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Masculinities/Femininities and Swedish Neutrality. A Feminist Analysis of Swedish Foreign Policy
Lund University, Sweden
Department of Political Science
International Studies Association
March 1998
To be presented at the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, in the panel Gender and Foreign Policy, March 21, 15.45."Wars--hot and cold--are like love affairs. They don't just end. They fizzle and sputter; sometimes they reignite. Mornings after are times for puzzling, for sorting things out, for trying to assess whether one is starting a new day or continuing an old routine." (Enloe 1993:2)
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to argue the relevance of gender in foreign policy analysis. The discussion of foreign policy will particularly concern Swedish foreign and security policy, which has since 1834 been characterized as a non-alignment strategy. This doctrine became increasingly institutionalized (Elgstrûm 1997:2). Through its focus on the Swedish case the study exemplifies how a feminist analysis can add "new" perspectives and "new" knowledge to foreign policy analysis. Feminist theory is here used to understand phenomena which do not necessarily or directly involve women as individuals or as a group. On the contrary, foreign policy and particularly security politics, is a political space remarkably empty of women, also in Sweden. Women's apparent absence in both the security discourse and in its practice will be problematized here.
This paper explores the design a research project 1 that looks at Swedish foreign and security policy from a feminist perspective. Naturally, this means that the empirical base for the paper is only fragmentary at this stage. The starting point and the theoretical base for the paper comes from research done by feminists mainly in the US and hence, is based in the US context. There are many important differences between the US and Sweden both in terms of strategic location, size, resources as well as security policy and domestic policies. Some of those differences will be discussed here, some will remain for further research. Given that the contexts are so different, there might be some problems with the relevance and applicability of the theoretical approaches adopted. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that the study can generate knowledge both in the general field of foreign and security policy, in the specific field of Sweden's foreign policy as well as make a fruitful contribution to the growing field of feminist research in IR.
The Swedish Neutrality Doctrine
The starting point for the Swedish neutrality doctrine is Sweden's interdependence on international security relations. Sweden is a small country with limited resources. The relations between great powers in its vicinity has been perceived as the most significant threat by policy makers. During the cold war the concern was particularly with the relations between the superpowers (SOU 1966:56). Hence, the security strategy has been extremely internationally oriented and have adopted the belief that it is mainly the actions of great powers that can jeopardize Sweden's security (SOU 1985:23 ch 7.2). The logic behind neutrality is that by remaining non-allied, more alternatives and options will remain in case of conflict in the area. The seemingly passive stance that non-alignment and neutrality suggests has been accompanied by an active strategy to ameliorate international relations, particularly through the UN, by for example the work for disarmament. In addition, as will be argued here extensively, it has had a particular relationship to, and an impact on the domestic scene and on the women and men living within its borders.
Here we can only give an overall view of Swedish neutrality and focus on a few of the particular characteristics of such a strategy. By necessity, the account will be very general and it is therefore important to keep in mind, that many changes have taken place in the neutrality policy, perhaps some of the most dramatic ones occurring since 1989 and with EU membership in 1994. The changes that have taken place in Swedish foreign and security policy have been dramatic, particularly when they are considered in a historic perspective. The neutrality doctrine developed as a result of the international security dependency of Sweden, i.e. its extreme dependence on the changing security environment which surrounds it. The cold war has been particular important, and the end of the cold war thus, has represented a dramatic challenge for Swedish security policy yet in the very making. Although contested today, two classic features which have been of a dogmatic nature, remain central (at least on a rhetoric level): It is the strategy to stay non-aligned during peacetime with the ambition of being neutral in case of conflict, together with the idea of universal military training allmn vrnplikt (Andr'n 1978:16).
The main empirical base for the research project will be the cold war period and the post-cold war years. The cold war period will be an important starting point because, as Grant (1994) and Enloe (1993) argue, particular gendered identities were formed during this period in the US context. We suspect that the cold war as lived in the Swedish context, also had similar but perhaps not identical, implications for the construction of gendered identities.
Masculinities, Femininities and Security Policy
A feminist approach to foreign and security policy centers the analysis on gender. Gender, as opposed to sex, is a social category which is considered an outcome of the historic development of patriarchy, which, through socialization, has marked individuals as women and men. Gender has as its base specific definitions of masculinities and femininities. These gendered identities are interdependent as "...masculinity is constructed out of ideas about femininity, its alleged opposite" (Enloe 1993:19). Since gender structures appear to have penetrated all aspects of society it would be reasonable to expect evidence of masculinities and femininities also in the security affairs of any particular country.
