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Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the MTCR: a Ten Year Review *
International Studies Association
March 19-23, 1998
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Introduction
A number of arms control and nonproliferation successes have been attained since the end of the Cold War, particularly concerning nuclear and chemical nonproliferation; less progress has been made in the areas of biological nonproliferation and conventional arms control. 1 Ballistic missiles, because of their nuclear weapon delivery capability, are systems of concern to nonproliferationists, and curbing missile proliferation is an important goal for the nonproliferation regime. 2 This article examines efforts aimed at containing ballistic missile proliferation, 3 efforts that gained prominence with the formal establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987.
The basic premise behind the MTCR is that denying technology to missile seeking states can stop, or slow the pace of, missile programs in these states. The technology control approach to curbing missile proliferation is made more effective by the fact that producing missiles is an expensive endeavor, costing hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. 4 Supplier controls restricting the availability of technology further increase the costs of a missile program, and as a result governments are hard pressed in making the financial allocations required for missile development. The missile nonproliferation regime has also been successful in the short term because the threat of sanctions has caused potential missile suppliers to refrain from missile exports.
After making a promising start, the MTCR has reached its limits in terms of affecting missile proliferation. The MTCR has been successful in creating norms against missile technology sales, and as a result missile sales and missile technology exports by the primary suppliers have been largely halted. The MTCR has had only modest success in halting missile production among developing nations. Since the MTCR was formally announced in 1987, six states considering missile programs - Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan - curbed their missile aspirations. However, missile development continues in five other states - India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran - and the MTCR is unlikely to stop these programs.
The greatest limitation of the present missile nonproliferation regime stems from its exclusive supply-side focus. Regimes, in general, are defined as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor-expectations converge in a given area.' 5 Supply-side regimes may be defined as those that seek to create norms among the suppliers of a particular product or system. The missile nonproliferation regime is comprised largely of the MTCR. This regime is a supply-side regime since its membership is centered exclusively around a cartel of suppliers who have a common understanding on not exporting missile-related technology.
It is worth noting the fundamental difference between the missile nonproliferation regime and the nuclear, biological and chemical nonproliferation regimes. The missile nonproliferation regime relies primarily on MTCR prescribed supplier controls. The nuclear, biological and chemical nonproliferation regimes include a supply-side component, 6 but function primarily through regional and international treaties that legally commit nations to not seek Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. States signing the NPT or regional nuclear free zone treaties in Latin America, the South Pacific, and Africa, renounce the possession of nuclear weapons; states signing the CWC agree not only to refrain from acquiring chemical weapons but also to destroy existing stockpiles. These regional and global arms control treaties derive their effectiveness through a logic of collective action, whereby states refrain from acquiring WMDs with some degree of confidence that their neighbors would undertake similar actions; neighboring states in turn reciprocate. 7 This dynamic of reciprocal restraint from WMDs, backed by inspections to verify compliance, enhances the security of all parties, and has thereby successfully persuaded a large number of WMD-capable states to renounce WMD programs. Lacking an overarching treaty, the missile nonproliferation regime's prospects for tackling presently unaddressed issues on the missile nonproliferation agenda, such as seeking the elimination of existing missile forces, are limited. The short-term successes achieved during the MTCR's first ten years may well be overshadowed by its long-run failures that will be manifest over the next decade.
This article begins with a survey of early developments in the field of missile proliferation and the establishment of the MTCR, and then reviews the implementation of the MTCR. Finally, an assessment of the missile nonproliferation regime is undertaken, focusing on two issues - first, the implications of the process of the MTCR's formation for further expansion of the regimeÕs scope and domain; and second, the role of supplier controls in curbing the missile aspirations of nations, and the utility of technology embargoes as a nonproliferation tool. The four main conclusions of this analysis are that first, technology controls are often necessary but rarely sufficient as arms control tools. Second, the MTCR has reached the limits of its originally intended scope and domain. Supplier controls have halted some missile programs but are unable to curb existing and continuing missile programs. Third, the exclusive initial focus on supplier controls has led to the neglect of other components of the missile nonproliferation regime; political and institutional inertia has hindered movement towards enlarging the scope and domain of the missile nonproliferation regime. Fourth, missile nonproliferation efforts centered around the MTCR must be supplemented with regional or global missile nonproliferation treaties having a broad scope in order to tackle the important remaining issues on the missile nonproliferation agenda.
Early Developments in the Field of Missile Proliferation and the Formation of the MTCR
In the 1950s and 1960s, few restrictions were placed on the transfer of nuclear and space technology between states - instead, technology sharing (through programs such as the Eisenhower administration's 'Atoms for Peace' initiative) was stressed by both the East and West blocs. From the early 1960s onwards, the US transferred technical data on sounding rockets and space launch vehicles (the equivalent of short-range and intermediate-range missiles respectively) as well as complete sounding rockets to other NATO members, and to Argentina, Brazil, India, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan and Taiwan; the former Soviet Union and West European states undertook similar technology transfers. 8 In addition to their space-technology transfers, both superpowers exported short-range ballistic missiles. Washington transferred 120 km range Lance missiles to its NATO allies, and supplied 40 km range Honest John artillery rockets to South Korea and Taiwan, while Moscow supplied Scud missiles to its Warsaw Pact allies and to clients in the Middle East. It should be noted that Washington and Moscow also aided longer-range missile programs of their close allies. Washington assisted missile projects in Britain and France, and has actually transferred a strategic missile--the Trident--to the UK; Moscow supplied assistance to Chinese ballistic missile programs in the 1950s.
From the early 1970s onwards, the liberal US policy on sharing and transferring nuclear, space and missile technologies gradually became more restrictive, for both commercial and national security reasons. The Nixon administration's decision to sell production licenses of a Delta space launch vehicle to Japan was denounced in Congress as a sacrifice of US technology; the ensuing debate in Congress eventually led to the promulgation of a revised export control policy - NSDM 187. This Congressional act drastically reduced US cooperation with foreign rocket programs in order to protect US commercial interests in space launch services and to shield the Space Shuttle project. In the mid-1970s, Washington also began limiting missile sales; for example, it denied Israeli requests made after the 1973 Yom Kippur war for the 1,000 km range Pershing I missile, and instead supplied Israel with the 120 km range Lance missile. 9
In the period 1978-81, four events that illustrated the potential of non-industrialized nations to build missiles greatly increased concerns in US policy making circles about the growing availability of and interest in rocket technology. These events included South Korea's 1978 test of a surface-to-surface missile; Iraq's bid to purchase rocket stages from Italy, discovered in 1979; India's launch of a satellite in 1980; and a German firm's (unsuccessful) test of a rocket stage in Libya in 1981. 10 In October 1982, under a revised export control policy, NSDM-187, US cooperation with foreign rocket programs was greatly constrained. In November 1982, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 70 (NSDD-70) calling for the investigation of ways to control missile proliferation. 11 That year, Washington initiated talks with other G-7 members on the subject of missile proliferation; these talks led to the informal establishment of a missile technology control regime in 1985. In April 1987, the existence of the MTCR was publicly announced; by targeting nuclear weapon delivery systems (i.e. ballistic missiles), the MTCR was intended to complement and further strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The MTCR was not formed as an international treaty; rather, the MTCR represented a political understanding among its members to restrict their exports of missiles and missile technology according to MTCR guidelines. The MTCR Annex specifies two categories of items whose transfer is to be restricted. Category I comprises (1) complete systems including rocket systems (ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicles (cruise missiles and drones), and (2) complete sub-systems (rocket engines, guidance systems, re-entry vehicles). MTCR members undertake to deny requests for the transfer of these items, except in rare occasions and given binding end-use assurances from the recipient. Category II items include dual-use technologies with a wider range of commercial applications, such as propellants and guidance equipment. The transfer of these items is reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and is subject to less stringent restrictions than Category I items. The MTCR's implementation, and the degree to which it acquires legal force, differs from state to state according to the national legislation and export control procedures of its members.
