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Fear And Loathing in Macedonia:
Ethnic Nationalism And The Albanian Problem
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
Over the past 150 years, Macedonia has provided a unique testing ground for nationalism as an ideology. If nationalism, as Hans Kohn writes, "asserts that the nation-state is the ideal and the only legitimate form of political organization and that the nationality is the source of all cultural and of economic well-being," then the fact that the very concept of "nationality" has been so bitterly contested over the years in Macedonia inherently reflects that a uniform identity for its inhabitants has not been established. 1 Since the onset of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration, competing nation-states and nationalities surrounding Macedonia have fought ideological and physical wars to determine under which national banner its people would fall. It was not until the establishment of Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia that an independent Macedonian nationality was officially recognized. Even then, this identity went unaccepted by the surrounding nations (Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania) whose governments each saw Tito's policy as nothing more than a political ploy to lessen their own traditional influence in the region. These three countries considered all, or at least large numbers of, the Macedonians to be unrecognized members of their own "nations."
Today a newly independent Republic of Macedonia is struggling to survive as a nation-state. In one sense, the struggle is largely based on international factors, in particular on a precarious relationship with the republic's southern neighbor, Greece. Although unopposed to Macedonia's right to exist as an independent state, at least as publicly stated by the present Greek government, Athens has insisted that Macedonia change its name based on the intrinsic belief that the term "Macedonia" -- with all of its historical and cultural implications -- is part of the Greek national identity. Since Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece has aggressively acted upon this belief through a general embargo of Macedonian goods, followed by a total economic blockade of Macedonia's main trading route through the Greek port city of Thessaloniki.
Combined with the UN embargo imposed on rump-Yugoslavia, the eighteen-month blockade crippled Macedonia's already-weak economy and was only abandoned in September 1995, after intense Western diplomatic pressure forced a reluctant Greece to the negotiating table. The result was a comprehensive agreement in which Macedonia agreed to change those parts of its constitution that Greece felt suggested a "territorial claim" on the Greek province of Macedonia, as well as to alter its flag. In exchange, Greece agreed to lift the blockade and promised to move quickly toward full diplomatic recognition. 2
This article will attempt to demonstrate, however, that the greatest threat to the survival of the Republic of Macedonia comes not from Greece or its other immediate neighbors, but from within its own borders. This internal variable, as Jacques Rupnik points out, is ominously similar in character to a constitutional defect that contributed to the sparking of civil war in Croatia. "Both Croatia and Macedonia now define themselves as the states of the Macedonian and Croatian nations," and believe that their constitutions provide the minorities in their countries (Albanians in Macedonia and Serbs in Croatia) with a wide range of rights. Rupnik notes, however, that those same rights "are perceived by those groups as giving them second-class status." 3
Despite large numbers of non-ethnic "Macedonians," such as Albanians, the nascent Republic of Macedonia has become an ethnically-defined state, a state embodied by and for the "nation" or "corporate will" of Slav Macedonians. 4 Other groups living within its borders who do not pertain to the "corporate will" of Macedonians -- Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Vlachs, and Romanies (Gypsies) -- have been unceremoniously designated as "minorities," in a manner similar to the Serbs living in Croatian territory, who are considered as part of a national minority within the Croat nation. Bogdan Denitch emphasizes how structurally dangerous this designation can be in the state-forming process:
If the new states are defined as nation states -- that is, as the homeland of the politically dominant [national group] -- then they will always have at least two classes of citizens: the majority, the full members of a political nation; and the minority (or minorities), who will be tolerated and given fewer rights. The minorities will never be fully equal members of the political nation if that political nation is defined ethnically. 5
Much of the instability within Macedonia today is rooted in the ethnic definition of the new state, and is manifested in the increasingly violent reaction of Macedonian Albanians to what they perceive as their entrenched and expanding "second-class status." Indeed, it can be argued that the state's very survival is contingent upon which ethnic definition is finally employed.
This statement is not intended, however, to undervalue the damage inflicted by Greece's blockade of and diplomatic antagonism toward Macedonia. In the last year alone, Macedonia's gross national product (GNP) contracted by 6.2 percent, 6 while real industrial production shrank by 51.9 percent between 1989 and 1991. 7 Macedonia's economic difficulties have exacerbated internal tensions between the Albanians and the majority Macedonian Slavs. Thus, Greek nationalism, manifested in the form of economic discrimination toward Macedonia, has indirectly stoked the fire of Macedonian nationalism, thereby worsening relations between the majority Slav population and the minority Albanians, and making the need for a comprehensive solution to these tensions all the more imperative. 8
Milo Paskal warns that instability in Macedonia will prevail unless and until the country's Albanian minority is placed on the "same footing" with the Slav Macedonians in the country. 9 In this sense, ethnically-defined Macedonian citizenship, as presented in the current Macedonian constitution, has served to heighten tensions between the two communities, since Albanians perceive themselves to be increasingly marginalized by the state-forming process. This article will examine how and why the polarization between the two communities has increased since independence, and in particular, why ethnic nationalism has become an important component in the Macedonian state-forming and political processes. Further, this article posits that until the Macedonian Albanians are fully and institutionally included in a "civic" constitutional definition of Macedonian citizenship, the potential for ethnic discord, even separatism, will continue to simmer under Macedonia's political surface, ready to erupt at any time.
