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The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords: Failure or Success

Zlatko Isakovic

Institute of International Politics and Ecoomics
Center for Peace and Conflict Research
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

International Studies Association

March 1998

Within the paper firstly are briefly considered the internal and international causes and conditions of the Yugoslav crisis. The main parts of the paper are devoted to the Dayton Peace Accords, its main civilian and military segments (the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, elections, human rights, rights of refugees and displaced persons, regional stabilization etc.). Pointing to some significant open questions, weaknesses and dilemmas as well as to the successfulness in accomplishment, the author concludes that the key issue is whether the Dayton arrangements will work in Bosnia and Herzegovina or it will be divided if and when SFOR or other peacekeeping force ends its mission.

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords (November-December, 1995), the two parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 have been divided between the Entities of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska could be geographically divided on its Eastern part (consisting of Eastern part of Herzegovina and Northern parts of Bosnia) and Western part (parts of Northern and Western Bosnia). The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided on eight cantons covering Western part of Herzegovina as well as most parts of Central Bosnia and Southern parts of Western Bosnia. Major nations of Bosnia and Hercegovina are Bosniacs (before 1993 Muslims), present-day living mostly in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs, living mostly in Republika Srpska, and Croats, living mostly also in the Federation.

Internal and International Causes and
Conditions of the Yugoslav Crisis

The Yugoslav crisis (1991-1995) could be seen, at one side, as an event caused (at least predominantly) by the local elites, while international community was merely "caught by surprise," behaving as a "powerless spectator" or a "confused participant". There is also another explanation that focuses the "hostile external world powers" as the sole culprits, at the same time downplaying the significance of local actors" role.

The ex-Yugoslav multiethnic society represented a hybrid, where used to exist combined integrative forces (ties of more or less similar ethnic origin, language and culture, a relatively high number of interethnic marriages, existing on a continuous geographical and economic space) as well as disintegrative forces (different cultures and religions, a tragic (cursed) history, constituent nations belonged to great rival empires and churches that "eternally" divided and regrouped them, etc.). The country was called "a Balkan colossus with one iron and one clay foot".

Initially, all the Yugoslav nations attempted to unite into one state, but at the same time they had second aims (First Yugoslavia was created in 1918 on the basis of a major misunderstanding: the Council of Croats and Slovenes wanted a confederal Yugoslavia (a partnership of equals), but for Serbs Yugoslavia was a unitary country (in which they can fulfill an old dream: all Serbs united in one state). The tensions between these two visions were sharpened by Serbian centralizing tendencies and Croat tactics of political obstructionism to expand their autonomy in face of what many Croatians felt as Serbian colonization. The more Serbian political elite (which cherished the self-image of being the Yugoslav Piedmont) saw itself as a political ruler in the centralist state, the more Yugoslavia represented for radicals in Croatian and Slovenian political elites just a transit station to independence (and vice versa).

The dual forces moved institutional organization of the state and country from one extreme to the other. One kind of extreme was the rigidly centralized order (which culminated in the in the 1929 King"s coup and later dictatorship and Tito"s authoritarian supranational rule, especially during the first two decades after the Second World War). Opposite kind of extreme led to the creation of Banovina Croatia (an "embryo of confederation", established in 1939) and to the 1974 constitution. In the Second World War the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was shattered to pieces (into satellite states under fascist tutelage) and drown to civil war (partly similar to the one from 1991 to 1995).

The "iron hands" (of both the King and Tito) over the society produced a general sense of national deprivation, that by a curious twist was not imputed to the authoritarian style of rule but to the other nations (what generated the rebirth of nationalist movements). The integrity of communist Yugoslavia (though its communism was called "liberal" or "communism with human face") was maintained by Tito"s arbitrary power, but this "glue" that held the federation together was gone with his death. One author looking upon the history of the First and Second Yugoslavias explained their fate by a statement that both of them disintegrated because of a surplus of the national and the lack of democracy. (Markovic, 1997)

