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The Russian Election Compendium
RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
April 18, 1996, No. 19
I. Estimated Probabilities of Presidential Election in June
1A. Betting Charts:
| Individual | Likelihood | Change From Last Week |
| Graham Allison (SDI Director) | 65% | |
| Sergei Grigoriev (SDI Fellow) | 65% | |
| Matthew Lantz (SDI Researcher) | 65% |
B. Events Affecting Likelihood of Elections in June:
THE BRYNTSALOV CONTROVERSY: The Central Election Commission (CEC) denied registration to its first presidential candidate, VLADIMIR BRYNTSALOV. Bryntsalov is a wealthy Duma Deputy whose official business is pharmaceuticals, but who has a reputation as a drug mogul. Rather than collect the additional signatures required after 400,000 of his 1.35 million signatures were rejected, he appealed the decision to the S upreme Court. In an extremely controversial move, the Russian Supreme Court found in favor of Bryntsalov and ruled 170,000 of the rejected signatures were valid, which placed him above the one million mark. The CEC protested the decision and refused to reinstate Bryntsalov arguing the Supreme Court could not force the CEC to register him. The Supreme Court suspended its order pending the result of a General Prosecutor Office's expert appraisal. The outcome of the standoff will be important: it will determine electoral procedures for the future; it will suggest how strict the CEC will be on signature verification; and it will help determine how many candidates will appear on the June 16 presidential ballot. The CEC also denied registration to a second candidate, MARTIN SHAKUM, President of the International Foundation for Economic and Social Reform for lack of sufficient valid signatures. (OMRI 4/11, 4/15, Kommersant Daily 4/16)
HOW THE ELECTION WORKS; DATES AND FACTS: The first round of the election will take place on June 16, 1996. To be a registered candidate, an individual must submit one million valid signatures to the Central Election Commission by April 16. Once officially registered by the CEC, a candidate may begin campaigning. Each candidate is guaranteed free air time on TV. The TV campaign will begin on May 14 and end on June 14. No campaigning may take place the day before the election. Polling must be completed in the week before the election.
If no candidate reaches 50% of the vote in the first round, the top two candidates will compete in a second round run-off election. Each candidate will receive additional free air time. To the concern of some, the date of the run-off election has not yet been established. The election law states the CEC must publish first round election results no later than three weeks after the June 16 election (by July 7). The run- off must take place no more than two weeks after that (by July 21). (FT 4/11, International Foundation for Electoral Systems information.)
RUSH TO SUBMIT SIGNATURES: Of the 78 voter initiative groups authorized by the CEC to collect signatures, only 17 managed to submit petitions with one million signatures by the April 16 deadline. Kemerovo Oblast Legislature Chair, AMAN TULIEV (see Zyuganov section below), Democratic Russia Leader GALINA STAROVOITOVA, and former Federation Council member VLADIMIR PODOPRIGOVA, all turned in their signatures the day before the April 16 deadline. Along with these three, the CEC is currently reviewing signatures from GRIGORY YAVLINSKY, ALEXANDER LEBED, SVYATOSLAV FEDOROV, SERGEI MAVRODI and four others. A decision must be made on their candidacies within ten days. BORIS YELTSIN, GENNADY ZYUGANOV, VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY, and MIKHAIL GORBACHEV are already officially registered as candidates by the CEC. (OMRI 4/16,17, FT 4/17)
ELECTION OBSERVATION LAW: The draft law "On Public Monitoring of Elections and on Openness and Glasnost in Vote Counting" passed its third and final reading in the Duma on April 17. The law details the rights of public monitors and provides for the mandatory recount of votes. Public monitors have the right to be present at polling stations, to attend vote counting, and to see the results of the vote counting while it is being done by members of the electoral commission. Any Russian citizen nominated by at least ten other citizens can be a public observer at a local polling station. To be a regional election commission observer, a Russian citizen needs 50 signatures. Prime Minister VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN sought to remove these mechanisms for nominating monitors, but failed. The prior law only allowed official party- nominated monitors. Article Six of the law provides for recounting a randomly chosen sample of 2% of the precincts within a voting district. If any errors are found, the new law would trigger further recounts. The draft law was presented by VIKTOR SHEINIS of Yabloko and had the support of the Communist Party. (Segodnya 4/11, OMRI 4/17)
