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The Russian Election Compendium
Russian Presidential Elections Conference
19 April 1996
Graham T. Allison: [...] We're going to presume that you saw the presentations last night or are familiar with what was said. So we're not going to repeat those today, but instead I'm going to ask for some brief introductory comments from two people who are part of this seminar but didn't have an opportunity to speak last night. First Yegor Gaidar, and second, Alexander Batanov.
Let me welcome our many Harvard and Cambridge guests here, but also say a word of welcome to some of the people gathered here who are not from Cambridge. Yegor Gaidar does not need an introduction to this group; as you know, he was the Prime Minister of Russia who, in January of 1992 initiated the economic transformation program. Today he runs a research institute in Moscow and is head of the party Russia's Choice and stays very active in Russia's political life. Alexander Batanov, who will speak second, is among the most successful campaign managers in the emerging class of Russian campaign managers in Russia today. He is a director of INTELCOM, which is part of the VID Group. In the December Duma elections he and his group ran the campaigns of 13 separate candidates, but they were not too successful: only 11 of their 13 candidates won. I think he actually has the best record of anybody running campaigns, and this was for 4 different parties, so they are somewhat ambidextrous. Alexander, who has been actively involved in the conversation with the Strengthening Democratic Institutions (SDI) Project here, and been back and forth-I think this is his forth visit in the last 4 or 5 months-has been, I think, one of the best sources on what is actually happening in campaigns.
In addition to these two, today we will be hearing from several people whom I already introduced last night. John Lloyd, who will also be asked to make a brief comment after the two presentations, is an associate of SDI here at the Kennedy School, was the Bureau Chief for the Financial Times in Moscow, and while I always embarrass him, I do believe it is the case that he has been the single best source of information and analysis about developments in this ongoing Russian Revolution.
To my right is Irina Khakamada. Irina, as I introduced last night, is a member of the Russian state Duma and the president of the Common Cause Party. In the December Duma elections, the party she leads got about a million and a half votes. And I'll embarrass her as well by quoting a Russian press line that she is the icon of the new Russian political woman.
To her right is Sergei Grigoriev, who is part of the local scene here; he is sometimes Russian and a long time associate of the Harvard project, a visiting professor at Northeastern, and in addition to being an excellent analyst, also serves as the most wonderful translator and interpreter for these events, which we greatly appreciate. Beside him is Sergei Kolesnikov. Sergei Kolesnikov has been here, again, a number of times, but to summarize briefly, he is now the Chief Assistant to Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and also Chief of the Directorate of the Government of Information. He played one of the leading roles in Nash Dom Rossiya's campaign in December, and is actively conscious of the campaign there.
In addition, we have the pleasure of having with us Richard Rose, who is Director of the Center for the Study of Public Policy in Glasgow. He has recently been involved in a polling effort to understand the transformation of Post-Communist societies. He is co-author of a book called How Russians Vote which was published, or at least is being published just this year.
I don't want to introduce everybody here, but there are a couple of guests who I at least want to mention. We took advantage of Alexander Buzgalin who happened to be in Cambridge today. Alexander is of the Moscow State University, and has very strong ties to the Left in Russian politics, which is not as well represented in this panel as would be normally the case. Evgenia Albats is here visiting for the year at the Russian Research Center from Izvestia and beside her is our good colleague and friend, whom I didn't know we were going to have the good fortune to have visiting, Sergei Khruschev. We have a mix of people who are interested in Russia.
I think our Russian guests will see for sure that there is a large level of interest in the Russian elections here on the part of the American group, and we are very glad to welcome all of you here. We are going to start with Yegor. He will take about five or seven minutes to say what he wants to say about the Russian elections: who is going to win, whether it is going to happen, what difference it might make, and anything else he would like to say. Then I will turn to Alexander to give us a look at this question from the perspective of people who are actually managing campaigns. He and his group are managing among other things, Mayor Luzhkov's campaign, and Mayor Luzhkov is running the Moscow effort for Yeltsin. Please, Yegor.
Yegor Gaidar: Well, dear friends, I will be very glad to share my views about the perspectives of the Russian elections. But to summarize very quickly and not to misspend all of my time, I would tell you that I don't know what will be the results of the Russian elections. More than this, I would very seriously put in doubt the reputation of any person who would claim that he knows the results of the Russian elections. It doesn't mean that we can say nothing about this results; some things are clear, or almost clear, on the basis of the polls data, general knowledge of the mood of population, etc., and of those things what can we say?
First of all, the event of sixteenth of June is strongly overestimated; nothing will be decided on the sixteenth of June because it is absolutely clear that no candidate will have 50% of the vote. Secondly, it is almost clear who will be win on the sixteenth of June. It will be Zyuganov and Yeltsin. It is quite clear that Zyuganov and Yeltsin will be in the second round. You can like it or dislike it, but it is very difficult to imagine any other possible scenario. Thirdly, the crucial elections will be somewhere around July 7, and they will be between Yeltsin and Zyuganov. And the fourth point is that the present polls couldn't show us the results of who will win. The difference between them is that if you will put the question of Yeltsin and Zyuganov, winning in the first round and running, and who will win, whom you will want, usually the results are with a difference of one percentage points, which just doesn't mean anything. And it will often happen that will change this attitude of the electorate in last two months, next two months.
So, that means that we are facing practically two ible scenarios, Yeltsin winning or Zyuganov winning. If we are trying to analyze the developments in Russia we can do it only on scenario-based odds. What will happen this first case, what will happen in the second case. There was a question here about the possibility that the elections will be canceled. For instance, Yeltsin's results are bad in the first round, he is unprepared to go to the second round, he is canceling elections, etc., whether this is possible. Well, to tell you the truth, I cannot exclude what could occur in this situation. But I do absolutely exclude that this attempt would be successful; it would be both unconstitutional and highly unpopular. Practically, that will leave Yeltsin absolutely dependent on the support of the power ministries. Until the power ministries are not invited, actively to interfere in politics, nobody seriously cares about the attitudes there, it is the fact of behavior of 2 millions of the voters, much less of the teachers and the doctors. But if they will be invited directly to decide the political fate of the country, it will be clear that Yeltsin does not have too many supporters in these Power Ministries. I would not go into details, but I am absolutely sure that this attempt, if ever tried, would produce results very similar to those of August 1991. That is why I always advise everyone not to try this silly, stupid experiment, and I hope that it will not be tried.
Well, now for the consequences of the elections. I will repeat what I said this morning from the purely economic point of view, not going into the political details. Now we are facing the very evident influence of the coming elections on the Russian financial markets. For instance, interest rates; the interest rate on the Russian State Treasury Bills with the maturity over July from early March started to drop rapidly without any basis in the monetary policy or in the money supply, etc. It is clearly the expression of the lack of confidence in what will happen after July. And that creates, even now, serious problems for both the government and the Central Bank. From the beginning of April we are facing a very serious increase in demand for the hard currency from the Russian enterprises and the commercial banks. They are starting to change the structure of the portfolio to minimize the political risks. They are cutting down their over-portfolio and increasing their hard currency portfolios.
Generally, the Central Bank now has the necessary hard currency reserves to deal with the situation before the first of July. It will have to heavily intervene in the market in order for it to have the potential to protect the markets of both State Treasury bills and hard currency from radical changes and from radical de-stabilization. But it will not be easy and it will require very serious efforts from the Central Bank and the Government. So, with all this effort, we are approaching July 7.