| Year | Total # of Members | # Entrants in a Year | Nations Entering Regime in Each Year |
| 1987 | 7 | 7 | Canada, (West) Germany, France, Italy, Japan, UK, US |
| 1990 | 13 | 6 | Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Australia, Denmark |
| 1991 | 18 | 5 | Norway, New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, Finland |
| 1992 | 22 | 4 | Portugal, Switzerland, Ireland, Greece |
| 1993 | 25 | 3 | Iceland, Argentina and Hungary |
| 1995 | 28 | 3 | Russia, South Africa, Brazil. |
| 1997 | 29 | 1 | Turkey |
*MTCR non-members who formally adhere to the regime include Israel, China, Romania, Ukraine, and South Korea.
The implementation of the MTCR's export control provisions was intended to result in the halting of missile sales to, and the curbing of missile programs in, target states. Two areas where the MTCR was recognized as being inadequate were its ineffectiveness on the programs of states such as India and Israel that had an existing independent technological capability to construct rockets, and its failure to offer incentives for countries seeking to buy or build missiles to abandon these activities. 12 A further vital aspect of missile proliferation, the elimination of existing missile forces of some twenty states, was not addressed by the MTCR. In this respect, we note that (excluding missile programs that were suspended or scrapped in the 1990s, and excluding the nearly-retired Lance missiles kept in storage by NATO members) tactical ballistic missiles are found in the following states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen possess Soviet or North Korean supplied 70 km range Frogs, 300 km range Scuds, 500-800 km range modified-Scuds, 120 km range SS-21s or 500 km range SS-23s. Chinese supplied missiles are found in Iran (150 km range M-7), Saudi Arabia (2,500 km range CSS-2) and Pakistan (300 km range M-11s), and may also have been transferred to Syria (600 km range M-9). Israel has US-supplied 120 km range Lance missiles (near-retirement, in storage) and indigenously built 500 km range Jericho I and 1,500 km range Jericho II missiles. India's indigenously built 150-250 km range Prithvi missiles are in production but have not yet been deployed. 13
The Implementation and Expansion of the MTCR.
A key feature of the MTCR's expansion and implementation is the dominant role played by the superpower behind its creation, i.e. the US. In its initial years, the MTCR was composed only of the G-7, and left out three important groups of suppliers: non-G-7 European Union (EU) states; non-Western suppliers such as the former Soviet Union and China; and developing nations that were potential second-tier suppliers of missile technology. In the ten year period since the MTCR's formal establishment, the most important suppliers of missile technology have acceded or adhered to the MTCR. In addition, numerous second-tier suppliers have been persuaded to scrap their space or missile programs. A combination of domestic and external political and economic factors, complemented by US pressure and incentives to comply with the MTCR, lie behind the above mentioned MTCR successes. The MTCR has been moderately successful in affecting the missile programs of target states.
Primary suppliers: Western Europe, Russia and China
In the late 1980s, three events - Iran and Iraq's use of missiles against each others' cities in 1987-88, China's sale of 2,500 km range CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia, and increasing knowledge about the joint Argentina-Egypt-Iraq Condor missile project - heightened concerns about missile proliferation, and in turn spurred on efforts to expand the MTCR. A major early priority for the MTCR members was to bring all EU nations into the MTCR before the removal of intra-EU trade barriers. European governments generally appreciated the value of the MTCR, especially because of the proximity of Europe to (and consequent missile threat from) North Africa and the Middle East, and therefore acceded to the regime. Despite joining the MTCR, European states were initially inclined to continue their space technology exports. For example, in late 1989, overriding US objections, France insisted on proceeding with the sale of liquid fuel technology to Brazil's space agency, a contract which was eventually suspended in 1991 after protracted negotiations with Washington.
Moscow was initially reluctant to join the MTCR because it disagreed with the regime's exclusive focus on technology denial, having itself been subject to a technology embargo under CoCom. 14 Moscow supported a supplier controls, but desired that these be supplemented with a broader technology-transfer regime such as a World Space Organization that would link 'states with the advanced technological base of missile production' with 'countries interested in obtaining access to space.' 15 By 1990, on account of a greater thaw in US-Soviet relations, because of continued US pressure to comply with the MTCR, 16 due to the detrimental political and diplomatic consequences arising from the use of Soviet-supplied missiles, and because Soviet territory was increasingly falling within range of ballistic missiles originating in the Middle East, Moscow became more supportive of the MTCR. 17 In June 1990, the then-Soviet Union agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines. Moscow's formal membership into the MTCR was delayed because of problems in intelligence sharing between Moscow and the West, and because of Moscow's space technology exports. In 1990-92, Russia sought to transfer cryogenic rocket engines to India, which resulted in the imposition of US trade sanctions against Russian and Indian space agencies in May 1992. 18 When Russia suspended the contract in 1993, US sanctions were lifted. 19 Eventually, a negotiated settlement allowing the transfer of cryogenic engines to India (without the related technology) led to Washington finally approving Russia's membership in June 1995.
China initially stayed out of the MTCR for a number of economic and ideological reasons. In the late 1980s, China's defense ministry was pursuing the development of M-series missiles specifically for export. Beijing also preferred to maintain sovereignty and control over all aspects of its arms trade and declared that it was in no way less responsible than the West in its approach to arms sales. 20 Further, Beijing expressed annoyance at being asked to conform to rules when it was left out of negotiations that created these regulations. Finally, Beijing questioned the rationale behind restricting trade only in ballistic missiles when trade in another nuclear weapon delivery system - military aircraft - was not restricted. US pressure on China (in the form of trade sanctions, such as those imposed in June 1991 against the sale of high-speed computers and satellite parts to China) and the boom of the Chinese economy (which made China less reliant on arms sales as a source of revenue) caused Beijing to reconsider its position towards the MTCR. 21 Generally speaking, Chinese participation in global nonproliferation regimes has been steadily increasing from the early 1990s onwards. The post-Mao Chinese leadership was committed to making sure China's voice was heard in the world community, and China realized that arms control was going forward with or without Chinese participation; further, one of China's historical complaints about arms control has been that the rules have been made by the great powers and then imposed on the rest of the world, and therefore the Chinese were deliberately becoming involved in nonproliferation regimes in order to reverse the previous pattern. 22
In late 1991, Beijing agreed to conditionally support the MTCR; in February 1992, China provided an adherence commitment in writing to Washington. In June 1992, Washington lifted missile-related sanctions against China. Despite publicly stating its adherence to the MTCR, China appears to have proceeded with the sale of M-11 missiles (and possibly missile components and manufacturing equipment) to Pakistan, and may also have transferred M-9 missiles and missile components to Syria. 23 China had negotiated these agreements with Pakistan and Syria before it agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, and thus was reluctant to lose foreign exchange and credibility by canceling the contracts. These Chinese missile transfers may thus be regarded as one-time exceptions to China's pledge to halt its ballistic missiles exports.
