Session Three: Impact of the Corridor on the Democratization of States

Future Prospects for the Eurasian Corridor
A series of round-table discussions
April 23, 1998

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

Michael Ochs (Moderator): Hello and welcome to the third panel on today’s agenda. I am Michael Ochs of the Helsinki Commission in Congress. I would like to first of all congratulate Rusudan for her persistence and for being the guiding spirit for this conference. And I would like to thank my friend Fiona Hill for inviting me to moderate this panel. They have also given me leave to make some brief introductory remarks before we talk about democratization in the region.

At the risk of a very brief and overly simplified definition, democratization involves the development of relations between state and society which permits individuals to create the institutions of civil society that can then act within the framework of checks and balances, in what has become a very strong executive power in the countries with which we are concerned. I am struck by the real range to which democratization or the lack of democratization has taken place in these countries. It is an important point because in the previous discussions today we talked about regional security and economic growth. If in all of those respects everyone loves the idea of the Eurasian Corridor, then the attitude towards the impact of the Corridor and interdependence on democratization is somewhat more problematic. It is widely believed in Kyrgyzstan that the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakstan have pressured the President of Kyrgyzstan when it has come to the issue of democratization. This is because they believe that too much democratization in a neighboring state is a very dangerous precedent for them. To some extent, the same thing applies when it comes to other aspects of democratization, for instance, holding elections. A good election in one country can be an example for another country. A head of state might then feel pressured to hold an even better election than he might have otherwise, but a bad election allows someone to assume that you can get away with it because the bar and expectations have been lowered. So basically, precedent setting is very important.

Our first presenter will be Tamar Hajian, the Vice President and General Counsel of Brandeis University.

Tamar Haijan: Thank you Michael. It is a pleasure to be here today and to share with you some of my experiences as an American lawyer who over the last ten years has gone back to Armenia in order to work on the establishment of a civil society under the rule of law. The region is of a varied landscape, with states and systems at various levels of development, sizes and scopes. The transition in Armenia in particular shows that sometimes the civil society develops more quickly than the political. In a region characterized by leadership that takes the form of reinvented Politburo members, Armenia now has new faces. And those new faces are faced with the task of tempering robber baron capitalism with a tax system and a fairer method of distributing wealth in the region and an effort to minimize the influence of mafia forces. Armenia, under threat of annihilation and dismemberment over the course of the 20th Century, is now moving forward as a regional player and is building on the legacy of its 1918 democracy and democratic foundations, at which time we had two women Ambassadors and universal suffrage. This is important in the psyche of building democratic institutions after 70 years and their absence.

Major developments that have taken place since 1991 include a proliferation of constitutional drafting, using a combination of US technical advisors and a French model, a rather odd anomaly. Some of the shortcomings of such a process, which have come to light now, are some of the missed opportunities of inserting shortened term lengths, staggered terms and the latitude for a transitional society to make adjustments. The public legal culture had to develop in a number of other places. Vast bodies of law exist. Implementation is much slower. In the transformation from the days of the supreme Soviet to the 1995 parliamentary elections, we saw some of those shortcomings coming to light. But the interesting side factor is that pluralism and diversity developed toward the beginnings of a formation of a range of political parties. This is evident with 12 candidates running for President with very different platforms in this last election last month. One other very important factor in the development of democratic institutions and mentality is the fact that there are 20 independent television stations operating in Armenia now. They may have shoe string budgets and limited time, but the growth of an independent media bodes well. The judiciary, which has traditionally been one of the most corrupt institutions, is now beginning to form judicial councils where members actually speak up about the rights and protection of judges. They reflect the same kind of pluralism of thought as they move away from a command system to a more independent and hopefully more protected institution.