So, we have two different scenarios. In the first, Zyuganov wins. Before he even enters his Kremlin office, there are several effects. First of all, there is a crash on the securities market. We experience a very serious increase of the supply of the State Treasury Bills in the market and an increase in the interest rate. The Minister of Finance in very difficult position to service this debt because nobody wants to invest in State Treasury Bills except on a prohibitive interest rate. The banking community is under very serious pressure because State Treasury Bills are now the most liquid and most secure instrument within which we could deal. The rapid drop of the price of the State Treasury Bills would be the beginning of very severe banking crisis. What is happening with the population? Of course any average Russian family will start immediately to change its portfolio: selling rubles, buying dollars. How can we solve that? The same with commercial banks and with Russian enterprises. This will lead to an enormous increase in the demand for hard currency.
The Central Bank is confronted with a sad and unpleasant choice-what to do? To devaluate, drastically, but then nobody can forecast the results of this devaluation because the most evident results will be additional increase of the demand for hard currency. To try to spend all the resources of hard currency that are left in the economy and to protect the exchange rate, and what to do next? To intervene to save State Treasury Bill markets? To increase their liquidity? But then this liquidity within a very short time will be in a hard currency market. So the most evident choice with which a new Communist government will be confronted would be immediate rush on the financial markets and very strong pressures to go away from the ruble convertibility regime-to abolish the ruble convertibility. This would all occur in a very, very short time after the Presidential elections, after the results of the Presidential elections are held.
Well, elimination of the ruble convertibility regime, of course, is a very serious strike on all of the market institutions in Russia. We, until now, had not spoken one word about ideology, programs, only about, more of less, the inevitable results. So, if we are going away from the ruble convertibility regime, what does it mean? It means that they can petition on the import goods of a few very important Russian markets-they will radically undermine them. For instance, if you will now analyze the structure of the contracts on the supply to Russia of various goods, you will see that many of these contracts are ending in June. Nobody knows what that will be in July. So that means radical worsening of the situation with market equilibrium of the Russian markets. Communists are there, ruble convertibility is no longer present. You cannot legally buy dollars. What would the average Russian family do? Of course it will start buying goods that could be in short supply and could hurt-sugar, salt, matches, etc., etc.
So, what is the result? The result is rapid acceleration of the open inflation and the Communist authorities are confronted with a very serious pressure somehow to intervene. And "somehow to intervene" practically means to impose some kind of a price controls. Imposition of the price controls immediately creates once again the situation well known to Russians of a shortage economy, lines, etc. And, really, it confronts the State with the very difficult task of managing this type of economy in which money does not work anymore. So, I would not really like to continue because results are more or less predictable of the farther possible development. That is if Zyuganov wins.
If Yeltsin wins: well, also let us regard the situation on the financial markets. What will happen if Yeltsin wins? First of all, everybody in Russia or in the world is looking at what happens and thinking whether they should extract money from Russia or try to bring money to Russia. I am absolutely sure that the first result of the Yeltsin victory would be radical increase of prices on the Russian stock market, because everybody knows that the game in the Russian Blue Chips during the next few months after the Yeltsin victory is the safest way of getting big money. In a minute it will be clear that State Treasury Bills are be safe and producing hundred and twenty percentage points of hard currency interest per year. Of course, immediate transfer of the portfolio of dollar to the ruble form. Central Bank would have to deal with the very serious problem of the oversupply of hard currency. That could have some inflationary consequences and will have to deal accurately to avoid acceleration of the inflation in the second half of 1996.
I would not really here go into the details, but that will mean that we will enter the period in which investments in Russia are more or less safe, safe and still highly protected. That is of course radical change. And with all of the problems that will still be in the place: problems with the legal rules, legal infrastructure etc., of course the result will be radical increase of the general level of private investment in Russia. With the more or less foreseeable consequences for the amount of the production, for the GDP dynamics, for the budget revenues, for the possibility of resolution of the most pressing social problems, etc. Here also I am not speaking about necessary forms that should be taken and I don't know whether they will be taken by the Russian government. I do not know whether Yeltsin will be efficient in military forms, whether he will be efficient in few important directions of the qualifications of the property rights, etc. I am just speaking about most evident and inevitable consequence of this election. So, of course...I think I have overused my time.
GTA: No, you are doing fine.
YG: So, but the result. It is impossible to predict now. We can analyze it only on the scenario-basis approach. And the two scenarios are quite different, so the elections are really very important.
GTA: Thank you very much, Yegor. We had not promised people here an opportunity to get investment advice, [laughter] but one of the wonderful opportunities that the Russian Revolution presents for people today is fantastic opportunities to put their money where their mouth is and both with respect to whether you simply want to bet at the Ladbroke equivalent on who is going to win the election, which of course you can do in Moscow today, or if you want to place larger bets on what the consequences, or what will happen given the alternative consequences. I don't think I've heard a better and more precise analysis of the financial implications and I think this is just one dimension of the multi-dimensions that Yegor and I were talking about this morning but that is one where you can be quite specific, and I think, myself, right on target. So, from the point of view of somebody who is actually thinking about the election and the management of the election everyday, Alexander Batanov will give us a perspective.
Alexander Batanov (interpreted by Sergei Grigoriev): Thank you Graham for you kind words. This is my fourth time to Harvard this year only, and in fact, you know that I am really coming here in fact to get the frequent flyers and the discount card from Delta. And I have almost succeeded-not as a politician, but as somebody who is a technocrat in the campaign. I will build my presentation on some different angles, and please maybe you would excuse me in advance for some of the harsh statements I will make.
The notion of public relations is something new for Russia, but those past few years were enough to understand what kind of importance has to be attached to it. We understand now, also, that the laws along which the campaigns are built in the West are not working in our country. For example, the Presidential candidate of Russia who says "I want to be your President" in the eyes of a Russian voter loses. This is unlike a similar person who makes a similar statement in the United States. In the same way if you draw parallels with advertising, however well-thought it may or could be, Johnson & Johnson, or Stimorol, or other companies, it causes more irritation with the voters than some of the, if you look at it, much worse than the commercials of the Russian companies. We have an example, a famous person called Lunonid Gulipkov from Mavrodi's Pyramidal Fund, or MMM. This actor became so popular and so much a part of the image of the person he is acting that he is now responding to a different name. People call him Leonid instead of his real name. I think this was also the reason for the failure of the first PR advisors coming from the United States, those people who were trying to work with Chubais's privatization campaign. In fact, the result of their work was a complete failure. They just caused among the Russian citizens, a very negative attitude toward privatization, as towards something very foreign and alien. We can also probably quote here the example of the US AID agency which had been trying to work on the advertising of the voucherization campaign in Russia using, by the by, the money of the American taxpayers.
The same agency was also making commercials for Russia's Choice during the 1993 election campaign, and those were scandalous results. For example, if the day before the privatization campaign was launched, Chubais had changed his name and would be somebody called a Petrov, and voucher would be called with the word, not voucher, but "to loan," something closer to the Russian reality, maybe we would not have to deal with Zyuganov today in our country. And this is PR as well. Something that made me really indignant, something which I learned about just before my departure for the United States this time, is that the people who call themselves representatives of an American agency called Yankee Rubicon are currently running the campaign of another Communist candidate, Amongildi Tulyaev. And I guess how would you treat the situation if we were invited here to run say Buchanan's campaign? It is too early to speak about PR services in Russia. There are very few agencies, and in the public opinion they are strongly confused with advertising agencies. That is why we have this huge amount of commercials shown on the eve of the elections instead of a well-thought and planned public relations campaign.
