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The Russian Election Compendium
Duma Elections Conference Summary
Everything You Wanted to Know About the Russian Elections, but...
On Monday, December 11, 1995, Harvard's Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project and Shorenstein Center for Press and Public Policy hosted a conference for members of the media on the upcoming Russian parliamentary elections. The meeting brought together editorial board members, op-ed writers, and foreign policy journalists to assess the impact of the Russian elections. Speakers at the conference included John Lloyd, former Moscow Bureau Chief for The Financial Times, Sergei Grigoriev, former Deputy Press Spokesman for Mikhail Gorbachev, Evgenia Albats, correspondent for Izvestiya, Marvin Kalb, Director of the Shorenstein Center, and Graham Allison, Director of Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs.
I. Expectations about Results of December 17 Russian Parliamentary Election
Of the 43 parties, whose antics are too often reported in the press, only eight are seriously competitive for the parliamentary elections: Our Home is Russia (Chernomyrdin), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Zyuganov), the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) (Skokov, Lebed), Yabloko (Yavlinsky), the Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky), the Agrarian Party (Lapshin), Women of Russia (Lakhova), and Russia's Choice (Gaidar).
All panelists agreed that the big loser in the parliamentary elections will be the government "party of power", Our Home is Russia, led by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. 80-90% of the electorate will cast votes for parties other than the government. This result is not surprising. When Russians ask themselves whether they are better or worse off than they were three years ago, three out of four reply worse. The rejection of Our Home thus mirrors that of other countries in which citizens have experienced sharp economic decline.
The panelists concurred the likely winner of the elections will be the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP-RF) with over 20% of the vote. The Communists have capitalized on the old CPSU machine and lists and effectively targeted old party members, especially Russia's 37 million pensioners. The Communists pledge to increase pensions and security, restore order, and make Russia great again. In the countryside, they are cutting into voters who previously supported the Agrarian Party. Nostalgia is a central theme in the CP-RF campaign rhetoric.
Another significant winner in the elections will be the nationalist Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) lead by Yuri Skokov and General Alexander Lebed. KRO's message of a renewed great Russia through "blood, sweat, and tears" has resonated with the voters. KRO claims Russia's destiny is to be determined only by Russian hands. This message is combined with a strong anti-corruption and nationalism campaign. The convincing KRO showing has hurt Vladimir Zhirinovsky's more radical nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, which now is in danger of not clearing the 5% hurdle.
The only reform party expected to do well is Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko bloc. Its role over the last two years as a democratic opposition to the Yeltsin government allows it the unique ability to promote reform policies without having to shoulder responsibility for economic hardships caused by government policies. Yegor Gaidar's Russia's Democratic Choice party has struggled to gain support this year after losing its major financial backer last the spring. Gaidar's bloc is unlikely to clear the 5% hurdle.
Parties are not well established in the regions. Although parties run local candidates in the regions, regional voters often find it difficult to distinguish between many of the parties' similar agendas. Local politicians are likely to do well in the district voting, many of these may be independent candidates.
Campaign finances are murky. Although strict laws regulating campaign finance exist, enforcement is weak and parties ignore official guidelines by using cash. All of the major banks are players on the political scene. Many support more than one party to ensure a favorable result no matter which party emerges victorious. Many parties, including the Communists, also have major business support.
Commenting individually on the Russian political scene
Evgenia Albats, claimed the current political situation is not one of political parties running for elections, but one of competing interest groups representing various business interests. She also predicted that all parties are likely to play the nationalist card in the future which will affect how Russia's minorities are treated.
Graham Allison noted both the similarities and differences between the current Russian political situation and the situation in Weimar Germany in 1932. Objectively, the experience of daily life is strikingly similar: hyper-inflation, rapidly increasing unemployment, domestic chaos, and a sense of national humiliation at the hands of foreigners. While this provided rich soil for demagoguery in 1932 Germany, by contrast, in 1995 Russia extremism is not selling well. Indeed, radical claims are attracting fewer voters than they did in the 1993 elections, as successful political parties are smartly moving toward the center.
II. Implications of the Parliamentary Elections
Economics: If the Communist gain power in the State Duma, how will this affect economic reform? All panelists agreed a return to the previous command economy is impossible. Current Communist leaders, including Duma members, are actively engaged in the struggle for assets. They have backers from both banks and major corporate contributors. Indeed, John Lloyd asserted, "They will try to recarve the private property to favor themselves and their friends, rather than turn it back to the state."
