countries. In return, several African countries experienced political turmoil as leaders who agreed to support anti-communism were backed by Western powers and as some were later overthrown with the aid of the same powers of the West. Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Zaire(Congo) among others were considered key stronghold countries aided by the West as bolsters against communism. The unstable political situations and economic difficulties of these countries since independence is well-known, and their roles as pawns in the Cold War greatly contributed to this instability.

These countries had difficulty dealing with questions of both internal and external sovereignty during the Cold War. They assumed the Western form of state with territories not designated themselves but assigned to them by the imperial countries. Therefore, the central government ruling these territories did so without necessarily gaining affirmation from those living in these territories. Tribal and regional loyalties were often much stronger than those to the central government. Many Africans also did not consider themselves citizens of the country, but rather, of a region or tribal group. Internal sovereignty was therefore difficult to attain and more difficult to maintain for a particular government. Authoritarianism as a means of preserving central power was therefore often the result.

Externally, the continuation of economic controls by France, England, and others and the dependence on the West for trade and aid limited the independence of these states. The political manipulation of regimes to satisfy the Cold War desires of the West also was a limit to the external sovereignty of these states for the West often intervened in internal political affairs. These states sprung from territories designed by others and represented a combination of cultures and did not spring naturally from these cultures. The states of Africa were also often manipulated by the West. They therefore did not operate in the same manner as those in the West and have had difficulty operating successfully both domestically and internationally in these modern state units.

Japan's experience in dealing with the Cold War world held only a few similarities to those of Africa. Japan was also greatly affected by the Cold War power struggle. However, Japan was treated very differently than Africa by the United States and Europe. Large amounts of capital, goods, and technology flowed into the country while the United States supplied it with military protection. Japan also oddly benefited both from the destruction of its infrastructure during World War II and from the technology it had gained from its rapid prewar industrialization. Both these factors enabled Japan to utilize capital given by the United States to build a new, modern postwar infrastructure to establish a firm foundation for rapid reindustrialization. The prewar oligarchical political system also formed a hierarchical power structure which led the way to a powerful postwar bureaucracy and dominant one-party legislative system. 22

Beginning with the occupation of Japan by United States forces after World War II, Japan started to forge a strong if not always cordial relationship with the US. Article IX in the post-World War II Japanese constitution stipulates that Japan will not support a military and will not participate in military activity abroad. As the Cold War intensified, Japan's dependence on the United States for its defense shaped Japan's relations with other countries along the lines of US and Western European policy. 23 Particularly in its giving of aid, Japan took an anti-communist strategic approach, concentrating its aid in countries allied with the US and Western Europe without interfering with the policies of these powers in the region.

This strategy worked until Japan grew so large economically that the US began to protest against its economic policies which limited free trade. The US often used the fact that the country was Japan's main protector in the Cold War to attempt to impel Japan into opening its economy to more imports. The push-pull relationship between the US and Japan further strengthened Japan's resolve to be as indirect in its foreign policy making as possible as to not incur the wrath of the United States while at the same time dealing with countries which possessed needed resource inputs or which had large import markets for Japanese goods, particularly important after the oil shocks of 1973-74. Japan's inactive foreign policy therefore enabled it to continue attaining its defense from the US while dealing with most countries in a mainly economic manner.

Beginning in the late 1960's, as Japan ran large world trade surpluses and became one of the richest countries in the world, Japan showed its support of anti communism by targeting its Official Development Assistance (ODA) at anti communist countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire, and Malawi. 24 Additionally, as Japan continued to run large trade surpluses in Africa (see tables 1 and 2) in the 1960's, several countries invoked Article 35 of GATT and imposed trade restrictions on Japan. In 1965, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and Nigeria began to restrict Japanese imports. Not coincidentally, Japan began giving yen loans to Africa in 1966, with Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as recipients. 25

Through its mainly economic foreign policy in Africa, then, Japan could secure sources of natural resources and open markets to its products without becoming embroiled in political conflicts in the region that might bring it up against the policies of the Cold War powers of the US and Western Europe.

