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The Pomaks:
A Religious Minority in The Balkans
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
A religious minority of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Pomaks now live dispersed in five Balkan countries: Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Albania and Turkey. A living legacy of the complexities of Balkan history, the Pomaks represent a perfect case to study interstate political intricacies around the unsettled identity of small inter-communal groups. An examination of this community will enrich our knowledge about the nature and perspectives of Balkan Islam that stands outside of the Arab-Iranian-Turkic unity of the three peoples that have carried the major burden of Islamic history.
Most scholars have agreed in the past that the Pomaks are a religious group of "Slav Bulgarians who speak Bulgarian as their mother tongue and do not understand Turkish but whose religion and customs are Islamic." 1 They embraced, or rather were forced to adopt, Islam from the Turks who conquered the Balkans in the fourteenth century. 2 The Pomaks joined the Islamic community in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the same reasons as the Albanians: to escape from the djiziya tax on non-Muslims, the devshirme tax, which involved taking small boys away from their families in order to join the janicercorps, and the generally cruel attitude to non-Muslims, the raya.
While the Pomaks stick to Muslim rites and clerical hierarchy, they still share some customs with their Christian neighbors. The exact etymology of the word "Pomak" is not clear. It is a pejorative name given by their Christian neighbors and is close in sounding to "tortured" or "forced to Islamize" in Bulgarian. Professor Felix Kanitz has interpreted the word "Pomak" as a derivative from the Bulgarian word for "help," pomagam, because the Pomaks helped the Turks during the latter's domination of Bulgaria. 3 Most Pomaks in Bulgaria prefer the name "Muslim Bulgarians," yet writers outside the Balkans employ the originally derogatory term Pomaks. Other known names for these people are "Ahryani," "Pogantsi," "Poturani" in Bulgaria, and "Torbeshi" and "Poturi" in Macedonia. The Bulgarian scholar A. Ishirkov derived the name "Ahryani" from the para-religious brethren of the "Ahi" widespread in the Rodopi in the Ottoman period. As mountain dwellers, the Pomaks have been stock breeders and agriculturists for centuries, but in the twentieth century many have specialized in construction and mining.
Pomaks are estimated to number between 150,000 and 200,000 in Bulgaria, in excess of 40,000 in Macedonia, 36,000 in Greece, 4 and (a figure difficult to establish) about 80-120,000 in Albania. These numbers are the first but not the only issue of controversy overthe Pomak community. Andre Liebich has pointed out several of the obstacles that impede any reliable count of minorities in Eastern Europe: 5 interference of state policies; falsification of data;direct intimidation of census respondents (i.e., indirect threats or disadvantages as a result of a clear declaration of one's identity), and the more serious problem of vague, selective, or conflicting estimates and the manipulation of data by fragmenting, amalgamating, inventing, or even omitting groups on behalf of "minority experts." In addition, in the case of the Pomaksas a religious minority, there are additional problems such as assimilating the Pomak communities to larger groups on the basis of either religion or language, and the multi-level identity of the Pomaks themselves, a problem which will be discussed later in this study.
Konstantin Irecek counted approximately half a million Pomaks at the turn of the century around Pleven, Lovech, Thesaloniki, Nevrokop, Vardar and Debar, while Turkish sources of the same period reduced the figure to 200,000. In southern Bulgaria, Pomaks inhabit areas west of the Turkish minority in the Rodopi mountains (around Smolyan, Velingrad, Razlog and Gotse Delchev) and are mixed with Christian Bulgarians. There are small scattered communities throughout Bulgaria, e.g., near Lovech. In Greece, the villages near the Bulgarian border in all three provinces of Western Thrace are predominantly Pomak, with the exception of some, like Micron Dereion, which have a mixed population. Many Pomaks live in Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotikon, mixed withTurks and Greeks. 6 They inhabit areas inMacedonia around Berovo, Debar, Bitola, Struga, Dolna Reka and Skopje 7 and in Golo Bardo in Albania, near the Macedonian border. In the twentieth century many Pomaks left for Turkey, where they lost their language and together with local Pomaks in Eastern Thrace were assimilated by the Turks.
Complicated politics in the Balkans have created confusion over ethnic identity. The Pomaks have been variously regarded as Turks, Bulgarians and occasionally as people distinct from either Turks and Bulgarians. They should not be confused with the Bosnian Muslim Slavs, who speak a different Slavic language and demonstrate a group identity of a different style. As a religious minority, the Pomaks identify themselves on linguistic and historical grounds with the Bulgarians (and lately with the Macedonians in that republic) but, on the basis of Islam, with the universal Muslim community, the Umma, and occasionally with the Sunni Turks. Traditionally, religion is prior to linguistic or ethnic ties in Islam. Despite their Bulgarian ethnic origin, the Pomaks have participated little in Bulgarian national life, especially in the independence movement against the Turks in the last century. Interestingly, however, the famous Batak massacre in 1876 of Christian Bulgarians revolting against the Ottoman sultan was perpetrated by irregular Pomak bands. Some authors attribute to the Pomak social psychology a general feature of Sunni Islam: an inherent loyalty to central government. The Pomaks have been loyal subjects of various suzerains, from the Ottoman sultan to the Bulgarian government. Reportedly, Bulgaria's Pomaks experience their service in the Bulgarian army as a question of honor, despite the record of government anti-Muslim campaigns. 8 This does not mean that the concept of citizenship has a very special place in the Pomaks' system of values -- rather, stable government is simply preferred to chaos. Central to the Pomaks' understanding of the structure of power is the traditional patriarchal family and communal relations.