In the 1991 and 1996 presidential elections, the president of Armenia began with a wide variety of support across the board. By 1996 the neglect of institution building culminated in him losing the trust of the public at large. His resignation in February of 1998, albeit peaceful and orderly, was in contrast to the expected term for a presidency that has a great deal of power attached to it. I will also point out that this can be contrasted to experiences in other republics as well. So Robert Kocharian came to be President through an electoral process which included a run off election at the beginning of this month, in which a country with a small population (under 4 million people) had a large portion of its population engaged in the political process. Imagine 12 candidates in 1,600 precincts. Some calculations will tell you that a great number of people were involved. The non-elitist attitude of the press at that point, its ability to go out and interview men on the street and its flexibility, is very important. Election observers considered this a fair but imperfect election. Some of the OSCE publications after the fact make one wonder where and what the bar is for future elections. It will be interesting to see how these standards are applied to other Caucasian republics when election time arises.

Finally, in discussing changes since 1991, I would mention the establishment of the Karabakh republic with the attributes of a self governing democratic state, rejecting the notion of autonomy under Azerbaijani rule. Another major development that has been taking place since 1991 is the beginning of the opening up of Iran, which has by default become a lifeline to Armenia. And Armenia has been a small but positive influence on its transition into a more secular state.

Armenia has many challenges to the development of a secular state of democracy, as do other states. Some of the problems that Armenia is still facing include the history of irredentism in the region which has left Armenia victimized over and over again, overcoming the devastation of a 1988 earthquake, the settlement of refugees from pogroms as well as the earthquake, and the blockade of Armenia from two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey. It is a startling contrast for visitors in the region to compare the condition of Armenian refugees with that of other refugees in the region. However, the refugees have been integrated into the country. With its paucity of resources, the country has still been able to make do, if not perfectly but adequately, in keeping people out of camps and not allowing hatred to fester. Those of you who know the region know what a difference it is to take an urban population and to put them into agrarian situations. It is a big struggle and a loss of status for these people.

The creation of jobs in the middle class poses another challenge. It will be a long time before the economy can sustain the institution of the middle class, which is crucial to building democratic institutions on a lasting basis. As in all countries that receive massive amounts of foreign aid, the transition to a sustainable development model is no less important in Armenia than anywhere else. Investment in the democratic infrastructure and citizen education helps this process, but it’s economic restructuring and a sustained effort of attracting investment that makes the difference.

Armenia may not be the most active player in pipeline politics, but it is certainly an active player in the pipeline region. The development of the Eurasian Corridor as a route for trade can only impact positively, not just in the form of material benefits, but in the form of regional institutions of cooperation. Armenians are a diaspora people and well attuned to living in different parts of the world and different societies in an integrated fashion. The tradition of being part of a larger world of larger units and still keeping one’s ethnic identity is seen by Armenians as being in one’s natural state. Perhaps some of the experiences that have come out of democracy building in Armenia can be shared in building the legal, economic and trade norms of the region.

Outside parties have played major roles in the issues I have mentioned. In promoting regional cooperation and democratic norms, we have to look at two levels. One level includes immediate actors, the states in the region, but in some respects there is also a surrogate operation going on. Until the United States, Turkey, Russia and Iran come themselves to some equilibrium it will be very difficult for the states of the region to do so. The maintenance of neutrality and good offices, including the avoidance of imposed partisan solutions, is a very important component to this process. Periodically, initiatives need to be reassessed or they run the risk of dead end strategies that seem to be plaguing the OSCE negotiations right now. When even-handed standards are applied evenly throughout the region with a sensitivity toward and knowledge of pre-1991 history, it is still very helpful to the parties of the land to take a new look, a fresh look, to turn a new leaf. As in so many things in life, issues are not dealt with, injustices that prevail and are not addressed and the perspective of short-term profit ensures short-term thinking, which only exacerbates the situation.

I would end my remarks by recalling something that was said about constitution building in the days when many of us were quite naïve, in the later part of the 1980s: that everything would be wonderful and fine once the old Soviet Union was broken up into manageable parts and everyone could find their place under the sun in peace, prosperity and happiness. Constitution building and democratic process building is never done in a vacuum. It is never done in a situation of economic deprivation and when the key issues are not addressed and parties do not speak to each other and build together.

