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Cybernations: The Internet, Virtual Reality, and Self-Determination
International Studies Association
March 17-21, 1998
Bruce Cockburn says that "The revolution will not be televised." The global reach of CNN makes that claim doubtful. Regardless, however, the revolution will be digitized, faxed, e-mailed, posted, virtualized, and generally be available electronically to a large portion of humanity. It may not be the immediate, real-time revolution we expect from CNN à la Tienanmen Square or Boris Yeltsin standing up to Soviet tanks, but it will be real-time nonetheless. What revolution am I talking about? The revolution taking place with the digitization of identity, the wedding of selfhood and the electronic age, the redefinition, or, conversely, the reification, of communal affiliation via cyberspace.
We are, it seems, achieving the "Information Standard," 1 experiencing "Placelessness" and the "Age of Everything-Everywhere," 2 forming virtual communities, 3 immersing ourselves in the "Network Society," 4 "Being Digital," 5 building "Cit[ies] of Bits," 6 and becoming "Netizens" and "Digital Citizens." 7 If this is true, then the ways we experience reality, encounter ourselves and others, participate in daily activities, and, of course, act politically, are in the process of being dramatically redefined and remade. The "virtual" is overtaking the "real." Virtual cash evades the control of governments and can even bring economies to their knees. 8 Ideas also evade the grasp of governmental censors, whether they be about human rights or racial hatred. Territorial boundaries are rendered meaningless as bits and bytes and electrons and data and faxes and images speed along fiber optic cable, up and down satellite links, and through the matrix of cyberspace, the infobahn, the Internet, the Information Superhighway, the Global Information Infrastructure at the speed of light.
Space contracts, time shrinks, the territorial state becomes a figment of imagination. Do we face "The End of Sovereignty?" 9 "The Twilight of Sovereignty"? "A New Sovereignty?" 10 Are we going "Beyond Sovereignty"? 11 Will the "nation-state," as MIT cyber-guru Nicholas Negroponte argues, "evaporate without first going into a gooey, inoperative mess" "[l]ike a mothball, which goes from solid to gas directly," and will there, thus, "be no more room for nationalism than there is for smallpox"? 12 Is the territorial state being replaced by the "logical state"? 13 Will the very foundations of identity and political organization be radically transformed by the telecommunications revolution, by the 'Net? Or, are we in the midst of overwhelming cyberhype? The answer at this point, I think, to these questions is: yes, no, and maybe.
The aim of this paper is not to answer all of those questions. Indeed, getting a handle on just one seems a daunting enough task. It seems obvious that something is happening to the way we communicate, organize ourselves, and identify ourselves. But what? Are identities undergoing fundamental change? Are they being deterritorialized? Again, the answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, the Internet is making new types of nonterritorially-based identities possible or "virtually" more real. On the other, the same bundle of technologies is reifying old-fashioned ethnic/national/communal territorially-based identifications. A contradiction? Of course, but in the Age of Ambiguity, 14 that should not bother us, for we can recognize the local and the global forces simultaneously tearing us apart and binding us together, and handle this seeming cognitive dissonance with aplomb.
In this paper, I look at these contradictions that seem to arise in this era of globalization. I attempt to get a grasp on how the advent of instantaneous global communications may be affecting the milieu in which we construct our identities. Are these identities changing? Are they the same, with a cyber-twist? I provide a few examples where different types of identities, those firmly planted in old-fashioned, specified terra firma, as well as those with a more transnational character, are attempting to use the Internet to further their identity construction or self-determination projects. These include the Nation of Hawaii, the Kurds, Tibet, the Zapatistas, the Vatican, and the self-styled Dioc¸se sans frontiers of "Partenia." What can we conclude? Yes, the advent of ARPANET, BITNET, the Internet, the World Wide Web, and the Global Information Infrastructure, are changing in rather fundamental ways the way we interact and view ourselves and each other. Yet, it is far too soon to declare the end of nationalism and parochial identity. The former Yugoslavia demonstrates the extreme localization that occurs in this age of globalization. And the plight of the Kurds, the demands of the Quˇbˇcois, and the radicalism of a small part of Islam all highlight the centrality of identity in today's hyperlinked world. Indeed, global telecommunications will facilitate the reification of these identities.
What's New?
What is new, of course, is the Internet and cheap, instantaneous global communications. The original predecessor to the Internet was ARPANET, which was set up by the US Defense Department to facilitate research among defense researchers and, supposedly, to ensure that the DoD's communications infrastructure could survive a nuclear war, 15 although this last explanation has been contested recently. 16 The conceptual antecedent for the core Internet technology, packet switching, was put forth by Paul Baran, who worked for ARPA and who was concerned precisely with how to ensure that a communications network could continue to function in the event of a nuclear war. He proposed doing this by decentralizing the network, this leading directly to the current semi-anarchical structure of the Internet. 17 Universities first came online in 1969 with the UCLA ARPANET node, and were predominant in the evolving network from then on. The National Science Foundation became a major developer of the communications infrastructure in the 1980s, and eventually ARPANET, BITNET (designed for scholars outside of the sciences), and other networks were rolled into one meta-network called the Internet. The phenomenal growth of the capacities of the Internet can be demonstrated in two ways. First, it is seen in the amount of traffic which can move on the Internet. In the 1970s, ARPANET used 56,000 bits per second links between nodes (the same speed of the credit card size modem I bought last year for my laptop computer). The current technology for the backbone of the Internet moves information at gigabits per second, the equivalent of sending the Library of Congress in one minute. With the phenomenal speed increases have also come conceptual developments in the way we access and interact with information in cyberspace. From text-based, command line interfaces developed ftp (file transfer protocol) with the ability to download files from remote computers and gopher, which, while still text-based, provided a more user-friendly interface. The development of USENET discussion groups made possible some of the first virtual communities (see below) as they allowed people to engage in public, ongoing discussions about just about anything imaginable. The most recent revolution, however, came in late 1993 when the World Wide Web sprung into public consciousness via an article in the New York Times. The Web allows for the transmission of not only text but pictures, sounds, movies, etc. It also provides increasingly more levels of interactivity, as witnessed by the proliferation of online shopping, as well as other less commercial uses. In the past few years the number of sites on the Web has expanded dramatically, almost incomprehensibly, and the number of people who have access to the Internet has expanded equally dramatically, to perhaps 50 million people today. This is less than one percent of the world's population, and the distribution of access reproduces the global distribution of wealth. This is still an immensely large number of people, and does represent an increasingly diverse cross-section of human society, and it will keep growing, such that one author has estimated that in only a few years the online community will be larger than all but the most populous countries:
In five years there will be more network users than citizens of any single country except India or China. What will happen when McLuhan's global village becomes one of the largest countries in the world? Using two-way communications, not broadcast? And crossing boundaries of space, time, and politics? 18
What are the possibilities for the realignment of identity in such a world? How can states keep their citizens' loyalty when the possibilities for one's allegiance become truly global?
