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Putting The Military on Trial: The Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea and Argentina
International Studies Association
March 1998
Introduction
During the 1980's in Latin America, many countries moved from military governments to more democratic regimes. In several instances, military rule was responsible for gross violations of human rights including detention, torture and execution. Once the transition began, civilian governments faced some daunting questions. Should they prosecute the military for their past behavior? What effect would this have on the consolidation of democracy? In Argentina, the government chose to prosecute the military soon after the transition to democracy began in 1983. The trials sparked several military rebellions determined to halt further prosecutions, and raised fears about the military's willingness to remain out of politics.
South Korea faced a similar problem. In December 1987, the Republic of Korea (ROK) held elections that began its transition to democracy. The leader that preceded this election, Chun Doo Hwan, and the 1987 president-elect, Roh Tae-woo were both ex-generals and leaders in the 1979 mutiny and 1980 coup that earlier had forestalled a transition to democracy. 1 Particularly egregious to South Koreans was their role in crushing an opposition movement in the city of Kwangju in 1980 with estimates of those killed ranging from several hundred to several thousand. In January 1996, the government indicted both former-presidents for treason and their role in Kwangju, bringing the total to fourteen former generals under arrest concerning this incident. These accusations against Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo joined earlier indictments linked to the 1979 mutiny, and corruption charges stemming from huge campaign slush funds.
On August 26th, 1996, a South Korean court sentenced Chun and Roh for the crimes of mutiny, treason and corruption. Chun received the death sentence, later commuted to life in prison by a South Korean appeals court. Roh was given a sentence of twenty-two and one-half years in prison, also reduced on appeal to 17 years. 2 In the closing days of the Kim Young-sam administration, both ex-leaders were pardoned after serving only about two years of their sentence. 3
Using South Korea and Argentina as cases, this paper examines the effects of trying military leaders on the consolidation of democracy. In Argentina, trials begun under the Alfonsin government provoked several military rebellions. Yet in South Korea, there was little response from the ROK's armed forces. Why did the South Korean military appear to be less concerned over the trials of its former leaders than was the case in Argentina? Why did the South Korean military not intervene in some way to influence the proceedings? What are the lessons here for the consolidation of democracy?
PUTTING THE MILITARY ON TRIAL: ARGENTINA
In 1983, Argentina began its transition to a democratic regime after many years of military rule. Military rule in Argentina occurred from 1966 to 1973 and 1976 to 1983. Throughout these two periods the armed forces conducted a war against the left that resulted in many deaths on both sides. The "dirty war" during the latter seven years of military rule included repression, torture and the disappearance or death of close to 10,000 Argentineans. 4
Military rule began to crumble in 1982 when Argentine authorities seized the Malvinas Islands. Buenos Aires had long ago laid claim to these islands occupied by the British, who called them the Falklands. At the time, the Argentine economy was in serious trouble with inflation skyrocketing, foreign debt growing and public support sagging. Military leaders hoped the invasion would distract the populace from their economic woes and unify the people behind the military government. Unfortunately, the Argentine military underestimated British determination to retain these islands and overestimated their own preparedness for the undertaking. 5 The British soundly defeated Argentina, a serious embarrassment to the military junta in Buenos Aires.
Losing to the British was the last straw and public support for the government plummeted. The junta soon broke apart and officials in the armed forces promised elections. In 1983, Argentines elected Raul Alfonsin, a Radical party candidate, for president and returned to civilian rule.
The Alfonsin administration faced a difficult question: Should they prosecute the military for human rights abuses during the "dirty war?" Alfonsin campaigned on this issue and after the election embarked on investigations and trials that sought to punish some of those responsible. According to one study, "... the public's incalculable suffering aroused a general repudiation of the military institution" and "the military found itself discredited by and ostracized from society to a degree not previously experienced." 6 However, Alfonsin attempted to limit the number of officers tried and limit the prosecutions only to higher level officers. Apparently, Alfonsin believed that the military could reform itself as it adjusted to democracy. 7 Despite his efforts, demands for prosecution soon spiraled out of his control as judges and prosecutors began indictments against many officers. 8 Eventually, approximately 1,700 people awaited trial for human rights offenses. 9
As expected, many in the military despised these measures. As one scholar notes, "... the armed forces felt nothing but hatred for the civilian government; they never forgave Alfonsin for bringing the juntas to trial...." 10 In May 1986, Alfonsin barely missed assassination while visiting an army base. Also, he received the resignation of the army chief-of-staff, who previously had supported the government, and numerous complaints from other high-ranking generals. As well, the officer corps showed little remorse for their actions during the "dirty war." Later in the year, Alfonsin pushed through Punto Final --End Point Law-- a law that placed a 60-day time limit on initiating new prosecutions. 11 Though Alfonsin tried to restrict the prosecutions, he was unable to gain control of the proceedings. Court systems worked extra hours and canceled vacations in order to meet the 60-day statute of limitations. Thus, despite Alfonsin's increasing tilt towards the military and their demands, prosecutions continued forward.