Moderator: Thank you Tamar. The floor now goes to Jayhun Molla–Zade of the US–Azerbaijan Council.

Jayhun Molla–Zade: I think the issue of democratization is becoming more and more important for the countries and people of the region. Democracy is important everywhere around the world, but in countries that have the potential to become oil producing countries and are expecting a windfall of wealth, how can they mange this wealth? How will the wealth help democracy building?

Since 1991, different countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have undergone different democratic experiences. One of the crucial issues is ethnic conflict. This confrontation and hostility has lead to the failure and mistakes in the politics of leaders. This also led to the failure of the popular front government to build strong institutions. In Armenia, the President was strong for quite some time but fell because of the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict. We see that there are some hands or forces that are behind these failures. Things have been different in Central Asia since 1991. Kazakhstan has done well with its independent media, but recently there have been problems involving this same issue. Many of you know that this country is lacking real political dissent. Any time it occurs it is brutally suppressed.

Coming back to the South Caucasus, many people point to the two women Ambassadors, the free media and the numerous political parties as a signs of democracy. These are the signs of democracy. Sometimes these seeds of democracy can grow into something more viable, but sometimes it can remain as a facade to the West. After some turmoil, Georgia has done a good job of holding free and fair parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze came back and gave stability to Georgia, but at the same time he was strongly supporting young Georgian politicians that got the support of the people. This allowed them to build strong institutions. We see the results of economic and political reforms despite the fact that Georgia is not really a big oil producing country. What this entire region really needs are not only the signs of democracy, but free and fair elections with which people can change their governments. I do not think that they can do that yet. In contrast, the good thing about the Baltic states is that their leaders are willing to step down and lose elections and people can really choose their governments.

There are good economic prospects for this region. However, a large threat to many of the nations of this region is ending up like Nigeria or Venezuela, with no real prosperity, because of corruption and the misappropriation of wealth. Some leaders say that they will follow the Indonesia model, but we can see the problems of that as well. Instead, it would be better to look at the West where they are wealthy without oil. One then necessarily looks at Norway. Yet I think that the Caucasus and Caspian region will be neither Nigeria nor Norway. They will be something else.

It is important that the people of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are not as influenced by the Soviet legacy, particularly when discussing whether people can really move towards democracy. The US can play a major role in this effort. The US can play a more active role in terms of elections, in strengthening democratic institutions in this country, building political and economic institutions, building NGOs, training activists so that they will really know how the democratic process works in the democratic world. The West should invest in democracy building measures. The US government and its Congress should be more active in the intellectual aspects of democracy building.

Refugees remain a great problem for democratization. The Azerbaijani government has resettled some of the refugees, but they had limits as well. The government bureaucracy has also created some problems, especially in terms of its appetite when it comes to aid. Of even greater concern is the fact that the people are not in the camps because the government is building hatred. There is enough hatred on both sides, and this has become another obstacle to democratization.

Moderator: Thank you Jayhun. Our first discussant is Nicholas Daniloff, the Director of the School of Journalism at Northeastern University.

Nicholas Daniloff: Thank you very much Michael. I would like to pick up on some of the points both of our presenters have made on freedom of the press in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. And if there is time I will comment on refugees. I think that we all view a free and independent press as an important element in any democracy, but we must also remember that these societies are really just emerging from the Soviet Empire and the Soviet stamp remains very heavy on both of them. In a way one can hope that Armenia could make some significant progress because of its ties to the West. Much help could come from France and the United States. Armenia has abolished censorship of the press while Azerbaijan has retained Soviet style censorship. However, the Soviet stamp continues to operate in areas of no censorship. There have been cases of serious intimidation, both while journalists are collecting information and after they have published information that has not been pleasing to bureaucrats.