So What? New Identities, Old Identities, and Cyberevolution
The Information Age and the telecommunications revolution are making possible three different, yet interrelated, developments with respect to the construction of identity in the (post)modern world. These are the creation of new non-territorially-based identities (or a shuffling of individuals' identity matrices), the strengthening or reification of existing communal identifications, and the facilitating of self-determination movements. These three developments are intimately connected. For example, changing one's identity matrix may involve taking on one or more of the established identities already out there, and this adoption might serve to strengthen (or possibly transform) the existing identity. The process of facilitating a self-determination movement will also probably strengthen the overall communally-held identity and the ties among members of the community.
New Identities
Howard Rheingold, in his path breaking book, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, discusses the new types of identities made possible by the Internet. He foresees significant impacts of the growth of what he calls "Computer Mediated Communication" (CMC). Specifically, CMC or the Internet can facilitate the building of ties and indeed community and culture among individuals in disparate locations in the same town or around the world. For example, he describes the development of the WELL (Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link), which initially brought together people in the San Francisco Bay area electronically, to discuss a wide variety of topics, from parenting to politics. It allowed people who would otherwise never have run across each other to dial-in, join discussions, and form bonds. He describes the WELL, and many other similar spaces, as virtual communities because of the kinds of strong social bonds that are created as a result of CMC. The people do not talk face to face, but they engage in the same kinds of interactions that communities need to be created, flourish, and evolve. When he joined the WELL, Rheingold argues that he was participating in the self-design of a new kind of culture. I watched the community's social contracts stretch and change as the people who discovered and started building the WELL in its first year or two were joined by so many others. Norms were established, challenged, changed, reestablished, rechallenged, in a kind of speeded-up social evolution. 19
What is the basis for his assessment that these virtual communities are, indeed, authentic in some sense? First, he points to the concept of collective goods which communities agglomerate and distribute, and which bind individuals together in communities. These include, according to Marc Smith, social network capital, knowledge capital, and communion. The first are the general benefits one receives from being able to plug into a network of people. The second refers to the vast amount of knowledge that can be found among the members of these virtual communities, and which the members generously share. The third collective good is the real relationships that are formed among people as they band together electronically to discuss issues of vital importance to them, such as parenting or politics. The ties that are formed are no less real because the occur via computer screens rather than face to face communication. 20
Rheingold also points to Ray Oldenburg's idea that there are three main "places" people inhabit-places to live, places of work, and places of conviviality. The last, so-called "third place", refers to the Agora of ancient Greece, the place where people engage in casual conversation which includes not only idle chatter, but also the vital discussion of public issues which affect everybody. These third places, which provide "'psychological comfort and support,'" are receding, and nowhere more than in the US as communities have started to come apart at the seams as a result of mall culture, among other factors. 21 Online communities provide space for these third places, "places of conviviality," virtual Agoras where people can participate in public discussions and engage in many of the other interactions which are necessary for psychological well-being.
Third, Rheingold discusses what he calls the "social contract" which forms in a virtual community. In the WELL, one aspect of this social contract, or the rules governing the relationships between the members, is that nobody is anonymous. There must be some way to attach a real-life identity to the "speakers" in the Agora. Further, in the WELL as in many other places in cyberspace, there is an expectation that one will share what expertise and information one has with other members of a community. 22 That this does, indeed, occur in a multitude of electronic fora indicates the kind of social bonds and expectations that can arise via bits and bytes, without face to face interaction. Indeed, as Benedict Anderson points out, members of communities never have the opportunity to meet most of the other members. These communities are thus "imagined communities": "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the power of their communion." 23 Given that all communities are imagined, constructed in the minds of the members, it is thus not surprising that such communities could appear in cyberspace. In fact, in at least one sense, these online communities might have a better grounding for the members because it relies on interaction, albeit via modem, among the members of the community to create and sustain itself. Most imagined communities rely on shared traditions, history, etc. to create a sense of being. Online communities of the kind I am discussing do not have that sense of history, of course, although the members are in the process of creating history, traditions, norms, and many of the other things that bind people together. Yet, virtual communities have one distinct advantage-the members choose to become and stay members. One is not born into the WELL, for example. Rather, one self-consciously decides to dial-in and confer recognition on the other members as important parts of one's life. While one may come to see another, more traditional type of identity as important as a result of education, family, or other social acculturation, virtual identities are important precisely because of this aspect of choice.
To Rheingold, the WELL "felt like an authentic community... because it was grounded in [his] everyday physical world." 24 That is, since many of the members were from the San Francisco Bay area, they could get together in person, and do all of the things members of other communities do, such as attend weddings, parties, etc. This may indicate that physicality and place will always continue to play an important part of community. Yet, as pointed out, imagined communities in the form of ethnic groups, nations, etc. cannot rely on physical interaction because there are generally too many members who are too dispersed to make this an essentially component of maintaining their identity. In addition, Rheingold, like others, obtained the sense of community and connectedness before the face to face interaction. And, most members of virtual communities will never have the opportunity to meet each other, but will have a feeling of community and connectedness nonetheless. As one of the originators of ARPANET predicted in 1968, "'on-line interactive communities.... will consist of geographically separated members, sometimes grouped in small clusters and sometimes working individually. They will be communities not of common location, but of common interest....'" 25
These new, non-territorial communities and identities will vary in their importance to individuals. This importance will depend upon an individual's existing identities and relationships and the functions such communities carry out. Do they provide an outlet for informal "conviviality"? Do they allow an individual to engage with others of a like mind in discussing important personal issues? Or, do they provide somebody with a core identity which seems to overshadow others? An example of the latter might be the networks of neo-Nazi hate groups which have found the Internet a congenial place to not only spread their hate propaganda, but also to form a more coherent and cohesive sense of identity globally, seeing themselves as the only defenders of their freedom against various worldwide conspiracies. Of course such hate does not need the Internet to propagate itself, but it is convenient, and also allows disparate individuals and groups to coalesce and provide an identity that may be one of the only ones that matter to the members.
