TThe Search for Peace in Chechnya: A Sourcebook 1994-1996

Overview of Peace Proposals for the Conflict

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

March, 1997

The following reviews some of the proposals for reaching a settlement in Chechnya that were published in full or cited in the Russian press, or made available for alternative distribution in 1995-1996:

November 1995

Oleg Lobov:

The Secretary of the Russian Security Council was cited in the Russian press as submitting a proposal to President Yeltsin involving the use of force to prop up Doku Zavgaev's government in Chechnya. The proposal went on to suggest that around $1 billion in subsidies and additional large sums of money should also be invested directly in the republic by the Russian Government to facilitate its reconstruction and "win the hearts and minds" of the population. Lobov further proposed that the Russian forces would then be withdrawn in stages as the security situation improved.

February 1996

Mintimer Shaimiev:

President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan, in a proposal submitted both to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev in February 1996, recommended a 7-point process for the resolution of the crisis:

• Negotiations with all sides in the conflict including Dudaev, Zavgaev and the Federal Government (with the latter's representative being at least a Deputy Prime Minister);
• Official delegations from both sides with the plenipotentiary powers to discuss all aspects of the problem, including Chechnya's status;
• Guarantees from representatives of other "subjects" of the Russian Federation (at the level of the Council of Heads of the republics and the Council of Governors of Russia) and also from the OSCE and Council of Europe.
• The withdrawal of Federal troops, the disarmament of fighters, and a general amnesty that includes Dudaev. (Even those field commanders who refuse to disarm would still have a seat at the negotiating table).
• The demilitarization of the territory of Chechnya, and elections for a new Chechen Government under the supervision of deputies from the Russian State Duma and international organizations.
• A bilateral working group of Federal and Chechen representatives to discuss the reconstruction of the republic, with some funds made available in advance for the reconstruction work and the balance paid on completion.
• An agreement expressing the good will of both sides and their mutual obligations toward the people of Chechnya and Russia and the international community, and ensuring the long-term demilitarization of Chechnya irrespective of who comes to power after democratic elections.

Shaimiev stressed in his proposal that a demilitarized Chechnya would not pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

Nikolai Gonchar:

Nikolai Gonchar, a Russian Duma deputy, was cited in an article in Moskovsky Komsomolets on February 9, 1996 as suggesting that the crisis in Chechnya could be resolved on the basis of a referendum among the Chechen population and simultaneous negotiations with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev. In Gonchar's proposal, if the Chechens voted for independence then Russia should cut off all financing and demand that Chechnya pay reparations for the Russian army's campaign in the war. Any Chechen regions that voted against independence in the referendum would also be incorporated into the Russian Federation and the Russian government would construct housing for those people wishing to leave an independent Chechnya for Russia. A peace treaty renouncing all territorial claims and the use of force to resolve conflicts would be signed. Russian troops would remain in the republic until this treaty was implemented, and would be withdrawn only when minimum guarantees for Russia's security were met.

Viktor Chernomyrdin:

In various newspaper interviews and public addresses in 1995-1996, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin spoke of continuing military operations at the local level, greater reliance by Moscow on the government and forces of Prime Minister Doku Zavgaev, and the permanent presence of Russian ground forces in Chechnya.

In a letter to the Duma in early February 1996, cited in Segodnya on February 10, 1996, he outlined a strategy where the main burden of disarming Dudaev's forces would fall on Zavgaev's government, and where Russian federal forces would concentrate on "local actions" related to disarmament and heading off "armed provocations." Russian combat operations would also be preceded by information and propaganda work to convince the public that these actions were "forced measures." The aim would be to try to withdraw the Russian federal forces by the end of March or early April 1996 with the exception of contingents which would be stationed permanently in Chechnya. Russian press reports at this juncture further suggested that under this scenario, two army brigades would be stationed permanently near Grozny after the end of the war.

