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Cultural Pluralism and Political Reincarnation in Nepal
International Studies Association
March 20, 1998
Introduction
His Majesty's Royal Kingdom of Nepal had been an absolutist Hindu feudal monarchy since 1769 until a reform movement transformed the political system into a raucous multicultural, multiparty parliamentary democracy in 1991. How did this extraordinary transformation take place?
This paper analyzes the collapse of the central authority of the independent monarchy and the dynamics of change that gave rise to the promulgation of a new Constitution and the legalization of political parties in 1990 and the first democratic multiparty elections in 1991. 1 It assesses the development of the political system over the past seven years, a period which has witnessed two general elections, numerous local elections, and seven different cabinet governments in power since 1990. 2
The paper attempts to assess the extent to which the recent democratic institutional innovations may have reduced deeply- imbedded fatalistic attitudes and pervasive caste discrimination, and may have promoted increased political education, participation, and the development of local civic and political groups. It considers current political trends, including an anti-democratic backlash which fuels the nostalgia for return to the traditional system of political hierarchy based on caste, sex, and ethnic distinctions as well as the opposing trend of expanding regional and ethnic nationalist groups.
Historical background: the political transformation
Nepal has existed as a kingdom centered in the Kathmandu Valley for more than 1,500 years. The country is known for its majestic Himalayas and has nine of the fourteen peaks in the world over 8,000 meters, including Mount Everest and Annapurna I. A traditional society with a predominantly agricultural economy, Nepal is heavily influenced by Hinduism, a legacy from India which defines its culture and caste-structured society. 3
Modern Nepal began its evolution in the sixteenth century with the founding of the hereditary monarchy of the House of Gorkha by Dravya Shah in 1559. In the late eighteenth century, Gorkha conquests extended the kingdom through the Himalayas for almost 1,500 kilometers from the western boundary of Garhwal, India, through the territory of Sikkim in the east. In the early nineteenth century, Gorkha power came into conflict with the British East India Company. The resulting Anglo-Nepalese War (1814-16) was devastating for Nepal: the Treaty of Sagauli reduced the kingdom to the boundaries it has since occupied, less than 900 kilometers from east to west. For almost thirty years after the treaty was concluded, infighting among aristocratic factions characterized Nepal.
The next stage of Nepalese politics was the period of hereditary Rana rule--the establishment of a dictatorship of successive Rana prime ministers beginning with Jang Bahadur Rana in 1846. During the period of Rana rule, which lasted until the end of 1950, Nepal was governed by a landed aristocracy. This period provided stability, but also inhibited political and economic development because the Ranas isolated the country and exercised total control over internal affairs. The Rana dictatorship was a result of a partnership between the rulers and the army. Patronage ensured loyal soldiers; the military supported the Rana prime ministers and, later on, the Shah monarchs, who were figureheads during Rana rule.
In January 1951, the Nepali Congress Party, modeled after the Indian National Congress Party, forced the Ranas to concede to the end of their authoritarian rule. At a meeting in New Delhi held under the auspices of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Rana prime minister, the Nepali King, and the Nepali Congress Party agreed to establish a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The restored monarchy assumed charge of all executive powers: financial management, appointment of government officials, and command of the armed forces. The latter power became an increasingly useful tool for enforcing control.
In 1962 King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev devised the centrally controlled partyless council system of government called panchayat. This system served as the institutional basis of the king's rule and was envisioned by the palace as a democratic administration although it functioned only at the king's behest. Incorporated into the 1962 constitution, the panchayat system was established at the village, district, and national levels. Successive changes in government and constitutional revisions did not weaken the powers of the absolute monarchy. In fact, a May 1980 referendum reaffirmed the status quo of the panchayat system and its continuation as a rubber stamp for the king. Elections in 1981 and 1986 were characterized by the lack of political programs.
Government by an absolute monarch behind a democratic façade lasted for some thirty years. Although many party members were exiled to India, opposition to the government and the panchayat system continued to grow, particularly in the late 1980s when the outlawed political parties announced a drive for a multiparty system. A coalition between the Nepali Congress Party and the Communist Party of Nepal was formed in late 1989. The increasing disillusionment with and unpopularity of King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's regime and the worsening economic situation caused by the trade and transit dispute with India added to the momentum of the incipient pro-democracy movement.