Modern social science is not confined to the idea of a singular, pure group identity of a people. One and the same person may feel himself or herself to be a national of a given state and a member of different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups. Arend Lijphart uses the term "overlapping memberships"proposed by the group theorists A. Bentley and D. Truman. 9 Lijphart argues that there are different types of cleavagesin society along national, religious, linguistic or social lines. Thesecleavages may crosscut and thus create different loyalties to differentsegments in society. 10 Lijphart suggeststhat these loyalties are weakened by the overlapping memberships and tend to bemoderate, thus implying a possibility for compromise: Lijphart's "consociational cooperation." Nevertheless, complex historical tradition and recent political input into the debate over the identity of the Pomaks have contributed to the complicated character of the discussion on the issue of Pomak identity. In this sense, the activities of close as well as distant political actors have influenced not only a large part of the information on the Pomaks but also the self-identification of these people.
This confusion with larger Muslim groups was perversely used by Bulgaria's communist regime in its anti-Turkish assimilation campaign of 1984-85 to prove that all ethnic Turks are Slav Bulgarians, i.e., Pomaks, who were forciblyIslamized and Turkicized by the Ottoman authorities. Similarly, official Greek sources tend to claim that Turks are Pomaks while Pomaks are Slavophone Muslim Greeks. Conversely, Turkish nationalists claim that the Pomaks are Turks. 13
Besides the assimilation theories, the thesis of a distinct Pomak political identity has also found sponsors who argue that distinctive religion and custom-based features are forged into an ethnic identity. The "distinct group "thesis is the second-best choice of Turkish nationalists in Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia. Religious missionaries to the Bulgarian Rodopi from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Syria and Libya have propagated a theory about a presumed Arabic origin of the Pomaks. Following the anti-Muslim assimilation campaigns in Bulgaria, the seeds of these theories have found fertile soil. A large number of mosques, financed by Islamic countries, have been built in the Rodopi. Yet Bulgarian authorities and public opinion are quite sensitive to claims that the Pomaks differ ethnically from the Bulgarians. Fears that the revival of Muslim values would lead to Turkish assimilation of the Pomaks are growing. In contrast, almost all Bulgarian state authorities have shown no interest in the Pomaks outside of the country. Only limited scholarly attention has been revived in Sofia. However, Greek sources, interested in distancing the Pomaks from the Bulgarians, adopt a Hellenized version of the "distinct group"thesis. The authorities in Athens support this thesis by limiting all information going in and out of the Pomak regions of Western Thrace. The cultural links of the Pomaks to the Bulgarians or Turks constitute one of the nightmares of Greece's strategy planners. Macedonian authorities and scholars try to engage the Pomaks in their republic in the process of a Macedonian nation building, calling them "Muslim Macedonians." Last but not least, smoothers in the booming area of ethnic relations and human rights tend to see distinctions, infringement of rights and assimilation campaigns every time the name Pomaks is mentioned. A limited number of Pomak activists claim allegiance to the "distinct group" thesis under the influence of various political factors.
The Pomaks are often wrongly confused with the Bosnian Muslims. These two communities, although both Muslim Slavs, speak different languages and have different historical records. The Serbo-Croatian-speaking Bosnian Muslims are the descendants of the heretical Bosnian Bogomil Church, dominant in the pre-Ottoman Bosnian state, and converted to Islam en masse with the advent of the Turks. 14 Their nationalism rose in the twentieth century but reflected centuries of conflict with Catholic and Orthodox Christians. They are a compact population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sandjak area in Serbia and Montenegro. When the Bosnian Muslims were officially elevated to the status of a nation in 1971, the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was deemed to be a form of Muslim statehood, which pitted against them the local Serbs and Croats -- a confrontation which was always fueled from outside by Turks, Serbs and Croats. A disgraced minority before1970, the Bosnian Muslims appeared at the head of an independent state after1990. The Bulgarian- speaking Pomaks, smaller in number, dispersed, and badly organized, have never cherished such political ambitions. Their protests in1971-1989 in Bulgaria were related to their cultural rights of free choice of name and religion. Historically, they converted to Islam piecemeal rather thanen masse and today live scattered throughout different areas.