In April 1987 and again in January 1988, the military responded to the trials by rebelling. The rebels, the carapintadas--painted faces, emphasized this was not a coup d'etat but a demonstration of their grievances with the trials and the government's treatment of the military. 12 According to two scholars:
However destabilizing these rebellions may have been, they were generally not motivated by a desire to undermine the constitutional order and elected government. These rebellions were not the work of renegade bands of soldiers bent on violently destroying the democratic system. These were soldiers in conflict over certain government policies, most notably the judicial proceedings against the officers charged with human rights abuses during the Dirty War . . . . 13
Following the 1987 rebellion, the Argentine legislature passed the Obendencia Debida [Due Obedience] law that exempted all officers below the rank of colonel from prosecution. This measure asserted that these officers were "subordinated under superior authority, and in compliance with orders, without the power or possibility of inspection, opposition or resistance to them in regard to their suitability or legitimacy." 14
The carapintadas rebelled two more times in December 1988 and December 1990. These two rebellions had less to do with the trials of military officers. Rather, some were attempting to carve out a "place" for the military in the political process. In 1990, loyalist forces crushed the last rebellion, much to the relief of the Menem government and the Argentine public.
THE LOGIC OF MILITARY REBELLION
Why did the Argentine military rebel? Alfred Stepan in Rethinking Military Politics argues a successful transition to democracy requires "substantial agreement between the military and the incoming government on a number of key issues." 15 These include how the new leaders will deal with human rights violations from the previous regime, defining the mission of the military in the new regime, 16 and the military budget. Also an issue are the prerogatives the armed forces will preserve during the democratic regime, for example, the degree of independence the military will retain from legislative or executive oversight. If the military and incoming government disagree substantially on these issues, the armed forces may be more likely to reenter the political arena.
The Alfonsin government severely curtailed military prerogatives, sharply cut the defense budget and increased civilian oversight of the military. 17 Yet, the motivation for the rebellions may also have been deeper. A study by Deborah Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina maintains it was the loss of prestige that was most important in the decision of some elements in the military to rebel. The military believed their war against the left had been crucial to national security, and winning that war, despite the brutal tactics, was an important success. These actions were the very things they were being prosecuted for and condemned as an institution. As Norden notes: "Rather than honoring the military heroes for defending the nation from a dangerous enemy, the trials portrayed them as criminals and the 'enemy' as innocent victims." 18 While the government also tried to condemn the guerrillas for their share of the violence, they did not convince the military. Thus, the rebellions were spontaneous reactions by elements in the armed forces to attacks on the institution by the Alfonsin government and "the rebels' primary goal was merely to protect the institution from perceived outside aggression." 19
THE GENERALS IN SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS
South Korea's experience with military rule began in 1961 with the coup led by Major General Park Chung-hee. After a short period of chaotic, democratic rule that followed the departure of President Syngman Rhee in 1960, the South Korean military, led by Park, seized power in May 1961. Park proceeded to rule South Korea until his assassination in 1979 by the chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.
After Park's assassination, South Koreans believed democracy would follow. For a year, South Korea existed as a democracy. However, on December 12th, 1979, Major General Chun Doo Hwan led a mutiny to seize control of the military. In May 1980, Chun further extended his control over the South Korean government.
After resigning his commission, Chun won an election for the presidency in August 1980 and again in February 1981 under a new constitution. The electoral process at that time was not done by direct popular vote, a vote Chun would likely have lost. Instead, the vote was done by an electoral college that heavily favored Chun's ruling party. Chun governed South Korea with an iron fist, while guiding the ROK economy to many years of growth.
Throughout his term, slated to end in 1988, Chun maintained that he would step down and comply with the constitutionally mandated single term. Even if Chun did step down as promised, the electoral system favored the ruling party, virtually ensuring a victory for their candidate in the next election. Negotiations had been underway between the government and opposition leaders to revise the electoral system and make other changes to the constitution. In a stunning blow, Chun suspended the talks in April 1987, maintaining that little could be accomplished before the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul and the scheduled December presidential election. Soon after, Chun nominated Roh Tae-woo as the Democratic Justice Party candidate.