Table 1: Japan's Trade with Four African Countries, 1955-76
(millions of yen)
  Zaire Kenya Tanzania Mozambique
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1955 1226 45 1685 498 4611 1349 213 165
1960 587 1399 7985 3209 3332 3436 663 1394
1965 1871 1374 9236 1998 3545 1943 3199 3938
1970 15,548 13,539 14,958 1679 7767 6504 13,282 8130
1971 22,582 9390 17,063 2917 6159 3202 13,068 8130
1972 14,852 8355 14,341 3038 6523 3532 11,863 9651
1973 13,813 22,115 19,827 6600 11,612 4467 10,705 6601
1974 19,646 31,659 30,291 7842 20,351 5047 10,679 24,262
1975 11,180 17,764 21,292 7794 16,060 3132 7072 18,796
1976 9962 25,632 29,975 7026 22,395 3752 3960 10,633
source: Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975 and 1980.

Table 2: Japan's Foreign Trade by Area
(billions of yen)
Year Total Asia South America Africa
  Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1955 723 889 302 324 53 37 74 22
1960 1460 1617 525 493 64 52 126 59
1965 3043 2941 990 983 89 140 294 127
1969 5756 5408 957 1650 173 273 415 353
1970 6954 6797 2181 2009 214 351 512 395
1971 8392 6909 2483 2354 286 312 719 347
1972 8806 7228 2491 2505 299 269 643 360
1973 10,031 10,404 3187 3753 385 356 850 475
source: Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

The international context at the beginning of the Cold War contributed to the positions of both Africa and Japan in the world Cold War hierarchy. Whereas Africa became a Cold War battleground between East and West and a source of cheap commodity goods, Japan became a vital outpost for US troops and a noncommunist anchor for the West in Asia as well as a source of cheap imports for the United States. Japan also had the internal drive to develop as rapidly as possible to become a powerful world player rather than be subsumed by the confrontational world system. Its status as useful tool to the US and its complex bureaucratic governmental structure and drive to come back from the defeat of war combined to push Japan into the role as economic power.

Its dealings with Africa were shaped by its role in the international system. The nature of Japan's foreign policy and international relations was decided by its relationship to the United States, its hesitation to formulate an active political role due to its defeat in World War II and its dependence on the US for its defense, its desire to become a world power without conflicting with the goals of the countries of the West, its need to secure inputs of resources, and a hierarchical authoritative political system albeit with a democratic structure that left such debate to people with political authority.

Japan's strong nationalism combined with its feelings of international vulnerability and the perceived need to become strong economically to survive have driven Japan to develop an economic system which, although dependent on foreign sources of oil, coal, and other resources, and which has grown so rapidly by concentrating on the development of high-quality, inexpensive exports, has remained relatively closed to large amounts of noncommodity imports and foreign investment in Japan. Japan could maintain such a system because of its authoritative political culture and its usefulness to the United States during the Cold War. The US, although the main force behind the rules of international economic interactions as established in the Bretton Woods system, rarely cried out against Japan's far from free trade markets. Japan was more useful to the US as a stable exporter of inexpensive goods than as an economically undeveloped entity that could fall prey to the claws of the communists.

As Shigeru Yoshida, one of the primary formulators of contemporary Japanese foreign policy, writes in 1957,

...Japan clearly must feed its 90 million people through trade. Given this, Japan's commercial ties naturally and necessarily stress America and Britain, which are the most economically affluent and technologically advanced countries, and those with which we historically have the closest ties...It is simply the fastest and most effective way to promote the interests of the Japanese people. 26

Japan was driven to develop economically to quell its sense of vulnerability and protect itself from the interests of the superpowers. Japan's view of the world as a place where it must struggle to survive was also part of the reason Japan supported the policies of the Western powers without actively forming its own policies that might conflict with those of its trading partners and defenders. Japan protected itself due to its perceived vulnerability in the world system by maintaining an inactive political policy and concentrating on developing its own economic strength.

In contrast, although, as Nyong'o says, the colonial and Cold War legacy in Africa have hindered many African countries from making the state their own, 27 several people in Africa have not merely sat back and watched Africa crumble. Discussions and debates as to how to deal with this continuing linkage with Europe and the United States, as well as how to develop particularly African non confrontational and non dictatorial economic and political systems are ongoing. From Marxist scholars such as Samir Amin who call for Africa to form an alternative definition of the nation-state not based on Western conceptions of bourgeoise leadership and the capitalist mode of production 28 to Ali Mazrui's calls for Africa to refind its own strong, unique history and base African political and economic structures upon it 29 to calls for pan-African unity as a means of forming a strong peaceful Africa, 30 scholars demonstrate the combination of the Africa's subjugation by the international system and the empowerment, activism, and frustration that go along with lively, intense debate by Africans about possible strategies for their future. The desire to rise up, to change the unsatisfactory status quo, the disagreements about how a particularly African development path can be created, are discussions that were pursued intensely during the 1960's and 1970's and are still discussed by many on the continent.