Constitutional Nationalism in an Imagined Community
Gligorov's pragmatism has served merely to minimize, not to resolve, growing tensions between the Slav Macedonian and Albanian communities. In order to understand why such tensions have developed, we turn now to a theoretical framework provided by Benedict Anderson. In his seminal work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Anderson theorizes that a nation needs to be defined as an "imagined political community." Such a community is "imagined" because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion." 14 In this context, post-Ottoman Macedonia has been a unique, fertile battleground for competing Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Albanian, and finally ethnic Macedonian "imagined communities."
In terms of the current Republic of Macedonia, this competition has developed into clashing visions of the state put forth by the Albanian community and the dominant Slav Macedonian majority. The Slav Macedonians perceive Albanians as a divisive force in the forging of the new state, precisely because they do not fit into the Slav Macedonian ethnic definition. A great many Slav Macedonians have come to accept the nationalist precept in which national sovereignty itself is based on ethnic differentiation. As Inis Claude wrote more than forty years ago, this conception of sovereignty leads to a situation in which national minorities are regarded as "alien elements which impede the proper functioning of the state as the political instrument of the nation [that is, of the ethnically-defined majority]." For Claude, this is what is signified by the term "nation-state." By definition, then, "nation-states and national minorities are incompatible." 15
Robert Hayden writes about this incompatibility in the context of a disintegrated Yugoslavia. He emphasizes that the great danger for the emerging states is that ethnic nationalism, or "ethnonationalism," as Walker Conner has termed it, 16 can easily become the foundation for sovereignty, in which "sovereignty resides with a particular nation (narod), the members of which are the only ones who can decide fundamental questions of state form." 17 Hayden explains that this foundation takes the form of "constitutional nationalism," in which "a constitutional and legal structure ... privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state." 18
No one would argue that "constitutional nationalism" is as ingrained in Macedonia as in Croatia. Unlike the 1990 Croatian constitution, the 1991 Macedonian constitution repeatedly emphasizes the need for "peaceful cohabitation with minority nations." Article 78 even provides for a Council for Interethnic Relations in the Republican Assembly, in which two elected members of each minority group in the state have the special power to assess and propose parliamentary solutions to interethnic problems. 19 Still, the constitution's preamble clearly states that the Republic of Macedonia was "established as a national state of the Macedonian people" to provide for the "cohabitation of the Macedonian people with... [the] minorities living in the Republic." 20 In this context, Albanians are officially relegated to a secondary place in society. The Macedonian constitution provides rights to all people in the state, yet defines the state as the political incarnation of the Macedonian people. We can thus begin to understand why many within the Albanian community have felt cornered into a "separate but equal" place in their society.
President Gligorov has not challenged this constitutional definition of citizenship, in part because the Slav Macedonians support it so strongly. The next section of this article will examine the evolution of this ethnically-based Macedonian state.
It is not the task of this article to question whether a sense of Macedonian cultural, ethnic, or national identity existed prior to 1945. There is ample evidence that a Macedonian sense of "nationality" separate from Bulgaria, Serbia, and the other surrounding nations had developed long before Tito came to dominate Yugoslav politics. 22 As William Pfaff noted in his piece "Invitation to War: Balkans," to argue that the sense of a Macedonian "corporate will" is artificial and created by Tito and other Yugoslav leaders is to venture onto the unstable ground of historical hyperbole and myth propagated and encouraged through nationalism. 23 Nevertheless, it was Tito who was the catalyst behind the creation of an official Macedonian political entity. In this sense, then, a process of Macedonian state building, based on an ethnic definition of sovereignty, truly began to evolve with Tito's seizure of power in 1945. 24
Tito had two distinct motives for advancing the cause of the new Macedonia. First, he saw Macedonia as counterbalancing the dominant role that Serbia might play in the "South Slav" union. His was to be a true federal Yugoslavia, one of shared constitutional power among its constituent republics. Official Yugoslav recognition of a distinct Macedonian nationality was essential to maintaining Yugoslavia's integrity. 25 Ironically, although Tito's policy was one of de facto encouragement of Macedonian nationalism, he encouraged it in order to defuse the kind of nationalist tension which has doomed the Yugoslav state since its first incarnation.
