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The Making of a Greater Albania?
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
This paper assesses the potential creation of a Greater Albania. History has left the Albanian nation partitioned, and the international community should not overlook the possibility of widespread ethnic conflict involving ethnic Albanians and the states that hold them. The theoretical framework in this paper draws primarily on the irredentism and security literature on ethnic conflict and expands it where necessary. The literature is useful for showing how negative historical experiences and current mistreatment feed secessionist sentiment among ex-Yugoslavia's Albanians and make Albania willing to annex them. However, it tends to assume that ethnic conflict and irredentism will be less likely if the military environment favors the status quo state. This is rather short-sighted since a militarily disadvantaged state can be "tacitly" irredentist. The case study in this paper shows that Albania is an irredentist state in the making, exercising options short of military intervention that preserve the possibility of national unification in the long-term. Albania is taking tacit steps to annexation, such as political coordination with the leaders of its irredenta and "internationalization" of the plight of its ethnic brethren. The concept of tacit irredentism on the part of militarily weak states deserves more attention. If the international community overlooks tacit annexation, it risks providing lopsided guarantees or assistance to the supposedly non-irredentist state -- which might later provoke conflict. Thus, the final section of this case study outlines prescriptions that the international community should follow if it is to prevent another Balkan conflagration in the near future.
History and Partition
How did ethnic Albanians come to live outside Albania? It was only in the late nineteenth century, during Ottoman rule, that an Albanian nationalist movement developed. At this time, Albanian speakers resided in large, sometimes homogenous concentrations in the Ottoman administrative districts (vilayet) of Kosovo, Shkodra, Janina and Bitola. 2 In 1878, Albanian elites formed the League of Prizren primarily to prevent foreign powers from grabbing the declining Ottoman state's Albanian territories. 3 Although powerful nationalist movements represented other Balkan ethnic groups, some of which had acquired nation-states (i.e., Greece in 1833), the Albanians did not call for independence. 4 There was a strong desire for local-self government and resistance to Istanbul's levies, yet "the population, which was 70 percent Muslim, was in the great majority in favor of remaining within the Ottoman Empire, certainly as long as traditional rights and privileges were maintained." 5
The autocratic sultan, however, suppressed the League of Prizren and crushed peasant revolts repeatedly, compelling Albanian elites to focus on cultural initiatives such as the development of language and education. Education in Albanian-speaking areas was religiously based. Muslim schools taught in Turkish, Christian Orthodox schools in Greek, and Catholic schools in Italian. Albanian elites made limited gains, and in 1887, in the southern city of Korçë, Ottoman officials permitted the opening of the first school that would teach in Albanian.
Although by the beginning of the twentieth century the new, Young Turk government in Istanbul granted the Albanian movement limited political and cultural concessions concerning language, military recruitment and taxation, it refused to permit the unification of the four vilayets of Kosovo, Shkodra, Janina and Bitola under Albanian jurisdiction. Albanian nationalists bitterly contested the status of the vilayets, yet were still divided between total independence and enhanced cultural-political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, Ottoman authorities continued suppressing local revolts.
When the First Balkan War Broke out in 1912, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria decisively rolled back the Ottoman armies. Faced with the defeat of its guardian and under the threat of foreign occupation, the nationalist movement gained support and proclaimed Albania independent. As Ismail Qemal Vlora, the leader of the nationalist movement, raised the flag in the coastal city of Vlorë, Serbian forces swept down Albania's northern spine, and Greek forces occupied the south. The Great Powers intervened and set up an Albanian state under the jurisdiction of the International Control Commission (ICC) in 1913. The ICC deprived the new state of large territories with an Albanian presence, especially Kosovo, but also around Janina and Bitola. Both the ICC and Qemal's government claimed jurisdiction over the infant state. To make matters worse, large landowners (who opposed the dismantling of the feudal structure) and the Muslim peasantry (who preferred the Ottoman past to the authority of the Christian powers) instigated massive unrest throughout the country. 6
Albania was annexed and divided numerous times during and in between the two world wars, emerging from Axis occupation in 1944 as an independent shell of a state without industry, infrastructure and schools. Furthermore, the boundary manipulations of the Axis occupiers, which carved out a Greater Albania at Yugoslavia's expense, were short lived; after World War II the borders reverted to those established by the ICC.
Enver Hoxha, head of the victorious National Liberation Army, consolidated control over Albania and liquidated forces opposed to the Communist solution. Hoxha's government was a harsh "Marxist-Leninist" dictatorship, yet Albanians were in control over their state's matters to an unprecedented degree. Ethnic brethren across the border lived under a less doctrinaire regime, yet were at the bottom of Yugoslavia's political and social hierarchies. Contacts between the two Albanian communities were limited.