There are indications that some Pomaks also converted to Islam from heretic communities, such as the Bogomils (adherents of another sect, the Paulicians,are believed to have converted to Catholicism). A particular belief among tobacco-raising Pomaks in Greece that the devil and tobacco have a common fate may be evidence of this, since the Bogomils believed that Satan created the world. Yet, there is no link with the medieval Bosnian state.
Certain religious differences between the Pomaks and the Turks stemming from their different ethnic backgrounds have often been noted, such as the admixture of non-Islamic customs shared by the Pomaks with local Christians, and the lack of the organizational patterns and mystic life of the Turkish Muslim community.The Pomaks, who understood neither Arabic nor Turkish, could not assimilate the whole of Turco-Arab Muslim tradition and rites. Pomak Islam remained on the simple level of oral tradition and syncretic customs.
On several occasions (1912-13, 1942-45, 1962-64 and 1971-90) Bulgarian authorities exercised pressure on the Pomaks to divert them from their Muslim names and rites related to marriage, death, circumcision, and dress. Firstly,after their incorporation into Bulgaria in 1913, some Pomak intellectuals voluntarily adopted Christianity. The primitive character of Pomak Islam contributed to this social mobility. Yet this move was abused by Bulgarian authorities who made baptism obligatory. A few years later the government of Radoslavov, in order to attract Pomak votes, promised to return, and in fact returned, their names. A relatively prosperous period for the Pomaks followed.In the 1920s there were 42 schools for Pomaks with 3,060 students. 15 Measures to develop the community were taken in the 1930s and the Bulgarian king Boris III personally enjoyed high popularity among the Pomaks. From May 1937 to February 1944, the cultural organization "Rodina," later characterized as fascist, marked the second wave of "restoring the Bulgarian roots of the Pomaks." The first years of the communist regime (1945-56) were marked by wide recognition of the rights of the Pomaks. Even in the 1980s, Velichko Karadjov, a Pomak, was promoted to eminence in the communist regime. However this tendency was reversed in the 1970s. In1971-73 the authorities pursued a concerted campaign to forcibly induce the Pomaks to choose new names from an official Bulgarian list. 16 Taking away the names and banning burials in Muslim cemeteries as well as circumcision meant losing individual legitimacy before Allah. Many Muslims expressed their anger. There were instances of both police brutality and violent resistance, such as those in the village of Ribnovo,Pazardjik district in July 1971, and in the villages of Lazhnitsa, Kornitsa,and Breznitsa in Blagoevgrad district in March 1973. According to Amnesty International, 500 Pomaks served prison sentences in the Belene prison in1975. 17
In August 1989, Pomaks from the Gotse Delchev area protested against the authorities' refusal to issue them passports to travel abroad at a time when anew passport law allowed 300,000 Turks to emigrate to Turkey. 18 A crowd comprised largely of Pomaks rallied in front of the Parliament building in Sofia in December 1989 to demand a legal act restoring Muslim names. This was done by a decree of December 29, 1989, and a law was passed in March 1990. Yet the name change alienated the Pomaks from Christian Bulgarians, and many supported or joined the MRF.
After the restoration of Muslim names, the study of Turkish in Bulgarian state schools was reestablished. Some MRF activists, however, such as the mayors of Yakoruda and Satovcha in the Mesta valley, promoted the study of Turkish as the mother tongue for Pomaks. This evoked tension, as it was regarded as Turkish assimilation. Some school directors resisted the study of Turkish. Most Pomaks, especially those in the Smolyan region (except for the village of Mogilitsa),some people in Yakoruda, and some villages of the Chech region refused to study Turkish as a mother tongue. Other methods used by Turkish nationalists appeared to be the adoption of a Turkish name system for the Pomaks and the registration of Pomaks as Turks in the censuses, e.g., in Yakoruda. 19
The mayor of Satovcha, Yussuf Djudjo, a Pomak activist of the MRF,independently decided to issue passports with Turkish, and not Pomak, Muslim names. The district attorney dismissed Djudjo as mayor on accusations of falsifying documents. He was given a suspended sentence of fourteen months for abuse of administrative power. The MRF, however, made him its district boss and increased his salary. 20 The MRF often confronts state authorities although, paradoxically, it has comprised part of these authorities. The MRF leader A. Dogan stated on November 27, 1993, that the movement "will not allow anyone, the Parliament, the President, the government, the executive, and the political parties included, to dictate our rights and freedoms in [the Western Rodopi] region." 21 This attitude is identical to the situation in Macedonia,where the Democratic Party of the Turks encouraged Pomaks in Macedonia to study Turkish as their mother tongue or to register as Turks in the census in May-July 1994. 22 For Pomaks from poor areas,Turkey is a promised land for work and earning hard currency. 23 Some Pomaks living in Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia were subjected to Turkish assimilation in the past and lost their mother tongue, like those who emigrated or were expelled from Greek Macedonia to Turkey.