DUMA CONTEMPLATES TRANSITION LAW: The Duma Legislation Committee approved the draft law "On the Inauguration Procedure of the Newly-Elected Russian Federation President." The bill will have its first reading before the entire Duma in late April. It will regulate the two month transition of power after the presidential election. Two last minute amendments to the bill provided for the benefits of former presidents and the rights of incoming presidents. Former Russian presidents would enjoy a life-long pension of 50 minimum wages per month, state-supported body guards, a car, a dacha, and government- member-level health care. On the transition rights, the newly elected president would have the right to be present at meetings of the Duma, Federation Council (Upper House), government, Security Council, and other bodies to become familiar with their functions. He will be able to speak live on state-run TV and radio. He must be informed by the outgoing president of decisions regarding the introduction of states of emergency or martial law. (OMRI 4/5, Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/12)
RUSSIA PREPARES FOR ELECTIONS/TRANSITION: Red Storm Rising? Much of Russia is waiting to see what the election results will yield before they make long-term plans. Banks are taking advantage of pre-election jitters by offering short-term, high interest rates on investments that mature just before the election. International investments have dropped off. Vacations are being planned abroad, and some Russian students studying abroad are being told by their families to stay put until July. The Communist Party reports record numbers of people reactivating their memberships. (NYT 4/15)
IN SEARCH OF RUSSIA'S CHOSEN ONE: KHAKA BENDUKIDZE, Moscow entrepreneur, on the lack of choice in the Russian presidential election: "The ideal presidential candidate doesn't exist; he probably hasn't been born yet, or maybe he is just 15 years old. An ideal president for our country today would need to be as tough as Thatcher, as smart as Nixon, speak as well as Clinton, have the patience of the Pope, and know Russia like Solzhenitsyn." (FT 4/11)
II. If June Presidential Election, Who Wins?
A. Individuals' Estimates
% chance of winning the presidency
| Graham Allison | Matthew Lantz | Sergei Grigoriev | Moscow Times Oddsmakers | ||||
| (March 11, 1996) | |||||||
| Yeltsin | 25% | Zyuganov | 45% | Yeltsin | 50% | Zyuganov | 8-5 (63%) |
| Zyuganov | 23% | Yeltsin | 40% | Zyuganov | 50% | Yeltsin | 3-1 (33%) |
| Yavlinsky | 20% | Chernomyrdin | 8% | Chernomyrdin | 4-1 (25%) | ||
| Chernomyrdin | 10% | Yavlinsky | 4% | Yavlinsky | 11-2 (18%) | ||
| Zhirinovsky | 10% | Zhirinovsky | 2% | Zhirinovsky | 6-1 (16%) | ||
| Lebed | 5% | Lebed | 1% | No Election | 7-1 (14%) | ||
| Lebed | 8-1 (13%) | ||||||
| Nemtsov | 30-1( 3%) | ||||||
| Gorbachev | 0-1 ( 2%) | ||||||
B. Recent Events Affecting Outcome of Presidential Elections:
BORIS YELTSIN: On the Campaign Trail with Boris: The day after Boris Yeltsin was registered as an official candidate he flew to the strongly Communist Belogord region for a campaign swing. Much of his stay was scripted. He lay a wreath at the war memorial, met with entrepreneurs and priests that would have been imprisoned by Communists, and promised people he would increase their pensions and ensure their wages were paid. Playing on public sympathies he humbled himself before the electorate saying, "I can tell you honestly, I am not proud of the job I have done." During the trip he caused a stir by stating three prominent left-wing Duma deputies should be in prison for their involvement in the hard-line coup of 1991. Communist leader GENNADY ZYUGANOV called the statement "an unprecedented slur." (FT 4/6-7, NYT 4/7)
Yeltsin Organizational Congress: The organizational congress for the All-Russian Movement of Public Support for Boris Yeltsin (ODOP) hosted 1040 candidates from 580 regions and groups. The chants of "Yeltsin! Yeltsin!" were reserved, and the official program announcement was delayed until May so opponents could not use the themes against the president. Speaking to the participants, Campaign Manager SERGEI FILATOV warned supporters from the regions not to establish parallel organizations to those governed by the central Yeltsin campaign headquarters. The sole purpose of regional organizations is to obey the center. (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/9, OMRI 4/9)
Yeltsin Campaign Themes: Although the announcement of the campaign platform was delayed, broad themes of family, fighting crime, ending the war in Chechnya, strengthening CIS integration, support of high-tech industries, and compensation for depreciated savings are expected. However, on a more practical level, DMITRI SIMES of the Nixon Center in Washington, DC, summarized Yeltsin's apparent campaign themes as, "I understand why you voted for the Communists. I have adjusted accordingly, and I will do what you wanted the Communists to do, but more reliably and without social polarization or unnecessary conflict with the West." (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/6, OMRI 4/9, Washington Post 4/7)