This literature lists certain structural and military factors that determine the risk of war. Van Evera asserts that the risk of war will be great if an ethnic minority in one state has the strength to plausibly reach for freedom, and the central state has the will to resist their attempt. This is governed by a variety of factors such as the demographic arrangement of the minority, its political unity and the military power it wields against the central state. The defensibility and legitimacy of borders is also important for Van Evera. If boundaries between two states with an overlapping ethnic group are defensible, they reduce the risk of war; the defense is dominant and the disgruntled motherland is less likely to engage in irredentist behavior. 8 If borders are seen as historically illegitimate, demands for border changes are more likely to be made than if boundaries were the product of historical negotiation and agreement. 9
If these criteria fall on the war-promoting side, the ethnic core state is more likely to pursue annexation. The balance of power is especially important here. The states and ethnic groups involved, according to Posen, are highly sensitive of the military balance of power. Posen argues that states are likely to engage in irredentist behavior to rescue stranded islands of their co-ethnics in a neighboring state if they fear the balance of military power and offensive dominance might shift against them in the future. 10 Weiner asserts that it is possible for a weaker state to redress an unfavorable balance of power by forming alliances with proximate friendly states or greater powers outside the region. 11 Weapons sales and military guarantees from other countries, for instance, can make an ethnically incomplete state more confident in acting irredentist.
Political and perceptual factors also determine whether or not a core-state will act irredentist. Van Evera states that memories of a "neighbors' cruelties will magnify an emerging nation's impulse to in-gather its diaspora, converting the nation from a diaspora-accepting to a diaspora-annexing attitude." 12 Posen agrees that past crimes matter, especially since they figure into oral history and living memory where they can feed fear and hatred between ethnic groups. 13 Current minority treatment is also an important factor. Van Evera asserts that a nation is more likely to be irredentist if an adjacent state abuses the rights of its ethnic brethren. 14 For coexistence to be possible, the minority must perceive the majority leadership as legitimate and the press must be committed to ethnic sensitivity.
The irredentism literature's theoretical framework, however, needs qualification. It is a useful starting point for understanding irredentist behavior, but it is rather poor on explaining how relatively weak ethnic-core states go about claiming their irredenta. Weiner, for example, suggests that the "Macedonian syndrome" will not operate if the irredentist state is very small and weak and the anti-irredentist state is large and powerful. 15 Regionally weaker states, however, can be "tacit" irredentists, promoting the long-run annexation of their ethnic brethren in political or covert military ways short of outright attack.
A state that is not strong enough to attempt military rescue of its proximate ethnic brethren can resort to measures that promote annexation in the long-term. First, such a state will be likely to coordinate policy with the leadership of its irredenta. Political coordination is vital for a militarily weak state since it will restrain the irredenta's political leaders from taking secessionist steps too quickly. It also maintains a unified national front that can present a consistent and unanimous case to the international community for its "national plight." This point is related to the second option available to a weak state -- the state and its ethnic brethren will try to "internationalize" the issue. That is, they will try to curry favor with international organizations such as the UN to put pressure on the state holding the "captive" nation.
The short-term goal of a militarily disadvantaged state that seeks to unify scattered co-ethnics will be to stabilize the situation so that ethnic conflict does not break out before its chances of victory become substantial. A point of caution is required. International involvement can improve stability in the region or perhaps result in peaceful and gradual national unification through negotiation. However, the backing of the international community (i.e., organizations such as the UN or NATO) can make the weaker state more confident in pursuing its irredentist goals. If the ethnic core-state receives too many guarantees or abundant military support from international organizations, it might attempt annexation or covertly encourage its irredenta to secede, confident that the international community will take its side. Thus, it is short-sighted to assume that an incomplete nation-state will renounce irredentism simply because its military power is relatively weak.
The strength of Albanian ethnic identity is often questioned through religious, tribal, and political criteria. Scholars sometimes emphasize the cultural-linguistic division of Albanians into Gegs (in the North) and Tosks (in the South) as disrupting national unity. Besides sharp differences in the Geg and Tosk dialects, most literature on Albania tends to categorize Gegs as isolationist, religiously devout and strongly devoted to the preservation of patriarchal hierarchies. The Tosks, on the other hand, are considered more urbanized, open to foreign influence and less preservationist. 17 Kosovo's Albanians are Geg, whereas in Albania the Geg-Tosk ratio is nearly even.
