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Responses to Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process

Greg Gause

The Mershon Center

February 1997

Steve: My impression is that your group has identified the variables that might affect the way the peace process goes. In fact, you probably have too many to factor into any one scenario. One way to proceed might be to divide the variables into First Order and Second Order variables: First Order variables would be those in which a change would have direct and immediate consequences on the peace process; Second Order would be those in which change would have an indirect and/or longer-term effect. You rightly have problematized the question of just what direction your vectors might take. This distinction would add intensity as a second element of the vector.

Second Order variables are not less important, they are just less immediate and, in many ways, the direction of their vectors is harder to identify with any certainty. From a policy standpoint, they would also be more difficult for policy makers to affect in the short term. Among the variables you have identified that I would categorize as Second Order are:

  1. World Economy: In general an open and growing world economy makes it more likely that the US and the EU and Japan would cough up the money for side payments to all the parties directly involved (including Palestinian refugees outside of the occupied territories) in the peace process.

  2. Israeli and Palestinian political identities: This was an excellent point raised in the paper by Badredine Arfi. If the po-mo's are right that identity determines interests (and I think they are, at least to some extent), then this question is the most basic one for the future of the peace process. It is also probably the one that is least amenable to short-term changes or policy manipulation. One can speak of this or that event affecting the popularity of a leader, or his ability to manuever, etc., but it is harder to hypothesize how the contest among basic notions of identity (what is our territory, who are our friends, how do we interpret our history) work themselves out.

  3. The World oil market: a substantial increase in world oil prices would bolster all the Arab economies and increase demand for Palestinian expatriate labor, thus reducing over time some social tensions in the OT and probably leading the Gulf states to patronize Arafat more generously. Would that make the Palestinian side more or less likely to compromise with the Israelis? My guess would be more, but it could cut the other way. A substantial decrease in world oil prices would lower the overall economic outlook in the Arab world, increase social tensions in the OT, and reduce the already limited patronage Arafat gets from the Gulf (but probably not the patronage for Hamas, much of which comes through private channels). It would also lessen the international pressure, at least somewhat, for progress toward settlement. But these vectors, as for those of the world economy, would work into the process very gradually over time.

  4. Inter-Arab and regional alliance shifts: the analysis of this vector presupposes regime stability throughout the region. If Egypt moved closer to Iraq, or Syria moved closer to Jordan, or Iran and Saudi Arabia started making nice to one another, there would be repercussions for the peace process, just as there have been from the strengthened Turkish-Israeli relationship, the Jordanian-Israeli strategic partnership and the consolidation of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. However, I would argue that the intensity of these vectors would be low. No regional alliance changes could affect overall Israeli military superiority in the theater (remember, I assume no regime changes here, so Egypt and Jordan remain committed to their treaties with Israel). No regional power (with the exception of Israel) or combination of regional powers can or would, as things now stand, patronize Arafat effectively -- giving him enough money and political cover to either make difficult compromises with Israel (as on Jerusalem, or rolling up Hamas for good) or take a significantly harder line position toward the Israelis.

  5. The emergence of new Middle Eastern nuclear powers. The most likely candidate here is Iran, but even a nuclear Iran cannot substantially change the balance of forces in the Arab- Israeli arena, unless it were to pursue an incredibly high-risk strategy. The further we get in time from the heady days of 1979, the less likely such a confrontational policy becomes. The direction of this vector is also not immediately clear. Peres regularly made the case that Israel had to settle with its Arab neighbors to confront the real enemy -- Iran and Islamist movements. So a nuclearized Iran might induce an Israeli government to settle with Syria, to break the Syrian-Iranian alliance. But an effectively nuclear Iran is probably beyond our five-year time horizon.

The First Order variables all have high intensity levels, in the sense that important changes in them can have immediate and important effects on the peace process. Perhaps the way to characterize them is in terms of their probabilities, according to your typology of predetermined elements (direction of vector clear, certainty high); critical uncertainties (both direction of vector and probability of change hard to determine); and wild cards (unlikely events that would have immediate and important consequences on the peace process).

First Order Variables -- Predetermined Elements:

  1. Israeli power preponderance, with the obvious consequences in the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian- Israeli negotiations. However, general recognition of its overwhelming power superiority might make an Israeli government more willing to finish a deal with the Palestinians and/or the Syrians -- nail down a settlement while bargaining leverage is at a maximum. That was at least part of the motivation behind the Peres/Rabin involvement in the Oslo process.