Target States - MTCR successes.Since the MTCR's advent, six states - Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa and Egypt - have curbed their ballistic missile development aspirations. Further, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa have gone on to become MTCR members, thus strengthening the regime. A number of domestic and external political and economic factors, as well as MTCR restrictions and US pressure, were behind the cancellation of the above mentioned missile programs.
Argentina and Brazil embarked upon missile programs from the early 1980s onwards for national security reasons (stemming from mutual threat perceptions between the two states) and also with the intention of acquiring foreign exchange from missile exports. In 1984, Argentina embarked on the Condor II missile project in collaboration with Egypt and Iraq, and with German and Italian firms. Brazil's missile program was undertaken in the 1980s by two firms - Orbita, which worked on MB/EE-150, -350, -600 and -1000 missiles based on Sonda sounding rockets, and Avibras, which was developing SS-300 and SS-1000 missiles (numbers correspond to the system's range in kilometers).
A transition to civilian democratic regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s played an important role in Argentina and Brazil's eventual decision to scrap their missile programs. Civilian governments placed greater emphasis on economic reforms than on military power, and were therefore willing to curb missile programs. The newly installed civilian governments also undertook a number of confidence building initiatives (particularly nuclear confidence building agreements signed in 1990-91) that greatly improved bilateral relations, thereby removing the national security reasons for continuing with missile programs.
Further, difficulty in obtaining the necessary technology (due to MTCR restrictions) considerably hindered the missile programs of Argentina and Brazil and raised the costs of production. The Condor project was hampered by the failure to develop accurate guidance systems, and the missile reportedly failed a launch test. Brazil's missile programs encountered technical difficulties in building guidance and control components, liquid fuel propulsion systems, and the technology for igniting and separating rocket stages. 24 A decrease in the demand for missiles after the Iran-Iraq war further reduced the economic viability and profit-making potential of these missile projects. US diplomatic pressure on Argentina and Brazil caused economic aid (in the form of investment, technology and credit from the West) to be linked to a reduction in their military budgets and the scrapping of their missile programs, measures which civilian governments were willing to undertake for reasons cited above.
Argentina announced the suspension of the Condor II project in April 1990, and finally declared the termination of the project in May 1991. Argentina then adopted export controls consistent with MTCR guidelines in April 1992, and turned over to Spain components from the Condor II program for destruction; Argentina's application for membership was approved by MTCR member states in March 1993. 25 While Brazil continues to develop artillery rockets (Avibras produces and exports the SS-series of rockets, having ranges varying from 30- 80 km), Brazil scrapped its ballistic missile programs and announced its desire to adhere to MTCR guidelines in December 1994. In Brazil's case, two additional factors were influential in its final decision to accede to the MTCR - the need to acquire technology for its VLS space launch vehicle (the MTCR technology embargo had brought this project to a virtual standstill), and Brazil's desire to be seen as a responsible international actor because of its aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 26 Brazil formally acceded to the MTCR in October 1995, retaining its space program which now avails of and benefits through technology transfers from MTCR members.
South Africa's missile development activities involved the 500-1000 km range 'Arniston' missile; this program was undertaken in the mid-late 1980s largely out of national security considerations. The South African firm Armscor was involved in the development of these missiles (resembling Israel's Jericho missiles); three missile flight tests were conducted in 1989-90. Armscor continued with missile development even after South Africa halted its nuclear program, and eventually transfered its defense subsidiaries to a civilian company - Denel - in 1992. Denel pursued further development of the Arniston as a satellite launch vehicle. After spending some $55 million on this project, Denel announced its termination in June 1993, claiming that it was uneconomic. 27
Another underlying reason behind the scrapping of Pretoria's missile program related to improvements in regional security. The improved security situation led to South Africa's signing the NPT in 1991, and also made Pretoria more willing to halt its missile activities when confronted with US pressure on the issue. South Africa's decision to join the MTCR must also be seen as part of its desire to be viewed as a responsible international actor and its resulting active and fruitful involvement in the international nonproliferation regime in the post-apartheid period. For example, South Africa played a critical and invaluable role as a mediator and consensus-builder between the Nonaligned and Western blocs at the May 1995 NPT Extension Conference.
Egypt currently produces 80 km range Sakr-80 artillery rockets, but has curbed its other ballistic missile development efforts on account of financial constraints, technology embargoes and Washington's disapproval. In addition to its involvement in the Condor II project, Egypt planned to indigenously manufacture Scud-type missiles. Iranian interest and funding, technology transfer from North Korea, from German and Italian firms and via a US-based supplier, all supported Egypt's (now curbed) missile programs. 28
South Korea restricted its missile development activities (involving 150-250 km range upgraded Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles) not because of technology embargoes but largely on account of pressure from Washington. Seoul flight tested the Nike-Hercules missile (later designated NHK-1 and NHK-2) in the surface-to-surface mode in 1978. After this test, South Korea pledged, under a 1979 bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Washington, to constrain its missile development to missiles with ranges under 180 km. In 1990 Seoul agreed to US inspections of NHK-2 missiles to verify their 180 km range limit, and also pledged to not develop satellite launch vehicles. In 1995, Seoul requested abandonment of the 1979 MOU and sought to build longer range missiles to counter North Korea's missile activity, a request that Washington denied. 29 For similar reasons, Seoul has restricted its satellite launch vehicle activity. Although it launched indigenously built KSR-I sounding rockets in 1993, Seoul has curbed its more ambitious satellite launch vehicle aspirations (which would have generated the equivalent of an intermediate range missile).
Taiwan's missile-related activities have been restricted to the production of 'Sky Bow II' surface-to-air missiles. Taiwan terminated its plans to produce 100 km range 'Green Bee' missiles (resembling the Lance missile) and 1,000 km range 'Sky Horse' missiles largely because of US diplomacy and MTCR restrictions. In addition, upon observing the effects of the MTCR in raising the economic and political costs of rocket development programs in other nations, Taiwan's policy makers decided to not pursue a satellite launch vehicle program; instead, Taiwan opted to restrict its space program to building satellites. 30
Target States - MTCR limitations
The missile nonproliferation regime has had little success in halting the missile programs of Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. The MTCR's founders themselves recognized that technology controls would not affect Israel and India's missile programs; no other components of the missile nonproliferation regime (such as diplomacy or security guarantees) have halted missile development in any of the five above mentioned states. India, Israel and Pakistan do, however, comply (officially or unofficially) with the MTCR's norms against missile exports.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Israel transferred missile technology to South Africa, Taiwan, Iran and China primarily for financial reasons (income from missile technology transfers was a revenue source from which Israel financed its military expenditures). 31 The lack of new customers for Israel's missile technology and the risk of curtailment of US-Israeli cooperation in the aerospace sector (as a result of sanctions that would be required under US export control legislation) eventually persuaded Tel Aviv to declare its adherence with the MTCR. Israel has applied for MTCR membership; its missile force that includes 500 km range Jericho I and 1,500 km range Jericho II missiles remains intact.
Technology embargoes have had little effect on India's fairly advanced missile program, which in its early years borrowed technology and human resources from India's space program, but has thereafter operated independently from the space program. The Agni's first stage is a 9-ton solid-fuel rocket adapted from India's SLV-3 satellite launch vehicle, which was in turn based on the US' Scout satellite launch vehicle of 1960s vintage. The Agni's second stage is a liquid fuel system similar to the Prithvi. (The Prithvi's propulsion system is similar to that of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile). The Agni has been flight tested to a distance of 1,400 km, well short of its announced 2,500 km range. India's space program aims to launch its locally built satellites with indigenously built launch vehicles - the PSLV (flight tested four times to date) and the GSLV. Although these launch vehicles are inappropriate for use as ballistic missiles, their range and payload capabilities correspond to those for 8000 km range ballistic missiles. India plans to deploy one hundred of its indigenously produced 150-250 km range Prithvi missiles, which have been flight-tested sixteen times from 1988 onwards. India's 2,500 km range Agni missile was flight-tested three times between 1989 and 1994 before the project was suspended in December 1996, primarily for political and financial reasons rather than on account of technology embargoes. India's policymakers, however, remain under domestic pressure to continue further development of the Agni.