This process of realigning identity is what David Elkins refers to as "unbundling." "Bundling" involves taking a bunch of identities together. Territoriality provides a framework for understanding ourselves and our relationships to others, both within our territorially-defined state and outside. There are common elements such as history, tradition, culture, religion, language, ethnicity, etc. which may be present within the bundle called the state, and citizens of these imagined communities take most or all of these together as key aspects of identity. When one goes beyond the territorial state for vital aspects of one's identity, that identity becomes at least partially separated or unbundled from the state. Elkins observes that such unbundling may result in new forms of bundling as identities become realigned and change in import. 26 However, it also makes us realize that our identity, rather than being singular, is multiple, and that perhaps we should talk in terms of a matrix of identities, which include all of those things associated with the territorially state, all too often misidentified as the nation-state, as well as those that have nothing to do with the state or which transcend territoriality and the authority generally considered to be all important in global politics. As, for example, a global Green movement arises, facilitated at least partially by the Internet and other communications technologies, a new type of consciousness or identity forms which goes beyond territoriality and which decreasingly recognizes the state as having a legitimate voice in environmental and other matters. The global Green identity undermines the state's ability to claim authority. It may, however, be more ambiguous than this since a matrix does not make identities mutually exclusive. Indeed, our multiple identities do not have to be bundled in the traditional sense. We can pick and choose from various bundles without having to take everything within any one bundle. One can still recognize common traditions, histories, cultures, etc. of one's territorial/physical home without necessarily acceding to the authority of the state representing the territory in all matters. This might be the case with new types of communities/identities formed as a result of the creation of cyberspace, or computer mediated communication may help to reify existing transnational identities, thus further relocating perceived legitimacy and authority away from the state.
Old Identities
The communications revolution is undermining state authority by helping to "relocate" authority, making new loci of allegiance and authority possible. 27 For example, Thierry Breton provides a fictional account of what he calls a "logical state," "an assemblage of individuals who already share the same interests and aspirations, who subscribe to the same values and are acting toward a common purpose, wherever they might be found on the planet." 28 It is "a supranational community that bears some resemblance to those nations that have been dispersed by historical forces but which have preserved their national identity...." 29 The fictional example that Breton uses is that of a plan by the Vatican to use communications technology in order to link up all Catholics around the world and be able to address them directly all at once. In this way, the authority of Rome could more easily be exercised, and citizens might shift more of their allegiance from the territorial state in which they live to the nonterritorially-bound Catholic logical state. Although this has not happened 30 -- yet -- one could imagine any number of possible candidates for logical states -- other religions, including Islam and Judaism; various transnational ethnic groups, such as the Kurds; or, possibly, even transnational corporations attempting to gain greater allegiance from their far-flung employees. Any attempts to relocate authority in this way could have an extremely destabilizing impact on states as the traditional holders of power and authority, and these territorially-bound units would be hard-pressed to stop this process. The control of territory, which has been an important aspect of sovereignty, may diminish in importance: "as the information revolution makes the assertion of territorial control more difficult in certain ways and less relevant in others, the nature and significance of sovereignty are bound to change." 31 This also raises questions about the relevance, in at least some instances, of territorial, state-based identity.
In fact, the Internet shrinks time and space such that borders "virtually" disappear and appear significantly less relevant to the construction of identities and communities and allegiances. Although it is certainly possible to overstate the degree to which the development of instantaneous global 32 communication relegates borders to the dust heap of history -- certainly access to concrete, life-sustaining resources can still be determined by which side of a fence you are on -- the myths which support the territorial (nation-)state now coexist with, and in some instances are being partially replaced by, other transnational, global myths.
The Vatican Web site 33 is an instance of a transnational community (logical state) using these new capabilities to strengthen an already existing global identity with both territorial and nonterritorial elements. The Vatican is, on the one hand, a territorial state (albeit one with a rather small population) which carries out traditional diplomatic activities, and the Vatican Web site provides news of those activities. On the other hand, the Vatican is also the center of one of the largest global identities which transcends territorial boundaries as well as virtually all other boundaries and identities. It is, in Breton's words, a logical state. Its Web site might represent an attempt by the central authority of that "state" to shore up its authority by making available its positions and edicts and "laws" to the citizens of this state. To the extent that the Vatican can more easily spread it messages to believers it might also more easily be able to exert its authority over its far-flung flock, subverting the authority of states while shoring up one part of 1 billion people's identity matrix.
Partenia, 34 on the other hand, represents a "Virtual Diocese." In fact, it is virtual in two ways. First, it "exists" in cyberspace. Second, it represents a nowhere land, a diocese with no parishioners (in the traditional sense anyway, as opposed to the Vatican which has one permanent inhabitant), where, for centuries, dissident clergy within the Catholic Church have been banished. Partenia as a territorial entity "exists" in the middle of the Saudi Arabian desert. The current bishop of Partenia is Jacques Gaillot, who had been the bishop of Evreux in France until he ran afoul of the Vatican authorities. After being banished (metaphorically) to the middle of the Muslim world, Gaillot set up a Web site ("physically" based in France) from which to communicate with the parishioners 35 in his newly imagined "Dioc¸se sans Fronti¸res" of Partenia, which he describes as "a place of freedom where we can meet one another and speak to each other as if we were on the market place," 36 a virtual Agora where believers who may not necessarily fully accept The Truth as told by the Vatican can explore alternate Truths and variations on the transnational Catholic identity. After his "transfer" to Partenia, Gaillot lived with 150 homeless people (that is, those without a fixed territorial residence/referent) in France and communed with cyber parishioners, using the Internet as a means of resistance and as a way to promote a more open global identity than the one proposed/imposed by the Vatican. In other words, as the Vatican attempts to reify a preexisting transnational identity in an authoritarian manner, Partenia attempts to provide an alternative vision or interpretation of that identity.
