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Why Have Donbas Russians Not Ethnically Mobilized Like Crimean Russians Have?
An Institutional/Demographic Approach
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
This essay will argue that the Russian population of the Donbas region of the Ukraine is less ethno-politically mobilized than the Russian population of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, because in the Donbas, which consists of the Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasti (provinces), Russian elites have fewer demographic and institutional resources to carry out ethno-political mobilization. 1 Due to the fact that the Donbas Russian elites have fewer and/or less effective resources than the Crimean Russian elites or the Donbas Ukrainian elites, the Donbas Russian elites have allowed themselves to be coopted into the multi-ethnic leftist movements of the Donbas. These movements, which embrace Ukrainians and Jews as well as Russians, represent virtually all of the Donbas Russians' demands -- occasionally including secession or re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Only an explicitly Russian ethnic appeal is lacking. Therefore, I conclude that the Donbas Russian elites have found it more easy, efficient, and effective to mobilize their constituencies along the lines of economic and social policy issues, as opposed to mobilizing an exclusive ethnic identity. I do not argue that Donbas Russians are not at all politically mobilized, because they are -- but not ethno-politically. Nor do I argue that among them there is no Russian ethno-political mobilization, but rather that their ethno-political mobilization is minor and peripheral, particularly compared to Russian ethno-political mobilization in the Crimea.
For the purposes of this article, institutions will be defined as bureaucratic and political party organizations. Resources will be defined and typologized as follows: demographic resources include the level of income and education of the ethnic community, as well as its level of urbanization and industrialization. 2 Institutional resources include the prestige of office, the functional differentiation and role specialization of an institution as an organization, the money and coercive organs which a bureaucracy may possess, press and media organs, and the reduction of operational transaction costs inherent in having standard operating procedures, set rules, defined roles, and a system of rewards and punishments for the execution of these roles.
Crimean Russian ethno-political mobilization began in 1989-1990; however, the acquisition of the institutions and the bureaucracy of first the Crimean ASSR and then of the Crimean Autonomous Republic served as a catalyst which even further strengthened ethno-political mobilization. This institutional acceleration of mobilization resulted in a quasi-federal Ukraine which contained a region so charged that it twice declared independence, in 1992 and in 1995. Therefore, I do not posit that institutions were a direct cause of ethno-political mobilization (i.e., institutions as the independent variable and ethno-political mobilization as the dependent variable), but rather ethnic activist elites, henceforth referred to as "ethnic entrepreneurs," were the independent causal variable. In this framework, institutions and demographic factors served as intervening variables, and ethno-political mobilization remained the dependent variable. Thus, the political institutions, namely the parties and oblast level administrative structures, compelled and constrained the Russian elites in certain ways and empowered them to act in other ways. For example, the presence of an extensive bureaucracy and a directly-elected presidency in the Crimean Autonomous Republic gave members of Crimean elites like Yuri Meshkov even more resources -- such as prestige, legitimacy, press coverage, and even international stature -- with which to mobilize the Crimean Russians. Although Meshkov had already been behind Crimean Russian ethno-political mobilization before the establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and even before Ukraine's independence, Meshkov's assumption of the presidency turned his social movement, the Republican Movement of Crimea (RDK), into a ruling political party. Once an ethno-nationalist organization such the RDK (and its separate but closely-allied offshoot, the Russian Party of the Crimea) took power, economic, political, and cultural elites such as Crimean businessmen, managers, and mafiosi could gain more influence with the organization if they supported the RDK's secessionist agenda. Moreover, Meshkov's position as president of the peninsula established him as the clear leader of local Russian ethno-politics, nationalism, and secessionism.
The Donbas Russians, in contrast, have had no one leader and have no explicitly ethnic Russian party or movement of significant size (although there were smaller "Russianist" parties and several sizeable parties seeking re-establishment of the Soviet Union). Donbas Russians also have no comparable position of power and prominence for a secessionist leader because the executives of the Donbas administrations (as in all other oblasti except Crimea) are appointees of the Ukrainian president, and the Donbas oblastniye sovyety, or provincial legislatures, are dominated by ethnic Ukrainians who are a majority in these oblasti. Thus, given their poverty of demographic and institutional resources, the Donbas Russian elites have not been able to mobilize their constituents on a purely ethnic basis, but have found it expedient to join multi-ethnic leftist parties in order to pursue their goals, namely: the establishment of closer relations with Russia and the CIS; the institution of Russian as a state language; the freedom of choice of the language of instruction in schools; and the acquisition of regional economic and political autonomy.
