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How to Succeed at Seceding:
The Value of Federalism in Political Divorce
1
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
On October 30, 1995, citizens of Quebec went to the polls to vote on whether to secede from Canada. Most seemed to have an idealized image of what independence would mean, focusing on flags and français, not on international trade, diplomatic recognition, or currency stability. A more realistic picture of what to expect could be found in Central Europe, where less than five years ago the Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak federations fractured. Bloodshed often accompanied the border changes; the civil wars in Bosnia and Croatia have vividly demonstrated the consequences of secession gone wrong. Former Czech prime minister Petr Pithart had his own advice for Quebec: "Canadians won't want to hear this, but my advice would be to postpone a final decision. We were too impatient. Yes, it seems unbearable. But it is better than paying the long-term price of losing a country." 2
Secession is the political equivalent of divorce. It may be mutual or contested, violent or peaceful, and both parties may claim the spoils of the marriage. The de jure circumstances of the divorce are not as important to future viability as the parties' preparations for life on their own. The petitioning party, for example, must have some hope for survival on its own; alimony is not customary with secession. Emotional, educational, employment, and economic resources are critical to an individual's post-marriage life; for states the key factors are attitudinal, structural, and economic. In the political realm, federations may provide the petitioning party with greater resources for post-divorce life. With structural pockets of autonomy, federations are marriages without fusion. They provide the political equivalent of separate bank accounts, separate names, and separate friends. Whether originating from love or convenience, federations are marriages in which neither partner loses their individual identity.
At best, the Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak states were marriages of convenience. The collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires left a hodgepodge of nations seeking statehood in Central Europe. Though the post-World War I peace conferences drew the actual boundaries, Tomás; G. Masaryk, Nikola Pasic, and the London-based Yugoslav Committee had already begun to consider state collaboration. Neither Slovaks nor Slovenes were completely happy to join peoples with whom they had so little in common, but neither had much choice. On their own, their countries would be minuscule and vulnerable to irredentist claims. 3 After World War II, a collective political arrangement providing mutual defense and a combined economy again prevailed as the best option. Yugoslavia formally became a federation in 1945; Czechoslovakia in 1969. The marriages were not happy, and Slovenia began to consider an annulment, Slovakia a divorce.
The Slovak and Slovene secessions did not succeed merely by default. Whether uncontested or based on irreconcilable differences, divorce is seldom a panacea. The "capital" taken from a marriage will largely determine the viability of the departing parties. Domestic enabling factors were necessary to prepare the ground for both Slovenes and Slovaks to successfully seize the opportunities to become independent. The Slovak and Slovene cases fall somewhere between peaceful and contested secessions; 4 both proceeded largely on constitutional grounds, but resistance from the respective parent state was mitigated by that body's collapse. Unlike Croatia, neither Slovenia nor Slovakia had a minority population resisting secession. Slovenia initiated the secession process, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia later reluctantly reacted to the changes in Yugoslavia's structure. "We feel no involvement with ex-Yugoslavia," Prime Minister Janez Drnovöek recently said, "We have nothing to do with it. We were lucky to get out." 5 By holding the process of secession constant, patterns of state configuration influential to secession and new state building can be determined.
Scholarly works on secession tend to focus on events leading up to departure, taking a brief glance at the separation process, and then completely ignore life afterward. International law in particular evaluates the legitimacy of the secession process, so that international bodies can determine whether or not they should recognize the proto-state. 6 Other approaches may be grouped into three categories: political, philosophical, and economic.
Political : Until recently, political science has done little to analyze the phenomenon of intra-state conflict, neither in the form of secession nor civil war. Writing in 1964, Harry Eckstein suggested that social science's preoccupation with precision, such as the behavioralist movement popular in the 1950s and 1960s, has directed political scientists more toward developing analytical tools than toward examining the empirical evidence at hand. As the discipline sought precise techniques, field work, and controlled experiments, civil wars became unsuitable topics for study, because "internal wars, unfortunately, are not very suitable for these kinds of work." 7 Similarly, secessionist movements, so often based on normative arguments, are difficult to analyze objectively and quantitatively.
During the 1980s, more political scientists addressed secession, but largely assumed that national self-determination was the primary motive for seeking separation. At the forefront of this trend was Lee Buchheit, whose 1978 book, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, picked up many of the arguments of nineteenth-century nationalists, namely that "'parochial' sentiments are deeply embedded in human psychology." 8 Buchheit's main contribution, it has been suggested, was "proposing international standards for determining the legitimacy of secessionist claims that take into account the needs of oppressed peoples, of existing states, and of the international system." 9 How to go about seceding successfully was not addressed in practical, objective terms.