Pakistan's missile program has only partially been affected by the MTCR - Pakistan indigenously built and tested 100 km range Hatf-1 and 300 km range Hatf-2 missiles from a design based on France's Dauphin and Eridan sounding rockets, but has not tested longer range Hatf-3 missiles. 32 Pakistan's Hatf missiles may not be mass produced if Pakistan instead opts to deploy its 300 km range M-11 missiles, which have been transferred to Pakistan from China and are kept unassembled in storage.
North Korea has indigenously manufactured hundreds of 300 km range Scud-B and longer range modified-Scud missiles; it has also tested the 1,000 km range Nodong I missile, which is built around a cluster of four Scud motors. 33 North Korea's missile exports were an important source of revenue for its government; missile exports on the order of $500 million constituted an important fraction of North Korea's GNP, which is $25-30 billion annually. North Korea supplied Iran with one hundred Scud-Bs in 1987-88 for approximately $ 3 million each; most were fired on Iraq in the 1988 'War of the cities.' Later Iran obtained additional North Korean Scud-Cs (600 km range) for $2.4 million apiece. 34 The North Korean missile program is of particular concern because, besides its security implications for Northeast Asia, North Korean missiles have been (and are likely to continue to be) exported in large quantities. While North Korea's missile sales have been temporarily suspended in recent years, Pyongyang has not responded positively to US initiatives calling for its compliance with global missile nonproliferation norms; North Korean missile sales may well resume in the future. 35
Iran has been the recipient of missiles from North Korea, and has indigenously produced 50 km range 'Oghab' and 130 km range 'Iran-130' artillery rockets. In addition, Iran has been undertaking the development of longer range Scud and Nodong I-type missiles with North Korean assistance; these missiles would enable Iran to launch attacks on Israel. 36 One additional case illustrating the MTCR's limitations is that of Iraq. Technology controls did not prevent Iraq from flight-testing a satellite launch vehicle in 1989; nor did they prevent Iraq from indigenously modifying and greatly extending the range of its imported Scud missiles, enabling them to strike Israel during the Gulf War.
Assessing the supply-side approach to curbing missile proliferation. 1,000 km range Nodong I missile, whic
In assessing the successes and failures of the missile nonproliferation regime and of the supply-side approach to arms control, two issues are relevant. First, an analysis of how the process of the MTCR's formation and development affects prospects for the consolidation and further expansion of the missile nonproliferation regime is undertaken. This analysis sheds light on the regime's scope, domain, and its capacity to deal with remaining issues on the missile nonproliferation agenda. Second, an examination of the importance of technology controls in national decisions on curbing missile programs is undertaken - this has implications on the issue of whether technology embargoes are necessary or sufficient as an arms control tool.
The MTCR's development and future prospects: Institutional Strategy, Domain and Scope.
A regime's domain is similar to the breadth of an international organization - it is the number of member states in the regime. A broader conceptualization of a regime's domain would include states that conform to the regime. In the ten years since its inception, the MTCR's membership (domain) has greatly increased from seven to twenty-nine members. The MTCR's actual domain is slightly larger - almost all other potential missile suppliers either formally adhere to the regime or informally comply with its principles. The only two potential suppliers holding out against the MTCR's norms are Iran and North Korea.
The scope of the missile nonproliferation regime, i.e. the issues covered by the regime, has not significantly changed since its formation. In general, a regime's scope (analogous to the depth of an international or regional organization) may be of three types - comprehensive, complete or partial. A regime with a comprehensive scope covers a number of interrelated or similar issue-areas. For example, a comprehensive WMD nonproliferation regime would incorporate the nuclear, chemical, biological and missile arms control regimes under a single umbrella organization. A regime's scope is complete when the regime address all aspects of a given issue-area. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is de facto complete, and the unification under a single umbrella organization of all its components, including the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, would represent the de jure completion of this regime. A regime's scope is considered to be partial if the regime is concerned with only a few aspects of an issue-area. The missile nonproliferation regime is a partial regime, because only one aspect of the issue - controlling the transfer of missile technology - is presently addressed by the regime. Other aspects of the issue, such as the creation of norms or a legally binding treaty against missile possession, are non-existent in the missile nonproliferation regime.
Since the MTCR's inception, two minor expansions of the regime's scope have taken place. First, the MTCR's technical parameters have been extended; MTCR restrictions now cover a wider range of dual-use technologies and a broader category of missiles. Initially, missiles able to deliver a payload of 500 kg to a distance of 300 km fell within the scope of the MTCR; by mid-1993 the regime's technical parameters changed to include all missiles intended for delivery of weapons of mass destruction. This extended scope unambiguously covers missiles such as the Chinese M-11 and the Russian SS-21, which are officially declared as having ranges under 300 km, but which can carry lighter payloads to distances greater than 300 km. 37
Second, ad hoc measures to eliminate existing missiles have been undertaken through two separate initiatives. First, a provision that requires states entering the MTCR to destroy their missile forces led Hungary to destroy some 50 Scud missiles, while South Africa and Argentina destroyed their prototype missiles and related production equipment. US financing pays for these missile-destruction projects. Ukraine and (to some extent) South Korea remain reluctant to destroy their existing missiles, and therefore have not been granted MTCR membership. Second, Washington has commercially acquired small quantities of Scud missiles from East European states, and used them in missile defense tests.
Overall, however, the missile nonproliferation regime's scope has remained restricted to supplier controls. Consolidating the missile nonproliferation regime and expanding its scope to form a more complete regime are the two remaining issues that the MTCR's members will encounter in the near term.
Washington's role in the MTCR's formation illustrates a central argument made by hegemonic stability theory, which notes that a dominant superpower (the hegemon) supplies leadership and resources that provide the impetus for forging consensus among states, thus leading to regime formation. 38 The MTCR's consolidation may well be assured for the short term - while Washington's leadership was instrumental in the MTCR's establishment and expansion, US leadership may not be absolutely essential for the MTCR's continuation. Although a few violations of the MTCR have been reported in recent years, 39 the MTCR's norms are largely accepted by its members; their desire to perpetuate the regime would result in the MTCR's maintenance in an era of declining US hegemony.
In this regard, the 'institutionalist' school notes that the functional demand for regimes is an important factor in regime establishment as well as for regime continuation. The force of inertia, the absence of an alternative, and the residue of common interests among the dominant powers operate to maintain a system despite the decline of a hegemon that created the system. The information-providing and transaction-cost reducing functions of regimes also facilitate their persistence; in general, regimes are more easily maintained than created, as states learn their benefits. 40 The main cause for concern regarding the missile nonproliferation regime is the lack of impetus for its expansion.