The differential in the levels of Crimean and Donbas Russian ethno-political mobilization is notable because a large gap exists despite the many similarities (i.e., the fact that many variables are relatively constant) between the two cases. For example:
1. Both regions have the same ethnic groups -- with the minor exception of the Crimean Tartars, who play a rather peripheral role. 3
2. Both regions are subject to the same national minorities policy established by Kiev, with the exception of the fact that Crimea is an autonomous republic, while Donbas is a standard oblast. This difference is of major importance, and I will examine it later.
3. Both regions have majorities that are native Russian speakers, although Crimea alone among the regions of the Ukraine has an ethnic Russian majority. This fact is also important and will be examined later.
4. Both regions voted for independence in 1991 (Crimea at 54 percent, Donbas with more support).
5. Both regions are experiencing Ukraine's economic collapse.
6. Both regions were subordinated first to Moscow and now to Kiev.
7. Both regions were the sites of major Russian military defeats and victories, both in World War II and in earlier centuries.
8. Both regions have had very close and sizeable economic, political, and cultural ties with both Ukraine and Russia.
9. Both regions are located next to Russia.
The two regions differ largely in the spheres of economic structure, ethno-demographic structure, institutional structure, and historical factors, such as the date that they were annexed to the Russian empire and the conditions surrounding this event. For example, the Donbas has even more native Russian speakers than does Crimea, and these Russian speakers (and some ethnic Russians) and their ancestors have had a longer period of residence in Donbas than the Russians of the Crimea. Nevertheless, the Donbas Russians are, counter-intuitively, more quiescent than the Crimean Russians. 4
Why, then, is there now a difference in the level of ethno-political mobilization? This paper will contrast a combined demographic-institutionalist explanation, as opposed to economic, historic, and other kinds of explanations behind the fact that Crimean Russian elites have chosen to mobilize their masses, while Donbas Russian elites have not. The primary focus will be on the Donbas Russians' failure to mobilize. I assume that decisions of the Russian minorities' elites to mobilize, as opposed to grass roots mobilization, is the main issue, for research for this paper discovered no evidence that grass roots mobilization has spontaneously occurred. 5
It is hypothesized that the institution of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, specifically the installation of the Russian-dominated parliamentary, executive, and symbolic structures, have facilitated Crimean Russian mobilization. In contrast, the lack of any such structures for the Russian ethnic group in Donbas has retarded and/or undermined ethno-political mobilization there. The presence of a Russian-dominated regional government has given Russian ethnic entrepreneurs the resources and the infrastructure to carry out interest aggregation, interest articulation, recruitment, and other forms of mobilization. In contrast, the oblast governments of the Donbas are Ukrainian-dominated and have less infrastructure and autonomy (and therefore mobilizational space) than the Crimea.
Another ethnic factor will also be added: the presence of russified Ukrainians in both regions. Russified Ukrainians, who share many of the concerns and demands of the ethnic Russian minority, dominate the Donbas institutions. They have used their resources and institutional/infrastructural power to co-opt the Russian minority in an alliance which makes political and economic demands on Kiev. However, these demands are not particularistic nor parochially ethnic in nature. Rather, the Donbas Russians' demands are regional, economic, cultural, and political (but not ethno-political). Therefore, the Russians of the Donbas find that it is not necessary to mobilize as Russians per se, but as part of a larger, multi-ethnic political alliance. Indeed, it seems that the Russian minority has found it far more effective and efficient to pursue their ends by mobilizing around issues, rather than ethnicity. In contrast, the Russian elites in Crimea find that their institution-based resources and infrastructure, bolstered by implicit diplomatic support, explicit private monetary support, and parliamentary moral support from Russia, make it unnecessary for them to pursue inter-ethnic coalition building around socio-economic issues. Firmly anchored in the Crimean government, the Russian elites feel free to mobilize (in hopes of gaining more power, prestige and wealth) by making ethnic appeals, claiming that mobilization is necessary to protect against Ukrainization and the loss of socio-economic opportunity. Therefore, if the Donbas had 1) a Russian majority or even 2) a Russian minority which held most of the positions of power in the Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasti -- particularly if they had held many of the top positions in the oblastniye sovyety and the executive offices (like the parliament and strong presidency of the type which the Crimean Russians possessed), the Donbas Russian elites would have the resources to ethno-politically mobilize the Donbas Russians.