These African and Japanese perspectives also determined the nature of the relations between these two entities at that time and established the groundwork for what these relations were to become in the future. Japan's continued booming economic growth combined with the oil crises of the 1970's began a drive towards a somewhat more active economic role in Africa. The oil crises of the early 1970's and the resource nationalism exerted by developing countries at this time spurred in Japan feelings of "resource danger" (shigenkikikan) and therefore Japan began the drive to establish closer relations with primary commodity exporters. The continued feelings of vulnerability in Japan are demonstrated by Japan calling itself shigensh koku, or "few natural resources country." 31 Japan depended on the world for its industrial inputs and relied on its industrial outputs for maintenance of a strong position in the world system. Its foreign policy towards developing countries was based in this strategic need for natural resources.

Japan has utilized the conception of state to its own benefit. It acts as a state in the international context in order to gain legitimacy. It attempts to comply with the wishes of the West in its foreign policy by adhering to the guidelines they set. Japan therefore dealt with mainly anti communist countries during the Cold War. At the same time, Japan interacts with the developing world to gain markets and sources of needed resources. Its economic power have enabled it to do so. The unit of state has worked well for Japan in complying with the West and gaining needed resources, yet Japan has yet to be able to set the rules of the game and gain the power in the world that it desires. It has attained internal and external sovereignty in that it has attained legitimacy both at home and abroad, but this sovereignty is contingent in both instances. Japanese domestic sovereignty as a state is conditional upon its maintenance of a prosperous economy and stable political system while emphasizing Japan's particular unique culture. Japan must maintain a sense of importance and power within its borders in this Western state form while also being careful not to destroy its Japaneseness. Externally, Japan also acts as a Western state to gain legitimacy while not wanting to be the strategic power backed by military might as those powers of the West, for its defeat in World War II prevent this. Japan also has different goals internationally than the West, for its scarcity in resources and its development as a mainly economic power entreat the country to deal with others on those terms and not necessarily have the same goals in the developing world, for instance, as the West. Japan therefore must act as a Western state while maintaining the Japanese culture and working towards particularly Japanese goals.

Africa's options to limiting dependency on the European and American economic and political core were small. Africa's place in the international context as exporter of primary commodities could change little due to Africa's limited access to technology and the relative instability of the political systems and leaders in several African countries. At the same time, several African countries, to protect themselves against a new economic colonialism by newly-industrializing countries, exercised their right under GATT article 35 to restrict imports, and therefore exports to Africa from Japan were limited. 32 Although the Lomé Convention of 1975banned the special trade rights established by former colonial powers, several African countries continued to have de facto tied relationships, particularly to France and Portugal. Therefore, Japan perceived African markets as difficult to enter. 33

The African civilization as it is struggling to find itself deals with Japan mainly on economic terms, through trade and the receipt of aid. Additionally, economic ties with Africa have been concentrated in few countries. Japan has always felt shut out of the francophone and lusophone countries, which continued to maintain non tariff barriers even after the 1975 Lomé Convention. Japan has few Africa specialists who are informed about these countries. Japan also concentrates its trade in countries which have large internal markets or large amounts of natural resources, like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Zaire. Direct investment in Africa makes up only two percent of Japan's foreign investments, half of which from 1951 to1981 was concentrated in Liberia to take advantage of its liberal tax and disclosure laws. The remaining investments are split between manufacturing ventures in countries with large domestic markets, like Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria or in mining ventures in Niger, Zambia, Zaire, and Nigeria. 34