Galina Starovoitova:

Yeltsin's former adviser on Nationalities issues and member of the State Duma, was cited in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on February 10, 1996 as proposing a solution where the two key problems of the withdrawal of Russian troops and the determination of the ultimate status of Chechnya would be dealt with separately. The then current state of combined jurisdiction for individual zones in the republic would be retained for a short transition period until new all-Chechen elections across the whole territory of the republic could take place. This would be once the military operations had been brought to an end; once all POWs and prisoners had been exchanged on the principle of "all for all;" and after a broad amnesty for Chechen fighters had been issued.

Mikhail Gorbachev:

In interviews with the Russian press cited in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on February 13, 1996, the former Soviet President suggested that a direct dialogue between Yeltsin, Dudaev, Zavgaev and other Chechen leaders should be initiated to work out a program for a political settlement for Chechnya. This settlement would involve an agreement on the cessation of all military operations in Chechnya, and a ban on terrorism and the use of force to define Chechnya's status. The resolution of Chechnya's ultimate status would proceed from an agreement by all parties that the republic's secession from Russia was impossible. Any final decision on Chechnya's new status within Russia would then have to take into account the interests of all ethnic groups living in the republic, as well as Russia's interests.

Ramazan Abdulatipov, Valery Borshchev, Yegor Gaidar, Sergei Kovalev, Vladimir Lukin, Mikhail Molostvov, Lev Ponomarev, Yuli Rybakov, Viktor Sheinis and Grigory Yavlinsky:

This group of prominent Russian Duma deputies published their joint proposal in Izvestiya on February 20, 1996. The proposal offered a 7 stage approach to the resolution of the crisis on the basis of 4 fundamental principles: 1) peace talks as the only realistic way of resolving the war, 2) a comprehensive ceasefire; renewal of the July 30, 1995 Russian-Chechen military accord; and renewed political negotiations, 3) negotiations between representatives of the Russian federal government and the warring parties on the status of Chechnya without demanding any preconditions, 4) a decision on the long-term status of Chechnya to be taken only after a referendum in the republic.

The 7 stages were as follows:

• Lifting the moratorium on the earlier Military Accord (from July 30, 1995) and the resumption of the work of the Joint Observer Commission in Chechnya. Continuation of the exchange of prisoners with the end goal of completing a total exchange--an "all for all" formula.
• Speedy initiation of talks on the mechanisms for a ceasefire by all parties in the conflict, with the assistance of the OSCE.
• Immediate political negotiations among all sides to the conflict with the participation of a round-table of socio-political forces in Chechnya--without any preconditions and with the aim of working out a process for defining the status of Chechnya. The negotiations would also focus on how to prevent an armed confrontation in Chechnya after the withdrawal of federal forces, and on the signing of a Charter for National Reconciliation. The Russian side would send an official representative to the talks with full plenipotentiary powers for political decisionmaking.
• A parallel agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian troops.
• An agreement with all sides on measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons from Chechnya into adjacent Russian territory.
• An announcement from all sides of guarantees and concrete measures to stop criminal activities against the civilian population, prisoners of war and detainees, by whoever is perpetrating these acts, and of harsh punishment for those who are found guilty of crimes.
• The first step in the political negotiations must be the announcement of a transition period in which all sides guarantee the Chechen people the right to freely express their will in comprehensive elections and a referendum on the status of the republic, according to a mutually agreed formula.

March 1996

Doku Zavgaev:

In early 1996, the Moscow-backed Chechen Prime Minister proposed to Chernomyrdin's Commission that he hold negotiations with all groups in Chechnya, including Dudaev. In March, Zavgaev began to meet with the leaders of individual Chechen regions and villages to sign a series of treaties of "peace and accord" with his government and the Russian federal forces that were intended to bring the war gradually to an end. These treaties were suspended after pro-Dudaev forces attacked and effectively recaptured Grozny in August 1996.