The Yugoslav foreign debt was increased rapidly during the last decade of Tito"s life. After his death neither republics nor federal government was able to cover it (more than 20 billion US dollars), and at the same time internal economic disintegration started. This was the beginning of long-lasting economic crisis: during 1980s accelerating inflation and unemployment - as well as several aborted cures - decreased average real income sharply. Citizens were abandoning their urban jobs for family farms and market operations to make ends meet, and the whole economy suffered. Politicians who belonged to various republics/ethnic groups started to blame each another for misused capital received from foreign sources. It would have been surprising if political radicalism had not emerged; the only open question was what kind of radicalism would be predominant: left-wing, right-wing, populism, nationalism or a combination? (See Wiberg, 1993: 95)

The end of the Cold War and bipolarity in Europe reduced the importance of basic geopolitical assumptions underlying both the First and Second Yugoslavia. 2 Disintegration of the USSR and disappearance of Eastern Europe marked the definite end of Truman"s (or rather Kennan"s) containment doctrine, while rapid changes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania and Russia as well as deepening crisis in the Second Yugoslavia made it lose the significance of the "symbol of difference in the communist world" which for decades granted it privileged position within the US policy of "differentiation." When the "iron curtain" disappeared, geostrategic importance of some border and buffer zones - like territories of Czechoslovakia, Baltic Republics, and Second Yugoslavia - became much minor important than before. Since changes in the USSR have finally marked the end of the "Soviet threat" and bipolarity in Europe, efforts for establishment of a new international order on the continent, based on development of democracy and right of nations to self-determination start to occupy the central place in the policy of Western countries. 3

The two blocs with irreconcilable goals were established: federal (centralist) bloc (Serbia and Montenegro) versus confederal (secessionist) bloc (Croatia, Slovenia, and later Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Serbian elite was insisting upon the legitimate right to defense of integrity (inviolability of borders) and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, while the opposite bloc was firmly requesting the legitimate right to self-determination. In addition, the distinct social profile of the elites in Yugoslavia after Tito"s death, their authoritarian spirit and inability to compromise deeply contradicted the multiethnic composition of the society.

The main mistake of the European Community and other international (external) actors seems to be the fact that the recognitions of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were given before the minority rights of ethnic Serbs were assured (at the beginning of conflict Serbs demanded just some kind of cultural autonomy in Croatia and cantonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Since the Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent states, positions were exchanged: ethnic Serbs started to insist upon the right to (own) self-determination and governments in Zagreb and Sarajevo - upon the right to defense of the integrity and sovereignty of their newly established countries. However when territories are shared by mutually contesting ethnic groups, self-determination as well as defense of the territorial integrity of one can be achieved only to the detriment of the other. The recognition of both rights to smaller and smaller units leads to total dissolution of a society, while an attempt to prevent this danger - once the process has been ignited and precedents made - leads to conflicts on every level of secession.

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords

As previous peace plans 4 as well as a few proposals and offers were not accepted, in 1995 the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled more than 70% of the territory of the country. They accepted to reduce their share of the territory to 49%, but it seemed that they were hesitating too long to realize the promise. The bombardment of the territory controlled by the Serbs 5 was needed from international community point of view (the purpose was to force Serbs to realize the promise), and in a way also from Republika Srpska government"s point of view (the purpose was to find a reason or argument which will be good enough for the withdrawal of the Serbs from the territory, but not perceiving that act as a coward, poltroon act). In the same time, the forced withdrawal fitted the Serbs "paranoia politics" ("everybody is against the Serbs"), the Croat Realpolitik and the Muslims or Bosniacs illusion politics (See Wiberg, 1993: 108) as well as the international community"s mainly opportunistic and pragmatic politics.

According to Annex 2 of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided between the two in proportion 51 : 49. However, it seems that the Second Yugoslavia"s central conflict "powder keg" still exists consisting of the Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it seems that it was even "enriched" by a new conflict between Croats and Bosniacs.

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords consists of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 Annexes (including those on military aspects of the peace settlement and regional stabilization, inter-Entity boundary, elections, Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, arbitration, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, preservation of national monuments, public corporations, civilian implementation and International Police Task Force - IPTF), the Agreement of Initialing the General Framework Agreement, side-letters, concluding statement and map of territorial division. Civilian elements of implementation of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords are to be coordinated between the local parties and the High Representative named by the UN Security Council. The High Representative, while attending the meetings of the Joint Military Commission, has no authority over the IFOR, SFOR or an eventual later peacekeeping mission. The role of the High Representative is limited to convene and chair the Joint Civilian Commission, to establish, if necessary, similar local subordinate commissions, cooperate with the Joint Military Commission and peacekeeping military missions, to report to the UN Security Council, military missions, EU, etc., who may then take an action as lies within the mandate and they see fit. According to the text of the Annex 10, High Representative"s implementation power depends in a wide extend on cooperation of various political authorities and police forces, but his actual political significance could be greater.