For example, during the election to the State Duma, most of the politicians decided not to go for direct debates, the live debates on TV. And the only person who decided to go for public debates, was a fragile woman, Irina Khakamada, who is present here today and who literally beat the shit out of Alexander Rutskoi during this program. The process of structuring of the PR will be completed when the progress of, let's say the 'structurization' of the current Russian society will be accomplished. This will take a lot of time. As a small example, the corresponding companies and political consultants of the United States had the opportunity for dozens of years to study, let's say, the results of the Primaries in New Hampshire, in Missouri, in Texas, in any part of the country. And today they certainly have a right and the opportunity to judge about the traditional votes in those states. They also can act accordingly on the basis of the experience and knowledge they have acquired.
Russian companies and Russian agencies do not have these opportunities and it means they also do not have the same kind of experience. If the Russian Red Belt again in June will vote for the Communists this would be the first completed files in the computers of most of the PR firms working in the field. But there is one more problem for the politicians. The, how shall I say, the banal and trivial attitude of the politicians, treatment by the politicians of the idea of interaction with society and appealing directly to the people. Russian politicians believe that it is better to spend 40 minutes and speak about something unclear and vague that no one really understands, about macroeconomic stabilization, about inflationary expectations of the TV screens. They think it's better than just sometimes to pause and just say nothing. This attitude of the politicians has so far dominated.
What we also do not have in our country is a single terminology of notions used in public relations. As a result we have those monstrous expressions such as "The images coming back to the President." [SG: Well, it's hard to translate. In English it doesn't sound as ugly as it does in Russian.] That's Sergei Filadov, Yeltsin's former Chief of Staff and now the guy who runs his campaign. The people [this is not an expression] but the people still prefer not to work with the media, with the press and with the TV, but just to buy them, instead of making an event, following which the journalists would try to hunt and work on the thing.
There are also some positive things; we are gradually building the understanding that the international and the American experience of public relations have to be studied attentively even if for the sake of having an idea of what one should not do in Russia. Today aside from all the talk about the mysterious Russian soul, one also has to add the talk about the mystic features of the Soviet soul. Sometimes people get very much irritated by certain things we hear from Western politicians, political scientists, and journalists, such as what kind of terrible things are taking place in Russia today, but it is time to admit that the West has gotten what it had been trying to get since Gorbachev's days. It is the Western conditions that the Russian government has been following; it's the Western advisors that are being listened to today in the Kremlin; and it's the West by its awkward and sometimes poorly directed activities which helped to provoke the Communists to come back in the 1995 Parliamentary elections. They have done it too much and we can also consider that part of the responsibility for provoking anti-Western Russian chauvinism, the West also has to share part of the blame for it. Another example is that the youngsters so much unhappy and excited about the so-called Western pop culture today, to make sure that today the most popular radio program in Moscow, which is the capital city, is the Russian radio with this terrible and ugly Russian pop songs. But people listen to it and youngsters listen to it today because these songs are in Russian. This Russian radio has a line of those who would like to advertise on the radio at least for one more year ahead.
The critical problem that the West is facing and the United States is facing in particular is that the governments in these countries were not yet able to answer the following questions to themselves. First of all, what kind of Russia do they want to have today? A weak Russia torn apart by internal contradictions and crises, incapable to compete with the rest of the world, aside maybe by the terms of sales and production of nuclear weapons? Or a strong and stable country, which would be a guarantor of peace in the region but also a competitor in the world markets of services and consumer goods. Sometimes we are facing funny paradoxes: the US government is openly expressing its unhappiness about the fact that the official documents of the Russian government contain today the notion of the Near Abroad as if it hurts the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, not to mention the fact that the United States, in this case, acts as an advocate for the former republics when there is no special need to advocate their interests.
I was with the Republican party in New Hampshire and I was amazed at what I heard from Lamar Alexander who told us that America finally won in the Cold War. But we were not trying to win in this war anymore. In that sense that was the content of the policy of nuclear disarmament. But if you state that you won it means that you accept the responsibility for the processes which take place in the country which you fought against. Today in the United States there is a very popular idea that the Americans should be less and less preoccupied with international relations, and that whatever is happening across the ocean is not really worth a lot of attention. In January when we had the tragic event of the Chechens taking over the village, the biggest event for the Boston TV was the snowstorm. But if the Communists were to come to power in Russia, our domestic problems would become again your problems and the problem of public relations right now when the country is facing this dilemma of choice between the Communists and the Democrats, from my point of view, from my point of view are not so far off the American shores. And then you shouldn't be asking the question for whom the bell tolls; it also tolls for you. My main conclusion, as a result, today is somebody really needs a good and well-thought PR campaign towards anything. I think that the US government should define its PR campaign towards Russia, but I think that this would already be the topic of a conversation about American public relations. Thank you.
GTA: Thank you very much, Alexander, for a very candid analysis; as you said, you were going to have hard comments. I think it is quite useful to hear what people actually think. Disagreements are encouraged here because we often learn more from things we disagree with than from the choir. Let me see if the others want to make a comment on these points for just a minute or two, and then were going to throw it open to conversation. John Lloyd...
John Lloyd: I am going to be very brief, Graham, because the discussions, the presentations, have been exceptionally interesting but long. There are two things that I took from these which may be worth talking about a bit further. One, although Alexander Batanov didn't refer to it in his presentation just now, but he did in the previous presentation, the press conference at which most of you were not there, and that was the notion that Yeltsin would benefit from being the tsar, whether a good or bad tsar it does not matter and that he will get, as we used to say in Britain, the "deferential vote", that is the vote of those who will vote for the incumbent with a sense of deference, or a sense perhaps of fear, or a sense that he represents the order which should be supported because he is the order. And Alexander [used] another interesting and fascinating conceit with which Yegor Thumurivich agreed when we were speaking earlier is that none of the other candidates for the presidency, including Zyuganov, who as Yegor Gaidar said will almost certainly face Yeltsin in the second run-off, with the exception of Yeltsin, actually wishes to be President. Either their psychology doesn't permit it, in the case of Zyuganov, or that they're in politics more to make money as in the case of Zhirinovsky. That means then, if this is true, and I see a great deal in it, it means that the kind of cost-benefit analysis which we are used to bring to bear on presidential party candidates in the West only has a limited use. That is for people to say, the Russian have suffered so much in the past five years, and therefore, they will punish the incumbent, the incumbent being Yelstin, may have something to it but may not. And the normal criteria which we bring to bear on our election campaigns and our political personalities may be to some extent suspended. That seems to me, if that is true, a rather interesting point.
Secondly, to answer Yegor Gaidar's question which he posed when he was speaking. He said "If Zyuganov wins, what happens on the market?" This is not a question that would have been asked five years ago and certainly not ten years ago in Russia or in the Soviet Union, but now is a central question of Russian politics, as it is a central question in the politics of other countries. The scenario which he painted given a Zyuganov victory stopped at one point-he painted an economic scenario of increasing economic authoritarianism. But he stopped at that, though it would seem fairly rational to consider that if one were imposing price and other controls, then the next step, or indeed the parallel step, would be to impose political authoritarian steps-that clearly the two would have to go together, tat they could not live separately.