Ethnicity, however, has been the primary focus of Albanian identity, surpassing narrower allegiances to a given region and categorizations of Geg and Tosk. Both Gegs and Tosks took part in the national awakening, and historical accounts do not provide appreciable evidence of Geg-Tosk conflict. 18 Thus it comes as no surprise that conflict between these two groups has not materialized since the fall of Communism. The initial Geg-Tosk electoral polarization witnessed in Albania's first multi-party election in 1991 disappeared by the second election in 1992. The victory of the Democratic Party cut across divisions of North-South, tribe and religion. 19 Geg-Tosk distinctions do not disrupt national unity within Albania, nor do Albania's Tosks make an issue out of the fact that the vast majority of Yugoslavia's and Macedonia's Albanians are Geg. The Geg-Tosk cleavage is best described as a regional rivalry, a concept which is prevalent in most countries yet does not disrupt national unity. 20
Religious diversity, furthermore, has not weakened Albanian solidarity. The majority of Kosovo's and Macedonia's Albanians are Muslim, but include Orthodox Christians in Macedonia and Catholics in Kosovo. Within Albania, the majority of the population is also of Muslim descent, but there are large numbers of people who have Catholic or Christian backgrounds. 21 According to the reports of the Helsinki Committee, religion has not caused serious conflict among Albanians since the creation of the nation-state in 1913. The various faiths in Albania are tempered and do not threaten national unity despite occasional excesses in religious revival. 22 As a case in point, at a mosque inauguration in the northern city of Shkodër, representatives from the town's Catholic and Muslim communities connected the top of the mosque's minaret and the church's dome with hundreds of Albanian flags and lights in the presence of President Berisha. He stated that this served "to show our enemies that we are together for the interest of the nation." 23
The press also tends to point out that trans-border nationalism among Albanians is weak because Kosovo's Albanians have been cut off from Tirana's Albanians for decades and have developed different political and social cultures. The Kosovars that poured into Albania after the fall of Communism also tended to treat Albania's Albanians with contempt, and some engaged in dishonest business deals and ruthless speculation.
Nonetheless, Albanian trans-border nationalism remains strong. The erosion of Albanian Stalinism facilitated ethnic solidarity. The many Kosovars who held Tirana's totalitarians in contempt were more likely to treat democratic Albania as a "motherland" with which to cooperate. Albania's ruling Democratic Party carefully coordinates policy with the representative parties of ex-Yugoslavia's Albanians. The government in Tirana also employs large numbers of refugees from Kosovo in the public sector and has set up a generous quota system at the university for Kosovar students.
Inside and outside the Albanian border, there exists a feeling of national solidarity that marginalizes religious, tribal and regional divisions. In November 1992 in Vlorë, President Berisha attended ceremonies marking the eightieth anniversary of Albania's independence with the President of Kosovo's underground leadership, Ibrahim Rugova, at his side. Berisha stated, "the soul unites us because the nation is like an individual. You can break its body into pieces, but you can never break the soul." 24 As rhetorical as this speech might have been, it nicely summed up national reality. The Balkan peninsula's Albanians share a name, a myth of common ancestry, ethnohistorical memories of the collectivity (i.e., folklore, the national awakening at Prizren, etc.), one language, attachment to a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. 25 The next counterargument to anticipate is the treatment of Albania as a state so weak that it has no option but to avoid the national question altogether. In the past few years, the Western Press and even the Open Media Research Institute have often assumed that irredentism is simply not an option for impoverished Tirana. Bread, political reform and Western aid sweep national unification under the rug. Radio Free Europe, for example, points out that President Berisha appeared to be an irredentist at the outset but quickly became more moderate, urging intervention in Kosovo only to preserve human rights. 26
Contrary to the belief that Albania will avoid a Balkan imbroglio of its own, the following sections will dispel the "helpless" state argument to show that Albania is an irredentist state in the making. Having established the salience of Albanian nationalism, I will use the theoretical framework of the previous section to show that Albania is a tacit irredentist state.
Political and perceptual factors influence whether an ethnic core-state will act in an irredentist manner and whether an ethnic minority will wish to secede. The social and political standing of the Albanian communities in the former Yugoslavia tends to fall on the war-promoting side of the irredentist and secessionist criteria to varying degrees. Human rights abuses and political deprivation are acute in Kosovo, and socio-political rights are in need of substantial improvement in Macedonia. The Albanians also feel historically aggrieved, although significantly more at the hands of the Serbs.