Yeltsin Organization and Strategy: Thus far, Yeltsin's campaign organization has consisted of little fanfare. Organization is ragged to non-existent. Most campaign stops comprise of making promises to alleviate economic hardships for groups of voters. One source reported Yeltsin was dissatisfied with his staff and claimed he would personally take charge of the campaign and place financial issues in the hands of Prime Minister VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN. (Washington Post 4/6, OMRI 4/9)
Yeltsin's strategy seems to be a rehash of his successful 1991 strategy. Not satisfied with a bi- polar Yeltsin/Zyuganov race, Yeltsin hopes to appear above the mundane politics of the others by appearing loftier, more competent, and more constructive. Such a strategy served him well in 1991, but may not persuade voters this year. (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/6)
Interview with Campaign Chairman SERGEI FILATOV: Yeltsin must clarify what reform means in the election campaign. He must explain the meaning of building "a federative, low-greed, democratic, social base." The government's economic program is 90% fulfilled. The largest mistake of the government is that it is no longer linked to the populace. This link can and must be reestablished in order to win the confidence of the waverers. Regional leaders will be used in this effort. The Communist leaders are ideological and share the goal of transferring power from the people to the party. Yeltsin, alternatively, draws his strength from the Constitution and the rule of law. (Moskovskiye novosti No. 13 3/31-4/7)
Promises, Promises: In different speeches throughout the month, Yeltsin has pledged (1) to end pension arrears by the end of April. He signed a decree on April 8 ordering the government to grant a loan of Rb 4 trillion ($818 million) to the pension fund. He also ordered the government to submit to the Duma a proposal to increase pensions by 10% per month beginning May 1. (2) to partially reimburse those who had their savings eroded through inflation. Another decree on April 8 ordered the Central Bank and Sberbank to draw up a reimbursement program within three months. (3) to support the military/industrial complex with an additional Rb 2 trillion ($409 million) of spending beyond what is currently in the budget. and (4) to give Rb 26 trillion ($5.3 billion) in subsidies to farmers this year. (FT 4/9,17, OMRI 4/9,12,16)
Lukoil Head Backs Yeltsin: VAGIT ALEKPEROV, head of Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company, announced that he would back Yeltsin saying he was alarmed by talk of renationalizing his firm. ALEKPEROV is considered the second most influential industrialist in Russia, following REM VYAKHIREV, the head of Gazprom, who is also backing Yeltsin. (FT 4/17, OMRI 4/17)
English Assistance: Sir TIM BELL, Margaret Thatcher's favorite public relations man has apparently signed on to advise the Yeltsin campaign. In the past he advised Prime Minister VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN. He is believed to be behind a recent program on NTV with NAINA YELTSIN discussing her husband's home life. (FT 4/11)
GAIDAR's Support: Former Prime Minister YEGOR GAIDAR announced his Russia's Democratic Choice Party (DVR) had not decided which presidential candidate to support. GAIDAR praised both Yeltsin and YAVLINSKY for moving toward Russia's Democratic Choice policies. In particular, he commended Yeltsin on his Chechen peace overtures and land privatization moves, and he supported Yavlinsky's recent statements against Communism. The party's leaders are divided on whom to support with human rights advocate SERGEI KOVALEV supporting Yavlinsky and former First Deputy Prime Minister ANATOLY CHUBAIS supporting Yeltsin. The St. Petersburg chapter of DVR voted to support Yeltsin 49-25 on April 13, but the April 12 national policy council meeting failed to reach a definitive conclusion. GAIDAR announced that the issue will be resolved at the May 18 national party congress. (Segodnya 4/13, OMRI 4/15)
GENNADY ZYUGANOV (CP-RF): On the Campaign Trail in Samara; How to Pay for All of This: "Those who lose the election will have to submit to the will of the majority of the citizens," said Zyuganov at a campaign stop in Samara. The losers' obligations are provided in a draft law on the continuity of power currently in the Duma.
Zyuganov also revealed the first hint of how he would pay for the massive expenditures promised in the Communist party platform. Zyuganov would recapture some of the $300 billion that has "fled" the country. The party will also use in a "rational way" revenues from the sale of liquor. This will be enough to pay wages to teachers and doctors, student stipends and pensions, if a "new budget is drawn up." He also plans to raise funds from a "thrifty" use of precious metals, the fuel and energy complex, and the textile industry.