Therefore, again, pushing the logic a little bit farther one could see why there is some serious debate about allowing the election to go ahead, or the second stage to go ahead if Yeltsin does badly, because the consequences of a Zyuganov victory, and I think this is quite right, are extremely serious. Now, I agree 100% with Gaidar that to stop the elections would be worse than having it take place, but a Zyuganov victory is clearly a very serious matter indeed, and it is one I think we should be especially aware of as and when commentators over here say, "Well, the guy is a bit like Krasniewski in Poland, or Brauzaukis in Lithuania, he'll learn quickly, he'll be a different kind of animal." There is, I am afraid, it seems to me, insufficient evidence of that optimistic viewpoint.
GTA: Thank you very much, John, and I think that puts a question and maybe we'll put it back to Yegor just for a minute. Yegor, you did one dimension which was the economics, and John has put the question of what that means for the politics. What would you say?
YG: Well, I would absolutely agree with John, I just would not like to go to the more or less evident political consequences. Those who are experts in the Russian history knows the notion "enemies of the people" were practically implemented in 1929 when the Communists needed somebody to blame for why the goods that were previously under NEP, New Economic Policy, and the shops, are not there anymore. The so-called, those who are jamming the working supply [...].
So that is why they will need something to explain it and of course some kind of external ventures. A small victorious war is the best possible reaction in this time of political crisis, because in the war it is easy to explain why the poor are suffering. The consequences, in my point of view, of this scenario is that they will be especially politically dangerous until immediately after the elections, but it will be evident that the economy is going into a shambles. This is exactly the moment when they will try to be more authoritarian and more aggressive in their approach to foreign policy problems.
GTA: On that specific point, other members, do you agree or disagree? Sergei Kolesnikov, what would you say?
Sergei Kolesnikov (interpreted by SG): In general, I would agree with Yegor Gaidar. But I believe that there is one issue here that has been dropped in the discussion. One peculiarity of today's Russian economy the fact that there are many financial and economic groups which, while privatized, are nevertheless still very closely linked to the government. Five or six major groups were already able to find a common language with the government. They were basically given quite a large chunk of previously state-owned property to own and to run, but they are also a potentially very strong group which did not yet get access to the favors of the government.
Looking at this, one can certainly think about the political implications when we see these groups today during the elections supporting the political forces belonging to the opposite camp, hoping that immediately after the elections the situation will be put under their control and they will get access to bigger chunks of property. They believe that nothing would change in the system, only the hands of the holders of the privileges, and some other groups which today are not related to the government would be able to get all the privileges and other things for themselves. In principle, of course, there might be a possibility that this system might work, but those patterns that Gaidar spoke about will, I think, will be dominating in case of a victory. In that terrible picture that Yegor depicted, and that I agree with, the only thing I do not agree with is the pace. All those predictions would materialize, but probably not as fast.
YG: If you permit, I would absolutely agree with what Sergei approved, but I would d follow it one step farther. There is nothing more pro-corruption than, for instance, the multiple action rate. There is nothing more pro-corruption than the quotas for the world export. So really the movement in this direction is constructing the most pro-corruption situation in the Russian economy of the late 1980's, and beginning if the 1990's, where with one signature you could transfer one dollar into a hundred dollars. Exactly because there are the business interests that are behind, for instance, the Communists, they would know very well how to benefit from this mess in which neither market nor stable socialism are not at work anymore. So, they are really not a contradiction.
GTA: Dick Pipes.
DP: I would like to address a question to Mr. Batanov.
GTA: This is Dick Pipes who is a history professor here at Harvard and who has written on the first Russian Revolution, among other things....
DP: He very explicitly said that a great deal of the blame rests on the United States. I as a historian am used to the United States getting blamed for a lot of things that go wrong in Russia. We were blamed by the White generals in Russia for not giving sufficient support to them to suppress the Communists. We were blamed by some American historians for not recognizing the Soviet Union and therefore giving rise to Stalin.
Now, my question is this, suppose things go differently. Suppose Yeltsin wins and manages to lead Russia toward prosperity and stability. Will he be prepared to give us credit? [laughter]
AB (translated by SG): You are right. Everyone should start by blaming himself. I said a few very tough things and I am aware of this. In a way this was a speech of grotesque.
GTA: Evgeni says he has been inspired by Kozyrev. Please continue. I am just teasing.
AB: In reality, I am not a historian or a political scientist; I am a technocrat in this business. The documents which we prepare for this campaign have a heading: "Certain Considerations Toward the Election of the President of Russia due to take place on July 7, 1996." The election of Boris Yeltsin on July 7, 1996. I will repeat it again. I am deeply convinced he will remain President. We can discuss here with you different reasons as to why he would stay or different means as to how this can be achieved. But the only thing which we are trying to do, is to make sure we will not be looking for somebody guilty and who to blame.
GTA: When Alexander was making these comments, Irina mentioned, just on the side, that this expresses the view of a very substantial part of the population in Russia today. So I would ask you please to comment, maybe to agree and disagree.
IK (translated by SG): I would like to stand up for Sasha Batanov. Because if he needs his President to win he has to arrange his election campaign in such a way that it responds to the feelings and attitudes of the Russian people. And those attitudes are such that if Sasha were running today for the President of Russia and would make this speech today in Russia, he would have won and be ahead of all of the candidates on the list. First of all, the devastating defeat would be suffered by the democratic candidates. Yavlinsky could not even be ranked near him. I have been warning people about this that in Russia and I would stress it again, I am not in favor of autocracy or autocratic methods, but Russia has a specific situation. The liberal values, democratic values did not become yet the way of life for ordinary people. Before, those were some kind of aspirations and today those values have been discredited. The authorities have not yet learned how to combine liberal values with the idea of maintaining elementary order. When this ideological vacuum emerges it has always been filled with some great power Russian messages. Those who really want to win will have to learn how to say things like this. That is why before June 16th, or let us say until July 7th or August 7th, because it is obvious that for a while the run-offs will not take place. You just have to learn how to ignore that type of rhetoric. You just have to wait until the whole thing is over.
GTA: We have three points on this. To assure my colleague Dick Pipes that yes, indeed the US will be blamed if Yeltsin wins, not given credit. Alexander Buzgalin wants to say that for sure from his party, if Yeltsin wins the US will be blamed.
Alexander Buzgalin: Thank you for the invitation. I came here to make some provocations, if I understood correctly, as a person of the Left. So I will start with such provocations and maybe jokes. You will decide what it is, provocation or joke.
First, there are two types of democrats. For the first type of democrats democracy means first of all, a respect to human rights, freedom of speech, and so on. If it is necessary to attack human rights in order to build efficient economies they will never do it. There is a second type of democrat who can say, "Somoza or Pinochet is a son-of -a-bitch, but he is our son-of-a-bitch." It is a quotation. They can say that maybe Yeltsin is not such a good guy. Of course, 40,000 people were killed in Chechenya, 100,000 people were wounded, 400,000 people are refugees, but it doesn't matter. In other words, he is a guarantor of democracy and future prosperity of Russia. I don't know what type of democracy we represent here, our friends they will tell you.
Also there are two types of socialists. One of them will tell you that the only real democracy, only real power of the people can be the basis of socialist changes and for them democracy means power of the people but not power of the Democrats. In Russia we now have a joke: What does power of democracy mean? Power of the Democrats. Mainly the Democrats who started the war in Chechenya. For the other type of socialist it is possible to put into the prison block, and so on, millions of people in order to build new future society. I definitely can say that I am a romantic socialist. I am a permanent dissident. I was dissident in previous times because I was a democrat now I am a dissident because I am a socialist.