Enloe convincingly demonstrates how masculinities and femininities were reproduced and powerfully transformed in the course of the cold war. The priorities of security politics and the resulting militarization, she suggests, is gendered because it builds on, and is related to a particular from of masculinity. We argue that such gendered identities may vary with different security policies and contexts, such as with the difference between the US and the Swedish security concerns. Our overall focus will be on masculinities and femininities, with exemplifications in the Swedish foreign and security context. It is important to note that the use of the terminology masculinities and femininities, does not mean that we want to escape to an abstract account, indeed such identities as well as the outcome of security decisions have very important implications on women's and men's lives.
In order to carry out the analysis we suggest a break-down of the security policy in three interconnected dimensions: the protected, the protector and the image of an enemy. We argue that these dimensions are central concerns and necessary ingredients in the formation of any security strategy. Within each dimension we will investigate if and in which ways masculinities and femininities are involved and if they have been transformed over time. The central question posed for Swedish neutrality policy, are:
Who are the protectors? and who is protected?
What is to be protected?
How is the 'enemy' portrayed?
The inspiration for this approach comes from Enloe's and Elshtain's studies of security and war and has highly influenced the research design suggested here.
The paper will also be organized according to this three aspects as each section will give a tentative answer to the questions raised.
Who are the protectors of Swedish neutrality?
The role of the protector has in general been materialized through the military, a field which has been the domain of men and the apex of masculinity (Elshtain 1994:109-118). The male citizen became the norm already in the Athenian polis and hence, had a higher ranking in society than the female citizen, due to his "willingness" to give his life for his country (Hartsock 1983:186-209). During times of war the image of the female citizen has often been accentuated and transformed toward an image of woman as serving the country (nation) through her caring and nursing skills, while the outmost privilege to sacrifice ones life for the country, has been reserved for men i.e., soldiers. In the military, violence is sanctioned by the state but has been gendered as the characteristics/identity of the "Just Warriors" or the protectors are associated with masculinities while those who are to be protected, represent the non-masculine, "The Beautiful Souls" or femininity (Elshtain 1987). The position of the male soldier/citizen also has implications for civil life. The division between the protector/the protected in security policy is connected with the division between public/private in domestic relations. The public/private division has allowed men access to the public life where they have also represented women, while women have remained in the private sphere, i.e., the home (Eduards 1983; Pateman 1988 ). The defense and military sector often serves as a recruitment base for civil jobs and careers. It follows that there is no clear division between military and civilian life. On the contrary, the contacts created in the military training of young men can serve as a recruitment for important civil positions during the 'recruit's' entire professional life.
The implication that the masculinization of the citizen (through the soldier) has on the maintenance of gender structures in society, may vary according to the degree of militarization but also we suggest, on whether there is a professional military or a general drafting and whether women are enlisted or not.
A particular focus would be on what the drafting of all Swedish men for a year's training at the age of 19 has implied for the making of a particular foreign policy. 2 Recall that this general drafting has been one of the central features of the neutrality doctrine. The professional part of the army has been minimal. Such a system has effectively eliminated women in the armed forces as only men were drafted. However, it also established a particular breading ground for a masculine culture to develop. In this context lifelong friendships and important networks are established between the soldiers. This has contributed to a gendered structure of society because these relationships within the masculine culture build up in the military, have tended to overflow into civilian life as well.
The experience gained within the military seem to be highly valued in society. This, despite the often menial tasks and projects carried out within the training. According to a large governmental investigation on women's economic power status in Sweden, the year and months of absence that the compulsory draft entails has no negative effect, or is seen in anyway as a drawback to men's employment and careers. (rather, on an individual basis through the networks built, it is seen as beneficial). On the other hand, women's absence from the work force in order to take care of the small children is perceived as a huge obstacle, in that it explains women's lower wages. Military service does not effect men's wages negatively (Albrecht et al in SOU 1997:136; Hûrnqvist in SOU 1997:138 and SOU 1998:6 p 118) Surprisingly, the tasks performed and learned in the military are valued much higher than the tasks performed and learned in raising children, even though the time that men and women are absent from the work force is roughly equal. 3 Both activities are protected by law in that they can not serve as grounds for work dismissals.
Since both the right and responsibility to bear arms and protect the country has been the exclusive domain of men we expect that it has resulted in a highly masculinized culture in the field of foreign and security policy. We would also like to assess whether such a masculinized culture also prevails in the Defense Administration, and the Strategic Research Institutes. Studies have shown how the military is dependent on a strongly masculinized language and working methods (Macdonald et al. 1987; Isaakson 1989). Furthermore, Cohn (1987) has demonstrated how the defense intellectuals in the US developed a particular language which played an important role in constructing their identity, furthermore she shows the gendered dimension of this strategic language.
