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Studies of Diplomacy in Post-Communist Russia: Changing Paradigms
University of Nizhny Novgorod
Political Science
International Studies Association
March 1998
Introduction
The demise of the USSR and its Marxist ideology, the re-emergence of Russia as a separate, independent entity, the challenges of the post-Cold War world have compelled Russia to redefine its national interests and make major adjustments in the spheres of both foreign policy and diplomatic studies. In turn, this led to a fierce debate on the past, present and the future of diplomacy among scholars, experts and practitioners. This debate is far from at an end. Neither a coherent international strategy nor a solid theoretical base have yet been found.
This paper deals with studies of diplomacy in Russia during the 1990s. It has three main purposes: First, to distinguish and depict major theoretical approaches and foreign policy schools in the country. Second, to outline problematique of the Russian diplomatic discourse. Third, to examine institutional dimensions of the post-Communist diplomatic studies such as main research, training, library and archival centres as well as professional associations.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND FOREIGN POLICY SCHOOLS
The Russian post-Communist diplomatic discourse departed from ideological rather than from theoretical issues. There can be at least four explanations why this happened. First, after the collapse of Marxism, which has served as an official theoretical basis for social sciences, a sort of theoretical vacuum emerged. For some time Russian academics simply did not dare to touch upon theoretical problems because it was too sensitive for them. They were unable or did not want to fill in the above vacuum by some new theory or theory borrowed from abroad. Second, the Russian scholarship had to respond to the real challenges posed by the post-Cold War international environment and meet the immediate needs which confronted the newly born Russian diplomacy. This environment was more favourable to applied rather than theoretical studies. Incidentally, the Russian Foreign Ministry under Andrei Kozyrev demonstrated its dislike for any conceptualisation of diplomacy. 1 Third, with the rise of numerous think tanks and more or less independent mass media the demand for foreign policy experts has dramatically increased. Many gifted scholars moved from the academic institutes and universities to analytical centres, newspapers and TV programmes or tried to combine these new jobs with the old ones. This made diplomatic studies more popular but their quality and standards of expertise became worse. 2 Fourth, the financial crisis of the first half of the 1990s and changes in public attitudes to science had the most negative impact on diplomatic studies in Russia. The state and society as a whole lost interest in science and higher education and the prestige of these fields declined. Salaries decreased dramatically and social protection was almost destroyed. Scholars migrated from the academia either abroad or to other sectors (private business, politics, think tanks, mass media). According to the Russian Vice-Premier Vladimir Bulgak, 15,200 Russian scientists have adopted foreign citizenship and another 5,000 work in foreign countries on a contract basis (these figures include specialists in natural sciences as well). 3 The personnel of the leading research institutes has been downsized. Some of them such as the Institute of the USA and Canada has been temporarily closed down because of the lack of finance.
In sum, these factors prevented rather than facilitated development of theory of diplomacy in post-Communist Russia. Moreover, they were conducive to ideologisation of the Russian foreign policy debate.
There were several schools of foreign policy thought in post-Communist Russia, differing both in their conceptual foundations and in their approaches to concrete international issues. Along with purely Russian schools almost all classic international relations paradigms - realism, idealism/liberalism and globalism/radicalism/structuralism (or state-centric, multi-centric, and global-centric approaches to international politics, according to a categorisation devised by James N. Rosenau) 4 can be identified. It goes without saying that these schools were rather fluid coalitions, and to condense a complex debate into just a few categories obviously risks oversimplification. They do, however, provide me with a helpful framework for analysing the Russian post-Communist discourse on diplomacy. Such an approach leads one to ask certain questions, seek certain types of answers, and use certain methods in the theory-building. It also brings order to the analytical effort and makes it more manageable.
The early stage of this discourse has been manifested by the Atlanticism-Eurasianism dichotomy. The Atlanticists (Westernisers) These were a relatively small but influential group of high-ranking governmental officials and academics who favoured pro-Western orientation of Moscow's international strategy. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev became their recognised leader. Besides Kozyrev, Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, Minister of Communications Mikhail Poltoranin, and deputies of Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, Georgy Kunadze and Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev, were part of the grouping. 5 From August 1991 to the end of 1992, the ideas of this group dominated policy formulation and implementation as well as diplomatic discourse in Russia. For that reason, Yeltsin's foreign policy was clearly pro-Western.
The Atlanticists believed that the West (Western Europe and the United States) should be the main orientation for Russian diplomacy. They insisted that Russia historically belongs to the Western (Christian) civilisation. That the main task for Russian international strategy should be one of building a partnership with the West and joining Western economic, political and military institutions - the EU, NATO, IMF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G-7, and so on. Mr. Kozyrev stressed in the NATO Review that Moscow's main guideline is to "join the club of recognised democratic states with market economies, on a basis of equality". 6 He regarded such a partnership as a principal source of international support for Russian reforms.
During that period (1991-93) Moscow refrained from opposing NATO enlargement. Moreover, on a number of occasions high-ranking Russian officials (President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, State Secretary Gennady Burbulis, etc.) proposed that Russia itself could one day become a full member of NATO. 7 In the Atlanticists view, NATO was an important instrument in providing both European and trans-Atlantic security. The Atlanticists maintained that combined with the CSCE, NATO could become the starting point for the formation of a new type of Euro-Atlantic Community; one which could guarantee international stability from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
The Atlanticists insisted that Russia should reduce the global activities of the former USSR due to a lack of resources, and radical changes in the country's foreign policy doctrine should be implemented. They believed that a renunciation of the global imperial policy and the ideological messianism of the former Union could open up prospects for domestic reforms and facilitate Russia's national revival. At the same time, this should not lead to Moscow's self-isolation from wide-ranging processes of international co-operation. 8
However, a new geopolitical situation following the breakdown of the USSR, and a number of international and domestic developments, caused a crisis in the Atlanticist school of thought, as well as a shift towards traditional strategic concepts.
It appeared that the West was not really responsive to Russia's demands of large-scale economic assistance and its endeavour at participation in Western economic and politico-military institutions. Moreover, the Western countries often ignored Moscow's position with regard to important security questions (for example, the speed and conditions of Russian troops pulling-out from Eastern Europe, national minorities rights in the 'near abroad', NATO expansion, conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the arms trade with China, Iran, India and other Third World countries). Thus, the West did not accept Russia either as a part of Europe or Western civilisation in general (the main thesis of the Atlanticists). On a number of occasions Yeltsin and Kozyrev complained about the 'non-constructive' policies of its Western partners.
In addition, bloody national conflicts throughout the southern borders of Russia changed Moscow's security philosophy. It was in relation to the 'near abroad' that the Russian leadership started to define its 'strategic interests', to speak of 'spheres of influence' and to express concern about a possible 'power vacuum' being filled by hostile powers. In fact, Moscow elaborated a sort of a Russian Monroe doctrine when, in February 1993, Yeltsin laid claim to being responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the whole post-Soviet space, and also when Kozyrev appealed to the international community (the UN and the OSCE) to grant Russia an international mandate of peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet Union. 9
Finally, Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics, as well as the anti-Yeltsin political opposition, put pressure on the Russian government to make the latter more assertive regarding the protection of ethnic Russians in the 'near abroad'.
These developments reduced the influence of the Atlanticists in Russian foreign policy and forced their leaders (including Kozyrev) to move closer to nationalist views.
Moreover, the Atlanticists split into two groups. While Kozyrev's followers became more assertive as to the West and neo-imperialist as to the 'near abroad', a number of liberal politicians, academics and journalists were in favour of 'civilised dialogue' both with the West and the FSU countries. The liberals opposed Kozyrev's 'linkage tactics' regarding troop withdrawals and Russian national minorities in the ex-Soviet republics. They were also against the maintainance of Russian military bases and its considerable military presence in the 'near abroad'. Eurasianism The Yeltsin-Kozyrev pro-Western line evoked painful reactions from many Russian politicians and intellectuals who tried to elaborate some alternative concepts of diplomacy. Since 1992 Eurasianism has been the first serious alternative to the pro-Western theories which were dominant in Russian foreign policy thinking during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The Eurasianist concept ('evraziistvo' in Russian) became very popular among Russian intellectuals during the mid-1990s. The concept drew heavily upon a philosophical school of 1920s Russian emigres who had tried to find a compromise with the Stalinist version of Socialism. It stresses the uniqueness of Russia: One of its key postulates being that in civilisational terms Russia has never been part of Europe. 10 Hence, it should choose a third way between the West and the East. Globally, Russia should be a bridge between these civilisations.
Contemporary proponents of this theory have been split into two opposing groups. One of them resided in the reformist (so-called "democratic") camp, while the other belonged to the Slavophiles.
The Democratic version. The Democrats tried to adapt Eurasianism to their views for a number of reasons. First, they realised their own weakness in terms of neglecting the national question and Russian national values. The nationalists and the Communists were obviously stronger in this field, and thus, in part, managed to capture the sympathy of the ordinary people by appealing to their humiliation over their national dignity. According to a well-known Russian writer, Leonid Vasiljev, the Democrats have had to confront the patriots with the Russian idea, and try to reclaim the national, cultural and historical legacy of which the patriots have tried to claim for themselves. 11 Obviously, the adoption of Eurasianism by the Democrats was part of a strategy aimed at conquering both Russian public opinion and the political elite.
Second, Eurasianism was a reaction by those Democrats disappointed by both the the West's reluctance to admit Russia to its institutions, and the scale of Western assistance to Moscow. They understood that it was unwise to rely to heavily upon the West. By adhering to Eurasianism they tried to demonstrate to the West that it could well lose a potential ally.
Third, Eurasianism reflected the geopolitical position of Russia, the need to maintain stable relations with both the East and South. Speaking at a meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry in February 1992, Sergei Stankevich, the then Advisor to the President, said: "There is no getting away from certain facts. One of them is that we are now separated from Europe by a whole chain of independent states and find ourselves much further from it, which inevitably involves a definite and, indeed, a quite substantial redistribution of our resources, our potentialities, our links and our interests in favour of Asia and the Eastern sector". 12
As apparant from the term Eurasianism itself, the geographic frame of reference for the Eurasianist foreign policy concept implied first of all the Eurasian continent. Other regions were of peripheral interests for Eurasianism. Hence, in the methodological sense, the Eurasianist foreign policy concept was somewhat close to the geopolitical school of thought (comparable with the Mackinder Heartland theory).
The Eurasianist philosophy departed from a thesis on Russia's special mission in history. According to Stankevich, "Russia's role in the world is, in my view, to initiate and maintain a multilateral dialogue between cultures, civilizations and states. It is Russia which reconciles, unites, and coordinates. It is the good, Great Power that is patient and open within borders, which have been settled by right and with good intentions, but which is threatened beyond these borders. This land, in which East and West, North and South are united, is unique, and is perhaps the only one capable of harmoniously uniting many different voices in a historical symphony". 13
Konstantin Pleshakov of the Institute for American & Canadian Studies has put it in more pragmatic terms: "...the primary object of Russia's mission today is to be fundamental to Eurasian continental stability... Another aspect of Russia's mission is to guarantee at least minimum respect for human rights in post-Soviet space". 14
The basic idea of the Eurasianist security concept was the notion of national interests. According to Stankevich, the national interests of any country are predetermined by geography, history, culture, ethnic composition, and political tradition. However, from this rather traditional mixture of geopolitical and realist principles he suddenly moved to the messianistic terrain of a national idea: "Between those fundamental interests that do not change at all and those that are always changing, there is a set of interests which reflect what may be called the "national idea." The national idea is a nation's self-identity. It is a very emotional topic; a subject concerning the changing course of a nation's history. It is not a scientific value system but a set of visualizations of the national past - and the national future." 15
Stankevich believed that Russian national idea should be one characterised by democracy, federalism, and patriotism rather than totalitarianism, imperialism and socialist internationalism. More precisely he identified Russian national security interests as follows: self-preservation; the prevention of further collapse; the creation of a system of democracy and federalism that checks both imperial dictatorship and separatist tendencies; efficient guarantees for ethnic Russians who live in the near abroad; and the evolution of a strong and efficient state with a stable foreign policy. 16
The Eurasianists believed that the government had paid too much attention to the Western direction of its foreign policy, while Russia's most compelling needs were in the South and in the East. The Eurasianists argued that, first of all, Moscow should deal with the arc of crisis developing on Russia's southern borders, and with the problems which had arisen in relations with its own sizeable Muslim population. Russia, they argued, has to develop an active diplomacy to meet challenges posed by Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Islamic countries. And that coping with these threats and challenges is more important than maintaining an active dialogue with the West on European and trans-Atlantic issues.
The 'Eurasianist' approach gave priority to the consolidation of economic, political and security ties between the countries of the FSU, preferably within the context of the CIS. "The most important element of Russia's new foreign policy", wrote one follower of Eurasianism, "must be the development of relations with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). These countries are inextricably linked by geographical proximity and historical ties... Because it is the only nation capable of serving as the focus of this new union, Russia must assume the role of protector and guarantor for the smaller states of the former Soviet Union. In addition, it is through such a union that Russia can best support Russians who now find themselves living in foreign countries." 17 The Eurasianists persuaded the Yeltsin government to make the CIS a priority for Moscow's international policy, and to initiate the Commonwealth's integration.
In defining the Eurasianist concept of security regarding the near abroad, Vladimir Lukin, the then Russian Ambassador to the United States, called it a Russian variation on the good neighbour policy. According to Lukin, democratic Russia does not fear the sovereignty and independence of its new neighbours; in fact, Russia helped them to become independent in the first place. Moscow is not going to force them to adopt its own form of government, nor will it interfere in their internal affairs. At the same time, Russia is entitled to expect them to respect and uphold the human and civil rights of their Russian-speaking residents. Russia is also justified in expecting its neighbours to prevent threats to Russia from arising on their territory as a result of the activities of third countries. Russia is prepared to provide them with any co-operation necessary to establish their own security through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. 18
For the Eurasianists, Eastern Europe was geographic priority number two after the CIS. In 1992-93, the Eurasianists viewed this sub-region through the prism of Russia's economic, rather than purely security, interests. They complained about the disruption of traditional economic ties with Eastern European countries who had appeared to have re-oriented themselves towards the West. However, the school also predicted that very soon these countries would again be interested in co-operation with Russia as the Western markets would no longer have vacant niches. According to one observer, "Russia's economic interests would be well served by a preferential protectionist policy that would enable the East European countries to trade their non-competitive products for Russian non-competitive products.
The Eurasianists recommended co-operation with the Third World rather than with the industrial West. While the former perceives Russia as an equal partner the latter treats Moscow as a second-echelon state. In addition, a number of prosperous and rich Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan, South Korea and some of the ASEAN countries could be promising trade partners and a source of investment for Russia's troubled economy. Moreover, military co-operation with India and China could be important pillars for the new Eurasian security complex. As Lukin put it, "Russia must put its political and economic relations with China on an equal footing to its relations with Europe and the United States. Russia's goal here should be to establish an "irreversible interdependence", in which neither country could return to a policy of direct confrontation with the other". 19
To the south, the Eurasianists suggested, Russia's primary interest lies in preventing open conflict with third countries over influence in the developing vacuum of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan are already involved in the region. In the Eurasianist view, it was important not only to focus simply on the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, but also to take into account a possible military confrontation between Islamic, Christian, and Asian civilisations. The possible Balkanisation of Russia's southern underbelly would be full of colossal threats, not only for Russian security, but for the strategic stability of all of Eurasia.
At the same time, this faction of Eurasianists has not denied the importance of keeping good relations with the West. They do not object to Russia entering either the international economy or the 'defense structure of the advanced part of the world community'. 20 In their view, Russia's most important interest consists of improving their relations with the European Union, and their gradual integration into the European economic and political system. At the same time, Russia should oppose the transformation of Europe into a closed economic system and military-political union, just as it should oppose the appearance of a dominant regional power (Germany). For the Eurasianists, it is best to preserve both the multipolar nature of European politics and the role of the United States in the region. At the same time, both the function and the role of NATO should be reconsidered.
The main point in the Eurasianists dispute with the Atlanticists has been the need to adjust the balance between the Western and Eastern directions of Moscow's international strategy. As one advocate of Eurasianism explained, "Partnership with the West will undoubtedly strengthen Russia in its relations with the East and the South, while partnership with the East and the South will give Russia independence in its contacts with the West." 21
Initially the Eurasianists were much less influential than the Atlanticists inside the Yeltsin government and Russian political elites. However, as Russian society's discontent with Kozyrev's pro-Western line increased, Eurasianism became stronger among both policy makers and foreign policy experts. Starting to coalesce in 1992, by 1993 the Eurasianist Democrats were able to influence foreign policy and security debates in Russia. The theoretical framework of Russia's 1993 foreign policy doctrine (especially the setting of regional priorities) was obviously affected by Eurasianist ideas. 22 The nationalists and the Eurasianists were together successful in forcing Kozyrev to link Russian military politics and troop withdrawals with national minorities rights in the ex-Soviet republics (especially in the Baltic states). Echoing these Eurasianist themes, President Yeltsin during his 1992 visit to India emphasised Russia's Eurasian identity by pointing out that most of Russia's territory - 10 million out of 17 million square kilometres - lay in Asia, and that most Russian citizens lived in the Asian part of Russia. 23
The Slavophile version. In contrast with the 'democratic' version of Eurasianism, the Slavophiles downplayed the country's unique geopolitical position and instead stressed Russia's distinctiveness from both the West and the East. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, a Russian authority in international relations theory, noted: "The geopolitical location of Russia is not just unique (so is that of any state), it is truly fateful for both herself and the world... An important aspect of this situation was that Russia, being situated between two civilizations, was a natural keeper of both a civilized equilibrium and a world balance of power". 24
According to the Slavophiles, this predetermined in no small measure the evolution of the Russian state as a great power and the establishment of a strong central authority. Unlike the Democrats, the Slavophiles have not been frightened to label Russia as an empire and to support its revival. Pozdnyakov pointed out that: "Russia has always been held together by a strong system of state power... I have no doubt that guaranteeing Russia's existence is a top priority today. This can only be done by a strong authority equal to saving the people from arbitrary practices, anarchy, hunger and civil war. This must extend to the whole nation". 25
Contrary to the Democrats, the Slavophiles opposed Western assistance. They considered it irrelevant and burdensome, and proposed a reliance upon Russia's own resources. They opposed Russia's joining the of Western economic, political and military institutions on the basis of it restricting the country's sovereignty.