The track pursued in the MTCR's formation was the piecemeal approach, where a small aspect of the issue was initially addressed. 41 In the 1980s, when Washington and its allies urgently sought to stem missile proliferation, it was critical to act quickly and enforce measures which would take effect in a short time frame. Addressing a limited but important aspect of the missile proliferation problem - that of restricting the availability of missile technology through supplier controls (which could take effect within a short period of time) - was the most feasible initial strategy to undertake. Moreover, restricting the initial membership was also prudent for the short term. Generally speaking, cooperation among states is a prerequisite to regime creation; limiting the number of states in a regime renders cooperation more likely. 42 In the MTCR's case, restricting the number of initial members ensured cooperation and enhanced prospects for the rapid formation of the regime.
The MTCR's initial narrow scope and low degree of formalization was also the product of a consciously gradualist approach stemming from prior experience with the failed Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks. 43 The CAT talks in the Carter era generated much enthusiasm and resulted in the seeking of a comprehensive regime before the necessary infrastructure for the regime's implementation had been put in place. Over time, the complexities involved in establishing the regime led to dispiritedness that eventually caused the abandonment of the issue. 44 For fear of repeating the CAT experience, the MTCR's initial focus and scope was kept narrow, with the limited goal of persuading a small number of suppliers to halt their missile technology transfers.
It is worth noting the likely disadvantages of pursuing an alternative strategy to curbing missile proliferation in the 1980s. Such a strategy would have involved undertaking multilateral negotiations with many members of the international community, aimed at establishing a more formalized missile nonproliferation regime centered around an international treaty. The vastly diverging positions (in the 1980s) between states, on issues such as the destruction of existing missile forces 45 and the transfer of space technology, would have considerably delayed the establishment of an enlarged, treaty-based, regime. Moreover, domestic political factors also must be taken into account during treaty negotiations, especially when the support of domestic constituencies is required for treaty ratification. Further, treaty ratification itself can be a lengthy process. For all the above mentioned reasons, treaties take many years before they enter into force. As such, attempts to seek the creation of a missile nonproliferation treaty instead of the MTCR would not have been prudent in the mid-1980s, because in the interim period before a treaty entered into force, missile proliferation would have continued. Missile sales by primary and emerging suppliers could have resulted in the proliferation of hundreds of short- and intermediate-range missiles. In such a situation, the feasibility of establishing a broader missile nonproliferation treaty would have been called into question, simply because eliminating hundreds of additional missiles would pose a considerable challenge. Therefore, the piecemeal approach, deferring the enlargement of the missile nonproliferation regime's domain and scope, was appropriate for the short term.
Continuing with the present supply-side technology control focused missile nonproliferation regime will not, however, result in any significant further progress being made on the two remaining issues of concern to missile nonproliferationists - the halting of missile production by continuing missile developers, and the elimination of existing missile forces in some twenty states. These issues must be addressed through bilateral or multilateral diplomacy at the regional or global level, aimed at the creation of a regime similar to the nuclear, chemical or biological nonproliferation regimes which have a broader scope. And yet the expansion of the present missile nonproliferation regime into a more comprehensive regime centered around regional or global missile nonproliferation treaties has not been sought by the MTCR's members. Institutional and political inertia has caused MTCR members to remain content with the MTCR's short-term successes, and to therefore continue to rely largely on their initial and existing supply-side approach rather than to seek broadening the regime. The MTCR has more or less reached the limits of its initially intended scope and domain; it is not designed to, and will not be able to, address the existing unresolved issues in the field of missile proliferation. To summarize, the piecemeal approach taken by the MTCR's founders has essentially left behind a partial, half-formed missile nonproliferation regime that is far from attaining completion. Thus the missile forces and missile programs of numerous nations will remain unaffected by the present, incomplete, missile nonproliferation regime.
Technology Embargoes as Arms Control Tools
The missile nonproliferation regime has attained a few notable successes. The MTCR has prevented the emergence of additional missile programs in the Middle East. In the past decade, technology controls have made it considerably harder for Libya, Syria and other states having missile development aspirations to actually follow through with these plans; thus technology controls are at least partly responsible for the absence of missile development in the above mentioned countries. The most significant achievement for missile nonproliferation regime has been the curbing of missile programs in South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. Most of these states, however, have the necessary technical and financial capability for missile development (see Table 1). The question then arises as to whether these nonproliferation successes were due to MTCR technology embargoes or because of other factors. The missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa and Taiwan were slowed by technology embargoes largely because they employed sophisticated high-performance technologies that increased their reliance on foreign suppliers. 46 These programs were consequently greatly affected with the advent of the MTCR. Given adequate demand-pulls and incentives, however, these states may well have proceeded with slightly lower technology based, more feasible, missile programs.
Regime changes to democracy, improvements in regional security, and political-economic considerations - including a willingness to reduce somewhat burdensome defense budgets and the desire to be seen as responsible actors in the international community in return for acceptance and aid from the West - were factors that were just as important as technology embargoes in national decisions to halt Argentina, Brazil and South Africa's missile programs. The correlation between nuclear and missile programs must also be noted - Argentina, Brazil and South Africa renounced their nuclear ambitions in the early 1990s - thus an important incentive to keep their missile programs (i.e. for nuclear weapon delivery purposes) was eliminated. 47 In contrast, India, Pakistan and Israel have retained their nuclear option and also continue with their missile programs.
For South Korea, Taiwan and Egypt, the security-related demand for missiles remains due to the absence of any sustained improvement in relations with their primary adversaries, North Korea, China and Egypt's Middle Eastern neighbors respectively. For Egypt and Taiwan, a combination of technology controls and US pressure and incentives played a decisive role in the halting of their missile programs. Technology controls per se posed few barriers to the missile aspirations of South Korea - US pressure and incentives were the primary reason for South Korea's halting its missile program.
Technology controls have marginally delayed, but not halted, the missile programs of India and Israel. Technology embargoes have constrained the missile programs of North Korea, Iran and Pakistan to short-range missiles (based on the 300 km range Scud and shorter range sounding rockets), though North Korea has flight-tested and is close to deploying the 1,000 km range Nodong I. Clearly, technology controls alone cannot stop missile proliferation, since virtually all of the technology needed to construct short-range missiles can be commercially obtained or developed by any state with an airframe industry, access to chemicals such as nitric acid and hydrazine, and the ability to repair jet and turboprop engines. 48 If a state has sufficiently strong motivations and the necessary capital (such as income from oil or mineral revenues) to develop missiles, it could do so either independently or by pooling resources in cooperation with other states. 49
To summarize, technology controls were necessary but not sufficient for halting the missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa and Taiwan. Technology controls were neither necessary nor sufficient in curbing South Korea's missile aspirations, and technology controls have slowed (and for some states considerably constrained), but not halted, missile programs in India, Israel, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.
a. Technical capabilities are determined according to the size of a state's industrial sector, prior arms production record, and military critical technology base. Financial capabilities are determined through average annual defense budgets for the period 1983-93, calculated as follows--defense budgets over $ 7 billion: high capability; $ 4 billion - $ 7 billion: mid-level capability; under $ 4 billion: low capability (see fn. 4 for cost-estimates of missile programs).
b. Trade-based influence, or leverage arising from economic interdependence, is determined according to the US share of a state's exports, total trade, and GNP, calculated as follows: US share over 20%: highly interdependent & therefore subject to considerable US influence (1); 10-20%: moderately interdependent (0.5); under 10%: low-negligible interdependence. Security influence is determined through security ties or military aid.
c. Democratization does not have a direct impact in most cases; some proliferators undertook missile programs under democratic regimes, but also curbed these missile programs under a democratic regime. Others began and curbed missile aspirations both under non-democratic regimes.
d. The Department of Defense report on "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (1997) indicates that Pakistan has suspended its 600 km range missile program; Egypt and Syria are reported to be nearing development of Scud-type missiles, although no flight tests have been undertaken--deployment usually takes 2-3 years after the first flight test.