The dissolution of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, and the successes of the pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, had an impact in Nepal. In part as a result of the participatory experiences of Nepalese in India, movements arose to effect changes in Nepal's government and society.
Theoretical views on revolution and political change
Will the Nepalese democratic revolution be completed? Will the country's experiment with multiparty parliamentary government succeed? It may be argued that the Western-style democracy transplant may fail in Nepal. It is not axiomatic that a political system based on an essentially Protestant tradition established in an under-populated vast land and based on English legal habits will serve as a necessarily useful model to a Hindu country with numerous ethnolinguistic groups, relatively overpopulated, small and poor.
There is a large contemporary literature centering on the debates about regime transition and political development. 4 Several major factors are often cited in this literature as essential in analyzing the rise and fall, or the success or failure, of a revolutionary transformation from authoritarian to democratic government.
* Massive poverty
The most deeply-rooted and long-term phenomenon at the bottom of many insurgencies is massive poverty and often rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. Peasants or farmers or workers or farmers or workers become rebellious when the actions, or sometimes, the inactions, of their local leaders threaten their minimal subsistence needs -- when they raise land rents or increase the charges on farm inputs, or refuse customary credits, or take some land from their tenants. Then peasants or farmers or workers become desperate and outraged and rebellious.
If poverty is a precondition for revolution, then Nepal - one of the ten poorest countries in the world - would be a likely candidate for radical change. Estimates of its per capita income for 1996 ranged from US$180 to US$200. According to the 1996 World Factbook, Nepal's population growth rate is estimated at 2.45% (mid-1996). Life expectancy at birth for males averages 53 years. The infant mortality rate is 79 deaths/1,000 live births. The literacy rate (% of total population age 15 and over who can read and write) is 26% for the total population, 41% for males, and 13% for females. 5
Various factors contributed to the economic underdevelopment--including terrain, lack of resource endowment, landlocked position, lack of institutions for modernization, weak infrastructure, and a lack of policies conducive to development.
Until 1951 Nepal had very little contact with countries other than India, Tibet, and Britain. Movement of goods or people from one part of the country to another usually required passage through India, making Nepal dependent on trade with or via India. The mountains to the north and the lack of economic growth in Tibet (China's Xizang Autonomous Region after 1959) meant very little trade was possible with Nepal's northern neighbor.
The effects of being landlocked and of having to transit goods through India continued to be reflected in the early 1990s. As a result of the lapse of the trade and transit treaties with India in March 1989, Nepal faced shortages of certain consumer goods, raw materials, and other industrial inputs, a situation that led to a decline in industrial production.
Economic development to reduce poverty has been a high government priority since May 1991. The government began moving forward with economic reforms particularly those that encourage trade and foreign investment, e.g., by eliminating business licenses and registration requirements in order to simplify investment procedures. The government has also been cutting public expenditures by reducing subsidies, privatizing state industries, and laying off civil servants. (In 1995 little progress was made in these areas because the communist government had trouble formulating and implementing policies.) The 1997 coalition government of Surya Bahadur Thapa intended to pick up the pace of reforms in 1996, focusing primarily on raising revenues to develop the rural sector by increasing taxation and privatization. The international community provides funding for 62% of Nepal's developmental budget and for 34% of total budgetary expenditures.
Poverty alone, however, does not lead to rebellion. Only when poor people perceive themselves to be exploited beyond sufferance will they become rebellious. Rebellions have resulted from abusive authoritarian rule or harsh military rule, from exploitation by colonial government or a social oligarchy. When the social systems which had previously provided farmers or workers with a minimum of adequate security are harmed or destroyed, then they may rebel against this sharp threat to their existence. These rebellions are often reactions -- unfocused outbursts of rage -- against the insecurity which the modern world has brought.
Most rebellions, however, do not develop into revolutionary movements. Most rebellions remain local and ephemeral. Peasants or farmers or workers are often guided more by rage at current conditions than by any careful calculation of a strategy of how to improve their positions. Sometimes, however, rebellion has led to a sustained revolutionary movement throughout a country. Why? What changes an ephemeral and fragmented rebellion into a sustained and focused strategy for revolutionary change?