They also favoured turning the protection of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics into a top foreign policy priority. Contrary to the Democrats, however, the Slavophiles did not rule out the use of force to defend these minorities.
Finally, they proposed to change the current geopolitical priorities by paying more attention to Russia's southern and eastern neighbours and to keep a relatively low profile in the West.
By the end of 1993, both versions of Eurasianism - democratic and Slavophile - found themselves, similar to Atlanticism in a critical situation due to a number of intellectual and political factors.
Intellectually, Eurasianism has been unable to respond to two fundamental issues. Firstly: what are the civilisation criteria for drawing lines between the West, the East, and Russia? If a civilisation is to be defined by religion, why does the West include, along with Catholic France and Italy, a Protestant America, a mixed Protestant-Catholic Germany, and an Orthodox Greece? Which religion should serve as a basic criterion in defining the East? Is Russian identity defined by Orthodoxy alone, or instead by a mixture of Orthodoxy and Islam? Does Israel belong to the West or to the East? Indeed, if the level of industrial and technological development is important in distinguishing the West from the East, then Japan is certainly a more Western state than, say, many Western European countries. Moreover, this school of thought has also failed to explain why prosperous Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan, South Korea, some ASEAN countries, Turkey, and so on, have undergone modernisation (including import of some Western values) without any serious damage to their national values and traditions. Being unable to find satisfactory answers to these questions, Eurasianism has operated with concepts which have been misleading, contradictory and unfit for building new theory.
Some critics of Eurasianism have pointed out that what is now called the West can no longer be reduced to Europe and its civilisation. It is a synthesis of cultures and civilisations that has taken decades to accomplish. An important aspect of this synthesis has been the adoption of European cultural values, although this process did not amount to renouncing one's own distinctiveness. Now the West includes not only Europe and North America, but also Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrialised countries.
Secondly, the Eurasianists have been challenged by the question: what is this unique Russian national idea which provides Moscow with a special historical mission? Stankevich's definition of the Russian national idea as democracy, federalism and patriotism hardly reflects the uniqueness of such an idea. The United States, Canada, Germany, India and a number of other states could describe their national ideas in these terms as well; but it does not provide them with a sufficient moral basis to proclaim their special historical mission. The Slavophiles have also failed to define the Russian national idea. From time to time different concepts - sobornost (conciliarism, rule by a collective mind), dukhovnost (spirituality), the peace-loving Slav tradition, etc., - have been proposed as a frame of reference. But these concepts have obviously contradicted real life in post-Communist Russia and failed to conquer the country's market of political ideas.
Politically, neither democratic nor Slavophile Eurasianists have been able to form an influential political party or coalition. Alternative political movements such as the Communists and the Liberal Democrats have not so much not been concerned with theorising but, instead, have concentrated on more concrete domestic problems. And hence, they have been much more successful on the Russian political arena. Being a product of political and intellectual elites, by the end of 1993 Eurasianism had definitely tended towards political marginalisation.
In addition, Eurasianism had had a mixed record in the international arena. With the exception of Kazakhstan, the CIS countries showed little interest in implementing Eurasianist ideas. For some of them (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) Eurasianism represented a cover for Russian imperialism. A number of the FSU countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) were interested in co-operation with the Western rather than Asian countries. Neither Western Europe, nor the United States, were satisfied with the role that Russia had been playing in post-Soviet space. Instead of stabilising and mediating, Moscow often fuelled local conflicts operating under the old imperialist principle divide and rule. Moreover, Russia suddenly discovered that it was no longer the only country which laid claim the role of bridge between various civilisations. Some CIS member-states (Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan) and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states) has also sent clear messages to the world that they too claimed the same status.
As 1993 progressed, other schools of thought, alternatives to both Atlanticism and Eurasianism, became influential.
The rise of the derzhavniki
is coalition was the end result of a process of consolidation of the three major political forces - the industrial lobby, the federal military and civilian bureaucracies, and the moderate Democrats. The three leading figures of the new alliance were Arkadii Volskii, co-leader of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, the de facto head of the 100,000-member People's Party of Free Russia; and Nikolai Travkin, chairman of the 50,000-member Democratic Party of Russia. The former Secretary of the Security Council Yuri Skokov and Vice Premiers Oleg Lobov and Mikhail Malei supported the group as well. In the intellectual community its positions have been elaborated by Sergei Karaganov, Andrei Zubov, Andranik Migranian among others.
This group was quickly labelled the derzhavniki or the gosudarstvenniki (proponents of state power). The term of derzhavnik denotes the advocation of a strong and powerful state which can maintain order and serve as a guarantee against anarchy and instability; a rather traditional Russian view of the state's role. Their domestic political aim had been to slow down the pace of market reform and to force the government to make major concessions to the powerful interest groups that they represented (state-owned enterprises, workers in the defence sector, some leaders of organised labour).
As for Russia's foreign policy, the derzhavniki proposed that it should be guided by the principle of self-limitation and self-sufficiency. First of all, they pointed out that "the disintegration of the Soviet Union has turned Russia into a medium-sized power. Of course, we still have an immense territory and nuclear potential. Nevertheless, the size of our population and especially the dimensions of our GNP place our country in a different category of nations". 26 For these reasons, it was argued, Russia should not compete for influence as a global power.
But this period of concentration on its internal problems should not, however, prevent Russia from pursuing an active foreign policy in various parts of the world. The derzhavniki opposed either a pro-Western or pro-Asian choice for Russia's foreign policy. They believed that Russia is both a European and an Asian country. According to the derzhavniki, the best way to define Russia's identity was to become Russian and to respect the nation's own history and values. They were fascinated with the ideas of Dostoyevsky: "As soon as Europeans see that we have begun to respect our people and our nationality, they will begin to respect us for their part". 27
Along with the Democratic Eurasianists they considered the CIS and the near abroad as a top priority for Moscow's security policy. "Russia must bear its cross and fulfil its duty by playing an enlightened post-imperial role throughout the ex-Soviet Union", observed Vladislavlev and Karaganov, "A decisive component of Russia's new mission in the world is to ensure, with help from the world community, that the ex-Soviet area does not become a geostrategic hole radiating instability and war and ultimately endangering the very existence of humanity". 28 A need for the gradual economic and military integration of the CIS has been acknowledged as well. Belarus and Kazakhstan have been most the promising partners in the Commonwealth in this respect. The derzhavniki have put pressure on the government to create a proper CIS mechanism to provide such integrationist processes with the essential institutional support.
The derzhavniki described Kozyrev's policy of ignoring minority rights violations in the Baltic republics as amoral and short-sighted. In their view, Russia has a duty and mission to defend the rights of all its ex-compatriots. This is imperative, not only due to it being a moral duty, but also because of practical considerations. They emphasised that suppressing the rights of some minorities would trigger an inevitable chain reaction.
At the same time, they stated, Russia's assertive policy in the near abroad should not imply an imperialist policy. The derzhavniki assumed that any attempt to forcibly re-establish the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire would be fraught with danger; overstraining Moscow itself and also possibly leading to international isolation.
This group regards the West as an important priority in Moscow's foreign policy and favours better relations with the West, but not at the cost of diminishing Russia's role as an independent great power with its own spheres of influence. They remain fairly sceptical as to the West's willingness and capability to help Russia in realising its reforms. They argue against an excessive reliance on Western economic assistance and political guidance and advocate an active arms export policy regardless of Western opposition. 29
It was the derzhavniki who first suggested that the West may well choose to implement a sort of neo-containment policy towards Russia because of its irritation at Moscow's less than compliant tone, its increasing concern about signs of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space, as well as over Moscow's reluctance to accept NATO enlargement, to restraint its arms sales, and to stop playing the Chinese card. 30
The derzhavniki have been the leading critics among Russia's political elites over Western policies concerning NATO's expansion. They warned that enlargement could lead to a resumption of the East-West confrontation, although in a milder form than before. They recommended that the West should delay its decision on expansion for a number of years. Moreover, both Russia and the West should propose some positive programme for Central and Eastern European countries to reduce their security concerns. There could be bilateral or unilateral Western guarantees for their security, and an early enlargement of the EU and WEU, and so on. And that Russia should develop its relations with the EU and WEU as a counterweight to NATO's offensive capabilities. 31
As a result of the December 1993 elections, which demonstrated the success of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the domestic basis for pro-Western policy shrunk. For many Democrats statist ideology became the only way to save the remnants of Democratic principles and confront the extremists, nationalists, and Communists. A significant group of Atlanticists (including Kozyrev) and the Democratic 'wing' of the Eurasianists both joined the derzhavniki.
The so-called Kozyrev Doctrine, proclaimed by the then Russian Foreign Minister in a speech to Russian diplomatic representatives in the CIS and Baltic states in January 1994, became a symbol of the derzhavniki's concept of foreign policy. He declared that the vital strategic issue for Russian diplomacy was the defence of Russian minority rights in the 'near abroad'. He affirmed the need for a Russian military presence in this area and advocated the idea of dual nationality. 32
Russian policy towards the West also became more assertive. At the same time, as Hannes Adomeit put it, "The neo-imperialist bark has been worse than its bite; aggressiveness has been more a matter of words than deeds. This discrepancy is in all likelihood due to the fact that several of the derzhavniki, Kozyrev among them, are essentially sheep in wolves' clothing. They retain a fundamentally Western outlook but feel obliged to make verbal concessions and tactical adjustments to changes in popular mood and pressures exerted from within the political establishment". 33
1996 took off with the appointment of a new Russian Foreign Minister. Andrei Kozyrev was replaced by Evgeniy Primakov, previously Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Primakov was a less controversial figure than Kozyrev: the Democrats and the government's opponents both acknowledged his professionalism and eagerness to protect Russia's national interests. He also followed the derzhavniki course. Primakov proposed a slightly different set of geographic priorities - the CIS, Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Europe and the USA - to demonstrate to the West Russia's capability as a counterweight to NATO and EU enlargement. 34
Realism: return of the repressed
The derzhavniki with their suspicions toward idealism and romanticism and their advocacy of national interests, paved the way towards the rehabilitation of the realist school of thought. The balance of power, rather than the balance of interests, was again in fashion. National, not international, security became a matter of primary concern.
A number of prominent foreign policy experts from different political camps gradually became fascinated with realist principles - Director of the Institute of American & Canadian Studies, Sergei Rogov, leaders of the Yabloko association, Vladimir Lukin and Alexei Arbatov, former Secretary of the Security Council, Marshall Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Directorate of the Foreign Ministry, Vadim Lukov, and so on. By 1995, Sergey Karaganov and his influential Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Council had also slowly shifted to the realist position. Furthermore, the re-birth of realism was well-received by Russia's military/defence-industrial complex.
The realists did not form a united political organisation or coalition. Politically, the realists have belonged to different groups, although with a predominant orientation to the democratic parties and associations. The realist concept simply provides them with a common theoretical framework and ideas which easily cross party-lines.
According to the realists, Russia's national security concept should depart from the real potential of the state, provide for a rational use of resources, combine and interact with internal, foreign policy, socio-economic, scientific, technological, information, as well as all other aspects of life and work among the state's people. In fact, the realists were one of the first schools of thought in Russia to propose extending the concept of national security to include, not only hard security issues, but soft security topics as well. As the realists underlined, a security concept should contain a comprehensive analysis and classification of the existing and potential threats to Russia's security, as well as starting points for the development and functioning of internal and external mechanisms for both the prevention and operational elimination of these threats. In other words, the concept should be a complex of security goals and ways of ensuring this; of ways and means of achieving this that would correspond to Russia's historical position and future role. It should ensure a co-ordinated effort on the part of both the state and the people as a whole to provide security at the national, regional, and global levels, as well as the organisation of internal and international interaction in solving urgent and long-term security problems. 35
The realists distinguish four main categories in terms of Russia's national interests. First, there are functional interests - economic, political, social, military, humanitarian, and environmental. Second, there might be other groups, depending on the degree of these interests longevity - short-term, mid-term, and standing interests. Third, interests could be categorised depending on their importance - vital, important, or marginal. Finally, domestic and foreign policy interests could be defined. 36
The realists stress that in an interrelated and interdependent world national interests of different countries may overlap, cross, or even clash in various forms, ranging from soft, diplomatic to radical, military ones. The realists also distinguish two kinds of threats to Russia's security: external and internal.
The external sources of threat were defined as follows:
(a) political: attempts to challenge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation by exploiting inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts; territorial claims laid by foreign powers; blocking integrational processes in the CIS; creating obstacles to Russia's co-operation with the former Soviet republics Eastern European countries; political instability in neighbouring countries; human rights violation and the resultant uncontrollable mass migration from these countries; efforts to weaken Russia's role and positions in the international organisations, and so on.;
(b) economic: the diminished economic independence of Russia; a decline in its economic and scientific-technical potential; fixing its fuel and raw material specialisation in the world division of labour; restricting Russia's presence on some world's markets; blocking Russia's access to advanced technology; uncontrolled exports of capital and strategic raw materials; Russia's non-admittance to the international financial, trade and economic organisations; smuggling, and so on.;
(c) military: existing and potential armed conflicts in the vicinity of Russia; the unsettled problem of nuclear weaponry in the former Soviet republics; nuclear weapon and technology proliferation; the lack of a proper border regime, especially in the south and west of Russia; the unclear status of Russian military presence in the ex-Soviet republics; the military build-up in neighbouring countries and adjacent regions, and so on.;
(d) environmental: ecological disasters in neighbouring countries; long-term negative effects resulting from global environmental shifts; and
(e) social: the internationalisation of organised crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, mass epidemics, the modern slave trade, and so on.
However, the realists were also keen to emphasise that at present the main sources of threat to Russia's security come from inside the country which is in a deep system crisis.
Internal threats were described as follows: (a) the potential disintegration of the Russian Federation as a result of inter-ethnic and centre/regions conflicts; (b) socio-economic tensions stemming from economic decline, the rupture of economic ties, inflation, rising unemployment, deep-going social differentiation, the degradation of science, educational system, medical services, and so on; (c) organised crime and corruption; (d) cultural and spiritual degradation; (e) the degradation of the environment; and (f) the lack of information security. 37
To cope with these threats Russia should first accomplish its domestic reforms. Only in this way will the country have necessary resources to restore its internal, and to some degree its external, stability. The realists believed that a cohesion of all levels of security - intraregional, national, CIS, European, Asia-Pacific, global - should be reached. This should be aided by the rational and effective use of all forces and means currently at the disposal of the Russian state.
Moreover, the realists prefer political, diplomatic, economic and other peaceful methods to meet security challenges. However, they do not rule out the use of military force if differences between states vital interests cannot be reconciled.
The regional priorities of the realists are similar to those of the derzhavniki. Rogov suggests that there are three main circles of Russian interests - (1) near abroad; (2) East Europe, the Middle East and Far East; and (3) the West (the United States and Western Europe). The remainder of the world meanwhile is of peripheral importance for Russia. 38
The near abroad is the first regional priority in Russia's international strategy. The main goals of Moscow's foreign policy in the near abroad are to prevent the rise of unfriendly regimes and the emergence of ethnic and religious conflicts, to establish stable relations with its neighbours, to protect Russian citizens human rights, to shape a common security space on CIS territory, and to resolve territorial disputes with the NIS.
According to the realists, reimposing Russia's military and political dominance over the post-Soviet space at any cost would cause numerous sacrifices and lead to countless failures. Instead, Russia's diplomatic inventory must contain a wide range of accurately weighed and measured economic, political, military and cultural methods which could assist with the protection of Russian interests and with the development of friendly relations with their neighbours. The realists have emphasised that CIS integration could only be achieved once Russia becomes attractive to its partners. Integration will be costly for Moscow; Russia could afford it only if its domestic reforms succeed. 39
As Rogov put it, the second circle of Russia's national interests includes Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.
The realists are critical of Kozyrev's policies towards Central and East European countries because Moscow has been unable to prevent their drift towards the West both in economic and security terms. According to the realists, Eastern Europe must be shown, through clever initiatives in various fields, that it will be more safe and prosperous, not in the role of a cordon sanitaire thrown around Russia, but functioning as a connecting link between Eurasia and Western Europe. 40
In line with other schools of thought, the realists have stressed the Eurasian geopolitical location of Russia. However, Russian foreign policy on the continent should be defined by real interests rather than messianistic ideas.
Russian policy towards the Middle East should be determined by its interests in the near abroad - the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Potentially, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan may be Russia's opponents. According to Lukin, very likely, Russia will, in the years ahead, have to vigorously resist Islamic fundamentalism, the spread of which would threaten to destabilise the situation both near and inside the CIS. Still, it is essential, however, not to be drawn into a confrontation with the biggest Islamic countries (including Iran), but instead seek various avenues of agreement and develop mutually beneficial interstate relations. Russia must rebuff all attempts by Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan to encroach on Russian economic, political, and military interests. 41
As for the Far East, the realists have noted Russia's current weakness and declining role in the region. Rogov admits that some of the ex-Soviet republics could be drawn into the spheres of interest of such regional centres of power as China or Japan. 42 Arbatov even suggests that China may represent the greatest external security threat to Russia in the long run. 43 He and other realists do not approve of too quick a military rapprochement with the PRC and warn of the possibility of Russia's one-sided dependence on Beijing. 44
For that reason, Arbatov observes, the interests of Russia in the region may be best served by the maintenance of America's political role and limited military presence. 45 If the United States were to withdraw, the Japanese reaction could be none other than remilitarisation in view of the rapid growth of economic and military power in China. A clash between these two giants could draw Russia into the conflict as well. In addition to keeping US military presence, Russia's national interests would be best served by a new multilateral security system in the region.
