The Russian Election Compendium

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
June 25, 1996, No. 23

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCENE

AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF THE ELECTION

In response to requests from friends, Harvard's Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project (SDI) has prepared this brief summary of the political scene in Russia in between the first and second rounds of the election.

I. The June 16 Presidential Election: What Happened?

• The results: The official results announced by the Central Electoral Commission on June 20:

Yeltsin 35.28%

Zyuganov 32.03%

Lebed 14.52%

Yavlinsky 7.34%

Zhirinovsky 5.70%

Sv. Fedorov .92%

Gorbachev .51%

Voter turnout was 69.8%

• Regional voting: Yeltsin ran strongest in large cities, where reforms had taken hold, and in the north and far east. Zyuganov did well in the depressed Red Belt the agricultural and rural areas across Russia's south.

• Runoff date: Yeltsin and Zyuganov go head-to-head for the presidency on Wednesday, July 3. Traditionally, Russian elections are held on Sundays. But the Yeltsin team, fearing that their voters would leave town for country homes and not return to vote on a Sunday, moved the election to mid-week. Gennady Zyuganov, surprisingly and perhaps unwisely, agreed to this date.

II. What Were the Messages of the First Vote?

• Vote against fear: Russian voters fear the past as much as they dislike the present. In an extraordinary move of political jujitzu, the Yeltsin campaign made the issue not a referendum on Yeltsin, but rather a referendum on the Communist party. In most campaigns, the key question is the Reagan question, "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" Yeltsin's campaign transformed this question into, "Will you be better off in four years if the Communists return?"

• Voters rejected Yeltsin: Two out of every three voters rejected President Yeltsin and his government's policies. Although the press has portrayed the results as a Yeltsin victory, he still only received the vote of 35% of the population, many of whom chose him with little enthusiasm as the "least bad" option.

• Voters rejected Zyuganov: Two out of three voters also rejected a return to the past. Gennady Zyuganov and the Communists failed to expand their constituency beyond their gains in the 1995 Duma election (about 24 million votes). Zyuganov's campaign tactics mistakenly chose to shore up his hard-line support, which would likely have voted for him anyway. Lack of moderate social-democratic stances in Zyuganov's campaign alienated crucial centrist voters which were needed to move beyond the natural Communist constituency.

• A star is born: The strong third place showing of retired general Alexander Lebed was the surprise of the campaign. His success demonstrates a longing for order among a sizable portion of the electorate. Lebed's success also reflected the results of a deal with the Yeltsin camp prior to the election. After Lebed's meeting with Yeltsin on June 9, television coverage of the retired general expanded dramatically most of it decidedly positive. The campaign also received financial and strategic assistance from the Yeltsin camp. The morning-after agreement between Lebed and Yeltsin makes it clear that the deal had already been done.

• Zhirinovsky's fall: Vladimir Zhirinovsky's surprisingly poor results (6%) shows the Russian voters enjoy his entertainment value more than they consider him as a serious presidential candidate. Much of Zhirinovsky's nationalist vote went to Lebed.

• Free and Fair: Voting and vote counting in the election for the most part were free and fair. Only isolated minor voting violations were reported throughout Russia. More serious fraud allegations occurred in Tatarstan, where the head of the Communist party claimed vote tabulations were changed, and in Chechnya, where the OSCE declared the election neither free nor fair. About the fairness and freedom of the campaign itself, larger objections arise. Television and press coverage of the campaign essentially functioned as an arm of the Yeltsin reelection bid. Moreover, Yeltsin campaign spending violated campaign finance rules with abandon.

III. What Is Next?

• Maneuvering and alliances: In order to move beyond the 35% of the vote he received in the first round, Yeltsin has acted swiftly to capture the center by announcing an alliance with Alexander Lebed. By placing Lebed in charge of national security, Yeltsin not only coopted the third leading vote-getter, but also showed his willingness to make personnel changes. The move also ensured the tacit support other first round candidates. Yavlinsky, Fedorov, and even Zhirinovsky have subsequently all told their supporters not to back Zyuganov.

• Yeltsin against hard-liners in his cabinet: Yeltsin's move to oust confidant Alexander Korzhakov, Security Service head Mikhail Barsukov, and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets after the arrest of liberal campaign aides reflects deeper intrigues under the covers. At this point, it appears that the gang of three were attempting to postpone the second round of the election. The big winner from the ousting will be Lebed.

• Yeltsin courts the democrats: With the dismissal of the gang of three and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Yeltsin has now met most of the conditions Yavlinsky stated for democrats to support his government. The dance between Yeltsin and Yavlinsky seems to be ongoing, but the results remain unclear.

• Harry Truman would be proud: Yeltsin has run a highly effective Western-style campaign. He emerged from an unwinnable position to become just one step away from being the first reelected Russian president. To get to this point Yeltsin relied on political consultants, strategists, and media specialists to craft a campaign that stressed to the electorate fear of a Communist return and a belief that only Yeltsin could defeat Zyuganov. His campaign ads showed testimonials of regular Russians reminding voters of the difficulties of life under Communism. Yeltsin's rock concerts across Russia appealed to the young and helped to address the health issue by showing a vigorous Yeltsin dancing on stage. The campaign decision to move the runoff to Wednesday with an eye to maximize voter turnout shows a real sense for campaign strategy. Yeltsin must keep this momentum for the last twelve days of campaigning.

• Lebed's Future: Lebed has moved himself from the pack of candidates to become Yeltsin's heir-apparent. Speaking in Yekaterinburg on the last day of the campaign, Yeltsin announced he had a strong successor already in mind. When asked after the first round of the election if he was referring to Lebed, the president demurred at first and then smiled and said, "You are thinking along the right lines." Lebed appeals to the Russian desire for order and a strong czar-like leader. He is also untainted as a Moscow insider. His talk of fighting corruption is similar to a younger, brasher Yeltsin of the 1980's who fought corruption and was fired from the politburo. Yeltsin's age and health mean that Lebed is the man to watch. However, if Yeltsin wins the second round, his entrenched entourage and Lebed will have difficulty in developing a modus operandi for governing.

• Zyuganov: Any where to run? From an election strategy point of view, it is interesting to consider what possibilities exist for Zyuganov. He has spoken to Lebed without success, and his efforts with Zhirinovsky have also failed. At this point it is hard to imagine Zyuganov changing his image, especially since Yeltsin will not allow him positive coverage on television. Getting out his vote and hoping for Yeltsin overconfidence is Zyuganov's only hope.

IV. Why Does This Matter?

We stick by the view that this election is the single most important election occurring in 1996. While the Yeltsin government left a lot to be desired before the campaign and will continue to leave a lot to be desired after the campaign, when compared to a Zyuganov alternative, the choice is clear from the perspective of Russia's and the West's interests. As earlier SDI memoranda have suggested, a Zyuganov election would not only collapse the Russian economy, but would also bring the prospect of real chaos and disorder to Russian society, and subsequently the world.