As long as women were excluded from the military, the masculinized culture appeared as natural, normal and invisible even though women were often the victims of this masculinization both in times of war and peace. Prostitution has been an important complement for military bases (Enloe 1989:65-92). Rape has often been perceived as a 'natural' part of warfare, and domestic violence has become a reality when soldiers return home and are to be integrated in civil life again (May and Strikwerda 1994; Pettman 1996:99-101; Blackstock 1996).
It is really not until women enter the military force that the masculinized culture becomes evident and problematic. The logic of gender segregation is broken and the male norm becomes visible in a number of different ways. What was earlier perceived as a method to mobilize and motivate soldiers, in a sexualized and misogynist language turns to sexual harassment when there are women soldiers or officers present (Pettman 1996:148-152). Even if we today see more women in the military than previously, this does not necessarily mean that we have a more equal society. It could also be a result of a militarization of society. D`Amico (1987 :112-115) suggests that this is the case. She exemplifies with the US military force where the increasing female participation has not in any substantial way changed the institutions and military structures.
After a long discussion and governmental Commissions the military regulation in Sweden was changed in the early eighties, as the first basic military training was opened for women in 1983, and as of 1981 women could become officers (Kryhl 1996). However, there were restrictions on which positions women could obtain. The limitations had to do with which jobs were considered combat positions and hence, exclusively for men. By 1993 women had achieved basically the right to all the Swedish officers positions. They are not drafted like the men, but allowed to join the military on a voluntary basis if they want to become officers. As of January first 1997, out of the 16 232 officers serving in the armed forces, 321 were women (www.mil.se).
Three cases of sexual harassment of women within the Swedish army have been reported in the last two years. These cases show clearly that the object is to intimidate the women officers through sexual abuse. In one case, the abusive word "cunt" was written on the female officers wall, this was later accompanied by a series of sexually abusive phone-messages. In another case, the female officers was urinated on and otherwise treated sexually abusive. In the third case a recruit masturbated in front of the female officer. Most surprising was that the male senior officers were dumbfounded at these activities and were ill-prepared for such incidents. The female officers had to make the complaints and reports on their own. The attempts to prepare for the changing structure of the military, by the military organization itself has been carried out mainly at the central level of the armed forces and have not yet trickled down to the local level.
In our project we would like to analyze what the exclusive access to the Swedish military defense by the compulsory 4 military training, has meant for the position and possibilities in civil life, in the making of Swedish citizens. Here we would particularly like to assess what implications network formation has had for recruitment in civil life or how military training is viewed in the work force in general terms, as regard to for example absence due to child care. We would also like to assess how the masculinities and femininities have been materialized within the Swedish military, the defense administration and strategic institutes, and compare this with the research done in the US context. Here, we will pay particular attention to the changes created by the recent access of women to officers training.
Women and children -- the protected.
Femininity, being part of a dualistic construction, is a complement to masculinity (Warren 1991; Plumwood 1993). For that reason it is problematic to argue that women would be more peace-loving than men. The peaceful and passive identity is equal to the identity of the protected and hence, tied to the identity of the protector. In other words, the protector is associated with certain particular masculine characteristics while the passive and peaceful identity of femininity is associated with the protected.
Just as the protector needs something to protect in order that the relationship be complete, there can be no masculinity without a complementary construction of femininity. For the relationship to be complete, we can argue as does Enloe, that any type of militarization demands that men are willing to die for their country while it simultaneously requires that women will not sacrifice their lives for the nation (1993:17) but are willing to be the protected ones. Masculinity is constructed and defined as non-femininity (1993: 19-20). Following from this, women have their given and specific role associated with femininity. Women are expected to service, nurture and nurse the citizen-soldier, to reproduce new soldier-citizens and take over the soldier's civil work in wartime while returning to the traditional role in peace time.
An example of the division of tasks in terms of the protector and the protected is the supporting organization for the military defense: Swedish Women's voluntary Defense Service Lottarûrelsen. It was founded in 1924 and today has around 30 000 members. It is a non-political organization of volunteer women who service the armed forces. The tasks they have performed over the years are tasks associated with the identity of the Beautiful Souls, i.e., servicing, nurturing and nursing activities (www.lottorna.se).
Through her nurturing and nursing role woman becomes an indispensable part of the defense and security politics (Reardon 1985; Kaplan 1994). Accordingly, it is not in the maintenance of this role where the possibilities for peace lies, but rather in the questioning of the gendered identities associated with security policy.
The feminized identity is a passive one because it is women who are given the role of the ones who are protected, while masculinity is the active part since masculinity is associated with the defender role. The two gendered identities complement each other. Elshtain has also asserted that there are indeed similarities between the soldier and the mother. They are both concerned with, are anguished and traumatized whether they have done enough, for the country as soldiers, or for the children/family as mothers. While the roles as soldier or mother are constraining in the demands on complete loyalty, they also enable in that they create clear and defined role expectations (Elshtain 1987: 222-225; see also Sylvester 1994:329).