Arbatov believes that Moscow should eventually transfer the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan as a part a fundamental revision of political and security relations between the two countries. A new security regime based on arms reductions and confidence-building measures could be created in the Western Pacific. Economic co-operation between Moscow and Tokyo could follow, provided that Russia creates attractive conditions for foreign investments in Siberia and the Far East. Russia should also promote the (re)unification of Korea in order to eliminate this source of serious tension in the region. 46
According to Rogov, the third circle of Russian interests includes Moscow's relations with the West, in particular with the United States and Western Europe.
As for the United States, the realists see a number of areas where the two states have common interests: (a) accomplishing Russian economic and political reforms; (b) developing a bilateral arms control regime (in particular, further reductions in strategic armaments and nuclear test ban); (c) preventing the rise of resurgent regional powers which could violate existing power balance; (d) nuclear, chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation; (e) peace-keeping. 47
At the same time, the realists have singled-out some sources of tension between Russia and the United States - Russia's inability to move fast with its domestic reforms; the lack of a common enemy, which is indispensable for any military-political alliance; the model of mutual nuclear deterrence inherited from the Cold War; America's refusal to admit Russia into the Western community; the preservation of the system of military-political alliances set up by the United States during the Cold War; NATO and EU enlargement through admitting the Soviet Union's former clients but not Russia itself; Russia's arms and dual-use technology transfers to Third World countries, and so on.
Many of these differences may well remain in the foreseeable future. According to the realists, Russia should be firm as regards its most vital interests (for instance, preserving a common European security system and arms control regime, the prevention of a military build-up and alliances in the country's vicinity, Moscow's dominant position in the post-Soviet security space, and son on.). At the same time, Russia should avoid quarrelling with America over differences on secondary matters such as nuclear deals with Iran, missile engine technology transfers to India, advanced weaponry transfers to China, and so forth. 48
Concerning European security problems, the realists have focused first of all on NATO and EU enlargement. They do not oppose the latter, and regard the former as detrimental to the regional security system. The realists do not favour NATO's dissolution. On the contrary, they acknowledge the Alliance's positive role in the maintainance of European security both in the Cold War era and beyond. 49 But they also believe that NATO should not be extended and strengthened at the expense of Russian security. According to the realists, to prevent a new clash between the East and the West the entire European security architecture should be changed. The OSCE should become the main collective security organisation on the continent. Its job should be to create a European Security Council (ESC) with permanent members possessing veto power and a number of rotating non-permament members, representing smaller European and CIS states. NATO and the WEU should be subordinated to the ESC and serve as its military arms in maintaining regional security (especially in peace-keeping operations). 50
Since this proposals has proved to be unrealistic, the realists have focused on the search for a compromise with the West. They have proposed both a delay in NATO's expansion for a number of years, and for its eventual enlargement to be limited to the Visegrad countries only, and not to be extended to the Baltic states. They have also proposed a special Russia-NATO charter to ensure Moscow's security (no further expansion to the CIS countries, no military bases and nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, the continuation of arms control dialogue, and so on.). 51 The Russian-NATO Paris agreement (May 1997) was concluded, in fact, on the basis of these principles. 52
The realist legacy has had a fairly mixed record. On the one hand, realism has contributed positively to the Russian foreign policy debate. The realists have helped to overcome the crisis in Russian foreign policy thinking which had been generated by the struggle of two extremes represented by such powerful schools of thought as Atlanticism and Eurasianism. The realists succeeded in articulating Russia's real security interests and priorities to both domestic and foreign audiences. Moreover, the spread of their ideas made Russian security thinking more predictable and understandable for the West. The new Russian national security concept which have been approved by the President in December 1997 drew heavily upon the realist ideas. 53 On the other hand, the coming of realism with its emphasis on national interests, national security, and national sovereignty implied an obvious return to the old paradigms belonging to the age of classical modernity. They failed to develop any concepts addressing the challenges of postmodernity.
Geopolitics: new opportunities in Russia?
Along with realism, its close relative - the geopolitical school of thought - is currently in fashion in Russia. In part, it could be viewed as a counter-reaction to Russian theories concerning Marxism and Gorbachev's New Political Thinking (NPT) which both denied the role of geopolitical factors in international relations. As late as 1983 the Soviet Encyclopaedic Dictionary noted that geopolitics is a monopoly of "racism, Malthusianism and social Darwinism". 54 With the collapse of both Marxism and NPT the Russian catacomb adherents of geopolitics were permitted to argue that geography plays a crucial role in international politics in general, and also in shaping national interests in particular.
One additional reason why many Russian theorists have been fascinated with geopolitics is that this concept assisted them in escaping from the intellectual dead-end caused by the Atlanticism-Eurasianism political controversy. At a certain stage both schools realised that both pro-Western or Eurasian orientation was imposed by ideological preferences rather than dictated by Russia's real national interests. The geopolitical paradigm was seen by many thinkers as having a solid theoretical basis compared to many other concepts. In fact, all leading Eurasianist theorists (Pozdnyakov, Pleshakov, Bogaturov, etc.) became followers of the geopolitical school. 55 Indeed, even some former Westernizers (Razuvayev, Kudrov, Sorokin, etc.) accepted geopolitical views as well. 56
As Tyulin explains, the popularity of geopolitics in Russia is also a sort of psychological reaction of some Russian scholars and politicians to the collapse of the Soviet Union as superpower. Since Soviet superpower status had been directly linked to confrontation paradigm and fighting enemy, the search for a way to restore the country's former status turned to geopolitics. While the Marxist perception of the world has been founded on the concepts of ideological and class confrontation, in the post-Communist era the outlook shifted towards geopolitical rivalry. 57
The geopolitical school departs from the assumption that every state consists of three indispensable components: territory, population, and political organisation. Wherever people may live, and under whatever political system, their activities are invariably conditioned by the physical environment. Every state has unique geographic features. Its territory has a location, landscape, form, size, and natural resources. These specifics account for the equally unique historical background of any country. Of the numerous factors influencing people's activities, geography changes least of all. It underlies the continuity of national policy provided that the geographic area remains unchanged.
The size of territorial possessions is a tangible element of the relative strength of a country in defending its interests. Natural resources and geography are factors for either the solidity or looseness of social and economic ties. Coupled with climate, they set a limit to agricultural production and condition internal communications and foreign trade. The country's strength should therefore be assessed primarily by looking into geography.
According to proponents of the geopolitical paradigm, today's divided world is both a political and a geographic reality to be reckoned with by the political and military strategy of every state, as well as by the concept of national security and interests. Every country's vital interests includes its self-preservation as a specific cultural and historical community. Geopolitically, this means primarily defending national territory. This is the precondition for political and economic independence. Pozdnyakov believes that countries giving priority in their foreign policies to ideological, moral, emotional or other factors are defeated sooner or later and become dependent on stronger powers. Some politicians demonstrate the greatest political dilettantism by imagining that in a world dominated by power politics, good relations between countries are a product of friendly sentiments between their leaders or peoples. 58
Many Russian adherents of geopolitics, in fact, accept Saul Cohen's concept of two geostrategic regions: the maritime world dependent on trade (with the United States as its core) and the Eurasian continental world (where Russia is the core). According to Pozdnyakov, the United States, as one of the two geostrategic regions, is now the only remaining superpower. And, it is trying to take advantage of this situation as a means to achieve some of its goals, which, until recently, have largely been unattainable. 59
To geopoliticians minds, two things are of paramount importance for the maintenance of world order and stability: (a) establishing a clear boundary between Western sea power and Eurasian land power in Europe, and (b) preserving the unity of the Heartland. According to some analysts, both these principles of global security are seriously challenged by the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The boundary between the West and Eurasia has shifted eastward. To date, this boundary is not properly defined. Russia, which controlled most of the Heartland, has shrunk in terms of territory and is currently unable to play the role of balancer in a geopolitically unstable world. A geopolitically imbalanced Eurasia might provoke a universal re-division of the world with its resources and strategic boundaries. In turn, it could imply a protracted period of turbulence, rift and bloody conflict. To avoid such a worst-case scenario, both Russia and the West should make joint efforts to stabilise the post-Soviet geopolitical space. It could restore Russia's historic mission to be the mediator and to serve as a safeguard against forces aiming at world-wide domination. Echoing Mackinder's three geopolitical theses, Pozdnyakov coined his own geopolitical formula: "He who controls the Heartland can exercise effective control over world politics, above all by maintaining a global geopolitical and power balance, without which lasting peace is unthinkable." 60
Based on a rather old-fashioned frame of reference, the geopolitical school has, however, failed to explain a number of important phenomena and processes in a contemporary world. First, a geopolitical interpretation of how the geographic environment inter-acts with society and politics is often simplistic and wrong. With its emphasis on geography, the geopolitical paradigm almost completely ignores other crucial factors shaping the international relations system, such as economy, trade, information, social movements, interest groups, political leadership, law, culture, religions, ideologies, an so on. These factors not only constitute international politics; usually they also serve as a buffer between geography and world politics, a buffer which transforms geographic impulses into a language of diplomacy or military strategy. Geographic factors effect international politics indirectly rather than directly. For instance, landscape as such does not matter for international relations, say, in the Middle East. But, it becomes important when economic reasons (water resources distribution) or military-security considerations (potential battlefield) are involved.
Second, the geopoliticians very often misinterpret both the sources and the nature of countries foreign policy behaviour. For example, the desire of many Central and East European countries to join NATO and the EU could hardly be explained by their geopolitical motivation alone. Obviously, they hope to get both economic and security-strategic benefits from their NATO and EU membership. In addition, cultural and identity considerations force them to choose a pro-Western orientation.
Japan is yet another example. Given its geographic characteristics - peripheral location, small territory, a lack of natural resources, and overpopulation - Tokyo should be treated as a minor power. Contrary to geopolitical assumptions, Japan was able to develop one of the prime economies in the world and evolve into one of the real power poles in contemporary international relations. Again, in contrast with the Heartland concept, not continental (Russia) but maritime (the United States) power has bridled potential Japanese hegemonism most effectively during the last fifty years.
Third, geopolitics rarely explains the genesis of many phenomena and the causes of changes in international relations. This theory focuses on a description of the geopolitical interests of various countries or the world's geopolitical structure at a given time, but does not examine how and why these interests or this structure were formed and transformed. For example, why did the United States become the core of the maritime world and Russia gain control of the Heartland? Or, why is Russia unable to play a dominant, and therefore stabilising, role in Eurasia any longer? Why do the small states accept one great power as a leader and reject another?
Finally, the very concept of either a unipolar (Heartland, World-Island, Rimland) or bipolar (maritime and continental worlds) geopolitical structure is open to debate. Many theorists believe that the existing international relations system is multipolar. Others argue that the world was always probably multipolar. While some suggest that there is no system at all and chaos prevails. Many scholars admit that the world could be either unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, but point to economy, military strength, ideology, and so forth as foundations for leadership rather than geographic determinants.
Some Russian geopoliticians have seen the drawbacks of their paradigm and put forward improved versions. Pleshakov, for instance, thinks that a geoideological paradigm (GP) should replace geopolitics in explaining international relations in the 20th century. He defines the GP as a dynamic interaction between geopolitics and a universal ideology. 61 The GPs came into being with the rise of powerful modern ideologies marked by two parameters: the highly active involvement of the masses in the declared transformation of the world, and the establishment of durable institutions ensuring ideological control. Gadzhiev in his fundamental work on geopolitics also points out links between geopolitics and ideology in the 20th century. 62
Some Russian theorists prefer to produce soft geopolitical concepts which do not neglect the plurality of factors influencing international politics, but regard geography or spatial dimensions as most important ones. According to one definition, geopolitics is about "how the states use spatial factors to identify and attain their political purposes". 63 According to Pleshakov, geopolitics "can be defined not only as objective dependency of some nation's foreign policy from its geographic location but also as objective dependency of international actor from totality of material factors which provide this actor with control over the space". 64 Some scholars, such as Gadzhiev, view geopolitics as a subfield of political science or equivalent of international relations theory which emphasises the spatial-temporal dimensions of world politics. 65
For other specialists, the geopolitical paradigm is a theoretical departure in order to justify their reading of Russia's foreign policy priorities. Sorokin believes that geopolitics as a discipline consists of two parts: fundamental geopolitics which produces theoretical outlook on the world, and applied geopolitics which aims at policy-relevant recommendations. 66 For example, this group of geopoliticians use geopolitics to prove the importance of the near abroad and adjacent regions for Moscow's national interests. 67
Despite the seemingly old-fashion argumentation, the geopolitical paradigm should retain its influence in the Russian foreign policy debate in the foreseeable future. Not only the existence of a theoretical vacuum, but current geopolitical challenges and a need to define Russia's national identity (including national interests and security politics) make this paradigm both significant and attractive to Russian policy makers and analysts.
The idealist/liberal paradigm
Despite the dominance of the realist/geopolitical paradigm the idealist/liberal perspective on diplomacy is also represented in Russia. In fact, Atlanticists drew upon some idealist principles. Idealism emphasises globalisation trends in the world economy which strengthen the trend toward global management of economic and political developments and generally increases the relevance of international legal frameworks, thus reducing global anarchy. Idealists believe that the development of multilateral institutions and regimes could guarantee stability of the international system. Although the trend toward a multipolar world is not neglected within the idealist/liberal perspective, it argues that the future development of the international system is no longer predominantly determined by the shape and outcome of rivalries among the major centres of economic and military power, but increasingly by the dynamics of their common development and interdependency. 68 The idealists/liberals argue that the geopolitical drive for control over territories does not matter anymore, and suggest that it should be replaced by geoeconomic thinking. 69
The debate between realists and idealists in Russia on more practical aspects of diplomacy has mainly been concentrated on two issues: CIS integration and European security. For instance, Zagorski argues that the real dilemma of Russian politics in the CIS is not further disintegration versus integration, but rather reintegration versus eventual "natural" new integration on the basis of democratic and market reforms yet to be completed. Zagorski also argues that, in order to pursue the latter option, one needs to recognise that the major building blocks of the experience of the European Union do not apply to the CIS and another "NAFTA-type" of soft integration should be the goal. 70
As to European security, the major controversial issue was NATO enlargement. While mainstream thinking has put forward the geopolitical argument against enlargement, the liberals have argued for a co-operative solution to the issue which would strengthen and institutionalise interaction between Russia and the West. The basic argument of liberals has been that the predominant interest of Russia in Europe should be the strengthening of multilateralism as a guarantee that there will be no return to balance of power politics in Europe. 71
Pro-Western liberals viewed no serious threat stemming from NATO enlargement. They believed that NATO extension was a natural reaction of the former Soviet satellites to Russia's unpredictable behaviour. They criticised Yeltsin for his failure to persuade the Central and Eastern European countries that Russia posed no threat to their security any longer. The liberals also were discontent with Yeltsin's inability to make full use of the opportunities that were opened to Russia in the framework of different security arrangements ranging from PfP to OSCE programmes. 72
The liberals considered NATO as a main guarantor of stability in Europe (in particular in relations between Western and Eastern Europe). 73 They believed that Russia was interested in NATO's responsibility for the stability of borders in Central and Eastern Europe, a region with a number of potential hotbeds of instability that could endanger Russia and the CIS member-states. The liberals thought that once joined NATO the Central and Eastern European countries, which are currently anti-Russian, will no longer have incentives to be hostile to Moscow and that they would become more benevolent neighbours to Russia. In this view, partnership between NATO and Russia could become an instrument of conflict resolution in Russia's relations with its neighbours. 74 The liberals also emphasised that the Western direction was the only one where Russian national security interests have not been really challenged. Moscow should have good relations with NATO to free hands to cope with the arch of instability extending from the Black Sea and North Caucasus through Central Asia further to China. 75
The liberals pointed out that NATO was not aggressive or totalitarian military organisation. Rather, NATO is an alliance of democracies. 76 It is defensive rather than offensive security organisation. The liberals underlined that NATO eastward extension will not really change Russia's geopolitical and geostrategic situation. By the way, Russia is already has some common borders with the NATO countries (Turkey and Norway). Its navy traditionally faces NATO forces in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and in the Arctic. Finally, the liberals maintained, Russia has to focus on its domestic problems such as economic decline, organised crime, environmental decay, nationalism and separatism which they consider much more dangerous than NATO enlargement. They proposed that Russian diplomacy should be focused not on resistance to NATO expansion, but on dialogue with NATO on disarmament and confidence-building. 77
More generally, NATO has been regarded as a mechanism that helped to modernise societies, overcome nationalistic aberrations, and condition the thinking and behaviour of new political elites. 78 Some liberal analysts even believed that national humiliation experienced by Russia in case of NATO enlargement was useful for the future democratic transformation of this country. According to some accounts, NATO extension will force Yeltsin (a) to progress with economic reforms; (b) to pay more attention to Russia's neighbours such as Belarus, China, Iran, and Japan; and (c) to start real military reform. 79
Realists and idealists disagree on the nature of the post-Cold War European security model. Realists believe that in the age of multipolarity only flexible pan-European security system can guarantee balance of power on the continent and national sovereignty of particular countries. They hope that the OSCE, the only organisation where Russia acts on the equal footing with other major Western powers, can be a core of such a security system. Liberals, however, are rather pessimistic as regards the possibility of creating an effective pan-European structure where Russia may have a major say. According to Zagorski, a Big Europe is emerging as a result of expansion of West European and trans-Atlantic institutes rather than on the basis of the only pan-European organisation such as the OSCE. Transformation of these organisations and, especially, of the EU into the pillars of a Big Europe can not but result in marginalisation of the current pan-European structures, in particular of the OSCE, which reduces the available options for Russia's integration into the European developments. The main objective of Russia's policy should not be joining West European organisations, but using co-operation with them to facilitate its own integration into the world economy and the community of democratic states. This aim may be attained not only through membership, but also by creating mechanisms of extra-institutional co-operation between Russia and the EU, NATO and other organisations. 80
Borko sees four possible scenarios for future Russian-European relations: full integration or alliance; confrontation; partnership; and Cold Peace. The first scenario is very tempting, but seems to be impossible in the foreseeable future. Confrontation is possible if extreme political groups inspired by aggressive national-patriotic ideology come to power. The re-election of President Boris Yeltsin and further reforms have diminished the threat of this extreme scenario, but given unstable socio-economic and political situation in Russia it is too early to put aside this scenario. The scenario of partnership seems to be the most desirable and probable, but there is a number of obstacles such as the lack of trust and understanding between Russia and Europe, different mentalities of the Russian and European elites, economic decline and human rights situation in Russia, difference of opinion on concrete trade and customs tariff issues, etc. The Cold Peace scenario is probable as well if Russia's progress along the road of reforms is accompanied by serious setbacks, or if Russian politicians choose a hard foreign policy for domestic reasons. Russian-European relations, Borko concludes, most likely will oscillate between partnership and Cold Peace. 81
Although liberals are unable to dominate or at least influence the Russian diplomatic discourse they, however, fulfil a useful function by challenging the realism/geopolitics and providing this paradigm with an intellectual alternative.