Potential Change in Government: Graham Allison anticipates a new prime minister as a result of the elections. John Lloyd summarized the views of First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets' supporters in Moscow regarding Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin's predicament. If Chernomyrdin's bloc gains more than 9% of the vote, he will have his own power base and will be difficult to dismiss as Prime Minister. On the other hand, if he fails to clear the 5% hurdle to get into the Duma, Yeltsin's apparat will not see him as a threat and allow him to stay in his office. If Our Home gains 5-9% of the vote (as is expected), Chernomyrdin could be considered a threat to the president and not have the political support to prevent his ousting.
Foreign Policy: Anti-Western sentiment exists in Russia, mostly in the form of resentment that the West had much to gain from the break up of the Soviet empire and the fact the West overtly supported Yeltsin's shelling of the Russian White House in October 1993. However, foreign policy has not played a major role in the election. The panelists agreed that domestic issues will dominate foreign concerns. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is a likely casualty of the elections. But rhetoric aside, no major change in Russian foreign policy is anticipated. Evgenia Albats disagreed with the rest of the panel on this point and predicted Russian troops would exit Bosnia within two weeks of the election. Graham Allison cautioned the West to avoid "lightening rods" such as announcements about NATO expansion that may incite the Russian electorate prior to the June presidential elections. Reintegration of the former Soviet Union will be a much discussed option in the future.
Implications for Presidential Elections: The parliamentary elections serve as a functional equivalent of a primary for the scheduled June 16 presidential elections. Those who fare well will become viable presidential candidates. While his party is the most popular, Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communists, is not charismatic. General Alexander Lebed, is considered by many to be the opposition front runner, but infighting within the KRO may damage his chances. Grigory Yavlinsky is expected to carry the reformist torch in the presidential race. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin continues to deny interest in the position - in deference to Yeltsin. Although certain to run, Vladimir Zhirinovsky appears to be a spent force. Significantly, all panelists believed the chances of the presidential elections being canceled were as much as 50-50. The panelists doubt the willingness of Yeltsin and his entourage to effect what would be the first willing and peaceful transition of power in Russia's history.
Real Power in Russia: John Lloyd noted that the controversial article by American diplomat Thomas Graham was astute in perceiving the real struggle in Russia is within the Kremlin. Powerful clans are competing to gain the upper hand in Russia's policy making arena. The security clan, led by Yeltsin bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov and First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets competes with an energy clan headed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and a pro-reform/Western oriented clan fronted by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais. Currently, the security clan seems most powerful.
Revenge Agenda: John Lloyd also mentioned that reformist politician Yegor Gaidar fears that one of the major results of a Communist victory will be acts of revenge against those who dismantled the Soviet Union, who caused economic hardship, and especially who fired on the Russian White House in 1993. Sergei Grigoriev concurred, predicting the opposition parties have learned from the events of October 1993, and now realize they can come to power through democratic means. Once the Communists come to power in the parliament, they will concentrate their efforts on winning the presidential elections next June. If they are successful, then a revenge agenda may be formed.
III. Panel Conclusions
John Lloyd: Lebed has replaced Zhirinovsky as the leading nationalist, but his nationalism focuses on rebuilding a great Russia through what Russians do for themselves at home. The post-election Russia will continue to have a market economy because only market economies have proven to ensure economic growth. Russian democracy, on the other hand, is not guaranteed.
Sergei Grigoriev: Political realities are more important than economic realities. Power comes first; economic realties come later. The reintegration of the USSR in the one form or another will be a reality for the future.
Evgenia Albats: Religion will play an increasingly important role in the future. All parties are seeking the blessing of the church. Although Russia will definitely have some sort of market economy in the future, it still matters what type of political regime it has as well. Russia needs democracy to guarantee personal rights.
Marvin Kalb: Russia is doing well, and its economy is improving. However, one must recall Brinton's theory of revolution, which states people are most likely to revolt when their situation has improved and their expectations are rising..
Graham Allison: These elections will take the pulse of the nation. The fact that these elections are being held at all, in the face of significant opposition, is a testimony to the growing strength of the democratic principles underlying the chaos. It is important to note the most virulent, hateful, and radical messages are not selling. Although the government will lose , even the opposition parties have moved strongly toward the middle. Russia's democracy cup is more full than empty.
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