Conclusions
The empirical evidence on supply-side technology controls is that they are marginally useful as nonproliferation tools. While the missile nonproliferation regime has attained a few successes, technology embargoes are only partially responsible for these successes. Overall, a diverse set of institutional and structural factors - supplier-controls, improvements in regional security, democratization and interdependence - have contributed to the present modest success achieved by the missile nonproliferation regime. These modest gains attained by the regime in the past few years hardly translate into optimism for its future. Rather, the present failures of the missile nonproliferation regime - its inability to halt proliferation in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula - further heighten concerns about the regime's long-term outcome.
Improvements in regional security in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula would certainly enhance prospects for the elimination of missile arsenals in these regions. Yet it is not necessary to wait for improvements in regional security before seeking the global elimination of ballistic missiles. Four factors favor the establishment of an NPT-like missile nonproliferation treaty or of regional missile-free zones in the present international order. First, ballistic missiles have little military utility because they are not accurate delivery systems and cannot hit a military or industrial asset when fired at a distance hundreds of kilometers from a target. Missiles mainly have political utility by functioning as national morale boosters and terror weapons. 50 Thus governments would not be averse to eliminating missiles that have no military utility. Second, missiles have been purchased largely for prestige reasons (missiles are equated with technological advancement and modernization) and in order to symbolically acquire parity with a neighbor's missile force. 51 This logic behind missile acquisition implies that states would be willing to eliminate their missiles if neighboring states undertake similar actions. Third, the demand for missiles is presently low. Most Middle Eastern states have enough missiles for their short-term requirements; the low demand for missiles makes it economically unfeasible for a potential supplier to consider undertaking an export-oriented missile program, especially since the costs of such an endeavor are greatly increased by MTCR-induced technology embargoes and sanctions. Fourth, indigenous space launch programs are expensive, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, 52 and more importantly are somewhat unnecessary given the availability of numerous launch vehicles on the international market. These factors caused states having space launch aspirations in the 1980s - Argentina, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan - to dismantle their largely dual-purpose space and missile programs. For similar reasons, apart from the existing space launch vehicle programs (in the US, Russia, Ukraine, China, Japan, India, Brazil, Israel, and the European Space Agency), no additional state is likely to seek a space launch vehicle program in the near future.
Given the above mentioned factors that make feasible further initiatives on missile nonproliferation, the best approach to build upon the short-term successes of the MTCR would be to expand the scope of the missile nonproliferation regime by aiming for the establishment of regional missile-free zones or a missile nonproliferation treaty. A prohibition on the testing, production and deployment of ballistic missiles is feasible and verifiable; implementation of the START I and INF treaties has already tested and proved verification procedures that could be used for a missile nonproliferation treaty. 53 The offering of space related incentives and space launch provisions for countries that refrain from missile development, and continuing restraint on the part of the industrialized nations from any expansion of their missile programs, would address objections by developing nations that the missile nonproliferation regime is discriminatory, and thereby further enhance prospects for the creation of a broader regime. 54
Given the feasibility of aiming for a broader missile nonproliferation regime, the only remaining question is whether an expanded regime is in fact required given the modest success achieved by the MTCR. Two contradictory trends emerge from the recent developments in missile proliferation. On one hand, missile proliferation appears to be decreasing. A number of states have curbed their missile aspirations, largely because they presently have no great utility for missiles. Further, many states with missile forces may have little incentive to seek the replacement of their missiles that are nearing retirement - this is especially true of East European states. On the other hand, a few nations continue their missile programs - these programs are presently limited to short-range missiles (such as 300 km range Scud-derivatives), but given a sustained effort could well result in the eventual production of 500- 1,000 km range missiles within a five year period, missiles which could also be exported. In addition, a few missile owning states may acquire chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Biological and chemical weapons, although best delivered by aircraft, can nevertheless be delivered by missiles. 55 The acquisition of 'strategic' chemical or biological agent tipped missile forces by a few states would greatly heighten security concerns among neighboring states and revive their demand (and development efforts) not only for ballistic missiles but also for a WMD-based deterrent. States that have presently renounced their missile aspirations could, in the absence of verifiable treaty-based commitments binding them and their neighbors to refrain from missile development, be more inclined to pursue missile programs. Such renewed missile programs are unlikely to be halted by technology controls since missile technology would be more easily available some five to ten years into the future. In such a situation, the present success achieved by the MTCR would rapidly disappear, and the missile nonproliferation regime (and possibly even other WMD regimes) could collapse. In summary, the short-term successes of the MTCR may not endure; it would be best to begin addressing the long-term issues concerning missile proliferation by aiming for the creation of a broader missile nonproliferation regime.
To conclude, the supply-side approach to tackling missile proliferation has yielded positive results in the short-run, since it has succeeded in halting missile exports of key suppliers and led to the cancellation of many missile programs. The MTCR served some useful purposes: it raised international awareness of missile proliferation; it provided states with a structure, a set of objectives, and technological guidelines for export control regulations necessary to deal with missile proliferation. 56 Despite the best efforts of its members, however, few further successes will be recorded by the MTCR, simply because its exclusive supply-side focus and limited scope has not and will not be able to address two prominent remaining issues on the missile nonproliferation agenda, i.e. the halting of continuing missile programs in a handful of states and the elimination of existing missiles in numerous additional states. These important issues must be addressed through regional and international institutions that have a broad scope and domain.
Notes
Note *: This paper also appears in Contemporary Security Policy, December 1997. Back.
Note 1: The indefinite extension of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, the halting of nuclear tests and the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, US and Russian nuclear force reductions under the START treaties, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 are among the prominent arms control successes in the post Cold War period. Progress has been slow in building a verification agency to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972. Limited success has been achieved by conventional arms controllers at the regional level, for example in Europe through the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Two noteworthy (albeit minor) conventional arms control achievements at the global level are the creation of transparency in arms sales through the UN Register on Conventional Arms, and an international treaty prohibiting anti-personnel land-mines. Back.
Note 2: Ballistic missiles may be conceptually categorized as falling in the gray area between Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons - on one hand, and conventional arms on the other. The nuclear tipped strategic missiles of the declared nuclear powers would be included in the WMD category. The tactical ballistic missiles of numerous non-nuclear states are armed with conventional warheads; technically speaking, they are therefore conventional weapon systems, but because of their WMD delivery capability, they have found a place on the WMD-focused nonproliferation agenda. Back.
Note 3: A wide range of systems are categorized as 'missiles' - (a) air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles; (b) artillery rockets such as the Frog series with ranges under 100 km; (c) ballistic missiles such as the Scud; (d) cruise missiles, which are air-breathing subsonic systems, the equivalent of unmanned aircraft, and technologically quite different from the other categories of missiles. The MTCR targets categories (c) and (d); this article primarily deals with category (c). Strategic missiles (i.e. the long-range nuclear-tipped missiles of the declared nuclear powers), and the space launch vehicles of Japan, China, Ukraine and the European Space Agency (some of which are derived from ballistic missiles) are not the targets of the MTCR, and are not considered in this article. Back.