The neo-Marxists
here are two main versions of Marxist-inspired political thought in Russia. The first one is more traditional and exemplified by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), led by Gennady Zyuganov. The second one is close to social democracy and developed by some organisations and authors such as the Gorbachev Fund, Alexander Yakovlev, Dmitri Furman and so on.
Traditionalists. The Communists have been unable to reconcile themselves to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the country's loss of great power status. They believe that Gorbachev and Yeltsin led the USSR to defeat in the Cold War and finally to its collapse. These leaders are regarded as national traitors.
As some pro-Communist experts have suggested, in search of a national security doctrine, Russia should choose between two alternatives - (a) the domination of national-state interests over cosmopolitan ones, and Russia's independent position in the international relations system; or (b) an orientation towards Western values and the joining of a community of civilised countries. 82 The CPRF opts for the first alternative. The Communists emphasise the invariable nature of the country's national interests which do not depend on a concrete regime or dominant ideology. They believe that the main Russian national interest inherited from its history consists of preserving the country's territorial and spiritual integrity. An idea of a powerful state based on multi-ethnicity is equivalent to the Russian national idea. Thus, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and weakening of the Russian state have undermined Russian security and worsened its geostrategic position.
As for the threat perceptions, pro-Communist analysts have singled-out some global developments which could challenge Russian national security: (1) resurgent powers that aim at changing their regional and global status and who may shift the world power balance (Germany, Japan, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, etc.); (2) the rise of regionalism in the world (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc.) which may potentially increase Russia's isolation; (3) the aggravation of global social, economic and environmental problems; (4) a decrease in the significance of nuclear deterrent force and the rise of unstable regional alliances with high conflict potential.
The Communists have also advocated a number of measures to prevent a further weakening of Russia's international authority: (1) the non-expansion of the UN Security Council membership; (2) strengthening the Security Council's role in peace-keeping and solving of international conflicts with a minimal Russian involvement in peace-keeping operations; (3) improving the nuclear non-proliferation regime; (4) observing the principle of equality and reciprocity in concluding nuclear arms control agreements with the United States; (5) opposing the scheme Europe without Russia or attempts to replace the OSCE by NATO as a principal security organisation on the continent. 83
The Communists believe that Russia is part of neither the West nor the East. It should define its own, independent way. At the same time, the Communists are not really fascinated with Eurasianism, regarding both Russian and world history as a result of objective processes rather than messianistic ideas. However, they acknowledge the need for a national ideal or doctrine that could consolidate Russian society. 84
Moreover, a number of regional priorities could be identified as part of the Communist foreign policy platform.
Similar to the Eurasianists and the derzhavniki, the Communists regard the CIS and near abroad as a first priority for Moscow's foreign policy. As they believe that the Soviet Union has been dissolved illegally, the Communists have tried to foster the reunification of the former Soviet republics. Even so, they have ruled out the use of force to restore the USSR. According to Zyuganov, it should be done on a voluntary basis. 85 The main tools of reunification are the development of economic, political, military, and cultural co-operation between the CIS member-states, the creation of a proper institutional framework, as well as the gradual transformation of the Commonwealth into a confederation with the final aim of restoring a united federative state.
Along with some liberals and nationalists, the Communists have put pressure on the Yeltsin government in order to protect Russian minorities abroad. In case of their victory in parliamentary (1995) and presidential (1996) elections, they have planned to sign relevant treaties with Russia's neighbours, "to be closely monitored by the Russian authorities, and to demand unflinching compliance with them from our partners." 86
The Communists believe that the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, Russian troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and the loss of Moscow's control over this region have generated new threats to Russia's security. According to the CPRF paper, "Russian borders, collapsed or "transparent", have become inviting highways for junk commodities, dirty money, infectious diseases, narcotics, weapons, and radioactive wastes." 87
The pretensions of NATO on expanding its zone of responsibility and the alliance's potential enlargement were also included among the Communist threat perceptions: "With the undisguised connivance of the UN Secretary-General, and in defiance of the basic principles of international law, NATO is today attempting to arrogate the function of "collective peace-keeper" and to take up matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of states in whose territory military conflict happens ... The West's attitude to Russia is strikingly illustrated by what is actually the secret deal struck between NATO and the UN behind Russia's back that gives the former the right to use armed force in Yugoslavia purportedly in the name of the UN." 88
The CPRF pointed out that NATO's eastward expansion would violate the strategic balance in Europe in a number of ways. The enlargement will inevitably: (a) destroy the existing security buffer between Russia and NATO; (b) bring NATO's military presence to the Russian borders, including military bases and probably nuclear weaponry; (c) provoke a Russian military build-up on its western and north-western borders; (d) accelerate the creation of a military alliance within the CIS and resume the confrontation between the East and the West on the military block basis; (e) challenge Ukraine and Moldova's status as neutral states; (f) cause the collapse of the CFE Treaty; and (g) undermine the OSCE's role as the main backbone of the European security system. As the CPRF paper concluded, "It is crystal-clear today that NATO's involvement in Bosnia, the Alliance's proclaimed intentions to expand its "zone of responsibility" and to give it a new role, and the plans to enlarge the Alliance further to the east and to draw into it not only the former socialist countries but also the traditionally neutral states are all components of a single strategy spearheaded against Russia." 89
According to other assessments, the aim of the United States is to undermine Russia's economic, scientific-technical, and military capabilities, and also to isolate Moscow from promising trade partners and markets (in particular, in areas such as advanced technologies and arms trade). The West's motive for doing so, it has been argued, is to hopefully prevent Russia's transformation into a potential rival. 90
To put pressure on both the pro-Western Yeltsin government and NATO, the Communists undertook some measures through their faction in parliament. The faction proposed to revise the CFE Treaty in accordance with the new realities and voiced its negative attitude to the ratification of the START II Treaty until the US and NATO changed their position on the Alliance's extension. The Communists again threatened to return to the discussion of Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace programme. 91 Finally, the CPRF faction together with the Liberal Democrats urged the government to oppose the NATO countries drive in the Balkans through bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. 92
Their opponents from the derzhavniki and realist camps agree in principle with the Communists on their assessment of the implications of NATO's enlargement. However, they point out that it is wrong in the first place to represent the NATO member-states as a completely united organisation with regard to enlargement, and to also ignore the difference of opinion between various political forces on the pace and scope of extension. Secondly, the decision on enlargement was made in an attempt to overcome NATO's identity crisis and to cope with post-Cold War threats rather than being targeted against Russia. Third, there could be a compromise between the Alliance and Russia to guarantee Moscow's security and minimise the enlargement's detrimental effects. Such a compromise has been finally reached at the Paris summit.
As for other regions, the Communists have proposed to restore Russia's links with its traditional friends and allies such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba. This could prevent America's unchallenged world-wide leadership and provide Russia with profitable orders for its troubled arms industry. They accepted a détente in Sino-Russian relations as well as active arms export policy in the region because it strengthens Russia's international authority and supports the defence industry. Many leaders of the CPRF are fascinated with the Chinese model of socialism and believe that Gorbachev should have used the PRC's experience to reform the Soviet Union. At the same time, the CPRF is concerned with the future security orientation of China and the correlation of forces in Asia-Pacific which is turning out to be quite unfavourable for Russia. 93
It should be noted that contrary to the domestic sphere, the CPRF has failed to produce any coherent and clearly pronounced foreign policy doctrine. Instead, it operated with an amalgam of the party leadership's statements and remarks which made it difficult to reconstruct the CPRF's foreign policy platform. Despite its immense domestic influence, the CPRF has, in fact, been unable to influence the Russian discourse on theory of diplomacy.
The Social Democrats: re-vindicating NPT? After his resignation in December 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev and a number of his close friends (Aleksandr Yakovlev and Georgi Shakhnazarov, the most prominent among them) committed themselves to the creation of a social-democratic movement in Russia to confront both the Communist-nationalist coalition and the monetarists. The Gorbachev Fund and the journal Svobodnaya Mysl (Liberal Thought) became the most important pillars for the emerging social democracy in Russia. Although the Social Democrats failed to form any influential political coalition comparable with the derzhavniki,the Communists or Zhirinovskiy, they were able to produce some foreign policy concepts which affected Russian diplomatic discourse.
Similar to the Eurasianists, Social Democratic security thinking has focused on the concept of stability. Internal stability has been defined as cohesion within the political system, adherence to normal democratic procedures concerning the rotation of ruling elites, the absence of pressing ethnic and social conflicts, and a healthy, functioning economy. 94 International stability has been seen as a balance of interests among major international players (contrary to the balance of power in the past). 95
Along with other schools of thought, the Social Democrats have contributed to the Russian discussion of national interests. Contrary to the Gorbachev doctrine that was grounded on the unconditional priority of all-human interests over national interests, the Social democrats admitted that national interests is the subject of primary concern for any country. They define national interests as a manifestation of the nation's basic needs (survival, security, progressive development). 96 National interests may be subjective in terms of their form or way of expression, but they are definitely objective in terms of their nature. In a nation-state, national interests are usually synonymous with state interests. In multi-national countries (like Russia) the articulation and representation of national interests are a much more complicated process involving numerous political actors and requiring more time and effort to reach a public consensus.
Some analysts close to the Social Democrats suggest that Russian national interests should include three main components:
(1) The protection of democratic order, territorial integrity, ensuring military security, peaceful conditions for development, and preventing various military threats. Moreover, some less significant interests are identified - arms control and disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, combating international terrorism.
(2) The creation of favourable, mutually advantageous, and equal conditions for participation in the international division of labour and international commercial and humanitarian exchanges.
(3) The protection of the interests of the Russian citizens outside the country. 97
The Social Democrats, however, do not limit themselves to an acknowledgement of the significance of national interests. They believe that in an interdependent world international actors cannot afford to pursue solely their own interests. Since the international environment has become multi-dimensional the actors should take into account both the national interests of other players and universal (all-human) interests. According to the Social Democrats, narrow-minded nationalism is absolutely outdated and detrimental not only to the world community but, in the end, to a nation conducting nationalist policy as well. 98 As Yuri Krasin of the Gorbachev Fund observed, "There is a compelling need for the cardinal and qualitative transformation of the entire world community system in our time. Such a need is caused by numerous threats to humankind's existence. In this connection, all-human interests, values and approaches become more important than parochial interests including the national interests of particular countries in their traditional sense." 99
Thus, New Political Thinking is still relevant for Russia and the rest of the world. However, the principal mistake of the Gorbachevian version of NPT should not be repeated: national interests must not be sacrificed for the sake of all-human values. Instead, the balance between national and universal interests should be found. 100 So, faced with the eternal realist-idealist debate the Russian Social Democrats have disagreed with both parties.
They realise that democracy in the international relations system is still in its infancy, and few all-human values have taken root in humankind's mentality. The Social Democrats regard the creation of a global civil society as the only way of replacing national interests by all-human values. In their view, a world civil society could be based on a system of horizontal links between both inter-government and non-Governmental Organisations dealing with economic, political, environmental and cultural issues. 101 Some experts (Shakhnazarov) have proposed to create a world government to solve global problems and to save humankind from imminent catastrophe. 102 Thus the Kantian project of eternal peace - the methodological basis of NPT and its currents proponents - could be put into practice.
The Social Democrats perceive the world as moving from the unipolar (America is the only superpower) towards a multipolar structure. None of the countries or ideologies will be able to impose its model on the others. The Social Democrats disagree with Fukuyama's thesis on the world-wide domination of the liberal-democratic model. Various civilisation models will compete in the foreseeable future. A future world will be born in the process of the interaction of two contradictory processes - integration and regionalisation. The future poles of power will emerge on the basis of economic, religious, and cultural differentiation. Some analysts distinguish Arab-Muslim, Europe-centric (including the United States), Eurasian (including Eastern Europe), South Atlantic, Indian, and Asia-Pacific centres. 103 Others point to North America, the EU, Eurasia, the Islamic world, and Asia-Pacific as the main future poles. 104 In any case, these developments will make the world less predictable and more multidimensional than has been the case so far.
Which identity should Russia choose? The Social Democrats usually pay tribute to the Eurasian geographic position of the country, but they emphasise that, from a cultural and civilisational point of view, Russia is part of Europe and Russians are part of the European nation. 105 For that reason, Russia should aim at entering pan-European economic, political, and security structures. Europe is also defined in a civilisational rather than geographic sense: the Gorbachevian project of CEH or Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok is still popular among the Russian Social Democrats.
The Social Democrats also emphasise the need for effective policy towards Eastern Europe because Russia has vital geostrategic, economic and cultural interests in the region. They believe many Eastern European countries, notable Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, are ahead of Russia in the pace and scale of their transition from the totalitarian system to democratic rule and a market economy. Russia should study more carefully and use more widely their experience in carrying out its own socio-economic reforms. Some experts recommend the establishment of a special economic relationship with these countries which should be based on a proper legal ground and, in addition, to include the creation of an organisational structure - bilateral commissions for economic, scientific and technological co-operation; joint banks, chambers of commerce and industry; trade and investment insurance funds, etc. 106 The Eastern Europeans, however, have showed little interest in the special relationship model mainly because they have already become oriented towards the EU rather than to their former partners in the socialist block.
According to the Social Democrats, Russia has a vital interest in ensuring that the countries of Eastern Europe do not feel threatened. They understand that a perceived threat from Russia would likely compel many East European countries to join NATO. In order to prevent this scenario, Russia must offer solid guarantees to safeguard the security of the East European states. 107 However, the Eastern Europeans have not been happy with Russian guarantees; instead, they have opted for fully-fledged membership in NATO.
Despite pro-Western tendencies in social-democratic foreign policy orientations, some analysts have underlined the need for a more balanced approach to geopolitical priorities. They have recommended a more vigorous development of Moscow's relations with the East. As one expert observed, "Russia's most powerful neighbours are in the East - in Asia. Its relations with the East include relations with China. These are already of fundamental importance and their importance for Russia's destiny will grow further in the first decade of the next century, when China will have a real chance to become an economic (and possibly also a military) superpower, according to many forecasts." 108 To cope with challenges both in the East and in the West, the Social Democrats have proposed a model of multidimensional partnership that is directed at co-operation with the major players of the world regardless of their geographic location. According to this model, Russia's policy should not be based on playing geopolitical cards (Chinese, American, European). Instead, it should be oriented to establishing long-term and stable bilateral relations as well as to promoting multilateralism. 109 However, it remains unclear which methods should be used to create such relations and how to convince other powers to accept this model.
To sum up, the social-democratic foreign policy doctrine took over many concepts and principles of Gorbachev's NPT. The latter, however, was complemented with some advocacy of Russia's national interests and balanced policies towards the East and the West.
The Right Radicals
There are a number of radical and extremist organisations in Russia. They are united primarily by their rejection of Yeltsin's domestic reforms and by criticism of his pro-Western foreign policy. At the same time there are also major disagreements about both the meaning of Russian history and the appropriate model for the future. Hence, they have been unable to go beyond negativism and to develop a coherent, forward looking agenda of their own.The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is the most important among the right radical organisations. LDPR faction was the largest one in the Russian Duma in 1993-95. The party still has influential positions within the Russian parliament elected in December 1995.
It is difficult to reconstruct Zhirinovskiy's foreign policy concept due to the lack of its elementary logic and the extravagant form of expression of his ideas. One should take into account his numerous statements which often contradict each other. It seems that Zhirinovskiy prefers geopolitics as his theoretical basis, but at the same time he may borrow some ideas belonging to another schools of thought. All these circumstances should be taken into account in the process of analysing Zhirinovskiy's foreign policy views.
According to Alexei Mitrofanov, the LDPR representative in the Committee for International Affairs of the State Duma, Russia's national interests include:
•Creating more favourable international conditions for the country's economic and political development.
•Securing the country's national security and international stability.
•Restoring Russia's strategic boundaries and its historical geopolitical space.
• Restoring the Russian state in its natural frontiers, primarily bringing Ukraine and Belarus back to Russia.