* Viable alternative government and a catalyst of transformation
If a popular insurgency is to succeed as a revolutionary movement, it will need to demonstrate that it can provide effective leadership and durable organization. A revolutionary movement needs leadership to formulate a strategy that will relieve the oppression or restrain the exploitation, which will actually improve the condition of the poor. Organization is needed to channel the rebel's blind, hopeless rage into a large, strong, and durable basis of support. The revolutionary movement will be successful to the extent that it can provide immediately useful services and concrete benefits; for example, lower rents, lower interest rates, or protection from abusive authorities.
If a revolutionary movement is to achieve power, what is finally needed is a triggering event which punctures the myths and symbols of established authority and provides legitimacy to the revolutionary bid for power. A dramatic catalyst is needed to arouse and polarize public opinion, to disrupt the customary obedience to authority, and to spark a genuine popular insurgency against the government. A catalyzing event may force an existing government to crumble due to massive disaffection or civil disobedience, as well as a popular insurgency, acting in concert with, or under the direction of, the fully mobilized, national, radical insurgency. Then a new provisional revolutionary government can take authority - the power to rule - from a discredited established government.
Nepal's long-standing history of continuity of rule and relative stability was challenged when the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, or pro-democracy movement, was formally established on February 18, 1990, almost forty years after the end of Rana control. Demonstrations and rallies--accompanied by violence, arrests, and even deaths--were held throughout the country.
The triggering event for revolutionary change in Nepal took place in 1990 when dozens of pro-democracy demonstrators were shot by police, prompting a surge of anti-royal sentiment that forced King Birendra to yield most of his authority to an elected government. 6
Government crackdowns on the pro-democracy demonstrations generated the sparks that ignited popular insurgency against the old order. Political unrest became widespread. Ethnic groups agitated for official recognition of their cultural heritage and linguistic tradition and demonstrated against the monarchy. The goal of the pro-democracy movement, however, was to establish a more representative democracy and to end the panchayat system.
The demonstrations and protests characterizing the prodemocracy movement gained momentum when the ban on political parties and activities was lifted in April 1990. That same month, the prime minister resigned, the Council of Ministers and the Rashtriya Panchayat (National Panchayat, or Parliament) were dissolved, and talks with the opposition were begun. A multiparty interim government replaced the panchayat system.
* Accommodation and synthesis in Nepal's democratic transition
A new provisional revolutionary movement needs legitimacy - popular acceptance of its claim to govern. The new government must justify its rule through normalizing electoral procedures or through newly-ratified constitutional methods of regime change. This in turn requires some accommodation and consolidation with the existing institutions and bureaucracies which implemented law and order during the previous constitutional regime. When substantial accommodation does occur, the result is usually a synthesis, that is, new policies somewhere in the spectrum between the old ones and the rallying call of the revolutionary movement. A successful movement can force a change in policy, but it cannot dictate the terms.
In Nepal, this accommodation began when the the king nominated a four-member council, established a Constitution Recommendation Commission, and announced that he would begin an official inquiry into the deaths that had resulted from the pro-democracy demonstrations. In mid-May, a general amnesty was declared for all political prisoners. A draft constitution was announced in the summer of 1990. King Birendra wanted the draft amended to give him more leverage, but subsequent negotiations did not yield as much as he desired. In November 1990, the king finally approved and promulgated a new, more democratic constitution that vested sovereignty in the people.
The panchayat system finally ended in April 1990; in May 1991, general elections were held. 7 They were deemed "generally fair, free, and open" by an international election inspection team. Approximately 65 percent of the populace voted. Although more than forty political parties registered with the election commission, only twenty political parties--mostly small, communist splinter groups--were on the ballot. The Nepali Congress Party won 110 of the 205 seats in the House of Representatives, and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) won 69 seats. Previously operating in exile and behind the scenes, the various communist and other parties and coalitions became a powerful presence in the newly constituted bicameral Parliament. Nepal continued its gradual move toward a multiparty democracy.
Pro-democracy protests continued unabated. Demonstrations were held on February 18, 1992, the second anniversary of the founding of the pro-democracy movement. In early April 1992, rival student groups clashed, and communist and leftist opposition groups called for a general strike as a response to double digit inflation and a more than 60 percent increase in water and electricity tariffs. As a result of skirmishes between the police and demonstrators, a curfew was imposed. In addition, the government banned primary and secondary schoolteachers from political activities and from joining or campaigning for political parties.