The more a minority perceives itself as having been historically mistreated at the hands of another ethnic group, the stronger its desire to secede and the stronger its motherland's desire to annex it. Albanians tend to view themselves as victims of crimes committed by other nationalities. Albanian history is written around the theme of unfair partition. Victor Friedman, a Balkan linguist and expert on the region's history, points out that the Great Powers supported Serbian and Greek nationalist claims at the expense of Albanian aspirations. 27 Recent history has also promoted ethnic discord, especially in Kosovo. In the spring of 1981, massive riots rocked Yugoslavia's Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. On March 11, student demonstrations against the miserable living conditions at the university in Prishtina quickly evolved into violent manifestations in which ethnic Albanians (77.5 percent of Kosovo's population according to the 1981 census counting 1.6 million heads 28 ) demanded republic status for Yugoslavia's poorest region. 29 Belgrade moved heavily armed forces into the area, crushing the demonstrations. The state of emergency gave the security forces virtually a free hand, resulting in thousands of arrests, countless interrogations often involving torture, comprehensive house sweeps, school closings and mass purges against ethnic Albanians. Death toll estimates range from an official 12 to various speculations of hundreds and even thousands. 30
Tirana's reaction to the repression is notable for two reasons. First, it defended the demand for a "Kosovo Republic" as legitimate. 31 As a republic, Kosovo would be able to develop more direct and freer ties with Albania. Republic status would also permit Kosovo the constitutional right to secede from Yugoslavia. Second, Tirana's leaders and dissident Kosovars repeatedly condemned the violence as Serb chauvinism rather than Yugoslav oppression. 32 By holding the Serbs responsible for the repression, the Albanian leadership solidified the crisis as an ethnically-motivated one and made conciliation less likely. 33
If a nationality continues to oppress a minority living in its state, it will encourage secessionist and irredentist behavior. The continuing repression in Kosovo makes ethnic conflict more likely. Serbia's Albanians consider themselves to be greatly oppressed. Continuing abuse, according to Van Evera, magnifies the desire to secede and heightens the core-state's impulse to incorporate its irredenta by force. 34 According to social and political factors, Kosovo, now over 90 percent ethnically Albanian, is primed for a bloodbath. Mass firings, torture and disappearances continue. President Milosevic of Serbia has stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and sent in a police force of 60,000 (not counting military personnel). 35 Show trials intended to paralyze and terrorize the Albanian leadership are commonplace. 36 In response to the erosion of social and political rights, the Albanian leadership has created a "shadow state" in Kosovo, providing health care, social-security, basic necessities and an education system, financed by a 3 percent income tax and remittances from abroad. 37 More recently, the Human Rights Council reported that 7,477 Serbian refugees from the Krajina were settled in Kosovo and that 20,000 more were scheduled to arrive. 38 Ethnic relations are completely polarized, and Serbia will not grant Kosovo's demand for independence. 39
The social and political status of Albanians in Macedonia is significantly better, yet the potential for secession and irredentism exists there as well. Albanians, on the whole, do not accuse Macedonians of having committed historic crimes. 40 Generally, Macedonians' national inspirations have been marginalized as much as those of Albanians. On the other hand, Albanians see their present-day status as a disadvantaged one. Aside from the Parliament and the Cabinet, ethnic Albanians are severely underrepresented in the public sector. 41 Higher education in the Albanian language has also been a major source of contention. During the winter of 1994-95, the unofficial establishment of an Albanian university in Tetovo (a town with a sizable Albanian population near the Albanian border) resulted in mass arrests and violence when Macedonian police attacked the university premises. 42 Fadil Sulejmani, one of the founders of the university arrested during the incident, later warned, "if the police try to prevent us from working, 200,000 Albanians will rise to our defense and they [will] have guns and grenades." 43
Although ethnic Albanian parties participate in a coalition government with moderate Macedonian parties, ethnic issues are highly divisive and result in frequent walkouts by the Albanian representatives. In the winter of 1992, Albanian political organizations conducted a referendum in western Macedonia which endorsed territorial autonomy for Albanian areas and which was promptly dismissed as illegal by Macedonian authorities. 44 Moreover, both the 1991 and the 1994 censuses were conducted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust and animosity, although Albanian parties did not call for a boycott of the latter census. The political goal of the 1994 census was to overturn the minority status the Macedonian government had given to ethnic Albanians. 45 The official status of Macedonia's Albanians is a hotly contested issue. The Albanian political leadership demands that the government grant ethnic Albanians "state-building" status. The exact meaning of "state-building" status is unclear. The more extreme political elements describe it as a "state within a state," whereas the more moderate political wings imagine a federation where the Albanian language has full equality in public life and where representation in the state sector is proportional to ethnic breakdown. 46 However, the Macedonian government is unlikely to compromise further. 47 The 1994 census recorded just over 440,000 ethnic Albanians (out of a total population just under 2 million), and the Macedonian government will not grant equal constitutional status to a group that is only 23 percent of the population. Albanian elites insist they have been under-counted and that they are at least 33 percent of the population. 48
In summary, although historical treatment of Albanians in Macedonia has not been particularly gruesome, current ethnic accommodation is dissatisfying. Tirana has endorsed the demand of "state-building status" for Macedonia's Albanians, much to Skopje's annoyance. Communal violence is on the rise and ethnic resentment is high. The main Albanian party (PPD) also suffered a recent split; the more extreme splinter group (PPD) has stated its willingness to resort to violence to bring down the government if Albanian political demands are not met. 49
Political and perceptual factors indicate both the presence of an irredentist intent on the part of Albania and the minority's willingness to secede, although more so with regard to Kosovo. Historically, Albanians field major grievances against the Serbs, and history yields little mistreatment on the part of the Macedonians. Presently, political deprivation is acute in Kosovo and mutual perceptions are at the most hostile extremes. In Macedonia, Albanians are less aggrieved and have comparatively far-reaching political and social rights. However, they perceive their status to be a disadvantaged one, and communal violence is on the rise. Although ethnic separation and secessionist sentiment is irreversible in Kosovo, in Macedonia there is still a chance to prevent partition and promote coexistence.
