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The Task Structure of International Peace Operations
1
George Mason University,
The Institute of Public Policy
International Studies Association
March 1998
Paper prepared for presentation to the 39th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 17-21 1998.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to systematically examine the task structure of international peace operations. Specifically, this paper assesses the relevance of approximately 400 tasks across 29 historical peace operation cases. Utilizing a variety of statistical techniques, this research demonstrates that peace operations can be empirically categorized according to their task structure. These categories include: complex missions such as Operation Joint Endeavor that involve a wide range of tasks pursued in a volatile, conflict region; missions primarily involving the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid such as Operation Support Hope (Rwanda); observer missions such as a variety of "traditional" UN MILOB operations; and, operations that are primarily diplomatic and political often with the goal of establishing a competent civil authority. The research concludes that peace operations involve complex task interrelationships. This finding has particular implications for our understanding of concepts such as "mission creep." Our analysis, for example, reveals that the most prominent "cluster" of peace operation tasks relates to complex enforcement operations such as those witnessed in the 1990s -- Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia. These operations regularly involve a milieu of tasks involving combat actions of enforcement, peacekeeping, and nation building. These operations seem to inevitably involve interdependent tasks that are broad in scope and in some instances not intuitively obvious. Such a situation makes "mission creep" highly likely, indeed even expected. The paper concludes that mission creep might be a useful domestic political concept but not exceedingly useful when historically examining the tasks of peace operations.
"Our [Bosnia Peacekeeping] force is there to defend American vital interests, and important interests, and not overindulge ourselves in employing them to humanitarian and other types of operations."
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen 3
"The administration is sizing the [Bosnia] mission to a politically correct force and deadline rather than sizing the force to the mission. The danger may not be so much of mission creep as mission constriction."
Sen. Dick Lugar, R-Ind. 4
"The Clinton administration’s end-of-the-year deadline for the departure of American peacekeeping troops from Bosnia is fading away. Good. From the beginning, it was a bad idea to set an arbitrary and unreal deadline on this important but uncertain project. … [M]ission creep is already taking place and is producing positive results."
Washington Post Editorial 5
"What you see happening is certainly mission creep. … Secretary Perry’s recent comments suggest the administration is prepared to transform what was to have been a limited military mission into an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces to nation-building in the Balkans."
House Speaker Newt Gingrich 6
"Question: …to help rebuild the infrastructure in Bosnia. This is something that’s a little surprising. Is that mission creep? Secretary Perry: No. … What General Joulwan has said is … that the Dayton agreement allows IFOR – allows NATO forces to perform these missions in support of the civilians … This is not mission creep."
Then- Secretary of Defense William J. Perry 7
1. INTRODUCTION
American post-Cold War foreign policy has been defined, in part, by a proliferation of U.S. policies and missions defined under the rubric of peace operations. 8 Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia are recent examples of such foreign policy operations that have gained the salience and attention of American policy makers and public. These missions also have been troubling and confusing to many Americans because they do not represent operations that clearly or "cleanly" fit into the conceptual frameworks traditionally used by the American public in assessing major foreign policy initiatives. They do not represent war; they do not represent peace; moreover, they do not represent the types of missions that have dominated American foreign policy since the end of World War II. Peace operations do, however, represent phenomena that will grow in prominence to American foreign and military policies, according to recent, major review of US defense policy. 9
Some of the skepticism that has arisen concerning peace operations is the result of perceived policy failures of a number of these missions. U.S. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is probably the most prominent, recent example of a U.S. mission that has helped to tarnish the views of many concerning peace operations. Restore Hope started as a humane mission to feed starving Somalis but degenerated into a guerrilla war where U.S. troops fought Somalis. Unaware of the apparent "mission creep" that expanded the U.S. policy agenda, the public was outraged when 18 U.S. soldiers died in an October 1993 firefight. When the last U.S. official and his 59 Marine bodyguards left Mogadishu, the U.S. abandoned a failed investment of $1.3 billion and 44 American lives 10 as well as significant public support for peace operations 11 .
1.1 Confusion Concerning Peace Operations And Mission Creep
"The purpose, shape and role of these ‘blue-helmeted’ peacekeepers remains a mystery to many people. Discussions of peace operations often ignites a wider debate over the justification for engagement in humanitarian missions, the use of military force in the world, and the principles of nonintervention and respect for national sovereignty." 12
Much of the confusion surrounding peace operations, we posit, is a function of a lack of understanding or agreement concerning the specific tasks that constitute a peace operation. This confusion is compounded by the fact that today peace operations can not be isolated from other new factors and dynamics that characterize the environment of the international political system.
The end of the Cold War has unleashed a variety of factors and processes that are significantly different than those of the Cold War national security regime
13
and must be considered in the assessment of a peace operation missions. These include:
Russia, the traditional foe of the U.S., has been overwhelmed by a historic transition process from communism to capitalism and has paid relatively less attention to a wide variety of international problems. Moreover, as suggested by a recent report drafted by senior Pentagon officials reviewing U.S. defense strategy, it is not expected that another superpower is likely to emerge to challenge the U.S. for decades. 14 This dynamic would appear to give the U.S. greater latitude in its foreign policy to pursue foreign policy missions that it might have previously foregone.Ethnic, religious, and historical forces have emerged that have the capability to overwhelm weak governments and societies;
Centers of gravity of a variety of forces that have the capability of causing conflict – economic, religious, ethnic, historical, etc. – are difficult to isolate and, therefore, difficult to control and present new challenges for peace operations; and
Peace operation forces are being asked to conduct operations in areas with no legitimate government – such an environment can obscure operational missions and their associated tasks. 15
The confusion surrounding peace operations as well as the post-Cold War international environment is epitomized by the fact that nearly every recent U.S. peace operation has been evaluated, in part, relative to its "mission creep" or lack there of. Mission creep can be defined as the expansion of a military mission to include tasks viewed as beyond the scope of the original mission. Mission creep occurs, in large part, because of an originally undefined end state or unarticulated policy, coupled with a lack of mission focus and unclear mission definitions and objectives. 16
The concept of mission creep has become extremely important in the evaluation of peace operations because such operations are complex, highly subjective and often difficult to "win" missions. There has also been a tendency for countries participating in peace operations to not clearly define their goals prior to intervention and eventually losing track of originally assigned objectives. While most politicians and military leaders seem to abhor mission creep, keeping a peace operation’s tasks within a narrow, predefined scope is extremely difficult and may even be self-defeating in certain contexts.
Many observers' initial evaluation of the Bosnia mission appeared to be an exercise in judging the presence or absence of explicit mission creep. Bosnia is a very interesting case relative to the concept of mission creep. It can be argued that even the original troop size and original "exit" date for IFOR was based on rather artificial and intangible factors rather than detailed mission planning. 17 The probabilities of mission creep occurring in such a contect is great, and probably should be expected.
The problem of controlling mission creep in the Bosnia case was exacerbated by the apparent inconsistencies in Administration policy statements concerning the nature of the mission. For example, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on numerous occasions ruled out the use of U.S. troops to seek out and arrest suspected war criminals, declaring that this "would, in fact, represent mission creep.... It is not IFOR's task." However, then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in June 1996 that "our troops will conduct more visible and proactive patrols throughout the country...[which will] put war criminals at greater risk of apprehension." The role of U.S. troops in providing assistance to war crimes investigators, including providing security for gravesite investigators has also been controversial. Then-IFOR commander Adm. Leighton Smith declared in January 1996 that "NATO is not going to provide specific security...for teams investigating these grave sites." Several weeks later, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that "we'll provide the security that allows them to do that.... I don't consider that mission creep." More recently, reports have indicated that IFOR troops have been engaging in civilian-oriented activities, carrying out constabulary functions, searching for illegal weapons, and assisting in the reconstruction of Bosnia's infrastructure. IFOR has reportedly had greater success in this regard than the civilian aid organizations that have been tasked with these responsibilities. 18
How can mission creep be avoided when even the framers of the mission are apparently confused as to what explicit tasks are judged consistent with the mission plan? We believe this is more than a rhetorical question.
Confusion concerning peace operations is not confined to the U.S. public or policy makers. A recent study conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute and the University of Maryland found that peace operations could also be confusing for the individual troops assigned to the mission. Data based on interviews and focus groups with veterans of Operation Restore Hope, for example, found considerable confusion in the minds of individual soldiers who participated in this mission emanating, in part, from:
The overlap and differences in scope between combat and peacekeeping tasks;The belief that the perceived mission (combat) differed from the stated mission; Unit preparation and training for peacekeeping versus combat tasks that differ significantly;
The belief that personnel, equipment, and weapons did not match their actual mission; and
Perceived inappropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE). 19
Donald Daniel has offered additional reasons for confusion concerning peace operations and other "new types" of military missions, especially as they relate to individual soldiers and the military establishment. 20 Daniel presents a number of assertions and implications concerning peace operations and other "non-traditional" missions 21 that may help explain why such operations are fraught with confusion.
The first assertion, he suggests, is that military leaders find peace operation missions among the most difficult to undertake. Unlike traditional operations, during peace operations the military cannot expect those parties relevant to the mission or conflict will act in a manner that the military leaders are traditionally accustomed to. Hence, the mindset of commanders needs to change. In enforcement operations and "gray area" missions military leaders must assume that some resistance will be either centrally coordinated by some government or faction or, even worse, sporadic -- e.g., roadblocks manned by drunken irregulars armed with Kalashnikovs--with no clear indication whether such a situation represents the rule or exception. Unlike a Desert Storm situation, soldiers participating in peace operations cannot assume that they can or will be engage in full-fledged combat aimed at winning and breaking all resistance. Rather, the same military personnel expected to demonstrate resolve or enforce resolutions and sanctions are also expected to do so with the constricted rules of engagement in the hope that the parties to the conflict will, in the end, willfully assent to the peace operation’s mandate. Hence, to the soldiers involved, the tasks employed to achieve the operation’s goals are often viewed as contradictory to its ends.
A second assertion, made by Daniel, is that all the problems associated with peacekeeping increase geometrically when quasi- or openly mandated peace enforcement missions are pursued. Traditional peacekeeping assumes consent of the parties and usually occurs after an outbreak of conflict. 22 Traditional peacekeeping elements, suggests Daniel, are relatively small in number (often bringing together only individuals rather than units), they do not generally require large amounts of supplies, communications equipment, and medical facilities. Gray area operations or enforcement, according to Daniel, are usually mandated because the international community wishes to halt killing and destruction. Since people are being maimed and killed, the sense of urgency is high and the stakes on the human level are paramount. This means step-level increases in the magnitude of the problems UN and other forces must resolve but a step-level decrease in the amount of time available to resolve them. The issues are not only those of sovereignty and intervention that define the outer limit of the debate. From an organizational perspective they involve concerns about proper planning, intelligence, equipment, communications, command and control, size and capabilities of contributed forces, and coordination among them (including resolving such basis issues as language problems).
Finally, Daniel argues that the US should be leery of missions involving forceful intervention because he does not believe that they necessarily make things better in the long run. He suggests that there are also valid questions about how much the international community can afford to do and how much it can do. The problem requiring attention -- as in Rwanda -- may grow too big for the community to deal with until it subsides. Even if a problem is addressed, it is enough to deal with merely symptoms unless the underlying causes of the problem are addressed. If root problems are not alleviated through the pursuit of appropriate tasks then the problems will recur. Hence, Daniel argues that peace operations’ tasks will be more involved, more expensive, and more frustrating than most publics of contributing member states to the peace operation are willing to tolerate. Such practical dilemmas, he suggests, will always overwhelm moral qualms and suppress consequent guilt and eventually result in confusion and failed policy.
Regardless if one accepts Daniel’s arguments, the fact remains that peace operations are both pervasive and controversial. The need to assess claims made by Daniel and others is to explicitly examine the tasks that constitute peace operations. A systematic understanding of the tasks pursued by peace operations, we believe, can enhance our understanding of peace operations. How we have approached such an assessment is the topic of the next sections of this paper.
1.2 Peace Operation Task Analysis
The underlying assumption prompting the research reported here is that much of the confusion and skepticism concerning peace operations can be traced back to our lack of systematic knowledge concerning the structure of peace operations. A peace operation, like any military or political venture, will consist of a series of missions that are themselves the composed of explicit tasks pursued to reach some stated or implied policy goal. 23 In order to understand peace operations, we must understand the explicit tasks that define such operations. 24
We do not assume that all peace operations will consist of similar tasks or task types. Peace operations probably more so than traditional military operations appear to be very context-driven. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that certain types of peace operations and central tendencies of the relevant tasks pursued can be historically discerned. The Center for Naval Analysis, for example, has broken down the spectrum of peace operations that have involved the participation of US Marines into the following conceptual typology:
Humanitarian intervention and military peacemaking/enforcement/keeping;Movements of people;
Natural disaster relief;
Nation-building activities;
Policing functions; and
Other activities. 25
We would expect that if such a typology is empirically valid, we should find trends and consistencies in the categories of tasks relevant to each type of peace operation.
There are additional analytic payoffs to the systematic examination of peace operation tasks. The examination of peace operation tasks allows us to coherently address the concept of "mission creep". It seems reasonable to hypothesize that certain tasks and types of tasks will be interrelated. If this hypothesis is indeed correct then mission creep needs to be evaluated in a new light. "Deep structural" dynamics of peace operations may "exist" that make the probability of certain task interaction highly likely in certain contexts. This, in turn, would suggest that the concept of mission creep might ignore the realities of the complexity and dynamics of peace operations.
1.3 Specific Research Objectives
What peace operations represent is the focus of the research presented in this paper. Specifically, the research reported below is aimed at the quantitative, systematic examination of tasks associated with peace operations. All of the research reported in this paper is grounded in historical data.
Some of the explicit research questions that we will address in this analysis include:
Are there certain tasks that are generally relevant or pursued during a peace operation?Do certain tasks cluster together suggesting that there are tasks that historically have been pursued in tandem (both implicitly and explicitly)?
What does the clustering of certain tasks mean to the concept of "mission creep?"
Has the task structure of peace operations changed during recent years?
Can we differentiate different types of peace operations by their task clusters?
As stated above, the underlying assumption of our research is that the evaluation of peace operations requires an assessment of the tasks that define these missions. Only through the analysis of the tasks that categorize such operations can we begin to coherently assess what such missions mean for the foreign policy of the United States.
1.4 Definitions
The United Nations defines peacekeeping as "the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace." 26
The US Army defines peacekeeping as "neutral military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement." 27
For the purpose of this paper, we adopt the DOD definition (approved by JMTGM# 094-95) of Peace operations as missions "encompass[ing] peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. 28 Peacekeeping is defined as "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement" (approved by JMTGM# 094-95). Peace enforcement is defined as an "application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order" (approved by JMTGM# 094-95). Finally we define peace building as "post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (approved by JMTGM# 094-95. Peacemaking is defined as "the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it" (approved by JMTGM# 094-95).
Peace-enforcement is defined by the US Army as "the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The primary purpose of PE is the restoration of peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community." 29 The UN has not formally defined peace enforcement but does talk about peace enforcement units that would be warranted, as a provisional measure, under Article 40 of the UN Charter. Former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali notes that such units should not be confused with forces constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with military personnel which governments agree to keep on stand-by for possible peacekeeping operations. 30
2. METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1 Peace Operations Task List
In order to assess peace operation tasks, one first must obtain a list of such tasks. Unfortunately an authoritative and generally accepted and validated list of peace operation tasks does not exist. Hence, our first research objective was to generate such a task list.