Zyuganov assured his followers victory did not mean "reward but responsible work to restore the semi-ruined country." He urged his followers to spread his ideas "from door-to-door and mouth-to-mouth." (Segodnya 4/16)
The Financial Times on Zyuganov's Agenda: Zyuganov will find it difficult if elected to address the wide- ranging desires of his supporters. His bloc includes both hard-line Communists and Western-oriented social-democrats, all of whom will have to be appeased. Zyuganov apparently seeks the Soviet Union of 1988, with a national political orthodoxy, strong state economic involvement in top levels of the economy, and liberalism below. It is doubtful that Zyuganov is physically capable of implementing his policies. Regional leaders, industrial bosses, journalists, and mafia lords will all work to subvert the renationalization of the economy. The sinews of power available to the leader (the army and the KGB ( are a shadow of what they once were. However, Zyuganov will have to decide quickly how he will meet his promises to the electorate. Should he choose to print money, inflation will ensue, and the IMF loan will be withdrawn. This might lead to the expulsion of the IMF, a currency crisis, and eventual economic chaos. (FT 4/11)
Zyuganov's Nationalism: Zyuganov's platform differs from the traditional Communist agenda of the past. It combines a national-patriot idea with the idea of social justice. In some ways it is a conventional nationalism: playing to bruised national pride and the bitterness of those "who won a war but lost an empire." Zyuganov claims in his speeches, "Our nation is being deprived of its very last asset, our fatherland" and "Those liars will not separate us again! We will unite!" Yet Zyuganov's nationalism is uniquely Russian as well ( flavored with conspiracy and pseudo-psychological theories. (See Russian Election Watch #18 on satellites tampering with election results.) Finally, unlike traditional Communist themes, Zyuganov has attempted to embrace the Russian Orthodox church. He held discussions with religious leaders for four hours at the Sergiev Posad Monastery and equated Communist ethics with the 2000 year history of Jesus. The themes have proven effective and gained support from nationalists such as former Vice President ALEXANDER RUTSKOI and SERGEI BABURIN. (Washington Post 4/10, OMRI 4/12, Financial Times 4/13-14,)
Secret Government Plans Against the Communists?: Communist Duma Deputy and head of the Security Committee VIKTOR ILYUKHIN, told Ekho Moskvy on April 2 that Russian security services are preparing three scenarios to discredit Zyuganov and his campaign. The government may accuse Communists (1) of creating paramilitary units to take power by force, (2) of financial machinations during the 1995 Duma campaign, or (3) of conducting separate negotiations with Chechen leaders. (Segodnya 4/13, OMRI 4/15)
Zyuganov to Abolish the Presidency?: According to Communist Duma Speaker GENNADY SELEZNEV, Zyuganov will abolish the institution of the presidency within 2-3 years of coming to power in favor of a Russian parliamentary system because a "presidency always begets a tug-of-war between branches of power." (OMRI 4/11)
Zyuganov on the Media: Zyuganov continues to claim the existence of a concerted effort to keep his message off of TV and radio. He finds slightly greater support from the local media. In response, Ekho Moskvy commentator, ANDREI CHERKIZOV rejected the accusation saying, "space costs money; there is more interesting material to publish; and there is a Communist press to build up Zyuganov's image." (OMRI 4/10)
Taking a page from the US Republican primary, Zyuganov has also recently begun attacking the content of Russian TV, claiming it only shows money, gambling, murders, destruction, violence, semi- pronos, and boorishness. (Hello, Ralph Reed!) "This is a completely Americanized type of TV, at its worst at that." He seeks a public council on TV including cultural figures and scholars. He also argues ORT (Russian Public TV) in its present shape is not long for this world. (Moskovsky Komsomolets 4/11)
Aman Tuliev; CP-RF'S Number Two: AMAN TULIEV, head of the Kemerovo Oblast legislature, is the charismatic, energetic darling of the rank and file Communist activists. His name is often mentioned as a potential prime minister candidate or secondary presidential candidate should Zyuganov fail. Like Zyuganov, TULIEV straddles the line between hard-line Communism and social-democracy. He is generally seen as a hard-liner but has made moderate stances such as seeking tax cuts and accusing YELTSIN of making populist pledges that will lead to inflation. He is opposed to renationalizing enterprises already sold to private owners and argues the issue is "not how to divide the pie, but how to make the pie bigger." He sells Communism as well disciplined government versus the current corrupt regime. (FT 4/11)