Following this chain of events, political protest escalated dramatically. Not only had Chun short-circuited reform efforts, he appointed a former general --Roh and Chun were classmates at the Korean Military Academy, class of 1955-- who also had ties to the Kwangju Massacre. Thus, South Korea was likely to have another authoritarian leader with ties to the military.
On June 29th, 1987, candidate Roh shocked South Koreans by announcing his agreement with many of the opposition's demands, especially his support for a direct popular election of the next president. Chun relented and allowed the reform process to continue. In December 1987, Roh Tae-woo won the presidency. His opponents, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, split the opposition vote allowing Roh to win with about 37% of the popular vote. Despite this status as a minority president and former general, Roh presided over South Korea's first step in a transition to democracy.
In 1990, opposition leader Kim Young-sam merged his party, the Reunification Democratic Party with the ruling Democratic Justice Party to form a new party, the Democratic Liberal Party. While strange to see these parties united, the move gave Kim Young-sam the inside track on the 1992 presidential election. As expected, Kim Young-sam defeated his two rivals to become South Korea's next president. Kim's term ended in 1998 and, according to constitutional provisions, could not run again. Long time dissident Kim Dae-jung won a close vote in December, 1997 to take the presidency away from the ruling party.
THE INVESTIGATION, INDICTMENTS, AND THE TRIAL
Kim Young-sam's election marked the first time in some thirty years the South Korean president did not have ties to the military. Yet, disturbing questions remained concerning the previous regimes of Chun and Roh. A lengthy investigation process beset by many twists and turns finally culminated in indictments of these two former presidents in December 1995 and January 1996. The following pages describe some of the events that led to the indictments and the specific charges --corruption, mutiny, and treason-- filed against the men.
From the start, Chun's regime existed with a cloud over its head. The coup that brought Chun to power and the violence at Kwangju called into question for many South Koreans the legitimacy of the regime. Before Chun left office in 1988, President-elect Roh formed a committee to investigate these events. Based on the committee's findings, the government acknowledged that events at Kwangju were "part of the democratization efforts of the students and citizens in Kwangju," not a rebellion as Chun had maintained. A few months later, the government apologized for the harsh treatment it imposed and offered regrets "that nearly 200 civilians and members of the military and police were killed and many more wounded in the turmoil...." 20 However, the Roh government stopped short of calling for further investigation into the incident. 21 Chun appeared to be safe.
By the fall 1988, Chun's fate was more bleak. Allegations surfaced that he had siphoned off money from the Ilhae Institute and the Saemaul community development program to finance his retirement and provide a base for future political influence. 22 In the face of growing pressure from a National Assembly controlled by opposition members and a disgruntled public, Chun gave a formal, televised apology to the nation and left with his wife for seclusion in a Buddhist monastery. 23
In December 1992, Kim Young-sam succeeded Roh Tae-woo to the presidency. President Kim's agenda included reform and anti-corruption which sparked again calls for the "liquidation of irregularities," another reference to events from the Chun and Roh regimes. However, President Kim maintained that Korea needed to let the matter rest and move forward. "We should not forget the atrocities. But let's forgive them to achieve national reconciliation." 24 Yet, President Kim also described the Kwangju incident as a "pro-democracy movement," not a rebellion as the Chun government had maintained, and that the December 12th incident was "a development tantamount to a coup d'etat...." 25 As a result of these remarks, numerous people initiated lawsuits against Chun and Roh, 26 and other groups pushed for further investigation. However, officials indicted neither Roh nor Chun as a result of these efforts.
The desire for a greater accounting of the Chun and Roh administrations would not end. Responding to numerous lawsuits, the Seoul Prosecutor's office continued to investigate the allegations but eventually decided to suspend indictment of the defendants. 27 Once again, it appeared that Chun and Roh avoided prosecution. However, the respite lasted only a month. Protests by college faculty, students, workers and citizens made it impossible for the issue to go away.