Elections to the village development committees and municipalities were held in late May 1992; the elections pitted the various communist factions and other parties against the Nepali Congress Party administration of Prime Minister Girija Prasad (G.P.) Koirala. More than 90,000 civilian and security personnel were assigned to safeguard the elections. In contrast to the May 1991 parliamentary election, the Nepali Congress Party routed the communists in the urban areas and even made some gains in the rural areas. The Nepali Congress Party won 331 positions, or 56 percent of the seats, in the municipalities; the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) won 119 seats, or 20 percent of the seats; and other lesser parties won the remainder of the seats. In newly established village development committees, the Nepali Congress Party won 21,461 positions; the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) won 11,175 seats.
Elections for the 205-seat House of Representatives in November 1994 left no party with a firm grip on power. More than 20 parties took part in the election, most allied with one of the two major groups, the Nepali Congress and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Nepal, divided by ideology and deep suspicion. The Communist government that came to power was ejected in a confidence vote nine months later. A Nepali Congress-led coalition took over, but lasted just 18 months.
Lokendra Bahadur Chand, of the conservative pro-royalist National Democratic Party, was next, followed by Surya Bahadur Thapa. With his coalition with the Nepali Congress faltering after three months, Thapa advised King Birendra to disband Parliament and order new elections two years early rather than face a vote of confidence. Within hours, Nepal's opposition communists and rivals within the prime minister's own rightist Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) had counter-petitioned the King, urging him to summon a special parliamentary session to vote out the Thapa government.
Prime Minister Thapa made the call for fresh polls after learning that at least 87 MPs from the CPN-UML and nine from his own National Democratic Party (RPP) had planned a no-confidence motion against his coalition government formed by the NC, the RPP and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP). 8 Thapa's was the fourth coalition government in Nepal since the mid-term polls in late 1994. He himself came to power on October 7, 1997 after the NC brought down the former coalition government with a no-confidence motion.
Since 1991, opportunistic or recalcitrant Members of Parliament (MP's) have frequently been the cause of political instability in Nepal. The situation became considerably worse when the 1994 mid-term election produced a hung parliament where no single party held a majority. There have been numerous occasions in the past seven years when MP's either refused to obey the whip of their parliamentary leaders or left their own parties, joined the opposition and abstained or voted against their governments, causing the fall of four of the five governments. In September 1997, an anti-defection bill was unanimously approved by the lower house of Nepal in an attempt to prevent MP's from deserting their own parties and thus bring stability to Nepal's politics. MP's from the then ruling Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist, Cpn-Uml) and the National Democratic Party (Rpp) and those from the main opposition Nepali Congress voted overwhelmingly for the bill. 9
As the 1998 new year began, the king was still undecided whether to dissolve parliament and hold mid-term elections or to convene a special session of parliament to discuss a no-confidence motion against the present government. After days of consultations with advisers, legal experts and party leaders, King Birendra referred the issue to the Supreme Court, the first time for the King to do so. In August 1995, the Supreme Court overturned a recommendation by then Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, CPN-UML) to dissolve parliament and hold fresh polls and reinstated the dissolved parliament.
The court ruled that dissolution was not allowed if an alternative government could be formed from the existing parliament. But a year earlier, the same court held that then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress (NC) was within his constitutional authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and holding of mid-term polls. "Squabbling political parties have plunged Nepal into a fresh political crisis, further eroding the people's faith in its fledgling democracy," according to one political analyst. 10 "The games politicians play have desensitized the people towards democracy. They are becoming numb, indifferent, " commented Dr. Devendra Raj Panday of the Nepal South Asia Center, a think tank. "Instead of delivering on economic promises made to the people, politicians are frittering away the gains of democracy. "
Current political trends: deadlocked democracy
Nepal has had six prime minister in seven years and four since the 1994 mid-term elections which produced a hung Parliament. 11 While some political observers believe the political uncertainty is a part of parliamentary democracy, others worry that continued instability has resulted in growing popular apathy towards democracy. Political instability may have encouraged corruption and stalled development programs 12 .