Land Reform: The Empire Strikes Back: The Communist and Agrarian controlled Duma Agriculture Committee drafted a new bill entitled "On Special Features in the Exercise of Citizens' Constitutional Rights to Land." It seeks to reverse the Yeltsin decree allowing the buying and selling of land. The draft law outlaws selling, renting, giving, or inheriting land. Individuals only have the right to rent land for their lifetime as long as they are productive. Children have no claim on the land. (Moskovskiye Komsomolets 4/5)
GRIGORY YAVLINSKY (YABLOKO): Kommersant Daily on Yavlinsky's Campaign: Grigory Yavlinsky has gained the support of some prominent Russian reformers, but lacks a large regional organization. Although the polls claim he has the fewest enemies, the public still doubts his ability to govern. A third of the country is not sure Russia's situation will improve after the election. As the election nears, voter support will probably divide between YELTSIN and ZYUGANOV, leaving Yavlinsky with as little as 2% of the vote. His role will only be to split the Yeltsin electorate. Still, Yabloko Duma member VIKTOR SHEINIS claims Yavlinsky will not drop out regardless of numbers. (Kommersant Daily 4/2)
VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKY (LDPR): Zhirinovsky Registered: Vladimir Zhirinovsky became the third officially registered candidate by the Central Election Commission. He placed third in his run for the presidency in 1991. (FT 4/6-7, OMRI 4/9)
LDPR Youth League Formed: Zhirinovsky announced the establishment of a youth branch called the Young Falcons modeled on the defunct Communist Pioneers. He denied he intended to use the youth for political purposes, but Reuters quoted an aide saying they would take part in rallies and distribute literature. (OMRI 4/12)
Close Sheremetevo?: Zhirinovsky demanded government officials close Moscow's main airport from May 1 to July 1 to stop "swindlers from escaping to the West with our money." (NYT 4/15)
ALEXANDER LEBED (KRO): Signatures: General Alexander Lebed's campaign claims to have collected two million signatures. Signatures were collected by the Democratic Party of Russia, the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), and Honor and the Motherland. Campaign sources said 70% of KRO's regional structure assisted Lebed despite KRO leader YURI SKOKOV's pleas against Lebed. (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/3)
Lebed and the Military: Lebed announced if he became president he would preside over a drastic cut in the military. He believes Russia needs only 15 fully-manned armored and infantry divisions, down from the many understaffed divisions that currently exist. Smaller forces would be more efficient and less expensive. (OMRI 4/16)
Disunity in Lebed Support Structure: Twelve regional branches of the Democratic Party of Russia disagree with the national party's decision to back General Lebed. The regional organizations, which included Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Kaluga, and Primorie, all sought to join the All-Russia Movement of Public Support for Boris YELTSIN. The groups rejected ZYUGANOV as advocating a backward course. (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/11, OMRI 4/15)
THIRD FORCE (LEBED, SVYATOSLAV FEDOROV, YAVLINSKY): Third Force Stumbles: A press conference of Third Force leaders Lebed, Fedorov, and Yavlinsky to discuss the YELTSIN Chechen peace plan failed to materialize. The official reason given for the cancellation was the late return of Yavlinsky to Moscow. The real reason, according to Nezavisimaya gazeta, was a split between Yavlinsky and Lebed over the Chechen solution. Yavlinsky apparently disagreed with the Lebed article "Garbled in Blood". (Nezavisimaya gazeta 4/5)
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: Gorbachev Registered: The former Soviet President became the fourth candidate officially registered by the Central Election Commission. (OMRI 4/15)
III. Polling Results For Presidential Election:
A. Polls assessing popularity of candidates:
"One of Russia's most prestigious polling organizations" (likely the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Research {VTsIOM}) released a poll taken during the month of April assessing the popularity of the presidential candidates in the first and second round. The poll was reported in The Financial Times on 4/17:
In the first round:
| Zyuganov | 26% |
| Yeltsin | 18% |
| Yavlinsky | 10% |
| Lebed | 10% |
| Zhirinovsky | 8% |
In the second round:
| Zyuganov | 29% |
| Yeltsin | 28% |
The All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Research (VTsIOM) released a poll assessing the popularity of the presidential candidates in the first round. The poll was reported in Kommersant Daily on 4/6.