Why is there no regional association of Donbas Russian elites? The most likely answer is because there are no uniquely ethnic Russian power structures or even ethnic Russian-dominated institutions of an inter-ethnic nature in the Donbas region. Without any institutions dominated by their own elites, the Donbas Russians did not have elites with enough resources and power to mobilize their communities.
Rogers Brubaker predicts that Russian minorities in the new republics of the former Soviet Union will demand communal rights and privileges and will mobilize if these are not granted, fearing that any government which does not recognize communal rights will de facto or de jure discriminate against them. 6 But Brubaker's hypothesis does not explain why Russians in some regions will be more resistant to the formally liberal model of rule, while others will be quiescent.
Brubaker proposes that the presence of the institutions in national republics is the key reason why some nationalities successfully mobilized while others did not. Brubaker's proposition can be logically extrapolated to form the hypothesis that the Crimean Russians are mobilizing because they dominate pre-existing political institutions that were left over from the Soviet era and have further transformed them in the era of Ukrainian independence. This section of the paper will attempt to show that this institutionalist hypothesis, in conjunction with demographic patterns which will be explored later, does indeed form a powerful explanation of why the Crimean Russians are mobilized while the Donbas Russians are not. An institutionalist explanation for Crimea's higher level of mobilization is that the Crimean Russian elites, because of their elevated status as the heads of an autonomous republic (which was only incidently once a part of the RSFSR) were able to use the infrastructural power and resources of their positions to mobilize the ethnic Russians of the Crimea to support a campaign for greater autonomy and even independence.
Philip Roeder notes that expanded autonomy is one way for ethnic cadres to enlarge the resources within their control. Autonomy increases their discretion in the allocation of positions for power within the republic and in the administration of educational and employment policies. 7 The elites of Crimea and Donbas would be equally expected to want such autonomy. Indeed, both Donbas Ukrainians and Donbas Russians primarily demand greater regional autonomy, usually including the federalization of Ukraine. In addition, they demanded social guarantees from the state, the institution of Russian as a second state language, dual citizenship, closer relations with Russia, and greater integration into the Commonwealth of Independent States. 8 Nevertheless, the Crimean Russian elites in the local government have been able to organize more effectively for the attainment of the above goals because of their dominant position at the head of powerful institutions.
The establishment of Ukrainian sovereignty and then independence elevated Crimea from an oblast to an autonomous republic, then to a virtual state within a state that possessed the confidence and means to declare independence. This enabled and motivated the Crimean Russian elites to mobilize their community ethno-politically. Once the Ukrainian SSR restored the Crimean ASSR, all the ingredients for Crimean Russian ethnic mobilization were put in place. The Crimean Russian ethnic entrepreneurs' initial success gave them new resources which allowed them to acquire still more resources and to demand even more. In contrast, the Donbas Russian elites did not even dominate their oblastniye sovyety. They thus were unable to start the accumulative process of ethno-mobilization to acquire institutions which could facilitate further mobilization.
Roeder's institutional approach asserts that the institutions that allowed the Soviets to rule and to maintain order became hijacked by the ethnic entrepreneurs and were used as a means of ethno-political mobilization. 9 In the same way, this paper asserts that the Crimean Russians are more mobilized than the Donbas Russians because the Crimean ASSR and later the Crimean Autonomous Republic had institutions which the Russian local majority could use to assist in the process of ethno-political mobilization. These institutions then marshaled resources and channeled ethnic grievances into formal interest articulation and policy formation.
Roeder predicts that ethnic groups which are relatively advantaged will be the most ethno-politically assertive. 10 Indeed, Russians in Ukraine were more urbanized, more highly educated, and more highly paid than Ukrainians (346 to 314 rubles respectively), as of September-October 1991. 11 But if income alone were the most important criteria, then again the Donbas should be just as ethno-politically mobilized as the Crimea.