According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (at the first place the Parliament, the President, the Supreme Court and the Central Bank) are responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, finances of the institutions and for the international obligations, immigration, refugee, and asylum policy, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, common and international communications facilities, inter-Entity transportation, etc. (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III/1 and 5) The Republic, which consists of the two Entities, 6 could be described as "a union of two self-governing political entities", but one author considers it as "the fiction of a single state." In any case, one can assume that its "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preamble, paragraph 6) is at least divided between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities.

It seems that the main problems in the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords are in disputes over respective competence between the Entities" and the republic"s governments. 7 Second, problems may occur over positions and adopted political solutions respected and pursued by members of political/national parties" and/or cantons" leaderships within the Entities.

Second major open question is related to the nature of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (created in Washington in May 1994). Namely, the inner instability of the Federation could be perceived as a problem that can lead even to a conclusion on its fictional nature. The Federation was established under the international pressure and despite irreconcilable differences between the two sides. After a few years of Federation"s existence chiefly on paper, and after the Agreement on the Implementation of the Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina was reached during preparations for the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords, it was concluded that the Federation does not work.

The main reason can be generally described as irreconcilable differences in many regards. First of all, the two sides do not agree on the internal structure of their federal state. The Bosnian side sees the federation as a community of Bosniacs and Croats, and the Croatian side sees it as a "union of two politico-administrative entities (of the two communities of Muslims and Croats)." Although Herceg-Bosna - in conformity to agreements between the two sides - should cease to exist, the Croatian side has established own administrative bodies and organs, which act as a sort of parallel state, and looks as a state within the state (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Herceg-Bosna has firm links with neighboring Croatia using the same currency and flag and coat of arms like Croatia"s. The fact that Croatian kuna is in circulation as a legal tender in Herceg-Bosna has some negative repercussions on economic situation in the Federation.

As the Croatian currency is much stronger than the Bosnian money a substantial economic dependence on Croatia has been developed. What is more, the authorities of Herceg-Bosna control the border crossings to Croatia and levy "customs duties" and "taxes" on "imported goods" supplied to the federation. Major problems exist, therefore, with regard to the creation of a single economic area. (Calic, 1996: 133)

It was predicted that one can expect struggles for redistribution of the Croat-populated regions" economic potentials, which are bigger that the Bosniacs-populated ones", i.e. Bosniacs" attempts to share the Croatian economic power.

Among crucial disputed questions is dilemma should institutions be built on the basis of the 1991 census or according to the current ethnic composition. The gravity of these problems, open questions and disputes can be fully understand if one take into consideration existing fears of nationalism. 8

Nationalism, understood in an exclusive sense, has gained acceptance at many levels within the Bosnian-Muslim government party SDA which has had a particularly pronounced impact on local politics. The Bosnian government"s de facto loss of power is a result of the creation of the federation has intensified the directional dispute within the SDA between the advocates of a (more or less homogeneous) Bosnian-Muslim nation-state and the supporters of a multicultural state entity. (Calic, 1996: 133)

Within the Republika Srpska there is a split between the Momcilo Krajisnik"s orientation, at one side, and Biljana Plavsic"s orientation, at the other side. Plavsic"s position could be at least to some extent compared with the position of Fikret Abdic in Bihac during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 9 Geopolitical positions of their regions seem to be rather similar: air distance between Banja Luka and Bihac is some 102 km; Abdic"s Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was surrounded by the Serbs and later also Croats, 10 and Western part of Republika Srpska is practically surrounded by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina"s and Croatia"s territory. As long as the Posavina corridor is there, however, there is land connection between the two parts of the Republika Srpska, but SFOR may play a similar role of protector for Plavsic as the Serbs did for Abdic. 11 Although Abdic is a Bosniac or Muslim, and Plavsic is a Serb, they have similar orientations in terms of trying to develop a cooperation with the neighbors generating in that way political disputes with the mainstream national political leaders.