| Zyuganov | 27% |
| Yeltsin | 21% |
| (no other results reported in article) | |
The Public Opinion Fund released a poll assessing the popularity of the presidential candidates in the first round. The poll was reported in Kommersant Daily on 4/6 and the Boston Globe on 4/7.
| Zyuganov | 21% | |
| Yeltsin | 19% | |
| Only 6-7% of those responding claimed they would definitely not vote. | ||
| (no other results reported in article) | ||
The UK Center for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde found more than 50% of Russians believe President Boris Yeltsin should resign and fewer than 20% think he should be running for reelection. 75% of respondents blamed the current government for economic ills, while only 36% believe the former Communist regime is at fault. The study suggests despite Yeltsin's recent polling surge, underlying hostility still exists toward him. Reported in The Financial Times on 4/16.
A unattributed poll on the popularity of the presidential candidates in Rostov-na-Donu was reported in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 4/10:
| Yavlinsky | 23% |
| Zyuganov | 21% |
| Yeltsin | 16% |
| Lebed | 9% |
The candidates with the highest negative ratings in the region were:
| Zhirinovsky | 64% |
| Yeltsin | 16% |
| Zyuganov | 15% |
An unattributed poll of the military asking "Which political leader do you most trust?" was reported in Moskovskiye novosti No. 13 3/31:
| March '95 | Aug. '95 | Jan. '96 | |||
| Zhirinovsky | 15.5% | Zhirinovsky | 15.8% | Zyuganov | 21.5% |
| Chernomyrdin | 14.6% | Yavlinsky | 14.5% | Zhirinovsky | 18.4% |
| Zyuganov | 14.2% | Zyuganov | 14.1% | Chernomyrdin | 8.3% |
| Lapshin | 10.2% | Lapshin | 10.5% | Rutskoi | 5.6% |
| Yeltsin | 9.8% | Chernomyrdin | 9.9% | Yavlinsky | 4.3% |
| Shumeiko | 8.7% | Yeltsin | 6.2% | Yeltsin | 4.2% |
| Rutskoi | 7.4% | Rutskoi | 6.2% | Rybkin | 3.1% |
| Yavlinsky | 6.6% | Rybkin | 5.8% | Lapshin | 1.5% |
B. Other Polls:
A poll by the Public Opinion Foundation asked 1345 Russians "Which of the listed things will happen in the country in the event a Communist candidate wins the summer 1996 presidential elections?" Respondents were allowed to choose up to three answers. Obshchaya Gazeta reported the results in the No. 14 April 11-17, 1996 issue.
| Order will be reimposed and peace restored to the country. | 17% | ||
| There will be a return to empty shelves and shortages of everything. | 16% | ||
| Timely and regular payments of wages will be guaranteed. | 15% | ||
| There will be a return to low prices of stable foods and consumer goods. | 14% | ||
| Property that has of late passed into private hands will be restored to the working people. | 14% | ||
| There will be curtailment of democratic freedoms (censorship will be introduced, free exit of the country will be restricted, free elections will be abolished.) | 14% | ||
| Russia will end up in international isolation; the Cold War will resume. | 12% | ||
| The USSR will be restored. | 11% | ||
| Civil war will break out, chaos and anarchy will ensue. | 10% | ||
| Military conflicts will arise between Russia and the ex-USSR republics. | 9% | ||
A poll by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Research (VTsIOM) reported in OMRI on 4/15 found 41% of those polled believe the Soviet political system existing before the 1990's was the best option for Russia. 27% supported Western-style democracy, and 9% supported the current system. On economic issues, 42% favored an economic system based on state planning, 33% favored a market economy, and 25% responded "difficult to say."
A poll on the Soviet reunification by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Research (VTsIOM) conducted from March 22-27 with a degree of error of +/-4% was reported in Kommersant Daily on 4/2:
30% had positive or rather positive views toward the State Duma resolution against the Belovezh Accords.
40% had negative or rather negative views of the Duma vote.
30% had no opinion of the Duma vote.
22% believed the resolution would speed rapprochement with the former Soviet states.
38% thought the resolution would aggravate relations with the CIS.
40% could not judge the consequences of the action.
A poll by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Research (VTsIOM) reported in Moskovskiye novosti No. 13, 3/31 asked 1345 respondents "There is a belief that if a Communist Party candidate wins the June 1996 election the political regime in the country can change. Will such changes be responsive to your interests?
37% were not sure or indifferent to possible changes.
34% were against such changes.
29% were for such changes.
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