What about another transnational global identity numbering about one billion people-Islam? The Internet can, of course, provide outlets for the spread and understanding of Islam globally. It provides access not only to the Koran, but also analysis of the Koran and other sources of Shari'a Law, and much other cultural information. The Internet may be facilitating the reification of Islam, but it is doing it in what may be termed a more democratic way. In the same way that Partenia represents an alternative to Papal orthodoxy, so is the Islamic presence on the Internet presenting non-authoritative discussion and analysis by "self-authorizing authors." 37 That is, while there is a lot of discussion about Islam, it may not be mediated by religious authorities. And, in fact, the Internet is allowing people in some of the strictest Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, to get online and discuss issues such as atheism with others outside of the Saudi Arabia, this in a country where one can be condemned to death for apostasy: "Religion, a temper-raising subject in this region, has found a natural home in cool cyberspace. Internet's anonymity is giving many unprecedented courage to speak their minds without facing any consequences." 38
This is seen as particularly threatening in an area of the world which is characterized by a close relationship between religion and the state, and where many governments are highly authoritarian. For example, "Iraq is not on the Internet, but Iraqis are, and one of the things they do is to represent and extend Iraq into an international 'cyberspace' populated by self-authorizing authors independently of Iraq's formal authorities." 39 That is, Iraqis are able to present a different vision of Iraq, the articulation of which would get any Iraqi thrown in jail. Likewise in Saudi Arabia 40 and Bahrain, 41 where dissidents can speak against the government via the Internet. Authorities perceive a potential threat to traditional values through the Internet (with access to such things as pornography), whereas some dissidents are advocating an even stricter Islamic state via cyberspace. The government of Saudi Arabia wants to control access to the Internet, but like the doomed attempts to create a Virtual Wall of China (see below), the very nature of the Internet makes this a lost cause.
The virtualization of Islam has allowed new voices to be heard and older voices to be heard more widely. The Internet has enabled "a migration of existing messages" from traditional fora such as universities or coffee houses, "chang[ing] the balance of who and what is published." 42 Further, Anderson argues that a particular facet of Islam appears on the Internet. It is not the authoritative pronouncements of the 'ulema or the "popular" Islam of the non-literate masses, but "a more middle-brow Islam associated with a more middling population: its versions range from fundamentalist to liberal." 43 The Internet is thus providing new outlets for new interpretations and "re-intellectualizations of Islam," opening the door for greater contestation across the religious spectrum. For those Islamic or Islamic-oriented states with a particular take on Islam (Sunni/Shi'a, moderate/conservative, secular/religious) this must be rather disconcerting because it allows discussion and debate beyond the bounds imposed or sought by state/religious authorities.
Self-Determination
The process of reifying identities may also include pushing for a different political space for the group, that is, self-determination. The Internet can function as a tool for self-determination in two ways. First, because it can provide access to a wide variety of information across borders to members of the group, it can foster a continuing sense of identity. This is particularly important for dispersed groups such as the Kurds or Tibetans. Second, it can provide a new way to act in the global political realm to lobby on many different fronts for its self-determination claims. Such "cyberdiplomacy" can be important for both territorially-dispersed and territorially-compact groups.
One already established territorially-based community which is using the Internet to further its self-determination goals is the Nation of Hawaii. 44 Hawaii is part of the Fourth World: "Nations forcefully incorporated into states which maintain a distinct political culture but are internationally unrecognized." 45 It uses its Web presence as a way to publicize and gain support for its claims to sovereignty. Two members of the "government" of the Nation of Hawaii, Scott and Kekula Crawford, argue that the swiftly evolving information and communication technologies and networking infrastructure are playing an expanded role in supporting the self-determination of peoples and emergent nations....
Access to information and facilitation of communication provides new and enhanced opportunities for participation in the process of self-determination, with the potential to enhance political, economic, social, educational and cultural advancement beyond the scope of traditional institutions and forms of governance. 46
The Nation of Hawaii provides information on its claim to sovereignty and a vision of what an independent Hawaii might look like (including establishing itself as an international tax haven 47 .
Besides the Web site, which is rather like a broadcast, the Nation of Hawaii and other parts of the Hawaii self-determination movement also have more interactive fora, such as e-mail discussion lists and USENET newsgroups. These include the non-interactive Hawaii Nation Info list, kanakamaoliallies-l, "where lively discussions about Hawaii's self-determination are ongoing," and the soc.culture.hawaii newsgroup. These various fora have "helped many people stay connected to the events of the culture and politics of Hawaii who would have no way to otherwise." 48 They have helped to foster a continuing sense of political and cultural connectedness. As with the other virtual communities discussed above, online communion can be very real and palpable:
The sense of community which forms in the interactive spaces... is really something remarkable. Profound ideas are discussed, visions are shared, strategies are planned, news is spread, and only with technology are these communities able to exist. For a population that has suffered the diaspora of the Kanaka Maoli people, this is one crucial aspect to the cultural renaissance and political movement gaining momentum rapidly in Hawaii and around the world within dispersed communities.
.... The number of part Hawaiians around the world who are now awakening to their heritage is growing steadily, and the Internet provides a primary and unique means for them to engage a community of others with similar interests. 49
This community-building and identity-reifying potential of the Internet could have important political impacts. Such a presence may, paradoxically, represent something which could only have occurred in the Information Age, as well as a traditional sovereignty movement. As Crawford and Crawford note, one key aspect of statehood is the ability carry out international relations. For most submerged groups this is extremely problematic. They do not have the resources nor the access to relevant individuals and institutions to carry out traditional forms of diplomacy or successfully lobby for their independence. The Internet, on the other hand, provides for the ability to engage in "cyberdiplomacy" and "internetional relations" to "initiate and/or develop relations with other governments, both recognized and unrecognized." 50 However, the struggle for Hawaiian sovereignty is still very much a state-centric, territorially-based enterprise. First, the ultimate goal of the movement is for independence from the United States for the Hawaiian islands. Second, the members of the Nation of Hawaii are relatively undispersed. That is, most of them are not in exile or otherwise transnationally dispersed; rather, most of them actually live in Hawaii. Thus, while the Internet may be useful for them to publicize their cause and make contacts with other Fourth World nations, it is not necessarily helping to keep alive a transnational identity.
Two groups that do fall into this category are Tibet and the Kurds. The Tibet Online Resource Gathering 51 has both cultural and political goals, including providing information on the plight of Tibet and serving as a virtual community space for the movement. This movement is dedicated to bringing about substantive negotiations without preconditions between the Chinese and Tibetan Governments, so that they can find a solution which will bring an end to the suffering of the Tibetan people, in accordance with the people's right to self-determination." 52
It provides general historical and cultural information about Tibet, and links to about 250 support groups worldwide. These and other links, as well as several e-mail lists comprise the Barkhor Community Space which might be likened to the virtual Agora alluded to above: "The Barkhor is a meeting place for supporters of Tibet and discussion of Tibet issues. This virtual Barkhor is dedicated to returning the right of free speech and gathering to the actual Barkhor, the traditional city center of Lhasa, capitol of Tibet." 53 It thus provides a space for the transnational maintenance of Tibetan identity and cultural, as well as focusing on the political goal of returning Tibetan rule to Tibet. It provides information on human rights in Tibet, and the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet 54 publishes a vast array of legal material relevant to self-determination for Tibet.