As "Slav Bulgarians who speak Bulgarian as their mother tongue," 24 many Pomaks in Bulgaria would identify themselves as Bulgarians. Nevertheless, because religion has been a traditional differentiator in the Balkans, campaigns to change Muslim names and habitually low Christian-Muslim integration have repeatedly allied them with the Muslim Turks. A 1992 sociological survey of the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia indicated that one-third of the Pomaks in the country identified themselves as Muslim Bulgarians. The same survey reported that 93 percent of the non-religious and 47 percent of the religious Pomaks would marry a Christian Bulgarian, while only 56 percent and 42 percent, respectively, would marry a Turk. 25 Yet Christian Bulgarians demonstrate lower affinity to integrate with the Pomaks. 26 About one-third of the Pomaks, mainly around Gotse Delchev (Chech), Yakoruda, Velingrad, Garmen and Madan tend to accept the Turkish ethnic identity. They have manifested stronger resistance to anti-Islamic campaigns than Pomaks from other areas. Today, they exhibit a higher inclination to be assimilated to the Turks. 27 Although some Pomaks have started to study Turkish, no more than 6 percent speak it well -- 18 percent of the Pomaks present it as their mother tongue, allegedly forgotten since 1912. 28 Arif Mustakli, a deputy from the MRF, once declared that he is a Pomak but feels that he is a Turk. His opponent from the Bulgarian nationalist Fatherland Party, G. Pavlov, claims in response that under pressure from administrative and Muslim religious authorities that are in the hands of the Turkish-dominated MRF, about 100,000 Bulgarian Muslims registered as Turks during the last census.
Some Pomaks, mainly teachers, specialists with secondary technical education and administrative executives, declare that they are part of a specific ethnic group, "Muslims," "Ahryans," "Pomaks," etc. They are insulted by their Turkish and Christian neighbours' pejorative attitude that they are people who have changed their confession for political reasons, for they do not accept the thesis that their ancestors were "Islamicized." In this case, religion is interpreted as an ethno-generating factor. Allegations by Bulgarian media accuse the Turkish-backed MRF and Turkish diplomacy itself for promoting both the pro-Turkish and the distinct Pomak identity theses.
The idea of constructing a separate Pomak ethnic group has very weak roots among the Pomaks. It is mostly promoted by outside politicians. This thesis is often seen in Bulgaria as a first step to Turkish assimilation. The Greek authorities, for their own reasons (to deny the Pomaks' links to Bulgaria) have adopted their own version of the "distinct group" thesis, with the Pomaks as the descendants of an ancient Thracian tribe. 29
The United States, as a close ally of Turkey, is regarded as one of the potential supporters of the "distinct group" thesis. 30 In the US Department of State report to Congress for1993, the Pomaks are treated as a minority comprising 2-3 percent of Bulgaria's population, which, while sometimes referred to as "Bulgarian Muslims," are a distinct people of Slavic descent whose ancestors converted to Islam. Most of them are currently Muslim, although a handful became atheists or converted to Christianity, according to the report. 31 Kamen Bourov, who is attempting to establish a Pomak party, the Democratic Party of the Pomaks, has traveled to the United States to seek political support. 32 According to the Pomak MRF activist Djudjo, Bourov is only a careerist. 33 The Rodopi-based union "Rodolyubie," which aims to assimilate the Pomaks into Bulgarian society, claims that the idea of a distinct Pomak ethnic group is a foreign creation, the purpose of which is to develop a new confrontation in the Balkans. 34 In response to these controversies, some scientists from the medical institute in Stara Zagora, repeating a Greek "experiment" to be discussed later, carried out a project "proving the Bulgarian blood and the Slavonic ethnic origins" of the Pomaks by analyzing the blood of 1,000 Muslim Bulgarians from different regions. 35 Many scientists and politicians in Bulgaria, including health minister T. Gugalov,protested against these non-medical tests, recalling the Nazi "experiments."The Bulgarian origins of the Pomaks, they said, are evident. 36
Many young and better-educated Pomaks clearly identify themselves as Bulgarians. These often live in immediate proximity to the ethnic Turks. One of these Pomaks is the late poet Svilen Kapsazov, who worked for the anti-communist opposition and actively denounced the communists' violent campaigns against the Pomaks. Some Pomaks want to retain their Bulgarian names but also their Muslim identity; however, they face the rigidity of the Muslim clergy. Since 1989, imams have refused to bury Pomaks without restored Muslim names. 37 The supreme Mufti of Kardjali,Fikri Sali, insisted that Muslims do not have the right to have non-Muslim names. 38