Second, through the promotion of a Macedonian national identity, Tito undermined Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian territorial claims on Macedonia. He denied Serbia a large chunk of its former "Greater Serbia" and stated that Macedonians could not be identified as Bulgarians. He also began to question national identity in northern Greece, implying that the numerous Slavic-speaking Greeks in the northern Greek province of Macedonia were actually members of this new official Macedonian nationality. Tito's official recognition of Macedonian nationality was intended to differentiate Macedonians from surrounding national groups, and to find a more permanent solution to the troublesome Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian claims on Macedonia. 26
This solution was, at least on the surface, very much an exercise dictated from above. Tito's goal was not simply to establish a new political entity; it was to sanction the official recognition, even creation, of a distinct Macedonian culture. An independent standard Macedonian grammar was formulated and an independent Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was established. Here we see one of the great ironies which served to distinguish the Yugoslav brand of communism from all others: a communist government literally created and worked with a religious community to carve out a new national identity.
The Church rapidly became an essential tool for the consolidation of the Slav Macedonians into a nation. For many Macedonians, it would come to symbolize the fight against a perceived threat of Albanian nationalism and the growth of Islam in the regions of western Macedonia. 27 Today, many Macedonians see the Church as "the key to nationhood." The nationalist political party VMRO-DPMNU (in Macedonian, IMRO in English) even went so far as to propose Metropolitan Mikhail, the Bishop of Macedonia's capital Skopje, as its presidential candidate in the 1990 elections. 28
Like Bulgarian and Greek nationalism, Macedonian nationalism attempted to use and co-opt historical legacies and myths for its own purposes. Greek nationalists tried to "Hellenize" Macedonian Slavs in the nineteenth century through the publication and circulation of Slavic versions of Greek stories. 29 Under Tito, official policy disassociated Alexander the Great and his myth from its Greek roots, while Slav scholars attempted to prove that the Macedonians of Alexander's time were ethnically distinguishable from the Greeks. 30 Ancient Macedonian symbols and myths, previously assigned to the Greek national identity, now became part of the official Macedonian culture.
Ancient Macedonia was not the only myth used by Macedonian authorities in their drive to entrench the new identity. The medieval Tsar Samuilo, who had briefly ruled over a medieval "Macedonian" empire, was presented as a national hero, even though his legend had also become part of modern Bulgarian nationalism. In addition, the Macedonian language was officially presented as the most direct link to Old Church Slavonic, the first literary Slavic language. 31
Macedonian nationalism managed to change the way Slav Macedonians were perceived by the outside world, despite Bulgarian, Greek, and Albanian opposition. John Zametica writes that "the Macedonian nation was indeed a test-tube baby, but it made some sense in that the Macedonians could only with some difficulty be described as Bulgarians, and only with some imagination as Serbs." 32 Slav Macedonians had never quite fit into any other national category. While the roots of Macedonian nationalism had been developing for many years, under Tito Yugoslav officials worked hard to keep its roots strong and healthy. To the dismay of Greek and Bulgarian nationalists, a definite sense of Macedonian "national identity" was solidly in place by the time the state gained independence in 1991. The current Macedonian foreign minister, Denko Maleski, argues that "the word `Macedonia' is part of our history," and that if recognition of the nation were denied, Macedonians would face a "crisis of identity." 33 Maleski's words point to an ethnically- defined Macedonian nationalism, one based on the differentiation of the "majority" Slav Macedonians from the groups of "minorities" residing within Macedonia's borders. Yet what of those who do not fit into this ethnically-defined category? After all, there are sizable communities of ethnic minorities within the state: Albanians, for example, make up between 20 and 40 percent of the population. Is it possible to be both Albanian and Macedonian? Maleski's words tend toward the negative.
It appears that the consequence of Tito's promotion of Macedonian nationalism is now the logical exclusion of a significant percentage of Macedonia's population from the workings of the new state. The following section will analyze the electoral consequences of Tito's legacy in detail.
After the first free Macedonian elections of 1990 and during the march toward a declaration of independence in 1991, several crucial problems threatened the stability of the new republic, most importantly the rise of nationalist politics. The single largest political party to emerge from the elections was the nationalist VMRO-DPMNU, winning 33 out of 120 seats in the Sobranie, or national assembly. Led by Ljupco Georgievski, this party had one immediate goal: to ensure that the new state of Macedonia was legally and institutionally defined along ethnic lines.