THE CHARGES AND TRIAL
Corruption
In August 1995, investigations began again but for reasons unrelated to Kwangju or the December 12th mutiny. As part of an anti-corruption drive, President Kim issued a special decree in 1993 that required the use of real names for all financial transactions. Before this decree, politicians and business people could use aliases in these transactions to hide inappropriate or illegal accumulations of money. The special decree prevented such behavior and was the undoing of Chun and Roh. In October, a businessman admitted to holding 10 billion won ($13 million) in a bank account for Roh. Prosecutors quickly pursued the allegations. 28
On November 16th, 1995 authorities arrested Roh Tae-woo and on December 5th, indicted him for taking 280 billion won ($367 million) in bribes from South Korean businessmen in return for government concessions. Roh also admitted that these amounts were part of a more than 500 billion won ($650 million) political slush fund accumulated during his 5 year term in office. 29
In January 1996, prosecutors included Chun's name on the bribery indictments. They charged Chun with amassing a fund of 950 billion won ($1.2 billion) from big business donors with 215.9 billion won ($270 million) of this allegedly given as bribes. 30
Mutiny and The December 12th Incident
On December 21, 1995, prosecutors indicted Chun and Roh on a second set of charges. Following President Park's assassination in 1979, Chun, supported by Roh and other army officers, staged a mutiny within the military. Major General Chun, head of the Defense Security Command and chief investigator into Park's assassination, arrested Army Chief of Staff General Chung Sung-hwa and several other generals without the prior approval of then President Choi Kyu-hah. Chun also violated the chain of command by seizing the Defense Ministry and Army Headquarters, and the official residence of the President in hopes of pressuring Choi into approving their actions. 31 Prosecutors noted at the arraignment that this incident was "a well-planned military insurrection designed to obtain control over the entire military, and as a result, Chun, the mastermind, should be punished." 32
Treason and The Kwangju Massacre
Prosecutors handed down the final set of indictments in January 1996, charging both ex-presidents with treason. The indictments stemmed from Chun's efforts to consolidate his hold on power in May 1980. The most serious of these charges concerned the events that occurred in Kwangju. In response to Chun's takeover and arrest of Kim Dae-jung and other dissidents, a riot broke out in that city. Eventually, Chun ordered the military to move in with live ammunition and orders to crush the protest. The result of the clash was bloody. Estimates of those killed ranged from several hundred, the government estimate, to several thousand, estimates by various human rights groups. The events at Kwangju, likened to China's Tiananmen Square, were an open sore for most South Koreans.
In December 1995, the trials of Chun, Roh and the other defendants began, and lasted almost six months with the final verdicts given in July 1996. On all counts, the Court found Chun and Roh guilty. Chun was given the death penalty for his conviction and Roh received a sentence of twenty-two and one-half years in prison. Both parties appealed and obtained reduced sentences, eventually to receive full pardons in December 1997.
WHY DID THE MILITARY REBEL IN ARGENTINA BUT NOT IN SOUTH KOREA?
While the specter of the trials played out in Seoul, an intriguing question was apparent. Why did the South Korean military show little interest in the trials of its two former leaders? When juxtaposing the military's reaction in Argentina with events in South Korea, one might have expected some type of reaction from the military to influence the outcome of the trials. Yet, there was little reaction from the military.
Four factors appear to be most important in explaining the ROK military's restraint during the trials. These factors are: first, the strength of public opinion against any further military intervention; second, efforts taken by the democratic regime to rein in the military before conducting the trials; third, the nature of the allegations against the military; and fourth, the retention of key prerogatives for the military. The first factor, strong public opposition to military intervention, was important in South Korea and occurred in Argentina as well. Consequently, this factor is less useful in explaining the different reactions. Also, both Argentina and South Korea undertook efforts to rein in the military early in the democratic transition. Yet, there were some differences in how each attempted this and the timing of their efforts. Finally, the last two --the nature of the allegations and the retention of key military prerogatives-- appear to be important differences not present in Argentina that may help explain why a military rebellion did not occur in South Korea.
Public Opinion
The disposition of society to military intervention is an important aspect in restraining the military. If society is divided and the political system fragmented, the military may have greater opportunity for intervention. Moreover, elites in the society may even ask the military to intervene. 33 Conversely, a society unified against intervention may make it more difficult for the military to act. When the Argentine military took over in 1966, large segments of society supported their efforts. However, a faltering economy eventually turned public opinion against the military. Failure to secure the Malvinas islands from the British drastically eroded support for the military junta. In the wake of the "dirty war" and the failed economic policies of the generals, Argentines had their fill of military rule. Even as Alfonsin attempted to placate the military with measures limiting the prosecutions, public protest against the armed forces continued. 34 However, this alone did not prevent the military from rebelling and they stepped in four times thereafter.
Since South Korea began its transition to democracy in 1987, public opinion has also staunchly opposed any repetition of military intervention. Concerning the events of 1987, two scholars note:
civil society posed the most formidable deterrent to military intervention. The popular sector's unity of purpose and its increased organisational strength through horizontal coalition among intellectuals, labour, church and students ultimately deterred the military from meddling with civil politics. 35 As one measure of public opinion, a survey of South Korean's indicated a decline of military influence. According to the survey, Koreans ranked the military as the most influential group in society in 1986 and 1988. By 1990, the military fell to fourth and people predicted that by the year 2000, the military would be last among eleven groups. 36
In addition to the anti-military mood, a serious embarrassment to the upper echelons of the armed forces exacerbated these feelings. In May 1993, allegations surfaced that senior officers bribed their superiors in return for promotions. 37 Eventually, authorities jailed ten Navy and Air Force generals but President Kim ordered all ten freed "in view of their long service to the country." 38 According to one press report, the "incident has shattered the reputation of the armed forces as selfless institutions." 39 Given the public disgrace, it would be even more difficult for the military to intervene.