Note 4: For example, the development and production of about 400 Condor missiles was estimated to result in a total cost of $3.2 billion; the initial research and development costs were approximately $ 1 billion. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: threat and response (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 64. India spent $160 million for the development and first flight-test of its Agni missile ('IGMDP spin-offs sought,' Milavnews No. 358 (August 1991), p. 13). India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) was allocated a budget of $1.3 billion for a ten year period from 1983-93. Based on the above mentioned costs of missile programs, it should be noted that missile programs are financially feasible for a number of states. Some thirty states have defense budgets of at least $3.5 billion, and earmarking a small fraction of this budget (say 5%) over a number of years would enable these countries to embark upon a missile program. (Budget figures from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1993-94. (Washington DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 1995, p. 30). A similar point is made by Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 88-9. Back.
Note 5: Stephen Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,' International Organization Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 186. Back.
Note 6: The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group restrict the transfer of dual-use nuclear and chemical technologies respectively. Back.
Note 7: For any pair of states A and B, state A refrains from acquiring WMDs, and neighboring state B reciprocates by also refraining from seeking WMDs, since if B did not reciprocate, this would cause A to reconsider its earlier non-WMD decision, a step that could eventually escalate into an undesired arms race between A and B. Back.
Note 8: Jurgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, 'National Implementation of the MTCR - The US and German Experiences,' in Hans Gunter Brauch, Henry van der Graaf, John Grin and Wim Smit, Controlling the development and spread of military technology (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1992), pp. 238-240; Gary Milhollin, 'India's Missiles - with a little help from our friends,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989, pp. 31-35. Back.
Note 9: Scheffran and Karp, in Brauch et. al, Controlling the development and spread of military technology, pp. 239-40 Back.
Note 11: Janne Nolan, 'Alternative Approaches to Managing Missile Proliferation,' in William Potter and Harlan Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1994), p. 283. Back.
Note 12: Statement of Vincent DeCain in Missile Proliferation: The need for controls (Missile Technology Control Regime) (US House: Hearing before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs), July 12 & October 30, 1989, p. 10. Back.
Note 13: The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 177-80; The Military Balance 1995/96 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996). Back.
Note 14: The former Soviet Union was subject to a technology embargo by the West under the Cold War export control regime, CoCom. Moscow had also criticized Cocom for hindering its economic development. Therefore, Moscow initially expressed reservations about participating in Cocom-like, exclusively technology-denial based, regime. Back.
Note 15: Martin Navias, Going Ballistic: the build up of missiles in the Middle East (London: Brasseys, 1993), p. 201. Back.
Note 16: In negotiations with the then Soviet Union, Washington often linked the further strengthening of US-Soviet economic relations to Moscow's compliance with US nonproliferation objectives. For example, in 1989, then US Secretary of State James Baker warned the Soviets that improved trade relations with the US depended in part upon Soviet readiness to control missile proliferation. Navias, Going ballistic: the build-up of missiles in the Middle East, p. 201. Back.
Note 17: Iraq's conversion of Scud-B's to longer range al Husayn missiles and their use against Iran complicated MoscowÕs relations with Tehran. In 1989, the Soviets expressed concern about Israel's Jericho II missile program and Saudi Arabia's purchase of CSS-2 missiles, since both these missiles were capable of reaching Soviet territory. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: threat and response (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 15. Back.
Note 18: In the period 1990-92, Russia consistently rejected US appeals to cancel the sale of cryogenic rocket engines to India. Powerful lobbies in Russia such as the tactical missile design bureau, the military-industrial complex, the Glavkosmos space firm, the conservative majority in the Supreme Soviet, and key members of the foreign military sales bureaucracy, opposed Russia bowing to US pressure on this issue; only the Russian Foreign Ministry was in favor of canceling the contract with India. Charles Peterson, 'Moscow, Washington and the Missile Technology Control Regime,' Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), p. 59. Back.
Note 19: After Russia's suspension of the cryogenic engine contract, bilateral accords that allowed Russia to launch eight US commercial satellites, and for joint missions involving the US space shuttle and Russia's Mir space station, were formalized. These US-Russian space cooperation ventures would not have been possible if US sanctions against Russia's space agency had remained in place. Greg Koblenz and Jon B. Wolfsthal, 'Russia Agrees to Adhere to MTCR, Suspends Rocket Deal with India,' Arms Control Today Vol. 23, No. 7 (September 1993), p. 25. Back.
Note 20: For example, China denied Libyan requests for both long range CSS-2 missiles as well as shorter range M-9 missiles. Martin Navias, 'Proliferation in the Middle East and the North Asian Connection,' Arms Control, Vol. 14, No. 3 (December 1993), p. 304. Back.
Note 21: Hua Di, 'China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation,' in Potter and Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network. pp. 168-9, 180 Back.
Note 22: Wendy Frieman, 'New Members of the Club - Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995,' The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring/Summer 1996), p. 26. Back.
Note 23: The exact status of Chinese M-9 missile sales to Syria remains unclear; see Navias, 'Proliferation in the Middle East,' Arms Control Vol. 14, No. 3 (December 1993), p. 304, and Ian Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1996), pp.72-4. Back.
Note 24: Robert Shuey, 'Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime,' in Brauch et. al., Controlling the development and spread of military technology, pp. 182-3. Back.
Note 25: 'Argentina Ships Condor Missiles for Destruction, Joins MTCR, ' Arms Control Today Vol. 23, No. 3 (April 1993), p. 24. Back.
Note 26: Wyn Q. Bowen, 'Brazil's Accession to the MTCR,' The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring-Summer 1996), p. 88. Back.
Note 27: Andrew Wilson, ed., Jane's Space Directory, 1996-97 (Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1996), p. 69 Back.
Note 28: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., 'Egypt's Missile Development,' in Potter and Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, pp. 23-40. Back.
Note 29: Evan Medeiros, 'U.S., Seoul to Continue Talks on Future of Missile Accord,' Arms Control Today Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 25. Back.
Note 30: Henry Sokoloski, 'Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence,' Orbis Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 245. Back.
Note 31: Gerald Steinberg, 'Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation,' in Potter and Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, p. 238. Back.
Note 32: The resemblance between the Hatf-1 and Dauphin rockets is noted by S. Chandrashekar, 'An Assessment of PakistanÕs Missile Capability,' Missile Monitor No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 4-11. Another source suggests that the Hatf-3 is a variant of the Chinese M-9 missile (of 600 km range), and that the Hatf-3 project was restarted in July 1994. 'Still Blinkered,' Hindustan Times , January 25, 1997. Back.
Note 33: Greg Gerardi and James Plotts, 'An Annotated Chrolonolgy of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments,' The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 65-68. The Nodong I was flight-tested in May 1993, to a range of 500 km; since 1993, no additional North Korean tests have been reported, though news reports in April 1997 indicated that North Korea had deployed, or was preparing to further test, up to ten Nodong missiles (Missile News, April 1997). Back.
Note 34: J.S. Bermudez, 'Ballistic missiles in the Third World - Iran's medium range missiles,' JaneÕs Soviet Intelligence Review, April 1992, pp. 148-149; Shahram Chubin, IranÕ s National Security Policy (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p. 23. Back.
Note 35: 'US-North Korean Missile Control Talks Begin,' Arms Control Today Vol. 26, No. 3 (April 1996), pp. 26-27. North Korea's missile sales have dropped since 1993, largely because of the lack of demand and on account of diplomatic pressure and incentives offered by Washington. Israel also engaged in talks with Pyongyang in 1993, with the aim of halting North Korea's missile sales to Iran. Back.