Reports on the activities of extremists in the interior areas of Nepal are increasing. Over 400 extreme left pro-Maoist students were arrested Monday in and around Kathmandu for demonstrating against the ruling coalition government. The banned Nepal Communist Party-Maoist (NCP-M) activists launched a "new people's revolution " last year against the multiparty democratic system of government and constitutional monarchy in Nepal which they want to replace with a "people's republic. " The Maoist insurgents, greatly influenced by Peru's "Shining Path " guerrillas, have been concentrating their activities in some 11 remote hilly districts in west and north Nepal. Their activities are spreading to other parts of the kingdom. Over 125 people have been killed in clashes between the Maoists and the police during 1997. 13
Newspaper editorials, columns and commentaries over the past year have been severely critical of politicians and politics in general -- reflecting the growing popular disenchantment. 14 A series of crippling, sometime violent, anti-government strikes called by rival political parties disrupted normal life for days on end between August and October 1997, causing huge losses in business revenue and tourism, the latter of which is an important source of revenue.
The political turmoil means little else is working, according to Som Prasad Gauchan, a sociologist and political scientist at Tribhuwan University. "All decision-making stops during the frequent political crises.". 15 "Business is in chaos, and the government is doing nothing to expand the economy or attract foreign investment," complains Ravi Bhakta Shrestha, vice-president of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries." 16 Houston-based Enron discovered that after Lokendra Bahadur Chand, prime minister for just six months last year, granted the energy company preliminary approval to build a multibillion-dollar hydroelectric project. Enron wants to present their proposal for final approval, but they haven't been able to get an appointment because the government keeps changing. Finance Minister Rabindra Nath Sharma, who has served two prime ministers since March, has yet to get around to adopting a proposal by the Central Bank that would have untied the Nepalese currency from the Indian rupee. The rupee has been falling in value in recent months.
When governments change, the heads of most departments and agencies change too. Scores of unemployed people line up outside leaders' homes, seeking an audience in hopes of getting a job. Outside ministerial offices, the rivalries that have kept politicians from forming stable governments erupt into violent clashes between student groups divided along party lines. There are also two government employee associations, one affiliated with the Communists and the other with the centrist Nepali Congress.
Frequent government changes affect Nepal's economic development in many ways, says Dr. Kishor Kumar Guru-Gharana of the National Planning Commission. Political instability causes policy instability, which in turn leads to macro-economic instability, he explained. He said as the system in Nepal is still a highly centralized one, every time political instability happens, government officials have to wait until the situation becomes clear. And every time there is a change of government, not only the prime minister and ministers, but also the secretaries, project directors and engineers are changed. "All of them have to take time to study new things and all these delay decision-making," he said. "As a result, 90 percent of the country's projects and programs have been affected. And on the average, there is a delay of two years in the implementation of the projects." 17
Conclusions: interrupted revolution or unfinished reaction?
The difficulty of replacing Nepal's long tradition of autocracy with a democracy, coupled with the economic challenges posed by physical geography and location, has been daunting. A large majority of the 22 million Nepalese who are poor have not benefited from the shift to democracy from one-party rule. Successive governments have been preoccupied by power struggles, and have had no time to enforce change.
By 1998, many of the prescribed changes had only just been instituted, or were still to come. Many observers expected that the populist experiment of a multiparty democracy would meet with eventual failure and that the monarchy and the army would return to some type of power-sharing formula. Reconciliation has been weakened by proliferation of factional political parties. 18
Several additional factors may generate new, or revive old, ethnic group, separatist group, or other centrifugal political tendencies. The sudden collapse of the monarchy, which had imposed political stability over a large part of the country, may create a vacuum where new political forces may attempt to mobilize support. The collapse of the Panchayat system may revive many of the left-over problems from the 1951 revolution that were never solved in the first place.
This tendency may be heightened by another transitional problem: xenophobia. The massive population movements of the past forty years - across the Nepal-India border and across the Nepal-Bhutan border - have made xenophobia into a major political phenomenon. Xenophobia encourages ethnic nationalism, since the essence of both is hostility to other groups.
Where an old regime disintegrates, where old social relations have become unstable, where insecurity rises, then, belonging to a common language and religion may become the only certainty in society. Ethnic nationalism can provide a basis for solidarity within the community.
In the new political arenas of Nepal, the politics of ethnic group identity may be easier to understand than any other, especially for people who lack both political education and experience. The politics of language, caste, or religion may replace complicated concepts like constitutions and civil rights. New political parties may find it easier to forge a common identity of primordial values based on biological ties, (family and kinship bonds) ethnic group membership, linguistic ties, or long-term regional ties, or sacred values based on religious beliefs. Indeed, "democratic elections often intensify ethnic and regional divisions rather than heal them." 19 This phenomenon has appeared in India in the rise of the right-wing Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party. Might this also occur in Nepal?