The priest Boyan Saraev, himself a Pomak who converted to Orthodox Christianity, founded the Movement for Christianity and Progress "Yoan Predtecha" (John the Baptist), which, according to its statute, is an organization of Pomaks. Saraev estimates the descendants of Islamicized Bulgarians whose mother tongue is Bulgarian to number 350,000, and many of them, including some in Northern Greece, are ready to return to the Christian faith. 39 Saraev has baptized many young Pomaks from the villages Pripek and Nedelino 40 and insists that 50,000 Pomaks had already registered Christianity as their religion in the 1993 census. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO-SMD) in Bulgaria states that Pomaks in Macedonia and Albania also seek a way to Christianity. Saraev's activities aroused the ire of Turkish and Greek nationalists, the MRF, the Mufti of the city of Edirne in Turkey and the magazine "The Voice of the Rodopi Dweller,"published in Turkey and Iran. 41 It seems that Pomak students from Islamic schools in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Syria have returned to the Rodopi to counter the activity of Saraev (which is welcomed by Bulgarian public opinion). The Iranian authorities protested against the mass conversion of Pomaks and threatened economic sanctions against Bulgaria. Boyan Saraev characterized this as pressure on the free will of the Pomaks who chose to adopt Christianity. 42
The official figures on Macedonia's Muslim Slavs have fluctuated greatly: 1591in 1953; 3002 in 1961; 1248 in 1971 and a dramatic rise to 39,555 in 1981,after the establishment of an association of Slav Muslims in Macedonia and its first cultural meeting in 1970. The association claimed that since 1945, 70,000Pomaks were assimilated to other Muslim groups, Albanians in particular. 43
The Serbian nationalist geographer J. Cvijic was the first to treat Macedonian Pomaks as distinct from the other Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks in 1913. 44 In 1946, the communist authorities of Titoist Yugoslavia and Dimitrov's Bulgaria, following Stalin's instructions on Macedonia, referred to the Macedonian Pomaks as Macedonians -- even in theBulgarian part of Macedonia. 45 The leader ofthe Movement for Cultural and National Revival of the Muslim Macedonians,Nijazi Limanoski (himself a Pomak) now voices the position of the Macedoniangovernment that the Muslim Macedonians should take part in the construction ofthe Macedonian nation. 46 The "WorldMacedonian Congress" claimed at its July 1994 meeting in Skopje that it defendsthe rights of all Macedonians, including Macedonians of the Muslim faith. 47
By analogy with the Muslim Bulgarians, the Pomaks in Macedonia are nowofficially referred to as Muslim Macedonians. Similarly to the Pomaks inBulgaria, some Muslim Macedonians have repeatedly identified themselves withfellow Muslims. The authorities have been concerned about the penetration ofAlbanian and Turkish nationalism into this community. 48 As in Bulgaria, some Pomaks look to integration withtheir linguistic brethren, while others turn to Turkey and its quest for aneo-Ottoman role as a protector of all Balkan Muslims. Some Pomak parents send their children to study Turkish as their mother tongue -- although they do not even understand the language. In January 1993 the government sent police to the village school in Zhupa in the region of Debar to prevent the instruction of Turkish as the mother tongue to Pomak children. 49 As in Bulgaria, the government explains this phenomenon as the result of the propaganda from Macedonia's Turkish political party and of the poor Pomak population's economic interest in studying Turkish in order to trade with Turkey or to emigrate and work there. The Democratic Party of the Turks in Macedonia and the Albanian Party of Democratic Progress utilized the census in May-July 1994 to persuade the Muslim Macedonians to register as Turks. 50 Another party pretending to represent the Muslim Macedonians, the Party for Democratic Action (SDA, bearing the same name as the party of Alia Izetbegovic in Bosnia) is characterized by the authorities in Skopje as an organization of immigrants from Bosnia.
The Turks and Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks in Greece are referred to as merely "Muslims" for purposes of state security, in order to dissociate them from their kin abroad. "The Muslim minority" is the only officially-recognized minority in Greece, as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne and its accompanying conventions, signed on July 24, 1923, by the defeated Turkish state. Because of an official reticence to give figures on ethnic minorities, it is difficult to separate the numbers of Pomaks and Turks in Greece. 51
There are two aspects of the Pomak issue in the strategic concerns of the Greek government. Firstly, to improve the country's security after taking over Western Thrace in the 1920s, Athens has tried to restrict the links between Pomaks and their fellow Bulgarian-speakers and co-religionists in Turkey.Secondly, Greek authorities have twice used the religious difference between the Christian Bulgarians and the Pomaks in order to claim territories nominally belonging to Bulgaria. In the first instance, the government of Venizelos actually succeeded in getting Western Thrace during the Paris conference in1919, using a statement of a deputation of Pomaks. At the next Paris peace conference of 1947, Greece demanded another "border reform" in the Pomak areas of Bulgaria, this time to no consequence. In this sense, a major thesis of the Greek authors is that the Pomaks were enslaved by the Bulgarians.