But of course it is partly jokes, and here also I am speaking as one among ten representatives of Centrist and Right forces and it is also a symbol of democracy, I think. In any case, I want to present some suggestions. When Yegor Gaidar said everybody can understand that after victory of Zyuganov Russia will have terrible economic, better to say financial crisis, economy of shortages, and all these enormous difficulties. I can put the question, why in such situations, does the stupid Russian population, at least one-half of this population, now begin thinking of supporting Zyuganov? What is the reason? Because all of the Russians are stupid, or at least one-half? I'll use the official statistic. I think in America there is the same problem: there is a lie, damn lie and official statistic. In any case there is a statistic, Yeltsin's statistic. Decline of GDP during period of economic reform, 40%; decline of industrial output, 50%; decline of agricultural output, more than 30%; decline of investments, more than 70%; decline of real incomes, 20%; decline of wages, more than 50%. OK, it is a statistic, and it is Yeltsin's statistic and for many, many people it is a question. And when they have wages as the main source of their livelihoods, and that is problem for both professors and workers, peasants and teachers, that is a question, plus unemployment, plus the destruction of the Soviet Union.
What will happen in America? I'll give you one parallel. In 1996 maybe you will have a president like Gorbachev, extremely democratic and his idea will be to open the southern border of America-free market of the labor force! What a simple idea! In past 100 years ago, if I am not mistaken, Texas, New Mexico, California were territories of the Mexican Republic. So in less than one year there will be a majority of Spanish-speaking people in the South of the US They will organize a referendum and they will decide they want to be independent, outside of the US. What will be the reaction of the democratic Americans? Will you be happy? Will you applaud? Like to the liberation of the Baltic Republics? By the way, I did support the liberation of the Baltic Republics. I am and I'll be supportive of the self-determination of the nations. But I wanted to give explanation as to why we have a growth of this chauvinism in Russia. That is important.
We have an unpredictable history in our country. First of all, we had a history of the Communist party in Russia, and everything was perfect when it was done by Stalin or Brezhnev. Now we have received everything that is bloody in our history, nothing positive. Now we gained a growth of enormous chauvinism and nationalism. It is cultural shock when [Arnold] Schwarznegger and Santa Barbara became the most famous cultural events in our country. And that is in Russia which has huge cultural traditions. That is the basis, that is the question.
Also, I want to say that I am not a supporter of Zyuganov at all. And I am afraid that if Zyuganov becomes President, maybe Khakamada, maybe Gaidar, maybe other friends, will come to Boston and become professors here. I definitely will be in Moscow, maybe in prison, maybe they will decide also to be in prison and be in prison too, I don't know. But he question is, what can the Communists really do if Zyuganov becomes president? I don't think they are so stupid that they will neglect the real support of the business and bureaucracy. In Russia we now have something like a Jurassic Park of capitalism. Corporate clans are the main agents of so-called market relations, quasi-market relations. And part of these dinosaurs who are fighting on our economic space may be vegetarian dinosaurs. They support Zyuganov, and can create a more or less stable situation after his victory. I am not sure it will be a huge panic and as far as future prosperity. We have received a lot of promises from Yeltsin that tomorrow will be a period of prosperity in the future five years, from different Prime Ministers during these five years, and then decline again. And then very simple explanation: Communists can not give us possibilities for our reforms. The same will be for Yeltsin. It was used as a parallel with August 1991. I can give you another parallel: October 1993, when Parliament in the center of Moscow was bombarded, hundreds of people were killed, and so on. I'm not a supporter of Anpilov; they did a lot of stupid and dangerous things, but in any case, it is a fantastic result when Yeltsin signed decree: I don't like this Constitution, I don't like this Parliament, it has to be closed. Maybe he will decide after the elections to continue the war in Chechenya, yes, maybe for Zyuganov victorious war is not so bad. Finally, after the October coup in 1993, it was necessary for Yeltsin to have a small victorious war; he started this, it is a reality, it is not a prognosis.
That is why we have these contradictions. That is why we have to think more and more abut how to create democratic pressure in order not to have repression if Zyuganov becomes president, and in order not to have continuation of economic crisis, unemployment, and so on, if Yeltsin becomes president. That is a question. OK, it is a provocation.
GTA: A revealing provocation. Thank you very much, Alexander. Ruud Lubbers was next with a question. Ruud is the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands who is visiting the Kennedy School as a lecturer this spring, and a friend of Yegor's from government days.
Ruud Lubbers: I am hesitating a bit because I am fascinated by all I am hearing of him and the questions of the actual political situations in your country. So, in the first place, my compliments. Secondly, I was not so shocked by Alexander Bogdanov who made it clear that the Russian population is blaming the West, and more particularly the Americans. Irina Khakamada confirmed that, after all, he is a political consultant and it is his job to translate the feeling of the population vis-à-vis his bosses, and how to work with that, and that is all right with me. Thirdly, I am not shocked hearing about the tsar. If I am not provoking too much here, Reagan was a tsar as well. I mean,. the way he could communicate with people was not always understandable by outsiders, but in the United States it worked very well. Even in my own country, I have seen that from time to time one is so enthusiastic about who is in charge anyway that they will stay in charge.
I come now to my question, and my question is simply this. When I listened for the last 24 hours, it struck me that practically all speakers from time to time referred to Irina Khakamada and say "Yeah, we agree with her. That is excellent. That is a good analysis, the way you should vote. But when I looked at the reality, as I hear, it is practically irrelevant because it is about consideration of the actual situation. We will have, I guess a continuation of the Chernomyrdin government which could do reasonably good business as well with the power and the authority of the state as well as with the market forces he has a certain taste for money and markets. He can manage I guess both sides and can manage both sides; he knows the traditions. So what I am not seeing very well is what will happen in terms of the changes needed in the future because, even if you blame other people for the past, I am looking to Mr. Batanov, then you can go on doing that. So at some point in time there has to be some sort of political strategy, or a strategy of the nation as such to prepare for a little bit of a different future in which maybe the society has to play a little bit larger role today compared to the situation as we know it, only government and business. It is a possibility. In that, the Duma has to play a role. One of the speakers please say a few things about that. Is there a sort of consensus here how to cope with the future, or is it only an intelligent debate to make funny comments about the actual situation. Thank you.
GTA: I think maybe Irina could respond.
IK (translated by SG): I would like to stress that the basic paradox of today's Russian life is that in July we are not making a choice between the future and the present, we are choosing at this point between the status quo and the past. But only the preservation of this status quo can give us a chance then to make then a step into the future. Maybe this would then seem to be too pragmatic, but I also represent some politicians who already have some property behind them, and each time the key question that I am interested in is how to make it possible for property work in Russia. I came to one conclusion. First we have to preserve what we have been able to achieve, and then we have to stick to one principle in politics, to not do more harm. Let's not do much good or much bad, let's just not do any more harm. Maybe just step aside and not interfere. For that purpose we need laws and political will of the authorities. For this purpose we will have to change those in power. But it is impossible to do this from the top.