Utilizing the relatively vast collection of books, articles, papers, doctrine, policy, JTTP lessons learned, and after-action reports contained in the Joint Electronic Library’s "Peace Operations" collection, 31 we compiled a comprehensive list of peace operations’ tasks. The JEL collection consists of literally hundreds of relevant documents and publications and represents hundreds of thousands of pages of information. Our research team methodically reviewed the entire JEL collection in an effort to compile an exhaustive list of tasks relevant to all aspects of peace operations. Appendix A presents our compiled list of 400 tasks. 32
It is important to note that this list was compiled from a wide variety of sources representing "actual" lessons-learned, journalistic and scholarly accounts of peace operations, doctrinal publications, and training materials. Thus, our list was compiled from doctrinal, theoretical and empirical accounts of peace operations.
In compiling the list we "erred towards inclusion rather that exclusion." We wanted a detailed task list that was exhaustive, but not necessarily mutual exclusive. A review of the list will find a number of tasks that are similar and in some instance the same while worded differently. Again, this was done to help us in our eventual coding of actual peace operations using the list.
2.2 Peace Operation Missions
Having a compiled task list, our next research step was the compilation of peace operations that could be examined via the task list. Table 1 presents the 29 Peace Operations selected for analysis. This list represents the vast majority of United Nation’s operations pursued since World War II and arguably the most complex operations of this kind ever pursued by the United States.
Table 1:
33
Peace Operations Analyzed
| Peace Operation | Description |
| UNTSO* | UN Truce Supervision Organization; Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders |
| UNMOGIP* | UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; Monitor cease-fires in Jammu and Kashmir |
| UNFICYP* | UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; Monitor buffer zone Greek and Turkish Communities |
| UNDOF* | UN Disengagement Observer Force; Monitor separation of Syrian and Israeli Forces in Golan Heights |
| UNIFIL* | UN Interim Force in Lebanon |
| UNGOMAP* | UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| UNIIMOG* | UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group |
| UNAVEM I* | UN Angola Verification Mission I |
| UNTAG* | UN Transition Assistance Group; Election Monitoring; Police Monitoring; Supervision of Cease Fire |
| ONUCA* | UN Observer Group in Central America |
| UNIKOM* | UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission; Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War |
| UNAVEM III* | UN Angola Verification Mission II; Monitor cease-fire and administer free elections |
| ONUSAL* | UN Observer Mission in El Salvador; Monitor human rights and supervision of forces |
| MINURSO* | UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; Conduct referendum on independence vs. joining Morocco |
| UNPROFOR* | UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia; Monitor cease-fire between factions |
| UNTAC* | UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; Supervise govt. functions and elections while rebuilding country and disarming factions |
| UNOSOM I* | UN Operation in Somalia; Ensure cease-fire and disarmament, provide national reconciliation and humanitarian rehabilitation |
| ONUMOZ* | UN Operation in Mozambique; Implement general peace agreement |
| UNOSOM II* | UN Operation in Somalia; Ensure cease-fire and disarmament, provide national reconciliation and humanitarian rehabilitation |
| UNOMIG* | UN Observer Mission in Georgia; Observe cease-fire |
| UNOMIL* | UN Observer Mission in Liberia; Observe cease-fire |
| UNMIH* | UN Mission in Haiti; Observe transitional govt. and human rights |
| UNAMIR* | UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda |
| UNOMUR* | UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda |
| UNMOT* | UN Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan |
| Operation Restore Hope | 4 Phase US-lead UNITAF operation in Somalia to: 1. establish lodgment; 2. secure relief sites and convoy routes; 3. expand security in Relief Sectors; 4. provide for transfer of its functions to UN control; Army forces involved: 10th Mountain Division - principal unit, with troops from 14 other U.S. posts, reserve units and 4 locations in Germany. 3 Feb. 93 peak strength 25,000 |
| Operation Support Hope | US Military Mission to Rwanda to: 1. provide air traffic and communications control for necessary airfields; 2. provide military security at the airfields; 3. provide surveillance aircraft to track refugees; 4. deploy loading/unloading equipment; 5. establish a purified water system; Army forces peaked at 2,590 |
| Operation Uphold Democracy | US Military Mission to secure a stable environment to permit Haitian Govt to achieve and sustain functional governance; prepare country for free fair elections; Initial deployed forces were from XVIII ABN Corps and the 10th MTN Div. As of 1800, 28 Sep 94, there were 19,605 troops ashore and approx. 9,200 afloat in support of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Army personnel were approx. 16, 400, the bulk of which were from 10th MTN Div. (This excludes, of course, the 82d ABN Div troops that were prepared to go to Haiti, but not sent at the last minute.) Force included more than 1300 Mil Police. Total Army personnel deployed, according to one source, were 20,931. Another source gives maximum number actually on the island as about 17,700. Dropped to 6K US troops in Haiti in Jan 95. It is not clear whether some of the above figures include approx. 1000 USMC personnel. 3d Special Forces Grp (1000+) 10th Mtn Div --> 3 Inf Bns from 25th ID (L)--some 3500 troops when support elms are included--and 3-2d ACR |
| Operation Joint Endeavor | US lead Military Mission to implement the Dayton Accord’s General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) signed by Former Warring Factions (FWF) of former-Yugoslavia. The mission to implement the GFAP fell to the military components of NATO, which authorized the first ground operation in its history and the largest military operation in Europe since World War II. The U.S. committed the 1st Armored Division as the nucleus of the “Multinational Division - North,” one of three multinational divisions comprising the Implementing Force (IFOR), under the command and control of the NATO Allied Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC), whose HQ was in Sarajevo. The U.S. contribution also included augmentation of the ARRC HQ, a National Support Element (NSE), comprised of elements of USAREUR and V Corps in Hungary and Croatia, and air and naval assets working throughout the Area of Responsibility. Primary tasks included: 1. cessation of hostilities between FWF; 2. ensure cooperation of the FWF with IFOR; 3. separate the FWF by ensuring withdrawal from a Zone of Separation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; ensure freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 5. supervise the transition of control between FWF in designated Areas of Transfer; 6. monitor the status of forces (demilitarization, weapons stockpile, training) throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina |
2.3.1 Un Peace Operation Missions
UN Missions were selected for a number of analytical reasons. Primary in selecting UN missions was the fact that the UN has been involved in peace operations longer than any other international actor and there are lessons to be learned from its experience.
The United Nation’s first listed purpose in its Charter is "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
The United Nations Security Council has been vested with a series of concrete measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are key to UN participation in peace operations. Chapter VI provides that international disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" can be brought to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. Thus, the Security Council is expressly mandated to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment and, in addition, to recommend actual terms of a settlement. The action of the Security Council in this context is limited to making recommendations; essentially, the parties themselves, acting on a voluntary basis to carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter must achieve the peaceful settlement of international disputes. If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists, the Council may use the broad powers given it in Chapter VII of the Charter. In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures, as it deems necessary or desirable. Next, it may decide, under Article 41, what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed by the Members of the United Nations, including the complete or partial interruption of economic relations, communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider such measures inadequate, it may take, under Article 42, "such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".
Early UN missions were essentially, holding actions. There was not, and still is not, any particular theory or doctrine behind them. They were born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action. The term "peacekeeping operation" did not gain currency until much later.
Peacekeeping operations have been most commonly employed to supervise and help maintain cease-fires, to assist in troop withdrawals, and to provide a buffer between opposing forces. However, peacekeeping operations are flexible instruments of policy and have been adapted to a variety of uses, including helping to implement the final settlement of a conflict. Peacekeeping operations are rarely, if ever, purely military. They have always included civilian personnel to carry out essential political or administrative functions, sometimes on a very large scale.
The sheer magnitude of possible tasks employed in a UN peace operation was a second reason we selected UN operations. We hypothesized that a focus on UN missions would give us the needed variance in task structure and relevance to entertain a series of research questions. Moreover, it would appear that the nature of UN peace operations has changed significantly over the last few years. During its first 40 years of existence the UN participated in 13 peace operations. Since 1988, the number of UN missions has than doubled with each mission more complex than its predecessor. 34 In 1990, the United Nations had five peacekeeping operations involving about 10,000 troops, not counting Korea. Three years later, there were 24 UN operations with over 75,000 troops, 5,600 of them US military personnel. Peacekeeping costs skyrocketed from $800M to almost $4 billion during the same period, with the United States paying approximately one-third of these costs. 35 As of December 31, 1996 there were 16 UN operations consisting of nearly 25,000 troops. 36 This new complexity requires examination.
Third, available resources made UN operations attractive historical cases for analysis. The UN has published extensive information concerning its peace operations experience. Hence, the research team had readily available data sources from which it could historically examine peace operation tasks. 37
2.3.2 United State's Peace Operations
Peace operations are not new for the United States. Since 1948, US military personnel have served in many such operations--to include the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Sinai (since 1982)--as members of a multinational force and observers (MFO). It is interesting to note that of the 631 separate operations conducted by the US Air Force worldwide between 1947 and 1992, only ten involved actual combat against major armed forces. 38
What is new is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent peace operations. During the 1990s, the US has been involved in a variety of complex and trying peace operations. Some have resulted in the US meeting its stated objectives, while others have not been as fortunate. We selected four US missions for detailed analysis -- Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), Rwanda (Operation Support Hope/JTF), Haiti (Operation, Uphold Democracy), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Operation Joint Endeavor). We believe these four recent missions were of such breadth and magnitude that in combination with the UN cases they would result in interesting data for analysis.
3.0 Peace Operations Task Relevance
Having compiled a comprehensive and exhaustive task list and selected cases of peace operations for analysis, the project team gathered a large volume of documentation and data from which to analyze each operation vis-à-vis the task list. Initially, we wanted to assess both the relevancy and actual "achievement" or "accomplishment" of each task for the peace operations in question.
We soon discovered that we could code each task for each peace operation and its respective relevance, but that coding task accomplishment was overly subjective. Assessing the "relevance" of each of the 400 tasks over the 29 cases required approximately 11,600 empirical judgments! Coding task accomplishment would have doubled that number of judgments and, more problematically, evaluating task accomplishment required, indeed necessitated, intense subjective judgments by the coder.
Coding the relevance of tasks was a much easier and cleaner analytic task. 39 As suggested above, we had substantial UN documentation that discussed not only detailed chronologies of events pursued in the operations, but also explicit tasks. For the four US cases, we utilized After Action Reports, Lessons Learned Documents, as well as operation case histories, scholarly and journalistic accounts. While our coding could have been much easier if we had at our disposal actual Unit Operation Orders and Situation Reports, we feel comfortable with task relevance coding. 40
Table 2 presents data concerning the number of tasks found relevant to each peace operation examined.
The Bosnia-Herzegovina UN and US missions, respectively UNPROFOR and Operation Joint Endeavor, were found to have the greatest number of relevant peace operation tasks. This finding highlights the notion that Bosnia represents the largest peace operation of its kind ever conducted in the post-Cold War period and quite possibly the most complicated -- if we can assume that the absolute number of tasks can suggest mission difficulty and complication. The magnitude and range of the tasks relevant to this operation illustrates the importance of force training and preparation for peace operations. Peace operations’ tasks are presently not included in unit METLs. In fact, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, specifically states that "Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit’s METL...For planning purposes, units require from 4 to 6 weeks of specialized training" to be prepared to conduct peace operations. We are not convinced that such a position is defensible considering the magnitude and complexity of tasks possibly facing the individual soldier.
Interestingly, the highest ranking operations relative to the absolute number of relevant peace operation tasks are all very recent or on-going missions -- UNPROFOR, Joint Endeavor, Uphold Democracy, UNMIH, UNTAC, Restore Hope, UNOSOM II and I ONUMOZ, UNOMIL, UNAMIR. Peace operations, at least at first glance, are requiring new skills and force abilities.
The number of tasks relevant to recent missions also suggests that the probability for missions to experience "mission creep" is increasing, assuming that the more relevant tasks an operation has the more likely the chances of mission creep. The only US-lead operation not among the most task-laden was found to be Operation Support Hope of Rwanda. This US operation was to provide military support to UN and NGO relief efforts ("Stop the dying"). JTF Support Hope was to provided humanitarian assistance as opposed to nation-building or peacekeeping where so many of the tasks of peace operations lie. In addition, the force was commanded to maintain focus and AVOID MISSION CREEP. The mission was NOT to get involved in peacekeeping, in an effort to avoid a repeat of the experience in Somalia – a fact that permeates the after action reports, lessons learned documents, and case studies of this operation.
The Support Hope US military mission was succinctly defined as: 1. provide air traffic and communications control for necessary airfields; 2. provide military security at the airfields; 3. provide surveillance aircraft to track refugees; 4. deploy loading/unloading equipment, and; 5. establish a purified water system. Quite simply the mission was "to provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations in theater to alleviate the immediate suffering of Rwanda refugees." 41 Hence, the role was to facilitate and support and not lead as the US did in Somalia. US forces in Kigali, with the exception of the CMOC, were restricted to the airport for the duration of the mission. It was clear that the US did not want to get involved in a protracted civil war and experience mission creep. It was also a relatively small mission with the JTF never exceeding 3600 troops AOR.
Table 2 also illustrates the changing nature of peace operations. More traditional military observation missions (MILOB) -- "traditional UN peacekeeping operations" such as UNDOF, UNMOGIP, UNTSO, UNIFIL all remained relatively focused on fewer, well-defined tasks. This finding suggests that UN operations may be less prone to mission creep when compared to operations lead by the US.
The data also highlight and have implications for the following observations of the Army’s Bosnia-Herzegovina Interim After Action Review that was recently held at the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute: 42
Table 2:
Peace Operations and Number of Relevant Peace Operation Tasks
| Mission | Start | End | Person | < td>Cost/yrNo_TASKs | |
| UNPROFOR | Mar-92 | Dec-95 | 39789 | 1600.0 | 339 |
| Joint Endeavor/IFOR | Dec-95 | Nov 96 | 20000 | 327 | |
| Uphold Democracy | Sep-94 | Apr-95 | 21000 | 319 | |
| UNMIH | Sep-93 | Jun-96 | 2123 | < td>50.0285 | |
| UNTAC | Mar-92 | Sep-93 | 22000 | 741.0 | 271 |
| Restore Hope | Dec-92 | May-93 | 25000 | 246 | |
| UNOSOM II | May-93 | Mar-95 | 9412 | 977.0 | 209 |
| UNOSOM I | Apr-92 | Apr-93 | 4219 | 178 | |
| ONUMOZ | Dec-92 | Jan-95 | 5063 | 310.0 | 154 |
| UNOMIL | Sep-93 | Sep-97 | 84 | 132 | |
| UNAMIR | Oct-93 | Mar-96 | 5522 | 193.5 | 123 |
| ONUCA | Nov-89 | Jan-92 | 9 1 | ||
| UNFICYP | Mar-64 | 1200 | 42.3 | < td>87||
| Support Hope | Jul-94 | Oct-94 | 82 | ||
| UNTAG | Apr-89 | Mar-90 | 22000 | 741.0 | 81 |
| MINURSO | Sep-91 | 334 | 40.5 | ||
| UNIIMOG | Aug-88 | Feb-91 | 72 | ||
| UNOMIG | Aug-93 | 136 | 23.0 | 70 | |
| UNIFIL | Mar-78 | 5146 | 146.0 | < td>63||
| UNAVEM II | Jun-91 | Sep-95 | 7285 | 42.0 | 60 |
| UNTSO | Jun-48 | 218 | 31.0 | 57 | |
| UNMOGIP | Jan-49 | 44 | 7.2 | 55 | |
| ONUSAL | Jul-91 | Apr-95 | 34 | 55 | |
| UNDOF | Jun-74 | 1061 | 36.0 | 53 | |
| UNIKOM | Apr-91 | 1174 | 75.0 | ||
| UNGOMAP | Apr-88 | Mar-90 | 39 | ||
| UNMOT | Dec-94 | 44 | 1.1 | 34 | |
| UNOMUR | Jun-93 | Sep-94 | 106 | < td>8.032 | |
| UNAVEM I | Jan-89 | Jun-91 | 30 |
Current doctrine may not be broad enough to ensure the full integration of civilian organizations, i.e., non-DOD, UN, IGO or NGO organizations, into planning for peace operations. Specifically, although units involved with Haiti developed close relationships when planning/executing peace operations, the same can not be said of OJE. This coordination and "mindset" of bringing these organizations in early during planning and execution does not appear to be institutionalized throughout the Army. Also, there appear to be inconsistencies in peace operations doctrine between Joint, Army, NATO (in draft), and UN publications.