Ninety percent of trade is concentrated in 11 countries: South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Sudan, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Mauritania, and Tanzania. 35 Aid is also highly concentrated in few countries and geared towards Japanese strategic interests. Eight countries received 70 percent of ODA from 1960 to 1990. 36 Of these countries, Zaire, Zambia, and Niger are major suppliers of raw materials such as copper and uranium. In Madagascar, Japan has investments in the mining of chromium ore and in fishing. Sudan is a potent source of chromium. Kenya is pro-West, and imports ten times more Japanese goods than it exports to Japan. Tanzania is not as rich as other African entities in resources, but under Nyerere it represented the pan-Africanist opinion which called for African states to join together to seek freedom from dependency on the international economic and political system. By establishing economic ties with both Kenya and Tanzania, Japan could play both sides of the diplomatic fence, establishing alliances with countries not necessarily cordial with the West, which was important to Japan after the oil shocks in 1973-4. Japan maintained almost solely economic relations with countries such as Tanzania to make sure that no conflicts with the West were engendered.

Table 3: Japanese Bilateral Aid (ODA) to Africa
(in millions of US dollars)
Year Total ODA
to Africa
Share of
Total ODA (%)
1960-66 .73 2.0
1967-69 8.10 8.2
1969 3.77 1.1
1970 8.15 2.2
1971 12.38 2.9
1972 5.01 1.0
1973 18.49 2.4
1974 36.23 4.1
1975 58.82 6.9
1976 45.93 6.1
1977 56.25 6.3
1978 105.49 6.9
1979 186.72 9.7
1980 222.91 11.4
source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Bluebook, 1981; Development Assistance, OECD-DAC, Paris,1970

Table 4. Sectoral Breakdown of Japanese ODA to Africa
(percentage of commitments)
Year Social
Infrastructure
Economic
Infrastructure
Production
Sectors
Program
Assistance
1970 1.4 69.4 29.2 --
1971 2.1 15.4 20.9 5.2
1972 2.9 20.4 21.7 5.5
1975 2.8 39.4 25.3 --
1980 8.5 60.6 24.4 --
(1)Social infrastructure includes education, health, population programs, public development and planning services, etc.
(2) Economic infrastructure and services includes transport, communications, river development, and energy.
(3) Production sectors include agriculture, industry, mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism.
(4) Program aid includes structural adjustment programs and concentrated country program assistance.
Source: OECD-DAC, Development Assistance, various reports, as collected by Nelson Noel Messone, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa: International and Domestic Determinants Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1994.

Building on the explanations given in the previous section, Japan's historical experience, world view, and ties to the United States and Europe propelled Japan to alleviate its fears of being cut off from needed natural resources to pursue mainly economic and quite distant relations with Africa. Japan did not want to become involved in Africa's political, national, and ethnic struggles. Japan served as a military outpost for the United States and as an ally who almost always voted with the United States in international organizations such as the United Nations. Japan also wanted to maintain a peaceful, unobtrusive position in the world in order to avoid fears of its returned aggressiveness after the events of World War II. It therefore rarely pursued a proactive foreign policy, particularly in regions where powers such as Europe and the United States were already active.

Japan's View of Itself

Japan has had little policy interaction with developing nations, particularly with Africa. It concentrated its efforts on developing markets in the industrialized nations. Japan had another reason for staying away from the developing world. As Yoshida writes,

The Asian and African nations...have relatively little organic interdependence with the economies of other countries...their leaders are putting their main efforts into politically and socially ridding these countries of colonialism and dependency, not into fostering economic relations with other countries. These leaders want to avoid aligning with one side or the other in the bipolar global setup and devote themselves to marshaling the energies of their people for the task of nation building. This might be termed passive neutrality....but their assertions of neutrality are not based on any particular economic or military strength. 37

Japan had no interest in forming international relations with an Africa with which it felt which was dealing with struggles in which Japan did not want to participate. Japan had no need to take a stance in the struggle for independence and nation formation occurring in Africa, for it was secure in the strong ties and the military protection given to it by the United States.