A caveat is to conclude that the passive role that women are ascribed in the patriarchal society also means that femininity is peace loving and can be an alternative to the belligerent and violent masculinity. In other words, "By holding care-taking as a model of virtue, the theory may obscure the role caretakers often play in supporting war and warriors, thereby discouraging women from examining the part they play in maintaining and reproducing a warist society." (Kaplan 1994:123). Rather it is necessary to go to the depth of the constructions of dualistic gendered stereotypes, question them as they have been re-created in the foreign security discourse and practice. It opens up to the possibility "..that we discover, through the binoculars of gender research, that our very categories of identity and attachment are habits rather than realities" (Sylvester 1994:316). Our suggestion is that the exclusion of women from the military training in the past, as well as the divisions of the supporting organizations, exemplified by the Women's voluntary defense organization and the Homeguard, together with the all male 'universal' military service, follows a clearly gendered pattern of foreign security organization.
Grant (1994) makes a related argument when she claims that the particular form of femininity (Friedan 1963) which was constructed in the US during the fifties and sixties was intimately connected and a necessary component of the cold war. National identities were constructed, roughly characterized in masculinities and femininities, where masculinity was the identity of the defender or protector, and femininity the identity associated with that which was to be protected (Grant 1994:119-128). The most dramatic change in gender roles in the US happened during the second World War. While the male US. citizen, i.e., the protectors were out defending democracy, women were called on to 'man' the production lines. There was ambitious propaganda backing up these changing roles and quite surprisingly and suddenly
"the work that women performed in the home was seen as having provided them with the skills that were transferable to defense work: if they could operate a sewing machine they could easily learn to run a drill or a punch press or a rivet gun."(Gluck 1987:12)
According to Gluck, among the women defense workers in the US in 1944, one third were former housewives. As soon as the need for women in the war production wound down, the attitudes toward women began to change. The Media, which had been taken part in the making of a new wartime femininity, did a turn-about and adopted the message to incorporate the femininity appropriate for a post-war society „ the housewife (Gluck 1987:14-18). A similar process of re-negotiation and re-formulation of femininities and masculinities took place in Sweden as war was imminent, and mobilization necessary, despite neutrality. Women were called in to work in positions and sectors where they had never been before and the picture of woman was subsequently re-constructed in peace time. In relation to such re-constructions it is interesting to note that when debates and initiatives to include women in the Swedish military force first came up on the governmental agenda in the late sixties, it came as a result of the demand for labor. It was part of a general strategy to satisfy the need for workers in typical male professions and only toward the end of the seventies did the issue of equality between men and women enter into the discussions (Kryhl 1996).
If the cold war had such an affect on the formation of masculinities and femininities as indeed Enloe argues, there are reasons to suspect that it did also affect the formation of masculinities and femininities in the Swedish context. However, US and Sweden differed immensely in the roles played and strategies used during the cold war. Enloe shows that the formations of different masculinities and femininities were intertwined with the developments of the cold war. The US performed the superpower role, while Sweden is a small country, dependent on the mercy of the great powers and located right in the middle of the two power spheres -- two very different roles played and different strategic considerations.
Gluck argues that even though the housewives left the industry and returned to the home after the end of the second world war, the experience gained from being part of the work force and being economically independent remained with them and formed the basis for later challenges of gender roles in the American context (Gluck 1987: 259-270). Wikander (1992:57-58) is more skeptical of the transformative role that the changing work patterns, during the world wars, had on changing gender roles. Instead, she argues that what appears to be most remarkable is how quickly traditional gendered divisions of labor, have been normalized after the wars. Hirdman (1990) as well as the recent investigation on Swedish women's economic power seem to support this (SOU 1998:6). Very little research has been done in terms of changing gender relations during the world wars in the Swedish labor context. 5 The lack of labor during the post-war years did however, initiated processes that would facilitate the entry of women into traditional male jobs (mainly heavy industry). The example is the one above on women's entry in the military force. It appears as if the women's labor is viewed in terms of a labor reserve that can be utilized in case need be. 6
Since the experience of the cold war appears to have exerted extensive influence in making masculine and feminine identities in the US context, it would be odd if the cold war, which was perhaps a closer reality in Swedish people's everyday life because of the geographical proximity to both the Soviet union and the allied states, would not demonstrate implications in the making of Swedish identities. Clearly, Swedish neutrality policy had (has) a very direct civilian base as the defense politics involves basically all male civilians with the explicit strategy of being able to mobilize many areas and sectors of society very quickly if need be. In some ways the making of the Swedish welfare state is closely linked to the development and the practice of neutrality. Through welfare state development, the home sphere (the private) was moved out into the public, but retained its specific characteristics as the feminine sphere in terms of a highly segregated work force. The welfare sector helped women with the tasks of caring for the sick and elderly, child care, schooling etc. and the individuals who were set to carry out the tasks were women. In other words, the welfare state became an organization exclusively for women by both carrying out the task they had traditionally done in the homes and creating employment opportunities for them in that same sector. The welfare state development in Sweden meant that women who were earlier dependent on men, became dependent of the state instead, both as the provider of welfare services which mainly benefited the women, since these were the tasks traditionally performed by women, and as the employer of women. Since EU membership the Swedish national interest has often been articulated in terms of the protection of "women friendly" policies. An important part of the study will look at the impact of EU membership on the masculinities and femininities constructed toward this new political situation for foreign and security policy, that membership entails.