Peace operations are not going to "go away." Adding peace operations tasks to at least some unit METLs, for example, will ensure the Army is better prepared to conduct these types of operations in the future. This would enable at least some units to deploy in a crisis, rather than receive the "...4 to 6 weeks of specialized training." Generic peace operations METLs with supporting tasks, conditions and standards would be helpful to units that could potentially deploy for peace operations. Exportable training programs, with associated POI, would be invaluable to units preparing for deployment. Adding peace operations to the METLs of selected units would not create specialized peace operations units, but units with the appropriate peace operations skills.
The US military must ensure that peace operations doctrine includes the need for early and continuous coordination with civilian organizations. Lessons learned involving civilian organizations from one operation must be applied to the next. Inconsistencies in peace operations doctrine between Joint, Army, NATO, and UN publications must be addressed.
Elimination of peace operations exercises at JRTC involving civilian organizations in 1995, 1996, and 1997, has probably hindered the ability of the US military to work with those organizations in future operations. Because of the perishable nature of such training, the US military may be "losing its edge" in using these organizations as force multipliers. The importance of peace operations suggests that adding humanitarian advisors, similar to POLADs, to all CINC staffs and possibly component staffs will better enable them to plan for and work with civilian organizations in the future. Placing humanitarian aid experts/instructors within the Army education and doctrine system, for example, may assist in providing leaders with the requisite skills to successfully conduct peace operations in conjunction with these types organizations in the future.
Table 3 presents data concerning the magnitude of the "relevance" of each of the compiled peace operation tasks. That is, the table represents a rank ordering of relevant tasks (in percentage terms) across the 29 peace operations examined.
"Observing and reporting on developments" was found to be relevant to all peace operations. This was the only task found not to be "variable" as far as its relevancy was concerned. Eleven tasks -- safeguard valuable cultural properties; limit freedom movement (land, air, sea); enforce maritime agreements; conduct nonpermissive evacuations; interdict narcotics; protect offshore installations; rescue hostages; accompany; neutral shipping; dispose personal property; incarcerate war criminals; and judge war criminals -- were not found to be relevant to the peace operations examined.
Table 3 highlights the importance of tasks explicitly involving conflict reduction or resolution to peace operations. With the exception of "supply military information and liaison" (which reinforces the importance of the multinational nature of most peace operations), all of the tasks found to be relevant in 90 percent or more of the operations involve aspects of conflict resolution and "peacekeeping". Investigative and monitoring "types" of tasks were also found to be quite relevant to most peace operations. This suggests the continuing importance of tradition MILOB, case-fire observation/verifications and other peacekeeping ventures. While the spatial dimensions of peace operations have expanded with new types of tasks coming to the fore, the older, more traditional tasks will not go away.
It is interesting that the highest-ranking humanitarian task -- "provide emergency relief" -- was found relevant in only 52% of the operations. No other humanitarian task was found to be relevant in at least 50% of the operations. It seems that humanitarian tasks as well as task associated with "peace building" have only recently become relevant to peace operations, thus accounting for there lower absolute relevance.
The data presented in the table validate the notion that most peace operations still conform to the model and rules of traditional peacekeeping. These missions often deal with cross-border disagreements or conflicts where the peacekeepers goal is to separate hostile forces and/or monitor borders, cease-fires, or force movements.
Table 3:
Percentage of Peace Operations Each Task Was Found Relevant
| Number | Task | % Relevant |
| 143 | Observing And Reporting; On Developments | 100 |
| 1 | Supply; Military Information And Liaison | 93 |
| 94 | Monitor; Combatants Or Belligerents Activities | 93 |
| 203 | Maintain; Information On Disposition Belligerents | 93 |
| 234 | Monitor; Conditions Potential Conflict Area | 93 |
| 245 | Assist; Conflict Diffusion, Stabilization, And Resolution | 93 |
| 146 | Investigation; Complaints And Violations | 90 |
| 64 | Transmit; Messages | 86 |
| 67 | Secure; Routes From Point Departure To Destination | 86 |
| 181 | Provide; Communication Between Parties | 86 |
| 1097 | Support; Monitoring Cease Fire | 86 |
| 179 | Investigate; Alleged Violations Peace Agreements | 83 |
| 213 | Discourage; Infiltration And Confrontations | 83 |
| 227 | Provide; Liaison Between Parties | 83 |
| 6 | Investigate; Breaches Cease-Fire | 79 |
| 360 | Provide; Area And Route Reconnaissance | 79 |
| 20 | Verify ; Cease-Fires, Cantonments And Disarmaments | 76 |
| 25 | Supervise And Monitor ; Cease-Fires, Peace Agreements | 76 |
| 32 | Monitor; Disengagement Forces | 76 |
| 178 | Inspect; Demilitarized Zones And Weapon Sites | 76 |
| 200 | Observe And Report; On Alleged Violations (MILOB) | 76 |
| 201 | Investigate; Cease-Fire Violations Or Boundary Incidents | 76 |
| 1152 | Conduct; Reconnaissance | 76 |
| 1167 | Stabilize; Conflict Among Belligerents | 76 |
| 60 | Liaison; Opposing Parties Conflict | 72 |
| 65 | Disseminate; Public Information | 72 |
| 90 | Patrolling; Security | 72 |
| 144 | Patrol; Border Or Line Demarcation | 72 |
| 177 | Conduct; Conventional Observer Missions (Milob) | 72 |
| 185 | Encourage; Resumption Normal Interparty Relations | 72 |
| 198 | Perform; Checkpoints And Observation Posts, Actions At | 72 |
| 35 | Patrol; Cease-Fire Lines | 69 |
| 47 | Provide; Early-Warning Capabilities | 69 |
| 209 | Supervision; Withdrawals And Disengagements | 69 |
| 2030 | Conduct; Liaison Visits With Local Authorities | 69 |
| 97 | Man; Observer Posts | 66 |
| 184 | Develop; Recognized Procedures Dealing With Violations | 66 |
| 2032 | Conduct; Liaison And Visits With Population | 66 |
| 1013 | Enforce; Cease-Fire/Disarmament | 66 |
| 88 | Post; Checkpoints And Road Blocks | 62 |
| 211 | Supervise; Demilitarization And Demobilization | 62 |
| 221 | Employ; Air Surveillance | 62 |
| 1171 | Deter; Violent Acts | 62 |
| 172 | Monitor; Boundaries | 59 |
| 197 | Perform; Fact-Finding Missions | 59 |
| 243 | Prevent And Contain; Outbreaks Hostilities | 59 |
| 342 | Secure; Area | 59 |
| 31 | Monitor; Withdrawal Occupation Forces | 55 |
| 102 | Support; Political Efforts At Mediation | 55 |
| 166 | Perform; Logistic Functions | 55 |
| 183 | Establish; Area As Limited Military Strength And Armaments | 55 |
| 1030 | Provide; Logistic Support To Move Supplies | 55 |
| 2031 | Conduct; Liaison With Other Intervenors (UN, OSCE, ICRC) | 55 |
| 43 | Provide; Emergency Relief | 52 |
| 53 | Conduct; Pre-Mission Reconn Assessment Missions | 52 |
| 61 | Assist; Weapon Collection/Confiscation | 52 |
| 83 | Implement; Cease-Fire | 52 |
| 89 | Security; Installation | 52 |
| 148 | Supervise; Truces | 52 |
| 1094 | Provide; Medical Care To Supported Force | 52 |
| 1179 | Provide; Checkpoint Security | 52 |
| 2 | Perform; Analysis | 48 |
| 4 | Mobility Support; Relief Efforts | 48 |
| 21 | Monitor; Law Enforcement, Indigenous | 48 |
| 48 | Deliver; Relief Assistance | 48 |
| 136 | Monitor; Refugee Flows | 48 |
| 138 | Conduct; Presence Patrols And Deterrent Deployments | 48 |
| 147 | Perform; Negotiation And Mediation | 48 |
| 173 | Demilitarize; Forces | 48 |
| 354 | Coordinate; Military Activities With Others | 48 |
| 1092 | Provide; Direct Medical Support Operations | 48 |
| 1208 | Perform; Movement Humanitarian Aid | 48 |
| 3 | Participate; Humanitarian Relief Operations (HRO) | 45 |
| 12 | Monitor And Investigate; Human Rights Violations | 45 |
| 26 | Mediate; Cease-Fires, Armistices Or Peace Agreements | 45 |
| 27 | Buffer Or Contain; Belligerents | 45 |
| 28 | Provide; Humanitarian Assistance, Delivery, Security | 45 |
| 34 | Mediate; Conflicts | 45 |
| 42 | Provide; Refugee Protection | 45 |
| 66 | Support; Local Authorities Create Consensual Operations | 45 |
| 111 | Provide; Logistic Support Peace Operations | 45 |
| 150 | Establish; Significant And Visible Military Presence | 45 |
| 155 | Transportation; Relief Supplies And Civilians | 45 |
| 156 | Provide; Health Services | 45 |
| 244 | Assist; Troop Withdrawals | 45 |
| 346 | Establish; Logistical Bases | 45 |
| 350 | Arbitrate; Local Disputes Or Fights | 45 |
| 357 | Guard Facilities; Facilities | 45 |
| 1078 | Transport; Supplies And Rations To Camps And Checkpoints | 45 |
| 1082 | Provide; Food | 45 |
| 1091 | Conduct; Medical Operations Including Surgery | 45 |
| 1107 | Security; Local Area | 45 |
| 1206 | Distribute; Food | 45 |
| 2026 | Provide; Medical Services To Civilians | 45 |
| 2029 | Conduct; Presence Through Information Campaign | 45 |
| 15 | Improve; Water Supply | 41 |
| 16 | Provide; Engineering Assistance | 41 |
| 36 | Conduct; Field Operations | 41 |
| 38 | Disarm; Combatants | 41 |
| 39 | Provide; Lift Support | 41 |
| 70 | Provide; Military Support To Humanitarian Tasks | 41 |
| 76 | Interpose; Between Combatants Or Belligerents | 41 |
| 79 | Protection; NGO And PVO Humanitarian Relief Efforts | 41 |
| 86 | Establish; Surveillance Over Planned Points Entry | 41 |
| 130 | Establish; Disengagement Zones | 41 |
| 149 | Provide; Measure Law, Order, And Stability | 41 |
| 151 | Support; Development Competent Civil Authority | 41 |
| 167 | Planning And Coordinating; Agreements Between Countries | 41 |
| 180 | Engage; Confidence Building Measures | 41 |
| 353 | Conduct; Resettlement | 41 |
| 1032 | Move; Supplies From Main Supt Centers To Dist Centers | 41 |
| 1034 | Transmit; Large Volumes Supplies And Equipment | 41 |
| 1087 | Provide; Potable Water | 41 |
| 1119 | Support; Checkpoint Security | 41 |
| 1166 | Conduct; Interviews With NGO's And PVO's | 41 |
| 1210 | Escort Convoys; Humanitarian Aid | 41 |
| 1211 | Provide; Escorting Convoys Humanitarian Aid | 41 |
| 1217 | Build, Operate, And Secure; Refugee Camps | 41 |
| 1218 | Provide; Command And Control Functions | 41 |
| 1227 | Disarm; Belligerents | 41 |
| 2002 | Mediate; Local Dispute | 41 |
| 2016 | Provide Information; Human Rights | 41 |
| 2024 | Provide; Food To Civilians | 41 |
| 2025 | Provide; Water To Civilians | 41 |
| 5 | Share; Intelligence | 38 |
| 13 | Supervise, Assist; Elections | 38 |
| 18 | Dismantle; Militia And Paramilitary Forces | 38 |
| 19 | Clear; Mines | 38 |
| 40 | Provide; Convoy Escort | 38 |
| 46 | Provide; Reintegration And Rehabilitation Assistance | 38 |
| 74 | Create; Visable Buffer Or Demilitarized Zones | 38 |
| 188 | Assist; Provision Security Elections | 38 |
| 205 | Verify; Destruction Military Equipment | 38 |
| 212 | Maintenance; Law And Order | 38 |
| 247 | Screen-Resettle; Refugees | 38 |
| 359 | Self-Protection; Static Positions | 38 |
| 1108 | Support; Escorting Convoys Humanitarian Aid | 38 |
| 1170 | Restore; Law And Order | 38 |
| 1182 | Perform; Communications Basic Service | 38 |
| 2004 | Distribute; Potable Water | 38 |
| 2005 | Provide; Clothing | 38 |
| 2009 | Report; Human Rights Situation | 38 |
| 1130 | Support; Airfield Security | 34 |
| 22 | Provide; Crowd Control | 34 |
| 33 | Assist; Law Enforcement | 34 |
| 37 | Establish; Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) | 34 |
| 41 | Verification; Weapon Destruction | 34 |
| 71 | Implement; Humanitarian Aid Airlift | 34 |
| 152 | Establish; Base Areas | 34 |
| 157 | Provide; Essential Services | 34 |
| 202 | Conduct; Liaison Visits To PK Forces | 34 |
| 215 | Participate; Diplomatic Negotiations Between Belligerents | 34 |
| 218 | Supervise; Negotiations | 34 |
| 232 | Provide; HRO Compounds And Warehouses Security | 34 |
| 1028 | Conduct; Airfield Operations | 34 |
| 1076 | Install; Water Purification Units | 34 |
