Predictions And The Middle East Peace Process

Etel Solingen and Michael Barnett

The Mershon Center,
February, 1998.

When addressing domestic political considerations in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), virtually all speak about a tacit alliance between "moderates" and radicals" in both camps. That is, moderates act strategically taking into account the political well-being of their allied moderates in the other camp while weakening the radicals on both sides, while the opposite process operates for radicals on both sides. Things are of course far more complex than this model suggests, but most importantly, this dichotomy begs the question of who the moderates and radicals are, why do they gravitate in that direction, and where do we get a handle on the potential future dynamics of these camps.

We agreed that domestic coalitions were the pre-determined elements because they are the media for the translation of broad socio-economic processes at the global and domestic level into concrete political action. The task is thus to identify the main socio-economic processes that are likely to drive and nudge the coalition processes. Etel has an elaborate and tightly developed argument regarding the relationship between globalization (as both an economic and political process) and Aliberalizing coalitions" on the one hand, and the alternative coalition of nationalist and religious constituencies on the other. Both Michael and Etel agree that coalitions are shaped, sustained, and transformed by other factors as well. A first step is to consider: the socio-economic and political factors that buffet the possible coalitions; how sensitive are these coalitions, once in place, to changes at the international and domestic levels; how many different coalitions are imaginable (Shas and Meretz?); the stability of these coalitions, a question that forces us to consider whether a minimum winning coalition for the peace process is a Riker-type 51% or something closer to 67%. We cannot begin to provide answers to these questions. Thankfully, we were only asked to take a first cut at the questions.

Predetermined Elements: Domestic Coalitions as Driving Forces

Liberalizing Constituencies and Coalition Formation. The distributional consequences of economic liberalization create two ideal-type political coalitions in each camp, one supporting it (internationalist coalitions), the other opposing it (statist-nationalist-confessional coalitions). The grand strategy of liberalizing coalitions includes the pursuit of economic reform at home, the decimation of its political opposition, and the maintenance of secure access to foreign markets, capital, investments, and technology. A cooperative (non-violent, stable) regional neighborhood serves all three interrelated aspects of this strategy well (for reasons spelled out elsewhere). In contrast, the grand strategy of statist-nationalist-confessional coalitions seeks to preserve allocations to statist and military-industrial complexes, to resist external pressures for liberalization, and to weaken political adversaries who advocate economic reform and internationalization. A regional context of insecurity and competition is a compelling requirement for sustaining this grand strategy, as is the fueling of myths (national, religious) that help justify the strategy. Although Palestine is a state-in-the-making, this coalitional competition, present in most states--seems at work there as well.

The symmetric attempt to weaken politically the adversarial coalition is an important component of the grand strategies of internationalist and nationalist-confessional coalitions. Both coalitions are constrained by their relative political strength (vis-a-vis their domestic challengers) in their ability to implement their respective grand strategies.

Coalitions are also constrained by regional coalitional balances of power, defined by the identity, strength, and interactive dynamics between/among coalitions ruling neighboring states. Thus, higher and extensive levels of cooperation can be expected where internationalist coalitions prevail throughout a given region than where statist-nationalist, or mixed, competing internationalist and statist-nationalist neighbors, face one another. By 1993, in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the 1992 Israeli election, the balance seemed to favor internationalist (or proto-internationalist) forces among the key regional actors. By 1997 this balance had been overturned.

This exercise both allows and compels to us map the coalitions in Israel and Palestine, derived largely from the preferences of the individual coalitional elements. One might argue that many politicians may want to liberalize, to maximize foreign investment, or to make certain concessions to their neighbors (including perhaps some ayatollahs on both camps). The question is where do they draw the line, how much are they willing to risk for that, and what they consider most important for their political health. Clearly,Yaacov Deri estimated correctly that failing to endorse a Hebron agreement with the Palestinian Authority would not break his political hold over Shas (despite of Shas's presumed "moderation"). In the end Deri allegedly secured his own private deal (over legal matters) and did not have to oppose the Hebron agreement after all, but we doubt he was bluffing when he threatened to do so.

Regarding the coalitions in Palestine, we imagine the following scenario. In 1994 the PA faced the intractable challenge of developing an internationalist strategy while forging statehood. The internationalist strategy bore the imprint of a dense international institutional overlay, including the World Bank, IMF, EU, UN, NGOs, all of which imposed administrative, economic, and political targets as a condition for delivering aid. As of January 1996 election results suggested strong support for an internationalist strategy (regional accommodation, an export-led model of industrialization, all lubricated by good relations with international institutions and world powers). Modern political and economic institutions began to emerge, from a Palestinian Central Bank to a Stock Market as well as new legal market-oriented frameworks. Despite "normal" friction, internationalist neighbors (Jordan, Egypt) provided their Palestinian counterparts with political support.

Statist-nationalism and confessionalism has deep roots in Palestine, even if a state itself has not become yet a reality. Islamist groups have spearheaded the challenge to the PA's incipient internationalist strategy, by linking and portraying all aspects of that strategy--regional accommodation, economic openness and global markets and institutions-- into a single package (of evil content). Israeli closures and the paucity of private foreign investments among others have lent a hand to the Islamist camp (even if extant polls suggest this camp only commands about 15 percent of popular support, and declining) . Moreover, state building developed opportunities to expand a clientelistic bureaucracy and an extensive military/security apparatus, neither of which bodes well for the requirements of an internationalist strategy. Secular statist-nationalists with a rich tradition--are also part of this camp. Finally, neighboring states with kin agendas provide political support to different elements of this opposition.