The fact that ethnic Russians dominated the Supreme Soviet of the oblast of Crimea was the first level of institutionalization which gave them the ability to mobilize for further autonomy and for the increase in resources which such autonomy provided. These resources were then used to mobilize the Crimean Russian masses. The acceleration of the institutionalization of the power of the Crimean Russian elites began with the September 1990 petition of the Crimean Supreme Soviet to its USSR and RSFSR counterparts to re-establish the Crimean ASSR. On January 20, 1991 a referendum was held in which 82 percent of the electorate participated, yielding a 93.2 percent vote in favor of the restoration of "the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty." 12 On February 12, 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet restored the Crimean ASSR. A few months later, on the same day that Ukraine declared independence (August 24, 1991), Yurii Meshkov founded the Republican Movement of Crimea, aiming for the eventual secession of Crimea. On September 4, 1991, the Crimean parliament declared state sovereignty as a constituent part of Ukraine and on February 26, 1992, the Crimean parliament voted to change the name of the Crimean ASSR to the Crimean Republic. 13 Just a little more than two months later, on May 5, 1992, Crimean Russian elites felt that they had enough resources and institutional infrastructure to declare independence from Ukraine. Such action may have partially been in reaction to the following decree of President Kravchuk:
A Presidential order of 14 April 1992 (with the amendments of 24 July, 1992) established a nation-wide system of local state administration. Under the terms of these Orders, the President nominates heads of the executive power at every level of local government, thus providing a parallel structure to the existing hierarchy of oblast (provincial), and rayon (county), city and town councils... 14 The former Soviet system was amended and divided into two levels -- provincial self-government whose functions include representation of the interests of the local population and clearly defined responsibilities in the economic and social spheres, and local government under the general control of the state administration. This measure seriously limited the capacity of regional councils to express demands for autonomy and evoked the resistance of certain influential provincial circles... 15
The above information provides some crucial evidence concerning the hypothesis that ethnic entrepreneurs' control of institutions is a crucial intervening variable that led to ethnic mobilization of Russians in Ukraine. The Donbas Russians are ruled by an executive appointed by the Ukrainian President. Not only does this deprive the Donbas Russian ethnic entrepreneurs of crucial resources, but these proconsuls also greatly strengthen Kiev's local power. Most importantly, the institution of such prefects gave Kiev the ability to keep ethno-political mobilization, particularly the secessionist variety, to a minimum. In contrast, at the time of the 1992 Crimean declaration of independence, despite the fact that Kravchuk had already issued the decree concerning the establishment of his local representatives, the Crimea apparently had no presidential representative to reign in the secessionists. In fact, it was not until December 17, 1992, that the Ukrainian Parliament passed the Law on the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Republic of Crimea. 16
Instead of using a proconsul to suppress the Crimean Russian elites, Kiev instead tried to placate the Crimean parliament by giving it even more power: on June 30, 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law titled "On the Delineation of Power Between the Organs of State Rule of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea." The law established dual citizenship of both the Crimea and Ukraine for inhabitants of the peninsula, and granted Crimea property rights to all the land and natural resources on its territory. 17 The powers and resources thus made available to the Russian elites controlling this institution were truly substantial. In addition to this move, on May 28, 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to allocate six billion rubles to Crimea for social programs and to solve credit and monetary problems. Such large amounts of aid to the CAR could only have strengthened the power of Crimean Russian elites represented by Meshkov, as these new funds could be used for patronage in building up his secessionist RDK party and in carrying out other means of ethno-political mobilization of the Crimean Russian population. Freedom to do this was further enhanced by the fact that Crimea was granted special economic status on June 1, 1992. 18
In economic matters, the ethno-mobilizing Crimean government was strengthened by the new right to nationalize property and to tax. 19 More financial power was ceded to Crimea on October 19, 1993 when Nikolai Bagrov (Crimean Parliament Speaker at that time) signed a new protocol with President Kravchuk. The protocol recreated a Crimean Republican Bank, a Crimean Bank for Hard Currency Exchange, and a one-channel taxation system so that taxes collected would remain on the peninsula. Crimea also gained the right to register representatives of foreign firms which conducted business in the Autonomous Republic. 20 Moreover:
The Crimean Republic won far reaching powers which covered most aspects of policies, apart from security and foreign affairs... The Crimean Republic has established upwards of 17 ministries, adopted laws on elections which envisaged a presidency, created its own flag and state emblem and obtained a presidential decree allowing a free economic zone. 21 The Crimean Republic also has the right to "enter independently into social, economic and cultural relations with other states." The Crimean authorities agreed to the establishment of the mission of the President of the Ukraine (in contrast to Presidential Prefect, as in the remainder of Ukraine), which was established in the Crimea to safeguard the Ukrainian constitution in January 1993." 22 Furthermore, "...the 'Crimean Republic' has established ministries, a Presidency, and its own flag and state emblem. It also has the 'right to enter independently into social, economic, and cultural relations with other states. 23 The only representation of Ukraine is the 'Mission of the President of Ukraine,' which contrasts with the presidential prefecture in the rest of Ukraine and in effect has more of the status of an embassy than that of a representative body of the central government." 24
The fact that Kiev ceded the power to appoint the chief executive of the CAR and agreed merely to have a representative that in many ways resembled a foreign embassy may have done much to cement the control of the Crimean Russian ethnic entrepreneurs, who within one year would succeed in electing one of their own, Yuri Meshkov, the foremost secessionist on the peninsula, as President of the CAR.