That is why yesterday I was speaking about certain concrete issues to free the small business and commercial sector from overburdensome taxation, enact laws on civilized lobbying, to create the so-called corridors for dialogue between the authorities and the civil society in the country, and then I believe we can make this soup boil, in which the genuine democratic values could finally be cooked for the country, not again on the basis of the top down model, but on the grassroots level, form the bottom to top. Then we will have new politicians, and then objectively we will have the need and whatever you can call it, maybe the third force. Then maybe we will have a new president. None of these components is present today if I am even prepared to trade seats with Mr. Buzgalin; I can go to jail and let him become a professor in Boston. And I am prepared to go for this. This is not a popular slogan, but we must admit that we need Yeltsin today, because only the status quo will give us a chance to unite our efforts, take a break and try to push through the parliament and the government some of our new values. And I know who is around Zyuganov and the Communists today, and I know that had they been in power, the war in Chechenya would have been a much bloodier one, and I now that if they come to power Russia is doomed to face self-isolation. And the most important thing I know is that they know how to do only one thing: they know how to keep power in their hands for a long time. So far, all the societal conditions in Russia today would only facilitate this, would help them in this. That is why I am prepared to go for all sorts of means to make sure Yeltsin wins, whatever image of the president we are facing today, whatever mistakes he made in the past.
GTA: Let me ask for quick comments from Alexander and I think Evgeni wants to comment on this one. Then we have about 20 more hands up, so please try to make it as succinct as you can and I am coming to Richard next. On the Lubbers question....
AB (translated by SG): I do not like Yeltsin because I do not want to love my president, whomever my president is. I have enough people in my life whom I love and want to love. Our president demands from us constant love. There emerges a situation when no one can say to the president any kind of tough words. When the president stops reading newspapers, no longer watches television, and when he visits Stavropol and the people keep asking him questions about why the war in Chechenya continues, he tells them "What war? The war is not going on there. There are certain minor clashes there." There is not a single person in his entourage capable of telling him honestly. If I were allowed to have full access to the body I would have been prepared to say so, because I do not want to claim his love. I don't want to have a Dacha in a prestigious area or a new apartment from him, but I would like to make money honestly and I would like my business to make money.
Now the people who are in power have a different motivation for staying in power. Think about this process in Russia. First of all, it was complete politicization when it was considered that each citizen of the Soviet Union and of Russia should understand about politics well. As a result, we have neither the desire or intention of the people really to understand about politics. Maybe it is a normal, regular process of separation, of alienation of the lives of the politicians, in a good sense, from the lives of ordinary people. In a way, the society today is getting through the process of getting rid of its illusions. When we get back to this, and from time to time the society gets back to the same thing, they find their expression in the votes not for, but votes against. I have been running the Presidential campaign in Belarus and the people there were voting not for Lukashenko, but voting against Kevitch, period. Although until the last day of the campaign, Kevitch's entourage kept assuring him "You are the only candidate supported by an overwhelming majority of the population." This was already after the first tour when Lukashenko was ahead, this was on the eve of the run-offs. By that time we already knew that half of Kevitch's inner circle betrayed him and made separate deals with Lukashenko, and we were aware of those deals. If the political situation of the country had depended upon me and my opinion, I would start yelling "For God's sake leave it alone, let it stay the way it is today!"
GTA: Yegor and I had been talking earlier, and I think your comment about the entourage of Kevitch is not dissimilar from the entourage of Yeltsin today, which is why I am less confident in the predictions of Yeltsin's victory than some of our colleagues. Alexander, for one minute then we will take the next question.
AB: On that remark, I think the most probable outcome is the victory of Yeltsin, but there is one real problem: the entourage of Yeltsin can betray him. For them it is the same nomenklatura. For them HELSIA meant Zyuganov who will be the guarantor of democratic power as Yeltsin is. He can be more profitable than Yeltsin. So they can betray Yeltsin as they betrayed Gorbachev before; that is the real opportunity.
GTA: Richard Rose, if you could please comment on this from the perspective of some of the polling that you have done, but briefly, please.
Richard Rose: The numbers are in the handout, but the first point to make is that in the first round, 40% if those who vote will vote against both Yeltsin and Zyuganov. So, if you look at the French first round, Chirac is President because he came in second in the first round. In the first round in France, 56% voted against the leader in the second. So, the critical question which is now being explored is that in the first round you get the luxury of agreeing with everybody on the platform that they are both no good. In the second round it gets more difficult because you have to vote for the lesser evil or perhaps the greater evil to keep the other out. The logic is to have an extremely unpleasant and de-stabilizing second round which will not be about ideology, or an intellectually coherent program. The optimist might say that Zyuganov might go for the protest against Yelstin vote rather than the Black nationalist vote, but that assumes he is intelligent, because Yeltsin cannot deny he has been president. With Yeltsin, it is quiet easy to say, "You know the worst with me," and this may raise other issues that have been presented. But what I think is really striking is where does this leave the Russian people next winter? And here what our survey evidence showed in July 1993, prior to the conflict of September/October, the middle mass of Russians are in favor of gridlock.
To Mr. Lubbers' question, our evidence suggests that Russians would rather make the mistake of having too little government than too much. They have tried too much. Therefore, with all respect to the people who have tried, the big gain is freedom from the state. What Irina is worried about is losing the freedom from the state, but a weak, bad government is to be preferred to a strong bad government. I think perhaps next year the post-election analysis of what happens in Russia should not be at the Kennedy school, because Kennedy believed in strong and active government. I would suggest James Madison University, because Madison said "If men were angels I would trust any kind of technocrat." But they are not, and I think that the hope is weak government-Russians feel that they cannot influence government, but they feel that government can't influence them.
GTA: Ruud, are you following up the same point?
RL: Yes, don't be mistaken by my words. In the first place I fully agree that in the upcoming months, the point is that Yeltsin is the best solution. There is no time now, this month, to be explicit about the future. It is an act of making the best out of it, and to defend yourself against reactionary forces. That is my opinion. Having said that, after that I am interested in how society can develop in Russia, not the government, but society. That was my second point. Don't be mistaken. I am not asking for a strong government with a new plan. I am asking what way those gentlemen here see the possibility of the creation of a real society giving shape and form to their own nation, to their own pride outside the government-the people themselves, the small businesses and so on, not the government, that was my point.
GTA: Good. Professor Brovkin.
Vladimir Brovkin: I wrote a book on the Mensheviks, and after they lost, in 1917 for many decades afterwards they have been discussing, "What did we do wrong?" Some people on the panel admitted that there is a possibility that Zyuganov may win. My question especially to Yegor Gaidar and Irina Khakamada is if you were to discuss this in August 1996 and if Zyuganov won, what would you say you did wrong? A follow-up to that is, why don't you support the existing alternative, Yavlinsky?
IK (translated by SG): Yavlinsky is not an existing alternative. If he were a realistic alternative, we probably would consider supporting him. There are a number of reasons why he did not become an alternative. The first is purely a technocratic reason, his public relations, the image making. Yavlinsky does not have the image of the Russian president or Russian tsar/president charismatic leader. He is a very intellectual-minded, delicate person. People like this do not become leaders in Russia. Second, Yavlinsky does not represent any systemic force. This is just Yavlinsky himself. He does not have an effective regional network that would work for him and that would help him to be strong vis-à-vis the Communists like the Communists do have. Thirdly, when students miss classes sometimes, it is usually not the students who are blamed for this; it is the professor's fault. If no one wants to rally around Yavlinsky, it is time not only to blame others, but to look at him as well. Maybe it is Yavlinsky's fault. If he cannot consolidate around himself even four or five leaders; if he cannot go for some sort of a compromise, if he cannot identify some common interests, then he cannot consolidate the nation.
GTA: Yegor do you have a comment?