Furthermore, it was only the population and armed forces in the Northern parts of the Bihac enclave that clearly backed Abdic, while Izetbegovic had support in the Southern parts. Plavsic also seems to be considerably less supported West of Banja Luka than in the Banja Luka area itself, and this division opens possibilities for a clash inside Western part of the Republika Srpska.

The differences between political orientations of Plavsic and Krajisnik as well as power struggle or competing bosses factor should not be underestimated. The differences between Abdic"s and Izetbegovic"s orientations and power struggle between them probably were among the main causes of the Muslim-Muslim or Bosniac-Bosniac war; Abdic/Plavsic refused to accept Izetbegovic/Krajisnik as the boss - according to his/her rhetoric - not wanting to follow him into suicide.

To conclude, Croat and part of Serb political leaderships in Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatened by Bosniacs" intentions to establish the Federation/Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a real federation/single state; Bosniacs" leadership is, in return, threatened by Serbs"/Croats" intentions to join (as much as it is possible) neighboring FR Yugoslavia/Croatia, etc. (See more detailed Isakovic, 1997: 49)

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is known as a strong generator of refugee flows, as such a large migration of millions of people has not happened in Europe since the Second World War. For that reason several important provisions of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords are devoted to the right of general freedom of movement in the entire state territory and the right of all refugees to return to their homes. (See Annex 7) However, as the complete law enforcement is in the hands of the Entities, i.e. local police forces, which were often noticed as the principal offenders when it comes to discrimination against minorities and abuse of human rights in general, 12 one author has concluded would be hard to implement. (Calic, 1996: 132)

One could presume that security is probably the main precondition for the return. However man and group members could hardly feel secure if nationalist leaders harbor indicted war criminals, who even ran several police stations. (See more detailed: Sharp and Clarke, 1996: 1 and 8) Article IX of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina obliges the Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. An author considers that, however, in the Entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the War Tribunal is more likely to have an effect more or less similar to Waldheim effect 13 than to reduce nationalism.

The parties are (in)directly forbidden to control changes of existing ethnic composition and are obliged to provide "a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions... in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms." (Annex 11) However, as the return of refugees would influence the ethnic composition of local administration, in many areas houses were destroyed in purpose to prevent the return. "No side is willing to share power among the peoples." (Calic, 1996: 134)

It seems that the provisions on rights of refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin as well as some other provisions were made under a (rather unrealistic) presumption that local police and some other public servants will treat people regardless to their nationality, and act - if it is necessary - even against some vital interests of own nations" members. 14 It was concluded that local nationalist leaders (who were elected and legitimized on the elections) as well as the leaders in Belgrade and Zagreb continued to block repatriation of minority groups and freedom of movement. 15 (See Sharp and Clarke, 1996: 1)

Man can hardly feel secure if an authority denies his right to access to his property, which is often precondition to get a citizenship, 16 to meet his relatives, friends, etc. Even if there are no borderlines and checkpoints between and inside the Entities, at least local people know where the borders are and cross them more or less unwillingly, with a suspicion and cautiously.

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords" provisions enable absentee votes to be counted in the municipality a person has fled from, but the voter may be able to have it counted elsewhere. If a refugee votes outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be interpreted as an expression of intent to return to the country. However, as a great majority of refugees left the Bosnia and Herzegovina under intimidation and various war pressures, one could hardly assume that voting outside the Bosnia and Herzegovina can be correctly taken as an expression of will, intent or readiness to return there. This kind of will, intent or readiness could be expected when the peacetime intimidation and pressures disappear there where refugees would return.

More than two years after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well in some other war affected areas of the Second Yugoslavia people live under control of the "feared warlords" and "nationalist Mafia chieftains", 17 who control people belonging to own and other nations without having any democratic basis; where policemen do not prevent bombing churches and torching houses, but take part in street "maltreatment" of fleeing pilgrims. Man and group members can also hardly feel secure if they are exposed to terrorist attacks and robberies (regardless to - political or other - motives, nationalities and/or origins of those who committed the crimes). It does not help much (on the contrary) if leaders condone police brutality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See Sharp and Clarke, 1996: 1) It seems that number of committed criminal acts (as well as number of suicides, particularly among refugees and displaced persons) is high, but law and order do not become better if they are established by brutalities.