Armed with such formidable capabilities and resources, it is no wonder that Crimean Russian elites were able to mobilize their community to the extent that they felt free to do the following:
...on 20 May 1994 the new parliament voted by sixty-nine to two to restore the controversial Crimean Constitution of May 1992, which establishes separate Crimean citizenship and armed forces and declares that relations between Crimea and Ukraine should be settled on the basis of a new treaty between two equal sovereign states. 25
It is significant that such a radical action came after the institutional grip of the Crimean Russian elites was even further strengthened by the Crimean Parliament's passage of a law establishing a presidency on September 17, 1993. Elections were held on January 30, 1994. 26 > By this time, the Russian community was so mobilized that only one of the six candidates in the Crimean presidential election supported remaining as a part of Ukraine, and that one candidate was Mykola Bahrov (a.k.a. Nikolai Bagrov), the russified Ukrainian who had authored Crimea's first declaration of independence. 27 The effects of instituting the presidency were immediate and powerful. "As it turned out, by propelling Meshkov to center stage the presidential election set the preconditions for a renewed conflict between Kiev and Simferopol and, by all accounts, has strengthened Moscow's position vis-à-vis Kiev." 28 The president used the institutional strength of his presidency: "...President Meshkov put three questions to the Crimean electorate that were designed to strengthen his negotiating position with Kiev." 29 This is a classic example of Russian ethnic entrepreneurs attempting to mobilize the ethnic Russians using their institutional infrastructural power.
Roeder notes that in the Khrushchev era, as "the cadres built institutional and even popular support within their ethnic communities, their dependence upon the center declined... The cadres' motivation to mobilize their ethnic constituencies rose in recent decades as their monopolistic leadership within the ethnic community came under increasing threat." 30 Thus, the Crimean Russian political elites, especially those in the Communist Party and the ex-nomenklatura in the secessionist movement (like Meshkov), seem to have used ethnic mobilization as a means of trying to maintain their special status in order to preserve their power. But in Donbas the Russians are a minority in both oblasti, and the russified Ukrainians consider themselves to be Ukrainians or are largely indifferent to bald appeals to Russian nationalism. The existence of the Crimean ASSR and then the CAR explains why Crimean Russian elites, then, would be in a much better position to mobilize their community, while the Donbas Russians had no distinct corps of native cadres of their own. Because the self-consciously Russian Donbas Russians are too few in number and have no institutional levers of their own to use, ethno-political mobilization has not taken place.