Fortunately, men and women living in Sweden have not had to experience the destructive and painful processes of war. Therefore it is important to note that against the constructions of the protector and the protected we are slapped in the face with the horrid realities of war. In such cases the idea of men protecting women in war and conflict seems like an extremely bad joke. It appears to be nothing new about this, since all wars seem to have been accompanied by rape and sexual abuse (Brownmiller 1975). A study on violence in the war in former Yugoslavia, conducted by Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic and based on the interviews of 70 refugee women and SOS hotline data, give ample evidence of the reality of warfare for women and show that rape and sexual abuse in wartime has very little to do with sexual lust or passion. Instead it verifies the patriarchal notion of women as objects that men possess.
"Women, who have no voice in deciding to go to war, are those who pay for men's decision to fight. Women from all sides are used, more or less, depending on the balance of power, as a means to achieve men's political and military ends (Nikolic-Ristanovic 1996:208)."
The protection of self-determination with Swedish neutrality policy.
It has been argued within the realist tradition that foreign policy is about goals and means which states or governments formulate in relationship to the national interest. In formulating these goals and means, the definition of the state's the national interest is of outmost importance. The foreign and security policy of a country emanates from its understanding of their national interest. It is arguable whether it is at all possible to define such a coherent national interest without marginalizing and excluding large parts of society. This seems even more likely in the case of the Swedish neutrality policy, according to Elgtrû m's study of the foreign policy development in the 19th century. Here we get a perspective of neutrality over almost a 200 year period, and it is amazing how stable that policy has been. As a matter of fact, stability over time, is one of its determining features. During this period, basically the same doctrine prevailed and the strategic thinking had the same basic reasoning. However, Sweden was not a democratic system, the state was ruled by a king who, together with his advisors formed the foreign policy (Elgstrûm 1997).
Our curiosity leads us to ask: What is it then that is to be protected with neutrality? It is quite clear that in the early shaping of Sweden's neutrality policy the national interest was defined by a king including, perhaps, a small elite. The national interest which has been defined in regard to neutrality policy since the mid-20th century has been to secure national self-determination. The consensus has appeared so complete that it has become part of the Swedish character, according to Ann-Sofie Nilsson (1994). The consensus on the security policy has prevailed, also among the political parties, up until at least the 1970s. The political parties have chosen to have ideological debates in internationalized questions, such as trade and aid, rather than pure security concerns, where consensus has prevailed (Bjereld & Demker 1995). We can conclude that there has been a relatively stable consensus around the goals and means of the neutrality policy, although in the post-cold war era there has been both changing and conflicting perspectives expressed. 7
In the following we will venture to ask, what is the gendered aspect of this development?
At first glance, 'the national interest' appears to have very little to do with individuals, no matter whether they are men or women. On the other hand, it is also obvious that states have neither goals nor means to secure objectives. Only decision makers in their roles as representatives of states can think and act in its name. Those representing states have, throughout history, almost exclusively been men. When a women occasionally, has taken a seat in a place of power this becomes overtly obvious, i.e., that she is a woman and different. The "male as the norm" of security relations, remains invisible until a woman takes the position of head of state, chief of the armed forces, foreign minister or the like. In such cases the female presence breaks the logic of segregation of the sexes and makes the norm visible (Hirdman 1990:78-80).
Since the national interest for Swedish security policy has been defined by almost exclusively male elites, it is also difficult to compare this with an alternative definition. The critique from the Organization Women for Peace in Sweden might be an evidence of this. The consensus about what was to be protected with the neutrality policy, was almost complete in the debates and discussions of the 1984 report from the governmental Defense Committee. 8 The only group opposing the way the national interest was expressed at this time was the organization Women for Peace which suggested that "the ultimate objective for Swedish security policy would be to make sure that people's life possibilities are ensured and a living environment preserved (authors translation) " (Rûster om....1986). Another possibility is to look at the arguments of the few women actually involved in the security policy debate (for ex. Alva Myrdal, Inga Thorsson) which should be supplemented with interviews with women active today.