Annexes 1-A, 1-B and 2 of the Dayton-Paris Accords regulate military measures (at the first place mandate of IFOR, redeployment and withdrawals of the Republika Srpska"s and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina"s troops (but not Bosniacs" and Croats" troops from their mutual front lines) and territorial division. All foreign forces (except IFOR) were supposed to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina"s territory to the mid-January 1996, but an expert considered that much of the foreign forces - despite of the Accords" ban - are likely to be given appropriate passports and uniforms by the Federation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska.

According to some provisions of the Annex 1-A, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces were supposed to clear in advance the areas to be transferred to each other of landmines, which seem to be difficult to implement. Clearing of landmines will probably last for decades and will be very costly. Even if man is allowed to return to his home and property or visit friends and relatives, how he can do it if unremoved mines plant fields?

In many parts of the country the warring factions have been pursuing a scorched earth policy, one motive being to prevent expellees from returning at a later date; houses were being deliberately destroyed to prevent the return of refugees. Refugees from elsewhere have long since been moved into the towns, villages or just individual houses where they remain still standing. To enable expellees to return to their places of origin, therefore, most of these newcomers would have to be removed. Furthermore, very few refugees are willing to return to their native territory if the latter is now controlled by the other side. The fear of exposure to renewed persecution is too deeply rooted. (Calic, 1996: 132-133)

Open questions related to the general freedom of movement as well as to the right of refugees to return home seem to be related to the election processes in the Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. Despite the Accords" assumption that "by Election Day, the return of refugees should already be underway, thus allowing many to participate in person in elections" (Annex 3, Article 4), the ex-warring parties from Bosnia and Herzegovina try to keep under own control ethnic compositions of the populations in purpose to gain or keep own legitimacy. This seems to be the main or one of main war aims, which remained to be very important also after the war (during the democratization period). For these reasons, it seems that mentioned Dayton-Paris Peace Accords" provisions would be hard to implement.

It seems that it will be also hard to have restored to people of the Bosnia and Herzegovina property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 as well as - within the existing economic circumstances or without foreign aid 18 - to use the right to be compensated for any such property that cannot be restored (as it was regulated by the Annex 7).

As the UN arms embargo for the successor states of the second Yugoslavia was not efficient, one author concluded that it was "leaking like a sieve." (Remington, 1994: 80) In 1996, after the signing of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords, involved sides reached the Vienna-Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control and their representatives issued statements on voluntary limitations on military manpower.


Table 1: Statements on Voluntary Limitations on Military Manpower

Army Number of Active Soldiers
1. Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 60,000
2. Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 55,000
3. Army of the Republika Srpska 56,000
5. Croatia 65,000
6. Third Yugoslavia 124,000

The Statements roughly anticipated the number of soldiers relations on the following way: 1 (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) : 1 (the Republika Srpska) : 1.1 (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) : 1.2 (Croatia) : 2.3 (Third Yugoslavia).

According to the Vienna Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, the parties are supposed to limit and, as necessary, reduce relatively quickly their armament, so that the holdings of any party do not exceed ceilings presented in the Tables 2-6.



Table 2: Armament of Fr Yugoslavia

Armament Existing Number 19 Limits From November 1,
1996
I II III
Battle tanks 2,500 1,025
Armored combat vehicles 1,300 850
Artillery 4,500 3,750
Combat aircraft 350 155
Attack helicopters 120 53



Table 3: Armament of Croatia

Armament Existing Number 20 Limits From November 1,
1996
I II III
Battle tanks 748 410
Armored combat vehicles 830 340
Artillery 1,800 1,500
Combat aircraft 92 62
Attack helicopters 28 21



Table 4: Armament of The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Armament Existing Number 21 Limits From November 1,
1996
I II III
Battle tanks 500 410
Armored combat vehicles 390 340
Artillery 2,800 500>
Combat aircraft 50 62
Attack helicopters 38 21



Table 5: Armament of The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (as part of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Armament Existing Number 22 Limits From November 1,
1996
I II III
Battle tanks 100 273
Armored combat vehicles 130 227
Artillery 1,500 1,000
Combat aircraft 10 41
Attack helicopters 8 14



Table 6: Armament of The Republika Srpska

Armament Existing Number 23 Limits From November 1,
1996
I II III
Battle tanks 400 137
Armored combat vehicles 260 113
Artillery 1,300 500
Combat aircraft 40 21
Attack helicopters 30 7

The Agreement roughly determined the numbers of armaments relations on the following way: 5 (FR Yugoslavia) : 2 (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) : 2 (Croatia). Secondly, the determined relations within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself are 2 (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) : 1 (the Republika Srpska), i.e. they are approximately correspondent to the presented relations between the voluntary stated numbers of soldiers.