Reining in the Military
An important task of a new civilian regime is to reassert control over the military to preclude further intervention. A democracy must be able to shape and control its military. 40 The civilian regime needs to alter the power relationships that existed during authoritarian rule by constraining the military, including intelligence agencies. Alfonsin made several efforts to subjugate the military to greater civilian control. First, the government strengthened the Ministry of Defense and weakened the power of the service chiefs, particularly in budgeting and formulating national security policy. Officials created a special council to advise the government on military matters but did not regularly include the service heads in these discussions. Instead, these chiefs were included only by special invitation of the Minister of Defense. 41
Second, the government passed two laws that circumscribed military authority. The first law, the Law for the Defense of Democracy, increased the penalties for leading a coup from a maximum of 15 years to a new limit of 25 years. The second law, the National Defense Law, removed the military and its intelligence agencies from roles in internal defense, confining them to defense against external enemies. Article 15 of the law states: "Questions relative to the internal politics of the country shall under no circumstances constitute working hypotheses of military intelligence organizations." 42 Now, the police and border patrol assumed responsibility for internal defense.
In South Korea, efforts to rein in the military took several different forms. Three types of actions were most significant: personnel changes; abolishing secret military societies; and reorganization of intelligence agencies.
Personnel Changes. Both Presidents Roh and Kim made significant personnel moves to achieve greater control of the military. These actions removed political generals appointed during previous administrations and replaced them with officers committed to staying out of politics. During his first year in office, Roh appointed Kang Young-hoon, a retired Army general to the post of Prime Minister. Kang was a moderate who opposed the military's involvement in politics. The following year, President Roh reassigned or retired forty-eight officers who were given their posts largely as political appointments by Chun Doo Hwan.
By the end of his term, Roh's efforts to rein in the military appeared to have succeeded. As one indication, Roh held a reception at Chong Wa Dae, the presidential residence, also called the Blue House, for the executive secretaries. None of these department heads was a uniformed general. As retired general Ko Myung-seung commented: "Our country has reached the stage where we can say goodbye to coups...." 43 Finally, Roh announced that his party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) would not appoint a military leader to be their candidate for the 1992 election. "For the sake of the nation and its political development, I should be the last president to come from the army," Roh noted. 44
Soon after his inauguration in February 1993, President Kim Young-sam initiated further personnel changes in the defense ministry. A spokesperson for the President noted that the moves were designed to eliminate military involvement in politics and allow the armed forces to focus on their primary mission of national defense. Concerning those removed for involvement in the December 12th incident, the spokesperson also asserted the government's intention to confine these moves to high level officers since lower ranking officers were only following orders. 45 At the end of his first year in office, Kim reiterated: "Our Armed Forces are being remodeled in keeping with the spirit of this new era of democratic civilian rule." 46
Abolishing Secret Military Societies. Another important threat to civilian government was the existence of secret military societies. Several years before Park's coup in 1961, Chun, Roh and five other officers formed Hanahoe (One-Mindedness Society), a secret society to "make the army the pre-eminent institution for safeguarding the country against North Korea." 47 Hanahoe members furnished several Army Chiefs of Staff who prevented non-members from moving into the post. In 1973, over a flap with Hanahoe's leader, Park banned all meetings of the society. However, the links among its members remained. 48 Another society, Aljahoe (Let's-Know-Each-Other-Society) formed after Hanahoe. However, Kim Young-sam forbid the formation of any private clubs in the military. 49 By abolishing Hanahoe and other secret military societies, Kim eliminated power centers that competed with the government's ability to control the armed forces.
Reorganization of Intelligence Agencies. The chief military intelligence agency is the Defense Security Command (DSC). This organization began in the 1970's as a parallel group to the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP), formerly the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). During his first year in office, Roh restricted some of the powers of the DSC. 50 However, when Kim Young-sam became president more significant restructuring of the intelligence community occurred.
First, Kim consolidated intelligence gathering by ordering the DSC and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to report directly to the defense minister. 51 Previously, these groups reported to the president giving them more direct access to government power. Also, the DSC would no longer conduct intelligence activities unrelated to military matters. 52 Finally, the DSC received greater legislative scrutiny as DSC generals were questioned by a National Assembly committee in October 1993. 53 Actions were also taken to rein in the NSP, including mandating precise procedures for intelligence gathering activities and numerous personnel changes.