During the Greek and Turkish population exchange in the 1920s, Athens"ethnically purified" Southern Macedonia and part of Western Thrace. In violation of the Lausanne conventions, 52 it expelled the non-Turkish Pomaks from Greek Macedonia to Turkey. The protests Albanian government in the League of Nations for a time spared of the the Muslim Albanians from expulsion from Greece, 53 but the defeated Bulgaria did nothing to stop the expulsion of the Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks. The Muslim minority in Western Thrace, Pomaks included, was exempted from the population exchange and allowed to stay. 54 According to Greek sources, 34,978 Pomaks(compared to a total of 72,800 in 1916), or 33.5 percent of the "Muslim minority," still live in Greece, 55 23,000 in the mountain areas above Xanthi, 10,000 in the district of Rodopi; and 2,000 inthe villages of Didimotikon. The Greek constitution of 1975, amended in 1985,guarantees full protection of life, honor and freedom (Article 5, Paragraph 2)to all persons living in Greece, regardless of their nationality, race,language, religion and political creed. 56 Yet, due to the Pomaks' non-Greek identity, Athens has consistently limited their trans-border contacts and, by virtue of the 1938 law No. 1366, their right to construct or transfer houses. This decree refers to foreign nationals, but the authorities use it against Pomaks who are Greek citizens. 57
Although Bulgaria has a 494 kilometer-long border with Greece, 58 there are only two ways to cross it: the motor way between Sofia and Athens at Kulata/Promahon, and at Ormenion near the border with Turkey. Neither passage is designed to serve the population of the border regions. The distance from the Bulgarian border to the Aegean Sea is very small(only 12 kilometers at one point) and the transportation restrictions severely harm the economy. Two major roads, the Makes pass and the Goats-Drama road, as well as a number of smaller ones, have been closed for decades. Theunderlying reason for these closures is to eliminate contacts between Pomaks and Turks from both sides of the Greek-Bulgarian border. Much of Western Thraceis a restricted area due to Greek national security considerations. Large portions of land have been expropriated from Pomaks and Turks, and their movement is confined within 30 kilometers of their homes. 58 The Greek authorities publish data showing high rates of illiteracy among Pomaks, while the study of their mother tongue is banned. In a document submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on December13, 1993, the Greek government admitted that there exists no teaching of Islam(not to speak of secular education) in the mother tongue of the Pomaks because this language has no written form 60 - thus intentionally ignoring the fact that the Pomaks are Bulgarian-speakers. All traces of Bulgarian presence in Western Thrace are to disappear. Construing artificial theories about the Pomaks in fact constitutes denial of their ethnic identity.
An unpublished pamphlet by Pavlos Hidiroglu illustrating the basic Greek theories on the identity of the Pomaks describes them as Islamicized,linguistically Slavicized descendants of the ancient Thracians with a Greek admixture. Hidiroglu widely uses a survey (a medical Ph.D dissertation defended in Thesaloniki) of blood tests of 1,030 Pomak villagers conducted in the 1970s,which allegedly prove the unique character of the community and some kinshipwith the Greeks. The Bulgarian language of the population is dismissed,according to the author, because the "high" (but unclear) percentage of Greek words used by the Pomaks consists of mostly verbs. A mere comparison, however,indicates that many of the same words are used in the colloquial Bulgarian language.
One of the names of the Pomaks, "Ahryani," is accepted by Hidiroglu as proof that Pomaks descend from a Thracian tribe with a similar name. The author arbitrarily assumes that the Thracians were part of the Hellenistic sphere of influence, thus legitimating modern Greek claims on the identity of the Pomaks.In order to distinguish the Pomaks from the Turks, Hidiroglu cites the fact that the former are taller, blond and blue-eyed (as are the Slavs). Yet in the next sentence, he claims that they are "Slavophone" but different from the Slavs. Greek theories on minorities in the north of the country combine in a peculiar fashion antiquity and Orthodox Christianity.
Like the Pomaks in Bulgaria and Macedonia, the Pomaks in Northern Greece are subjected to Turkish assimilation policies. Turkish scholarships and privileges are offered to young Pomaks from the area. Nevertheless, Greek authors speak of hostility between Turks and Pomaks in Western Thrace. Greek authors, such as Hidiroglu, A. Lyapis and Martilu Apostolidi, express a concern that if the Pomak dialect is not protected, it will be substituted by the Turkish language in a campaign orchestrated from Turkey. 61
No reliable data exists on Pomaks in Albania. They are estimated to number between 80,000 and 120,000. This minority has also become part of the political games in the Balkans. After 1945, the Albanian authorities had to recognize the Pomaks as part of the "Macedonian minority" in Albania, because they were interested in the recognition of Albanians' rights in various Yugoslav republics. As a consequence, some Albanian Pomaks have "Macedonian" as the nationality inscribed in their passports. Pomaks in Albania are less incident be assimilated by co-religionist Muslim Albanians than are Pomaks in Macedonia. The Macedonian authorities today claim that the Pomaks in Albania number 200,000, in order to counter claims by the Albanian minority in Macedonia which aspires to the status of a constituent nation in that republic.The Pomaks in Albania live in mountainous areas in the eastern part of the country. One of these areas, Golo Bardo, is cut off from the world for several months in the winter when heavy snow immobilizes transportation. In September1993, ethnographers reported a close link between the folklore of the Pomaks in Albania and the Pomaks in the Rodopi. Democratization in Albania was welcomed by the Pomaks. Even in 1993 people still felt the euphoria of liberation from the totalitarian regime and from the limitations imposed on freedom of consciousness and identity.