In short, a party that attempts to cheat on this system of military balance should either try to get better armament or better training for its soldiers. This is a result of the fact that the agreement and statements did not include qualitative limits, but quantitative limits only. In addition, according to the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords parties have the duty of exchanging complete information that presupposes establishing of a mutual trust. However, as the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted for years, this does not seem to happen soon.

It seems that there are two main (groups of) conditions for the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords" implementation success. First condition is a greater inflow of foreign aid. Fulfillment of this condition could influence the economic disintegration of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as its Entities, and could also help to eliminate some constitutional disagreements. In addition, the aid could - at least to some degree - reduce the lack of political legitimacy in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities. However, many of mentioned effects will depend on the degree to which the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords are actually implemented as written.

It seems that second condition for the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords" successful implementation is within military (peacekeeping) field. Most of Dayton-Paris military provisions were implemented in time and without greater difficulties. The IFOR had been limited to its military role (see Calic, 1996: 130-131), and the SFOR has had some kind of deterring role, but - as the time has been passing by - there have been appearing needs for a kind of its rather police or quasi-police engagement. To the extent Dayton-Paris Accords" provisions will not express significant interests of political leaderships of the three main ethnic groups, the only choice will be the politics of sticks and carrots.

It will be very important how mission"s mandate will be formulated and - if it is formulated as narrowly as the IFOR"s mandate - to what extend the mission will be ready to go beyond its mandate. It seems that these questions will remain open as long as the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords do not include a provision that will enable establishing a longer lasting peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusions

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords mostly obliges some of the Yugoslav successor states and their bodies, at the first place those in Bosnia and and Herzegovina last Herzegovina. Obligations of other actors depend of resolutions and agreements passed by intergovernmental bodies like the UN Security Council, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, NATO, the World Bank, etc. Predictions about their behavior must depend on how significant member states (at the first place, the USA, major powers of EU and Russia) and in some cases also the bodies themselves define and try to realize their interests. Being a responsibility of the most powerful world powers and actors, Bosnia and Herzegovina will at least partly share their future and the future of their mutual and other relations and positions and vice versa.

In many places, the complicated and sophisticated system of peace agreement implementation is praised as the beginning of a new architecture of security. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, NATO is testing its new peacekeeping concept, including the command and control structures created to this end, for the first time. There are high hopes that the "partnership for peace" will prove its worth here vis-à-vis Russia, which is linked with the NATO implementation force via a complicated mechanism. Furthermore, the impression is being gained that events in Bosnia-Hercegovina will decide whether the USA can sustain its leading role in Europe, how the relations between NATO and the EU/WEU will develop, and which role will be assigned in future to the OSCE. (Calic, 1996: 134-135)

The Dayton-Paris Peace Accords stopped the war, but it seems that did not eliminate actors, conditions and causes that started it. The economic crisis is not just still existing, but it is much deeper than in 1990. It seems that a genuine reconstruction of the war affected areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be expected and achieved from foreign sources only. Since the all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina probably to some degree see the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords as a diktat, one could suppose that they are going to implement just those parts that they see as being not in collision with their interests.

On the other hand, it seems that the international community - beside military force whose wider utilization can bring war back again 24 - dealing with nationalist oriented forces on all sides, has on its disposition economic means as the main ones (the stick and carrot policy). However, using economic stick, the international community is, in fact, preventing economic reconstruction, and offering a carrot without a stick does not seem to have a sense. For that reason, reconstruction will largely have to be local, very little (in comparison with the destruction) likely to come from the international community. Economic differences between the former republics will probably also continue to grow.