Two important differences are apparent here when comparing South Korea and Argentina. First is the timing. Argentina began its trials early in the transition to democratization while authorities were still implementing measures to restrict further military involvement. In South Korea, the government took significant measures to rein in the military before any of the trials occurred. Thus, the military appeared to be more firmly under civilian control in the ROK before that control was tested by trying these military men. Second, while Argentina instituted a number of measures to assert civilian control, ROK efforts were more extensive, particularly in the area of personnel.
It is important to note here that, while ROK efforts to rein in the military preceded the trials, this was not a conscious effort by Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam. While both presidents supported efforts to restrict the military's involvement in politics, they were also reluctant to push the trials. Roh himself was involved in many of the same wrongdoings as Chun and Kim had merged his party with Roh's ruling party. Rather, both presidents had to be pressured by groups within society --students, professors and workers-- to conduct the trials at all. As a result, the military was more firmly in civilian control before the trials proceeded but this sequence was largely unintended and not the result of enlightened South Korean political leadership. Nonetheless, the sequencing of these events in South Korea --reining in the military before prosecuting its leaders-- remained an important reason for the military staying on the sidelines during the trials.
Nature of the Allegations
Important differences existed with regard to the allegations leveled at the militaries in Argentina and South Korea. In Argentina, many officers in the military faced charges of extensive human rights abuses. Recall that these officers and the institution as a whole were being tried for actions they believed were an achievement, namely, ridding the country of left-wing subversives. Rather than receiving thanks for protecting the nation, the trials of these officers vilified the military. The armed forces perceived the trials as an attack on the entire military as an institution.
In South Korea, the allegations were different for several reasons. First, the accusations were more complex. Chun, Roh and the other high ranking officers faced three different charges: mutiny, treason, and corruption. Some of these allegations had a more personal bent, particularly the charges of corruption and the maintenance of the political slush funds. These allegations did not attack the military as an institution and focused attention more on the illicit behavior of individuals, namely Chun and Roh.
Second, some in the military had their own grievances with Chun and Roh. When Chun succeeded in his takeover of the military and the government, he removed numerous generals who remained loyal to the existing regime. Roh also made many personnel moves that alienated officers in the military. Thus, there seemed to be less incentive to rescue these individuals when the armed forces as an institution remained safe.
Third, South Korean authorities seemed more willing to limit prosecutions to only the higher ranking officers. In 1993 following government purges of several generals who took part in the December 12th mutiny, a government spokesperson noted that investigations would not focus on lower ranking officers since they were merely following orders. 54 Since the trials did not reach down below the level of general, officers below this rank did not believe they were being sold out by those above as had been the case in Argentina.
Retention of Military Prerogatives
During the years of military rule, the armed forces often accumulate various privileges and powers to facilitate their rule, items Alfred Stepan called "prerogatives." When the civilian government reasserts control, there may be significant conflict between the government and the military over the fate of these prerogatives. If the government restricts these powers and the military contests these efforts, there is a chance the military may step in to preserve its status. Of particular note here is the need for the military to maintain an important mission and significant levels of defense spending.
In Argentina, the government attacked these two key prerogatives. For several years, the government drastically cut the military budget, salaries and the number of conscripts. In 1981, defense spending accounted for 5.6% of GNP. By 1985, defense spending declined to 3% of GNP. Salaries decreased to the point many had to take second jobs. 55 The military viewed these cuts as unpatriotic and harmful to the nation. 56
The military also did not have a clearly defined mission. They had largely subdued the internal enemies of the left and there was a great deal of public and government pressure on the military to stay away from internal threats. Argentina did have some external threats, particularly Britain with whom they had recently fought a war. However, military authorities believed they were ill-prepared for such a mission. In contrast, Stepan notes the Brazilian military sustained previous levels of defense spending and became more involved in regional and international affairs, helping provide the military with a mission that did not focus on internal matters. 57
For South Korea, there was little doubt the armed forces retained a crucial mission for external defense. North Korea remained a serious threat with more than 1 million soldiers and a possible nuclear weapons capability. Numerous terrorist and infiltration incidents, including the submarine incursion in September 1996, made Pyongyang's intentions uncertain. Despite the relaxation of tension that followed the end of the Cold War, South Korea remained embroiled in a serious security dilemma that provided an important mission for the armed forces.