Note 36: Tehran reportedly turned to Russia for SS-4 technology after Pyongyang's reluctance to transfer the Nodong-I (Philip Finnegan and Steve Rodan, 'Israel Tries to Curb Russian Aid to Iran,' Defense News Vol. 12, No. 15 (April 14-20, 1997), p.1). Another source suggests that Iran has abandoned plans to develop 1,000 km range missiles (such as the Nodong I or SS-4) that are capable of striking Israel in order to remove the pretext for a pre-emptive strike on Tehran's nuclear and missile installations. Eric Arnett, 'Iran's missile ambitions scaled down, says SIPRI,' Jane's Defence Weekly Vol. 27, No. 15 (16 April 1997), p. 16. Back.
Note 37: Jon Wolfsthal, 'MTCR members Tighten Missile Transfer Restrictions,' Arms Control Today Vol. 23, No. 8 (October 1993), p. 19; Jon Wolfsthal, 'MTCR Members Agree on New Export Restrictions,' Arms Control Today Vol. 23, No. 1 (January/February 1993), p. 22. Back.
Note 38: Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72-9; 86-92. Back.
Note 39: While it is hard to determine the accuracy of news reports on missile-related trade, some prominent missile-related transfers reported in recent years include the transfer of some 24 Russian Scud-B missiles to Armenia, beginning in late 1992; these transfers were made without the formal permission of the Russian government (Nikolai Novichkov, 'Russia details illegal deliveries to Armenia,' Janes Defense Weekly Vol. 27, No. 15 (April 16, 1997), p. 15). Russia is also reported to have been considering providing SS-4 missile technology to Iran, while China sold C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran in 1996 (Jeff Erlich, 'U.S. Lawmakers Says China's Sales Warrant Penalties,' Defense News Vol. 12, No.15 (April 14-20, 1997), p.3. Back.
Note 40: Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade,' World Politics Vol.28, No.3 (April 1976), pp. 342-3; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 101; Ernst Haas, 'Why Collaborate ? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,' World Politics Vol. 32, No.3 (April 1980), pp. 357-402. Back.
Note 41: The piecemeal approach is one where a small aspect of an issue is initially dealt with, in anticipation that this would lead to a spillover and the expansion of the regime to include a more comprehensive and legally binding 'constitutional contract.' Oran Young, 'International Regimes, Problems of Concept formation,' World Politics Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 1980), pp. 349-51. Other paths to regime formation include the contractarian track where states negotiate a constitutional contract covering (typically) a broad spectrum of issues, and the evolutionary track where institutions arise either from widespread practice over time, or as a consequence of some dramatic, often unilateral actions that are subsequently accepted by others on a de facto basis. Back.
Note 42: Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 20-21. Oye notes that reducing the number of players has both positive and negative effects. Player-limiting strategies diminish the gains from cooperation while they increase the likelihood and robustness of cooperation. Further, player-limiting strategies impose substantial costs on third parties; these externalities may motivate third parties to undermine the limited area of cooperation or may serve as an impetus for the third party to enter into and enlarge the zone of cooperation. Back.
Note 43: Devin Hagerty, 'Domestic Politics and the Missile Technology Control Regime,' Paper Presented to the 24th Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, November 12-14, 1992, p. 16 Back.
Note 44: Testimony of Dr. Janne E. Nolan, in Ballistic and Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Third World (US Senate: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, Committee on Armed Services), May 2, 1989, p. 55. Back.
Note 45: Although the US-Soviet INF treaty negotiated in the mid-1980s resulted in the destruction of intermediate range missiles, INF-type missile reduction initiatives may not have been enthusiastically accepted by European and Middle Eastern states with regard to eliminating their shorter range missiles. Back.
Note 46: Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 144. Back.
Note 47: On the largely security-related considerations leading to denuclearization in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, see Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: why countries constrain their nuclear capabilities (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-80; Jose Goldemberg and Harold Feiveson, 'Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil,' Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, 'Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa,' Survival Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173. Back.
Note 48: Peter Zimmerman, 'Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough,' Orbis Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1994), p. 71. Back.
Note 49: Trade among regional powers in ballistic missiles dates back to the 1970s, when Egypt exported Scud missiles to North Korea. The Argentina-Egypt-Iraq Condor project, Israeli support for South Africa's rocket program, and Brazilian assistance to Iran in operating its Scuds imported from Libya and Iraq are other examples of missile-related cooperation among developing nations before the formation of the MTCR. Aaron Karp, 'The Maturation of Ballistic Missile Proliferation' in Potter and Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network. p. 12. Cooperative weapons programs have many advantages - they enable developing countries to get the most from scarce technological resources, they create opportunities to broaden their technological and scientific sectors, and they foster diplomatic relationships which strengthen technological and political bonds between developing states. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington DC: Brookings, 1991), p. 19. Back.
Note 50: For a survey of the utility of ballistic missiles and strike aircraft, see John Harvey, 'Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness,' International Security Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 41-75. Some analysts note that because they caused relatively little damage (in terms of casualties or the amount of civilian and military infrastructure destroyed) when used in wars, missiles have little military significance. Thomas McNaughter, 'Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,' International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 33. Other analysts note that missiles have significant political and strategic utility, as witnessed from their use in the Iran-Iraq war. Iraqi missile strikes on Tehran brought Iran to the negotiating table; for Tehran, missiles served as morale boosters by enabling Iran to respond to Iraqi missile attacks with Iranian counterattacks on Iraqi cities. Navias, Going ballistic: the build-up of missiles in the Middle East, p. 172. Back.
Note 51: Prestige and the desire for symbolic parity played an important role in Saudi Arabia's missile purchases. The modern Saudi air force, equipped with advanced strike aircraft such as F-15s and Tornadoes, could undertake almost any military mission required of it, and therefore Saudi Arabia had few military or national security reasons to acquire missiles. The perception that although all its neighbors, and especially a small neighboring state - Yemen - possessed missiles, the wealthy regional power - Saudi Arabia - had no missile force caused the Saudi regime to seek missiles. Navias, Going ballistic: the build-up of missiles in the Middle East. pp. 56-7. In India's case, the prestige factor was a motivation behind its missile program - an Indian analyst noted that the Agni's 'role as a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence builder and a symbol of India's assertion of self-reliance not merely in defense but in the broader international political arena as well.' K. Subramanyam, 'The Meaning of Agni,' Indian Media Reaction Report No. 103, United States Information Service, 2 June 1989, p.12. Back.
Note 52: For example, development costs for Brazil's VLS space launch vehicle were estimated at approximately $280 million, plus a similar amount for the launch facilities. Brian Chow, Emerging Space Launch Program, R-4179 (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1993), pp. 21-23. Average annual space budgets (for 1990-95) of other states ranged from $200-300 million (India, UK, Canada) to $1-3 billion (France, Germany, Japan, Russia, China). Back.
Note 53: Alton Frye, 'Banning Ballistic Missiles,' Foreign Affairs Vol. 75, No. 6 (November/December 1996), p. 106. Back.
Note 54: Lora Lumpe, 'Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World,' Arms Control Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1993), pp. 216. Back.
Note 55: On the destructiveness of CBW agents under specific conditions, see Steve Fetter, 'Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction: What is the threat? What should be done?' International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 22-23. Chemical warfare agents deteriorate at high temperatures and therefore may be rendered ineffective by the heat generated during missile re-entry or impact (P.A. McFate and S.N. Graybeal, 'A new proliferation threat from space?', in W.Thomas Wander and Eric Arnett, The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations and Responses (Washington DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992), pp. 95-96). Back.
Note 56: Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The arms control challenge of the 90's (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 127. Back.
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