The party charter called for the forging of a "spiritual, economic, and ethnic union of the divided Macedonian people." Those who did not fall under the definition of "Macedonian people," such as the Albanians, were considered by the party to be non-Macedonian nationals living within the new state. 34 Party members saw Albanians as a threat, "undermining Macedonian identity, and by extension, the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state." Although entitled to the same rights as other peoples of Macedonia, according to the charter, Albanians had "no claim to special rights." 35
Other political parties, such as President Gligorov's reformed League of Communists of Macedonia, did not share such a dogmatic view of the Macedonian national identity. At the time of the election, the party had recently chosen a new platform which advocated "individual freedom for all, democracy, the rule of law, acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and democratic socialism." Actively campaigning against the divisive nationalism advocated by the VMRO-DPMNU, Gligorov's party took a beating in the 1990 elections, winning only 31 seats. Still, it managed to thwart the former from coming to power by working with other parties to form a ruling coalition under the name of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM). One of the components of the new coalition was an alliance of two Albanian parties, the PDP and the People's Democratic Party (NDP), which together had captured 23 seats. Under Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, the new government included five ethnic Albanian ministers from this group. 36
At the time, this alliance seemed to be a crucial step in the right direction for many Albanians, who developed great hope that fundamental social problems would be addressed. Deep Albanian dissatisfaction with a worsening social status had led to the rapid growth and popularity of the Albanian political parties, whose electoral success was facilitated by the large concentration of Albanians in the western province of Tetovo. With the liberalization of politics in the late 1980s, these parties formed specifically to represent the Albanian community's interests, in particular to fight against the considerable discrimination that it faced. The parties' leaders consistently and publicly challenged Macedonian nationalist trends in Macedonian politics and society, especially attacking the growing influence of "ethnic-based" nationalist politics in the new state, as best represented by the VMRO-DPMNU. 37
As we shall see, however, the Albanian role in government has remained to a large degree ineffective, as the governmental reforms advocated and demanded by the Albanian alliance were not enacted. As such, the high level of frustration within the Macedonian Albanian community has not abated. Before examining the government's failure to address these issues, it is necessary to outline some of the most serious ethnic problems, which developed even before Macedonia's independence from Yugoslavia.
Albanian fears of being relegated to a second-class role in Macedonian society have very real roots in the historical and traditional divisions between Slav Macedonians and the Albanian community, as well as in recent events which have served to shatter the faith of the Albanians in government. To some degree, the mutual distrust that these two groups share can be traced back to the days of Ottoman control, when Muslim Albanians occupied a more prominent position than did the Christian Slavs. In this century, Macedonians felt a sharp sense of resentment in the 1950s when many Albanians loudly rejected the idea of becoming part of the new Macedonian constituent republic, going so far as to demand autonomy from Tito. 38
In the final years of federal Yugoslavia, particularly after 1981, when ethnic tension in Kosovo began to spiral out of control, Albanians faced consistent discrimination though official policy. In Macedonia as in Kosovo, Albanian leaders in public political trials were accused of seeking to undermine Yugoslav and Macedonian integrity, and Albanian business activities were restricted by local and federal communist governments. Perhaps most infuriating for the Albanians, however, was the government's official policy restricting Albanian language instruction in schools, the detrimental effects of which strongly reverberated well into the era of independence. 39
The lack of government action toward resolving issues of Albanian discrimination contributed strongly to Albanian distrust of Macedonian moves toward independence in 1991, and Albanian representatives called for a boycott of the original independence referendum in September 1991. This boycott was believed by more moderate Macedonian leaders to be a "stab in the back," but it was precisely those leaders, particularly President Gligorov, who were held responsible by many Albanians for not doing enough to "right the wrongs." 40
Many of these "wrongs" concern severe Albanian and Albanian language underrepresentation in education and official circles. According to community leaders, Albanians comprise only four percent of the state bureaucracy. 41 There are very few Albanians in the police force or in the military corps, and although Albanian representatives gained control in the local government in the year after independence, Hugh Poulton notes that "control amounts to little more than being able to ensure that the streets are cleaned; the real power resides in Skopje." 42 Albanians are growing impatient with their underrepresentation at all levels of society.
In matters of education, the situation has been even more dire. Of a total 71,505 students of secondary and higher education in Macedonia in 1993, only 2,794 were Albanian. Worse, of 22,994 university students, only 386 were Albanian. 43 These low numbers primarily reflect the fact that instruction in the Albanian language remains "dreadfully inadequate." In the Tetovo region, where ethnic Albanians make up 70 percent of the population, only 42 secondary classes were conducted in Albanian as of April 1994. 44 Again, even by the official 1994 census in which Albanians comprise 22.9 percent of the population, these numbers fall far short of being an equal distribution of educational resources among the two communities. 45
In recent months, the issue of language instruction has become a rallying point for Albanian discontent. Specifically, frustration about the lack of university-level instruction led to the unsanctioned establishment in December 1994 of an Albanian-language university in the city of Tetovo. Not surprisingly, the Macedonian government reacted strongly against the university and quickly moved to close it down. This move enraged students, leading to riots which paralyzed the region and generally heightened tensions between the government and the Albanian community. Although the government has promised to introduce more Albanian language instruction in existing Macedonian universities, it has remained adamantly opposed to the establishment of an independent Albanian-language university in Macedonia. 46
Why has Gligorov's government remained so uncompromising on this issue? E. J. Hobsbawm, in examining the rise of nationalism throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, writes that "linguistic nationalism was and is essentially about the language of public education and official use." 47 Government leaders viewed the demands for the university as a political action encouraged by extremist Albanian leaders, and they feared that its establishment would lead to an increasingly separatist atmosphere. 48
Despite Gligorov's more pragmatic approach in the current Macedonian government, it is clear that Albanian language and culture have come to be non-representative of the Macedonian state, and therefore "secondary." The political evolution of the new Macedonian state toward a legal "ethnic" definition has been best represented and symbolized by the adoption of the new Macedonian constitution in November 1991.