  2. A Palestinian entity that is weak in terms of power resources, poor and governed autocratically. It is PLO weakness that started the Oslo process (at least in large part), so Palestinian weakness is not an impediment to progress in negotiations. Arafat's corrupt and autocratic rule, while criticized by all right-thinking people everywhere, actually serves the negotiating process and the interests of most of the parties involved (except the Palestinian people themselves): he can roll up opposition if he wants to; he can make concessions without immediately threatening his power base (in terms of legislative coalitions or electoral politics); he can survive periods of economic and social distress. What he needs are patrons to keep the money flowing and the political cover intact, and the only effective ones are the Israelis and the international community. He wants to use his weakness and the threat of collapse to garner support from those patrons and get the international community to use its leverage on Israel. But in the end he cannot afford to see the process degenerate completely, because then both of these patrons will cease to see him as a useful client. And then is is done.

  3. A divided Arab world. It is very difficult to see a united Arab coalition willing to put real pressure on Israel (combined strategic and economic/oil) a la 1973, or to form a united front of support for Arafat. This contributes to Israeli power preponderance.

  4. US involvement at a level necessary to avoid a violent collapse. It is not clear whether the Clinton Administration is committed to moving the parties toward a two-state solution, or is happy to maintain "status-quo plus", but it is clear that it wants to avoid a violent collapse. It will expend considerable resources to do that (that, I think, is what Arafat is counting on).

First Order Variables -- Critical Uncertainties:

  1. Israeli leadership and coalition politics. The direction of the vector here is pretty clear: to the extent that Netanyahu personally is strengthened, compromise will be difficult to achieve. To the extent that a weakened Netanyahu turns right within his coalition for support, compromise will be difficult to achieve. To the extent that a weakened Netanyahu turns left, perhaps toward a reprise of National Unity government, compromise becomes more likely. If Labor comes back to power, compromise becomes much more likely, particularly on the Palestinian track. The issue here are the likelihoods of these various outcomes, an issue I leave to those who know Israeli politics better than I.

  2. The Israeli economy. There seems to be an assumption in the papers that the vector here is clear -- the better off the Israeli economy is, the more likely an Israeli government is to compromise. I think that was true with Labor in power, because its message to the voters is that peace will bring an economic dividend of full integration into the world economy. But with Likud in power I think the issue cuts the other way. Netanyahu's message is that we can have full integration into the world economy without territorial compromise. The Israeli swing voter who could go either way on the territorial issue (with adequate security safeguards) but wants continued high levels of economic growth is what Netanyahu needs in the next election. A downturn in the Israeli economy would turn such voters (how many of them there are I do not know, but the margins in the last election were razor-thin so small movements could have big effects) away from Likud and increase the weight of US pressure on Israel (eg., loan guarantee issue in Bush Administration).

  3. Extent of and tactics of US involvement. This is the question of whether the Clinton Administration wants to push for a two-state solution or is happy to maintain "status-quo plus." My guess is the latter, but, paradoxically, a real deterioration could spur high-level involvement, which militates toward the two-state solution. There are a number of second-order variables in US politics that will have an impact on this first-order variable: American Jewish community politics, Congressional involvement, Republican positions (do the Bush/Baker/Powell types or the neo-cons call the shots? seems like the latter are on top).

  4. The region-wide growth of Islamist movements. The vector here is clear: to the extent that Islamist movements become more powerful in Egypt, Jordan and the OT, leaders are more constrained in their ability to do deals with Israel. What is not certain is the fate of those Islamist movements. Egypt seems to have had some success in rolling up its Islamists. In Jordan we might be on the verge of a showdown between the government and the Islamists, which the latter will lose but with uncertain longer-term effects. The situation in the OT is harder to read. Arafat could certainly opt for a security solution to the Islamist opposition (as Israel, the US and some in the Arab world would like), but whether that would leave him stronger (and thus more able to compromise) or weaker (and thus more constrained) is difficult to say. My guess is that a full-scale security crack- down leaves him weaker.