The next issue to consider regarding irredentist or secessionist potential is the demographic and geographic arrangement of ethnic Albanians outside Tirana's jurisdiction. Macedonia's Albanian population (at least 23 percent of the total) is proximate to Albania's western border and also proximate to Kosovo's southern border, where Albanians are in the majority. Hypothetically, Albanian armies could march across the border and occupy large stretches of Western Macedonia. Macedonia's Albanians are densely intermingled with Macedonians on a local level, sometimes house by house, sometimes village by village. Albanians are also increasingly dominant in large Western towns such as Tetovo. Immigration from Kosovo and the higher Albanian birth rate will increase the Albanian presence in Macedonia at the expense of the Slavs. Kosovo is over 90 percent Albanian and growing. It lies on Albania's northeastern border, and its square boundaries make it a viable entity to annex. However, a large mountain barrier with few roads separates Kosovo from Albania, whereas a large plain opens Kosovo to Serbia on the other side. In the event of conflict between Albania and Serbia, the defense certainly favors Serbia.
At the current time, structural factors do not favor Kosovo's secession from Yugoslavia nor its annexation by Albania. Within Kosovo there is an overwhelming police force that will wreak havoc on any secessionist movement. The Kosovar leadership and the region's Albanians are largely unarmed. 50 The lack of intermingling in Kosovo also makes it easy for the Yugoslav army to ethnically cleanse and raze entire towns to the ground in the case of an Albanian uprising. Moreover, Albania's annexationist capabilities are slight. The balance of power is entirely in Serbia's favor. Albania can field nine divisions of 44,000 soldiers against 160,000 heavily armed Yugoslav troops. 51 The pre-cipitous mountain passes between Albania and Kosovo further favor the Yugoslav defense.
However, it is not accurate to assume that Albania is a non-irredentist or "diaspora-accepting" country, as the literature might suggest. Albania's policy towards Kosovo can be described as "tacit irredentism" or "long-term irredentism." A state that cannot shift boundaries due to its lagging military power can find other ways to promote annexation of co-ethnics in adjacent countries. Three options are open to a militarily disadvantaged state. First, the government of the core-state is likely to coordinate policy with the leadership of its irredenta. Tirana tightly coordinates its policy with Kosovo's "shadow state" to enhance its control over its co-ethnics and to prevent conflict from breaking out until its chances of winning armed conflict improve. 52 Cooperation has been highly successful since Kosovo's various parties are grouped together under President Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The LDK is a broad national front that has demonstrated persistent solidarity despite traditional polarization in Kosovo's political culture. This has been extremely useful, since it creates a common platform that can respond to the changing environment efficiently and can present its case to the international community neatly.
Second, a militarily-disadvantaged state that aspires to irredentism will try to "internationalize" the crisis by involving international institutions and organizations to take up the plight of its oppressed co-ethnics. President Berisha cooperates with President Rugova to compel international organizations and institutions to challenge Serbia's control over Kosovo. They have repeatedly urged the UN to slap sanctions against Serbia unless Belgrade permits the deployment of UN troops in Kosovo. During the 1995 peace talks in Dayton, Berisha and Rugova demanded that the peace plan include a solution to the Kosovo crisis. Although "internationalization" is not forthcoming, Berisha and Rugova continue to lobby for it since it could result in the gradual and peaceful creation of a Greater Albania (or at least an Albanian federation).
A third course of action a relatively weak state might take to address its national question is to seek military assistance and alliances to redress the imbalance of power. Albania became the first former Communist state to apply for membership in NATO. Although denied membership, Albania joined the Partnership for Peace and has been its most enthusiastic member. The US and Turkey have been particularly helpful in rejuvenating the Defense Academy and in modernizing the Albanian army. 53 Moreover, Washington's oral and written statements, threatening Serbia with the deployment of US military force in the event of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, have made Tirana more confident. 54 Following a recent NATO joint exercise to practice large-scale evacuation from the mountains near Albania's border with Kosovo, President Berisha declared that "ethnic cleansing" will be casus belli. 55
Albania's policy towards Macedonia is more complicated. Tirana's immediate goal is to maintain Macedonia's integrity by urging Albanian political parties to participate in the government. In the long-run, however, Tirana's policies leave the door open to annexation. The balance of power and demographic arrangement could work to Albania's favor as far as annexing portions of western Macedonia is concerned. Albania's military capabilities are bound to improve disproportionately to Macedonia's in the future, given the substantial military support Tirana receives. However, it is doubtful that strict balance of power considerations operate in the Macedonian case. The international community has been committed to preserving Macedonia's integrity, and the UN has stationed Preventive Deployment Forces (UNPREDEP). Consequently, Albania would not openly destabilize or attack Macedonia, especially while it is trying to involve the international community in Kosovo.