| 1077 | Transport; Displaced Individuals | 34 |
| 1085 | Support; Facility Or Embassy Security | 34 |
| 1090 | Dispose; Human Remains | 34 |
| 1095 | Provide; Transportation To Civilian Relief Agencies | 34 |
| 1098 | Provide; Initial And Immediate Facilities Engineering | 34 |
| 1106 | Evacuate; Medical Casualties | 34 |
| 1163 | Perform; Civil Affairs | 34 |
| 1168 | Provide; Reaction Force | 34 |
| 1181 | Establish; Emergency Communications | 34 |
| 1202 | Provide; Temporary Shelter Refugees | 34 |
| 1222 | Confiscate; Weapons At Checkpoints | 34 |
| 2006 | Distribute; Clothing | 34 |
| 2007 | Construct; Sanitation Facilities | 34 |
| 2022 | Assist; NGO Activities (Excess Material, Volunteers, ...) | 34 |
| 2027 | Provide; Shelter Support To Civilians | 34 |
| 57 | Ensure; Infrastructure, Availability Critical (Hospitals, Water/Power ,Etc.) | 31 |
| 63 | Dispose; Explosive Ordnance | 31 |
| 95 | Participation; Civil Affairs Operations | 31 |
| 103 | Support; Civil Affairs Operations | 31 |
| 112 | Construct; Base To Maintain Force | 31 |
| 120 | Provide; Temporary Refuge | 31 |
| 191 | Assistance; Interim Civil Authorities | 31 |
| 199 | Perform; Civil Affairs Support | 31 |
| 223 | Perform; Harbor Security And Protection | 31 |
| 226 | Provide; Trip-Wire Deterrent Activities/Preventive Deployment | 31 |
| 228 | Serve; War Supplies, Custodian Of | 31 |
| 238 | Perform; Law Enforcement Ops (Traffic, Riot Control, Etc.) | 31 |
| 239 | Coordinate; Foreign Support | 31 |
| 343 | Operating; Port Support Activity | 31 |
| 1003 | Prevent; Looting | 31 |
| 1011 | Perform; Countermine Operations | 31 |
| 1025 | Maintain; Inventory Food | 31 |
| 1054 | Build; Base Camps | 31 |
| 1086 | Setup; Tents With Electrical Power | 31 |
| 1109 | Relocation; Civilians | 31 |
| 1117 | Perform; Sanitation And Waste Disposal | 31 |
| 1158 | Use Force; Force To Deter Violent Acts And Restore Order | 31 |
| 1164 | Use; Civil Affairs Interpreters | 31 |
| 1169 | Conduct; Raids And Weapons Seizures | 31 |
| 1203 | Provide; Electrical Power | 31 |
| 1225 | Patrol; Urban Areas | 31 |
| 2020 | Assist; Community Projects | 31 |
| 11 | Establish; Infrastructure | 28 |
| 24 | Assist; Infrastructure Rebuilding | 28 |
| 58 | Facilitate ;Safe Conduct Agricultural Activities | 28 |
| 62 | Repair; Essential Infrastructure | 28 |
| 72 | Airdrop; Humanitarian Aid | 28 |
| 78 | Protection; Human Rights Minorities | 28 |
| 84 | Establish; Lodgement | 28 |
| 85 | Secure; Intelligence On Local Personalities And Facilities | 28 |
| 96 | Secure; Buffer Or Demilitarized Zone (Air Exclusion Zone) | 28 |
| 116 | Construct / Rehab / Upgrade; Port Facilities | 28 |
| 118 | Perform; Refugee Escort Efforts | 28 |
| 145 | Supervise; Exchange POWs, Civilians And Remains | 28 |
| 176 | Guarantee; Rights Passage | 28 |
| 186 | Restore; Government Functions | 28 |
| 206 | Provide; Combat Support | 28 |
| 220 | Employ; Maritime Surveillance | 28 |
| 1014 | Develop; Transient Centers And Camps | 28 |
| 1017 | Provide; Traffic Control | 28 |
| 1035 | Spot Mechanics And PLL; Along Routes Or On Convoys | 28 |
| 1037 | Establish, Operate, And Secure; Transportation System | 28 |
| 1038 | Provide; Maps And Imagery Products | 28 |
| 1063 | Support; Specified Route Security | 28 |
| 1068 | Render; Emergency Repairs To Vital Facilities | 28 |
| 1070 | Perform; Rudimentary Const And Repair Public Facilities | 28 |
| 1073 | Repair; Vehicles And Equipment | 28 |
| 1099 | Provide; C2 And Supervision To Subordinates | 28 |
| 1114 | Provide; Wells Potable Drinking Water | 28 |
| 1160 | Provide; Lift, Tactical Rapid Reaction Force | 28 |
| 1190 | Clear/Repair; Roads | 28 |
| 1223 | Prevent; Pilferage | 28 |
| 1233 | Assist; Public Safety | 28 |
| 2015 | Provide Information; Democratization | 28 |
| 2018 | Assist; Broadcast (TV/Radio) Re-Establishment | 28 |
| 30 | Evacuate; Refugees | 24 |
| 56 | Ensure; Maximum Freedom Movement Civilian Populations | 24 |
| 68 | Provide; Security Awareness Training | 24 |
| 106 | Establish; Command Relationships Between Forces, And Organizations | 24 |
| 125 | Protect; Sea And Air Traffic | 24 |
| 158 | Resettle; Dislocated Civilians | 24 |
| 190 | Investigate; War Crimes And Human Rights Abuses | 24 |
| 216 | Provide; Air Traffic Control | 24 |
| 240 | Provide; Civil Affairs (CA) Liaison And Coordination | 24 |
| 246 | Construct; Civil Infrastructure | 24 |
| 251 | Marginalize; Belligerent Faction Leaders | 24 |
| 1015 | Restore; Order After Riot | 24 |
| 1055 | Construct And Improve; Roads | 24 |
| 1057 | Upgrade And Maintain; Airfields | 24 |
| 1058 | Construct; Protective Shelters And Defensive Positions | 24 |
| 1067 | Construct; Rudimentary Surface Transportation Systems | 24 |
| 1075 | Provide; Power Generation | 24 |
| 1084 | Provide; Construction Material | 24 |
| 1162 | Provide; Clothing Exchange And Bath Facilities | 24 |
| 1192 | Construct; Forward Airfield Or Landing Zone | 24 |
| 1197 | Remove Or Clear/Reduce; Minefields | 24 |
| 1221 | Distribute; Flyers Ordinance/Mine Dangers | 24 |
| 1232 | Extract Or Evacuate; Victims | 24 |
| 1235 | Enforce; Curfews | 24 |
| 49 | Assist; Prisoners-Of-War | 21 |
| 50 | Trace; Displaced Individuals | 21 |
| 87 | Establishment; C3 Facilities | 21 |
| 100 | Expand; Lodgement | 21 |
| 113 | Improve/Upgrade; Main Supply Routes | 21 |
| 115 | Construct/Repair; Construct/Repair Bridges | 21 |
| 122 | Rebuild; Economies | 21 |
| 162 | Detain; Suspected Felony Crimes | 21 |
| 241 | Plan And Conduct; Counterpropaganda Operations (PSYOPS) | 21 |
| 304 | Plan; Support Structure | 21 |
| 1049 | Conduct; Combat Ops | 21 |
| 1060 | Constuct; Support Buildings | 21 |
| 1066 | Repair; Well Equipment | 21 |
| 1089 | Conduct; Intelligence Operations | 21 |
| 1198 | Provide; Well Drilling And Pipeline Installation | 21 |
| 1220 | Translate; Verbal And Written Commun And Documents | 21 |
| 1229 | Cordon And Search; Built Up Areas | 21 |
| 2003 | Mediate; Regional Dispute At Political Level | 21 |
| 2008 | Choose; Diplomatic Course Of Action | 21 |
| 2019 | Assist; Teachers And Other Educators | 21 |
| 51 | Supervise; Prisoner Releases | 17 |
| 52 | Establish; Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) | 17 |
| 77 | Enforce; Sanctions | 17 |
| 80 | Guarantee; Freedom Movement (Land, Air, Sea) | 17 |
| 109 | Provide; Fire/Counterfire Support | 17 |
| 128 | Seize And Hold; Ports Entry | 17 |
| 129 | Secure; Lines Communication And Enclaves | 17 |
| 161 | Impose; Curfews | 17 |
| 164 | Control; Riots | 17 |
| 175 | Enforce; Economic Sanctions | 17 |
| 192 | Train; Local Forces | 17 |
| 214 | Administer; Temporary Civil Functions | 17 |
| 236 | Provide; Minority Groups, Protection And Security | 17 |
| 248 | Interdict; Contraband Supply Routes | 17 |
| 1004 | Conduct; Special Forces Operations | 17 |
| 1006 | Enforce; UN Sanctions | 17 |
| 1009 | Conduct; Psychological Operations | 17 |
| 1023 | Perform; DS Maintenance, Mission Equipment | 17 |
| 1056 | Build And Repair; Bailey Bridges | 17 |
| 1064 | Constuct/Re-Dig; Latrines And Trash Pits Daily | 17 |
| 1083 | Clear; Debris | 17 |
| 1088 | Provide; Laundry, Bath, And Light Textile Renovation | 17 |
| 1188 | Remove/Clear; Existing And Man-Made Obstacles | 17 |
| 1231 | Search; Refugees Weapons And Explosives | 17 |
| 2000 | Conduct; Visits And Meetings With Other Diplomats | 17 |
| 2001 | Create; Diplomatic Courses Of Action | 17 |
| 10 | Establish, Train And Equip; Law Enforcement Forces | 14 |
| 73 | Collect; HUMINT | 14 |
| 92 | Perform; Show Force | 14 |
| 105 | Handover; Operations And Facilities | 14 |
| 107 | Conduct; IPB | 14 |
| 110 | Perform; Engineering Battlefield Functions | 14 |
| 123 | Reestablish; Constitutional Structures | 14 |
| 133 | Inspection; Selected Ships And Aircraft | 14 |
| 140 | Interdict; Arms Smuggling | 14 |
| 153 | Deny; Supplies, Diplomatic, And Trading Privileges | 14 |
| 189 | Facilitate; Transfer Power From Interim To Permanent | 14 |
| 233 | Provide; Technical Assist For Studies To HRO Projects | 14 |
| 352 | Prevent; Refugee Flows | 14 |
| 355 | Establish; Static Defenses | 14 |
| 1018 | Establish; Rear Area Security Raoc Threat | 14 |
| 1079 | Clear; Cars, Trees, Fences, And Debris From Roads | 14 |
| 1115 | Medical Research/Aide; Epidemics | 14 |
| 1118 | Perform; Interpretive Services Civil Affairs | 14 |
| 1189 | Build/Emplace; Obstacles | 14 |
| 1194 | Seizure; Airfield | 14 |
| 1205 | Security; Facility Or Embassy From Attack | 14 |
| 1224 | Handle; Detainees | 14 |
| 1234 | Guard; Damaged Homes And Victims | 14 |
| 2017 | Provide; Pipeline Repair And Services | 14 |
| 44 | Provide; Counseling | 10 |
| 75 | Evacuate; Civilians | 10 |
| 82 | Restore; Territorial Integrity | 10 |
| 126 | Interdict; Sea And Air Traffic | 10 |
| 171 | Provide; Legal Services | 10 |
| 193 | Perform; Search And Rescue Activities | 10 |
| 230 | Exercise; Trading And Other Economic Sanctions | 10 |
| 249 | Rehabilitate; Livelihoods People Who Have Lost Assets | 10 |
| 348 | Negotiate; Tactical Status Forces Agreement (SOFA) | 10 |
| 351 | Administer; Local Justice Codes | 10 |
| 1010 | Conduct; Psychological Operations (Increased Level) | 10 |
| 1016 | Provide; Transportation To Ferry Police Around City | 10 |
| 1052 | Conduct; Counterfire Operations(Bde Area) | 10 |
| 1059 | Construct; Fences Bunkers And Fighting Positions | 10 |
| 1072 | Perform; Sandbagging, Hauling, And Dike Reinforcement | 10 |
| 1074 | Support; Seizure Airfield | 10 |
| 1120 | Perform; Interpretive Services Commander And Staff | 10 |
| 1121 | Perform; Interpretive Services Security | 10 |
| 1159 | Support; Strikes And Raids | 10 |
| 1216 | Evacuate; Noncombatants | 10 |
| 2010 | Identify; War Criminals | 10 |
| 2021 | Assist; Religious Structure Repair | 10 |
| 119 | Assess; Political Asylum Request | 7 |
| 131 | Conduct; Operations Against Piracy | 7 |
| 141 | Conduct; Coercive Antiproliferation | 7 |
| 142 | Seize And Hold; Territory | 7 |
| 207 | Supervise; Free Territories | 7 |
| 219 | Perform; Maritime Interception Operations | 7 |
| 225 | Escort; Maritime Vessels | 7 |
| 237 | Distribute; Social Welfare Benefits | 7 |
| 356 | Seize; Buildings | 7 |
| 1001 | Conduct; Air Defense Low Level Air Threat | 7 |
| 1061 | Harden; Structures Against Direct And Indirect Fires | 7 |
| 1096 | Conduct; Air Defense Medium Level Air Threat | 7 |
| 1102 | Perform; Snow Removal | 7 |
| 1105 | Perform; Topographical Surveying/Mapping | 7 |
| 1116 | Control; Environmentally Related Disease | 7 |
| 1161 | Conduct; High Level Air Threat | 7 |
| 1204 | Provide; Evacuation Unit Or Embassy | 7 |
| 1230 | Eliminate; Snipers | 7 |
| 2028 | Conduct; Show Of Force Overflights | 7 |
| 117 | Rehab/Upgrade; Railroads | 3 |
| 165 | Perform; Claims And Liability Adjudication | 3 |
| 224 | Monitor And Enforce; Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) | 3 |
| 250 | Support; Counterdrug Operations | 3 |
| 320 | Assist; Partition Territory | 3 |
| 1053 | Support; Evacuation Unit Or Embassy | 3 |
| 1100 | Build And Repair; Mobile Assault Bridges | 3 |
| 1101 | Build And Repair; Medium Girder Bridges | 3 |
| 1112 | Conduct; Chemical Decontamination | 3 |
| 1175 | Provide; Bakery | 3 |
| 1200 | Build; Dams | 3 |
| 1201 | Repair ;Dams | 3 |
| 1214 | Acquire; Land Radars Target | 3 |
| 2011 | Locate; War Criminals | 3 |
| 2012 | Arrest; War Criminals | 3 |
| 2023 | Integrate; Space Systems | 3 |
| 59 | Safeguard; Valuable Cultural Properties | 0 |
| 81 | Limiting ; Freedom Movement (Land, Air, Sea) | 0 |
| 124 | Enforce; Maritime Agreements | 0 |
| 137 | Conduct; Nonpermissive Evacuations | 0 |
| 194 | Interdict; Narcotics | 0 |
| 195 | Protect ; Offshore Installations | 0 |
| 196 | Rescue; Hostages | 0 |
| 217 | Accompany; Neutral Shipping | 0 |
| 1026 | Dispose; Personal Property | 0 |
| 2013 | Incarcerate; War Criminals | 0 |
| 2014 | Judge; War Criminals | 0 |
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 seem to be incongruent. We suggested during our discussion of Table 2 that peace operations were changing. This seems abundantly clear from the data. Yet, the data presented in Table 3 seems to suggest that traditional peacekeeping tasks are still highly relevant and operational. Could it be that the traditional task structure of peace operations, as reflected by MILOB operations, serve as the foundation of most peace operations and that recent peace operations have only expanded on top of this foundation?