North-South hostility also furnished a rationale for maintaining large military budgets. From 1986 to 1995, defense spending rose from $5.11 billion to $14.40 billion, a 181% increase. 58 Though not adjusted for inflation, these figures indicate a significant increase nonetheless. It should be noted here that as a percentage of GNP, South Korean defense spending dropped by close to 23 percent. However, as these spending increases indicate, the drop was due more to significant rises in GNP than to decreases in overall spending. 59 Furthermore, in the wake of the submarine incident, Seoul announced that beginning in 1998, the government would increase spending by 12.9% per year for five years. 60 However, future spending levels are likely to be affected by South Korea's recent economic troubles.
CONCLUSION
Consolidating a democracy is a difficult undertaking. Pressure may be great to punish the previous military government and those within the military that perpetrated crimes against their people. Yet, comparing Argentina and South Korea indicate that a more cautious approach towards prosecuting the military may, in the long run, be more conducive to a smooth transition to democracy. Several lessons seem apparent from these two cases.
First, both Argentina and South Korea instituted measures to place civilian control over the military. Some of these measures were different, particularly South Korea's more extensive use of personnel changes to oust political generals and Argentina's efforts through legislative statute to restrict the military's role. Also, in Argentina, the trials were viewed by many as an important step in exerting civilian control over the military. However, South Korea undertook greater efforts to rein in the military before the trials, avoiding the rebellions that occurred in Argentina. Though there may be intense pressure to prosecute members of the military immediately, a more prudent course may be to wait. Instead, allow the civilian government more time to establish a better grip on the armed forces before going to trial. In South Korea, prosecutions did not occur until several years later while measures were instituted to keep the military out of politics. Again, this was not an intentional effort by South Korea's political leaders, having been pushed by societal groups to prosecute the military leaders. Yet, by delaying the prosecutions, South Korea had a greater chance to institutionalize civilian control before the armed forces might be provoked to intervene. Thus, despite the pressure to do so, a more expedient course may be first to take measures to ensure greater civilian control of the military before embarking on trials.
Second, if the need for justice and the pressure to prosecute the military early in the transition becomes overwhelming, civilian leaders must be careful that the military as an institution is not threatened. Two aspects seem evident here.
Prosecuting the military after a transition to democracy creates some difficult tradeoffs. There is likely to be great pressure to punish the abuses of the military regime. Yet this may provoke the military to intervene once again. Should an unsavory bargain be struck that exempts perpetrators from responsibility for the past be struck with the military? The lessons from South Korea and Argentina indicate that justice may be served. However, the civilian government may need to opt for a more flexible and cautious approach that eventually settles the justice issues while also establishing civilian control of the military and consolidating democracy.
Notes:
Note 1: Chun Doo Hwan was president from 1980 to 1988 and Roh Tae-woo was president from 1988 to 1993. Back.
Note 2: Shim Jae Hoon, "A Break with the Past", Far Eastern Economic Review, September 5, 1996, p. 21. Hereafter, this source will be noted as FEER. Back.
Note 3: Andrew Pollack, "2 Ex-Seoul Dictators Leave Jail, Pardoned After 2 Years", New York Times, December 23, 1997. Back.
Note 4: Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 58-59. Back.
Note 5: David Pion-Berlin and Ernesto Lopez, "A House Divided: Crisis, Cleavage, and Conflict in the Argentine Army", in Edward C. Epstein, ed., The New Argentine Democracy (Westport: Praeger, 1992), pp. 65-69. Back.
Note 7: J. Patrice McSherry, Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 204-206. Back.
Note 10: McSherry, p. 206. Back.
Note 11: Pion-Berlin and Lopez, p. 72, and Stepan, p. 71. Back.
Note 12: Norden, p. 128-131. Back.
Note 13: Pion-Berlin and Lopez, p. 64. Back.
Note 14: Norden, p. 104. Back.
Note 15: Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 68. Back.
Note 16: Stepan notes that military rulers in Brazil were guided "by their role as direct managers of the polity and their struggle against internal enemies." As the democratic regime attempts to control the military by restricting this "internal" mission, the military needs an alternative mission to keep it from stepping back into politics. Stepan, pp. 86-92. Back.
Note 17: Norden, pp. 92-93. Back.
Note 19: Ibid., pp. 126-127. Back.
Note 20: Korea Newsreview, April 9, 1988, p. 6. Back.
Note 22: John McBeth, "A Case to Answer", FEER, November 24, 1988, p. 14. Back.
Note 23: "Chun Apologizes for Misdeeds Under His Rule", Korea Newsreview, November 26, 1988, p. 4. Back.
Note 24: "Kim Vows to Restore Honor of Kwangju Citizens", Korea Newsreview, May 22, 1993, p. 4. Back.