The constitution was vociferously rejected by Albanian members of government, angry that its very formulation that did not "accord Albanians or other nationalities the same level of recognition or status," and pointed to several clauses as proof of their accusation. One such clause referred to the "historical fact that Macedonia is the national state of the Macedonian people," while another designated the Macedonian language, with its Cyrillic alphabet, as the official language of the state. 50 Since the Albanian language and religion were not given official "state" status, Albanians felt de-legitimized. Macedonia was moving toward Hayden's "constitutional nationalism," in which the dominant narod legally "solidif[ies] the cultural boundaries of the individual nation, differentiating it from others." 51
To their credit, President Gligorov and other moderates fought hard to include a human rights clause, which attempted to allay Albanian fears by guaranteeing "the protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic identity of all nationalities." Still, it seemed as if Albanian fears at the time of independence were being realized through the constitution, and that non-Slav Macedonians were being driven to a legally-recognized inferior status. 52
As could be expected, the PDP/NDP coalition insisted that the constitution either had to be substantially amended or scrapped all together. Albanian leaders repeatedly emphasized, their "traditions and culture had not been tolerated" by past Macedonian and Yugoslav governments. 53 Thus, any comprehensive solution would have to reject an ethnic basis for the Macedonian state and provide sufficient constitutional guarantees, stripping Macedonian citizenship of all ethnic qualifications. 54
Gligorov and the SDUM government, recognizing a very real need to maintain its political alliance with the Albanian coalition, realized that the situation called for compromise. In February 1993, after more than a year of negotiation, agreement on a new citizen-based constitution had been reached. The proposed constitution would omit any reference to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, a central demand of the Muslim Albanians. On the language issue, too, the government made progress, agreeing to recognize Albanian as an "official language." Documents such as national identification cards and passports could now be produced in both Albanian and Macedonian. 55
The revised constitution languished in the Sobranie, as the VMRO-DPMNU refused to accept its more moderate tone. Since a working majority of two-thirds was necessary to pass a new constitution, the nationalists had more than enough seats to block any change. Hopes were raised during the October 1994 election, when President Gligorov's ruling alliance won an overwhelming majority (110 of 120 seats) due to the VMRO-DPMNU's boycott of the election after the first round. VMRO party leaders had called for the boycott after "too many irregularities" had been noted by Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) monitors, including a change in electoral voting boundaries. 56
The Albanian parties did not fare well in the elections, winning just fourteen seats, down from twenty-four in 1990. The PDP/NDP alliance did not hide its displeasure at the new voting rules and redrawing of districts initiated by Gligorov and the non-Albanian members of the ruling coalition, and it blamed these "unnecessary" changes for their loss of seats. 57 Further complicating matters, however, was the fact that four of the fourteen seats went to a more radical Albanian party made up of NDP legislators upset with the pace of reforms. These dissenters vowed that they would not work with Gligorov's alliance, arguing that those PDP and NDP politicians who aligned themselves with Gligorov were his "subordinates" and could not effect any real constitutional change. 58
One central constitutional change still demanded by Albanian leaders involves the lowering of the residency requirement for Macedonian citizenship from fifteen to five years, thereby enabling many "newer" members of the community to gain this privilege. 58 Gligorov and the SDUM government have not only refused to change this law, but have also been accused of manipulating the 1994 census results in order to purposely lower the Albanian percentage of the population by 10 percent or more. A larger Albanian population, Albanian leaders argue, would de-legitimize the ethnic basis of the new Macedonian state and force Gligorov and the SDUM into the constitutional changes they have so far been avoiding. 60
The electoral success of Gligorov's coalition has not spelled victory for the Albanian cause. Despite the fact that the coalition still officially counts the much weaker PDP/NDP coalition as one of its allies, there have been no serious moves toward instituting constitutional change in the months since the election. One can only surmise that the now very significant power of the SDUM alliance, combined with a decrease in the Albanian parties' legislative weight, has caused a directional change in policy for the government and has, at the very least, delayed its plans to enact a citizen-based constitution. This shift, however, indicates that the government is now less able or less willing to manage growing Albanian discontent.