But one may ask the question, why should Russians as Russians favor Communism in Ukraine when so many Russians in Russia and especially so many Russians living in urban areas in Russia have voted for democrats in the Russian election. An answer suggests itself. People voted for Communists in Ukraine in those areas where the Communist Party apparatus has been especially strong and where social and economic conditions such as heavy concentration of state-owned industries, which have no future under a reformed economy, prevail. One can suppose that those voting for the Communists in East Ukraine included ethnic Ukrainians who chose to vote this way for the same reasons that motivated the ethnic Russians. The real problem Ukraine is facing, therefore, is to establish a national consensus about the question of reform... The Communists in Ukraine, whether they in fact are Russian or Ukrainian by descent, have now taken up the Russian ethnic cause in Ukraine... 31
That the Donbas Russians are politically mobilized, but not by ethnicity, is demonstrated by the fact that they participated in presidential elections and voted for a russified Ukrainian, Kuchma, by 54.3 percent in both Donets'k and Luhans'k. The opposing internationalist communist Moroz of the Socialist Party of the Ukraine received 25.4 percent and 16.3 percent respectively. 32 In the 1994 elections, "Turnout in Donetsk averaged 72% and in Luhansk 75%, fairly high figures for large cities (higher by almost twenty percentage points than the turnout in Kiev in the first round). As in the nationalist west, the urbanized population of the Donbas is now politically highly mobilized." 33 Nevertheless, this mobilization is socio-economic, not ethnic in nature. A total of 80 percent of Donets'k voters supported the idea of a federal Ukraine; 87 percent approved the proposition that Russian should be used as a second state language in Ukraine (90.4 percent in Luhans'k); and 88.7 percent believed that Russian should be "the language of education, science, and administration: (90.9 percent in Luhansk); while 88.7 percent were in favor of Ukraine becoming a full member of a treaty of economic union with the rest of the CIS (90.7 percent in Luhansk)." 34 In response to those who would say that Russophone Ukrainians, especially those who may be in favor of reconstructing the former Soviet Union, are not actually Ukrainians but converts to the Russian ethnic group, Arel and Wilson answer the following:
It is important to note that this [Russian] linguistic/Eurasian orientation among part of Ukraine's citizens does not mean that ethnically they identify themselves as Russians. Another survey conducted by one of the authors in the city of Donetsk in March-April 1994 shows that a great majority (80 percent) of the citizens there who are classified as ethnic Ukrainians in their passports indeed consider themselves to be Ukrainians, even when specifically asked not to take into account their passport identification (most of the others indicated they felt both Russian and Ukrainian, which appears to be related to the fact that they often come from mixed families)... 35 It is also important to indicate that a Eurasian orientation does not necessarily imply a hostile attitude toward the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, although a later survey by Khmel'ko's institute found that 45.5% of Russophones agreed with the proposition that 'Ukraine and Russia should unite in one state,' as opposed to 23.3%among Ukrainian speakers. 36 This would still suggest that a majority of voters with a Eurasian profile take it for granted that Ukraine should be independent but are concerned with the form this should take, above all in terms of the country's relations with Russia. 37
Thus, most (though not all) Russified Ukrainians (and even Donbas Russians) have shown no disloyalty to Ukrainian statehood. They have merely elected politicians like Kuchma, who claimed he would be much more amenable to closer ties with Russia. These russified Ukrainians often seem to be just as afraid of having the Ukrainian language and culture forced down their throats as the Russians are, hence they vote for the many of the same candidates as the Russians do. Indeed, Arel and Wilson hypothesize that the existence of Russophone Ukrainians and the fact that they often side with Russians on political issues is one of the main reasons why Ukraine has avoided ethnic conflict. 38
Another dimension of Russian "ethnic capital," or demographic structure, and the way in which it affects Russian political behavior is the class structure in the various regions of Ukraine. Being the majority in Crimea, one may presume that Russians are at least moderately well-distributed across classes. In Donbas, however, the situation is otherwise.
In the Donbas there is no real middle strata between enterprise directors and the traditional mass working class based in large mines and factories. The relationship between these two groups is therefore close. Both have a mutual interest in maintaining subsidies from Kiev and in preserving the system of factory-based social benefits on which the local working class has come to depend. Both groups are overwhelmingly Russophone and are likely to react sharply against any Ukrainization proposals coming from Kiev. 39
If it is true that the Donbas Russians are mostly working class, then one might assume that they have found class ties and class interests to be more important the ethnic ties, especially since they share the Russian culture with many (if not most) of their Ukrainian fellow workers.