• Regaining Russia's rights to the ports in the Black and Baltic seas as well as passages to Western Europe.
• Restoring Russia's role as a world superpower, which is consonant to its geopolitical predestination.
• Preventing any outside interference in Russia's internal affairs. 110
The near abroad is priority no. 1 for the LDPR. On the one hand, LDPR leaders have called for the ending of Russian assistance to other former republics of the Soviet Union and have declared that they do not want them as part of Russia, at least in the near future. On the other hand, however, he has also envisaged a Russia that includes all the territory of the former Soviet Union, suggesting that the former republics will experience further trouble and seek to subordinate themselves to Russia for economic and security reasons. As for Russia itself, he has suggested a new, expanded Russia which would have no separate republics based on nationality, and Russians would be essentially primes inter pares, with other nationalities allowed to maintain their cultural but not political identities. As Zhirinovskiy put it, "We are against preserving the CIS, just as we are against recreating the USSR. If anybody wants to join Russia, they are welcome, but only with the rights of a territorial unit: a province or oblast. No national-state formations." 111
In one interview Zhirinovskiy was reported to have said that Russia didnt want the Transcaucasus as there were only criminals there, no real economy, and no opportunities for Russia to profit; he said Iran could take over Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia could go to Turkey; but, he also said one day these countries would ask to belong to Moscow again. In another report, Zhirinovskiy said that Russia would step in to save the states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, if these states paid Russia to do it.
One report had Zhirinovskiy saying that Eastern Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova would be part of Russia; another account had him saying that Ukraine and Belarus are Russians and the people want to belong to Russia. He further told a Romanian newspaper that "Ukraine has not been, and will never be independent. It will be one of our provinces." 112
The Baltic states, according to Zhirinovskiy, would be part of Russia, except for Tallinn, which would be a separate city-state, and three cities in Lithuania which would form a small Lithuanian state. Koeningsberg might some day be returned to Germany. And, with respect to Finland, Zhirinovskiy has emphasised that there would be "no problem". But, if Finland was to want Karelia back, then all of Finland would have to be ceded to Russia. 113
In Zhirinovskiy's vision, Russians living outside Russia would be given dual citizenship and Russia would defend them, primarily with economic instruments of power.
In Eastern Europe, according to Zhirinovskiy, three cities in north-western Poland would become part of Germany, and Lvov in Ukraine might be given to Poland as compensation. He did not oppose Poland's joining NATO. He told Polish reporters: "... if Poland wants to join NATO, that is an internal matter for Poland and NATO.... Until recently, Russian forces guaranteed the Polish border. Today, in this matter, one should turn to NATO and Germany, which play the greatest part in this section of the continent." 114 On the other hand, he warned that the East European countries could become Western servants and advised them to remain neutral. He also insisted on dissolving NATO because the Warsaw Pact had already been dissolved. 115
In Zhirinovskiy's view, Slovakia might want to become a part of Russia. The Czech Republic would go to Germany. Austria and Slovenia should unite, perhaps along with Germany. Bulgaria would get the Dobrudja portion of Romania. Greece should return Thrace to Bulgaria. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians would all keep their existing borders. He proposed that all foreign or UN forces withdraw from the former Yugoslavia so that the warring parties could settle the conflict for themselves, but he also said that Russia and the Balkan states would together solve all the Balkans problems.
The LDPR considers the United States to be the principal anti-Russian power, intending to break Russia into a multitude of states dependent on the West. However, due to American strength Russia is bound to co-operate with Washington in various fields, especially in the maintainance of international security. 116 While Zhirinovskiy had been performing a certain amount of sabre-rattling in the form of anti-Western, and anti-US statements before the December 1993 election, after the election he backed away, softening his rhetoric in an apparent effort to present himself as someone with whom the West could deal with.
In his book Last Dash to the South, Zhirinovskiy proclaims as a geopolitical concept the necessity for Russia to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean by military conquest. 117 Viewing this last dash as the "task of saving the Russian nation," he argues that Russia needs to secure access to these warm water routes in order to thrive, and that it needs to subjugate its southern neighbours in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan to eliminate threats posed by pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. He claims that Ankara is planning "to establish a greater Turkey reaching from the Adriatic to Tajikistan." This would allow Turkey to dominate Slavic populations in the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, while placing extreme pressure on Russia via the Caucasus and Central Asia. He argues that Moscow must fight back by leading a pan-Slavic and an anti-Turkish alliance, perhaps in partnership with a resurgent Germany. He suggests that a military conquest to the south would be the basis for a renaissance of a Russian military which has fallen on hard times. 118
According to Zhirinovskiy, a religious war between Islam and Christianity could take place at the end of the 20th century. Only Russia could prevent such a war. He commented that: "Russia could be a factor for stability. It could stop the process of disintegration in Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia..." 119
In one interview, Zhirinovskiy projected a trilateral German-Russian-Indian axis, linking together an expanded Germany, a new Russia that would include most of the former Soviet Union and some additional territory, and India. With some two billion people linked together, Zhirinovskiy imagined that the world would take whatever form this axis imposed upon it. India and Russia together could neutralise China, and Germany and Russia could either neutralise or control Europe. 120
The LDPR fears Chinese ethnic aggression against the Russian Far East and favours using tough economic, administrative, and military methods to stop Beijing. 121
As for other regional problems, Zhirinovskiy told Japanese journalists "Youd better not raise the Kuril Islands issue, otherwise well bring up the issue of compensation for the 40 years of illegal use of Sakhalin by Japan... Well drive everyone out of the Sea of Okhotsk - the Japanese, the Koreans, the Phillipinos... The Sea of Okhotsk will be a closed Russian sea. Well establish a 200-mile zone, and youll be fishing in Australia." 122
Despite the influence of the Liberal Democrats in domestic affairs, their impact on foreign policy issues has been moderate. The Zhirinovskiy phenomenon has shifted Russian security debates slightly to the right, but has had no direct effect on official foreign policy and military doctrines as well as on theoretical discourse.
Postmodernism in Russia?
Up until now, Russian scholarship has been quite indifferent to postmodernism as a school of Western political thought. The Russian academic community has mainly ignored both the postmodern problematique and the discussions around it. Indeed, many Russian theorists are not even aware of this partcicular school. Few philosophers and historians have tried to implement postmodernist approaches to their research. 123 While some political scientists have studied postmodernism as one of the Western schools of political thought. 124
Predominantly postmodernism is regarded as being irrelevant for Russian political discourse. Foreign policy experts are especially unfriendly to postmodernism because, they think, it neither provides them with a theoretical framework for producing national interests or geopolitical concepts nor with practical advice on concrete issues.
However, some have suggested that a certain postmodern insight could be evolving in Russia due to some peculiarities in the national mentality. Russians have never been happy with the project of modernity grounded on rationalism, a belief in linear progress and the decisive role of science and knowledge. Even Marxism, a typical product of modernity, has been adapted to Russian conditions. Russians have never perceived other civilisations as hostile; on the contrary, they have been quite open to dialogue with other civilisations and cultures.
There is growing feeling among some Russian scholars that the country has already entered the postmodern epoch. There are completely new temporal and spatial dimensions in which individuals and society live in the period of transition. Moral values and individual perceptions of the surrounding world have significantly changed as well. At the same time, Russia's economic and technological potential, social structure, and political system still remain in the age of modernity. This typically postmodern discrepancy between an individual's material conditions and his/her psychological and spiritual orientations is gradually emerging as a fashionable theme in Russian social science literature. In her essay published by the main Russian political science journal Polis, Irina Busygina of the Institute of Europe, depicts a mysterious urban world of post-perestroika Moscow representing a mixture of Soviet and capitalist, Russian and Western, values and modes of living. 125 Another adept of postmodernism believes that in the postmodern epoch politics has been freed from economics, ideology and intellectuality; it needs no longer any legitimacy, and power appears in its pure sense - as power for power itself. 126 Other academics do not share anti-rationalist and anti-foundationalist views of postmodernists but acknowledge the existence of the postmodern era with absolutely new political system, actors and rules of the game which should be examined with new research methods. 127 Even realist Vladimir Lukin admits that the world has stepped into a new stage of its development which essentially differs from the previous one. Explaining why the old realism-idealism debate is no longer relevant, he writes: "The modern world, more diverse and multifaceted than ever before, is a world of postmodern global interdependence and medieval neanderthal geopolitics; of secular rationality and religious fundamentalism; of integrated economics, information, and even ideology (free markets and democracy) and sharply differing standards of living." 128
It should be noted, however, that for many Russian academics postmodernism is simply a sort of intellectual game or entertainment. When dealing with security issues, experts still turn to more traditional theories.
At the same time, postmodernist thought has begun to influence Russian foreign policy discourse - at least in areas such as modelling the new world order, Russia's place in world civilisation, defining national interests, and so on.
For example, Ilyin rejects the very idea of postmodernity because he does not believe in the end of history or man. However, he offers a rather postmodern world view by describing evolution of the international relations system from Westphalian, Vienna, Versailles and Yalta models to the present one which emerges as a combination of nation-states with post-urbanist mutations of civilisations and global villages/choritikas (from Greek choritika - rural, country, territorial). The latter he interprets as transterritorial, transnational and global political systems based on telecommunications and political rhetoric. 129
Some Russian postmodernists implement the grammatological civilisational model borrowed from the Western poststructuralists to explain the causes of conflict between different nations and civilisations. This model has pretensions to be more accurate than the notorious Huntington's clash of civilisations theory.
According to this model, a system of writing is a more important civilisational connecting link between members of a nation than, say, religion or culture. Present-day Russia, for instance, is a rather loose formation from a religious point of view, but, in terms of writing (Cyrillic alphabet), is far more homogeneous. Chinese dialects differ so greatly that language functions as a common vehicle only in writing. 130
There is a war of alphabets in the world: most of the peoples and groups now at war use different systems of writing, that is, they belong to different civilisations. Some groups either waging war or involved in some other conflict include: Serbs (Cyrillic alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Croats (Latin alphabet; Catholicism), common language, Serbo-Croatian; Nagorny Karabakh (Armenian alphabet, Armenian Church) - Azerbaijan (switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet; Islam); Greek Cypriots (Greek alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Turkish Cypriots (Latin alphabet; Islam); Russians (Cyrillic alphabet; Orthodoxy) - Chechens (who in 1992 began switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet).
Also, there are parties to conflicts professing a common religion but using different alphabets: (1) Orthodoxes: Moldavians (Latin alphabet) - Transdniestr Republic composed of Russians and Ukrainians (Cyrillic alphabet); Abkhazians (Cyrillic alphabet) - Georgians (Georgian alphabet); Georgians (Georgian alphabet) - South Ossetes (Cyrillic alphabet); Greeks (Greek alphabet) - Macedonians (Cyrillic alphabet); (2) Muslims: central Tajik government (Cyrillic alphabet) - guerrillas (Arabic alphabet), etc. 131
Small civilisations used to be a source of tensions in international relations because they struggle for their survival. They wage wars against more powerful civilisations, thereby making history. Postmodernists are very sceptical with regard to the capabilities of international organisations to cope with the destabilising potential of small civilisations.
Adherents of the grammatological model, however, have found it difficult to convince many Russian scholars that a system of writing is the main source of intra- and international conflicts. This model, they argue, describes the symptoms of conflict rather than its causes. Indeed, contrary to the grammatological explanation, one can find numerous examples of conflicts both between and inside nations using the same alphabet: intra-Arab conflicts, Latin America, China-Taiwan, wars between the European nations, civil wars (from American to Russian), etc. At the same time, the grammatological model can be heuristically valuable for understanding the history of, and current border-lines between, various civilisations.
As to security issues, Russian postmodernists argue that Russia should not base its policy on the concept of national interests. The latter, they believe, is, first, heuristically non-productive; second, theoretically weak; and, third, politically harmful. 132
The postmodernists have deconstructed the national interests concept in order to demonstrate its lack of meaning. For them, this concept is a mere camouflage for parochial interests. In reality, so-called national interests do not reflect either a state's or a nation's interests. That, in fact, they are interests of the elite which runs the government. By imposing its perception of national interests on society, the ruling elite tries to legitimise its dominance and control over both state and society. Each stratum or group has its own version of national interests, but only the most powerful group's version becomes officially recognised doctrine. This, however, does not mean that the successful of any particular concept necessarily corresponds to the real interests of the majority of the country's population. For that reason, foreign policy based on quasi-national interests can be detrimental to a significant part of society. 133
While the national interests concept was useful and productive during the early modernity, today it represents merely a conservative utopia. The postmodernists have categorised this concept and the revival of realism in Russia and other countries as a primitive communitarian response to the dominance of universalism in the age of modernity. According to a postmodernist reading, the national interests concept tends to protect speciality (or even exceptionalism) against universality which was imposed on humankind by the Enlightenment. But this extreme leads followers of the national interests concept to an intellectual and political dead-end. Theoretically, to prove your uniqueness or special rights over something you should - one way or another - use some universal matrix. Otherwise you have no criterion with which to compare different objects. Politically, by defending only its national interests a country could provoke an endless confrontation with other international actors.
The postmodernists have argued that the concept became obsolete in the age of transnational economy, information and communications. It does not fit into a new world order which presupposes that states give up a substantial part of their national sovereignty in favour of supranational organisations (including security matters).
The postmodernists warn that the search for Russian national interests may divert the country away from its path towards democracy. In a global sense, this can lead to confrontation with other powers who deny universal values and pursue only national interests. For them, liberal democracy versus Islamic fundamentalism, one ethnic nationalism against another, exemplifies such a confrontation.
The only way out is to get rid of the both extremes - universalism and communitarianism. The old universalities which proved either to be wrong or anti-democratic should be abandoned. Instead, new universal norms should be discovered. based on multi-culturalism, tolerance, self-criticism, and a dialogue culture. 134 At the same time, however, the postmodernists have avoided building concrete models of security either for Russia or the world.
It is hard to believe that the postmodernists could become an influential school in the Russian diplomatic studies in the foreseeable future. There are at least three main obstacles to the growth of their influence. First, Russia is still at the stage of trying to define its own national identity, and, therefore, realist concepts, such as national interests, national security, power balance, and so forth, will remain attractive both for academics and policy planners for many years. Second, the postmodernists, by limiting themselves to deconstruction are unable to produce any new theory (opposing the very idea of theorising). Finally, Western science has already passed the peak of postmodern discourse (late 1980s-early 1990s) while Russia was still relatively isolated from these discussions. Thus, Western postmodernists probably missed their best opportunity to gain a following in Russia.
Nonetheless, as Russia continues to progress with its reforms and opens up to greater international co-operation, it will inevitably face the postmodern problematique. Responses to postmodern challenges will not necessarily be given by the Western-like postmodernists; although perhaps they could be found by some other schools of thought. But, these challenges should be met somehow; otherwise Russia may never be competitive and prosperous again.
foreign policy consensus?
Along with the polarisation of Russian foreign policy elites and public opinion, there was a clear tendency towards consensus on foreign policy from 1994-97. This development reflects relative economic and political stabilisation in the country. In addition, the discussions of 1991-93 resulted in defining some common principles on which the major schools have agreed upon. Contours of an emerging consensus could be describes as follows:
1. Realism and geopolitics became widely recognised theoretical concepts regardless of the schools political and ideological orientations.
2. The priority of Russia's national interests; the secondary role of all-human or cosmopolitan values.
3. Russia should remain a great power with a major voice in the international community.
4. Other goals should not be given priority in Russia's foreign policy over the country's domestic needs. Foreign policy should serve these needs rather than be a goal in itself (as it was often in the Soviet time).
5. Russia's main national interest consists of ensuring the country's security and territorial integrity.
6. In the present-day world security includes not only military and geopolitical but also societal, environmental, cultural and other dimensions vital to the individual and society.
7. Russia should not be biased in favour of either the West or the East. Instead, its policy should be even-handed and oriented to co-operation with all countries. In fact, a moderate version of Eurasianism was tacitly accepted by the Russian foreign policy elites. As Zagorski put it, "This (foreign policy( consensus is going to take shape around the concept of Eurasianism or one of its versions since the concept itself is heterogeneous, being represented by diverse political trends, and much will depend on the actual balance of political forces. Personally I do not support this concept but am compelled to reckon with the existence of a certain movement of this nature and the fact that it already had its effect on Russian politics in 1993." 135
8. Among the Moscow's regional priorities, the near abroad is the most important one. Russia has special geopolitical, strategic, economic and humanitarian interests in the post-Soviet geopolitical space and should be recognised as an unchallenged leader in this area.
9. NATO's eastward expansion is the most serious security challenge facing Russia in Europe. Russian diplomacy should prevent NATO enlargement, or at least minimise its effects, by excluding the Baltic states and other former Soviet republics from the list of potential members, delaying the process for several years, and revising the CFE Treaty.
10. Russia should be more assertive in voicing its specific interests in relations with the West. It should not hesitate to differ with Western views if the Russia's vital interest is at stake.
11. Moscow should be more realistic in assessing the West's attitudes to Russia, in particular its position on Russia's admittance to the Western economic, political and military institutions.
This consensus has made it possible to produce a number of governmental concepts and doctrines such as the foreign policy concept and military doctrine (both adopted in 1993) as well as the Russian National Security Concept (1997).
It should be noted, however, that a consensus has been reached mainly on those issues dealing with Russia's immediate security needs. While many schools are able to identify threats to the country's security, they are still not ready to go beyond negativism and construct a positive security concept for the future.
Russian foreign policy schools continue to differ on many important theoretical and practical issues: the meaning of Russia's national interests and security; the correlation between hard and soft security; the future of national sovereignty; the role of the international organisations in ensuring national and international security; civilisational orientations; the use of military force in international relations; functional and regional priorities; particular ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts, etc.