The Pomak community in Turkey consists of local Slav Muslims from Eastern Thrace and descendants of Pomak immigrants who left their homelands for Turkey during the twentieth century. There they lost their language, and,together with the local Pomaks in Eastern Thrace, were assimilated to the Turks. According to Stefan Troebst, however, they are politically well-organized. 62
However, Turkey is primarily interested in the Pomaks who remain in the Balkan countries. Turkish authors have developed several theories on the origins of the Pomaks. Some relate Pomaks to Turkic peoples who occasionally came to the Balkans before the Ottoman Turks, such as the Avars, proto-Bulgarians, Uzes or Kumans. Another theory seeks to relate the Pomaks to the Alawite followers of Abu Muslim, the Iranian rebel who overthrew the Umayyad dynasty in 750 A.D. These followers of Abu Muslim, known as Hurremlar in Turkish, fled the caliphate after the establishment of the Abbassid dynasty. A splinter group known as the "Cepniler" came to the Balkans and gave birth to the Pomak group. 63 Other Turkish sources claim that the Pomak vernacular is very close to the Turkish Anatolian dialects from which65 percent of Pomak words come, while only 25 percent of the words are Slavic and 5 percent Greek. In fact, borrowings from Turkish were natural after the Pomaks embraced Islam, while adopting a proper name is a symbol of the cultural loyalty of the Muslim. The Turkish theories of obscure origins of the Pomaks, like the Greek theses, are dictated by political purposes.
If the minority problem in a world of nation-states is defined by the distinct identity of minorities, ambiguous identities or those that are not well established tend to become an international security problem. Claims on the identity of such communities are made according to different factors and tend to gravitate toward various interests of various states.
The question of the small and internationally-dispersed community of the Pomaks demonstrates the political intricacies and influences targeted at various strategic considerations of political and state factors. As the political position of Bulgaria weakened during the twentieth century and as various Bulgarian governments indulged in anti-Muslim campaigns, the ties of the Islamicized Bulgarians with the Bulgarian state came under strain. Yet, the Bulgarian public and authorities are increasingly sensitive to the mushrooming theories regarding Pomak identity. Athens is anxious about the fate of its Pomak population because of security concerns in Western Thrace. Macedonian authorities are concerned with their process of nation building, while Turkey does not want to lose what it views as the natural affinity of Balkan Muslims to their Ottoman past and to the contemporary bearer of this legacy: modern Turkey. In the best traditions of Balkan clientelism, the different actors try to involve their more powerful allies in the "petty" game around the Pomaks.
As turmoil in the Balkans spreads, the Pomaks, dispersed in five different countries, become an object of growing interest for scholars and politicians.In international politics, however, the identity and human rights of the Pomaks are often reduced to being merely elements in the interplay of the national security concerns of proximate, as well as distant, actors.
NOTES
*: A different version of this article will be published in Nationalities Papers and appears here in its original form Back.
Note 1: Hugh Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, Minority Rights Group Report no. 87 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1988), 7, and Alexandre Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, Balkanologische Veröfentlichungen, Vol. 11 (Berlin: Osteuropa Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin, 1986), 172. Back.
Note 2: H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: University Press, 1951), Fig. 85. See also Petar Petrov, Po sledite na nasilieto (Sofia: INI, 1972), 1-60, and Popovic, 66. Back.
Note 3: Felix Kanitz, Donau Bulgarien und der Balkanen (Leipzig, 1882), ii. Back.
Note 4: Popovic, 80, 173; see also S. D. Salomone, "The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology" in East European Quarterly 23, no. 1-2 (March-June 1989), 49, and Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 7, 29, 32. Back.
Note 5: Andre Liebich, "Minorities in Eastern Europe: Obstacles to a Reliable Count," RFE/RL Research Report, May 15, 1992, 32-39. Back.
Note 6: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 7, 29, 32. Back.
Note 7: Nijazi Limanoski, Islamkata religija I islamiziranite makedontsi (Skopje: Makedonska kniga, 1989), 133. Back.
Note 8: Tsvetana Georgieva, "Strukturata na vlastta v traditsionnata obshtnost na pomatsite v rayona na Chech (Zapadni Rodopi)" in Etnichestata kartina v Balgariya (Sofia: Club `90, 1993), 74. Back.
Note 9: See Arendt Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1980), 1-3. Back.
Note 11: See Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991), x-244. Back.
Note 12: 168 chassa, May 30-June 5, 1994. Back.
Note 13: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 8, 32. Back.
Note 14: See Dictionnaire des religions, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1985), s.v. "Les bogomils," by Kalman Sass. Sass traces the origins of the Pomaks to Bulgarian Bogomils or another heretical sect. Some Pomaks of Macedonia are still called "Torbeshi," which is the earlier name of the Bogomils in the same area. Bulgaria's Bogomils, however, never managed to become the dominant sect in their country and lived scattered around it. Back.