YG: A very short one. First, about the mistakes. Of course there will be analysis, and everybody will be analyzing what went wrong. I will not go into details because it is a long, long, long story. I think three points would be most important. First, that we were unable to persuade Yeltsin after the Autumn of 1993 at exactly the moment when he should go ahead with the reforms very rapidly and radically. I will not go into the details of explaining why it was important. Second, we were unable to persuade Yeltsin not to start this absolutely crazy war in Chechenya which itself probably could cost him the re-election. And third, we were unable to explain to Yeltsin the things that nobody explained to Kevtich: that it is very difficult to be the leading candidate in the ruling class in these elections.
GTA: Very well said. I think Evgenia is next.
EA: I will reflect very briefly and then ask one question. I have covered the Soviet and then Russian Parliament since the first one in 1989, and one thing that was a puzzle for me then and is still a puzzle for me today is why one can see the declining number of really educated and intelligent people in the Russian Parliament. The first Russian-Soviet Congress in 1989 was the conglomeration of the best representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, of Russian intellectuals. It was really the real great phase of the great culture. The last two Dumas remind me of a zoo in the middle of Moscow.
I was unable to resolve the puzzle until today. Now I understand the kind of PR we have, the kind of Parliamentarists we get in the Duma. I am very grateful for your enlightenment here when you explained to us that the main mistake Chubais made was that he did not change his name, an obviously Jewish name to a Russian-sounding name quickly. Thank you. There were a couple of other people in the history of Europe who made the same suggestions. So nothing you have said is novel.
[...]
We have a problem with institutional changes in Russia. Probably thirty years ago Samuel Huntington wrote a book about this where he said the problem of the transformation from a transitional society to modernity is the problem of establishing institutions quickly; it is not so much the problem of the speed of economic reform, but the question of institutions.
This leads me to my second comment on what was said here. The whole analysis of what we could hear is based on the assumption that the Russian political culture is very similar to the American one, since the American political culture very much depends upon voters' behavior and voters' attitudes. So we assume we have an enlightened polis in Russia that is capable of very well defining what is good and what is bad. In fact, it is not true; to be honest, one may even say that we have a polis of cowards. That is why it is so important, and we know very well, that our polis could be led in the directions that we want it to go, as was done in the years of Perestroika, especially 1989 and 1990. Unfortunately, we got quite the opposite result. Our politicians decided that they have to follow the attitudes and beliefs of the general public, the rank and file of the general population. Partly, that is one of our problems.
Thirdly, I want to say that of course Russia right now is choosing between bad and very bad, as always. I totally agree with Irina that our only hope in the June 1996 election is that people who grew up on the totalitarian regime tend to vote status quo. If they will vote status quo, I am absolutely sure that Yeltsin will win those elections.
My question is another, should he win, with the state of his health, we know that after any victory he goes into another type of "problems" that are not very healthy problems. Should he win and in two months he is going to have a heart attack or stroke, then in this situation the country will be run by junta-by his inner circle. So what is your reflection on that situation? I have the same question for Yegor Timorovich, for Irina and Yegor Timorovich.
IK (translated by SG): What can I say? Options like this are being considered, but on the basis of our Constitution, if Yeltsin collapses two months after his victory, then Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister becomes acting President. Two months after that, new elections will be scheduled, and then all the machinery of Our Home is Russia will be put into effect; the Communists, having lost to Yeltsin would lose part of their support, Chernomyrdin will have a badder and prettier image, which he has as compared to Yeltsin. So no junta and no problems.
The problems emerge in a different case: if the new elections are canceled. The elections may not take place for two different reasons: one is bringing changes into the Constitution by including Belarus in to the Russian Federation. This probably might have very serious implications if any hasty decisions [are made]. The second option is the provocation and imposition of martial law. In reality, this is not beneficial to Yeltsin. In both cases the Communists gain even more weight. But if we bear in mind that I completely agree with Sasha that the Communists are scared of their own victory, they still would very much want to preserve both the Duma, the Parliament, and their Communist party. The best option for everyone is Yeltsin's victory. I am sure that this will be some sort of a very slim victory. The maximum he can achieve would to be four or five percentage points ahead of Zyuganov.
Of course his inner circle would certainly manipulate in a strong way a president in such a poor state of health. But what does Yeltsin have to do with this? In the situation where we have to choose the lesser evil, we are all guilty. It is the fault of the democratic media who didn't care at all about the democratic politicians. It is the fault of the democratic leaders who do not know how to consolidate their efforts and their ranks. It is the fault of the Russian capitalists who have not yet become the bearers of Russia's national ideas. They are financing everything just to make sure they can keep the pockets open for new moneys to come in. But if it is the fault of all of us, then this is an objective reality; we cannot do it any other way. It means that we must stand in all of this shit and face it.
GTA: Alexander, do you want to add on to this in less than a minute?
AB: A small comment about the question why we do not have enough intelligent persons in the modern Parliament. I can say that maybe the intelligentsia are guilty if people do not want to elect intelligent representatives into the Parliament. The beginning of Yeltsin represents the end of Perestroika. It is better to say that the intelligentsia expressed the best feelings of the perspectives of our people; they are the heart of our lives for ordinary Russians. And if there are not more such representatives, who is guilty? The "crazy, stupid Russians" again. Why do we have such a big representative of elite intelligentsia in Boston and Israel and everywhere? Is it a question or not?
I would also like to make a remark. To say about the Parliament which was elected more or less democratically that it is a zoo is something like Stalin's style of estimating political enemies. It was such a tradition in the thirties to say "look at the American president, he is an animal." Now you can say look on the Russian Parliament and say "look at the Russian Parliament, they are animals in the zoo."
IK: I am a member of the Russian Parliament.
Evegenia Albats: They are rabbits, not animals.
AB: It's not mine, it is a quotation. If it is a zoo, then who are you?
GTA: Carol Saivetz.
Carol Saivetz: We have heard a lot about domestic forces and political processes and economic processes occurring today in Russia and their impact on the election. But in all of the comments there has been an underlying view of foreign policy issues, and it is that about which I would like to ask. We have heard about anger at the United States for the advisors who gave good or bad advice about the economic reform; we have heard about anger about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Irina herself said we should ignore the rhetoric that is anti-US at the moment until after the elections. My question is, can we ignore it, and what role is foreign policy playing, if any, in the views of the electorate, and what can we expect with a Yeltsin or Zyuganov victory?
IK (translated by SG): I already spoke about it last night, and I think that unfortunately we have to sort of divide the two at this point. We have to divide the real national interests which are behind the negotiations about certain issues in the sphere of foreign policy. We have to divide it from the so-called pre-election, or election-time rhetoric. That is why we need to forget, at this point that the elections will take place. It is a big issue, because otherwise it is impossible to talk about foreign policy seriously.
There are two key problems in foreign policy which really affect the domestic situation in Russia. First is the re-integration of Russia, and second is the relations with the NATO countries. During the Parliamentary elections, both issues played no role. That is why the speeches of most of the candidates did not touch upon these problems. During the Presidential elections this really becomes one of the most important parts of each presidential candidate's platform. And as you know, the restoration of the Soviet Union was the major ideological idea of the Communists which in a very rough way has been put into life by the Parliament. Yeltsin here was also trying to pull the blanket on his side.
If Yeltsin remains in power, I hope that re-integration would occur gradually, step-by-step. Intensive negotiations with Lukashenko were related more to political purposes than to any kind of economic considerations of a much more rational nature. If the Communists win, then the national movements would really develop in strong way in the former Union Republics. Instead of just seeing to it that we face a normal process of re-integration, first of all, economic re-integration with a preservation of political independence, we might end up having a gigantic civil war.