The Russian discourse on security still aims at responding to the fundamental question: what is Russia about? This discourse is a way to nation-building rather than to defining the country's future foreign policy and security agenda. This is hardly surprisingly given Russia's newly born polity, culture and even boundaries, as well as its unfinished reforms. It is understandable why fairly old-fashioned theories such as Eurasianism, realism, and geopolitics could come to dominate Russian security debates. As these concepts refer to national interest, national security, national sovereignty and territory, they seem a reliable theoretical basis in searching for a national identity. Russian and other countries experience shows that these concepts may provide both society and the political elites with some intellectual support for building a foreign policy consensus. Moreover, as Margo Light notes, "Pragmatic Nationalism represents the standard view one might expect the foreign policy elite to hold in any country. ... the robust identification and defence of the national interest is normal, in the sense of being in accord with political realist practice." 136 However, as a country departs modernity and faces the challenges of postmodernity, many quasi-reliable paradigms (including realism/geopolitics) do not work.
What can easily be predicted, however, is that Russian security debates will not stop with the reaching of a consensus on realist/geopolitical basis. It is the starting point rather than the end of these debates. With the achievment of a certain level of socio-economic and political stability, new concepts with emphasis on individual and societal security will likely challenge collectivist and state- or nation-oriented theories. The entire landscape of the Russian discourse on security will be even more diverse in the years to come. Plurality rather than unification and consensus- building will probably become a major characteristic of this discourse. A completely different set of priorities could be the focus of future security debates: ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity, preventing the rise of hostile powers and alliances may be replaced by concerns such as the environment, mass disease, international terrorism and narco-business, migration, the increasing vulnerability of economic and information networks, and so on.
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION AND TOPICS FOR RESEARCH
Theoretical pluralism in the post-Communist Russian scholarship has been accompanied by the growth of research and training centres dealing with diplomatic studies. Remarkably, this growth occurred in the situation when governmental support - financial and organisational - to science and education has been decreased drastically or stopped at all. Four main categories of centres can be identified: university departments and centres; the Russian Academy of Sciences; departmental institutes and research centres; and independent think tanks.
Universities
Despite the lack of finance and governmental support Russia's leading universities, such as Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow State University and St. Petersburg University, not only survived but also broadened the scope of research and improved curricula and training programmes. There can be at least two explanations of this phenomenon. First, professors and researchers became free in choosing theoretical approaches and teaching methods. This created a fruitful atmosphere for developing diplomatic studies in terms of both research and teaching. Second, universities learnt fast how to make fund-raising and earn money. University administrators succeeded in searching Russian and foreign grants, establishing good contacts with wealthy sponsors and attracting promising candidates for undergraduate, graduate and post-graduate programmes who are ready to pay for training. Some prominent Western foundations and donators have initiated sponsorship programmes to assist Russian international relations. Among these are the Soros Foundation, the McArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment, the Eurasia Foundation, IREX, the EU TACIS, TEMPUS and INTAS programmes, the NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowship programme, Volkswagen Foundation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and so on. They established offices in Moscow and some regional centres.
MGIMO focuses its research on the following topics: international relations theory (first vice-rector Ivan G. Tyulin, Mikhail V. Ilyin, Mark A. Khrustalev, Anatoly A. Zlobin); 137 national, regional and global security (vice-rector Andrei V. Zagorski, Alexei Bogaturov, Yuri A. Bulatov, Yuri P. Davydov, Yuri E. Fedorov, Sergei Solodovnik, rector Anatoly V. Torkunov); 138 conflict resolution (Khrustalev, Marina M. Lebedeva, Torkunov, Zagorski); 139 foreign services of different countries (Vladimir M. Matveev, Tatiana V. Zonova); diplomatic history (Victor A. Anfilov, Abdulkhan A. Akhtamzyan, Alexander Y. Borisov, Yuri A. Dubinin; Natalia K. Kapitonova, Valentin E. Korneev, Nikolai S. Leonov, Arlen V. Meliksetov, Mikhail M. Narinsky, Leonid N. Nezhinsky, Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Victor I. Popov, Larisa Yefimova); 140 international organisation (Leonid B. Berezovnikov, Vsevolod B. Knyazhinsky, Emilia S. Krivtchikova, ); international law (Tamara E. Abova, Leonid N. Anisimov, Lev M. Entin, Vitaly A. Kabatov, Yuri M. Kolosov, Alexander N. Kozyrin, Yuri I. Leibo, Stepan Molodtsov); 141 human rights (Robert V. Yengibaryan); international economy, eco-diplomacy and techno-diplomacy (Georgy G. Abramishvili, Vadim B. Bugkai, Irina N. Gertchikova, Lyudmila D. Gradobitova, Vilenin G. Klinov, Ivan S. Korolyov, Nikolai N. Liventsev, Raisa B. Nosdryova, Vladimir Shitov, Yevgeny A. Vasilyev) 142 and international information (Gennady K. Ashin, Yuri M. Baturin, Yuri P. Budantsev; Vladimir N. Ivanov). 143
Along with departments (such as departments of diplomacy, international relations and foreign policy, political science, European and American history, oriental studies, global economics, international economic relations and foreign economic operations, international information and journalism, international law, constitutional law and so on) the Centre for International Studies (established in 1974) conducts interdisciplinary studies on diplomacy with special emphasis on international relations system, regional stability and security, conflict resolution and Russian policy towards the CIS. 144
Moscow State University (MGU) aims its research projects at examining diplomatic history (Department of Modern and Current History chaired by Professor Yevgeny F. Yazkov, Centre for American Studies led by Professor Alexander S. Manykin and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Centre headed by Professor Yuri Rogulev); international relations theory (Department of Sociology of International Relations led by Professor Pavel Tsygankov and Department of Political Science headed by Professor Alexander S. Panarin); international law and constitutional law of foreign countries (Faculty of Law); global economics (Economic Faculty); international information and mass media (Faculty of Journalism led by Professor Yasen N. Zasursky); and oriental studies (Institute of Asian and African Countries headed by Professor M.S. Meyer).
Some other Moscow-based universities also run research projects on history, theory and organisation of diplomacy (Russian University of Peoples Friendship, Moscow State Pedagogic University, Russian State University of Humanities, State Academy of Public Administration, Moscow State University of Commerce, and Russian Academy of Economics).
The growth of regional centres of diplomatic studies is a remarkable feature of post-Communist Russia. Contrary to the Soviet period when it was an elitist discipline studied and taught at the limited number of Moscow-based institutes and universities diplomatic studies is spreading now around Russian peripheral universities.
In addition to the Department of Modern and Current History of St. Petersburg University (currently chaired by Professor Boris N. Komissarov) which traditionally had been involved in studies of diplomatic history, the International Relations Faculty has been established in 1994. The new faculty targets at examining not only diplomatic history but also international relations theory, international security and Russian foreign policies towards the United States, Europe and the CIS (dean of the faculty Professor Konstantin K. Khudoley, Professor Boris A. Shiryaev, Associate Professor V.E. Kuznetsov). Along with Department of Political Science (Professor Anatoly A. Fedoseev) the newly created Department of Political Institutes and Processes at the Faculty of Philosophy (chaired by Professor Yuri G. Artemov) also studies international relations system and international organisation.
A number of other St. Petersburg higher education institutes such as St. Petersburg Pedagogical University, European University, St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance, St. Petersburg University of Technology, and St. Petersburg State University of Electro-technics have got departments which somehow deal with international relations and world economy.
In 1993-94, some other peripheral universities, such as Kazan State University, Irkutsk State University, Kuban State University (Krasnodar), University of Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk State Academy of Economics and Management, Tomsk University, and Ural State University (Ekaterinburg), established faculties or departments on international relations. Studies of diplomatic history has always been an important part of research agenda of Altay State University (Barnaul), Far Eastern State University (Vladivostok), Mari State University (Yoshkarola), Mordovian State University (Saransk), Novosibirsk State University, Omsk State University, Perm State University, Rostov-na-Donu State University, Samara State University, Saratov State University, Tver State University, Tyumen State University, Udmurt State University (Izhevsk), Volgograd State University, Vyatsky Pedagogical Institute, Yaroslavl State University. Along with departments which combine teaching and research some universities established special research centres dealing with foreign policy studies. For example, Volgograd University set up an American Studies Centre. University of Nizhny Novgorod has got three research centres related to international relations studies - the Institute for New Strategic Studies, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution Research and Centre for Social and Political Studies.
It is premature to speak about particular academic schools in diplomatic studies in Russia, but some of them gradually emerge both in Moscow and regions. At least some grouping around certain research centres and intellectual leaders is already there. International relations theory is represented by centres such as MGIMO (Tyulin, Khrustalev, Zlobin), MGU (Tsygankov, Gadzhiev), 145 University of Nizhny Novgorod (Alexander A. Sergounin, Andrei S. Makarychev), 146 and Irkutsk State University (Gennady Novikov). 109 MGIMO is leading in studies of diplomatic service history and organisation (Akhtamzyan, Matveev, Meliksetov, Narinsky, Nezhinsky, and Pechatnov). Security studies as a discipline is well-established in MGIMO (Zagorski, Bogaturov, Fedorov, and Torkunov), University of Nizhny Novgorod (Oleg A. Kolobov, Sergei V. Subbotin, and Sergounin). 147 Peace research and conflict resolution can be found in MGIMO (Khrustalev and Lebedeva) and University of Nizhny Novgorod (Alexander A. Kornilov, Kolobov, and Olga O. Khokhlysheva). 148 American studies are strong in MGU (Yazkov, Manykin, and Rogulev), MGIMO (Pechatnov), St. Petersburg University (Shiryaev), St. Petersburg Pedagogical University (Victor K. Furaev and Vladimir V. Noskov), 149 University of Nizhny Novgorod (Kolobov, Makarychev and Sergounin), 150 Tomsk State University (Mikhail Y. Pelipas and Savely V. Wolfson).
It should be noted that rapid growth of peripheral centres not only brought to an end Moscow's monopoly on diplomatic studies but also provided the Russian scholarship with regional perspectives and added theoretical polyphony. Moreover, this process has contributed into training personnel for the local diplomatic and international business structures which are developing now rather dynamically in the regions. In turn, this provided the regional political, security and economic elites, which struggle with the federal centre for additional powers, with expertise on foreign and defence policy issues. Therefore, diplomatic studies has implicitly facilitated the process of democratisation and decentralisation of Russia's foreign, security and economic policies in the post-Communist era.
The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)
In contrast with universities the RAS has not been successful in adjusting its research, financial and administrative structures, and, therefore, in developing diplomatic studies. First and foremost the Academy is more dependent on the government in terms of finance. It has less opportunities for launching commercial projects. Foreign foundations and private sponsors are less generous in case of academic institutions; they prefer to deal with higher education institutes, independent think tanks and NGOs. Low salaries, the lack of resources and opportunities for professional career provoked a real exodus of foreign policy experts from the RAS in the 1990s.
The RAS lost many talented scholars even before the economic decline caused by the Gaidar reforms has started. Under late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin many leading researchers preferring political rather than academic career left the RAS for high-ranking positions in the government, politics and mass media. For instance, former research fellows of the Institute of USA and Canada (ISKAN) such as Vladimir A. Savelyev, Vladimir Lukin and Vladimir Averchev joined the Foreign Service; ex-Deputy Director of ISKAN Andrei A. Kokoshin took a position of the First Deputy of Defence Minister. After being the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Lukin has been elected to the State Duma where he chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee since 1993. Kokoshin has recently been appointed as a Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Former research fellow of the Institute of General History Sergei Stankevich at first joined the Moscow City Government and later on got a post of the presidential advisor. One of the leaders of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Sergei Y. Blagovolin and ex-research fellows of ISKAN Igor Malashenko and Irina Kobrinskaya opted for the Russian TV. Military expert Alexei Arbatov left IMEMO for the State Duma's Defence Committee. Yevgeny Primakov, who had led Institute of Oriental Studies and IMEMO in the Soviet times, has been elected as a Chairman of the upper house of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR under Gorbachev, served as a Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service under Yeltsin and took over the post of the Foreign Minister after Andrei Kozyrev's resignation early in 1996.
However, the RAS still retains good schools in some areas of diplomatic studies. Studies of diplomatic history are traditionally good in the Institute of General History (Alexander O. Chubaryan, Moisei S. Alperovich, Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Robert F. Ivanov, Alexei Komarov, Gennady P. Kuropyatnik, Victor L. Malkov, Oleg A. Rzheshevsky, and Vladimir V. Sogrin), ISKAN (Yuri P. Davydov, Edward A. Ivanyan, Henry A. Trofimenko, and Anatoly I. Utkin), IMEMO (Boris M. Khalosha and Dmitry G. Tomashevsky), Institute of Latin American Studies (Anatoly N. Glinkin), St. Petersburg Division of the Institute of Russian History (Alexander A. Fursenko, Victor N. Pleshkov, Valery A. Shishkin, and Vladimir A. Ushakov).
The RAS institutes are particularly good in area studies especially as many of them have been organised in accordance with geographic principle. ISKAN (Director Sergei Rogov, First Deputy Director Victor Kremenyuk, and Director Emeritus Georgy A. Arbatov) and IMEMO (Andrei V. Anikin, Yevgeny V. Bugrov, Oleg N. Bykov, Rivold M. Entov, Rachik A. Faramzyan, Alexander K. Kislov, Vladlen A. Martynov, Daniil M. Proektor, and Vladimir M. Shamberg) used to have got particular strength in American studies. Institute of Europe (Director Vitaly Zhurkin and Deputy Director Sergei Karaganov), IMEMO (Vladimir Baranovsky and Herman H. Diligensky) and Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies (Director Vladimir Volkov) examine European security and integration as well as ethno-religious conflicts on the continent. Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Director Valery A. Tishkov) specialises on conflict resolution studies. Institutes of Oriental Studies, Far Eastern Studies, Latin American Studies, African Studies cover their particular regions.
However, the RAS lacks expertise in and pay little attention to international relations theory. Few scholars from IMEMO (Baranovsky and Diligensky) and Institute of Europe (Razuvaev and Sorokin) published theoretical works. University centres still retain their priority in this particular field.
Departmental centres and institutes
Many Russian foreign policy, economic, security and defence ministries have got think tanks and training institutions of their own. For example, MGIMO has got dual loyalty being subordinated to both Ministry of Higher Education and Foreign Ministry. In addition to MGIMO which trains students for entering the foreign service, there is Diplomatic Academy which trains or re-trains mid-career diplomats. Along with departments (for instance, Department of Foreign Policy Studies), there are several purely research units in the Academy some of which such as the Centre for Methodology of International Studies (Professor Igor N. Kravchenko) and Centre for Global Problems (Professor Grigory S. Khozin) involved in diplomatic studies as well. The Foreign Ministry itself has got a Department of Historical and Archival Studies which is in charge with handling ministry's archives and publication of documents.
Similar to the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, Federal Security Service (FSS) and Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) have got research units in their higher education institutes: the General Staff Academy, Military University, FSS Academy, and FIS Academy. They are rather active in examining the role of the military and intelligence agencies in shaping and implementation of world politics. They also take part in debates on Russian national security doctrine and organisation. The Institute of Military History focuses on studying, publishing and interpreting of archival documents.
The Government of the Russian Federation runs a number of specialised higher education institutions which basically train personnel for the federal and local executive agencies. Some of them, such as the Russian Academy of Public Administration (and its regional branches), Public Economy Academy, and Academy of Finance conduct research projects on international relations, world economy and international law.
The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) is the most authoritative organisation among the state-run research institutes dealing with international studies. In accordance with the presidential decree, the RISS is a state research organisation which should provide the governmental bodies with analytical information and recommendations related to national security. Since its creation in 1992 the RISS is led by Yevgeny M. Kozhokin, a former member of the Supreme Soviet and chairman of the sub-committee on defence and security. The RISS maintains a staff of over 70 research fellows. It is mainly financed from the state budget but it also managed to get grants from NATO and some other foreign foundations. The Institute maintains close relationships with the Presidential Administration, Foreign and Defence Ministries, security services and the Parliament (State Duma and Council of Federation).
The priority areas of research for the RISS include: national security and Russia's strategic interests in different regions of the world; developments in the CIS countries; security system in Europe; Russia-NATO and Russia-EU relations; disarmament and global stability; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and peacekeeping operations. 151
The RISS produces reports, analytical reviews, expert evaluations, analytical memoranda and papers. The Institute publishes three series of papers: Problems of Russia's Foreign and Defence Policies, New Eurasia: Russian Relations with the Near Abroad, and Strategic Problems of Russian Economic Reforms. The RISS also publishes books with recent titles including: Ukraine: Vector of Changes, START-II Treaty and Nuclear Stability, and Western Europe on the Brink of the Third Millennium: Security, Politics, Economy. In addition, research fellows regularly publish their papers and essays in a variety of Russian newspapers and journals. The Institute periodically holds international conferences on national and global security, arms control and disarmament.
By virtue of their status as state research and training organisations, the above institutes have a unique opportunity to influence Russian foreign policy decision making. Some of them (Diplomatic Academy, General Staff Academy and the RISS) are really influential. This, however, makes them politically engaged and less academic. In spite of the their inclination to applied rather than theoretical research, the lack of information about research projects conducted by these institutions as well as the lack of co-ordination with the university and RAS centres the above institutes are able to make a valuable contribution to the Russian scholarship and should be counted as an integral part of the country's academic community.
Independent research centres
The rise of these centres is an important characteristic of the Russian political and intellectual life in the post-Communist era. Most of them have been created for purely political purposes such as monitoring, providing expertise and prognoses, servicing election campaigns and so on. For this reason, few of them have been oriented to fundamental research.