The first such sign emerged in the winter months of 1991-92, when several Albanian politicians from the Tetovo region declared the creation of the Republic of Illirida. Although this declaration proved to be more of a "hoax" than a political reality, the ramifications for the Macedonian government were clear. A combative, threatened mood within the Albanian community had come to the forefront of political discourse. 61 Although mainstream Albanian parties had never really supported separatism, the horrors of the Bosnian civil war and the inclusion of the PDP/NDP coalition in the government helped to further deflect political movement toward that goal. 62
Further signs of potential implosion were evident in January 1992 when a watered-down referendum was held in the western Macedonian counties where Albanians comprised a majority. Of the 276,921 Albanians who voted (92 percent of the eligible voters), 74 percent voted in favor of "territorial autonomy" for Albanians in Macedonia. This result overwhelmingly indicated strong support for greater Albanian identity and authority -- again, a growing desire to be "masters in their own house." 63 Not surprisingly, the government strongly denied the validity of the poll, and, in effect, ignored it. However, a strong statement had been made, and the movement for more autonomy became a loud rallying cry even for the more moderate PDP/NDP leaders.
It is important to stress that in spite of their demands, moderate PDP/NDP leaders have, for the most part, continued to emphasize the need to work for change through dialogue with the Macedonian federal government. Albanian party leadership has been successful, perhaps against the odds, in convincing many Albanians to work for change within the context of the state, rather than to consider secession as a viable option. 64
There are several reasons why a version of Albanian nationalism in Macedonia that advocates unification with Albania has not taken hold. In spite of growing contacts, many Macedonian Albanians "exhibit a certain degree of suspicion" toward their "brethren" across the border. In addition, there would be little economic benefit gained from outright reunification, since "grinding poverty" in Albania has served to dampen feelings of ethnic solidarity. Despite Macedonia's entrenched social and cultural discrimination, many Albanians live better there than they would in Albania itself. 65
Clear heads and calm spirits may not continue to prevail in an atmosphere of rising tension. Pressures have mounted, and the lack of Albanian participation in the building process of the new Macedonian state and society remains a serious problem, particularly the under-representation of Albanians and the Albanian language in the official circles of education and the state bureaucracy. Greece's blockade and the resulting decline of the economy have only further strained relations. This combination is rapidly creating an atmosphere conducive to more extreme positions. 66
As the government's willingness to talk did not translate into more decisive action, even after Albanians had joined the cabinet, rumors swirled that the PDP/NDP would withdraw their support from the government. At a December 1992 press conference, Muhamed Halili, leader of the two-party alliance, warned that if change did not soon come about, "we will then seek to achieve our ends through acts of civil disobedience." 67 Despite such threats, the Albanian parties have remained in the government, continuing to stress the necessity of progress through consensus with Slav Macedonians. Sami Ibrahimi, another leader of the PDP, declared that if the government moved against discrimination and revised the constitution, "We [would] stay in Macedonia forever." 68
But the PDP/NDP policy of working within the system has not been universally endorsed. There is evidence to suggest that a growing number of Albanians, frustrated by their parties' inability to redress their grievances through legislation, has turned away from politics and turned instead to more radical means of redressing social ills. 69 Albanian demonstrations have become more common. An offshoot of the terrorist Kosovo Albanian Liberation Movement named UNIKROM has been formed and may yet prove to be a highly disruptive force in its campaign for a "Greater Albania" to encompass Albania, Kosovo, and sections of western Macedonia. 70 In one of the most prominent scandals of 1993, the Ministry of the Interior claimed to have seized UNIKROM weaponry stored in Skopje and Tetovo, as well as a list of 20,000 "potential supporters" of this shadowy movement. Most ominously, the government arrested a number of PDP members, accusing them of conspiring to overthrow the government. Although the charges were widely believed to have been fabricated, twelve men were sentenced to ten years in prison. 71
One of the greatest threats to stability lies over the border in Kosovo. For years the formerly autonomous province has been predicted to be a future "hotspot" for Serbian military activity and "ethnic cleansing." Stefan Troebst outlines two worst case scenarios for Macedonia. First, in the case of a Serbian-Albanian war in Kosovo, the Serbian army might feel "compelled" to invade Macedonia due to the strong ties between both Albanian communities. Second, even without a military invasion, there is the possibility that up to a million refugees could flood into Macedonia. 72 In the case of a Kosovo war, writes Duncan Perry, the Macedonian Albanians would "probably cross over in large numbers to fight alongside their Kosovar cousins." 73 Fear of this potential conflict has led the United Nations and the Clinton administration to place nearly 1000 UN troops on the Kosovo-Macedonia border, including 300 U.S. troops.
