The Russian Election Compendium

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH
June 2, 1995, No.2

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

I. The Probability of Duma Elections in December 1995

A. Individuals	Likelihood	Change From Last Week
Graham Allison (5/17): SDI Project	75%
John Lloyd (5/17): SDI Project Fellow Financial Times	70%
Alexei Ulyukaev (5/5): Russia's Democratic Choice Moscow Head	90%
Matthew Lantz (5/22) SDI Project	80%
B. Recent Events in Favor of Parliamentary Elections:

YELTSIN PUBLICLY DENIES SPECULATION THAT DECEMBER ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MIGHT BE POSTPONED. States, "Categorically, the elections to the Parliament will be held on time as well as the 1996 Presidential elections" (Financial Times 5/25/95) FT analysis of Yeltsin's veto of Duma election law: Will hold elections because Yeltsin is sensitive to his image in the West. (FT 5/24/95)

C. Recent Events in Opposition to Parliamentary Elections:

DUMA FAILS TO OVERRIDE YELTSIN VETO OF DUMA ELECTION LAW: Needed 300 votes to override veto, obtained 243 in the first attempt and 237 in the second. Originally the law passed with 302 votes, but some Duma members feared a direct confrontation with the Presidential apparatus and changed their vote to avoid confrontation with the President. (omri 5/25/95)

COMMISSION REJECTS MAIN YELTSIN AMENDMENTS TO DUMA ELECTORAL LAW: A commission made up of members of the executive, the Duma, and the Federation Council (upper house) rejected many of the amendments offered by President Yeltsin to the Duma election law. The commission voted to keep the 225 list representatives and 225 district representatives. (Yeltsin sought 150 list and 350 regional to strengthen the regional representation.) However the commission recommended increasing use of regional lists. It also kept the 25% minimum voter turnout for valid elections. (Yeltsin sought 50%). Finally, it accepted Yeltsin's suggestion that federal officials running for office need not quit their jobs, but will not be able to use government benefits and perks in their campaigns. (omri 5/26/95)

II. Probability of Presidential Elections in June

A. Individual	Likelihood	Change From Last Week
Graham Allison	40%
John Lloyd	55%
Alexei Ulyukaev	60%
Matthew Lantz	50%
B. Recent Events in Favor of Presidential Elections:

See above statement by Yeltsin reported in May 26 Financial Times.

C. Recent Events in Opposition to the Presidential Elections:

III. If Duma Elections are Held in December, What are the Likely Outcomes?

A. Individuals
Graham Allison		John Lloyd
Alexei Ulyukaev		Matthew Lantz
Cherno	20%	CP-RF	23%
CP-RF	17%	Cherno	15%
AgParty	11%	AgParty	15%
LDPR	10%	LDPR	11%
RChoice	9%	Yabloko	9%
Yabloko	9%	Lebed party	9%
Rybkin	9%	Rybkin	6%
		RChoice	6%
Missing	15%	Nationalists	5%
B. New Evidence:

SHOULD YABLOKO AND RUSSIA'S CHOICE COOPERATE? The Carnegie Endowment in Moscow held a conference in late May on the upcoming elections. Igor Klyankin, director of Public Opinion, stated that Russia's Choice and Yabloko had different constituencies and should therefore not cooperate. Russia's Choice appealed to the young and rich with radical economic policies, while Yabloko appealed to a more moderate reformer. Klyankin argued the reform forces should concentrate themselves around these two poles. He saw Chernomyrdin's Bloc gaining 10% of the vote and Rybkin getting 9%, both drawing from undecided centrist voters, not the reform forces.

Opposing this view was Leonid Sedov, who claimed the formation of the centrist blocs who would gain 13% and 12% would draw from the reformist constituencies and therefore Yabloko and Russia's Choice should unite. (Segodnya 5/19/95)

Michael McFaul's "Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics After Chechnya," in the Summer 1995 edition of Foreign Policy predicts in the 1995 Parliamentary elections: Russia's Choice, despite difficulties will remain in Parliament and plan for their comeback next century. Yavlinsky's high popularity ratings will allow Yabloko to clear the 5% threshhold. The Communists and Agraians are positioned to increase their share of parliamentary seats. And finally, Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and Women of Russia will also be represented. The centrist blocs' fate will depend on how they coalesce over the next few months and how many such blocs compete.