Among the centres belonging to the first group (servicing foreign policy making) the Karaganov's Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP) is the biggest and most influential one. The Council was established in February 1992 as an independent non-governmental organisation. The Council is directed by an Assembly of some 50 prominent figures in government, business, academia, and the mass media. Among them First Deputy Foreign Minister I.S. Ivanov; First Deputy Defence Minister N.V. Mikhailov; former National Security Adviser to the President Yuri Baturin; First Deputy of Chief of the General Staff V.L. Manilov; Deputy Director of the FIS G.A. Rapota; Deputy Director of the FSS A.E. Safonov; President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkady I. Volsky; President of the Russian Bank Association S.E. Yegorov; Director of RISS Kozhokin; Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defence Committee Alexei Arbatov; Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin; Editor-in-Chief of newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta V.T Tretyakov; President of the NTV company I.E. Malashenko and so on. The Council has a small permanent staff of some ten and a number of part-time staff for specific projects.
The Council's activities include regular meetings and informal discussions among policy analysts and decision-makers; conferences, seminars, and discussion groups; research projects; an education campaign in the mass media; and consulting and training for technical and social assistance programmes. 152 The CFDP does not conduct projects at the request of the government structures but chooses the topic of research on its own initiative and based on the decisions of the Assembly and the Board.
Although the Council claims that it is not an analytical think tank, but it unites the leading Russian specialists in foreign and defence policy and aims at providing decision-makers with recommendations on the following topics: Russian national interests; threat assessment; developing and evaluating new strategic concepts; regional and global security; ethnic and religious conflicts; arms control; conversion and so on.
The CFDP publish occasional reports with titles included: A Strategy for Russia, National security of Russia and Ukraine: Current Challenges and Joint Solutions, Defence Industry Conversion, The Armed Forces and Society, The future of the post-Soviet space, Russia and the Baltic states, etc. The Council's programme Russia and the World regularly publishes information bulletin on major domestic and international developments.
The Russian Foreign Policy Foundation (RFPF) is another influential non-governmental actor in the decision-making process. The Foundation was established in 1992 on the initiative of the Foreign Ministry by the Diplomatic Academy, International Affairs magazine, and several powerful Russian banks (Incombank, Avtovazbank, Menatep) and companies (KAMAZ, LUKoil and others). From the very beginning the RFPF was designed for bringing together the Russian foreign policy and business community as well as harmonising their interests. 153 For this reason, it paid more attention to practical rather than research activities.
However, its research programme is also quite impressive. The Foundation holds several conference a year and publishes their proceedings. These included conferences on conflict prevention and resolution (1992), disputes in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea regions (1995), Kaliningrad (1992), Russia and Asia-Pacific (1995) and so on. The RFPF is very active in establishing contacts with Russian regions, such as Kaliningrad, Karelia, Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, and the Russian Far East including opening regional offices (Krasnodar and Novosibirsk).
Among other policy-oriented independent centres the Foundation Political Studies (Andrei V. Fedorov), the Foundation Politics (Vyacheslav A. Nikonov), Russian Public Policy Centre (Alexei Salmin), RAU Corporation (Alexei Podberezkin), Centre for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (Emil Pain), Centre for National Security and International Relations (Sergei Rogov), Institute for Defence Studies (Viktor Surikov) and others should be mentioned.
The second group of independent research centres which tries to combine applied and fundamental research includes: the Moscow Carnegie Centre (notably Lilia Shevtsova, Dmitry Trenin, Irina Kobrinskaya - up to 1997), the Moscow Russian Science Foundation headed by Andrei Kortunov, which incorporates the Centre for Strategic Assessments (Sergei Oznobishchev, Alexei Konovalov), the Centre for Russian Political Research headed by Vladimir Orlov and Gorbachev Foundation (Dmitry Furman and Victor Kuvaldin).
Archives and libraries
archival/library system. In the Soviet period diplomatic archives were opened only to the limited number of scholars; publication of few really important documents have been allowed. Acquisition of foreign literature for the libraries has been under the strict supervision of the highest authorities. The libraries lacked recent foreign literature. Works and periodicals which covered contemporary international relations (in particular, Soviet foreign and security policies) used to be placed at the special holdings (so-called spetskhrans) as a classified literature. The latter have also been available only to selected scholars.
The reform of the archival/library system has already started under the Gorbachev administration. Some archives including the Foreign and Defence Ministries archives became more open to researchers. Spetskhrans have been abolished.
Under early Yeltsin, in addition to the above archives, the KGB Archive and even the Presidential Archive (the former Archive of the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) have been open. Numerous documents on recent history of Soviet foreign policy have been released and published. Several million documents have been sold to the foreign archives and research institutes (sometimes without due control of the government and specialists).
However, the situation has changed by 1994 when the governmental control over archives had been tightened again. Moreover, given the bad financial conditions in which archives operated, the quality of services offered by archives has deteriorated. In a hope to survive some archives put pressure on research institutes and individual scholars to launch joint commercial projects. Few efforts, however, proved to be successful because potential consumers of archival production were poor themselves.
Similar situation was with the research libraries. On the one hand, libraries were free in their acquisition policy and establishing international contacts. Some of them (the State Library of Foreign Literature, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION), MGIMO, MGU, Russian Academy of Public Administration, University of Nizhny Novgorod, etc.) have succeeded in establishing exchange programmes with foreign counterparts, getting grants and modern equipment (including computerised search system, Internet, video- and audio-systems, copy machines). This let them improve the library services almost to the level of Western standards. However, on the other hand, the vast majority of the Russian public and university libraries are still in a difficult situation. Given the budget constraints and the lack of personnel many libraries cannot afford new acquisitions and provide better services. Extreme centralisation of library holdings is one more negative feature inherited from the Soviet past. As in the past, the literature on international relation (including periodicals) is predominantly located in the Moscow-based libraries (with exception of St. Petersburg). This, in turn, creates more difficulties for the regional centres in developing diplomatic studies on the periphery. Individual researchers have to form their own libraries which used to result from their trips abroad.
Professional associations and the problem of co-ordination
to the collapse of the USSR the Soviet Political Science Association directed by Georgy Shakhnazarov was in charge with co-ordination of international studies. The Russian Political Science Association has been established as a successor of the SPSA in 1992. However, it became very soon a fighting arena between the former scientific Communists and the new generation of political scientists. In the result of several splits the RPSA was stalled.
None the less the need for a specialised international studies association which could play a co-ordinate role was felt by the majority of Russian academics. Some professional associations covering area studies tried to take lead. Under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Oleg Peresypkin (former Rector of the Diplomatic Academy) the Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (established in the last century) tried to unite the Middle East experts. Series of conferences and interesting publications on diplomatic history have resulted from this endeavour. The Russian Association of European Studies, which has been formed in 1990, attempted to co-ordinate research process in its own area.
The two old rivals - Moscow and St. Petersburg - claimed priority for the first professional association on American studies. In 1994, the Russian-American Association of Historians has been established on the basis of St. Petersburg University (Professor Boris Shiryaev). This association brought together some American and Russian historians from St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Petrozavodsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and Yoshkarola (Mari Republic). Muscovites have been invited as well but few of them agreed to join the Association on an individual basis. The Association holds an annual conferences in May-June and publishes small newsletter in English.
Another organisation - the Russian Association of American Studies - has been initiated by experts in American history from Moscow State University (Yazkov, Manykin and Rogulev). With the help of the ISKAN (Rogov and Kremenyuk) and MGIMO (Pechatnov) the new association has been established in 1995. This has broader regional scope (along with Moscow institutes, research centres from Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Samara, Tomsk, and Volgograd are represented) and a bit more solid financial basis than its St. Petersburg counterpart. The Association holds one-two seminars a year and publishes their proceedings. 154
Similar to American studies the two Russian capitals compete in establishing a professional international studies association. In 1996, with the help of the European Office of the International Affairs Network (American organisation) the Faculty of International Relations of the St. Petersburg University has established a Central and Eastern European Association of International Studies, Prague-St. Petersburg (1996). Along with the representatives of the Central and Eastern European countries some scholars from University of Nizhny Novgorod and Ural State University have joined the Association. With the further help of the IAN the Association managed to organise several conferences in Budapest, Prague and St. Petersburg as well as to arrange fellowships in American universities for young teachers from the St. Petersburg University. Further progress in the Association's work is prevented by the lack of finance.
In 1997 MGIMO established the association of the Schools of International Relations with financial support of the Choidiev International Foundation. 155 However, similar to the St. Petersburg-based organisation this association is only making its first steps in co-ordinating the country's international studies centres.
The Association of the Russian Higher Education Institutes on Teaching International Relations, which has been formed by the Ministry of Higher Education on the basis of MGIMO in 1994, supervises and co-ordinate university curricula and grants institutes with licences to open new international relations programmes (B.A., M.A. and so-called specialists). 156 36 universities and other institutes joined this association. However, it deals mainly with routine details of teaching and training programmes rather than co-ordinates international studies in Russia. The Association may well be perceived as an instrument of state policy which attempts to protect and improve the quality of higher education in this particular field. Therefore, this organisation by no means replaces a real professional association. The latter yet to be created.
There are some possibilities to attain this goal. There are some signs of revitalisation of the Russian Political Science Association. The First All-Russian Congress of Political Scientists has been held in Moscow in mid-February 1998. A renewed association has been established and a new leadership has been elected. A section on geopolitics (i.e. international relations) has been created within the structure of the Association. Since International Relations as a discipline has not yet separated from political science in Russia and many Russian academics have not yet defined their scholarly identity a sort of symbiosis of IR and PS in the single organisation is possible. Some authoritative international organisations - ISA, IPSA, IPRA and their European branches - could assist the Russian academic community in establishing and developing such an association. Technical, legal and financial assistance could be helpful. A new Russian association could be constituted not only as a national organisation but also as a part of some world-wide professional association. This could facilitate both development of national schools and their integration into the global scholarship.
CONCLUSIONS
Six conclusions emerge from the above analysis. First, Russian diplomatic studies have experienced very quick and dramatic transformation from the discipline dominated by the Marxist ideology to the multiparadigmatic discourse. Second, although the realist/geopolitical school is currently dominating the discipline, other perspectives (such as idealism/liberalism, radicalism/structuralism and postpositivism) do exist and produce some alternatives to the prevailing paradigm. It appears that in the foreseeable future the Russian diplomatic discourse will look like a polyphony rather than monophony or cacophony. Third, the two main topics - diplomatic history and present-day Russian foreign policy - are the most popular themes among the Russian scholars and analysts. The Russian authors made the great strides in exploring these problems. However, the Russian scholarship still lacks profound theoretical works in this field. Fourth, diplomatic studies has changed their status being transformed from an elitist discipline to a normal subfield of IR. Fifth, the democratisation, demonopolisation and normalisation of diplomatic studies had many implications at the institutional level: the number of research centres dealing with diplomatic studies has dramatically increased, new regional centres have emerged. This made the Russian scholarship even more diverse and interesting. Sixth, at the same time, along with positive development, some institutional discrepancies are still there. While many university and non-governmental research centres are developing in a rather dynamic way some institutional components such as the RAS and the archival/library system are still unable to cope with the problems of the transitional period. There are also many problems with co-ordination of research activities because of the lack of a single professional association.
To conclude, given the dynamic development of diplomatic studies in post-Communist Russia there are some grounds for cautious optimism for the future of the discipline in this country. The discipline not only has survived but has also been re-built and expanded. Now time is ripe for further qualitative changes. Among these, the shift to theorising rather than mere continuation of empirical studies seems most important. Institutional adjustments are both relevant and helpful as well.
NOTES
* This paper has been prepared with the assistance of the fellowship research grants from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Research Support Scheme (grant No. 10/96), and NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowship programme.Note 1: See, for instance, International Affairs (February 1993), p. 3. Back.
Note 2:
Note 3:
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 January 1998. Back.
Note 4:
James N. Rosenau, Order and Disorder in the Study of World Politics, in Ray Maghroori and Bennet Ramberg (eds.), Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations Third Debate (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 1-7. Back.
Note 5:
Alexei G. Arbatov, Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives, International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall 1993), pp. 9-10; and Suzanne Crow, The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin (Munich/ Washington, DC: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, 1993), pp. 22-23. Back.
Note 6:
NATO Review (February 1993), p. 3. Back.
Note 7:
Pravda, 23 December 1991; Rossiiskaya gazeta, 5 March 1992 (in Russian). Back.
Note 8:
Andrei Zagorski, Anatoli Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik, Mark Khrustalev, Russia in a New World, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38, No.7 (July 1992), p. 11. Back.
Note 9:
B. Litera, 'The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian variation on the Monroe Doctrine', Perspectives (Winter 1994/95), pp. 45-52. Back.
Note 10:
Iskhod k Vostoku (Exit to the East) (Sofia, Bulgaria: Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe Knigoizdatelstvo, 1921); G.P. Fedotov, Sudba i Grekhi Rossii [Russia's Destiny and Sins] (St. Petersburg, 1991), vol.1-2.; Ivan Solonevich, Narodnaya Monarchiya [People's Monarchy] (Moscow, 1991) (in Russian). Back.
Note 11:
Lena Jonson, 'In Search of a National Interest: the Foreign Policy Debate in Russia', The Nationalities Papers (forthcoming). Back.
Note 12:
A Transformed Russia in a New World, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.38 (April-May 1992), p. 100. Back.
Note 13:
Cited in Jonson, In Search of a National Interest. See also Stankevich's path-breaking article Derzhava v Poiskakh Sebya (The Power in Search of Itself) in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 March 1992, p. 4. English translation: Russia in Search of Itself, The National Interest (Summer 1992), pp. 47-51. Back.
Note 14:
Konstantin Pleshakov, 'Russia's Mission: the Third Epoch', International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1993), pp. 22-23. Back.
Note 15:
Sergei Stankevich, Toward a New "National Idea", Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington. DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 24. Back.
Note 16:
Ibid., pp.31-32 Back.
Note 17:
Nikolai Travkin, Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, pp. 34-35. Back.
Note 18:
Vladimir P. Lukin, Russia and Its Interests, Sestanovich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests, p. 109. Back.
Note 19:
Lukin, Russia and Its Interests, p. 110. Back.
Note 20:
A.D. Bogaturov, M.M. Kozhokin, K.V. Pleshakov, 'Vneshnyaa Politika Rossii' ['Russia's Foreign Policy'], USA: economics, politics, ideology, 1992, no. 10, p. 31 (in Russian). Back.
Note 21:
Neil Malcolm, New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe, Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 167. Back.
Note 22:
Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation), Special Issue of Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik (January 1993), pp. 3-23 (in Russian). Back.
Note 23:
Anita I. Singh, India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia, International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 71. Back.
Note 24:
Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'Russia is a Great Power', International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1993), p. 6. Back.
Note 25:
Elgiz Pozdnyakov, 'Russia Today and Tomorrow', International Affairs (Moscow) (February 1993), p. 30. Back.
Note 26:
Russia's National Interests, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 38, No. 8 (August 1992), p. 135. Back.
Note 27:
Cited in: Alexander Vladislavlev and Sergey Karaganov, The Idea of Russia, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 38, No. 12 (December 1992), p. 36. Back.
Note 29:
Strategiya dlya Rossii: Doklad Soveta po Vneshney i Oboronnoy Politike (Strategy for Russia: Report of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy(, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 August 1992, p. 5 (in Russian). Back.
Note 30:
Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outide World (Washington/London: Brassey's, Inc., 1994), pp. 19-20. Back.
Note 31:
Sergei Karaganov, Fifty Years After Victory, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, Nos. 4-5 1995, pp. 63-64. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 1994 (in Russian); Litera, 'The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine', pp. 45-52. Back.
Note 32:
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 January 1994 (in Russian); Litera, 'The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine', pp. 45-52. Back.
Note 33:
Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 59. Back.
Note 34:
Peter Stupavský, Zahranicná politika Ruska v ére Jelcina (Russia's Foreign Policy in the Yeltsin's era(, Mezinárodni vztahy (Prague), No. 3, 1996, p. 10 (in Czech). Back.
Note 35:
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, A Security Concept for Russia, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 39, No. 10 (October 1993), p. 11. Back.
Note 36:
National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 42, No. 2 (February 1996), p. 8. Back.
Note 37:
Shaposhnikov, A Security Concept for Russia, pp. 14-18; Vadim Lukov, Russia's Security: the Foreign Policy Dimension, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, No. 5 (May 1995), pp. 5-7. Back.
Note 38:
Sergey Rogov, A National Security Policy for Russia, James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel (eds.), The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 76. Back.
Note 39:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, Nos. 11-12, 1995, p. 19. Back.
Note 42:
Rogov, A National Security Policy for Russia, p. 76. Back.
Note 43:
Alexei Arbatov, Russian National Interests, Blackwill and Karaganov (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p. 72. Back.
Note 44:
Ibid.; S. Trush, 'Prodazha Rossiyskogo Oruzhiya Pekinu: Rezony i Opaseniya' ['Russian Arms Sales to Beijing: Pro and Contra'], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 April 1996 (in Russian). Back.
Note 45:
Arbatov, Russian National Interests, p. 72. Back.
Note 47:
Sergei Rogov, Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, No. 7 (July1995), p. 5; Rogov, A National Security Policy for Russia, p. 76. Back.
Note 48:
Rogov, Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement, p. 9. Back.
Note 49:
Arbatov, Russian National Interests, p. 71. Back.
Note 50:
Alexei Arbatov, The Future of European Security: Split or Unity?, Visions of European Security - Focal Point Sweden and Northern Europe (Stockholm: The Olof Palme International Center, 1996), pp. 248-249; Rossiya i NATO (Russia and NATO(, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 June 1995 (in Russian). Back.
Note 51:
Alexei Arbatov, NATO and Russia, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, No. 2, 1995, p. 146; Rogov, Russia and the United States: a Partnership or Another Disengagement, pp. 10-11; Dmitri Trenin, NATO: How to Avoid Confrontation, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, No. 7 (July 1995), pp. 20-26. Back.