Just how realistic is such a disastrous scenario? Not very, according to many scholars. While tensions are extremely high, "a reasonably stable balance" between Serbian security forces and the Albanian majority prevails. This stability has much to do with the massive Serbian security presence: 500,000 Albanian men between the ages of fourteen and sixty years face a contingent of over 100,000 Serbian police and soldiers. Perry notes that the Albanian leadership, led by the shadow government of Ibrahim Rugova, "know[s] perfectly well that a violent response to Serbian state terrorism would result in military catastrophe and a large-scale exodus of refugees." 74 Meanwhile, in the wake of the Bosnian peace accords, there are tangible signs coming from Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic that a compromise with the Kosovo Albanian leadership may be on the horizon. 75 Although Serbs have already begun to purge Albanians from the police as well as bureaucratic and educational positions in Kosovo, and though many thousands of Albanians have emigrated to Macedonia, there are several reasons why the rump-Yugoslav Serbs would have nothing to gain from provoking an outright Albanian insurrection. First, Kosovo is already a part of Serbia, unlike the contested regions of Krajina and Bosnia. Second, "the ethnic balance between Albanians and Serbs is so tilted to the disadvantage of the latter -- outnumbered by at least eight to one -- that even massive ethnic cleansing would not profoundly change the ratio in favor of the Serbs." 76
The Attempted Assassination of Gligorov and Organized Crime
Had the assassination attempt been successful, Gligorov's probable successor would have been Stojan Andov, speaker of the parliament and acting president during Gligorov's absence. Andov would likely have advocated a major shift in policy, particularly toward the Albanian community. Andov had often disagreed with Gligorov's initiatives toward the Albanians, and many Albanian politicians believed him to be behind the derailment of constitutional reform. 79
Gligorov stood not only for policies of reform, but also stood in the way of corruption. 80 In late October 1995, several newspapers in Macedonia and Greece reported that investigators had linked the assassination attempt to a Bulgarian business conglomerate operating in Macedonia named Multigrup, which was accused of being involved with organized crime. 81 According to Sabrina Ramet, the economic hardship caused by the combined squeeze of the Greek blockade and the UN embargo on rump-Yugoslavia "has played into the hands of organized crime, which has understood all too well how to exploit [the situation]." 82 She quotes a 1994 Skopje-based Nova Makedonija newspaper editorial which attributes the rapid growth of organized crime to its reach into the highest levels of government, "since criminal conduct in an organized manner is not possible unless the authorities participate in it." 83
Increasing corruption in Macedonia has already destabilized Macedonia politically. Corruption may also sour crucial constitutional negotiations between the Albanian and the Slav Macedonian leaderships. Certainly, though, Gligorov's return to the political scene gives cause for optimism. The importance of Gligorov lies in the fact that he alone seems to understand that stability ultimately depends on finding some way to include the Albanian community in the state-building process. Unfortunately, he has not yet been able to convince the nation as a whole of this crucial necessity.
Gligorov and his SDUM allies, however, have not acted on their promise of constitutional and institutional reform, despite winning an outright majority in last year's elections. One could argue that the government has been preoccupied with economic crisis. But until the "ethnic" basis of the Macedonian state, as institutionalized by the Macedonian constitution, as well as continued discrimination and under-representation of Albanians and their language in Macedonian bureaucracy and education, is actively changed into a "civic" definition of the state, the potential for massive instability will remain. Bogdan Denitch points out that "without massive economic transfers and full-employment policies, which cannot be won without the support of the majorities, competing ethnic claims become a competing zero-sum game." 84 Until President Gligorov and his government, as well as the majority of Macedonians themselves, realize that any stable solution for Macedonia's future cannot exclude Albanians' equal participation, stability will be far from guaranteed, and the new state will remain precariously perched on the edge of collapse.
NOTES
Note 1: Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning in History (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1964), 10. Back.
Note 2: Kerin Hope, "Skopje's Row with Athens Settled as a Draw," Financial Times, September 25, 1995, 2. Back.
Note 3: Jacques Rupnik, "Europe's New Frontiers: Remapping Europe; Political Aftermath of the End of the Cold War: After Communism: What?," Daedalus 123, no. 3 (June 1994). Back.
Note 5: Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 141. Back.
Note 6: As reported by Stefan Krause in OMRI Daily Digest, January 11, 1995. Back.
Note 7: OMRI Economic Digest, November 9, 1995. Back.
Note 8: Duncan M. Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia," RFE/RL Research Report, October 2, 1992, 44. Back.
Note 9: Milo Paskal, "The Albanian Question Within the Current Context of the Balkan Crisis," Balkan Forum 2, no. 4 (December 1994), 131. Back.
Note 10: Misha Glenny, "Fear," New Republic, April 25, 1994, 13. Back.
Note 11: Duncan M. Perry, "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report, June 19, 1992, 35. Back.
Note 12: Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), 342. Back.
Note 13: Misha Glenny, "The Birth of a Nation," New York Review of Books, November 16, 1995, 27. Back.
