Domestic Political Forces in Israel

Domestic Political Forces in Israel

The Mershon Center,
February, 1998.

Note: The following propositions and contingent predictions are largely based on the working papers prepared for the first meeting, although the synthesis requires some elaboration and additional points that were not emphasized in the original papers. But for the sake of uniformity, I tried to confine the analysis to points already raised by the group. Also, the majority of the papers considered domestic political forces (and particularly leadership type in Israel) as the most important variable in determining outcomes in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Consequently, we might want to consider expanding the conditions that may affect various contingencies in this area. I assume that the Barnett/Solingen paper covers domestic economic forces, which I do not consider here. In this outline, I consider contingencies related to two central aspects of Israeli domestic politics: 1) leadership type; and 2) public opinion. Misty Gerner's contribution will address the Palestinian side of the equation.

I. Points of Agreement/Relative Certainty

The moderate-extremist internal struggle will continue, both at the political and religious levels.
Any negotiated outcome will face some resistance from the Israeli right, with the possibility of violent resistance.
Coalition politics (whether Labor or Likud is in power) will limit the political choices of the Israeli leadership vis-a-vis compromise with the Palestinians.
The desire among the majority of the Israeli population to separate itself from the Palestinians (this point was not mentioned in the original papers but I think it is a critical constant affecting the range of choice for Israeli leaders--even leaders of the right; of course, separation can be implemented in vastly different ways, including a formal border, autonomous areas, or economic strangulation through closures).

II. Points of True Difference

The party in control in Israel matters and limits the range of potential outcomes. In other words, outcomes are fixed:

Likud--->violent collapse (VC) at worst, status quo plus (SQ+) at best.

Labor--->two-state solution.

Problem: The above causal relationship was implicit in most of the papers, and for good reason. We would probably not be engaging in this prediction project if a Likud government didn't come to power and threaten to upset and even reverse the Oslo process. But, once we throw some conditions into the mix (terrorism, U.S. engagement, leadership style), the causal chain can move in several directions. A Labor government may move away from a 2-state solution in the face of massive terrorism, and a Likud government (at least if its leader is more concerned with his own stature and survival than with his nationalist ideology) can move toward a two-state or at least avoid VC depending on U.S. engagement. The next section attempts to spell out how some of these contingencies would work. However, for some in the group, the above causal chain may be the end of the story.

III. Contingent Differences/Propositions

A. Leadership Type

How does the nature of the ruling coalition in Israel affect the political process (assuming we can move beyond the Likud-Labor distinction)?

Contingencies

1) A weak coalition cannot make a lasting deal, especially if domestic terrorism is pervasive. This relationship is even stronger when the ruling coalition includes parties opposed to a deal under any circumstances, with or without violence.

Weak coalition--->VC or violent SQ

the original papers but

2) Confrontational rhetoric and leadership style can influence political outcomes, particularly if a confrontational style backs the alternative leadership into a corner in terms of its own domestic constituency. An inexperienced leadership can also approve policies that escalate tension in unanticipated ways (e.g. tunnel incident, Har Homa). The effect of this relationship is strengthened if the Israeli leadership offers no simultaneous signals of a practical negotiated final status settlement (i.e. one that assures the other side that the confrontational rhetoric is for domestic consumption, and not an accurate reflection of the government's intentions). Thus,

A confrontational and/or inexperienced leadership--->VC or violent SQ, especially if the Palestinian leadership perceives a confrontational stance as an effort to destroy Oslo, rather than an effort to appease domestic constituencies.

3) The extent to which the Israeli leadership feels bound by existing agreements (either because of U.S. pressure or domestic public opinion) will affect political outcomes. The more the Israeli public perceives Oslo as preferable to no process, the more constrained the Israeli leadership, and vice versa. Thus,

Leadership constrained by public's preference for Oslo--->negotiated final status or two-state
Leadership less constrained by public's preference for no process rather than Oslo--->VC or SQ.

B. Public Opinion

How does terrorism in Israel affect public opinion and support for Oslo?

Not surprisingly, all of the papers agreed with the general proposition that more violence in Israel produces a more hard-line Israeli attitude which in turn constrains Israel's ability or desire to compromise with the Palestinians (or in Netanyahu's case gets him off the hook). Thus,

Terrorism against Israelis--->hard-line public opinion--->VC or violent SQ.

The potential for violence to backfire on Netanyahu (i.e., where the public blames him for the demise of peace process) was either not mentioned or given a low probability (25% in one paper). However, if we look at how these expectations match the events over the past two months (a pilot prediction test), they are somewhat problematic. Major terrorism in Israel in September seemed to be leading to VC, but then the US Secretary of State comes along, the Mossad clumsily botches an assassination in a friendly country, etc. and all of a sudden Netanyahu is meeting Arafat and working groups have resumed cooperation. Granted, it can all unravel quickly, but the expectation that, in abstract, terrorism leads to a hard-line Israeli public and pushes toward VC was not met in this short period. This exercise underscores the need to bring in contingency to the causal chain.

Contingencies

If a certain threshold of violence is passed (to be determined), then terrorism could lead Israeli public opinion to push toward a negotiated settlement and away from SQ.
If the Israeli public believes Arafat (Palestinian Authority) is fighting terrorism, then violence against Israeli citizens could still lead to a negotiated settlement and away from VC. Conversely, if the Israeli public believes Arafat is instigating and supporting terrorism, then violence against Israelis is likely to lead to VC or SQ-.
If Hamas seems to be gaining the upper hand against Arafat, the Israeli public may tend to view Arafat as a more positive force. In turn, they will support efforts to implement Oslo in order to bolster Arafat (the lesser of two evils hypothesis).
High-profile American engagement tempers the hard-line Israeli public reaction to terrorism, and works against VC toward a negotiated settlement, provided the Israeli public still views Oslo as preferable to no peace process.
If the Israeli public views no peace process as preferable to Oslo (as a result of terrorism and a widespread perception that Arafat not just allows violence but actually instigates it, thus eroding the Hamas-PLO distinction), then VC or SQ- is likely.

IV. Wildcards

Change in Israeli leadership, either by early elections (with the possibility of a new Labor government) or by the formation of a National Unity government.
Assassination of Netanyahu, either by Palestinian terrorists or Israeli extremists.
Radical change in the Israeli-Syrian track (i.e. clear and genuine bilateral negotiations of a peace agreement or, conversely, an Israeli-Syrian war).
Death of Arafat.