Creation of an economic or other Yugoslavia is unlikely. The Cold War used to be a stimulus for internal cohesion in the Second Yugoslavia. However, since Bosnia and Herzegovina became some sort of "small Yugoslavia," it is hard to find out some similar potential threat that could stick together the main nations. By the Washington Agreement and Dayton-Paris Accords, Bosniacs and Croats are supposed to be allies, but in practice the Croats and Serbs can also become allies opposing to Bosniacs" centralizing tendencies. The latter alliance would exist as long as Croats and Serbs have to live within the Federation and Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. cannot unite with their mother states. A next step could be a conflict between a Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia for division of the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina"s territory. As the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina looks enforced by the international community as much as desired by the local sides, it will probably last as long as the enforcement and desires lasts. For these reasons, an answer to the key issue of this paper - is the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords failure or success - will depend on that what will happened with the Bosnia and Herzegovina if and when SFOR or other peacekeeping force ends its mission. A possible answer one could make now includes two options: first, it will be (completely) divided along the (two or three) ethnic lines, and second is the opposite one.

Belgrade, March 1998

NOTES

Note 1: The territory of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina has been traditionally divided in two portions: Bosnia covers its Northern and Central parts, and Herzegovina - Southern parts. Back.

Note 2: It was noticed that "very few other states had been as dependent for internal cohesion on the Cold War or where, for this reason, as negatively affected by its end." (Wiberg, 1995: 98) An another author considers that one of the certain causes of the dissolution of the Second Yugoslavia is the change in distribution of powers in the world thanks to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and so-called socialist community. (See Petkovic, 1996: 10) Back.

Note 3: As it was stressed, in the time when the Yugoslav conflicts occurred some important motives has little to do with Yugoslavia as such, but resulted from the configuration of international relations that were in maximal flux (much due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union). 'A "New World Order" had been coined as a phrase, but with little clear content: it might mean American hegemonic leadership or an American position as primus inter pares, but in either cases it remained unclear when and how the United States was desired and inclined to act in "European affairs." (Russia was initially treated as largely negligible, but later become more assertive about its own national interests in Europe).' (Wiberg, 1994: 237) Back.

Note 4: According to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, proposed in 1993, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was supposed to be divided in proportion 43 (Serbs): 32 (Bosniacs) 25 (Croats); the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace plan, which was made later in the same year, offered the proportion 52Ê:Ê30Ê:Ê18; and the 1994 Contact Group Peace Plan, proposed 49% to the Serbs and 51% to Bosniacs and Croats. Back.

Note 5: From 30 August 1995, during two weeks, some 3,000 NATO sorties bombed out the Bosnian Serb infrastructure to enable at the first place the armed forces of Croatia, Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and also Bosniacs forces to make territorial gains from the Serbs. Back.

Note 6: Responsibilities that are not expressly assigned by the Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall belong to the Entities. Following responsibilities are exclusively held by the Entities: establishing special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; providing assistance to the government of the Republic needed to honor its international obligations; providing a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdiction; and entering into agreements with states and international organizations with the consent of the parliament. (Annex 4 - Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article III/2) Back.

Note 7: In addition, as each of the three ethnic parties have a veto right against any proposed legislation, the political decision-making process in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulated by the Accords may be described as government by consensus. 'As in former Yugoslavia, it will probably prove impossible in the long term in view of the complicated federal constitution to hold the federal state together from within the central authority if the constituent republics strive for independence. The Yugoslav federal government, with its equal representation from the constituent republics, was, as a rule, unable to take action. Resolutions recurrently failed due to irreconcilable clashes of interests inside the multinational state. The situation will be very much the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, after four years of war such a constitution will have even less chance of success. The country's often praised multiculturality, which could provide such a basis, ceased to exist a long time ago.' (More detailed Calic, 1996: 132-133) Back.

Note 8: It seems that for this reason, the supposed reintegrations of Sarajevo and Mostar were among the major problems to the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords. In both cases, the tolerance from the pre-war time was replaced by the ethnic hatred created before and during the war and nationalisms predominated resulting in sharp ethnic divisions. For this reason, numerous people have been afraid to live in the multiethnic communities again. During the war Mostar city as well as city institutions were divided into Bosnian or Moslem and Croat segments. Although the city should be reunified according to the Dayton-Paris Peace Accords, it remained divided. Back.

Note 9: In Autumn 1993, when majority of Presidential Council (all six Serbs and Croats, plus the Muslim Fikret Abdic) called for negotiating on the basis of the further concessions made in what the Serbs and Croats had agreed to give beyond the original plan after hard external pressure after the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, but were disregarded by Izetbegovic. Abdic then proclaimed the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which immediately led to the Muslim-Muslim or Bosniac-Bosniac war in the Bihac area. (See Wiberg, 1995: 104) Finally, as some brigades became loyal to each of the two competitors, the armed forces in the enclave broke up. Back.