In the Donbas the Russian elites can and must compete with Ukrainian politicians, who may attract Russian votes. Likewise, the Russian politicians must try to attract Ukrainian votes. Because the two populations are culturally similar, the Donbas political elites must try to adopt centrist positions which will attract the mainstream majority. In contrast, the Crimea has an overwhelming majority of Russians, and therefore more extreme and particularistic appeals can be made because the politicians need not make much effort to attract Ukrainian and Tartar voters. In addition, because many Crimean Ukrainians are russified, there is even less of a need to adopt positions conciliatory to Ukrainian nationalism -- whereas opposing Kiev in the name of the Russian narod, or people, may be rewarded. With an ethnic power base intact, the Crimean Russian elites feel free to engage in more radical politics against the center in Kiev. In fact, the Russian elites seem to feel themselves so secure that they can afford to take part in extensive infighting, an example being the bitter feud between then Crimean President Meshkov and then Crimean Parliament speaker Serhii Tsekov in late 1994. Indeed, the Crimean Russian elites' demographic resources, armed with institutional power, were so strong that they could even coopt many local Ukrainians. After careful research on the Crimean parliamentary elections of 1994, Andrew Wilson concludes, "The evidence suggests that many Ukrainians must therefore have voted for the 'Russia' bloc." 40 This proves the hypothesis that many of the Ukrainians of the Crimea have been coopted by the pro-Russian parties.
Since the Russians of the Donbas are accustomed to living with a large and like-minded russified Ukrainian community, which, in coalition with the Russians, comprises a large local majority. Donbas Russians feel no need to mobilize ethnically against ethnic Ukrainians. Instead, they feel a need to mobilize as a general political movement or as a region against another region and its political movement: the nationalist West and Central Ukraine. Moreover, the Donbas elites have political allies in the regions of South Ukraine and the Black Sea Littoral oblasti, including, of course, Crimea. The Crimean Russian elites, on the other hand, possess enormous demographic hegemony magnified by institutional domination. Therefore, they face very little electoral threat, and, as noted, even get electoral support from the highly russified local Ukrainians (47 percent of whom claim Russian as their mother tongue). Fearing Ukrainization, or at least manipulating such a fear to get themselves re-elected, Crimean Russian elites have used the state institutions which they dominate in order to mobilize and politicize Russian ethnicity as a means of whipping up support, both locally and internationally.
In summary, the Donbas Russians need not mobilize ethnically when they can mobilize more easily, efficiently, and effectively as a purely political and regional force that operates in cooperation with Russified Ukrainians as well as with other regions. In contrast, the Crimean Russians find it easier and more profitable in terms of gaining local and international support to mobilize as a Russian ethnic group instead of as a broader socio-economic movement. This statement is coincident with the previous institutionalist arguments, because demographic factors determine the ability to use institutions as mobilizing tools. Therefore, the differences in ethno-demographics and cultural identities between the two regions are magnified by their different kinds of institutions and the presence or absence of Russian ethnic hegemony over them. These institutions and demographic situations cause the Russian elites in both regions to have a different structure of pay-offs and incentives, and hence they choose different mobilizational strategies: in Donbas, socio-economic mobilization; in Crimea, ethno-political mobilization.
NOTES
Note 1: I am thankful to Ian Bremmer for the insight that demographic factors and the infrastructural power of institutions are forms of resources, and that such demographic and institutionalist arguments are theories about resource-based power. Back.
Note 2: Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 36-52. Back.
Note 3: This assumption is made after an extensive review of the literature on the Crimean Tartar issue. See, for example: Ian Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," RFE/RL Research Report, April 30, 1993, 24-28; Refat Chubarov, Volodymyr Yevtoukh, and Stephen Browne in Developments in Crimea: Challenges for Ukraine and Implications for Regional Security, Maria B. Drohobycky, ed. (Washington: AAAS Program on Science and International Security, 1995); Serhiy Tolstov, "Dimensions of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Review XL, no. 2 (Summer 1993), 28-46; Susan Stewart, "The Tartar Dimension," RFE/RL Research Report, May 13, 1994, 22-26; "Ukraine's Policy Toward Its Ethnic Minorities," RFE/RL Research Report, September 10, 1993, 55-62. Back.
Note 4: If one assumes that the older the age of settlement in a region, the greater the proclivity to mobilize ethno-politically. Back.
Note 5: One possible exception to this statement is the Donbas miners' strike in 1993, but this mobilization was not ethnic in nature. Back.
Note 6: Rogers Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account," Theory and Society 23 (1994), 68-69. Back.
Note 7: Phillip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," World Politics 43 (January 1991), 219. Back.