  5. Timing and extent of violence against Israeli and Palestinian civilians. The likelihood of future violence from extremists on both sides is nearly 100%, particularly in times when it seems like the parties are making negotiating progress. And, with political will demonstrated by all the parties, the effects of such attacks tend not to alter the fundamentals of the bargaining situation. But the timing and extent of violence of the attacks can have important short-term effects, eg. election cycles.

First Order Variables -- Wild Cards:
These are changes that I think are unlikely in the 5 year time horizon, but if they were to occur their impact on the peace process would be substantial.

  1. A Syrian-Israeli military confrontation in Lebanon. This would entail a breakdown of the reconstructed Lebanese state, increased turmoil and armed incidents in the south of Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border, a willingness by Israel to re-involve itself deeply in Lebanese politics, and a decision by Syria that it could not afford to lose its dominant role in Lebanon again. Everything is then on hold on all peace process tracks, though the end of such a conflict (which would entail intensive US mediation and involvement) might spur new U.S. initiatives.

  2. The death or removal of Arafat. Badredine Arfi's contention that the PA is sufficiently institutionalized to carry-off a smooth transition at the top is comforting, but I would not want to see it put to the test anytime soon. If my analysis of the current Arafat regime -- an autocratic patronage regime -- is correct, his removal could lead to a period of serious instability in the Palestinian community. To whom would the various security services answer? Who would get his hands on the money? Again, such an event might bring both Israeli and international forces more actively into the picture, supporting pro-Oslo elements in the Palestinian community with money and political support, and spur on a new initiative. But that is not a sure thing. In the short term, the peace process would be suspended as all the parties waited to see who came next to Palestinian leadership.

  3. Islamic revolution in Jordan, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia. Any one of these unlikely but possible outcomes would lead to a major change in regional politics. U.S. policy would change drastically, probably moving even closer toward Israel and less willing to press any Israeli government for peace process concessions. The Palestinian Islamist movement would receive a new lease on life, with support from a government that shared a land border (or almost, in the Saudi case) with it. And the prospect that Israel could live at peace with its neighbors, the essential element that Sadat and Camp David introduced into the Israeli body politic, would be dealt a catastrophic blow. In all, probably the end of the peace process for the foreseeable future.

Summary of Variables

I. First Order Variables

  1. Israeli power preponderance. Vector: mixed. Could make Israeli government willing to deal, could make it unwilling to compromise.

  2. Palestinian poverty, weakness and autocracy. Vector: positive for negotiated settlement that acknowledges Israeli preponderance, as long as formal Palestinian statehood is end result.

  3. Divided Arab world. Vector: toward negotiated settlement.

  4. Minimum US involvement. Vector: preventing violent collapse.

  1. direction of Israeli internal politics. Vector: dependent upon direction of change.

  2. Israeli economy. Vector: with Likud in power, strong economy militates against compromise, weaker economy encourages compromise; with Labor in power, strong economy supports compromise.

  3. Extent of US involvement. Vector: dependent on Clinton Administration. Could be status-quo plus and could be two state solution.

  4. Region-wide growth of Islamist movements. Vector: clearly the stronger Islamist movements are regionally the less the chance is of a negotiated settlement.

  5. Extent and timing of violence against civilians. Vector: against compromise settlement, but intensity depends on timing and extent.

  1. Syrian-Israeli military confrontation. Vector: against progress in peace process, at least while confrontation occurs. Perhaps positive afterwards.

  2. Death or removal of Arafat. Vector: against progress in the peace process, at least in the immediate aftermath.

  3. Islamic revolution in neighboring states. Vector: strongly against progress toward negotiated settlement.

II. Second Order Variables

  1. World economy. Vector: open and growing world economy an indirect encouragement toward progress in peace process.

  2. Israeli and Palestinian political identities. Their development is crucial, but hard to anticipate. Could vector either way over long term.

  3. The world oil market. Vector: higher oil prices might mildly encourage peace process; lower prices might mildly discourage.

  4. Inter-Arab and regional alliance shifts (assuming regime stability). Vector very weak, whichever way it cuts.

  5. The emergence of new Middle Eastern nuclear powers. Vector: very weakly against progress in peace process.

The next step, which already makes my brain hurt just ontemplating it, might be to hypothesize how U.S. policy steps could affect the First Order/critical uncertainty variables, and how U.S. policy steps might help avoid the First Order/wild card variables.