One should note, however, that progress is being made in a number of areas. For instance, television is very important in Armenia because it reaches all of the country. Channel 1 and Channel 2, both owned by the government, are being restructured. Channel 1 will become a partly private and partly government owned entity with the government owning 51% of the shares. Channel 2 will eventually become totally privatized. Currently, there is no independent publishing house in Armenia. However, the Eurasia Foundation has chosen a publisher to become an independent publisher and seems ready to offer up financing, part grant and part loan, in order to buy a community press that would be capable of publishing all kinds of newspapers—that is community newspapers, opposition newspapers and possibly government newspapers. This would be very important, especially if all kinds of newspapers were published. Moreover, 20 independent television stations have been promoted by a Californian group, Internews. Internews is very active in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and is seeking to link all these countries by shared programs. This is, however, difficult to do when two of the countries are in a formal state of war with a cease-fire that always doesn’t hold. So sometimes when a program is developed in Armenia it may not find support in Azerbaijan and vice versa.

We should look to the young journalists. What are they like in these countries? Often you find young people who think it is easy to be a journalist, one has only to sit down and write. These new young journalists are often fast and loose with the facts. In a society which was closed, it is difficult to retrain old dogs. Therefore, it is important to support the young journalists and their training.

Let me skip to Azerbaijan, where there exists a Soviet-style censorship. All newspapers must supply their text to the censor before the material is published. ANS television is ostensibly not censored, but I am not completely sure of this. In fact, I appeared on a show and protested how even though the Azeri constitution bans censorship, it still exists. The intellectuals were delighted by the comments of an impertinent American and some said this would give the government an opportunity to demonstrate what a free press they had. What is paradoxical is that ANS television was the most important and powerful private broadcastor in the Caucasus, broadcasting that was without restriction, but to a certain extent cautious and balanced.

Azerbaijan, with twice as many people as Armenia, has twice as many journalists, which tells us that both countries have an active and vital group of journalists. Journalists always want to tell their story and the question is to what extent are they suppressed and to what extent are they intimidated. I would have to say that the Azeri journalists are very brave and they are constantly looking for ways to get their story out. In Armenia, journalists are very badly paid and when that happens they are most vulnerable to bribing.

Turning to the refugee issue, in Armenia, as far as I can tell, there is very poor information about Azeri refugees. One needs to be very careful about what information one has about refugees in Azerbaijan. There are a lot of them. There may be a million. That figure is disputed. They do not all live in tents. May of them live in cottages made of cinder block. Some live in buildings that are in terrible conditions. I have spoken with many refugees and their main desire is to go home. And when you talk to them they profess that they do not hate the Armenians. They want to go home. There is a danger, though. If the refugee situation is not solved in a period of ten years it is quite possible that they will produce teenage bomb throwers. Teenagers that would be protesting their conditions and the lack of resolution to the problems of the Nagorno–Karabakh.

Moderator: Thank you. Our next discussant is Henry Hale, Adjunct Assistant professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Henry Hale: Thank you very much. I wanted to follow up on some of Jayhun’s comments about the way in which the states might use their oil resources to develop. I think this speaks to a broader point I would like to make. The Eurasian Corridor offers great hope for many of these states, but much depends on how state leaders take advantage of the possibilities that the Corridor offers. So first, I would like to sound a cautionary note. The democratic record of states that depend primarily on oil resources or even just rents derived from external goods or export is not good. The Arab world is only one example and one can cite a variety of reasons for this. If a state’s primary source of revenues does not depend on its people, this can tend to promote a supplicant relationship between the people and the state. In addition, there is little incentive to develop a strong system of taxation. Samuel Huntington has said that one can reverse the American dictum and say that there is no representation without taxation, because this is the primary impetus for the government and the people to strike some kind of working relationship. In addition, oil benefits seem to be concentrated within a small elite group. And finally, there is little incentive for state leaders to invest in the diversification of their economies because all of their immediate oil needs are supplied by the taxes on oil exports.