Note 14: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991), 6. Back.
Note 15: Inis L. Claude, National Minorities: An International Problem (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955), 204. Back.
Note 16: Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 197. Back.
Note 17: Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," Slavic Review 51, no. 4 (Winter 1992), 656. Back.
Note 20: Quoted in Ibid., 659-60. Back.
Note 21: Nicolaos Martis, The Falsification of Macedonian History (Athens: Athnassiades Brothers, 1985); Ivan Mikhailov, Stalin and the Macedonian Question (St. Louis: Pearlstone Publishing, 1948). Back.
Note 22: For a comprehensive and objective analysis of Macedonia and the question of "nationality" in Macedonia throughout its modern history, see Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians? (London: Hurst and Company, 1995); and Glenny, "Birth of a Nation," which expands upon Poulton's arguments. Back.
Note 23: William Pfaff, "Invitation to War: Balkans," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (June 22, 1993), 97. Back.
Note 24: John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict (London: Brassey's, 1992), 34. Back.
Note 25: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 36. Back.
Note 26: Stephan E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1971), 199-203. Back.
Note 27: Hugh Poulton, "The Republic of Macedonia After U.N. Recognition," RFE/RL Research Report, June 4, 1993, 23. Back.
Note 29: Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, and National Identity (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), 311-313. Back.
Note 30: Perry, "The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival," RFE/RL Research Report, November 20, 1992, 14. Back.
Note 33: Quoted in Perry, "Odds for Survival," 14. Back.
Note 34: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 37. Back.
Note 35: Perry, "Odds for Survival," 17. Back.
Note 36: Duncan M. Perry, "Politics in the Republic of Macedonia: Issues and Parties," RFE/RL Research Report, June 4, 1993, 35-36. Back.
Note 37: Janice Broun, "Is Macedonia Next? The Chaos Moves South," Commonweal, August 14, 1992, 8. Back.
Note 38: Perry, "Odds for Survival," 15-16. Back.
Note 40: James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question," International Affairs 68, no. 3 (July 1992), 480-81. Back.
Note 41: Poulton, "After U.N. Recognition," 25-26. Back.
Note 44: Glenny, "Fear," 14. Back.
Note 45: Census results were taken from Sabrina Petra Ramet, "All Quiet on the Southern Front? Macedonia Between the Hammer and the Anvil," Problems of Post-Communism 42, no. 6 (November-December 1995), 32. Back.
Note 46: Patrick Moore, "Macedonia Bans Proposed Albanian University," RFE/RL Daily Report, December 14, 1994. Back.
Note 47: E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 96. Back.
Note 48: Risto Lazarov, "The Albanians in Macedonia: Co-Citizenship or...?," Balkan Forum 3, no. 2 (June 1995), 35-36. Back.
Note 49: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 37. Back.
Note 52: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 37. Back.
Note 53: Poulton, "After U.N. Recognition," 24. Back.
Note 54: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 38. Back.
Note 55: Poulton, "After U.N. Recognition," 25. Back.
Note 56: Moore, "Controversy Continues over Macedonian Elections," RFE/RL Daily Report, October 18, 1994. Back.
Note 57: Fabian Schmidt, "Macedonian Albanians Lose Seats in Parliament," RFE/RL Daily Report, November 8, 1994. Back.
Note 58: Schmidt, "Rugova Urges Macedonian Albanians to Form a Coalition," RFE/RL Daily Report, October 27, 1994. Back.
Note 59: Richard Caplan, "Macedonia Next?" Nation, December 14, 1992, 725. Back.
Note 61: Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, 136. Back.
Note 62: Stefan Troebst, "Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?," RFE/RL Research Report, January 28, 1994, 38. Back.
Note 63: "Macedonia: Next on the List," Economist, February 8, 1992, 48. Back.
Note 64: Poulton, "After U.N. Recognition," 25. Back.
Note 67: Quoted in ibid. Back.
Note 68: "Macedonia: An Old Cockpit," Economist, November 14, 1992, 59. Back.
Note 71: Perry, "A Balkan Problem," 38. Back.
Note 73: 73. Troebst, 36. Back.
Note 74: Perry, "Odds for Survival," 14. Back.
Note 76: Glenny, "Birth of a Nation." Back.
Note 77: Laura Silber, "Macedonians Pass Deal but Fear for Unity," Financial Times, October 10, 1995, 3. Back.
Note 78: Schmidt, "Perry in Macedonia," OMRI Daily Digest, November 27, 1995. Back.
Note 79: Glenny, "Birth of a Nation," 28. Back.
Note 81: Stefan Krause, "Bulgarian Business Group Linked to Attempt on Gligorov's Life," OMRI Daily Digest, October 31, 1995. Back.
Note 83: Quoted in ibid. Back.
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