The political project is embodied in the official Web site of the Tibetan Government in Exile. 55 Given the political climate in Tibet, Tibet itself cannot be used as a base from which to launch its self-determination movement (unlike Hawaii). However, the Dali Lama has had significant access to international leaders, and an Internet presence can facilitate getting the word out about his activities and also provide information about how to help the self-determination movement. The Web site provides legal and political information with respect to the status of Tibet, as well as up to date news and cultural information. The current physical capital of the Tibetan government in exile is in Dharamsala, India. The Web site is maintained by the Office of Tibet, the Dali Lama's official representatives in London. This demonstrates the essential irrelevance of territoriality or physical presence for the distribution of information.
Through the Internet, both individuals and officials are attempting to maintain cultural contact and support a self-determination movement. It is using what Knoke calls "placelessness" to support a sense of place. Knoke defines "the Placeless Society as the awakening omnipresence that will allow everything-people, goods, resources, knowledge-to be available anywhere, often instantaneously, with little regard for distance or place." 56 He argues that: "Everywhere, people, money goods, and knowledge flow so effortlessly from point to point that place becomes an irrelevant concept. The world is becoming placeless." 57 Certainly the Internet is contributing to this placelessness. However, paradoxically, it is also contributing to place. For, certainly it is not only the goal of the online Tibetan presence to foster transnational cultural communion, although that is certainly a significant aspect. That cultural communion of the Tibetan imagined community is made possible by, and would, indeed, be nonsensical without, a place-Tibet, physically set at the "rooftop of the world" between China and India. Further, the ultimate goal is to fully regain a place, that is, achieve self-determination for Tibet. This is hardly a "placeless" political project, but it is pursued, partly, by the placelessness of cyberspace which is, in some ways, represents the antithesis of what Tibetans, Hawaiians, and others are striving for.
The Kurds, much more than Tibetans, represent a truly transnational identity. They do not have their own country. 58 Thus the Kurds who live in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria in the region are not refugees 59 but rather the inhabitants of a transnational territory which was carved up into separate states during decolonization. The Kurds have experienced significant repression in all of the countries in which they live and have several active self-determination movements which have engaged in a variety of violent and non-violent activities. A number of Kurdish-related Web sites have appeared recently, among them the Kurdish Information Network, 60 Kurdistan Web, 61 Kurdish Worldwide Resources, 62 Washington Kurdish Institute, 63 and the American Kurdistan Information Network. 64 They all have political as well as cultural aspects. The American Kurdish Information Network hopes to function as a bridge over which friendships and knowledge are exchanged to the benefit of both peoples. Its aim is to increase awareness about the Kurds.... AKIN hopes to become a valuable resource center for policy makers, scholars, and students of the region. At the same time, it seeks to promote understanding between the Kurds and the Americans. In Kurdistan, AKIN wants the killings to stop, peace to prevail, and the will of the people to be respected and accepted. 65
The Kurds have the beginnings of a de facto state in Northern Iraq. At the same time, even if it were to become a recognized state (a highly unlikely occurrence in the foreseeable future), it would not encompass anywhere near the entire Kurdish community. However, various dispersed groups of Kurds have attempted to facilitate the maintenance of the "logical state" known as Kurdistan through, among other things, the Internet, providing common points of contact and sources of instantaneous cultural and political information to its members around the world.
One other entity that is attempting to solidify the Kurdish logical state is MED TV. 66 It is a satellite television channel that broadcasts in Kurdish directly into Kurdish areas. The need for this is plain. In Turkey, for example, broadcasting in Kurdish is prohibited, and many Kurds can only communicate in Kurdish. MED TV allows Kurds to gain access to information in their language. Further, it provides information which might be banned regardless of the language used to transmit it. It thus directly bypasses the controls of the states in which Kurds reside and facilitates the maintenance of an identity which the governments would like to eradicate. That Turkey sees this as a threat in evident in the lengths they and their allies have gone to try to suppress MED TV. Turkey has attempted to tie it to the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) (which MED TV denies), labeling it "PKK TV." In Turkey itself, the government has allegedly harassed sellers of satellite dishes and tortured people who were supposedly watching MED TV. MED TV is licensed in the United Kingdom, and Turkey has attempted to get the British government to suspend its license. In September 1996, police raided MED TV offices in London, Belgium and Germany in search of terrorist related materials. 67
The significance of this may be profound: "It reflects... the problems Turkey has in suppressing Kurdish identity in the age of technology and open borders...." 68 The Internet and satellite broadcasting render borders irremediably permeable. Governments are increasingly unable to prevent the dissemination of information which they view as threatening to the state:
All over the world, currently recognised international boundaries enclose linguistic and ethnic minorities within nation states to which they feel varying degrees of allegiance. It is not only the Turkish government that fears the dissidents and opponents can make use of satellite TV as a powerful new weapon. The impact of images far outweighs the power of radio. In the past, opposition groups have used radio to spread their message, operating out of an extra-territorial base, but the Kurds are the first banned nationalist movement to obtain their own television channel. 69
The examples above have, for the most part, been operating on the fringes of popular consciousness. One instance which has had a direct, public international effect is the case of the Chiapas rebellion in Mexico. This is a case of the poorest of the poor rising up to demand respect and self-determination. At the same time, they have been aided by some of the most high-tech developments. Descriptions of the rebel leader Subcommandante Marcos using a satellite linkup to distribute Zapatista propaganda from the depths of the Mexican jungle have fired the public imagination. While these reports may have been a bit overblown, it is nonetheless the case that the Zapatista cause has been facilitated partly by the global telecommunications revolution. The Chiapas rebellion is a perfect illustration of the uses of the Internet to help indigenous autonomy movements to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the state as they press their case. While reaffirming the primacy of place, the Zapatistas also took their case to the increasingly "placeless" global realm and in the meantime began to "think locally and act globally."