Albania seeks to preserve Macedonia's integrity in the short-term since it is not yet prepared to face ethnic conflict. Tirana urges the Albanian parties to work with the government in Skopje while demanding that the Macedonian authorities grant more rights to ethnic Albanians. Tirana, like the Albanian leadership in Macedonia, does not consider Macedonia's Albanians as a "minority" and endorses "state-building" status as a more fitting category. 56 Ethnic conflict is more likely to spiral out of control in Macedonia since the populations are locally intermingled and since the government cannot apply the same military pressure that Belgrade uses in Kosovo. Albania cannot afford an outbreak of conflict now. If Albanians in Macedonia attempt secession, Belgrade might use the opportunity to expel Albanians from Kosovo. Furthermore, Macedonia's border with Kosovo is the life-line of the latter's "shadow state" economy. The open border also channels Kosovar refugees into Macedonia rather than into Albania, which cannot bear the immigration burden. 57 In sum, the military environment does not allow Albania to act as an openly irredentist state. Tirana and its irredenta instead maintain the possibility of long-term annexation through political coordination, "internationalization," and alliance-seeking. Tirana's short-term goal is to maintain stability in the region until the international community intervenes to unify the nation or until it is militarily ready to provoke ethnic conflict with a good chance of extending its borders.
The international community and Western institutions have been to quick to assume that Albania is not an irredentist state. A number of specific prescriptions follow to minimize the potential for bloodshed in the future. In Kosovo, ethnic accommodation is long gone. For the most part, Serbians and Albanians view each other as genocidal conspirators. Albanians view Serbians as "colonizers" and "murderers," while Serbians tend to consider Albanians "fanatic Muslims" that would destroy Serbia given the chance. The respective ethnic media are rife with ugly stereotypes and hateful language. 58 If Albanians were substantially armed, there is no doubt that Kosovo would become a bloodbath. In the next few years the Albanian share of the population will approach 95 percent, even as Belgrade tries to settle ethnic Serbs in the region. The situation is unlikely to improve without external involvement.
The UN, EU and NATO should cooperate to prevent ethnic conflict in Kosovo. First they should jointly declare Kosovo to be a concern of the international community, not simply an internal Serbian affair. Second, they should pass a joint declaration that would clearly outline military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the event of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The declaration must include similar threats against Albania if it violates present borders. Third, UNPREDEP troops should be sent into Kosovo. This move should be accompanied by a multi-year plan that would restore Kosovo's autonomy, while gradually withdrawing most of the Serbian police and military units. The UN would slowly augment Kosovo's sovereignty as its status evolves from autonomy to Yugoslav republic status to eventual independence. The international forces would specifically commit to protecting remaining ethnic Serb communities and Serbian Orthodox cultural memorials. Conceivably, UNESCO and the EU could allocate substantial funds to restore and preserve historic Serbian sites. The UN could also arrange for these historic sites to be declared officially part of Serbia in a form of consular ownership. These factors could placate the Serbs into allowing Kosovo, a region they consider the heart of their sacred medieval kingdom, to slowly shift out of their control. An EU development package for Serbia could be used to make the deal more palatable.
Prescriptions for Macedonia are quite different. Although ethnic relations are tense, they are not at the point of no return as is the case in Kosovo. Accommodation and power sharing is still a viable solution to preserving Macedonia. Again, the UN, EU and NATO should coordinate their policies. First, they should declare Macedonia's borders to be not only inviolable, but immutable. Second, they can encourage the government in Skopje to allocate all public sector jobs according to proportional representation, not just the top posts as has been the case. Bilingual education should be provided at all levels, wherever it is requested in suitable numbers. An economic development fund, to be set up by the EU, can be used as a carrot to ensure compliance. The EU can also administer a journalistic superfund that would give substantial grants to media and publications that provide multilingual, ethnically-sensitive reporting. Third, more UNPREDEP forces should be placed at the border with Albania and Kosovo to prevent arms smuggling. Small caches of weapons can wreak havoc and spiral conflict out of control in Macedonia's locally intermingled communities. 58 Cantonization or a federal model is not advisable since Macedonia is intermingled at the local level and has numerous other minorities that are scattered unevenly.
With regard to Albania proper, certain precautionary prescriptions must follow. NATO should be more cautious in cooperating militarily with Albania. US assistance, as discussed previously, will make Albania more confident in asserting claims against its neighbors. Tirana already labors under the assumption that NATO and the UN will automatically take its side if war breaks out in Kosovo. Thus, the possibility that Albania will smuggle arms into Kosovo or Macedonia in order to provoke conflict should not be ruled out. The international community should also specify its willingness to extend military retaliation to Albania in the event that it provokes ethnic conflict. Hence, NATO should (as much as possible) confine its military cooperation with Albania to a defensive nature and should work together with UNPREDEP forces to ensure that no weapons leave Albania's borders. Finally, the EU can extend economic development assistance to Albania contingent upon the promotion of a stabilizing foreign policy.
These prescriptions are admittedly difficult to carry out and require making value judgments. The EU and the UN, for instance, might not want to get overly involved in the Balkans again. However, one hopes that the UN will take a more active role in preventing conflict, rather than in brokering cease fires as it did in Bosnia. The EU might also be more willing to take preventive measures to avoid the outbreak of another war and the consequent massive tides of refugees. Moreover, the US and NATO have finally made the use of force a credible threat through their intervention in Bosnia. This fact could compel Albania, Serbia and Macedonia to follow the plans of the international community. Acting now could prevent a war as gruesome as the recent conflict to the north.
