|
|
|
|
Responses to Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process
The Mershon Center
February 1997
General Thoughts re Driving Forces Approach to Prediction Scenarios
There are two issues I want to raise regarding our basic approach of focusing on driving forces to trace scenarios and predict outcomes.
First is the question of the time frame of the outcomes to which we are driving. I ask this with particular reference to the "violent collapse" outcome. There are numerous permutations here that we need to differentiate. I'm not adept enough to graph it on the computer, but here are the permutations:
Second is the level of specificity of what we seek to predict. This problem exemplifies the long-standing discussion of the difference between IR theory and foreign policy analysis. IR theorists of the paradigmatic "grand" scale often claim that they seek not to predict or even explain specific outcomes, rather only broad systemic trends and historical patterns. For our purposes that's at best of limited utility. On the other hand if we get to too specific a level of events (e.g., is there going to be agreement on a Gaza airport, when will the PLO amend its Charter, how much territory will Israel redeploy to in the next round), I'm unconvinced that our methodology can stand up to State Department cable traffic and CIA intelligence reports, or for that matter to good journalistic analysis.
I. Global Forces
My argument here is general to this category, and also taking it to a more systemic conceptualization. Three points:
First, in delineating key factors (Global Economy, US Role) we've lost the sense of broader systemic forces and structures. My view is that the principal explanation for why there is a Middle East peace process lies with the two principal broader transformations of the post-Cold War era, the end of bipolarity and economic globalization. This is not a new argument but one which is more systemic and structural and thus should frame and supersede looking at the more temporal shifts in the US role in the peace process and the fluctuations in the global economy.
Second, I would argue that these broad systemic forces favor a two state solution (with the Palestinian state semi-truncated re military and security). The reason is that the autonomy solution would be inherently unstable --- maybe it could be jerry-rigged for awhile and here and there, but it cannot be made sufficiently acceptable either to the Palestinian populace or the rest of the Arab world to have any real chance of stability. A two-state solution could be unstable, but also at least has the possibility for being stable. The United States and other global powers have a general preference for stable regions; so too do the forces of economic globalization re markets, investments and oil flows.
Third, though, the crucial wild card is violence. Systemic forces and their attendant preferences are not strong enough to bring about their preferred outcome. They are dispositions in that direction, but not outcome-determinants. Violence redefines the environment of the peace process in much more strictly security-based terms, especially for Israel. This takes us back to notions of issue hierarchy, even Maslowian psychological hierarchies of needs, in which economic factors are pushed back towards "lower" politics. They still are there, ready to re-emerge if the environment becomes less violence-torn and thus security-laden. But as in the Israeli 1996 election, and arguably now, when violence is running high, whether or not a coalition is liberalizing matters much less than its appeal to fundamental fears about security.
As to the U.S. role, no question that it matters, but at the present I feel it is more at a tactical level than a strategic factor. The U.S. is key to maximizing the usability of the political space that is available, but violence and domestic politics within the two parties are much more determinant of the amount of political space the US has with which to work.
II. Regional Forces
On the one hand domestic political forces are systemically constrained. Take Netanyahu: while he ran against Oslo he found once in office that the vote really was more anti-Peres than pro-Netanyahu and not so much anti-Oslo as not totally sure about Oslo (even the exit polls showed this). Thus he and his key people now characterize their policy as "improving a flawed peace process" and are quite explicit that they do not reject the peace process (as stated in a seminar I attended 8/11 with the new Israeli UN Ambassador Dore Gold --- one of us, a Columbia Ph.D., with somewhat of an academic past!).
But systemically constrained does not mean without domain of choice. Two points here:
First is even aside from issue positions we need to look at other factors, often called "leadership style". For Netanyahu two are key. One is his inexperience: most of his previous positions were rhetoric-based (UN ambassador, party leader), he never had executive-type experience in government and it shows. Best example is how he got beat back by his own ministers in his effort to create a centralized NSC. They played the political game better than him, and the policy consequence is that the Prime Minister doesn't have the policy structure he needs to exert centralized control over his own foreign and defense policy establishment. He has a National Security Adviser, but not an NSC. Another Netanyahu style characteristic is a penchant for a version of what Ted Lowi calls distributive politics --- he gave one constituency Hebron, and the another Har Homa. Doesn't work very well, a pretty elementary sense of playing off constituencies.
For Arafat the central proposition is that his principal goal is self-preservation in power. This is not synonymous either with getting a Palestinian state or with improving the lot of the people. Example of the latter: right after Oslo was signed quite a few Palestinians from their diaspora with professional skills like economists, public administrators, etc., were keyed up to be involved, but Arafat turned them away so as to keep the economics portfolios with his cronies; this has been no small part of the problem in attracting investment, has led to delays and cuts in World Bank aid, and recently even the Palestinian legislature called for the whole Cabinet to resign over corruption. So given the argument that one of the sources of violence is the dashed expectations of the Palestinian people for benefits from peace, one of the causal variables is this inverse relationship between Arafat's power and the success of the peace process. Another example: the way he deals with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others; what the peace process requires and what his sense of his political needs are differ, and he opts for the latter.
Second general point is that in our original framework we didn't have an interaction variable. We need one. Violence and security exemplify: Netanyahu can be harder-line in the atmosphere of violence, which in turn feeds Arafat's radicalness (the dogs and monkeys stuff in recent Palestinian rhetoric) which feed back into Netanyahu, etc.
Not a wild card but a key factor along the path: the Israeli election calendar. If violence continues Netanyahu could run again on a tough platform. But if it can be controlled, and the %s favoring peace and even a Palestinian state get re-activated within Israel, Netanyahu will want to run with having achieved final status agreement --- this would have to be by end of 1999 to be politically credible .... which by the way nicely fits the US electoral calendar as well. This is worth talking about in the group, as to whether and how much re-election considerations will push Netanyahu to be more moderate, or will he harden?
Email this citation