I would like to focus on the impact of the Corridor on this dynamic. It can go one of two ways. If the Corridor itself becomes primarily an oil pipeline, then this can be bad for the states involved because it facilitates the rent-like state, which can be bad for democracy. In addition, if the pipeline is seen as a source of transit revenue by the transit states themselves then it decreases their incentives for investing in broader economic development in their own economies and this will be bad for these transit states. However, I think that if the Eurasian Corridor is developed more broadly, then it can be a real boon for democracy in the region. It should be a stimulus for broad economic development. In addition, if we are talking about the construction of the transportation infrastructure, this will alleviate another problem of renting states which is where will they invest their petro-dollars. If you establish a solid, working transportation network, whereby goods produced locally can be taken and exported more efficiently, then this could increase the value of investing domestically. I think the key is strong leadership on the part of the presidents themselves. They must recognize the long term gains of developing strong democratic institutions and helping the Eurasian Corridor in a way that is not just oriented around oil, but that it is instead focused on a more diversified field of interest for the economy.

Moderator: Thank you. Our next speaker is Irakli Kakabadze, Coordinator of the Caucasus Program at the National Peace Foundation.

Irakli Kakabadze: I would like to continue on that very valid point about the distribution of benefits. No one is in the position to deny that economic development in the Caucasus is a high priority. But at the same time, we know that the necessary condition for economic development is a peaceful and stable society. A peaceful society that would allow us to better our lives. I worked for a national peace foundation in Georgia last summer and my general observation was that there was significant progress made in Georgia due to the democratic reforms made by some progressive people in Parliament. While these representatives are not in the majority, they are powerful enough to have influence. I have six specific points to make.

First, the rhetoric which comes from the West has a lot of power. It is the partial responsibility of the educated people in the Caucasus to emphasize economic development. This is very important. At the same time, economic development alone will not lead our countries to prosperity if there is no social justice and if there are civil rights violations.

Second, the problem is the vertical construction of society. There are still Soviet-era people who still emphasize hierarchical relationships, and this allows a majority of citizens to be viewed as second class citizens. In Georgia, the conflict between the center and the provinces has been in some ways suppressed and helped by some of the reforms. The NGO sector along with the private sector has done a great job at civil society building. At the same time there is a lot more work remaining. There should be some alternative to this kind of hierarchical mentality. Certainly, there are a lot of examples to be found from Western society. There is much to be said for creating creative solutions in regard to political rights. Georgia, for example, has done a lot about this, but much work remains to be done with the so-called second class citizenship, which includes basically the 80% of the population that is looked down upon by the elites.

Third, economic progress certainly requires further democratization. While it is good that there are corporations that are investing in the region, they need to know that civil society building is one of the region’s highest priorities. And enhancing political institutions will require that a large portion of the population is trained to ensure civil rights. We now have no watch dog organization. I hope that the Parliament will create some in the next few years.

Fourth, it is also important that we emphasize basic human needs, instead of merely economic needs. The problem with the Soviet Union was that it only emphasized economic needs. The emphasis on ontological or human needs like freedom, security, identity, etc. is very important. Identity is indeed very important—a lot of people died for it.

Fifth, I should tell you that our economic development when we started the national liberation movement was not that bad. The economic situation now is a little worse than back then, when instead we were deprived of our identity and freedom. However, it has proved itself to be an incredibly ineffective system of relationships within the region. We need to look within ourselves to be a self-sufficient region and talk to each other—Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, and all of our ethnic, national or regional minorities—to build a self-sustainable community. The Western community—corporations and the United States government—also can help by providing us with some examples of self-sustainable communities in the West.

Finally, the stereotypes of the Cold War should go away because the world of the 1990s proved that the old principles of big powers balancing the small powers, so-called realpolitik, was not true and was a very, very weak doctrine, in the Caucasus at least. So we need to have some more self-sustainable alternatives to that and there is a lot of thought in the West to contribute to that.