Another reason for distant relations with Africa is Japan's feelings of affinity with the developed countries of the West than developing countries of Africa or even Asia. As Yoshida wrote in 1957:

Japan today is actually more Western than Asian with respect to domestic politics, economics, industry, and social affairs....The Asian and African nations, by contrast, are still backward societies with low living standards and undeveloped industrial bases and economies. 38

Related to Japan's world view, Japan considers itself more Western than Eastern, more developed than developing. Not only does this view protect Japan against being subsumed by large powers, for it pushes Japan to continue in its quest for world power and strength although through nonmilitary means, but it does go into a view of the Japanese nation as something special, a country that is able to overcome the barriers of development and become strong even after the huge defeat of World War II. This view of the Japanese nation as unique and extraordinary has fueled a hesitation to associate with developing countries that are unable to help themselves to pull ahead. With the exception of aid to countries suffering from famine or other disasters, Japan gives little aid to the poorest countries of Africa except in the form of disaster aid 39 and maintains relatively distant diplomatic relations with most countries of the continent. Japan's view of itself as a special case, as a country different from those developing countries who are unable to shine in the world system, has impelled it to see little commonality with countries of the developing world.

Japan began intensive industrialization in the late 1800's during the Meiji Era. The Japanese government was able to impel the Japanese people to come together and sacrifice the freedom and luxuries they may have otherwise been able to have for the sake of the nation's well-being. The government could pursue this route to development for two reasons: first, a large bureaucracy existed in Japan even during the Meiji Era that was capable of constructing and pursuing development policies that may have been politically hurtful to elected politicians. Japan was also run by an oligarchical group of ministers headed by the Emperor, all of whom were deeply respected in Japan and were also not elected officials. Second, the Meiji oligarchs perpetuated an ideology that, since Japan was a small island nation that perceived itself as vulnerable to the whims of the large powers, national strength and unity were vital to the nation's health. 40 Japan succeeded in developing rapidly at this time, which reinforced the deep sense of nation that enabled the development to succeed. Masao Maruyama, a respected Japanese academic, also explains how this intense national pride fed Japan's fervid pursuit of victory during World War II. 41

Although much has changed since World War II, the strong Japanese sense of nation still existed in the 1960's and 1970's as did the well-developed complex bureaucracy. Japan no longer had an Emperor-led government, and Japan suffered greatly from its defeat in the war and the humiliation of being occupied by the United States, yet Japan was still a nation full of national pride and strength. Japan was able to use this strong sense of nation and its well-organized bureaucratic structure to aid its second round of economic development, pushing Japan into the role of great economic power at this time. 42

Japan has had great indirect effect on the international structure through its rapid growth utilizing an alternative development approach than that used by the United States and Europe. Japan did not develop by sticking to the free market capitalist principles espoused by the World Bank and IMF. Instead, Japan protected its vital markets and used a large, authoritative state apparatus to drive growth. Rather than focusing on uniform economically-oriented policies such as interest and exchange rate adjustment and the limiting of state spending, Japanese development focused on an active, strong state role as the primary factor to economic development and growth. 43 This focus in the literature on Japan is interesting, for Japan's international role has mainly been economic but not political and yet its development concentrated on the political, an authoritative state, ruling the economic. This indirect influence on the international system has demonstrated that there are many paths to development changing international attitudes towards economic growth and restructuring, and reinforcing the Japanese sense of pride in itself, for it was able to succeed internationally by utilizing a different route to development.

The push to show the world that it was a powerful nation, that it was strong enough to overcome the barriers to its development, meant that Japan could see little commonality between itself and the nations of Africa. These were countries which, as a famous Japanese developmental economist says, cannot necessarily follow another country's model to develop. 44 The countries must find their own way. Therefore, Japan could justify its hesitation to become too close to the countries of Africa by promoting a policy of self-help. This policy also kept Japan from being too closely associated with the developing world, as Japan considers itself a country as powerful and able as the countries of the West.

In 1974, Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura made a visit to five African countries(Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, Egypt) and spoke against colonialism (shokuminchishugihantai) and for African ethnic and tribal freedom movements (minzokukaih und ). He supported what he called economic Africanization and pledged that Japan would begin to expand efforts to understand Africa as well as increase Japan's economic cooperation to the region. 45 However, little substantially changed in Japan's policy towards Africa. Japan did begin giving Official Development Assistance to the region and increased the amount of trade, but political ties remained distant.

The main reason for this visit and expression of understanding of Africa's causes is difficult to tell, but being that little changed in Japan's foreign policy toward the region, and that the speech came during the time fear in Japan of resource scarcity was rampant, Kimura's words may have been mainly to ensure cordial relations between Japan and those countries that could provide needed resources, particularly since Africa had expressed dissatisfaction with Japanese economic policy in previous years sharply limited the amount of imports allowed in by Japan under Article 35 of GATT. Japan had responded to previous import restrictions by increasing its foreign aid to key countries in the region such as Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, and Tanzania, and not coincidentally, following this action and the oil shocks of 1973-4, visited Japan and spoke sympathetically about Africa's concerns.