In an effort to assess this apparent "inconsistency" in findings and to systematically examine task "clusters" we present Tables 4-7. These tables complement and systematically expand on the a priori clustering observations presented in Tables 2 and 3. Tables 4-7 present the results of principal components factor analysis of peace operation tasks. Principal components factor analysis was selected as the factoring or clustering model for this analysis because very little theory presently exists concerning our research questions and we have limited expectations as to the likely theoretical relationships among the peace operation tasks. This lack of theory makes the major alternatives -- some member of the common factor analysis model school -- less attractive. 43
Table 4:
Principal Component Factor Analysis of Peace Operation Task Relevance (Unrotated Loadings), Factors 1-6
| # | Variable | Factor1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor4 | Factor5 | Factor6 |
| 32 | Monitor Disengagement Forces-0.286 | -0.592 | -0.041 | -0.574 | -0.282< /td> | -0.258 | |
| 200 | Observe/Report Violations (MILOB) | 0.034 | -0.405 | 0.017 | -0.654 | 0.133 | 0.126 |
| 1167 | Stabilize Belligerents Conflict-0.349 | -0.469 | 0.317 | -0.167 | -0.503 | -0.117 | |
| 90 | Security Patrolling-0.352 | -0.165 | 0.494 | -0.399 | 0.38 9 | 0.382 | |
| 185 | Encourage Resumption of Normal Relations | -0.439 | -0.532 | -0.462 | -0.079 | 0.055 | -0.263 |
| 211 | Supervise Demilitarization/Demobilization | -0.559 | -0.423 | 0.3 49 | 0.108 | 0.378 | -0.038 |
| 342 | Area Security | -0.559 | 0.394 | 0.445 | -0.017 | 0.315 | |
| 31 | Monitor Withdrawal of Forces-0.304 | -0.518 | -0.593 | 0.161 | -0.090 | 0.206 | |
| 166 | Perform Logistic Functions-0.539 | 0.519 | -0.165 | 0.060 | 0.116< /td> | -0.153 | |
| 183 | Estab Areas as Limited Military/Armaments | -0.037 | -0.398 | 0.442 | 0. 255 | 0.081 | -0.459 |
| 61 | Assist Weapon Collection/Confiscation | -0.769 | -0.238 | -0.285 | -0.111 | -0.191 | 0.082 |
| 148 | Supervise Truces | -0.637 | -0.478 | 0.066 | 0.040 | -0.085 | 0.258 |
| 136 | Monitor Refugee Flows-0.740 | 0.467 | -0.057 | -0.054 | -0.179 | -0.092 | |
| 147 | Perform Negotiation and Mediation-0.586 | -0.271 | 0.134 | 0.406 | -0.319 | 0.245 | |
| 173 | Demilitarize Forces-0.642 | -0.192 | -0.187 | -0.013 | 0.561 | -0.187 | |
| 3 | Humanitarian Relief Operations (HROs) | -0.687 | 0.563 | 0.064 | -0.141 | -0.135 | -0.147 |
| 244 | Assist in Troop Withdrawals-0.411 | -0.591 | -0.150 | 0.428 | 0.2 98 | -0.092 | |
| 36 | Conduct Field Operations-0.710 | 0.247 | 0.180 | 0.038 | 0.257< /td> | -0.120 | |
| 76 | Interpose Between Combatants/Belligerents | -0.336 | -0.168 | 0.648 | < td>0.259-0.389 | -0.068 | |
| 151 | Support Development of Civil Authority | -0.582 | 0.127 | -0.386 | 0.121 | < td>-0.1170.388 | |
| 19 | Clear Mines | -0.404 | 0.608 | -0.179 | -0.037 | -0.056 | -0.137 |
| 40 | Provide Convoy Escorts | -0.781 | 0.461 | -0.040 | -0.187 | -0.159 | |
| Variance | 6.2011 | 4.0406< /td> | 2.2562 | 1.5616 | 1.5356 | 1.1095 | |
| %Var | 0.282 | 0.184 | 0.071 | 0.070 | 0.050 |
Table 5:
Continuation of Table 4 (Factors 7-9 and Communalities)
| # | Variable | Factor7 | Factor8 | Factor9 | Factor10 | Commnlty |
| 32 | Monitor Disengagement Forces | -0.074 | -0.027 | -0.015 | 0.058 | 0.919 |
| 200 | Observe/Report Violations (MILOB) | 0.354 | 0.364 | 0.062 | 0.040 | 0 .891 |
| 1167 | Stabilize Belligerents Conflict | -0.139 | -0.316 | -0.290 | -0.109 | 0.951 |
| 90 | Security Patrolling | -0.036 | 0.091 | -0.076 | -0.218 | 0.914 |
| 185 | Encourage Resumption of Normal Relations | -0.224 | 0.137 | 0.159 | 0.070 | |
| 211 | Supervise Demilitarization/Demobilization | 0.008 | -0.260 | -0.1 88 | 0.245 | 0.932 |
| 342 | Area Security | 0.029 | -0.166 | 0.195 | 0.195 | 0.892 |
| 31 | Monitor Withdrawal of Forces | 0.268 | -0.056 | 0.021 | -0.024 | 0.864 |
| 166 | Perform Logistic Functions | -0.187 | 0.397 | -0.203 | 0.010 | < td>0.861|
| 183 | Estab Areas as Limited Military/Armaments | 0.458 | 0.095 | 0.326 | -0.1 24 | 0.977 |
| 61 | Assist Weapon Collection/Confiscation | 0.083 | -0.204 | 0.033 | 0.864 | |
| 148 | Supervise Truces | -0.249 | -0.019 | 0.254 | 0.204 | 0.883 |
| 136 | Monitor Refugee Flows | -0.024 | 0.044 | 0.181 | -0.126 | 0 .863 |
| 147 | Perform Negotiation and Mediation | -0.136 | 0.140 | 0.238 | -0.090 | < td>0.864|
| 173 | Demilitarize Forces | 0.096 | -0.186 | -0.006 | 0.035 | 0.878 |
| 3 | Humanitarian Relief Operations (HROs) | -0.030 | 0.145 | 0.069 | 0.274 | 0 .954 |
| 244 | Assist in Troop Withdrawals | -0.060 | 0.188 | -0.241 | 0.037 | 0.920 |
| 36 | Conduct Field Operations | -0.162 | -0.050 | 0.022 | -0.409 | 0.876 |
| 76 | Interpose Between Combatants/Belligerents | 0.246 | 0.254 | -0.225 | 0.966 | |
| 151 | Support Development of Civil Authority | 0.361 | 0.116 | -0.208 | -0.037 | < td>0.871|
| 19 | Clear Mines | 0.347 | -0.406 | -0.013 | 0.066 | 0 .878 |
| 40 | Provide Convoy Escorts | 0.041 | 0.153 | -0.087 | 0.011 | 0.924 |
| Variance | 0.9599 | 0.9485< /td> | 0.6599 | 0.5366 | 19.8095 | |
| %Var | 0.044 | 0.043 | 0.024 | 0.900 |
Table 6:
Principal Component Factor Analysis of Peace Operation Task Relevance (Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings), Factors 1-6
| # | Variable | Factor1 | Factor2 | Factor3 | Factor4 | Factor5 | Factor6 |
| 32 | Monitor Disengagement Forces | 0.021 | 0.140 | 0.022 | 0.780 | -0 .151 | -0.482 |
| 200 | Observe/Report Violations (MILOB) | -0.141 | -0.004 | 0.101 | 0.100 | 0.058 | -0.896 |
| 1167 | Stabilize Belligerents Conflict | -0.042 | 0.096 | 0.050 | 0.890 | -0.155 | 0.094 |
| 90 | Security Patrolling | 0.058 | 0.225 | -0.075 | 0.076 | < td>-0.127-0.340 | |
| 185 | Encourage Resumption of Normal Relations | 0.143 | 0.410 | 0.210 | 0.298 | -0.377 | -0.226 |
| 211 | Supervise Demilitarization/Demobilization | 0.021 | 0.836 | -0.00 0 | 0.224 | -0.190 | 0.005 |
| 342 | Area Security | 0.467 | 0.159 | -0.082 | -0.144 | 0.062 | |
| 31 | Monitor Withdrawal of Forces | -0.160 | 0.235 | 0.786 | 0.120 | - 0.244 | -0.110 |
| 166 | Perform Logistic Functions | 0.814 | 0.120 | 0.018 | -0.225 | 0.086 | |
| 183 | Estab Areas as Limited Military/Armaments | -0.142 | 0.200 | -0.092 | 0. 032 | -0.060 | -0.093 |
| 61 | Assist Weapon Collection/Confiscation | 0.362 | 0.209 | 0.596 | 0.459 | -0.289 | -0.012 |
| 148 | Supervise Truces | 0.095 | 0.357 | 0.169 | 0.278 | -0 .781 | -0.112 |
| 136 | Monitor Refugee Flows | 0.854 | -0.077 | 0.175 | 0.090 | -0 .195 | 0.130 |
| 147 | Perform Negotiation and Mediation | 0.173 | 0.047 | 0.296 | 0.119 | -0.757 | 0.201 |
| 173 | Demilitarize Forces | 0.311 | 0.764 | 0.242 | 0.045 | -0 .016 | -0.058 |
| 3 | Humanitarian Relief Operations (HROs) | 0.919 | 0.042 | -0.063 | 0.006 | - 0.135 | -0.047 |
| 244 | Assist in Troop Withdrawals | -0.075 | 0.708 | 0.296 | 0.001 | -0.259 | 0.054 |
| 36 | Conduct Field Operations | 0.627 | 0.249 | 0.033 | 0.079 | 0.282 | |
| 76 | Interpose Between Combatants/Belligerents | 0.147 | 0.055 | -0.013 | -0.193 | 0.004 | |
| 151 | Support Development of Civil Authority | 0.392 | 0.065 | 0.791 | -0.113 | -0.040 | |
| 19 | Clear Mines | 0.593 | 0.019 | 0.272 | 0.013 | 0.3 19 | 0.227 |
| 40 | Provide Convoy Escorts | 0.928 | 0.088 | 0.145 | 0.108 | - 0.004 | -0.045 |
| Variance | 4.6003 | 2.4259< /td> | 2.0703 | 2.0305 | 1.9379 1.4559 | ||
| %Var | 0.209 | 0.110 | 0.092 | 0.088 | 0.066 |
Table 7:
Continuation of Table 6 (Factors 7-9 and Communalities)
| # | Variable | Factor7 | Factor8 | Factor9 | Factor10 | Comnlty |
| 32 | Monitor Disengagement Forces | 0.088 | 0.072 | -0.138 | -0.048 | 0.919 |
| 200 | Observe/Report Violations (MILOB) | 0.016 | -0.186 | -0.054 | -0.085 | |
| 1167 | Stabilize Belligerents Conflict | -0.311 | -0.121 | 0.014 | -0.014 | 0.951 |
| 90 | Security Patrolling | -0.105 | -0.832 | 0.105 | 0.055 | 0.914 |
| 185 | Encourage Resumption of Normal Relations | 0.348 | 0.227 | -0.419 | -0.063 | 0.867< /td> |
| 211 | Supervise Demilitarization/Demobilization | -0.215 | -0.239 | 0.186 | -0.087 | 0.932 |
| 342 | Area Security | -0.152 | -0.368 | 0.612 | 0.040 | 0.892< /td> |
| 31 | Monitor Withdrawal of Forces | 0.147 | 0.197 | -0.133 | -0.028 | 0.864< /td> |
| 166 | Perform Logistic Functions | -0.068 | -0.034 | -0.275 | 0.210 | 0.861 |
| 183 | Estab Areas as Limited Military/Armaments | -0.240 | 0.015 | -0.023 | -0.915 | 0.977 |
| 61 | Assist Weapon Collection/Confiscation | 0.148 | -0.116 | 0.048 | -0.039 | 0.864< /td> |
| 148 | Supervise Truces | -0.024 | -0.102 | 0.068 | 0.046 | 0.883< /td> |
| 136 | Monitor Refugee Flows | 0.066 | -0.099 | 0.121 | -0.075 | 0.863< /td> |
| 147 | Perform Negotiation and Mediation | -0.268 | -0.117 | -0.082 | -0.155 | 0.864 |
| 173 | Demilitarize Forces | 0.290 | -0.155 | 0.025 | -0.157 | 0.878< /td> |
| 3 | Humanitarian Relief Operations (HROs) | -0.116 | 0.079 | 0.236 | 0.088 | 0 .954 |
| 244 | Assist in Troop Withdrawals | -0.162 | 0.003 | -0.469 | -0.090 | 0.920 |
| 36 | Conduct Field Operations | 0.102 | -0.529 | -0.054 | -0.179 | 0.876 |
| 76 | Interpose Between Combatants/Belligerents | -0.877 | -0.071 | 0.021 | -0.290 | 0.966 |
| 151 | Support Development of Civil Authority | -0.165 | -0.052 | 0.056 | 0.186 | 0.871< /td> |
| 19 | Clear Mines | 0.124 | 0.132 | 0.515 | -0.039 | 0.924 |
| Variance | 1.4411 | 1.4203< /td> | 1.2917 | 1.1358 | 19.8095 | |
| %Var | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.052 | 0.900 |
Before commenting on the factor analysis results, a number of caveats deserve mention. Factor analysis requires more (nonmissing) observations than variables. This presents an analytical problem because our task list includes approximately 400 tasks that we examined relative to only 29 cases (peace operations). To reduce the number of tasks to be included in the factor analysis, we first disregarded any task that was relevant in more than (or equal to) 80% of our cases. Moreover, we similarly disregarded those tasks that were relevant in less than (or equal to) 20% of our cases. This was done to eliminate highly correlated tasks and to give us more variability in the data. Next we only selected tasks meeting the aforementioned criterion if it represented a third-order child in the CMPO theoretical model. Such tasks, being decompositions of other tasks, are less aggregated and represent more specific task categorizations. These criteria, in conjunction with some earlier factor analysis results that suggested intercorrelations violating the assumptions of factor analysis, resulted in the use of the 23 tasks presented in the tables below. These variables run the gambit of peace operation tasks "types" from military, combat, humanitarian to political and diplomatic activities.
The substantive factors that emerge from the unrotated factor analysis presented in Table 4 account for 90% of the total percent of the variance (19.1%) in our set of peace operations’ tasks across the 29 peace operation cases. The first three dimensions or clusters account for 57% of the total percent of variance.
Factor 1:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH PEACE OPERATIONS OF THE 1990.
A variety of types of tasks load on this dimension (supervise demilitarization/demobilization, area security, perform logistic functions assist in weapon collection/confiscation, supervise truces, monitor refugee flows, perform negotiations and mediation, demilitarize forces, humanitarian relief operations, conduct field operations, support development of civil authority, and provide convoy escorts). This factor alone accounts for 28% of the total variance suggesting that this cluster of tasks is rather significant. This dimension represents the types of tasks relevant to operations such as Bosnia and Somalia where the operations involve peacekeeping, peace building (nation building), humanitarian relief, peacemaking involving combat operations and political diplomatic activities. This dimension does NOT represent the types of tasks associated with traditional UN peacekeeping. This dimension involves tasks that are both proactive as well as preventative and helps to explain the greater relevance of "new" types of tasks but these tasks are NOT relevant at the expense of the more traditional peacekeeping missions. This dimension includes both the pursuit of humanitarian objects and active combat military operations.
This task cluster is consistent with peace enforcement operations that use Chapter VII -- authorization where the UN Security Council has delegated its authority to use force to those countries and coalitions acting in support of UN resolutions (but not necessarily representing a formal UN operation). Actual peace operations reflecting this task cluster include: Bosnia, 1992- ; Somalia, 1992-93; Rwanda, 1994; Haiti, 1994-95; and possibly, the Persian Gulf, 1990-91.
Factor 2:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONS INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS MONITORING WITHDRAWALS USUALLY IN AREAS TORN BY CIVIL WAR.
The tasks that load on this dimension appear to be the kinds that are relevant to peace operations such as Operation Support Hope in Rwanda. Here the major tasks involved critical humanitarian assistance, especially to large numbers of refugees in an area in the midst of a civil war. These peace operations are focused on the immediate crisis at the expense of nation or peace "building" and the operations usually do not involve combat operations. Rather, the operation is narrowly focused yet complex. The tasks that load on this dimension are: monitor disengagement forces, encourage normal relations, perform logistic functions (an absolutely critical task), supervise truces, monitor refugee flows, clear mines, and provide convoy escorts.
Factor 3:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH "HOLDING" ACTIONS.
The tasks that load on this factor are those usually associated with UN "holding" action missions. Here the peacekeepers are often interposed between the combatants or belligerents, often in an area designated as a DMZ. Monitoring the withdrawal of forces is a primary goal and continuing negotiations are aimed at getting the belligerents to resume normal relations. The explicit tasks that load on this dimension are: security patrolling, encourage resumption of normal relations, area security, establish areas as limited military/armaments, and interpose between combatants/belligerents. The "interposing between combatants/belligerents" task has the most significant loading on this factor – one of the major goals of holding actions.
Actual UN operations that have reflected this task cluster include: UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and UN Observer in Central America (ONUCA).
Factor 4:
TASKS AS ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL MILOB PEACE OPERATIONS.
All of the tasks that load on this factor -- monitor disengagement forces, observe/report violations, security patrolling, perform negotiations and mediation, and assist in troop withdrawals -- are the kinds associated with traditional UN MILOB missions. Examples of such missions include the first peace-keeping observer mission established by the United Nations -- the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This operation was established in Palestine in June 1948. Later examples of observer missions include: the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965, and the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP).