Note 15: See Popovic, 77, 92, 103. Back.
Note 16: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 7. Back.
Note 19: Demokratsia, no. 78, April 9, 1994. Back.
Note 20: 24 chassa, July 7, 1994, 5; Standart, no. 676, July 31, 1994; Demokratsia, no. 66, March 22, 1994 and no. 77, April 8, 1994. Back.
Note 21: Trud, no. 148, July 4, 1994. Back.
Note 22: Demokratsia, no. 183, August 13, 1994. Back.
Note 23: Duma, no. 47, February 25, 1994. Back.
Note 24: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 7. Back.
Note 25: Zhivko Georgiev, "Nyakoi rezultati ot izsledvaneto `Etnokulturnata situatsia v Balgaria -- 1992" in Sotsiologicheski pregled, no. 3 (1993), 58. Back.
Note 26: 1. Ibid., 54-81. Back.
Note 27: The Chech region has been divided between Greece and Bulgaria since 1913. Its economy suffered when the road to Drama was closed in 1913. It has a specific economic and cultural system. Religious dissidence has existed there since the Middle Ages when punitive expeditions were sent from Mount Athos, a religious center of Orthodox Christianity. Back.
Note 28: Georgiev, 54-81. Back.
Note 29: Evidence for this is provided in the reply to the questionnaire of the UN Special Rapporteur on minorities, submitted by the Greek government: UN document E/CN.4/1994/72/Corr.1 from February 10, 1994. Back.
Note 30: Kontinent, no. 119, May 31, 1994, and Duma, no. 49, February 28, 1994. Back.
Note 31: Demokratsia, no. 30, February 4, 1994. Back.
Note 32: 24 Chassa, July 4, 1994, 13. Back.
Note 33: Interview with Yusuf Djudjo in Standart, no. 676, July 31, 1994. Back.
Note 35: Kontinent, no. 127, June 9, 1994, and 24 Chassa, July 31, 1994. Back.
Note 36: Duma, no. 151, July 7, 1994, and Demokratsia, no. 151, July 7, 1994. Back.
Note 37: Trud, no. 112, May 20, 1994, and Duma, no. 299, December 15, 1994. Back.
Note 38: 24 Chassa, July 7, 1994, 5. Back.
Note 39: Duma, no. 174, August 3, 1994. Back.
Note 40: Trud, no. 118, May 30, 1994, and Demokratsia, no. 108, May 16, 1994. Back.
Note 41: Duma, no. 174, August 3, 1994 and Duma, no. 61, March 16, 1994. Back.
Note 42: Duma, no. 174, August 3, 1994. Back.
Note 43: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 29. Back.
Note 44: Wilkinson, 162-163 and Fig. 85. According to Wilkinson, it was Cvijic who in 1906 created the theory of the distinct Macedonian nation. Back.
Note 45: Demokratsia, no. 147, July 2, 1994 Back.
Note 47: . Nova Makedonija, August 8, 1994. Back.
Note 48: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 29. Back.
Note 49: See Nova Makedonija, January 7-10, 1993, and Limanoski, 116, 133. Back.
Note 50: Demokratsia, no. 183, August 13, 1994. Back.
Note 51: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 32. Back.
Note 52: Archives de la Société des Nations, Doc. No. R.82/2/33969/31152. Back.
Note 53: Archives de la Société des Nations, Doc. Nos. R.82/2/32701/31152 and R.82/2/32587/31152. Back.
Note 54: Archives de la Société des Nations, Doc. No. R.82/2/33969/31152. Back.
Note 55: Apostolos Hristakudis, "Musulmanskoto maltsinstvo v Gartsia" in Natsionalni problemi na Balkanite (Sofia: ARGES, 1992), 245-262; Popovic, 80, 173; and Salomone, 49. Back.
Note 56: Hristakudis, 245-62. Back.
Note 57: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 32. Back.
Note 58: The Southeastern European Yearbook 1991 (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1992), 318. Back.
Note 59: Poulton, Minorities in Bulgaria, 32. Back.
Note 60: UN document E/CN.4/1994/72 from Dec.13, 1993, 17. Apostolos Hristakudis, while admitting the Bulgarian background of the Pomak vernacular, claims only that some borrowings from Turkish and Greek exist. Back.
Note 61: See A. Lyapis, "The Pomaks in Time," Trakiki Epetrida, no. 4 (1983), 10-13 (in Greek). Back.
Note 62: Stefan Troebst, "Ethnopolitics in Bulgaria: the Turkish, Macedonian, Pomak, and Gypsy Minorities," Helsinki Monitor 5, no. 1, 39. Back.
Note 63: Cited from Enver M. Serifgil, "Toponimik bir arastirma: Gocler ve yer adlari (Turkler, Pomaklar ve Bulgarlar)," Turk Dunyasi Arasirmalari Dergisi 2, no. 7 (1980), 81-126. Back.
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