While news agencies reported that Subcommandante Marcos coordinated the rebellion and distributed Zapatista propaganda globally while hunched over a laptop computer with a modem and cellular phone, 70 Harry Cleaver describes a different reality. Disparities in economics are reproduced in access to telecommunications technologies. Thus, those who might be the most likely to want to use the Internet for their self-determination struggles may have the least direct access:
Despite all of the media hype which came with the discovery of the role of cyberspace in circulating Zapatista words and ideas, Subcommandante Marcos is not sitting in some jungle camp uploading EZLN communiques via mobile telephone modem directly to the Internet. Zapatista messages have to be hand-carried through the lines of military encirclement and uploaded by others to the networks of solidarity. Similar problems of access exist within those networks. Many who might be sympathetic to the Zapatistas, e.g., various rural and urban communities of Native Americans, Mexicanos and Chicanos in the U.S. and Canada, have few means to plug into the Net. There, too, access for most people must be mediated by groups of humanitarian or political activists who download EZLN Communiques and upload expressions of solidarity from off-line organizing. 71
Yet, EZLN communiques and other information did escape the Mexican government's attempts to isolate Chiapas, and were uploaded to Web sites, USENET discussion groups, bulletin boards, and e-mail lists. One of these sites is ĮYa Basta!, 72 which, while not an official publication of the Zapatistas, was set up with their approval "to provide reliable information on the Zapatista uprising and serve as a mouthpiece for the Zapatistas in cyberspace." 73 The site's webmaster states that: "The crisis in Chiapas will not be solved in Cyberspace; yet, the Internet can be a powerful tool for activism and information dissemination...." 74 It provides communiquˇs from the Zapatistas and other notices. Other Chiapas related Web sites include: Chiapas Alert Network, 75 Acci—n Zapatista, 76 ZAPNET (Zapatista Net of Autonomy and Liberation), 77 and Zapatistas in Cyberspace. 78 Chiapas95 79 is an e-mail list which distributes information regarding the smuggle in Chiapas as well as in Mexico generally. Chiapas-l 80 has become an important interactive forum for discussion of events in Chiapas. The network of Chiapas-related sites, including those in Italy, 81 the Netherlands, 82 France, 83 and Japan 84 has allowed the Zapatista to bypass governmental censors, in the same way that the precursors to the Internet were designed to survive nuclear war: "When the Mexican state sought to block the flow of information about the uprising in Chiapas it was outflanked every bit as effectively as any Soviet strike might have been. It could keep Televisa from reporting the facts, but it couldn't prevent thousands of independent computer operators from passing them on to all who wanted to know." 85
This has allowed activists worldwide to share information, organize, and pressure their governments and others to respond to the situation. Arguments and counter-arguments appear instantaneously in full public view for all who care to watch or participate in the discussions. All of this helped to fuel the global solidarity with the people in Chiapas and also may have helped pressure the government to negotiate with the Zapatistas and call off a manhunt for Marcos. 86
Cyberspace As Low-Intensity, High-Tech Conflict
The Mexican government is obviously feeling the effects of the Internet and the global telecommunications revolution. 87 As mentioned above, the Turkish government is very worried about MED TV. Also, however, the US government, the very entity that began and nurtured the Internet, is alarmed about the possibilities for "Netwar" on the part of social activists. In 1993, two analysts at the RAND Corporation coined the terms "cyberwar" and "netwar." Cyberwar "refers to knowledge-related conflict at the military level" or "conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to information-related principles. It means disrupting, if not destroying, information and communications systems...." 88 Netwar, on the other hand, applies to societal struggles most often associated with low intensity conflict by non-state actors, such as terrorists, drug cartels, or black market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. .....
Or, to the contrary, it may be waged against the policies of specific governments by advocacy groups and movements, involving, for example, environmental, human-rights, or religious issues. The non-state actors may or may not be associated with nations, and in some cases they may be organized into vast transnational networks and coalitions.
Another kind of netwar may occur between rival nation-state actors.... Some movements are increasingly organizing into cross-border networks and coalitions, identifying more with the development of civil society (even global civil society) than with nation-states, and using advanced information and communications technologies to strengthen their activities. 89
Chiapas may, indeed, be the first example of netwar as the transnational galvanizing potential of the Internet has been used by non-state actors to further the struggle of an autonomy movement against a state. Arquilla and Ronfeldt would probably see vindication of their ideas in the Netwarriors 90 Web site, which focuses on Chiapas, as well as other indigenous struggles.
The prospect of such war by other means is obviously distressing to Arquilla and Ronfeldt. It is also distressing to Charles Swett, an analyst in the US Department of Defense. Swett, who is Assistant for Strategic Assessment, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (Policy Planning), wrote a paper in 1995 entitled "Strategic Assessment: The Internet." 91 He cites, with what one must surmise is alarm, a variety of instances or scenarios where the Internet has been or might be used by activists, pro-democracy forces, human rights campaigners, drug traffickers, and terrorists to further their agendas, both domestically and internationally. He cites an Army report which refers to Chiapas:
...Subcommandante Marco [sic] of the Zapatista National Liberation Army [EZLN] in Mexico utilizes a portable laptop computer to issue orders to other EZLN units via a modem, and to foreign media contacts in order to maintain a favorable international propaganda image. Increasingly, an insurgent or drug trafficking group's access to and utilization of electronic media technology for exploiting the information superhighway will bolster their support networks and enhance their command and control. 92
Swett appears particularly alarmed by the development of the Association for Progressive Computing, 93 a global computer network for progressive activists which provides Internet access, public and private discussion groups, and a variety of other services, such as Inter Press Service, a news service with 200 affiliated journalists and 900 media outlets globally. To demonstrate that it "is clearly a left-wing political organization" he cites many of its discussions on such issues as boycotts, socialism, and the elimination of nuclear weapons. 94 All of this talk obviously worries Swett. He states that: "The Internet is clearly a long term strategic threat to authoritarian regimes, one that they will be unable to counter effectively." 95 Since some of these governments are friendly to the US (like Mexico), this is a situation that must be addressed by the US. Indeed, he puts forth a number of ways the Internet might be used by the Department of Defense, including gathering intelligence, spreading disinformation, psyops (psychological operations), and "unconventional warfare" like sending information "over the Internet to sympathetic groups operating in areas of concern that allows them to conduct operations themselves that we might otherwise have to send our own special forces to accomplish." 96
The US government is taking the potential of the Internet quite seriously and, consequently, so should a wide variety of indigenous groups, self-determination movements, and other social activists. Such groups, it appears, are likely to become targets of psyops and unconventional warfare. They thus need to be on the lookout for virtual infiltrations and attempts to electronically poison their efforts. However, given the current decentralized, distributed, anarchical nature of the Internet, it seems likely that it will continue to be a powerful tool for organizing, consolidating identities, and coordinating social activism, and attempts to stem the flow of information or undermine it may only be partially effective.