Table 6 represents the results of using a varimax rotated factor analysis (rotation of the initial solution with gamma = 1). Examination of Table 6 (and its continuation presented in Table 7) suggest that the individual dimensions explain less of the total variance with the individual factors more evenly matched in the explanation "power". Hence, this factor analysis does not present significantly different results than that presented in Tables 4 and 5 and discussed above. The factor loadings in these tables suggest the following dimensions 44 :
Factor 1:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS OF THE 1990s.
As we saw in the analysis of unloaded factors presented in Table 4, this factor is the most significant accounting for 21% of the total percent variance. This factor includes a broad range and type of peace operation tasks – area security, perform logistic functions, assist weapon collection, monitor refugee flows, demilitarize forces, humanitarian relief operations, conduct field operations, support development of civil authority, and provide convoy escorts.
Factor 2:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPLEX OPERATIONS THAT BASICALLY LACK A HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION.
The major focus of this factor are tasks involving explicit military combat activities with emphasis on disengagement, demobilization, and troop withdrawals.
Factor 3:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSITION ASSISTANCE.
This factor represents a cluster of tasks associated with "transition assistance" types of missions such as UNTAC were the withdrawal of forces is complimented by actions to promote the development of a competent civil authority.
Factor 4:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEMOBILIZATION, AND DISARMAMENT.
This factor clearly reflects missions primarily aimed at conflict resolution and demobilization and disarmament.
Factor 5:
TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC OPERATIONS.
This factor clearly represents missions that are almost exclusively diplomatic and political in nature with little active military or humanitarian tasks.
The factor analyses presented above suggest that peace operations can be divided into broad categories: complex missions such as Operation Joint Endeavor that involve a wide range of tasks in a volatile and conflict region; missions primarily involving the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid such as Rwanda; observer missions, "traditional" UN MILOB operations; and, operations that are primarily diplomatic and political often with the goal of establishing a competent civil authority. These categories are not, however, watertight. Mission creep is very common in peace operations, especially of the kind experienced in the 1990s where missions were expanded in response to new developments (i.e., Somalia).
Returning to the explicit research questions presented in an earlier section of this paper, our data analysis suggests that:
There are certain tasks that appear to be relevant across most peace operations. The tasks found to be relevant to at least 90% of the cases studied are:
observing and reporting on developments;supplying military information and liaison;
monitoring the activities of combatants or belligerents;
monitor conditions in a potential conflict area;
assist conflict diffusion, stabilization, and resolution; and
investigate complaints and violations.
We find it interesting that of the 400 explicit tasks examined, nearly all of the most relevant tasks involve aspects of information gathering. Clearly knowledge is power in peace operations and observing, reporting, monitoring, and sharing information are critical peace operation tasks.
Certain peace operation tasks cluster together and appear to be closely interrelated. Some of these task clusters include 45 :
1. humanitarian relief operations – provide convoy escorts – monitor refugee flows – conduct field operations2. supervise demilitarization of forces – assist in troop withdrawals— encourage the resumption of normal relations
3. support the development of civil authority – assist weapon collection/confiscation – monitor withdrawal of forces – observe and report violations
4. stabilize belligerents conflict – monitor disengagement forces – assist weapon collection/confiscation – clear mines
These task clusters make empirical sense and in many cases are not unexpected. Hence, the clusters lend face validity to our data collection techniques and analysis. The first cluster of tasks suggests the importance of providing security to humanitarian efforts both by providing escorts and conducting field operations. This finding points to the fact that even when an operation is purely humanitarian in nature the troops on the ground must be prepared to provide combat security.
Our analysis has implications for our understanding of "mission creep". An evaluation of the factor analysis reveals that the most prominent factor is a group of tasks that appear to relate to peace enforcement operations of the 1990s. These operations, according to our analysis regularly involve a milieu of tasks involving combat actions of enforcement, peacekeeping, and even nation building. These operations seem to inevitably involve tasks that are broad in scope and in some instances not intuitively obvious. Such a situation makes "mission creep" highly likely, indeed even expected. The 10th Mountain Division, for example, noted after its mission in Somalia that "mission creep is an invariable part of any operation." 46 Our findings suggest that mission creep might be a useful domestic political concept but not overly useful for the examination of peace operations. The concept of mission "constriction" appears to be a more analytically useful term. Mission creep implies the expansion of an operation's tasks beyond a clearly defined boundary. Our analysis suggests, however, that the boundaries of peace operations can be extremely broad. Moreover, a variety of peace operation tasks, some of which are dissimilar in nature, have been found to often have concurrent relevance.
Mission creep implies the expansion of an operation’s tasks beyond a clearly defined policy boundary. Our analysis suggests that the boundaries of peace operations can be ambiguous and broad. This is, in part, a function that mission tasks -- some of that appear dissimilar -- historically have had concurrent relevance. Hence, such operations that appear to be experiencing mission creep are, in fact, witnessing the interaction of particular peace operation tasks that are not obvious to policy makers and observers.
Our findings suggest that the structure of peace operations has changed during recent years with the operations becoming more complex. This is not to say, however, that tasks usually associated with traditional UN MILOB missions are no longer relevant. Rather, our findings suggest that traditional tasks still serve as a foundation for peace operations. The changes in the structure of peace operations involve the relevance of a wide variety of new tasks that demand attention of policy makers and analysts alike. This attention, however, should not be at the expense of more traditional peace operation tasks.
Our task analysis differentiated a variety of types of peace operations, including:
Multidimensional peace enforcement operations that have characterized the 1990s;Operations involving significant humanitarian activities in the context of violent civil wars.
Operations involving basically holding actions;
Traditional MILOB peace operations;
Operations associated with transition assistance to promote the development of competent civil authorities; and
Operations aimed at conflict resolution, demobilization, and disarmament.
4.0 CONCLUSIONS
The research presented in this paper deals with a largely unexplored topic, at least from a systematic and quantitative perspective. Hence, it is bound to initially raise more questions than it can answer. Although the approach taken here to address peace operations tasks is still in its development infancy, it should not be dismissed lightly.
The US participation in peace operations will not go away and such operations will probably be a central foreign policy dynamic for American decision-makers in the years to come. Any data, tools, or analyses that help facilitate attempts to cope with peace operations should be viewed as valuable inputs for the decision making process. The time seems right to expand attempts at understanding the workings of peace operations. Hopefully the momentum generated by this project and its large database will be maintained and even expanded. The rewards of such research could result in the more efficient utilization of resources and a more integrated peace operations decision calculus.
Appendixes
Appendix A:
Compiled Peace Operations Task List
| Number | Task | CMPO |
| 1 | Supply; Military Information And Liaison | 3.3.6.4 |
| 2 | Perform; Analysis | 3.3.2.2.1 |
| 3 | Participate; Humanitarian Relief Operations (HRO) | 3.3.6 |
| 4 | Mobility Support; Relief Efforts | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 5 | Share; Intelligence | 3.3.2.3.3 |
| 6 | Investigate; Breaches Cease-Fire | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 10 | Establish; Train And Equip; Law Enforcement Forces | 3.2.4.3 |
| 11 | Establish; Infrastructure | 3.2.6 |
| 12 | Monitor And Investigate; Human Rights Violations | 3.2.3.1 |
| 13 | Supervision, Assist; Elections | 3.2.4.5 |
| 15 | Improve; Water Supply | 3.2.6.1.2.2 |
| 16 | Provide; Engineering Assistance | 3.3.4.2 |
| 18 | Dismantle; Militia And Paramilitary Forces | 3.2.7 |
| 19 | Clear; Mines | 3.2.7 |
| 20 | Verify; Cease-Fires, Cantonments And Disarmaments | 3.1.1.2 |
| 21 | Monitor; Law Enforcement, Indigenous | 3.2.4.3 |
| 22 | Provide; Crowd Control | 3.2.4.3 |
| 24 | Assist; Infrastructure Rebuilding | 3.2.6 |
| 25 | Supervise And Monitor; Cease-Fires, Armistices Or Peace Agreements | 3.1.1.2 |
| 26 | Mediate; Cease-Fires, Armistices Or Peace Agreements | 3.1.3.6 |
| 27 | Buffer Or Contain; Belligerents | 3.3.3.2 |
| 28 | Provide; Humanitarian Assistance, Security, Delivery | 3.3.7.2 |
| 30 | Evacuate; Refugees | 3.2.2.2 |
| 31 | Monitor; Withdrawal Occupation Forces | 3.3.1 |
| 32 | Monitor; Disengagement Forces | 3.3.1 |
| 33 | Assist; Law Enforcement | 3.2.4.3 |
| 34 | Mediate; Conflicts | 3.1.3.6 |
| 35 | Patrol; Cease-Fire Lines | 3.3.1.2 |
| 36 | Conduct; Field Operations | 3.3.3 |
| 37 | Establish ;Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) | 3.3.6 |
| 38 | Disarm; Combatants | 3.3.3.2 |
| 39 | Provide; Lift Support | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 40 | Provide; Convoy Escort | 3.3.7 |
| 41 | Verification; Weapon Destruction | 3.2.7 |
| 42 | Provide; Refugees, Protection To | 3.2.2.2 |
| 43 | Provide; Emergency Relief | 3.2.1 |
| 44 | Provide; Counseling | 3.2.1.3.4 |
| 46 | Provide; Reintegration And Rehabilitation Assistance To Returnees | 3.2.2.5 |
| 47 | Provide; Early-Warning Capabilities | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 48 | Deliver; Relief Assistance | 3.2.1 |
| 49 | Assist; Prisoners-Of-War | 3.3.7.4 |
| 50 | Trace; Displaced Individuals | 3.2.2.1 |
| 51 | Supervise; Prisoner Releases | 3.3.5 |
| 52 | Establish; Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) | 3.3.6 |
| 53 | Conduct; Pre-Mission Reconnaissance Assessment Missions | 3.3.2.1 |
| 56 | Ensure; Maximum Freedom Movement Civilian Populations | 3.2.3 |
| 57 | Ensure; Infrastructure, Availability Critical (Hospitals, Water/Power Generation, Etc.) | 3.2.6.1.4.4 |
| 58 | Facilitate; Safe Conduct Agricultural Activities And Food Production | 3.3.7.2 |
| 59 | Safeguard; Valuable Cultural Properties | 3.3.7.2 |
| 60 | Liaison; Opposing Parties Conflict | 3.3.6.5 |
| 61 | Assist; Weapon Collection/Confiscation | 3.2.7 |
| 62 | Repair; Assist; Essential Infrastructure | 3.2.6 |
| 63 | Disposal; Explosive Ordnance | 3.3.4.2.6 |
| 64 | Transmit; Messages | 3.3.2.3.3 |
| 65 | Dissemination; Public Information | 3.1 |
| 66 | Support; Local Authorities To Create Conditions Necessary Consensual Operations | 3.2.4.1 |
| 67 | Secure; Routes From Point Departure To Destination | 3.3.7 |
| 68 | Security, Provide ;Awareness Training | 3.3.7.1 |
| 70 | Provide; Military Support To Humanitarian Tasks | 3.3.4.2 |
| 71 | Implement; Humanitarian Aid Airlift | 3.3.4.2 |
| 72 | Airdrop; Humanitarian Aid | 3.3.4.2 |
| 73 | Collect; HUMINT Collection | 3.3.2.1.1. |
| 74 | Create; Visible Buffer Or Demilitarized Zones | 3.3.5 |
| 75 | Evacuate; Civilians | 3.3.3.3 |
| 76 | Interpose; Between Combatants Or Belligerents | 3.3.5 |
| 77 | Enforce; Sanctions | 3.1.4 |
| 78 | Protection; Human Rights Minorities | 3.2.3 |
| 79 | Protection; NGO And PVO Humanitarian Relief Efforts | 3.3.7.2 |
| 80 | Guaranteeing; Freedom Movement (Land, Air, Sea) | 3.3.7.4 |
| 81 | Limiting; Freedom Movement (Land, Air, Sea) | 3.3.7.4 |
| 82 | Restoration; Territorial Integrity | 3.3.7.4 |
| 83 | Implement; Cease-Fire | 3.1.3.1 |
| 84 | Establishment; Lodgment | 3.3.3.2 |
| 85 | Secure; Intelligence On Local Personalities And Facilities | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 86 | Establish; Surveillance Over Planned Points Entry | 3.3.1.1.1 |
| 87 | Establishment; C3 Facilities | 3.3.2 |
| 88 | Posting ;Checkpoints And Road Blocks | 3.3.1.1.1 |
| 89 | Security; installation | 3.3.7.2 |
| 90 | Patrolling; Security | 3.3.7 |
| 92 | Perform; Show Force | 3.3.5.1 |
| 94 | Monitor; Combatants Or Belligerents Activities | 3.3.1 |
| 95 | Participation; Civil Affairs Operations | 3.3.6 |
| 96 | Secure; Buffer Or Demilitarized Zone (Air Exclusion Zone) | 3.3.7 |
| 97 | Man; Observer Posts | 3.3.1.1.1 |
| 100 | Expand; Lodgment | 3.3.3.2 |
| 102 | Support; Political Efforts At Mediation | 3.1 |
| 103 | Support; Civil Affairs Operations | 3.3.6 |
| 105 | Handover; Operations And Facilities | 3.3.2.3 |
| 106 | Establish; Command Relationships Between Services, Forces, And Organizations | 3.3.2.3.3 |
| 107 | Conduct; IPB | 3.3.2.1 |
| 109 | Provide; Fire/Counterfire Support | 3.3.3.1 |
| 110 | Perform; Engineering Battlefield Functions | 3.3.3 |