Moderator: Daniel Kunin, from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Daniel Kunin: I’d like to focus my brief remarks on something that Michael Ochs said at the beginning of this panel discussion. Michael mentioned the need for checks and balances on strict presidential systems, and also that precedent counts. Within the framework of that, I’d like to talk a little bit about the character, tone, and the future of the situation in Georgia, and to highlight the role of the Parliament and also the role of the press.

It is very significant that the Parliament of Georgia has developed an independent character. I think this is a reflection of President Shevardnadze’s leadership and his ability to allow the Parliament to develop an institutional character. This is a precedent-setting event. As an observer who spent the better part of the last four years in Georgia, I am probably one of the first persons who would tell you that after the 1995 elections, I expected the Georgian Parliament to be a rubber stamp. Given the way that the political party spectrum was lined up, the party of President Shevardnadze had close to a super majority so one would expect that legislation would pass through without much problem. In fact, that hasn’t been the case at all. There have been a number of celebrated incidents where either budgets have been shot down or individual candidates or ministers proposed by the President have been rejected.

I would like to turn to the role of the press. What is significant in Georgia can almost be understood when you compare Georgia and Azerbaijan. I have been involved in a number of journalist training programs and when the Azeri and Georgian journalists get together, the Azeris are generally shocked at what the Georgians are allowed to print. And of course, the Georgians are shocked that there are no Russian troops in Azerbaijan. But beyond that, it brings into focus indeed the broad spectrum of viewpoints that are shown in the Georgian political context.

In fact, the journalists themselves, as well as the leading parliamentarians, are characterized by youth. This again is a reflection of President Shevardnadze’s view and his ability to let this system grow on its own, and also the level of interest shown by young people in the development of Georgia. Not only are the chairmanships of the most important committees held by some of the youngest individuals in politics, but in fact the NGOs that are most active are youth NGOs. There is a young lawyers’ association which was instrumental in the creation of legislation.

Journalists have been invited by the Parliament to take part in discussions. I attended and worked on a seminar in December where the Parliament brought together a wide spectrum of media members, many of whom were very, very anti-Shevardnadze or supporters of the former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. One can say, why do you need to undertake that kind of a discussion in the formation of legislation? I think that the Parliament has decided that by holding these meetings, the result will be that the law will have a greater level of public support. I see this as an optimistic trend, which creates precedent and which helps to form an institutional check on the powers of the president.

At the same time, as Jayhun Molla–Zade stated, even given these successes, will we see a system that will allow citizens to vote out and vote in a new government? On that question, I am not sure. I am not sure if Georgia is capable of doing that, as there is still a slightly paternalistic attitude. The proof of whether or not that is possible will occur when the elections for Parliament are held in the fall of 1999, when we will see whether or not there is a turnover of power. The challenge is also reflected in local government reforms and the degree to which the central authorities will allow local governments to have directly elected officials. Although democracy is allowed to grow to a certain extent, there again is a fear that a very strong and firm framework defined by the current authorities in place still needs to be in place.

I would just end this with a note of optimism. Certainly the role of Georgia in the Eurasian Corridor is of paramount importance, not only as a transport route but as a country that is able to create dialogue between Azerbaijani and Armenian parties. To the extent that this can have an influence on democratization, I’m not very positive, as I do not think that the example of Georgia will directly affect the other states’ behavior. On the other hand, I do think it serves as a positive precedent.

Moderator: Our last discussant is Cory Welt, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Cory Welt: Thank you. I will just raise two points following up on Henry Hale’s analysis. First, as Henry pointed out, oil and democracy generally have not gone together very well throughout the world. If you look empirically and if you do statistical regressions, this seems to be the case. It is very interesting to take this relationship and apply it to Eurasia. I admit that there is a continuum of democracy, and some countries like Georgia have strong democratic impulses. But it seems to be panning out in the region that those countries without natural resources are the ones that seem to be democratizing in the region. The countries that we think will have the greatest problems democratizing are those that have natural resources.