With regards to the NATO expansion, there is a consensus of attitudes. Both the Communists and the President are against it, but at the same time we feel that there is a need to respect the rights of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to join NATO at their own initiative. In any case, the initiative undertaken by the Western circles to expand NATO came very untimely for Russia, because at this point the implementation of this idea backfires and works in the interest of the opposite political circles in Russia. This means that the Communists are accusing the President in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in the disintegration of the country, and in making it possible for NATO's borders to get closer to the borders of Russia. That is why, let's say, if I were able to give some advice to the people in the West, I would say it is very desirable at least to postpone, even in terms of rhetoric, ease the tension at least until next September. Speaking of national interests in the West and in Russia, the best way would be not to go for a NATO expansion in the coming three to four years, or maybe even begin parallel negotiations about Russia's inclusion in NATO.
But in any case, if Yeltsin wins, it also depends upon the outcome of the elections here as well. As we understand it, if the Republicans come to power, the policies pursued would also be very tough. Let us assume that both Yeltsin and Clinton get re-elected. Then I think that instead of rhetoric in the field of politics, both sides might move toward a more constructive and productive dialogue. But if Zyuganov wins in Russia, I would call it the gradual emergence of a Cold War in velvet gloves. Russia's self-isolation would be guaranteed as a result.
GTA: I am looking at my clock and I see we have eight minutes left and we have several hands up, so I am going to encourage brief questions and brief answers as well. Professor Szporluk is next.
Roman Szporluk: My question is for Irina Khakamada. I have noticed that there is a constant theme in your remarks from last night and today, namely the idea that what Russia lacks is a sense of national purpose, a sense of a national idea. You told us last night that Communism failed, the non-Communist alternative was autocracy, [...], and nationalism, and now there is a vacuum. My question to you is if you were to formulate a sense of a Russian national ideal, what would be your vision of Russia, because we really know that the country cannot build democracy as a mechanism, as rules, as law. They have to invent a new deal, a new society, a great frontier, whatever. What is your vision for Russia? Taking advantage of the occasion that I can speak, permit me also offer a comment in connection to what others have said. It seems to me that the Russians now have finally managed to establish what the Lithuanians have, the Poles, the Germans, everybody, to create a mass Belorussian nationalism in response to this room [laughter].
IK: Thank you very much for your question. I will try to be very brief. I would formulate Russia's national identity today like this: market, order, justice. But the market would not be a way to make just some people rich. It becomes an idea elevated to the level of the state. Associated with order beginning with the capital letter "O," and justice which also includes the sense of personal responsibility. When the people go bankrupt on the market, they should not blame anyone; it is market justice. The government should protect the individual freedoms of the people, and in that sense we do not have strong power, we just cannot do it. But how to achieve this? How to also in the process of doing so provide enough food for senior citizens and small children? All those who are in between those two categories, should be given not fish, but fishing rods; let them go and fish. Nothing was done in this sense. The biggest fishing rod in the country is still in the hands of those in power. All the market connections in the water you can't see through it, but you know that bigger fish swim around the fishing rod in the hands of those in power.
GTA: Yegor, did you want to give a short answer to this question too?
YG: Well, if you would not mind, just three short comments on the questions on those before and now. You mentioned the discussions of the Mensheviks and what they have done wrong during the Russian Revolution. They were really very interesting. The real answer is it just does not matter. The Mensheviks had zero chances in the great Russian Revolution. It is evident to everyone who understands anything about this revolution. That applies to many problems we are discussing today. The most childish approach, of course, is to try to blame your problems on somebody else-like America imposed this problem on us or anybody else. The majority of the problems with which Russia is now confronted are closely connected with its past, with the structure of the post-Communist society, with the structure of the inheritance of the society in the economic, financial, social, etc., institutional, etc., etc., meaning. Only starting from this point can one really understand what is happening not from the point of view of Clinton making the wrong things, Yeltsin drinking too much, etc.; it is more or less important, but very much secondary. Only one thing to finish the discussion. I am very that glad Mr. Buzgalin is prepared to go to jail. I think he will have good company and we will have many opportunities to discuss our differences of opinion. [laughter]
AB: I look forward to having discussions with Gaidar without time limitations.
GTA: Yegor has assured us he will be there [in prison] alongside you and Irina, so there is no absence of company. Now for the others they will have to speak for themselves. Maybe to close here, Sergei Khruschev? This is rather different than the conversations you used to have around the dinner table, so I am wondering what you are making of all of this?
Sergei Khruschev: First of all, I am in agreement with many of the people who spoke here and especially with Evgeni and Irina that we have no choice. We have bad and very bad. We had one person who destroyed the society, and we have another candidate who has no idea what to do. It is the fight between two members of the old elite, two members of the Politburo for the power who are using the same manner, the same ideas, and the same phraseology. I do not know; maybe it is the fate of the country. I just told Evgenia that while I was on a cruise I read the memoirs of the former Prime Minister of Russia, Witte, and he talked about the same story we are seeing with Yeltsin's inner circle. It is very similar to the inner circle of Nicholas II before the Revolution when before the war, before the Revolution, the Prime Minister warned it would bring the country to a disaster. I think it will bring the country to a disaster.
I am very pessimistic, because I asked the question of Yegor two days age when he was in Rhode Island and he did not answer me. For me it is part of a very dangerous scenario because look at what Yeltsin tried to do first. He tried to kick out the most reasonable candidates for the presidency. For me, it is the mayor of Moscow and the Prime Minister who were practical. I can't tell if they were good or bad, but when they are looking at these bald men when they are working, they are doing everything. They are control Moscow. I think that is a question of which person can do something. It is not a question of Communism or not Communism. I don't understand what it means to say "Communism now." I can talk about this for a long time. So, it is when we say that Yeltsin is better, I disagree, because as Yegor Gaidar said that if Communists come to power we will have a new small victorious war. We have this now with Yeltsin and Chechenya. He said that we will control the media. I don't know because you are inside the country and have more information . I am watching the first television channel and reading Izvestia, Nezavisimiya Gazeta, and some others. I think it is fully controlled. I can't understand it, it is just as it was during the Brezhnev time. My understanding of this is that in reality, it is no real choice.
SG: Sergei Kolesnikov says although they are trying to control the media and especially the first channel of the TV, nothing works out. [laughter]
SKh: Yes, I agree, sometimes when Boris Nikolayevich begins to speak not by reading the paper, but himself, it is possible to understand something.
IK: But the people learned about the war in Chechenya from the media....
SKh: No, no, no, of course there is some freedom, I don't try to tell that it is the last remains from the Gorbachev democracy. I do not think that Gorbachev was the best politician, but what he brought to the country was real political democracy. It is not the question of what we have now; I am an engineer and work with the control system. The control system lets man not that we have the signal but the tendency of the changes. Everything changes, everything declines in the present government. I am sorry, if I must choose, if Zyuganov wins, it would be better.
GTA: I am not sure that we have cone to a conclusion, but I am sure that we have come to the end. I think Sergei's last comment, with which I disagree, I must say, puts me in mind of the story of the optimist and the pessimist. The optimist says, "This is the best of all possible worlds," and the pessimist says, "You know, I think you are right."
SK: I know it is also told that the pessimist a better informed optimist.
GTA: Let me say on behalf of the Harvard group what a wonderful opportunity this has been for us to have such an extraordinary group of people speaking so candidly form many different dimensions. We will continue watching on the edge of our chairs as one approaches the June and July elections. We will look forward after a successful democratic election, to a discussion subsequently here about the post-mortem. So we thank you very, very much and hope you all come back.
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