Japanese policy towards Africa remained unobtrusive and almost solely economic in nature. Not only did Japan want to avoid being put in a situation where it would need to formulate a more concrete, active political foreign policy, but Japan was succeeding in attaining its goals with the policy towards Africa it was maintaining at that time. Japan could show the West that it was using its trade surplus not only for its domestic benefit but was greatly increasing the economic assistance given to developing countries. At the same time, Japan could establish its place in the world system as the giver of aid, as a strong economic force on par with countries of the West rather than a late-developing country with more in common with Africa than with the West. Foreign aid not only secured needed resources for Japan, but was a symbol that Japanese pride in itself as a nation was warranted, for it was a powerful player in the world economic system that was coming to the aid of the less developed world. 46

African aid recipients were also looking towards their strategic interests. These countries needed the funds which Japan was offering, and, although much of the aid was tied to agreements to contract Japanese companies to assist in the implementation of the project being funded, no political ties were suggested. It cannot be said that African countries viewed such non politically-tied aid with relief, however, for many authors see Japanese aid as a type of neo-mercantilism that would further bind Africa to its role as international provider of natural commodities and flood the continent with Japanese imports. 47

 

Conclusion

Japan's wish to remain allied with the US and receive its military protection and economic aid, its perceived need to remain strong to prevent being subsumed by the world's powers, and its view of itself as a unique country that had used its own special talents to become a great economic power have worked together to maintain distant relations between Japan and Africa. Japan saw little in common with Africa and wanted to refrain from becoming involved in African political conflicts in which the Cold War powers were already embroiled.

Japan had no moral inclination to spread its philosophy and culture to Africa. It had its own agenda in the region, to gain access to natural resources and markets and to enhance its international image and heed the wishes of the West. It pursued these goals in the form of the state which it took on again to gain legitimacy and respect with the West.

The pursuit of goals different from the West does not mean that the Japanese state is inherently different from the West. Yet, the reasons why Japan's foreign policy differed from the West and the manner in which it went about its policy stem from differences in culture and history from the United States and Europe. Japan was pursuing legitimacy and acceptance of its sovereignty from the West both in its formation of a state and in its foreign policy. The state was formed for different reasons from the West but intentionally to seek the notice and respect of the West. At the same time, Japan has steadfastly maintained its claims to uniqueness and cultural greatness.

This paper has shown that these reasons for formation of the state have also aided in the design of a foreign policy utilizing this state that differs from the West. Japanese relations with another non-Western region, that of Africa, show that Japan is pursuing both the goals of access to resources and markets and of demonstrating its deferment to the West in its Cold War goals thereby attempting to gain legitimacy with these powers. The manner in which it interacts with Africa shows a different utilization of the state unit from the West as the formation of the state showed differences from the West.

It is hoped that this study will lead to further research on relations between Japan and other non-Western countries to further explore the context and aspects of their interactions. The influence of the Western civilization on these relations and how they have maintained their own cultures in the form of the state merits deeper and more comprehensive examination.

 


Note 1: Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 5.. Back.

Note 2: Donald Puchala, "International Encounters of Another Kind," International Studies Quarterly (39), p. 7. Back.

Note 3: Donald Puchala, op. cit., p. 7, as taken from Toynbee's conceptualization. See Arnold Toynbee (with Jane Caplan), A Study of History (New York: Portland House, Revised and Abridged Edition, 1988), p. 44. Back.

Note 4: Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books,1991. Back.

Note 5: Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, "Conclusion" in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 426. Back.

Note 6: Michael Barnett discusses how the Arab world adopted the state unit as an institution to gain its leaders power and legitimacy in the world system, but that the state and the institution of pan-Arabism created a hybridized conceptualization of state that differs from that of the West. See Michael Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," International Organization 49 Summer 1995, pp. 479-510. Back.

Note 7: Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Back.

Note 8: Kenneth Waltz, pp. 128-129. Back.

Note 9: See Spengler, 1991, pp. 3-40 for an explanation of the golden era of civilizations. Back.