| 111 | Provide; Logistic Support Peace Operations | 3.3.4.2 |
| 112 | Construct; Base Force To Maintain Force | 3.3.4.1 |
| 113 | Improve/Upgrade; Main Supply Routes | 3.3.4 |
| 115 | Construct/Repair; Construct/Repair Bridges | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 116 | Construct / Rehab / Upgrade; Port Facilities | 3.2.6.1.1.3 |
| 117 | Rehab/Upgrade; Railroads | 3.2.6.1.1.2 |
| 118 | Perform; Refugee Escort Efforts | 3.2.2.2 |
| 119 | Assess; Political Asylum Request | 3.1.1 |
| 120 | Provide; Temporary Refuge | 3.2.1.4 |
| 122 | Rebuild; Economies | 3.2.5 |
| 123 | Reestablish; Constitutional Structures | 3.2.4.1 |
| 124 | Enforce; Maritime Agreements | 3.3.7.4 |
| 125 | Protect; Sea And Air Traffic | 3.3.7 |
| 126 | Interdict; Sea And Air Traffic | 3.3.3.2 |
| 128 | Seize And Hold; Ports Entry | 3.3.3.2 |
| 129 | Secure; Lines Communication And Enclaves | 3.3.7.2 |
| 130 | Establish; Disengagement Zones | 3.3.7.4 |
| 131 | Conduct; Operations Against Piracy | 3.3.7.4 |
| 133 | Inspection; Selected Ships And Aircraft | 3.3.5.5 |
| 136 | Monitor; Refugee Flows | 3.2.2 |
| 137 | Conduct; Nonpermissive Evacuations | 3.3.3.3 |
| 138 | Conduct; Presence Patrols And Deterrent Deployments | 3.3.5.3 |
| 140 | Interdict; Arms Smuggling | 3.3.7.4 |
| 141 | Conduct; Coercive Antiproliferation | 3.2.7 |
| 142 | Seize And Hold; Territory | 3.3.3.2 |
| 143 | Observing And Reporting; On Developments | 3.3.1 |
| 144 | Patrol; Border Or Line Demarcation | 3.3.5.3 |
| 145 | Supervision; Exchange POWs, Civilians And Remains | 3.3.1 |
| 146 | Investigation; Complaints And Violations | 3.1.1.2 |
| 147 | Perform; Negotiation And Mediation | 3.1.3 |
| 148 | Supervise; Truces | 3.1 |
| 149 | Provide; Measure Law, Order, And Stability | 3.2.4.2 |
| 150 | Establish; Significant And Visible Military Presence | 3.3.5.1 |
| 151 | Support; Development Competent Civil Authority | 3.2.4 |
| 152 | Establish; Base Areas | 3.3.4.1 |
| 153 | Deny; Supplies, Diplomatic, And Trading Privileges | 3.1.4 |
| 155 | Transportation; Relief Supplies And Civilians | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 156 | Provide; Health Services | 3.2.1.3.4 |
| 157 | Provide; Essential Services | 3.2.1 |
| 158 | Resettle; Dislocated Civilians | 3.2.2.5 |
| 161 | Impose; Curfews | 3.2.4.3 |
| 162 | Detain; Suspected Felony Crimes | 3.2.4.3 |
| 164 | Control; Riots | 3.3.7 |
| 165 | Perform; Claims And Liability Adjudication | 3.3.2.3 |
| 166 | Perform; Logistic Functions | 3.3.4 |
| 167 | Planning And Coordinating; Agreements Between Countries | 3.1.2 |
| 170 | Coordinate; Coordinate | 3.1.2.3 |
| 171 | Provide; Legal Services | 3.2.4.2 |
| 172 | Monitor; Boundaries | 3.3.1 |
| 173 | Demilitarize; Forces | 3.2.7 |
| 175 | Enforce; Economic Sanctions | 3.1.4 |
| 176 | Guarantee; Rights Passage | 3.3.7.4 |
| 177 | Conduct; Conventional Observer Missions (MILOB) | 3.3.1 |
| 178 | Inspect; Demilitarized Zones And Weapon Sites | 3.2.7 |
| 179 | Investigate; Alleged Violations Peace Agreements | 3.1.2.1 |
| 180 | Engage; Confidence Building Measures | 3.1 |
| 181 | Provide; Communication Between Parties | 3.3.6.5 |
| 183 | Establish; Area As Limited Military Strength And Armaments | 3.2.7 |
| 184 | Develop; Recognized Procedures Dealing With Violations | 3.3.7.4 |
| 185 | Encourage; Resumption Normal Interparty Relations | 3.1.3 |
| 186 | Restore; Government Functions | 3.2.4 |
| 188 | Assist; Provision Security Elections | 3.2.4.5 |
| 189 | Facilitate; Transfer Power From Interim To Permanent | 3.2.4.1 |
| 190 | Investigate; War Crimes And Human Rights Abuses | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 191 | Assistance; Interim Civil Authorities | 3.2.4 |
| 192 | Train; Local Forces | 3.2.4.1 |
| 193 | Perform; Search And Rescue Activities | 3.3.3.3 |
| 194 | Interdict; Narcotics | 3.3.7.4 |
| 195 | Protect; Offshore Installations | 3.3.7.2 |
| 196 | Rescue; Hostages | 3.3.3.3 |
| 197 | Perform; Fact-Finding Missions | 3.1.1.2 |
| 198 | Perform; Checkpoints And Observation Posts, Actions At | 3.3.1.1.1 |
| 199 | Perform; Civil Affairs Support | 3.3.6 |
| 200 | Observe And Report; On Alleged Violations (MILOB) | 3.3.1 |
| 201 | Investigate; Cease-Fire Violations Or Boundary Incidents (MILOB) | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 202 | Conduct; Liaison Visits To PK Forces | 3.3.6.4 |
| 203 | Maintain; Information On Disposition Belligerents | 3.3.2.1.2 |
| 205 | Verify; Destruction Military Equipment | 3.2.7 |
| 206 | Provide; Combat Support | 3.3.4.1 |
| 207 | Supervision; Free Territories | 3.3.1.2 |
| 209 | Supervision; Withdrawals And Disengagements | 3.3.6.5 |
| 211 | Supervision; Demilitarization And Demobilization | 3.2.7 |
| 212 | Maintenance; Law And Order | 3.2.4.3 |
| 213 | Discourage; Infiltration And Confrontations | 3.3.7.1 |
| 214 | Administration, Temporary; Civil Functions | 3.2.4 |
| 215 | Participate; Diplomatic Negotiations Between Belligerents | 3.1.3 |
| 216 | Provide; Air Traffic Control | 3.2.6.1 |
| 217 | Accompany; Neutral Shipping | 3.3.5.5 |
| 218 | Supervise; Negotiations | 3.1.3 |
| 219 | Perform; Maritime Interception Operations | 3.3.7 |
| 220 | Employ; Maritime Surveillance | 3.3.1.2 |
| 221 | Employ; Air Surveillance | 3.3.1.2.3 |
| 223 | Perform; Harbor Security And Protection | 3.3.7.2 |
| 224 | Monitor And Enforce; Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) | 3.3.1 |
| 225 | Escort; Maritime Vessels | 3.3.7.2 |
| 226 | Trip-Wire; Deterrent Activities/Preventive Deployment | 3.1 |
| 227 | Provide; Liaison Between Parties | 3.3.6.5 |
| 228 | Serve; War Supplies, Custodian Of | 3.3.7.2 |
| 230 | Exercise; Trading And Other Economic Sanctions | 3.1.4 |
| 232 | Security, Provide; HRO Compounds, Offices, And Warehouses | 3.3.7.2 |
| 233 | Provide; Technical Assistance Form Studies To HRO Projects | 3.3.4.2.6 |
| 234 | Monitor; Conditions Potential Conflict Area | 3.3.2.1 |
| 236 | Provide; Minority Groups, Protection And Security | 3.2.3 |
| 237 | Distribute; Social Welfare Benefits | 3.2.6.2.1 |
| 238 | Perform; Law Enforcement Operations To Include Traffic Control, Riot Control, Etc. | 3.2.4.3 |
| 239 | Coordinate; Foreign Support | 3.3.2.3.3 |
| 240 | Provide; Civil Affairs (CA) Liaison And Coordination | 3.3.6 |
| 241 | Plan And Conduct; Counterpropaganda Operations (PSYOPS) | 3.1 |
| 243 | Prevent And Contain; Outbreaks Hostilities | 3.3.7.4 |
| 244 | Assist; Troop Withdrawals | 3.2.7 |
| 245 | Assist; Conflict Diffusion, Stabilization, And Resolution | 3.1 |
| 246 | Construct; Civil Infrastructure | 3.2.6 |
| 247 | Screen-Resettle; Refugees | 3.2.2.5 |
| 248 | Interdict; Contraband Supply Routes | 3.3.7.4 |
| 249 | Rehabilitating; Livelihoods People Who Have Lost Their Assets | 3.2.5 |
| 250 | Support; Counterdrug Operations | 3.3.7.4 |
| 251 | Marginalize; Belligerent Faction Leaders | 3.1.4 |
| 304 | Plan; Support Structure | 3.2.6.1.4 |
| 320 | Assist; Partition Territory | 3.3.7.4 |
| 342 | Security; Area | 3.3.7 |
| 343 | Operating; Port Support Activity | 3.2.6.1.1.3 |
| 346 | Establish; Logistical Bases | 3.3.4.1 |
| 348 | Negotiate; Tactical Status Forces Agreement (SOFA) | 3.1.3 |
| 350 | Arbitrate; Local Disputes Or Fights | 3.2.4.3 |
| 351 | Administer; Local Justice Codes | 3.2.4.2 |
| 352 | Prevent; Refugee Flows | 3.2.2 |
| 353 | Conduct; Resettlement | 3.2.2.5 |
| 354 | Coordinate; Military Activities With Others | 3.3.2.3.3 |
| 355 | Establish; Static Defenses | 3.3.3.1 |
| 356 | Seize; Buildings | 3.3.3.2 |
| 357 | Guard Facilities; Facilities | 3.3.7.2 |
| 359 | Self-protection; Static Positions | 3.3.7.1 |
| 360 | Provide; Area And Route Reconnaissance | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 1001 | Conduct; Air Defense Low Level Air Threat | 3.3.7.1 |
| 1003 | Prevent; Looting | 3.3.7 |
| 1004 | Conduct; Special Forces Operations | 3.3 |
| 1006 | Enforce; UN Sanctions | 3.1.4 |
| 1009 | Conduct; Psychological Operations | 3.3.7.4 |
| 1010 | Conduct; Psychological Operations (Increased Level) | 3.3.7.4 |
| 1011 | Perform; Countermine Operations | 3.3.3 |
| 1013 | Enforce; Cease-Fire/Disarmament | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1014 | Develop; Transient Centers And Camps | 3.2.2.3 |
| 1015 | Restore; Order After Riot | 3.3.7.4 |
| 1016 | Provide; Transportation To Ferry Police Around City | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 1017 | Provide; Traffic Control | 3.2.4.3 |
| 1018 | Establish; Rear Area Security RAOC Threat | 3.3.3.1 |
| 1023 | Perform; DS Maintenance, Mission Equipment | 3.3.4.1.7 |
| 1025 | Maintain; Inventory Food | 3.3.4 |
| 1026 | Disposition; Personal Property | 3.3.4.1.8 |
| 1028 | Conduct; Airfield Operations | 3.2.6.1.1 |
| 1030 | Provide; Logistic Support To Move Supplies | 3.3.4.1.6 |
| 1032 | Move; Supplies From Main Support Centers To Distribution Centers | 3.3.4.1.6 |
| 1034 | Transmit; Large Volumes Supplies And Equipment | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 1035 | Spot Mechanics And PLL; Along Routes Or On Convoys | 3.3.4.1.7 |
| 1037 | Establish, Operate, And Secure; Transportation System | 3.2.6.1.1 |
| 1038 | Provide; Maps And Imagery Products | 3.3.2 |
| 1049 | Conduct; Combat Ops | 3.3.3 |
| 1052 | Conduct; Counterfire Operations(Bde Area) | 3.3.3.1 |
| 1053 | Support; Evacuation Unit Or Embassy | 3.3.3.3 |
| 1054 | Build; Base Camps | 3.3.4.1 |
| 1055 | Construct And Improve; Roads | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1056 | Build And Repair; Bailey Bridges | 3.3.4.2.6 |
| 1057 | Upgrade And Maintain; Airfields | 3.2.6.1.1 |
| 1058 | Construct; Protective Shelters And Defensive Positions | 3.3.4.1 |
| 1059 | Construct; Fences Bunkers And Fighting Positions | 3.3.4.1 |
| 1060 | Construct; Support Buildings | 3.2.6.1.4 |
| 1061 | Harden; Structures Against Direct And Indirect Fires | 3.3.4.1 |
| 1063 | Support; Specified Route Security | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1064 | Construct/Re-Dig; Latrines And Trash Pits Daily | 3.3.4.2.5 |
| 1066 | Repair; Well Equipment | 3.2.6.1.2 |
| 1067 | Construct; Rudimentary Surface Transportation Systems | 3.3.4.2.6 |
| 1068 | Render; Emergency Repairs To Vital Facilities | 3.2.6.1.4 |
| 1070 | Perform; Rudimentary Construction And Repair Public Facilities | 3.3.4.2.6 |
| 1072 | Perform; Sandbagging, Hauling, And Dike Reinforcement | 3.2.6.1 |
| 1073 | Repair; Vehicles And Equipment | 3.3.4.1.7 |
| 1074 | Support; Seizure Airfield | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1075 | Provide; Power Generation | 3.2.6.1.2.1 |
| 1076 | Install; Water Purification Units | 3.2.1.1 |
| 1077 | Transport; Displaced Individuals | 3.2.2.4 |
| 1078 | Transport; Supplies And Rations To Camps And Checkpoints | 3.3.4.1.6 |
| 1079 | Clear; Cars, Trees, Fences, And Debris From Roads | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1082 | Provide; Food | 3.2.1.1 |
| 1083 | Clear; Debris | 3.2.6.1 |
| 1084 | Provide; Construction Material | 3.2.6.1 |
| 1085 | Security, Support; Facility Or Embassy | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1086 | Setup; Tents With Electrical Power | 3.2.1.4 |
| 1087 | Provide; Potable Water | 3.2.1.1 |
| 1088 | Provide; Laundry, Bath, And Light Textile Renovation | 3.3.4.2 |
| 1089 | Conduct; Intelligence Operations | 3.3.2.1 |
| 1090 | Disposition; Human Remains | 3.3.4.2 |
| 1091 | Conduct; Medical Operations Including Surgery | 3.2.1.3.3 |
| 1092 | Provide; Direct Medical Support Operations | 3.2.1.3 |
| 1094 | Provide; Medical Care To Supported Force | 3.3.4.1.4 |
| 1095 | Provide; Transportation To Civilian Relief Agencies | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 1096 | Conduct; Air Defense Medium Level Air Threat | 3.3.7.1 |
| 1097 | Support; Monitoring Cease Fire | 3.3.1 |
| 1098 | Provide; Initial And Immediate Facilities Engineering | 3.2.6.1.4 |
| 1099 | Provide; C2 And Supervision To Subordinates | 3.3.2.3.4 |
| 1100 | Build And Repair; Mobile Assault Bridges | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1101 | Build And Repair; Medium Girder Bridges | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1102 | Perform; Snow Removal | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1105 | Perform; Topographical Surveying/Mapping | 3.3.2.1 |
| 1106 | Evacuate; Medical Casualties | 3.3.4.1.4 |
| 1107 | Security; Local Area | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1108 | Support; Escorting Convoys Humanitarian Aid | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1109 | Relocation; Civilians | 3.2.2 |
| 1112 | Conduct; Chemical Decontamination | 3.3.7.1 |
| 1114 | Provide; Wells Potable Drinking Water | 3.2.6.1.2.2 |
| 1115 | Medical Research/Aide; Epidemics | 3.2.1.3 |
| 1116 | Control; Environmentally Related Disease | 3.2.1.3 |
| 1117 | Perform; Sanitation And Waste Disposal | 3.2.6.1.2.3 |
| 1118 | Perform; Interpretive Services Civil Affairs | 3.3.6 |
| 1119 | Support; Checkpoint Security | 3.3.7.3 |
| 1120 | Perform; Interpretive Services Commander And Staff | 3.3.6 |
| 1121 | Perform; Interpretive Services Security | 3.3.6 |
| 1130 | Support; Airfield Security | 3.3.7 |
| 1152 | Conduct; Reconnaissance | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 1158 | Use Force; To Deter Violent Actions And Restore Order | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1159 | Support; Strikes And Raids | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1160 | Provide; Lift, Tactical for Rapid Reaction Force | 3.3.4.1.6 |
| 1161 | Conduct; High Level Air Threat | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1162 | Provide; Clothing Exchange And Bath Facilities | 3.3.4.2.3 |
| 1163 | Perform; Civil Affairs | 3.3.6 |
| 1164 | Use; Civil Affairs Interpreters | 3.3.6 |
| 1166 | Conduct; Interviews With NGO's And PVO's | 3.3.6.2 |
| 1167 | Stabilize; Conflict Among Belligerents | 3 |
| 1168 | Provide; Reaction Force | 3.3.3.1 |
| 1169 | Conduct; Raids And Weapons Seizures | 3.2.7 |
| 1170 | Restore; Law And Order | 3.2.4.3 |
| 1171 | Deter; Violent Acts | 3.3 |
| 1175 | Provide; Bakery | 3.2.1.1 |
| 1179 | Provide; Checkpoint Security | 3.3.7.3 |
| 1181 | Establish; Emergency Communications | 3.2.6.1.3.1 |
| 1182 | Perform; Communications Basic Service | 3.2.6.1.3 |