Another aspect which could support the hypothesis that the articulation of what is in the nation's interest is gendered, is through the research that has shown some obvious gender differences in foreign policy preferences. This has been pointed out by a number of studies in Denmark (Togeby 1994), in the US (Fite et al. 1990), in Canada (Stienstra 1994-95) in New Zealand (LaMare 1989) as well as in Sweden (Dohlvik 1995). The gender gap in foreign policy preferences suggests that it is possible that there would be different priorities made, had the decision makers within the field of foreign policy been women rather than men. What is more problematic is, nevertheless, to establish what such gender differences are based on. It may be too easy to fall back on an idea that women would be more peace loving than men and that the gender gap has to do with the exclusion of specific woman's values due to the absence of women. Lisa Togeby (1994:387) tests this assumption in the Danish context and concludes that "/t/he gender gap is explained not by women's traditional roles as homemakers, mothers or wives, but by their new roles in the labor market and political life." Her study suggest that we should be very careful in equating women's different preferences in foreign and security policy with specific women's values. In this regard we would like to emphasize that women's interests, just as gender, are social categories that have been formed out of the systematic power relation which has ordered men and women in specific roles and functions in society.
The question that arises is what a women on the post of foreign minister, which is exemplified in Sweden with Lena Hjelm WallÚn, (in the US by Madelaine Albright) means in terms of gendered orders. Is it an indication that the gendered relations in the Swedish society are in a transformative stage? If yes, then the second question is: what is it transforming itself into?
Militarization
We can conclude that the area of foreign and security policy has been extremely male dominated. Within this field the highest priorities for the national interest has been formulated, not only by the practitioners, i.e. decision makers, but also by theorists such as policy analysts and researchers. Within the research field international politics, the realist school has since the second world war, been the far most influential perspective on international relations. 9 The realist school takes as a given that the most important goal for foreign and security policy is the national interest of maintaining sovereignty over the national territory and secure the survival of the nation. Hence, the ultimate means for securing the national interest are military means. Tied to the notion of what is to be protected with Swedish neutrality, i.e., the right to self-determination, is the means assuring that protection will be achieved. The high reliance on military means, as the ultimate security strategy can be challenged. This is particularly relevant as we increasingly note that the most urgent problems today have to do with, for example: resource depletion; environmental destruction; natural catastrophes; mass-migration; the spreading of diseases; drug-trafficking and terrorism. Problems that do not easily conform to the traditional definitions of security policy nor can be satisfactorily resolved by approaching it from such a perspective. 10
When the military sector within a nation is prioritized, it normally implies that another sector is depleted of resources. This could be a relative good indication on how security policy and the prioritizing of military means, are> gendered. It becomes most evident in states that are highly militarized. In the most extreme cases we are talking about war economies, in which the production within the military-industrial complex subordinates all other activities (Peterson & Runyan 1993:83). Increasing spending in the defense sector naturally diminishes the funds available for spending on for example, health care, education and environmental protection. Areas of concern that appear to be increasingly important in contemporary times. We argue that security policies are gendered when they channel less resources into areas that are often prioritized by women.
Swedish neutrality policy has as it stated aim to remain neutral and non-aligned during peacetime with the prospect of staying out of conflicts in wartime. Neutrality can, due to the way it is expressed, perhaps be perceived as a peace strategy. This is partly an illusion as it turns out, neutrality has not avoided the militarization of society. Rather, there has been a thorough "militarization" of society which has taken specific forms in neutral Sweden. Due to the specific kind of security policy, the entire society has been mobilized in specific ways in order to build and support the neutrality stance. It has created a domestic weapons industry, a particular kind of agricultural policy and compulsory army. Compulsory implies that all able-bodied Swedish men, 19 years of age, are enlisted in the army. They serve one training year and a subsequent number of re-occurring enlistments until the age of 47. Other supporting structures have been built up which are based on voluntary participation, examples are the Swedish Women's Voluntary Defense Service Lottarûrelsen and the Home Guard Hemvrnet. 11 These form part of the total defense Totalfûrsvaret and in this represent a specific kind of "militarization" of society.