Note 10: Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.119. Back.

Note 11: For an insightful analysis of these divisions and disputes in India, see, Robert W. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Back.

Note 12: Puchala, 1995, discusses international encounters of another kind. This concept is taken from his work. Back.

Note 13: Seizaburo Sato, as quoted in Robert Scalapino, Japan's Foreign Policy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977. Back.

Note 14: Sato, p. 377. Back.

Note 15: Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics. London: Morris,1963. Back.

Note 16: Sato, p. 378. Back.

Note 17: Sato, p. 379. Back.

Note 18: One of the most recent examples of this is Japan's offer to mediate the crisis in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsis. Japan's offer was refused. Back.

Note 19: Hideo Oda, "Nihon no Africa Seisaku" (Japan's Africa Policy) in Masamisa Kawabata, ed., Afrika to Nihon (Africa and Japan). Tokyo: Keisoushobou, 1994: 80-91. Back.

Note 20: Samir Amin, Maldevelopment. London: Zed Books, 1990. Back.

Note 21: Ibid. Back.

Note 22: One of the most famous Japanese writings arguing this point is Masao Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso (Japanese Thought). Tokyo: Iwanami Publishers, 1961. Back.

Note 23: Several books and articles have discussed this point. See: I.M. Destler, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiro Fukui, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979; J.W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. Back.

Note 24: Jun Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business and Diplomacy. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997. Another reason for lack of economic interaction with francophone and lusophone countries is that Africa hesitated to trade with non anglophone countries due to trade barriers and language difficulties. Back.

Note 25: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1967. Back.

Note 26: Shigeru Yoshida, Kais J nen (Recollections of Ten Years). Tokyo: Shinch sha, 1957, vol. 1:24-38, translated in Japan Echo, Volume 22 (Special Issue, 1995): 51-55. Back.

Note 27: Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "Introduction," in Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. London: Zed Books, 1977: 24. Back.

Note 28: Samir Amin, The Arab Nation. London: Zed Press, 1978. Back.

Note 29: Ali Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1990. Back.

Note 30: cf. Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," International Organization 16, 2 (Spring 1962):275-290; Guy Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neo-colonialism or Pan-Africanism?" Journal of Modern African Studies 20, 2 (June 1982): 221-238. Back.

Note 31: Hideo Oda, "Nihon no Afrika Seisaku" (Japan's Africa Policy), p. 84. Back.

Note 32: Inukai, "Why Aid and Why Not? Japan and Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 254. Back.

Note 33: Jide Owoeye, "Imperialist Capitalist Investments in Africa: The Japanese Model," African Studies Review 15, 1 (1988): 34-40. Back.

Note 34: Owoeye, "Imperialist Capitalist Investments in Africa: The Japanese Model," p. 38. Back.

Note 35: Nelson Noel Messone, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa: International and Domestic Determinants. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1994. Back.

Note 36: William Nester, "Japanese Neomercantilism toward Sub-Saharan Africa," Africa Today 38,3 (1991): 31-51. Back.

Note 37: Ibid. Back.

Note 38: Yoshida, Kais J nen, p. 55. Back.

Note 39: Inukai, "Why Aid and Why Not? Japan and Sub-Saharan Africa" and Messone, Japan's Foreign Aid to Africa: International and Domestic Determinants discuss this point which is reinforced by aid statistics in the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook, yearly. Back.

Note 40: Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 25. Back.

Note 41: Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso. Back.

Note 42: For an explanation of the process of this development that is controversial but with which this author concurs, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy,1925-1975. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982. Back.

Note 43: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; Daniel K. Okimoto and Tadashi Inoguchi, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 2, The Changing International Context. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,1988; Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. Back.

Note 44: Kazumi Goto, "Beyond 'Structural Adjustment' and the 'East Asian Miracle': Development Management Reexamined," Journal of Development Assistance 2, 2 (March 1997): 1-21. Back.

Note 45: Oda, "Nihon no Afrika Seisaku," p. 85. Back.

Note 46: See Alan Rix, Japan's Economic Aid Policy-Making and Politics. London: Croom Helm,1980. Back.

Note 47: cf. Owoeye, "Imperialist Capitalist Investments in Africa: The Japanese Model," and Nester,"Japanese Neomercanitilism toward Sub-Saharan Africa." Back.