Note 25: Shim Jae Hoon, "Bitter Harvest", FEER, May 27, 1993, p. 15. Back.
Note 26: "Plan to Sue Ex-Pres. Chun", Korea Newsreview, May 22, 1993, p. 12. Back.
Note 27: "Dec.12, 1979 Incident Premeditated Military Revolt", Korea Newsreview, November 5, 1994, p. 8. Back.
Note 28: Shim Jae Hoon, "Dirty Money", FEER, November 9, 1995, pp. 16-17. Of particular concern to investigators was the extent of the fund and the degree to which the contributions "bought" favors from the Roh government. Back.
Note 29: "1-10 Year Jail Terms Asked for 14 in Roh Bribery Trial", Korea Newsreview, January 20, 1996, p. 7. Back.
Note 30: "Chun also Charged of Taking W215.9 Bil. in Bribes", Korea Newsreview, January 20, 1996, p. 7. Back.
Note 31: "Indictment for Chun and Roh Comes One Day Before Deadline", Korea Newsreview, December 30, 1995, p. 11. Other charges included attempted murder of superior officers, murder of a guard, and illegal movement of troops. Back.
Note 33: See "Democratic Opening and Military Intervention in South Korea: Comparative Assessment and Implications", Chung-in Moon and Kang Mun-Gu, in James Cotton (ed.), Politics and Policy in the New Korean State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 177-178, and Stepan, p. 4. Back.
Note 34: McSherry, p. 215. Back.
Note 35: Moon and Kang, p. 178. Back.
Note 36: Professor Lee Chun-hyong of Inha University conducted this survey every two years since 1986. The other groups ranked with the military were: the National Assembly, big businesses, the political opposition, university students, intellectuals, journalists, religious leaders, legal professionals, the middle class and trade unions. "Military Begins Blending Into Background", Korea Newsreview, November 20, 1993, pp. 8-9. Back.
Note 37: "Promotion Scandal Spreads to the Army", Korea Newsreview, May 1, 1993, pp. 8-9. Back.
Note 38: Shim Jae Hoon, "Shamed at the Top", FEER, May 20, 1993, p. 15. Back.
Note 41: Norden, pp. 96-98. Back.
Note 42: Quoted in Norden, p. 97. Back.
Note 43: Shim Jae Hoon, "Coup worries fade", FEER, March 14, 1991, p. 23. Back.
Note 44: The pronouncement was largely directed at Roh's brother-in-law, an ex-military man Kim Bok-dong, who indicated an interest in running for the presidency. However, the ruling also applied to others. Shim Jae Hoon, "No to Roh dynasty", FEER, April 25, 1991, p. 16 and "Kith and Kim", FEER, December 28, 1989, p. 8. Back.
Note 45: "Old Guard Brass Implicated in 'Dec.12 Incident' Purged", Korea Newsreview, June 5, 1993, p. 10. Back.
Note 46: "1993 First Year of New Korean Armed Forces: Kim", Korea Newsreview, October 9, 1993, p. 4. Back.
Note 47: Shim Jae Hoon, "Meeting the Boss", FEER, October 28, 1993, p. 36. Back.
Note 48: John McBeth, "The classmates' coup", FEER, January 12, 1989, pp. 25-26. Back.
Note 49: "1993 First Year of New Korean Armed Forces: Kim", Korea Newsreview, October 9, 1993, pp. 4-5. Back.
Note 50: John McBeth, "Cleaning out the barracks", FEER, September 15, 1988, p. 22. Back.
Note 51: "Military in For Radical Reforms: Kwon", Korea Newsreview, March 20, 1993, p. 9. Back.
Note 52: FEER, April 1, 1993, p. 25. Back.
Note 53: Shim Jae Hoon, "Meeting the Boss", FEER, October 28, 1993, p. 36. Back.
Note 54: "Old Guard Brass Implicated in 'Dec.12 Incident' Purged", Korea Newsreview, June 5, 1993, p. 10. Back.
Note 55: By 3 o'clock p.m., Army Headquarters was nearly deserted because many had left for their second job. Norden, p. 94. Back.
Note 57: Ibid., p. 80 and pp. 86-87. Back.
Note 58: These figures were taken from the 1986/87 through 1996/97 editions of The Military Balance, London: Institute for Strategic Studies. The figures for 1986 to 1991 were listed as "budget" numbers and the numbers for 1992 to 1995 are listed as actual "expenditures." Back.
Note 59: Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 115. Back.
Note 60: "South Korea Announces Military Budget Increase", New York Times, December 11, 1996. Back.
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