Note 8: Monika Jung, "The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections," RFE/RL Research Report, March 25, 1994, 51-52. Back.
Note 10: Ibid., 197 and 202. Back.
Note 11: Evgenii Golovakha, Natalia Panina and Nikolai Churilov, "Russians in Ukraine," in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich and Emil Payin, eds., The Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 62-63 Back.
Note 12: Svetlana Svetova and Roman Solchanyk, "Chronology of Events in Crimea," RFE/RL Research Report, May 13, 1994, 27.a href="#txt12"> Back.
Note 14: "'A Regulation on local state administration', in Holos Ukrainy, August 8, 1992, 4-6," footnote in the original. Back.
Note 15: Tolstov, "Dimensions," 39-40. Back.
Note 17: Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Simferopol," RFE/RL Research Report, August 21, 1992, 15. Back.
Note 18: Ukrainian Review XL, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), 64. Back.
Note 19: Denis J. Shaw, "Nationalization of Resort Complexes by Crimea," Post-Soviet Geography 34, no. 1 (1993), 72. Back.
Note 20: David R. Marples and David F. Duke, "Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea," Nationalities Papers 23, no. 2 (June 1995), 282. Back.
Note 21: "See Robitnycha Hazeta, 23 June and Holos Ukrainy, 18 and 25 September , 1993. The decree is published in Holos Ukrainy, 25 June 1993," footnote in the original. Back.
Note 22: "The law on "Presidential Representation in the Crimean Republic" is published in Holos Ukrainy, 27 January 1993. Sevastopol does not come under Crimean jurisdiction, but has an all-Ukrainian status, and therefore its presidential prefect was already in place)," footnote in the original. Taras Kuzio, "Russia -- Crimea -- Ukraine: Triangle of Conflict," Conflict Studies, no. 267 (January 1994), 227. Back.
Note 23: The footnote in the original is to Kuzio, "Russia -- Crimea -- Ukraine." Back.
Note 24: Ibid, footnote in the original. Martin Klatt, "Russians in the 'Near Abroad'," RFE/RL Research Report, August 19, 1994, 39. Back.
Note 25: Andrew Wilson, "The Elections in Crimea," RFE/RL Research Report, June 24, 1994, 7. Back.
Note 26: Svetova and Solchanyk, 31-32. Back.
Note 27: Marples and Duke, 283. Back.
Note 28: Roman Solchanyk, "Crimea's Presidential Election," RFE/RL Research Report, March 18, 1994, 3. Back.
Note 29: Wilson, "Elections in Crimea," 14. Back.
Note 30: Roeder, 212-213. Back.
Note 31: Roman Szporluk, "Reflections On Ukraine After 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," The Harriman Review 7, nos. 7-9 (March-May 1994), 2. Back.
Note 32: Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?," RFE/RL Research Report, August 19, 1994, 7. Back.
Note 33: Arel and Wilson, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections." RFE/RL Research Report, July 1, 1994, 14. Back.
Note 34: "Nasha gazeta, March 30, 1994; Luganskaya pravda, April 2, 1994; Zhizn Luganska, April 15, 1994; and Golos Donbassa, April 15, 1994. Additional information was derived from Serhii Bilokin, et al., Who's Who in Ukrainian Politics (Kiev: Mohyla Academy, 1993)," footnote in the original. Arel and Wilson, "Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," 15. Back.
Note 35: "The survey, conducted by the KIIS, was prepared by Dominique Arel, Jerry Hough (Duke University, Durham, North Carolina), David Laitin (University of Chicago, Illinois), Susan Lehman (Columbia University, New York), and Roman Lenchovskyi (University Mohyla Academy, Kiev) as part of a series of large scale sociological polls administered in five ethnic areas of the former Soviet Union," footnote in the original. Back.
Note 36: "These figures come from two all-Ukrainian surveys, with more than 2,000 respondents, carried out on 6-10 and 15-18 June -- that is, before the first round of the presidential election. The findings on this particular question have not yet been published," footnote in the original. Back.
Note 37: Arel and Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma," 9. Back.
Note 39: Wilson, "The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas," RFE/RL Research Report, August 20, 1993, 13. Back.
Note 40: Wilson, "Elections in Crimea," 15. Back.
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