NOTES
Note 1: I would like to thank Kestrina Budina and Tibor Papp for their insightful comments. Back.
Note 2: These regions roughly comprised the areas of present-day Albania and Kosovo as well as parts of Montenegro, western Macedonia and north-western Greece. Albanian speakers in Greece were either gradually hellenized or expelled in times of instability. Albanian minority consciousness in Greece does not exist to the extent that it does in the former Yugoslavia. Back.
Note 3: Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 84. Back.
Note 4: The League of Prizren was made up of two factions. One faction, mostly pashas, beys and reactionary representatives of high-ranking Islamic clergy followed Istanbul's dictations and sought to preserve the integrity of the Empire. Nationalists staffed the other faction, seeking to defend Albanian territories from proximate irredentist powers such as Greece and Serbia. The nationalists planned to fight for greater autonomy once the sultan had liquidated these irredentist threats: Stefanaq Pollo & Arben Puto, The History of Albania: From Its Origins to the Present Day (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 119. Back.
Note 5: Jelavich, 84. Most Albanians gradually converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. Back.
Note 6: See: Falaschi, "Ismail Qemal Bey Vlora and the Making of Albania in 1912," in Tom Winnifrith, ed., Perspectives on Albania (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Jelavich, 103. Back.
Note 7: Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development," World Politics (July 1971), 668.< Back.
Note 8: Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security (Spring 1994), 21. Back.
Note 10: Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 110. Back.
Note 16: Van Evera, 6. Back.
Note 17: These stereotypes are an anthropologist's nightmare. However, they have been established as Geg and Tosk cultural norms, often by members of the other group. Gegs and Tosks, in fact, are generally less polite when describing each other, resorting to stereotypes such as "soft," "weak-willed," "barbarian" and "backwards." A Tosk from the southern city of Gjirokastër prided himself on having taught "those animals up there how to eat with utensils" during a domestic cultural exchange program [Anonymous Informant. Resident of Gjirokastër. Personal Interview (Gjirokastër, Albania. 30 August 1993)]. Back.
Note 18: On occasion, historical texts speak of King Zog's reign during the inter-war years as causing Geg-Tosk discord. Tosks rebelled against Zog, a Geg chieftain from the northern highlands. Yet uprisings against Zog also took place in Geg regions of the country, suggesting that his inept and despotic reign, rather than his cultural background, that motivated rebellion. Back.
Note 19: Robert Austin, "What Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew," Orbis (Spring 1993), 269. Back.
Note 20: Tirana's adoption of Unified Literary Albanian, which combined literary features and vocabulary from Geg and Tosk regions of the country, casts further doubt on the Geg-Tosk polarization thesis. In 1968, Kosovo's political leaders and academics adopted ULA to foster cross-border cultural exchange. Refer to Janet Byron's study, Selection among Alternates in Language Standardization: The Case of Albanian (The Hague: Mouton, 1976). Back.
Note 21: Citing official statistics on religious breakdown can be misleading. Most scholars often claim that Albania is 70 percent Muslim. This statistic, however, is based on a pre-war census. The overwhelming majority of people in Albania were born under the atheist regime which liquidated the religious hierarchy, closed houses of worship and criminalized all forms of religious observance. Many Albanians today do not have strong religious consciousness -- see Austin, "What Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew," 265. Back.
Note 22: Komiteti Shqiptar I Helsinkit. Press Release, Tirana:, September 3, 1993. Back.
Note 23: Albanian News List. ALBANEWS , October 27, 1995. Back.
Note 24: Elez Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg," Conflict Studies 258 (February 1993), 24. Back.
Note 25: Smith proposes these criteria in "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security; Van Evera derives his definition of nationalism from Smith's criteria. However, other definitions of nationalism apply to the Albanian case. Benedict Anderson's definition of the nation as an "imagined political community... imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" also applies to ethnic Albanians. A nation is "imagined" because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. It is "limited" because even the largest of them has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. It is "imagined" as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that might prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, this fraternity makes it possible for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited meanings. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 6, 7. Back.
Note 26: Robert Austin, "Albania," RFE/RL Research Report , April 22, 1994. Back.
Note 27: Victor Friedman, "Populations and Powder Kegs: The Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and `Europe'," Draft to be published in the Woodrow Wilson Center's Occasional Papers Series. Back.
Note 28: The 1981 census in Yugoslavia registered 1.2 million Albanians in Kosovo, 300,000 in the Republic of Macedonia and 40-50,000 in the Republic of Montenegro. Back.
Note 29: Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Breakup, 1980-1992 (London: Verso, 1993), 9. Back.
Note 30: Regrettably, many aspects of the 1981 unrest in Kosovo remain shrouded in politicized secrecy and partiality. Radio Free Europe and Helsinki Watch present more objective accounts of the situation. Back.