Note 52:
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 May 1997, p. 3 (in Russian); and International Herald Tribune, 28 May 1997, pp. 1, 16. Back.
Note 53:
'Kontseptsiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii' [The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 December 1997, pp. 4-5 (in Russian). Back.
Note 54:
Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow, 1983), p. 291 (in Russian). Back.
Note 55:
Elgiz Pozdnyakov (ed.), Geopolitika: Teoriya i Praktika (Geopolitics: Theory and Practice( (Moscow, 1993) (in Russian); Elgiz Pozdnyakov, Filosofiya Politiki (Philosophy of Politics( (Moscow, 1994), Vol. 2 (in Russian); Konstantin Pleshakov, The Geoideological Paradigm, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, Nos. 4-5, 1995, pp. 101-107. Back.
Note 56:
Vladimir Razuvayev, Geopolitika Postsovetskogo Perioda (The Geopolitics of the Post-Soviet Period( (Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1993) (in Russian); V. Kudrov, Mesto Novoi Rossii v Mire (The Role of New Russia in the World( (Moscow: Institute of Europe, 1994) (in Russian); Konstantin Sorokin, Geopolitika Sovremennogo Mira i Rossiya (Contemporary Geopolitics and Russia(, Politicheskie Issledovaniya, No. 1, 1995 (in Russian). Back.
Note 57:
Tyulin, Between the Past and the Future: International Studies in Russia, p. 186. Back.
Note 58:
Elgiz Pozdnyakov, The Geopolitical Collapse and Russia, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 38, No. 9 (September 1992), p. 4. Back.
Note 61:
Pleshakov, The Geoideological Paradigm, p. 102. Back.
Note 62:
Kamaludin S. Gadzhiev, Geopolitics (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1997), pp. 176-197 (in Russian). Back.
Note 63:
Vestnik MGU. Series No. 12: Social-Political Studies (Moscow: MGU, 1994), p. 3 (in Russian). Back.
Note 64:
Konstantin Pleshakov, Komponenty Geopoliticheskogo Myshleniya [Components of Geopolitical Thinking], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October 1994), p. 32 (in Russian). Back.
Note 65:
Gadzhiev, Geopolitics, pp. 4, 16-39,85-89. Back.
Note 66:
Sorokin, Geopolitika Sovremennogo Mira i Rossiya, p. 8. Back.
Note 67:
Alexei Podberezkin, Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii (Russia's Geostrategic Position and Security(, Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 7, 1996, pp. 90-94 (in Russian); Razuvayev, Geopolitika Postsovetskogo Perioda; Vladimir Razuvayev, Russia and the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Area, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 39, No. 8 (August 1993), pp. 109-116. Back.
Note 68:
Mark Khrustalev, After the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Russia in a New World (Moscow: MGIMO, 1992); Andrei Zagorski, Anatoly Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik and Mark Khrustalev, Russia in a New World, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 38, No. 5 (1992), pp. 5-13. Back.
Note 69:
Andrei Zagorski, Geopolitik versus Geowirtschaft, Wostok, No. 6 (1995), pp. 6-8. Back.
Note 70:
Andrei Zagorski, Was fur eine GUS erfullt ihren Zweck, Aussenpolitik, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1995), S. 263-270. Back.
Note 71:
Tyulin, Between the Past and the Future: International Studies in Russia, p. 187. Back.
Note 72:
Andrei Kortunov, NATO Enlargement and Russia: In Search of an Adequate Response, in David G. Haglund (ed.), Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance (Kingstone, Ont.: Queen's University, 1996) pp. 74-75. Back.
Note 73:
Igor Maksimychev, Nuzhna li Evrope NATO? (Does Europe Need NATO?(, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 April 1994 (in Russian). Back.
Note 74:
Vladimir Kozin, Moskva Dolzhna Prisoedinitsya k "Partnerstvy vo Imya Mira" (Moscow Should Join "Partnership for Peace"(, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 February 1994 (in Russian). Back.
Note 75:
Dmitry Trenin. Budet li NATO rasshiryatsya na Vostok? (Will NATO Expand Eastwards?(, Novoye vremya, 43 (1994) (in Russian). Back.
Note 77:
Vitaly Churkin, U Rossii s NATO Nikogda ne Bylo Konfliktov (Russia and NATO Never Had Conflicts(, Segodnya, 25 April 1995 (in Russian). Back.
Note 78:
Kortunov, p. 76. Back.
Note 79:
Dmitry Makarov, Rasshirenie NATO Podtolknet Rossiyu k Reformam (NATO Expansion Will Further Russian Reforms(, Argumenty i Facty, 22 (1997) p. 9 (in Russian). Back.
Note 80:
Andrei Zagorski, Russia and Europe, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. II, Nos. 1-2 (1996), p. 67; and Andrei Zagorski, Michael Lucas, Rossiya Pered Evropeyskim Vyzovom [The European Challenge to Russia] (Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1993), pp. 77-107 (in Russian). Back.
Note 81:
Yuriy Borko, Possible Scenarios for Geopolitical Shifts in Russian-European Relations, pp. 207-211. Back.
Note 82:
Podberezkin, Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii, p. 86. Back.
Note 84:
Alexei Podberezkin, Cherez Dukhovnost - k Vozrozhdeniyu Otechestva (Restoring Motherland Through Spirituality(, Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 5, 1995, p. 89 (in Russian). Back.
Note 85:
Gennady Zyuganov, Za Gorizontom [Over the Horizon] (Orel: Veshnie vody, 1995), p. 86 (in Russian); Alexei Pushkov, Chinese Mirage, Moscow News, No. 22, 1995, p. 4. Back.
Note 86:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, p. 8. Back.
Note 89:
Ibid., pp. 8-9. Back.
Note 90:
Podberezkin, Geostrategicheskoe Polozhenie i Bezopasnost Rossii, p. 90. Back.
Note 91:
Gennady Zyuganov (ed.), Voyennaya Reforma: Otsenka Ugroz Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossii [Military Reform: Assessment of Threats to National Security of Russia] (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1997), pp. 20-23. Back.
Note 92:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, p. 9. Back.
Note 93:
Zuganov, Za Gorizontom, p. 87. Back.
Note 94:
Oleg T. Bogomolov, Russia and Eastern Europe, Blackwill and Karaganov, Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p. 142 (in Russian). Back.
Note 95:
Nikolai Kolikov, Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen [Russia in the Context of Global Transition], Svobodnaya Mysl, Nos. 2-3, 1994, p. 12 (in Russian). Back.
Note 96:
Yuri Krasin, Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost?[National Interests: Myth or Reality?], Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 3, 1996, p. 5 (in Russian). Back.
Note 97:
National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 6. Back.
Note 98:
Anatoly Utkin, Natsionalizm i Buduschee Mirovogo Soobschestva [Nationalism and the Future of the World Community], Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 3, 1995, pp. 78-86 (in Russian); Anatoly Utkin, Rossiya i Zapad: Problemy Vzaimnogo Vospriyatiya i Perspektivy Stroitelstva Otnosheniy [Russia and the West: Mutual Perceptions and Prospects for Building Partnership] (Moscow: Russian Research Foundation, 1995), pp. 51-52 (in Russian). Back.
Note 99:
Krasin, Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost?, p. 9. Back.
Note 100:
Ibid., pp. 11-12; Kolikov, Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen, p. 9. Back.
Note 101:
Krasin, Natsionalnye Interesy: Mif ili Realnost?, p. 12. Back.
Note 102:
Georgi Shakhnazarov, Vostok i Zapad: Samoidentifikatsiya na Perelome Vekov (East and West: In Search for Identity on the Turn of the Century), Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 8, 1996, p. 79 (in Russian). Back.
Note 103:
Vladimir Dakhin, Kontury Novogo Mira [The Contours of a New World], Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 4, 1995, p. 85 (in Russian). Back.
Note 104:
Kolikov, Rossiya v Kontekste Globalnykh Peremen, p. 13. Back.
Note 105:
Ibid., p. 5; Mikhail Gorbachev, Epilogue, Bento Bremer (ed.), Europe by Nature (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1992). Back.
Note 106:
Igor Orlik, Russia and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 38, No. 8 (August 1992), p. 28. Back.
Note 107:
Bogomolov, Russia and Eastern Europe, p. 142. Back.
Note 108:
Karen Brutents, Russia and the East, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 40, Nos. 1-2, 1994, p. 44. Back.
Note 109:
Alexei Voskresenskiy, Veter s Zapada ili Veter s Vostoka? Rossiya, SShA, Kitai i Mirovoe Liderstvo [Is There Wind From the West or East? Russia, the USA, China, and World Leadership], Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 10, 1996, p. 99 (in Russian). Back.
Note 110:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, p. 11. Back.
Note 111:
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 22 January 1994 (in Russian). Back.
Note 112:
FBIS-SOV-93-240, 16 December 1993, p. 17. Back.
Note 113:
James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist (Washington: National Defense University, 1994), p. 109. Back.
Note 114:
Ibid., p. 122. Back.
Note 115:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, p. 12. Back.
Note 116:
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Poslednyi Brosok na Yug [Last Dash to the South] (Moscow: LDPR, 1993). Back.
Note 117:
Izvestiya, 21 January 1994. Back.
Note 118:
Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist, p. 125. Back.
Note 119:
Ibid., pp. 110-111. Back.
Note 120:
Election 1995: Parties Foreign Policy Views, p. 13. Back.
Note 121:
FBIS-SOV-94-005, 7 January 1994, p. 10. Back.
Note 122:
V.P. Vizgin, Mishel Fuko - Teoretik Tsivilizatsii Znaniya [Michael Foucault is a Theorist of Civilisation of Knowledge], Voprosy Filosofii, No. 6, 1995, pp. 116-126; D.E. Kharitonovich, Poisk Novykh Metodov v Istoricheskoi Nauke [The Search for New Methods in the Historical Science], Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, No. 4, 1995, pp. 248-250 (in Russian). Back.
Note 123:
Andrey S. Makarychev and Alexander A. Sergounin, Postmodernism i Zapadnaya Politicheskaya Nauka [Postmodernism and Western Political Science], Sotzialno-politichesky zhurnal (Moscow), No. 3, 1996, pp. 151-168 (in Russian). Back.
Note 124:
Irina M. Busygina, Postmodernism v Moskve [Postmodernism in Moscow], Polis, No. 6, 1995, pp. 5-9. Back.
Note 125:
Y. Kachanov, Politicheskaya Topologiya: Strukturirovaniye Politicheskoi Realnosti [Political Topology: Structuring Political Reality] (Moscow, 1995), p. 38 (in Russian). Back.
Note 126:
Alexander S. Panarin, Politologiya [Political Science] (Moscow: Prospect, 1997), pp. 93-123, 172-180 (in Russian). Back.
Note 127:
Lukin, Russia and Its Interests, p. 113. Back.
Note 128:
Mikhail V. Ilyin, Ocherki Khronopoliticheskoi Tipologii [Essays on Chronopolitical Typology] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1995), pp. 48-49 (in Russian). Back.
Note 129:
Arthur Kuznetsov, A New Model for Traditional Civilisations, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, Nos. 4-5, 1995, pp. 98-99. Back.
Note 131:
Boris Kapustin, "Natsionalnyi Interes" kak Konservativnaya Utopiya ["National Interest" as Conservative Utopia], Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 3, 1996, p. 13. Back.
Note 132:
Ibid., pp. 16-19. Back.
Note 134:
Russia and the West, International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 41, No. 2 (February 1995), p. 38. Back.
Note 135:
Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 87. Back.
Note 136:
Mark A. Khrustalev, Teoriya Politiki i Politicheskiy Analis [Political Theory and Political Analysis] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1991) (in Russian); Ivan G. Tyulin, Politicheskaya Nauka: Vozmozhnosti i Perspectivy Mezhdistsiplinarnogo Podhoda [Political Science: Opportunities and Prospects on Inter-Disciplinary Approach] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1991) (in Russian); Ivan Tyulin, Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Acadenics and Professionals in International Relations (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1994). Back.
Note 137:
Andrei V. Zagorski, Rossiya pered Evropeyskim Vyzovom [European Challenge to Russia] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1993); Alexei Bogaturov, Velikiye Derzhavy na Tikhom Okeane [Great Powers in the Pacific] (Moscow: Konvert-MONF, 1997) (in Russian); Yuri Davydov, Russia and Eastern Europe (Providence: Brown University Press, 1993); Anatoly V. Torkunov, Koreyskaya Problema: Noviy Vzglyad [The Korean Problem: A New Outlook] (Moscow: ANKIL, 1995) (in Russian). Back.
Note 138:
Marina M. Lebedeva, Politicheskoye Uregulirovanie Konfliktov: Podkhody, Reshenya, Technologii [Conflict Resolution: Approaches, Solutions, Techniques] (Moscow: Aspect Press, 1997) (in Russian). Back.
Note 139:
Abdulkhan A. Akhtamzyan, Obyedinenie Germanii, ili Anshlyus GDR k FRG [German Unification or Anschlus of the GDR] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1994) (in Russian); Mikhail M. Narinsky, Kholodnaya Voina: Novye Documenty [The Cold War: New Documents] (Mocow: Pamyatnimi Istoricheskoi Mysli, 1995) (in Russian); Leonid N. Nezhinsky et al., Sovetskaya Vneshnaya Politika v Gody "Kholodnoi Voiny [Soviet Foreign Policy in the Cold war Period] (Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1995) (in Russian). Back.
Note 140:
Yuri Kolosov, Emilia S. Krivtchikova et al., Mezhdunarodnoye Pravo [International Law] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1994) (in Russian). Back.
Note 141:
Irina N. Gertchikova, Management (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994/95) (in Russian). Back.
Note 142:
Evgueny A. Vlassov and Stanislav V. Vasiliev, All about MGIMO: Academic Yearbook (Moscow: MGIMO, 1997), pp. 62-63, 74-90. Back.
Note 143:
Andrey Zagorski, Anatoly A. Zlobin et al., Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv: Protsessy i Perstectivy [The Commonwealth of Independent States: Recent Developments and Prospects] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1992) (in Russian); Sergei Solodovnik, Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia? (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995). Back.
Note 144:
Pavel A. Tsygankov, Mirovaya Politika: Problemy Teorii i Praktiki [World Politics: Problems of Theory and Practice] (Moscow: MGU, 1995); and Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya [International Relations] (Moscow: Novaya Shkola, 1996) (in Russian); Gadzhiev, Geopolitics. Back.
Note 145:
Vinay Kumar Malhotra and Alexander A. Sergounin, Theories and Approaches to International Relations (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1997). Back.
Note 146:
Gennady Novikov, Teorii Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy [International Relations Theories] (Irkutsk: Irkutsk State University Press, 1996) (in Russian). Back.
Note 147:
Oleg A. Kolobov, Alexander A. Kornilov, Andrei S. Makarychev, and Alexander A. Sergounin, Protsess Prinyatiya Vneshnepoliticheskikh Resheniy: Istoricheskiy Opyt SShA, Gosudarstva Israil i Zapadnoi Evropy [Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Historical Experience of the United States, Israel, and West Europe] (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1992) (in Russian); Alexander A. Sergounin, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997) (COPRI Working Papers; No. 4, 1997). Back.
Note 148:
Oleg A. Kolobov, Alexander A. Kornilov and Alexander A. Sergounin, Dokumentalnaya Istoriya Arabo-Izrailskogo Konflikta [Documentary History of an Arab-Israeli Conflict] (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1991) (in Russian); and Alexander A. Kornilov, Mech i Plug Davida Ben-Guriona [Sword and Plough of David Ben-Gurion] (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1996) (in Russian). Back.
Note 149:
Vitaly V. Noskov, Instituty Vlasti i Vneshnaya Politika SShA, 1901-1913 [Power Institutes and US Foreign Policy, 1901-1913] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1993) (in Russian). Back.
Note 150:
Oleg A. Kolobov (ed.), Aktualnye Problemy Amerikanistiki [Actual Problems of American Studies] (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1997) (in Russian); Oleg A. Kolobov, Politika SShA po Otnosheniyu k Izrailyu i Arabskim Stranam na Rubezhe 80-90 Godov XX Veka [US Policy Towards Israel and the Arab Countries on the Brink of 1990s] (Nizhny Novgorod: University of Nizhny Novgorod Press, 1995) (in Russian); Alexander A. Sergounin, SShA: Apparat Presidenta po Svyazi s Kongressom i Vneshnaya Politika [USA: President's congressional liaison machinery and foreign policy] (Nizhny Novgorod: Volgo-Vaytsky Publishing House, 1990) (in Russian). Back.
Note 151:
Oksana Antonenko, New Russian Analytical Centers and Their Role in Political Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996), p. 42. Back.
Note 154:
See, for example, Alexander S. Manykin, Yuri N. Rogulev and Evgeny F. Yazkov (eds.), SshA i Vneshniy Mir [USA and the Outer World] (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1997) (in Russian); and Alexander S. Manykin, Yuri N. Rogulev and Evgeny F. Yazkov (eds.), Novyi Kurs Franklina D. Ruzvelta: Posledstviya dlya SShA i Rossii [The New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Implications for the USA and Russia] (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1996) (in Russian). Back.
Note 155:
Vlassov and Vasiliev, All about MGIMO, p. 71. Back.
Note 156:
Polozheniye ob Uchebno-Metodicheskom Obyedinenii Vyshykh Uchebnykh Zavedeniy Rossiyskoi Federatsii po Obrazovaniyu v Oblasti Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy pri MGIMO MID RF [A Charter of the Association of the Russian Higher Education Institutes on Teaching International Relations Based in MGIMO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation] (Moscow: MGIMO, 1997), pp. 3-4 (in Russian). Back.
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