Salambek Maigov:

The Chairman of the Russian "Bashlam" Movement, which comprises members of the Chechen and Ingush diaspora in the Russian Federation, published a peace proposal on March 5, 1996 in Nezavisimaya Gazeta. This proposal was endorsed by a Congress of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples which met in Volgograd in mid-March. It was followed by Maigov's restatement of the steps necessary to secure peace in an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on June 8, 1996, in the wake of the meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Acting Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev on May 27 in Moscow; and by Maigov's own draft of a Russian-Chechen treaty in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on July 24, 1996.

The March proposal involved a two stage plan: 1) Creating a joint governing body for Chechnya which would be elected on the basis of free elections and universal suffrage; and 2) resolving Chechnya's political status in negotiations between a new Chechen government and the Russian leadership.

Stage 1 followed 3 principles:

1) The body supervising the election process should be in complete control of all Chechen territory and be capable of making the necessary preparations for the elections.

2) The elections should be genuinely popular.

3) The elections should be democratic and supervised by the UN, OSCE etc. to ensure they are not rigged.

Stage 1 would begin with the creation of a Special Supervisory Committee of Chechen resistance forces and the Russian army, which would lead to a ceasefire and the resumption of exchanges of POWs and other prisoners, and culminate in a military-political accord that would make the elections possible. Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPF), comprising Russian Interior Ministry troops and Chechen forces, would also be established to ensure the security of the elections. Once an agreement on the Joint Peacekeeping Forces was signed, the Russian Ministry of Defense combat units would be withdrawn. The JPF would then be responsible for upholding law and order, disarming renegade fighters and punishing unlawful activities. A Chechen Central Election Commission, consisting of citizens of the Chechen republic and representatives of all Chechen forces, would also be set up to supervise the elections. Once the elections were held, and a new Chechen government was in place, the final negotiations for a long-term peace agreement would begin with the Russian government.

Ramazan Abdulatipov and Sergei Shakhrai:

These two prominent members of the Russian Duma published a plan for the stabilization of the Caucasus region as a whole in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on March 13, 1996. The plan had 4 key stages:

1) "Unity in Moscow,"
2) "Agreement in Chechnya,"
3) "Agreement of Moscow and Chechnya," and
4) "Peace and Stability in the Caucasus:"

1) "Unity in Moscow"--this was presented as the only way to resolve the Chechen crisis. It would involve the adoption of a single position for all Russian federal agencies, the promulgation of corresponding laws to establish the general principles for regulating the crisis, and the designation of a single branch of government or government agency to take charge of solving the crisis. This agency would ideally be a state commission comprising representatives of all the relevant branches of government. The commission would also begin with a "clean slate" and be granted a carte blanche in its approach to the resolution of the conflict. In addition, a law establishing the general principles for regulating the crisis would be ratified by the Duma to give the commission a firm legal basis for operations.

2) "Agreement in Chechnya"--here Russian federal and regional agencies, Chechen socio-political movements and their leaders, and the religious authorities of Chechnya would be engaged in a dialogue under the guidance of the state commission. This dialogue would result in the creation of a similar single negotiating body for Chechnya representing all the political forces in the republic.

3) "Agreement of Moscow and Chechnya"--the two negotiating bodies for Russia and Chechnya, once established, would then discuss a number of key issues, including: a ceasefire, gradual disarmament and the withdrawal of Russian troops; a moratorium on terrorist activities; the prevention of armed incidents; the release of prisoners; the prosecution of criminal activity and attacks on civilians; the economic and social reconstruction of Chechnya; the formation of a new Chechen government; a process toward a new Chechen constitution; a new legal code for the republic; and a treaty on the delimitation of powers between the republican and federal government. The latter would follow the "Tatarstan model" of discussing the specifics of Chechen-Moscow relations without actually getting bogged down in the issue of Chechnya's ultimate status.