Central to the doctrine of neutrality was the issue of legitimacy. Sweden's neutrality had never been assured through international conventions, nor has it been affirmed in the constitution. Policy makers decided that to assure the neutrality doctrine's validity it was necessary that the political moves in the area of foreign policy were perceived as credible. Neutrality, as the chosen security strategy was, only credible as an alternative to major-power dominated policies when it could be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the great powers. Legitimacy, as interpreted by policy makers, was assured by the development and production of domestic military supplies. Sweden could not rely on getting weapons from other countries since this would jeopardize neutrality. 12 Because Sweden is a small country, with a small population together with the fact that weapon's production is a very expensive business, the Swedish government had to either develop a fairly militarized economy in terms of cost spent on weapon's production, or try to profit from weapons production by selling surplus to other countries. The latter strategy was chosen as it brought down the cost per unit. It did become somewhat embarrassing to preach peace and sell guns for profit. However, the dilemma was "resolved" by allowing sales only to non-belligerent countries (Hagelin 1990:49-50). In a comparison between four neutral states Hagelin concludes that
"Sweden is the clearest example of a contradiction between formal policy and actual military sales. The formally more restrictive foreign military sales policy in Sweden has not prevented an increase in most foreign military sales indicators." (Hagelin 1990:104-105)
Hence, there is no support for a claim that because the country has neutrality as a security doctrine that less resources would be spent on the military budget. On the contrary, very complicated processes, balancing between the need to remain independent as well as adapting to the trading climate on the international arena, determined security spending. Furthermore, the means used were not only military but there were also substantial concern to assure independence and self determination by domestic production of foods and textiles. In case of conflict in the near vicinity, Sweden should be self-sufficient for some time, not only in arms but also in food and clothing. Due to the self-sufficiency aspirations both the agricultural and the textile sector was heavily subsidized. It became economically unfeasible and the sectors Legitimacy, as interpreted by policy makers, was assurewere eventually deregulated.
The Threat and the Image of the Enemy 13
Enloe argues that the cold war was heavily reliant on creating the threatening and dangerous enemy. It is nothing new, that security policy is based on the definition of different types of threats, or the creation of threats. The more acute and dangerous these threats appear, the more resources can be mobilized to counter them, for example through the defense and security budget. The creation of the image of the enemy is thus, not only important for security itself, but essential to legitimize security decisions in society. According to the framework delineated earlier the enemy is the third dimension of foreign policy. Just as there is an interdependency in the relationship between the protector and the protected, the image of the enemy is also closely tied to a self image.
Svedberg (1998; 1996) talks about basic psychological processes such as attribution and how this comes into play in international politics and image formation of the enemy other during the cold war. As human beings we try to make sense of the world. This involves not the least trying to explain others' behavior. The term used for the process whereby we interpret others' behavior is attribution. Heider (1958) points out that our need to understand our surrounding motivates us to try and simplify and predict others' behavior. We thereby try to go beneath the obvious in order to get a sense of stable underlying processes, which Heider called dispositional properties. Heider suggests that others' motives are the dispositions we most frequently use to give meaning to what we experience. It is not however our experiences per se, but our interpretations of our experiences that make up our 'reality'. (Gudykunst, 1994,115)
For more than four decades the world became used to thinking in terms of a bi-polar world; with capitalism and the West as one pole, and communism and the East bloc, dominated by the Soviet Union, as the opposite pole. During this time, there was a process of creating, recreating and refining an enemy image. Thinking about the enemy eventually became more multi-faceted, involving formal academic study taking in an increasing number of aspects of the Other. Thus eventually the study of the enemy Other involved a number of disciplines. From being focused on the power constellations on the elite level, in the West the occupation called 'Kremlinology', it came to include the Other's specific (enemy) culture as well as aspects of their (enemy) psychology. In the West this could mean an image of the enemy Other and their culture as extremely authoritarian. In this model for thinking about the Soviet Union, an efficient, monolithic ruler ship kept the individuals under complete control by a method of isolating one from the other, thus depriving them of the option to develop society (the image of Orwell's lonely and despairing Winston in Nineteen Eighty-Four comes to mind). The enemy man or woman would as a result become passive, not creative, and simple-minded (however, sometimes also both sly and intelligent). As has been stated elsewhere, there was a great deal of mirror image formation vis a vis the Other bloc during the cold war, in the US and the USSR. Thus the image being reproduced and nuanced on the other side of the Iron Curtain, in the Soviet Union, saw the West as a vulgar, imperialist or capitalist 'non-society', where proper family values were long since forgotten. The capitalist Other-world produced lonely individuals, who were either passively exploited or simply motivated in life by ferocious egoism. In many instances, people on both sides of the ideological devide, believed the image reproduction to be important and true descriptions of the Other-place.