D. If June Presidential Elections. What Outcome?

A. Individuals
Graham Allison		Matthew Lantz
Yeltsin	20%	Yeltsin	25%
Rybkin	10%	Cherno	25%
Cherno	10%	Lebed	10%
Yavlinsky	10%	Yavlinsky	10%
Lebed	10%	Rybkin	8%
Other	40%	Zhirinovsky	3%
		Other	19%
B. New Evidence:

FEDERATION COUNCIL SPEAKER VLADIMIR SHUMEIKO ON A PRESIDENTIAL RUN: Many people see me as the number one candidate after Yeltsin. This does not show up in the polls, but "I don't believe polls." I need 70,000 signatures in 16 regions. I can collect this while others cannot. (Moskovsky Komoslets 5/20/95)

McFAUL'S PRESIDENTIAL SCENARIOS: Writing in the summer 1995 edition of Foreign Policy Carnegie Endowment Senior Advisor, Michael McFaul sees three potential presidential scenarios: First, Yeltsin runs with the backing of Russia's nationalist, law and order vote. However, for this consitutiency, Lebed is the obvious candidate. Second, Yeltsin cancels the elections that he cannot win. Uses a state of emergency. Third, Yeltsin decides not to run again. Chernomyrdin is the heir apparent, but bureaucrats do not always make good candidates. Therefore, the race could be wide open.

E. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA POLITICAL POLL FROM MAY 25, 1995

The poll was conducted among 1326 rural and urban Russian respondents. Participants were asked to answer to questions:

If elections for the post of President were held today.
1. "Which of the listed politicians would you like to see elected to this post?"
2. "Which of the listed politicians would you not like, under any circumstances, to see elected to the post of president of Russia?"

One could not give more than three answers to both questions. Answers are in percentages.

Question One (positive ratings):

1.	G. Yavlinsky (leader Yabloko bloc)				12%
2.	Svyatoslav Fedorov (Eye Surgeon, parliamentarian under Gorbachev)				10%
3.	Boris Fedorov (Leader Forward Russia bloc) (Former Finance Minister)				9%
3.	G. Zyuganov (Leader Communist Party Russian Fed)				9%
5.	A. Rutskoi (Leader Derzhava Movement				8%
6.	A. Lebed (General Russian 14th Army)				7%
6.	V. Zhirinovsky (Leader Lib. Dem. Party)				7%
8.	Y. Gaidar (Leader Russia's Choice bloc) (Former Deputy PM)				5%
9.	B. Yeltsin (President)				4%
9.	S. Shakhrai (Deputy PM, Leader PRES bloc)				4%
11.	V. Chernomyrdin (Prime Minister)				3%
11.	Y. Luzhkov (Mayor Moscow)				3%
13.	M. Gorbachev (Former President USSR)				2%
13.	P. Romanov (Duma Member, CP-RF)				2%
15.	I. Rybkin (Speaker State Duma)				1%
15.	V. Shumeiko (Speaker Federation Council)				1%
15.	Y. Skokov (Leader Russian Communities Bloc)				1%
15.	O. Soskovets (First Deputy PM, CIS)				1%

Question Two (negative ratings):

1.	V. Zhirinovsky				39%
2.	B. Yeltsin				35%
3.	M. Gorbachev				26%
4.	Y. Gaidar				16%
5.	A. Rutskoi				12%
6.	G. Zyuganov				9%
7.	All of those listed				7%
8.	G. Yavlinsky				2%
8.	A. Lebed				2%
8.	V. Chernomyrdin				2%
8.	V. Shumeiko				2%
12.	B. Fedorov				1%
12.	Y. Luzhkov				1%
12.	I. Rybkin				1%
12.	S. Shakhrai				1%
12.	P. Romanov				1%
12.	O. Soskovets				1%
18.	Sv. Fedorov				0%
18.	Y. Skokov				0%

Question Three: Will you vote for Viktor Chernomyrdin's electoral bloc?

Yes	10%
No	56%
Hard to say	34%