The Ambiguous Future for Virtual Identity(s)
Do the few examples discussed above actually represent a new form of agitating for self-determination or preserving the culture of dispersed communities, or are they just more instances of cyberhype? Kani Xulam, from AKIN, while arguing that "the Internet is a great tool to preserve the name and heritage of the Kurds for this generation and for posterity..." also recognizes that much of its target audience is not computer literate and thus their "reach is limited." 97 Certainly many other oppressed and dispersed peoples would be in similar circumstances. These "Fourth World" nations mainly come from the Third World where access to many of these technologies is still severely limited, and thus the benefits of the Internet will be lost on many except, perhaps, those members who have made it to the First World and have been able to gain access to computers and modems.
The Nation of Hawaii, on the other hand, is a "Fourth World" nation in the First World and many of its members do, thus, have access to the requisite technologies. Its e-mail network "is a virtual supplement to an already existing community, and helps to strengthen the identity of that community." 98 One of the driving forces behind this sees great potential for the Internet: "Self-Determination and the Internet...? looks to me like it's going to be: bloodless [and] able to shift the economy." 99 It is obvious that the potential for developing links and sharing information can be empowering and can give a voice to those who, for too long, have been voiceless. However, it seems likely that current global inequities will be reproduced in cyberspace. The vast majority of those who are on-line are in North America and Europe, while those in Africa and Latin America, especially, have little or no access, because of the simple lack of computers and bandwidth, as well as, in some cases, governmental telecommunications policy. Self-determination movements in developed parts of the world will find the Internet an inexpensive way to get out their message, while the vast majority of those who would like to take advantage of these technologies cannot.
Further, while the democratic possibilities of the Internet are significant, they are probably overrated by many. One problem, that of access, has already been mentioned. Further, however, while the information revolution has led us to the current Information Age, the Information Standard 100 has not completely eclipsed other forms of power. That is, while information matters, so do cold hard (if now virtual) cash and the ability to project military might. Thus, while the students at Tienanmen Square were able to undertake their revolution by fax, it was crushed by old-fashioned state police power. Further, there is in attempt (although probably futile) to create what might be described as a Virtual Wall of China, as well as attempts to restrict Internet access in other countries, particularly in East Asia. 101 While the government has embraced the Internet as a communications tool, it has not, at the same time, embraced the democratic, anarchical vision that many of its boosters share. Rather, it wants to control the type of information which might be accessed by its citizens. That is, a territorial entity is trying to control something which is inherently nonterritorial. That this is probably doomed to failure only serves to further underline the ambiguous nature of the possibilities of cyberspace.
Indeed, the role of the Internet in Chiapas demonstrates rather forcefully the inability of states to tame digital communication. And it may be in this type of situation where the potential of the Internet for undermining state authority, and enhancing self-determination movements will be most dramatically illustrated. And, this is where "netwars" will be played out. On the other hand, other types of community building and rebuilding, configuring and reconfiguring, while not appearing on the front (home)page of the New York Times, may have more long-term, if more ambiguous, effects as the identity matrix of individuals and groups becomes increasingly transnational and more complex as a result of the vast possibilities of cyberspace. The process of "unbundling" identity from the state and repackaging it can only be sped up as more of the world logs on.
Note 1: Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992). Back.
Note 2: William Knoke, Bold New World: The Essential Road Map to the Twenty-First Century," (New York: Kodansha International, 1996). Back.
Note 3: Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, [Online], 1993, Available: http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/intro.html. Back.
Note 4: Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). Back.
Note 5: Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, (London: Coronet Books, 1995). Back.
Note 6: William J. Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, Place and the Infobahn, [Online], 1995, Available: Back.
Note 7: Jon Katz, "Digital Citizens," Wired [Online], 5.12 (December 1997), Available: http://www.hotwired.com/special/citizen/. Back.
Note 9: Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1992). Back.
Note 10: Kurt Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty?, (Macmillan, forthcoming 1998). Back.
Note 11: David J. Elkins, Beyond Sovereignty: territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-first Century, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). Back.
Note 12: Negroponte, p. 236. Back.
Note 13: Thierry Breton, The Pentecost Project, Mark Howson, trans., (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1987). Back.
Note 15: Castells, pp. 351-2. Back.
Note 17: Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/3.html. Back.
Note 18: John Quarterman, quoted in Ibid. Back.
Note 19: Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/intro.html. Back.
Note 21: Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/1.html. Back.
Note 22: Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/2.html. Back.
Note 23: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991): 6. Back.
Note 24: Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/intro.html. Back.
Note 25: J.C.R.Licklider, quoted in Rheingold, http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/1.html. Back.
Note 26: David J. Elkins, "Globalization, Telecommunication, and Virtual Ethnic Communities," International Political Science Review 18 (2 1997): 142. Back.
Note 27: I have previously made the following argument elsewhere. See Mills, p. 22. Back.
Note 28: Thierry Breton, The Pentecost Project, Mark Howson, trans., (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1987): 58. Back.
Note 30: However, the Vatican does have its own World Wide Web site (http://www.vatican.va). There you can get Apostolic Exhortations, Apostolic Letters, and Encyclicals, as well as news from the Vatican Information Service. And cerainly the Pope's highly publicized globe-trotting, with its attendant medai coverage, such as his recent trip to Cuba, helps him get a across and single, global message. Back.
Note 31: Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty, p. 7. Back.
Note 32: Of course, there are still many countries, most notably in Africa, which have no Internet access, or where such access is restricted to the expensive hotels which foreign businessmen inhabit. Back.
Note 33: http://www.vatican.va. Back.
Note 34: http://www.partenia.org. Back.
Note 35: Partenia had 92,000 visitors in 1997. http://www.partenia.org/eng/actu.htm. Back.
Note 36: http://www.partenia.org/eng/1_9601e.htm. Back.
Note 37: Jon W. Anderson, "Is the Internet Islam's 'Third Wave' or the 'End of Civilization'?: Globalizing Politics and Religion in the Muslim World" [Online], pepared for delivery at the conference on Virtual Diplomacy sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace, (April 1-2, 1997), Available: http://www.usip.org/oc/confpapers/polrelander.html. Back.
Note 38: Faiza S. Ambah, "Dissidents Tap the 'Net' to Nettle Arab Sheikdom," The Christian Science Monitor [Online], (August 24, 1995), Available: http://www.csmonitor.com. Back.
Note 40: http://saudhouse.com. Back.
Note 41: http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/bahrain/. Back.
Note 44: http://hawaii-nation.org/nation/. Back.