Second, with that in mind, we can turn to the question of what the West can do to promote democracy in the region. I am a skeptic. I think that it is very hard for an outsider to come in and try to impose or encourage democratic principles. Fundamentally, you need a leadership that is committed to democracy and you do not see that a lot in the oil and gas exporting countries of the region. You do see it in Georgia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, where perhaps not the entire government, but very large sectors of the government are committed to democracy. These are the countries that cannot depend on revenues from oil exports to build their democratic institutions. They need to maintain a bargain with the population. Also, these are the countries who are most in need of aid from the West. The oil exporters are going to get the money and we need to worry less about them. In our efforts to build a civil society, we should go to those countries that have shown an effort at doing this themselves.

Moderator: Thank you to all of our speakers and discussants. Are there any questions or comments?

Raouf Husseinov: I am a student at the Kennedy School from Azerbaijan. The last speaker emphasized a need for strong leadership for democratization and I think that the American leadership does not fulfill that role. There is a flaw in thinking that oil exporters will get money regardless of American aid. The countries that are going to export oil will get money in 10–15 years. What do we do until then? The American government should take a role in helping to alleviate this problem, especially by eliminating Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act which specifically prohibits any kind of aid, including humanitarian aid to 1.2 million Azerbaijani refugees. If America wants to show real leadership, this is the place to show it. Azerbaijan’s lands are under 20% occupation and the country has 1.2 million refugees. I think this speaks for itself. I do have a question for Michael Ochs. Can you speak a little bit about the recent elections in Armenia and about the candidacy of Robert Kocharian.

Ochs: I was an observer during the first round of elections in Armenia. With respect to Robert Kocharian’s candidacy and whether he was eligible to run, these were subjects of dispute. Ultimately, the Armenia central election commission decided to register his candidacy. When I was in the Caucasus, I talked with the President of Azerbaijan and he said that they will do business with whomever is elected in Armenia.

I would like to raise another issue based on something that Tamar said about the election. It is true that the process of international observation of elections has become politicized over the last couple of years. I have been an election observer in many different countries in the former Soviet Union many times. In 1995, I worked for the OSCE coordinating the international observation of the parliamentary elections. Since then, a number of organizations have become involved in the international election observation business. For example, in the recent Armenian election, in addition to the OSCE, there was the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. There was the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the CIS Parliamentary Assembly and a delegation from the Russian Duma. It is not surprising that with so many people involved that you might get a variety of views of how an election went. At the risk of offending anyone associated with the organizations I have mentioned, I want to tell you in all seriousness and responsibility that among these organizations are some that I do not take very seriously. I do not take seriously appraisals from the CIS Parliamentary Assembly and the appraisals of the Russian Duma. I have worked and traveled with them, but none of them has seen an election in a former Soviet Republic that it didn’t like, no matter how bad the election was. This isn’t surprising because it wasn’t their job. Each observer delegation has political goals. It is literally the truth that the CIS Parliamentary Assembly made its assessment of the Armenian election on the night of the 30th of March before the vote had begun. You cannot assess an election before the vote has begun. They did and said it was fine. A little more complicated is the status of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. I have also worked with them. It has been my oppression that they are often more solicitous than I would be and more solicitous than the OSCE.

With respect to the OSCE and the Armenian election, it is the impression of many people that this process in this election was quite politicized. The final report of the OSCE concluded that the Armenian elections did not meet OSCE standards. There had been two preliminary statements by Sam Brown, the representative of the OSCE, and if you take a look at his second statement and then look at the final report you will see and get a sense of the tensions that took place between the OSCE as an institution and Sam Brown as an individual.

It is regrettable that the election observation process has become politicized. It will have future ramifications for future elections, and this will not be good. What happened in the Armenian election is that the viewpoint of Vienna, the center of the OSCE, took precedence over Warsaw, which is the office that is assigned to observe elections and is the best qualified to assess an election.

With that I would like to thank all of our panelists and discussants.