The sixties' and seventies' revolt against the established older generations also bears a noteworthy parallel development in both power blocs. Naturally, not everyone on either side of the bloc divide, believed in the images described above. On the contrary, the image production was in many instances perceived as yet another falsification by an artificial society. This perception was important as it fit into and became included in a larger revolt against the established order in both the US and the USSR. The image being simply false, it was consequently inferred that reality must be diametrically different than the established image.
Out of this spawned a dreaming about the Other as a much better human being, with higher ideals who had created a perfect life in a perfect society. This was probably overall more common in the Soviet Union which was closed off from most parts of the world, but neither was it of negligible importance in the West.
For many dissidents or semi-dissidents active during the sixties and seventies in the Soviet Union, a reversed enemy image of the West meant an unrealistically positive expectation on the West as a society and on the Westerner as an individual. Russians with experience from the dissident movement of the Soviet Union will often have an exaggerated positive image of the West and persons from the West. During the cold war and shortly thereafter, there were many people in the former Soviet Union who had very high expectations on the Westerners' ways, their professional level, moral standing, generosity, looks and health etc.
The task at hand will entail to outline both the enemy image and the self image from the perspective of Swedish policy makers, and particularly analyze whether a gendered dimension to such images can be construed. The question might be formulated as follows; is the enemy image connected to particular forms of masculinities and femininities?
Concluding Remarks
One of the most important contributions of a feminist analysis in foreign and security policy is as we argued in the beginning, the addition of new knowledge. Even more interesting is how a feminist approach can actually include "women" when we argue in terms of gendered identities. Because although women have appeared to be absent both from the security and defense discourse as well as practice, we have shown that they are present not only as passive victims of such policies, but also as active agents, participating in the protected or "Beautiful Souls" role. It has been possible to do so by the focusing on the interconnectedness of gendered identities, which means that coupled with every masculinity there is also a femininity, sometimes hidden and invisible but nevertheless essential for foreign and security concerns.
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Notes:
Note 1: Although this paper is entirely my own responsibility the project idea stems from a long an inspiring cooperation with my colleague Erika Svedberg, to whom I am greatly indebted, for the project idea as well as the specific points raised in the paper. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Wenner-Gren Center and Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundations for financial support.Back.
Note 2: This training is then followed up by reoccurring one-month training sessions until the man is middle aged.Back.
Note 3: The same studies show that when men choose to stay away from work due to child care, it also affects their wage and career opportunities negatively.Back.
Note 4: The compulsory military training for Swedish men was changed in 1995. It now means that all men at the age of 19 are drafted but they do not necessarily have to go through the military training (www. mil. se).Back.
Note 5: Researchers at the department of history at Ume' University have initiated a research project around these issues and we look forward to seeing the results.Back.
Note 6: Even though the Swedish welfare state often is viewed as 'women friendly', the recent governmental report (SOU 1998:6) also points to its exploitative nature in terms of women as a labor force.Back.
Note 7: There has been an ongoing critical debate mainly centered on what is argued to have been the neutrality policy and what has actually taken place in practice, an example is Wilhelm Agrell's book (1991) with the provoking title: Den Stora Lûgnen (The Big Lie).Back.
Note 8: The Swedish legislative process has a referral system (remissfûrfarandet) whereby governmental proposals, committee or other reports are sent to concerned groups, i. e. , interest groups, research centers and administrative agencies for comments, which are later to be considered before the final bill.Back.
Note 9: That the realist school was highly influential in the Swedish security context as well, is evident for example in the report on Swedish security policy issued by the Defense Ministry (SOU 1966:56) where both the vocabulary and the strategic considerations reflect realist assumptions (particularly ch. 2 and 3).Back.
Note 10: This is the argument raised by many researchers in security studies where the trend is to call for both concepts and strategies that consider non-military issues, such as pollution, resource depletion as well as poverty as more realistic security concerns. References here, Even neo-realist like Buzan (1991) have included a wider definition of security. Neither has such notion been unfamiliar to Swedish policy makers. An example is Prime Minister Olof Palme's speech of 1985 on Swedish security policy, where he clearly extends it to include a much wider definition of security.Back.
Note 11: The Home Guard Hemvrnet was created in 1940 as a response to Germany's attack on Poland, when the Swedish government feared that Sweden would be involuntarily drawn into war. The Home Guard is composed of young men who have not yet done their military service and of the men over 47. The engagement was and is voluntary and Hemvrnet is an important part of the army war organization. (www. mil. se/FM/arme/hemv).Back.
Note 12: The Swedish government learned a lesson which influenced this decision, when in the late 1930s in need to re-arm in response to the German military buildup, they were unable to obtain supplies form the allied states. The officials came to the conclusion that indigenous research and development in the military area was necessary (Hagelin 1990:37).Back.
Note 13: This discussion is based on Svedberg 1996; 1998.Back.
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