Ethnicity has not yet appeared as a major factor of political mobilization in Nepal. Several factors might explain this. 20 Nepal's many ethnic groups are distributed widely across many electoral districts. At the national level, no single group commands an absolute majority. There has also been a steady migration from rural to urban areas among all ethnic groups. For these and perhaps other reasons, cross-voting has occurred widely. Exclusively ethnic political movements have not yet mobilized significant electoral strength.
The old system of absolutist Hindu monarchy has fallen and it is highly unlikely that the pieces will ever be put together again, notwithstanding the persistent royalist sentiments. Unfortunately, nothing durable or widely accepted has been created to replace it.
In the meantime, the deeply-rooted demographic and economic trends that cause poverty in Nepal continue. The practice of parliamentary democracy has not brought about immediate, dramatic economic improvements. I has been extremely difficult to meet the high expectations of voters in one of the world's poorest countries. Many Nepalese have become tired of the political antics in the country and now say they want the country to be put on the right track of economic development.
Nepal is now faced with a gap between the capacity of its new political institutions and the growing expectations and demands on government. The result is a limited institutionalization of revolutionary change, a stalled or interrupted political transformation. The next revolution may be one of rising expectations and frustrations.
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Note 1: The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Raju Sitaula, Bijay Raut, and Ajaya Shrestha in the preparation of this paper. Back.
Note 2: Nepal's general election results and cabinet governments are summarized in Tables 1 & 2 in the appendix. Back.
Note 3: This section is largely drawn from the authoritative area handbook series, Nepal and Bhutan Country Studies, edited by Andrea Matles Savada. Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress, 3rd Ed., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993 Back.
Note 4: Relevant theoretical studies include Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Eds., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1996, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Univ of Oklahoma Pr, 1993, Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, Eds., Between States : Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Robert A. Scalapino, The Politics of Development: Perspectives on Twentieth-Century Asia (1989); James W. Morley (ed.), Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region (1993); and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (1995). Back.
Note 5: World Development Report 1997, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1997 Back.
Note 6: See Table 1. Chronology of the 1990 Revolution in Nepal. Back.
Note 7: See Table 2. Nepal's Political Parties and Leaders and Table 3. 1991 & 1994 General Election Results in Nepal. Back.
Note 8: "Political situation remains uncertain," Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 15 Jan 98, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accessed Feb. 11, 1998] Back.
Note 9: "Nepal Passes Bill Against Party Defection," September 17, 1997, Xinhua News Agency [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accessed Feb. 10, 1998] Back.
Note 10: Suman Pradhan, "Collapse Of Government Seems Inevitable," Inter Press Service, January 12, 1998. [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accessed Feb 10, 1998] Back.
Note 11: See Table 4. Prime Ministers of Nepal, 1990-1998 Back.
Note 12: According to "Editorial: Travails of democracy in Nepal," The Hindu, October 8, 1997 [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accesseed Feb. 10, 1998] Back.
Note 13: "Police arrest 400 Maoist students during anti- government demo," Agence France Presse, December 01, 1997 [Lexis/Nexis/News/ASIAPC, accessed Feb. 11, 1998] Back.
Note 15: Binaj Gurubacharya, "End of monarchy has meant democratic turmoil for Nepal," Associated Press, January 21, 1998 [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accessed February 11, 1998] Back.
Note 17: Yi Aijun and Chen Anning, "Nepal's Political Instability Hurts Economic Development," Xinhua News Agency, December 15, 1997 {Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, Accessed Feb. 11, 1998] Back.
Note 18: K.C. Shyam: "The Political Whoring Game," October 17, 1997, The Kathmandu Post [Lexis/Nexis, News/ASIAPC, accessed Feb. 11, 1998] Back.
Note 19: Robert Kaplan, "For the Third World, Western Democracy Is A Nightmare," International Herald Tribune, Dec. 30-31, 1995, p. 4 Back.
Note 20: Anand Aditya, "Emerging Ethnicity and Electoral Intervention in A Democratizing State," in Ganga B. Thapa, Ed., Democracy and Decentralization, Political Science Association of Nepal. Kathmandu, 1996 Back.
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