Note 10: Thus Izetbegovic's soldiers could get at him by air transport only, but in the last phase Ð once Abdic had become a clear Serb ally Ð the Croats may have assisted him. Back.

Note 11: The Western part of the Republika Srpska is connected with its Eastern part by the narrow corridor which has been a disputed issue between Serbs and Bosniacs as to what is to be arbitrated by the international arbitration: the Serb position has been that it is only the exact boundaries around the corridor that are up for arbitration, and the Moslem or Bosnian position has been that it is the corridor as a whole. As some experts consider that eventual arbitration's decision in favor of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could make of the Western part of the Republika Srpska incoherent and militarily indefensible territory, the Serb position makes the issue of defensibility one for discussion. Back.

Note 12: The Agreement on Human Rights (Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Accords) includes the right to life, to freedom from torture or other degrading or inhuman treatment, to a fair hearing in civil and criminal courts, to freedom of expression and a free press, to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and to freedom of movement. The same Annex includes a list of international conventions in this field, and provides for the Ombudsman (who is not supposed to be from the Yugoslav successor states) to raise matters of violation and the Human Rights Chamber to make decisions on them. The Chamber has eight alien members, four from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two from the Republika Srpska. Back.

Note 13: In June 1986 Kurt Waldheim won election to the Austrian presidency although his candidacy became controversial when some discovered documents showed that during the Second World War he was engaged in German army units in Yugoslavia and Greece. An independent committee of historians pointed in its report that Waldheim had not mentioned this period in his earlier CVs, and that he would presumably have been knowledgeable about some of the atrocities going on (without evidence that he had personally had anything with them to do). Thanks to that facts he became an isolated figure on the international scene where, but was elected with a good margin, and many Austrians obviously thought that nobody had no business to intervene in whom they elected for President. (More detailed: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1995 Ð Waldheim, Kurt) Back.

Note 14: 'During 1996, IFOR refused to undertake any policing tasks and the local police were responsive only to local political parties not to the rule of law. This led to embarrassing scenes of IFOR troops as passive witnesses to blatant harassment of minorities,' while 1,700 IPTF personnel 'were not armed and did not venture out after dark.' (Sharp and Clarke, 1996: 7-8) IPTF's task is to supervise and assist local police forces, and it does not have police functions of its own, but will depend entirely on cooperation of local police forces. Back.

Note 15: Reportedly, citizens of the Third Yugoslavia who have a non-Serbian name/surname or whose parents have such a name/surname needed a visa and/or had to pay a tax entering to Republika Srpska (going there or transiting to Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Refugees from the Republika Srpska, who were living in Macedonia, needed Republika Srpska's visa to enter to its territory. Back.

Note 16: Without a house or other real estate it is more difficult to get a citizenship, and without the citizenship it is more difficult to purchase the real estate. Back.

Note 17: According to the Dayton-Paris Accords, the Entities were supposed to concentrate weapons and troops, and to demobilize other forces (except police) through April 1996. According to an expert's opinion, demobilization was likely to mean either that all non-army forces are renamed police forces (although it is forbidden by the agreement) or that some 150,000 armed young men are suddenly unemployed, with various mafias as primary employment option. Back.

Note 18: These matters are in charge of the Commission (whose four members comes from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two from the Republika Srpska and three members are foreigners) and the Fund, which is supposed to be established in the National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bank seems to be very poor, and in 1996 a key obstacle for aid projects' implementation were 'enormous opportunities for corruption among the recipients.' Far from being cooperative, these men and women have repeatedly proved obstructionist, evasive and on many occasions downright dishonest. (See Sharp and Clarke, 1996: 1) Back.

Note 19: Data source: Kotej, 1996: 39. Back.

Note 20: Data source: Ibid. Back.

Note 21: Data source: Ibid. Back.

Note 22: Data source: Ibid. Back.

Note 23: Data source: Ibid. Back.

Note 24: In addition, after the Yugoslav crisis at least one point seems to be clear: problems in ethnic relations in ex-Yugoslavia cannot be solved by utilization of violence. On the contrary, violence and use of force usually become a part (even major part) of the problem, not the solution. (Oberg, 1994: 140) Back.

References