Note 31: Zëri I Popullit, "Pse u përdor dhuna policore dhe tanket kundër shqiptarëve ne Kosovë?," April 8, 1981. Back.
Note 32: See Zëri I Popullit articles: "Pse u përdor dhuna policore dhe tanket kundër shqiptarëve në Kosovë,?" April 8, 1981; "Vazhdojnë masat represive dhe diskriminimi I shqiptarëve ne Kosovë dhe në vise të tjera të Jugosllavisë," July 23, 1981; "Dhunë e terror I tërbuar I shoviniste serbomëdhenj kundër shqiptarëve në Kosovë," September 9, 1981; and "Masa të tjera represive kundër shqiptarëve në Kosovë," November 3, 1981. Back.
Note 33: This is related to the hypotheses of Van Evera and Posen which propose that ethnic conflict and irredentist behavior will be more likely if "crimes" are remembered and if victims can attach responsibility for these crimes to groups that are still present. Back.
Note 35: Fabian Schmidt, "Strategic Reconciliation in Kosovo," Transition, August 25, 1995. Back.
Note 36: Fabian Schmidt, "Show Trials in Kosovo," Transition, November 3, 1995. Back.
Note 37: Schmidt, "Strategic Reconciliation in Kosovo." Back.
Note 38: See ALBANEWS: Human Rights Council, Report no. 264, October 16. 1995; Kosova Daily Report no. 73, October 24, 1995. These reports, however, require caution. They come strictly from Albanian sources and charges of "colonization" could be exaggerated. Back.
Note 39: Milosevic, for example, claims that Kosovo's status is purely an internal Serbian affair. In July 1995 he urged Albanians "to sideline their political leaders and embrace the Serbian administration." The Albanian-run Kosovar Information Ministry responded that Milosevic"stands for violence and apartheid, for the killing of Albanians, for their imprisonment, the occupation of Kosovo, the removal of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from their jobs, large-scale campaigns of raids and tortures, the staging of dozens of political trials, ethnic cleansing, and the colonization of Kosovo by Serbs." Schmidt, "Strategic Reconciliation in Kosovo." Back.
Note 40: Albanians tend to focus on more recent oppression at the hands of Macedonian authorities. In the late 1980s, for example, the government in Skopje abolished secondary education in Albanian, tried to slow the high Albanian birthrate through legislation, and destroyed the high walls traditionally found around Albanian houses for the drying of tobacco. Biberaj, 5. Back.
Note 41: See: Friedman, "Populations and Powder Kegs"; Fabian Schmidt, "From National Consensus to Pluralism," Transition, March 29, 1995); Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: From Independence to Recognition," RFE/RL Research Report, January 7, 1994; Hugh Poulton, "The Republic of Macedonia after UN Recognition," RFE/RL Research Report , June 4, 1993; and Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, June 19, 1992. Back.
Note 42: Fabian Schmidt, "Balancing the Power Triangle," Transition, May 26, 1995. Back.
Note 43: Schmidt, "From National Consensus to Pluralism." Back.
Note 44: See: Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma;" Stefan Troebst, "Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?" RFE/RL Research Report, January 28, 1994. Back.
Note 46: See: Duncan M. Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: On the Road to Stability --- or Destruction?" Transition, August 25, 1995; and Schmidt, "From National Consensus to Pluralism." Back.
Note 47: In order to placate the Albanian community, the Macedonian government changed the preamble of the original constitution, which defined Macedonia as a "nation-state of Macedonians," to describe Macedonia more vaguely as a "state of its citizens." Back.
Note 48: Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia: On the Road to Stability -- -or Destruction?" Back.
Note 50: Although Belgrade accused Kosovo's Albanian leaders of collecting weapons for an armed insurrection and put many of them to trial, the prosecution was unable to produce a significant number of weapons or evidence of hostile intent. Schmidt, "Show Trials in Kosovo." Back.
Note 51: Albania's defense forces also suffer from a budget deficit and have not been modernized since the 1970s. Although Albanian military capabilities will drastically improve in the near future, they are no match for rump Yugoslavia's weapons inheritances and reserves that can call an additional 500,000 soldiers to battle. Back.
Note 52: Schmidt, "Balancing the Power Triangle." Back.
Note 53: Marianne Sullivan, "Seeking the Security of Military Might," Transition, August 25, 1995. Back.
Note 54: Austin, "What Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew," 272. Back.
Note 55: Schmidt, "Balancing the Power Triangle." Back.
Note 56: See: Schmidt, "Balancing the Power Triangle;"; and Zëri I Popullit, "Për një bashkëpunim mes partive politike shqiptare në ish-Yugosllavi," September 9, 1993. Back.
Note 57: In 1992, for instance, Tirana protested when Macedonia "tightened controls on its border with rump Yugoslavia to limit the influx of illegal Albanian migrants and suppress black marketeering." Robert Austin, "Albanian-Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Cooperation?," RFE/RL Research Report, October 22, 1993. Back.
Note 58: Refer to Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," Daedalus (Spring 1992). Back.
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