| 1188 | Remove/Clear; Existing And Man-made Obstacles | 3.2.6 |
| 1189 | Build/Emplace; Obstacles | 3.3.3.1 |
| 1190 | Clear/Repair; Roads | 3.2.6.1.1.1 |
| 1192 | Construct; Forward Airfield Or Landing Zone | 3.2.6.1.1.3 |
| 1194 | Seizure; Airfield | 3.3.3.2 |
| 1197 | Remove Or Clear/Reduce; Minefields | 3.2.7 |
| 1198 | Provide; Well Drilling And Pipeline Installation | 3.2.6.1.2 |
| 1200 | Build; Dams | 3.2.6.1 |
| 1201 | Repair; Dams | 3.2.6.1 |
| 1202 | Provide; Temporary Shelter Refugees | 3.2.1.4 |
| 1203 | Provide; Electrical Power | 3.2.6.1.2.1 |
| 1204 | Provide; Evacuation Unit Or Embassy | 3.3.3.3 |
| 1205 | Security; Facility Or Embassy From Attack | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1206 | Distribute; Food | 3.2.1.1 |
| 1208 | Perform; Movement Humanitarian Aid | 3.3.4.2.7 |
| 1210 | Escort Convoys; Humanitarian Aid | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1211 | Provide; Escorting Convoys Humanitarian Aid | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1214 | Acquisition Of Land Radars; Target | 3.3.3.1 |
| 1216 | Evacuate; Noncombatants | 3.3.3.3 |
| 1217 | Build, Operate, And Secure; Refugee Camps | 3.2.2.3 |
| 1218 | Provide; Command And Control Functions | 3.3.2 |
| 1220 | Translate; Verbal And Written Communications And Documents | 3.3.2.1.2 |
| 1221 | Distribute; Flyers Ordinance/Mine Dangers | 3.3.6 |
| 1222 | Confiscate; Weapons At Checkpoints | 3.3.7.4 |
| 1223 | Prevent; Pilferage | 3.3.7.2 |
| 1224 | Handle; Detainees | 3.3.7.4 |
| 1225 | Patrol; Urban Areas | 3.3.5.3 |
| 1227 | Disarm; Belligerents | 3.2.7 |
| 1229 | Cordon And Search; Built Up Areas | 3.3.2.1.1 |
| 1230 | Eliminate; Snipers | 3.3.7.1 |
| 1231 | Search; Refugees Weapons And Explosives | 3.3.7 |
| 1232 | Extract Or Evacuate; Victims | 3.3.3.3 |
| 1233 | Assist; Public Safety | 3.2.4.3 |
| 1234 | Guard; Damaged Homes And Victims | 3.3.7 |
| 1235 | Enforce; Curfews | 3.2.4.3 |
| 2000 | Conduct; Visits and Meetings with other Diplomats | 3.1.1.1 |
| 2001 | Create; Diplomatic Courses of Action | 3.1.2.2 |
| 2002 | Mediate; Local Dispute | 3.1.3.6 |
| 2003 | Mediate; Regional Dispute at Political Level | 3.1.3.6 |
| 2004 | Distribute; Potable Water | 3.2.1.1 |
| 2005 | Provide; Clothing | 3.2.1.2 |
| 2006 | Distribute; Clothing | 3.2.1.2 |
| 2007 | Construct; Sanitation Facilities | 3.2.1.5 |
| 2008 | Choose; Diplomatic Course of Action | 3.2.1.4 |
| 2009 | Report; Human Rights Situation | 3.2.3.2 |
| 2010 | Identify; War Criminals | 3.2.3.4 |
| 2011 | Locate; War Criminals | 3.2.3.4 |
| 2012 | Arrest; War Criminals | 3.2.3.4 |
| 2013 | Incarcerate; War Criminals | 3.2.3.4 |
| 2014 | Judge; War Criminals | 3.2.3.4 |
| 2015 | Provide Information; Democratization | 3.2.4.4 |
| 2016 | Provide Information; Human Rights | 3.2.3.3 |
| 2017 | Provide; Pipeline repair and services | 3.2.6.1.2.4 |
| 2018 | Assist; Broadcast (TV/Radio) Re-Establishment | 3.2.6.1.3.2 |
| 2019 | Assist; Teachers And Other Educators | 3.2.6.2.2 |
| 2020 | Assist; Community Projects | 3.2.6.2.3 |
| 2021 | Assist; Religious Structure Repair | 3.2.6.2.4 |
| 2022 | Assist; NGO Activities (Excess Material, Volunteers, ...) | 3.2.6.2.5 |
| 2023 | Integrate; Space Systems | 3.3.1.2.4 |
| 2024 | Provide; Food To Civilians | 3.3.4.2.1 |
| 2025 | Provide; Water To Civilians | 3.3.4.2.1 |
| 2026 | Provide; Medical Services To Civilians | 3.3.4.2.2 |
| 2027 | Provide; Shelter Support To Civilians | 3.3.4.2.4 |
| 2028 | Conduct; Show Of Force Overflights | 3.3.5.4 |
| 2029 | Conduct; Presence Through Information Campaign | 3.3.5.6 |
| 2030 | Conduct; Liaison Visits With Local Authorities | 3.3.6.1 |
| 2031 | Conduct; Liaison Visits With Other Intervenors (UN, OSCE, ICRC, ...) | 3.3.6.3 |
| 2032 | Conduct; Liaison And Visits With Population | 3.3.6.6 |
Appendix B:
Factor Score Coefficients (Factor 1-6)
| Variable | Factor1 | Factor2 | Facto r3 | Factor4 | Factor5 | Factor6 |
| 32 | 0.075 | -0.009 | -0.132 | 0.396 | 0.035 | -0.242 |
| 200 | 0.039 | -0.089 | 0.100 | -0.111 | 0.064 | -0.670 |
| 1167 | -0.057 | -0.030 | 0.016 | < td>0.5930.201 | 0.262 | |
| 90 | -0.060 | -0.052 | 0.039 | -0.021 | 0.047 | -0.141 |
| 185 | 0.105 | 0.100 | -0.140 | 0.036 | -0.221 | -0.120 |
| 211 | -0.091 | 0.539 | -0.127 | 0.097 | 0.030 | |
| 342 | -0.005 | 0.090 | -0.107 | -0.281 | -0.079 | |
| 31 | -0.114 | -0.008 | 0.437 | -0.053 | -0.026 | -0.035 |
| 166 | 0.267 | 0.077 | -0.101 | -0.128 | 0.092 | -0.036 |
| 183 | 0.035 | -0.052 | -0.001 | 0.004 | -0.078 | |
| 61 | -0.000 | -0.123 | 0.289 | 0.219 | 0.012 | 0.100 |
| 148 | -0.046 | 0.057 | -0.138 | -0.559 | -0.092 | |
| 136 | 0.204 | -0.220 | 0.019 | 0.039 | -0.119 | 0.049 |
| 147 | -0.018 | -0.241 | 0.082 | -0.499 | 0.145 | |
| 173 | 0.023 | 0.381 | 0.014 | -0.043 | 0.163 | -0.003 |
| 3 | 0.261 | 0.077 | -0.221 | - 0.056 | -0.135 | -0.221 |
| 244 | -0.027 | 0.349 | 0.058 | -0.124 | 0.073 | 0.085 |
| 36 | 0.109 | -0.114 | 0.019 | 0.098 | 0.099 | 0.323 |
| 76 | 0.052 | 0.010 | 0.036 | 0 .030 | 0.084 | -0.069 |
| 151 | -0.004 | -0.056 | 0.525 | 0.151 | -0.083 | |
| 19 | 0.067 | 0.092 | 0.183 | 0 .107 | 0.281 | 0.092 |
| 40 | 0.251 | -0.008 | -0.011 | 0.051 | 0.121 | -0.110 |
Appendix B (continued):
Factor Score Coefficients (Factors 7-10)
| Variable | Factor7 | Factor8 | Facto r9 | Factor10 |
| 32 | 0.069 | 0.139 | -0.028 | 0.030 |
| 200 | -0.056 | -0.087 | 0.012 | |
| 1167 | -0.178 | -0.112 | -0.033 | 0.148 |
| 90 | 0.011 | -0.668 | -0.073 | 0.083 |
| 185 | 0.258 | 0.234 | -0.214 | -0.047 |
| 211 | -0.178 | 0.102 | 0.266 | 0.185 |
| 342 | 0.008 | -0.013 | 0.510 | 0.064 |
| 31 | 0.037 | 0.075 | 0.059 | - 0.047 |
| 166 | -0.169 | 0.019 | -0.425 | |
| 183 | 0.024 | 0.053 | 0.025 | -0.870 |
| 61 | 0.170 | -0.155 | 0.044 | -0.091 |
| 148 | 0.099 | 0.140 | 0.216 | 0.140 |
| 136 | 0.162 | -0.063 | -0.038 | |
| 147 | -0.019 | -0.084 | -0.074 | < td>-0.139|
| 173 | 0.202 | -0.004 | 0.088 | -0.106 |
| 3 | -0.108 | 0.352 | 0.153 | 0 .098 |
| 244 | -0.221 | 0.044 | -0.339 | |
| 36 | 0.251 | -0.550 | -0.305 | -0.265 |
| 76 | -0.652 | 0.108 | -0.061 | -0.059 |
| 151 | -0.272 | -0.082 | 0.011 | |
| 19 | 0.063 | 0.185 | 0.427 | - 0.120 |
| 40 | -0.093 | 0.038 | -0.097 | 0.023 |
Notes:
Note 1: The research reported in this paper was partially supported by a contract from the Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. For a project Final Report see, Thomas H. Johnson, Analysis of Peace Operations Tasks: Relevance and Factor Analysis. (Fairfax, Va.: The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University, 1996). An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation at Cornwallis II Conference: Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict, April 8-10, 1997, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada. Back.
Note 2: Thomas H. Johnson is a Senior Research Associate of the Program of Peacekeeping Policy at The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University. He also serves as Director of Policy Research at Innovative Management Concepts, Inc., Sterling, Virginia. His present research interests include the analysis and implications of peace operations on American foreign policy and the ramifications of the military technical revolution. He is also leading a major research project that is developing modeling and simulation ontologies and repositories. His publications concerning modeling and simulation, political and defense economics, Third World conflicts and insurgencies, foreign policy analysis and peace research/conflict resolution have appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Modern African Studies, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science, Strategic Review, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, and a variety of edited compilations. He has taught at the University of Southern California and the Foreign Service Institute, and frequently lectures at Service Academies and the National Defense University. Back.
Note 3: “Cohen Issues Caution on Peacekeeping,” Washington Post, January 25, 1997, pg. A8. Back.
Note 4: “Mission Constriction,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, November 24, 1996 (URL: http://www.fwst.com/new…T12/1:EDIT12112496.html). Back.
Note 5: “Mission Creep,” The Washington Post, October 29, 1996, pg. A16. Back.
Note 6: “Gingrich, Armey Question Clinton on Future of Bosnia Mission,” John Diamond (The Associated Press), Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 20, 1996 (URL: http://www.netarrant.ne…8/1:NATION58062096.html). Back.
Note 7: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), DoD News Briefing, March 26, 1996 - 10:30 a.m. (URL: http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/news/Mar96/t032696_t0326sta.html). Back.
Note 8: Of course, peace operations are not unique to the post-Cold War era as suggested by over a half century of United Nations-led peacekeeping missions. Back.
Note 9: Bradley Graham, “Pentagon Studies Expanded Roles for a Smaller Future Military Force,” Washington Post, April 2, 1997, pg. A6. Back.
Note 10: Mark Thompson, “Haiti: The Past as Prelude,” Time, September 19, 1994, Volume 144, No. 12. Back.
Note 11: A recent poll conducted by the University of Maryland Program on Policy Attitudes indicated that a majority of Americans believed that the United States should not play the role of “world policeman” nor become isolationist. Instead, the poll suggested that Americans believe that the U.S. role in the world should be one of burdensharing with other countries. See URL: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/unpoll2.html. Back.
Note 12: Victoria K. Holt, Briefing Book on Peacekeeping: The U.S Role in United Nations Peace Operations, (Washington, DC: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Inc., 1994), pg. 1. Back.
Note 13: For example, see: D. Davis and Thomas H. Johnson, “Old Concepts for the Assessment of a New World,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume III, Issue 2, Summer/Fall, 1996. Back.
Note 14: Bradley Graham, Op. Cit. Back.
Note 15: Timothy L. Thomas, International Conflict Controllers: Manipulators or Manipulated, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 1996). Back.
Note 16: 10th Mountain Operation RESTORE HOPE After Action Report, p. 34. Back.
Note 17: See Sen. Lugar’s quote presented above. Back.
Note 18: Congressman Floyd Spence Chairman, House National Security Committee, “U.S. Troops in Bosnia: Caught in the Quagmire?”, National Security Report, March, 1997. Back.
Note 19: A synopsis of this research can be found at URL: http://call.army.mil:1100/nftf/mar94/394ch1.html. Back.
Note 20: Donald Daniel, “Issues and Considerations in UN Gray Area and Enforcement Ops”, (United States Naval War College, April 1994). Back.
Note 21: He refers to such operations as “gray area and enforcement missions.” Back.
Note 22: See the definitions of peacekeeping presented below. Back.
Note 23: A mission is a set of tasks related by participants, conditions, time, and purpose. A mission may be realized by the accomplishment of one or more tasks. Organizational purpose is reflected through the performance of constituent operations. Back.
Note 24: A task is an atomic concept of a peace operation and is a descriptor of an activity performed by an entity in a mission space. Tasks are both decomposable (comprised of subtasks) and interrelated. Back.
Note 25: Adam B. Siegel, A Chronology of U.S. Marine Corps Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1994), pg.15. Back.
Note 26: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), pg. 11. Back.
Note 27: Army FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Glossary-13. Back.
Note 28: We use the term “peace support” interchangeably with peace operations. Back.
Note 29: Army FM 100-23, Op cit. Back.
Note 30: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Op cit., pg. 26. Back.
Note 31: Developed by OC, Incorporated for the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Va. Back.
Note 32: George Mason University’s Program on Peacekeeping Policy has used this task list, in part, in the development of its Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO). For each task, the corresponding CMPO task number is presented (see column 3 of Appendix A). One of the ancillary project goals was to use the list to empirically ground the theoretical CMPO structure with historical data. Back.
Note 33: Asterisks in this table designate United Nation's peace operations. Back.
Note 34: US Army FM 100-23, pg. v. Back.
Note 35: Barry McCaffery, “US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations,” in Dennis Quinn (ed.) Peace Support Operations and the US Military (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1994) pg. 4. Back.
Note 36: Current United Nations Peace Operations & U.S. Troop Levels, URL: http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/tro96dec.html. Back.
Note 37: The only UN peace operations we did not analyze were those we did not have available data on -- UNSCOB, UNEF I, UNOGIL, ONUCA, UNSF, UNYOM, DOMREP, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNAMIC, UNAVEM III, UNPF, UNTAES, UNPREDEP. Back.
Note 38: Victoria K. Holt, Op. Cit., p. 15. Back.
Note 39: An experiment evaluating the inter-coder reliability (2 coders coding the same operation using the same sources) yielded coder agreement in the test case of 87% for the coding of “task relevance”. Back.
Note 40: It should be noted that in a number of operations we inferred certain task relevance according to the units employed. Back.
Note 41: Operation Support Hope, After Action Report, pg. 10 Back.
Note 42: “Bosnia_Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I),” US Army Peacekeeping Institute, May 20-23, 1996. Back.
Note 43: In our presentations of the factor analyses, only dimensions with eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater are presented. Back.
Note 44: The factor score coefficients for this factor analysis can be found in the Appendix, Tables 8 and 9. Back.
Note 45: See the factor score coefficients in the Appendix. We have clustered all tasks on a particular factor with a factor score coefficient greater than .10. Back.
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