The situation in Israel regarding coalitions can be roughly sketched as follows. Internationalist constituencies in Israel are massively entrenched in Labor's political camp (including Meretz), which attracts most urban professionals, middle class, highly skilled labor, export-oriented cooperative agriculture, and a vast pool of technical, scientific, service, managerial, and entrepreneurial groups. Statist-nationalist-confessional constituencies are logrolled in Netanyahu's coalition, which attracts populist, developing-town, nationalists (including economically-inward looking sectors), and the various religious camps. Note: Netanyahu catered to both a nationalist-confessional and an economically liberalizing constituency during the electoral campaign of May 1996. However, the inherent tension between the two grand strategies came to relief with the significant flow of internationalist constituencies away from Likud and allies (a process that had began in 1992). Moreover, statist-nationalist and religious parties have overwhelmed a feeble liberalizing fringe within Likud (such as Finance Minister Meridor). Despite some steps towards privatization, Netanyahu's coalition is essentially in the hands of rent-seekers, demanding subsidies along socio-economic or religious lines, cheap housing, imperial infrastructural projects and new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, all of which translate into an expansionary reality that transcends electoral promises of stabilization and adjustment (let alone peace). Simply put, an internationalist agenda is not in the cards for Netanyahu's coalition today, because such agenda requires regional concessions, harmonizing policies vis-a-vis international institutions, and other such prerequisites that are anathema to most coalitional partners.

Religious-Secular Divides.

There is an undisputed religious element to coalition politics in both Israel and Palestine; although religious forces have not entered into Aformal@ politics in Palestine, they have in Israel since the beginning of the state, and have benefited from both a growing population that demands a more religious state and electoral reforms that have allowed Israelis to engage in split ticket voting for the first time. These demographic trends and constitutional changes were responsible for increasing the political power of the religious parties in the 1996 elections, and these factors are likely to continue into the future and thus assure a strong role for religious parties and personalities. We might even be willing to claim that religious forces have a decisive influence in coalition politics in both Israel and Palestine.

The religious element in political life in Israel and Palestine demonstrates considerable parallels: neither is monolithic; both have violent fringes that are ready to do what it takes to defeat Oslo and its spirit of compromise; both have elements that can imagine territorial compromise of some sort if their core concerns are addressed; the Israeli and the Palestinian leaderships are both dependent on these religious elements to maintain coalition stability and are willing to use the veiled and revealed extremism of these movements in order to strengthen its hand in the peace process; neither the Israeli nor Palestinian leaderships are able to control these religious movements that both view as a threat to their own leadership and as an important weapon in their bargaining during the peace process.

Critical Uncertainties

1. How will economic trends and globalization affect the coalitional contest in each camp? (the assumption has been that sectors negatively affected by globalization are more likely to gravitate towards statism and confessionalism, more so in the Arab world, but also in Israel: the Shas phenomenon of doubling Knesset seats between 1992 and 1994). Will the "20 % threshold of hyperconfessionals" (see Solingen=s article in Journal of Democracy) be maintained? To what extent are recent economic trends perceived by economic elites as being affected by the peace process?

2. How will domestic institutional change convert socio-economic trends into political outcomes? Both in Palestine and Israel changes in the electoral system, for instance, can stem or dilute a trend towards political fragmentation.

3. Violence might be viewed as a predetermined element. What is critical is how that violence is framed in relationship to past violent acts and the prospects for security. For instance, Netanyahu framed the violence of Peres=s AOslo@ as producing no security, while he claimed that he would first deliver security and then peace. There is evidence that the recent wave of bombings in Israel has challenged that frame. The question is: what are those counterframes and are they able to mobilize collective action around a coalition for the peace process?

4. What role will U.S. policy have on the coalition process? U.S. policy will affect coalition politics, and we can imagine different coalition outcomes for both a Asoft@ line, that is maintaining a policy of Acall us when you are serious@ or a Ahard@ line, that is, twisting arms and perhaps playing the Baker card of making future aid conditional on not engaging on certain policies.

5. How will Netanyahu demonstrate that he is Aserious@ about security? and how will his attempt to demonstrate his credentials affect his domestic political standing? He has staked his credentials on his ability to deliver security without compromise, which has led to policies such as closures, demolitions, and the attempted assassination of Hamas leaders in Jordan, and has led to the contemplation of sending the IDF into areas AC@ controlled by the PNA. His attempt to maintain his image has led him to adopt policies that many consider self-defeating and political unwise, which has reverberated domestically with open questions regarding his decision making process and his ability to deliver security.

6. How far can Arafat move to crush the terrorist cells without eroding his own base of support?

Wild Cards:

1. Tapes, or other such surprises (Sarah Netanyahu's nightmares).

2. Likud split: secularists move to internationalist camp (Barak's dreams).

3. Scandal causes Israel b=Aliya to defect and bring down the government

4. ABPFSI (American Bingo Parlors for a Strong Israel) purchases several blocks in East Jerusalem to develop sites that are Yeshivas during the day, bilingual parlors in the evening.