Note 45: Richard Griggs, "The Meaning of 'Nation' and 'State' in the Fourth World," Occasional Paper #18, Center for World Indigenous Studies [Online], (1992), Available: World Wide Web Path: http://www.halcyon.com/FWDP/fourthw.html. Back.
Note 46: Scott Crawford and Kekula Crawford, "Self-Determination in the Information Age," [Online], (May 3, 1995), Available: World Wide Web Path: http://www.cernet.edu.cn/HMP/PAPER/230/html/paper.html. Back.
Note 47: "Overview: An Independent & Sovereign Nation of Hawai`i," [Online], Available: World Wide Web Path: http://hawaii-nation.org/nation/overview.html. Back.
Note 48: Scott Crawford, private e-mail message to the author, February 10, 1998. Back.
Note 50: Crawford and Crawford. In fact, they note the number of United States government representatives from a variety of offices who have signed [the guest book] and let us know that they have visited our site. For each one that has signed in, certainly many others have seen the information and chosen not to register. Because many U.S. government offices now have access to the Web, this seems to be quite an effective medium to share this important information. By signing in to our guest book they are also in a sense acknowledging the legitimacy of what they have seen there. This positive education within the occupying government is essential for a smooth and peaceful transition to restore independence. Back.
Note 51: http://www.tibet.org/. Back.
Note 53: http://www.tibet.org/Barkhor/. Back.
Note 54: http://www.tibeticlt.org/index.html Back.
Note 55: http://www.tibet.com/. Back.
Note 56: Knoke, pp. 20-1. Back.
Note 58: Although the Kurds do have de facto independence in Northern Iraq as a result of the intervention to protect the Kurdish population after the Gulf War. Back.
Note 59: Although the Iraqi Kurds who fled to Iran and the border of Turkey after the Gulf War were refugees. Back.
Note 60: http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/index.html. Back.
Note 61: http://www.Humanrights.de/~kurdweb/. Back.
Note 62: http://www.kurdish.com/. Back.
Note 63: http://www.clark.net/kurd/. Back.
Note 64: http://www.kurdistan.org/. Back.
Note 65: http://www.kurdistan.org/aboutakin.html. Back.
Note 66: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/intro.htm. Back.
Note 67: Ian Black, "Police Raid Kurdish TV in London," originally published in The Guardian, (September 20, 1996) [Online], Available: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/guardian.htm; originally published in Index on Censorship (Spring 1996) [Online], Available: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/impact/intro.htm. Back.
Note 68: Aliza Marcus, "Kurdish TV from Britain is Nationalist Voice," originally published by Reuters (May 15, 1995) [Online], Available: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/impact/showtime.htm; "Torture to Those Who Watch MED-TV," originally published in Yeni Politika (June 18, 1995) [Online], Available: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/impact/torture.htm. Back.
Note 69: Catherine Drucker, "Kurdish Voices From the Sky," originally published in the Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, (May 3, 1995) [Online], Available: http://www.med-tv.be/med/www/impact/voices.htm. Back.
Note 70: "Marcos on the Internet," The Christian Science Monitor [Online], (Feb. 27, 1995), Available: http://www.csmonitor.com. Back.
Note 71: Harry Cleaver, "The Zapatistas and the Electronic Fabric of Struggle," [Online], (November 1995), Available: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/cleaver/zaps.html. Back.
Note 72: http://www.ezln.org/. Back.
Note 73: http://www.ezln.org/about.html. Back.
Note 75: http://www.stewards.net/chiapas/10.htm. This site, includes, among other things, an automated letter writing campaign which, at the click of a button, allows you to send a message to the heads of the NAFTA governments regarding the situation in Chiapas. Back.
Note 76: http://www.utexas.edu/students/nave/. Back.
Note 77: http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/~zapatistas/index.html. Back.
Note 78: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html. This may be the most comprehensive guide to Zapatista online resources. Back.
Note 79: http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/chiapas95.html. Back.
Note 80: gopher://profmexis.sar.net:70/11/foros/chiapas-l. Back.
Note 81: http://www.ecn.org/la.strada/; http://www.ipsnet.it/chiapas/; http://www.ecn.org/ezln-it/; http://vivaldi. nexus.it/commerce/tmcrew/chiapas/chiapas.htm. Back.
Note 82: http://www.dds.nl/~noticias/prensa/zapata/. Back.
Note 83: http://www.anet.fr/~aris/zapata.html. Back.
Note 84: http://clinamen.ff.tku.ac.jp/EZLN/INDEX.html. Back.
Note 86: Cleaver; "Marcos on the Internet." Back.
Note 87: In response, the Mexican government has created Web sites with positive information about the government and the country. Cleaver. Back.
Note 88: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar Is Coming!" [Online], (1993), Available: http://gopher.well.sf.ca.us:70/0/Military/cyberwar. Previously published in Comparative Strategy 12 (2 1993): 141-65. Back.
Note 90: http://www.hookele.com/netwarriors/. Back.
Note 91: Charles Swett, "Strategic Assessment: The Internet" [Online], (July 17, 1995), Available: http://www.fas.org/cp/swett.html. Back.
Note 92: Ibid. It is interesting to note that if the previous description of Marcos having to get his pronouncements to the outside world via conventional means rather than by modem is correct, perhaps the US Army does, indeed, need to upgrade its information and "cyberwar" capabilities. Back.
Note 93: http://www.apc.org/. Back.
Note 94: However, since he did not actually join, he points out that it was "difficult to assess the nature and extent of its members' actual real-world activities." Perhaps he did not want to spend US government money on what he considers to be a subversive organization. Back.
Note 96: One might imagine the US government e-mailing Kurds or other Iraqi dissidents information whch could be used to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Or, consider how much more effective the Contras could have been if they had been armed with laptops in addition to M-16s. Back.
Note 97: Kani Xulam, private e-mail message to the author, March 25, 1996. Back.
Note 98: Scott Crawford, private e-mail message to the author, March 27, 1996. Back.
Note 99: Kekula Crawford, private e-mail message to the author, March 28, 1996. Back.
Note 100: See Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty. Back.
Note 101: Sheila Teft, "China Attempts to Have It's Net and Censor It Too," The Christan Science Monitor [Online], (August 5, 1996), Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/; Arslan Malik, "The Internet and CNN Won't (Soon) Free China," The Christan Science Monitor [Online], (August 15, 1997), Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/; Joshua Gordon, "East Asian Censors Want to Net the Internet," The Christan Science Monitor [Online], (November 12, 1996), Available: http://www.csmonitor.com. Back.
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