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Responses to Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process
The Mershon Center
February 1997
Steve asked each of us to do the following:
"Each participant will return to the next meeting with arguments on these seven driving forces. These arguments will include:
Elsewhere, Steve asks us to identify predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, and wild cards. While I am not entirely sure of the distinction between the last two, I'll give it a shot. To show that I can be as task-oriented as the next person, I'll take Steve at his word in this memo, with one exception. When it comes to assessing "probability," I find it more useful (especially for our group as a whole) to state probabilities in a contingent manner than in a statistical one. Phil Tetlock and I have had discussions about this, and have slightly different views on the utility of those involved in this project representing their knowledge in statistical probability terms.
Another explanatory note: In a number of cases, the distinction between predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, and wildcards is blurred. I paid less attention to those distinctions than to communicating my thoughts in general.
I should note that as I write this, two of the other participants have already sent their memos. To avoid a priming effect, I have not read their memos before composing this one.
Driving Forces
One major debate within Israeli politics today concerns "separation" of Israelis and Palestinians. Part of this argument is an economic one. Whether Israel and Palestine will, in both the long and short run, be better off with integrated or segregated economies are the issues at hand. As I see it, both economies will be healthier in both the long and short run if they are integrated. This is most arguable in the short run for Palestinians (less dependency on Israel is more desirable, but not very immediately practical. ) and for Israel in the long run (political action by a Palestine with a more robust economy and therefore more options could deprive Israel of a portion of its labor force upon which it relied).
B. Critical Uncertainties
The price of oil on the world market could play a role here. Such petroleum exporting states as Libya and Iran have more of a tendency to interject themselves into the Israeli-Palestinian situation, most likely by supporting more radical groups, when their petroleum profits are greater. Their verbiage may get even more intense when they are in a more difficult financial situation (one factor in which is the price of oil), but it is unlikely to be matched by financial support.
C. Wildcards
Severe retraction of the Israeli economy, if brought on by a renewed Arab boycott and not mitigated substantially by US help, could lead to more willingness of Israelis to negotiate on more fundamental issues.
A. Predetermined Elements
The U.S. can have clear influence over the peace process, in large part because of its economic assistance to both Israel and the PNA. However, the more overt the U.S. is in its attempts to influence policy on either side, the more backlash will be created in the general Israeli and Palestinian populations respectively. The more the U.S. tilts toward Israel, the more the PNA leadership will try to counterbalance the US by encouraging other actors such as the EU to get involved in a brokering role.
Clinton wants to "play for the history books" during his second term, and would love to have substantial progress toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians happen during this time. He will lose influence, however, the closer he comes to the end of his term (the "lame duck" factor).
B. Critical Uncertainties
U.S. Presidential politics is likely to get involved here. The 2000 presidential campaign has the potential to have some impact, as candidates may grandstand on issues of the Middle East. While the likely direction of influence of this factor is toward more support of Israel, scenarios where a presidential candidate pushes disengagement (de-emphasis) of the US from the Middle East is also a possibility.
C. WIldcards
Any US injuries or casualties, especially if troops are deployed in a Sinai-like buffer zone, could lead to a call for a disengagement push by the US.
A. Predetermined Elements
Jordan's influence is important, as are Syria's and Egypt's. If Jordan were to cease to play a role of providing "good offices" from which to broker Palestinian - Israeli negotiations, it would make it less likely that the PNA would be comfortable dealing with Israel. Similarly, if Egypt were to cut its ties with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the PNA would be less likely to risk isolation by continuing to negotiate. See the "Syria" section for expansion.
B. Critical Uncertainties
The health of Assad and King Hussein are critical. If either one of them becomes incapacitated or dies, it is not clear that their nation-states would follow the same course of action vis a vis the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
C. WIldcards
Islamicist ascension to power in any of the above states would, of course, change the entire equation.
A. Predetermined Elements
I do not adhere to the analogy of Netanyahu to Middle East peace as Nixon to rapprochement to China. The two important differences are Netanyahu's less comfortable degree of influence in his own governing coalition, and the degree of experience in his foreign policy team. The politics of the present governing coalition are such that Netanyahu is quite unlikely to seriously seek any middle ground with the PNA.
Movement within the Israeli Labor party away from Peres' vision of a new Middle East creates a different center of gravity in Israeli politics. There is no longer a centrist vision of cooperation with a nation of Palestine. As a result, even a national unity government (which won't happen as long as Barak feels that he can win the next Prime Ministerial election) would still negotiate much more grudgingly with the PNA than a Rabin or Peres Labor government.
The cabinet crisis/uncertainty in the PNA has the potential to leading to a lack of infrastructure to negotiate with Israel or implement some governance agreements. If most or all of Arafat's cabinet is in fact replaced, it is possible that amateurs like many of those surrounding Netanyahu could surface on the Palestinian side as well.
B. Critical Uncertainties
A tremendous increase in terror within Israel could lead to an Israeli national consensus to only negotiate with the PNA on issues of separation, i.e., a fortress mentality.
A. Predetermined Elements
Syria can play either an antagonistic role, a neutral role, or a supportive role with respect to encouraging PNA-Israel negotiations. The more antagonistic the Syrian role, the less likely the PNA is to consummate an agreement, unless both Jordan and Egypt overtly disagree with Syrian negativity.
B. Critical Uncertainties
As I noted earlier with King Hussein, the health of Assad is critical. If either King Hussein or Assad becomes incapacitated or dies, it is not clear that their nation-states would follow the same course of action vis a vis the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Assad wants his legacy to be regaining the Golan Heights, not having lost it. If he sees his health deteriorating, initiating a war with Israel would be a greater possibility. That would occupy Israel and make progress on Israeli-Palestinian issues impossible for a time.
A. Predetermined Elements
Right now, the key issues under discussion are: Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, water, the status of security zones Israel would retain, the status of strategic roads across the West Bank, as well as the imposition of political and security limits on the Palestinian authority. Of these factors, only the last is out of the direct purview of Israeli implementation. The politics of the governing coalition make settlements a touchy issue, even though all the public opinion polls I have seen indicate that the clear majority of Israelis are willing to halt further settlement expansion, and dismantle many existing settlements if peace is in the offing. With political will, Israel can implement. That political will is unlikely on most of these issues in the short term future
B. Critical Uncertainties
The more violence in Israel, the more I expect a widening split within the Israeli population in terms of how to react. With this government, implementation could not then be expected.
A. Predetermined Elements
As mentioned in the discussion of driving force number 6, right now, the key issues under discussion are: Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, water, the status of security zones Israel would retain, the status of strategic roads across the West Bank, as well as the imposition of political and security limits on the Palestinian authority. The most immediate of these for Palestinian implementation is "security." Without Israeli cooperation, either on their own or with a US push, implementation on this front is too risky for Arafat to carry out comprehensively.
Hierarchy
The driving forces interact so much that any single hierarchy is artificial. In general, though, I see the governing elite in Israel and the PNA as the most important factor. I place US and regional states (including Syria) at a second level and the global economy at a third level. The implementation "driving forces" follow at a fourth level, since I see them as direct outgrowths of the first - governing elites - factor.
Bottom Line
I am pessimistic in the short run, but still optimistic (the only optimist left?) in the long run. I see a distinct possibility for violence in the short run, but a number of years from now I expect a more comprehensive accommodation between Israel and a mostly autonomous Palestinian state.
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