4) "Peace and stability in the Caucasus"--this would be an all-Caucasus peace initiative. According to the authors of the proposal, although Chechnya is an internal matter for Russia it is also a window onto the problems of the Caucasus as a whole. A dialogue on the mechanisms for the resolution of the Chechnya problem within a Caucasus-wide framework was therefore suggested--to pull together all the Caucasus forces in finding a common methodology for resolving inter-ethnic conflicts and regional crises like Chechnya, North Ossetia-Ingushetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia etc. The authors stressed that this all-Caucasus approach would also help many of the regional groups find an "honorable" way out of their conflicts, which is a crucial factor in the Caucasus. Abdulatipov and Shakhrai also suggested the creation of a set of international (inter-Caucasus) commissions to tackle the specific problems facing the region, such as terrorism, economic crisis, criminal activity, transport, energy etc., with high-level representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia. The work of these commissions would conclude in a final conference on peace and stability in the region. The ultimate goal would be to integrate the Caucasus as a distinct region into the CIS.

Eduard Shevardnadze:

The President of Georgia, in a March 19 visit to Moscow, proposed to President Yeltsin that Russia and Georgia initiate a Caucasus-wide resolution of the region's conflicts. This would begin with a peace conference in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, and would focus on bringing an end to the wars in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh by strengthening ties among the internationally-recognized governments of the Caucasus and neutralizing separatist leaders. Shevardnadze's proposal was reported to include a Declaration of Peace, Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus, which would involve support for internationally recognized borders, measures against separatism, guarantees of human and ethnic rights, protection of transport and communication routes, and economic cooperation. The conference was subsequently held in the Russian North Caucasus town of Kislovodsk on June 3, 1996, where the presidents of Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all signed a declaration of support for territorial integrity, the non-violability of borders, and for the rights of ethnic minorities. The Kislovodsk declaration also abjured terrorism, religious extremism and aggressive separatism, but had no direct impact on the course of the war in Chechnya.

The Hague Initiative:

A group of representatives from the Russian Federation and the CIS, including President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan, Russian Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Former Nationalities Minister Valery Tishkov, Presidential Advisor Emil Pain, and Dudaev representative Vagap Tutakov, convened in the Peace Palace at The Hague on March 27-29 to discuss the war in Chechnya in the context of other post-Soviet conflicts. At the end of the meeting, the group produced a statement outlining a set of ten points for the resolution of the Chechen conflict. The text noted that:

"There is no military solution to the crisis in the Republic of Chechnya and, therefore, it is imperative:

• To cease military activities immediately.
• To resume negotiations among the conflicting parties aimed at the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Chechnya.
• To demilitarize Chechnya based on the Agreement on the Package of Military Issues reached on July 30, 1995.
• To resume the activities of the Special Observer Commission facilitated by the OSCE for the period of demilitarization.
• To create optimal conditions, including general amnesty, for free and fair elections in Chechnya.
• To involve the Council of the Heads of Republics and the Council of the Governors of the Russian Federation and the OSCE in negotiations as guarantors and mediators.
• To resolve the issue of the political status for Chechnya on the basis of the principle of a delayed decision.
• To implement a plan of peaceful resolution by taking into consideration international experience in conflict management.
• To build consensus on the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Chechnya among all the branches of power, and political and public organizations in the Russian Federation.
• To conduct a special meeting of the Hague Initiative to discuss ways of resolving the crisis in Chechnya."

Boris Yeltsin:

On March 31, 1996 President Yeltsin announced his plan for the resolution of the conflict in Chechnya, noting that "the Chechen crisis is the hardest problem for Russia. There has not been and is no simple way to resolve the conflict." On April 1, 1996 the plan was promulgated as a Decree--Program for Regulating the Crisis in the Chechen Republic--which included all of the points outlined in his public address on the previous day. The decree was presented as a blueprint for further action by Moscow. The important elements were as follows:

• The program for the settlement of the conflict will be implemented jointly by federal and republican organs
• All troop operations on the territory of Chechnya will be terminated from midnight on March 31, and troops will withdraw gradually from areas where there is no conflict to Chechnya's borders.
• The Chechen leadership will work to broaden the "zones of accord, security and peace" in Chechnya (Yeltsin claimed in his speech that these now covered 1/3 of Chechen territory).
• Terrorist acts will be responded to "adequately."
• Free and democratic elections for the republic's parliament will be held throughout Chechnya and the parliament will represent the interests of the entire population.
• A forum of representatives of the people of the Chechen republic, from all districts, towns, large villages etc., will be convened, and will also include representatives of the federal and republican authorities.
• The election of the parliament will recreate state authority in Chechnya. Once this is recreated, power will be devolved from the Russian Federation government to the head of the government and parliament of Chechnya.
• The process will culminate in a treaty on the delimitation of powers between Chechnya and the Russian Federation, which will eventually result in the resolution of the issue of Chechnya's status through discussions between Russian and Chechen plenipotentiaries.
• To get the negotiations underway, the Russian Federation government is willing to begin talks with Dudaev through intermediaries.
• Cooperation among all branches of the federal government is an essential prerequisite for a settlement, and a state commission will be formed with the Federation Council and Duma to supervise the entire settlement. The commission will be chaired by Chernomyrdin.
• The State Duma should also consider an amnesty for participants in the conflict, with the exception of those "who have committed grave crimes."
• The government will review its policies of distributing aid and reconstruction funds to Chechnya to ensure that it is properly targeted--but only to those areas where the situation is stabilized.
• The Ministry of Defense, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Border Forces and the Federal Security Services, along with the Chechen Government (Zavgaev) will within 5 days draw up a plan of action to tackle terrorism and diversionary acts aimed at preventing the resolution of the crisis in Chechnya.

May 1996

Boris Yeltsin:

As a follow-up to the March 31 peace plan, on May 27-8, 1996 President Yeltsin met with representatives of the pro-Dudaev Chechen government headed by designated President, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, in Moscow. A declaration of principles was agreed at the meeting and a further series of initiatives announced including:

1) A cease-fire to take effect from midnight on May 31-June 1.

2) A joint commission to monitor the cease-fire and facilitate an "all for all" exchange of prisoners within two weeks.

3) A draft project on power-sharing between the Russian Federation and Chechnya, which defines Chechnya as a "democratic, sovereign state" with the Federation with jurisdiction over all aspects of domestic policy, and the right to conclude international treaties and agreements. The Russian Federation reserves the responsibility for defense policy, security issues and transport. Both Chechnya and the Russian Federation would share the responsibility for the economy, foreign policy, and the demarcation of Chechnya's administrative borders. (This project was published unilaterally by the Russian government on May 29, 1996.)

June 1996

Vyacheslav Mikhailov and Aslan Maskhadov:

On June 10, 1996, Russian Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov and Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov concluded a series of negotiations in the Ingush capital of Nazran with two protocols for promoting the peace process. The first protocol on military issues outlined concrete measures for a ceasefire and the end of combat operations, and the creation of a working group to produce a schedule for the gradual withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the demilitarization of the republic. The protocol also noted the importance of new "free" elections for a Chechen executive and legislature and stated that these elections would be the "internal affair" of Chechnya. The second protocol on the exchange of prisoners made provisions for a joint working group to draw up lists of prisoners on both sides and take steps for their immediate release. The protocols were followed on June 25, 1996 by a Presidential decree from Boris Yeltsin providing for the phased withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya.

August 1996

Alexander Lebed:

On August 25, 1996, after promising a qualitatively new approach to the war in Chechnya and engaging in a flurry of diplomatic activity, Russian Security Council Secretary and Presidential Envoy to Chechnya Alexander Lebed signed a ceasefire agreement with Chechen Chief of Staff Aslan Maskhadov in the Dagestan village of Khasavyurt. The accord postponed a decision on the status of Chechnya, calling for an agreement on a treaty for regulating Russian-Chechen relations to be made before December 31, 2001. It also stipulated the creation of a Joint Commission of Russian and Chechen representatives to prepare for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya, combat crime and terrorism, draw up proposals for economic reconstruction, implement programs for the rebuilding of infrastructure, and control the supply and distribution of food and medical aid. The accord was made public by the Russian government on August 31, 1996.