Canada has been a particular source of secession studies, because Quebec has placed this issue firmly on the political agenda. John R. Wood advanced the study of secessionist movements by formulating a comparative analytic framework, which appeared in the Canadian Journal of Political Science in 1981, about one year after a referendum on secession was soundly defeated in Quebec. Wood noted that:
Despite the vital importance of the outcome of current secessionist attempts for both the wide array of states in which they are occurring and international politics at large, there is at present no coherent, systematic way of analyzing the origins of secession, the conditions which make it succeed or fail, or the consequences of various secessionist strategies or governmental responses. 10
Wood broadens the arguments for secession beyond simple national self-determination which, in practical terms, is frequently the least successful argument. Other motives, such as economic power or political viability, are much more important factors than ethnic homogeneity. Instead, ethnicity may only serve as a trigger for group consciousness.
Foreshadowing the Slovene and Slovak arguments respectively, Peter Gourevitch argued that peripheral regions with "ethnic potential," i.e. "some distinctive characteristic(s) among the people living in a region," could become politically activated by changing policies from the core. If political and economic activity are focused in the same region, peripheral nationalism will not be a danger, but when divided across several regions, politically based nationalism may emerge:
This may occur if the original economic or political core falters; that is, if it stops promoting economic growth or providing political leadership for the whole country. Or the noncongruence may occur if the peripheral region improves its economic position relative to the original center through the development or plausible prospect of the development of some resource or newly acquired geographical advantage. 11
Wood presents five aspects that a theory of secession must account for, which may also be taken as phases of separation for analytical purposes. First, there must be sufficient -- if not necessary -- preconditions to cause alienation, such as group solidarity, unmet economic expectations or perceived exploitation, declining legitimacy of the political regime, or psychological fears of repression or forced assimilation. Second, the components of emerging secessionist movements must be identified, such as ideology, leadership, organization, or incidents of violence. Third, Wood wants to know how the central government responds to the secessionist claims: with repression or constitutional reform? Fourth, before the battle for independence can begin, the decision to fight must be legitimized. For this, a referendum is ideal -- Wood notes that the Parti Québécois failed to gain that endorsement in 1980. Fifth and related, how does armed conflict resolve the secessionist crisis? Wood admits that "the great majority of secessionist struggles never reach a stage of all-out war," yet he prefers to focus on armed conflict. Slovenia had only ten days of armed conflict; Slovakia, none.
Michael Hechter draws upon Wood's article as well as his own work examining nationalism, in order to frame secession within rational choice theory. He offers a two-stage process: "first the population of a given territory must make a collective decision to secede, and, second, the leaders of the host state must make a collective decision that the net cost of ceding the territory in question is negative." 12 Three types of information are needed to analyze secessionist movements, yet are rarely available: data on the seceding population's territorial preferences, factors concerning socio-economic structure, and the cost/benefit calculations of parent state leaders. Comparative case studies of secessionist movements are "inadequate for a causal understanding of secessionist dynamics," Hechter notes, "because they lack sufficient controls." 13
Robert Young has offered one of the first studies to produce a theory of peaceful secession. 14 Drawing upon the separations of Hungary from Austria in 1867, Norway from Sweden in 1905, and Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, Young formulates thirteen empirical generalizations about peaceful secession. Young defines peaceful secessions as those which occur constitutionally; the critical variable is the predecessor state's acceptance of the principle of secession. He further suggests that the process itself may be highly path-dependent. "The nature of the `new' polities and the economic and political relations between them may depend critically on the process through which secession took place." 15 Though he does not address the Slovene or Yugoslav cases, Young sees Czechoslovakia's split as violating several aspects of his "crisis of secession" which should create political solidarity. Instead of a declaration of intent to secede, "the whole separation took place through a gradual process of polarization, one that was spearheaded by partisan leaders who found it politically profitable to engage in mutual antagonism." 16
Philosophical : One of the few recent philosophical analyses of secession comes from University of Arizona philosopher Allen Buchanan. 17 Buchanan carefully delineates secession from civil disobedience, revolution, emigration, and other methods of protesting against an incumbent regime. Rather than overthrowing the seated government, secession seeks to withdraw from current jurisdiction and to redraw geographic boundaries. Secessionist leaders may want to establish their own sovereign territory, but they may equally wish to join an existing state, such as Nagorno-Karabakh's desire to transfer from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction.
Buchanan rejects arguments for national-self determination as too vague and too normative for practical policymaking. Instead, he formulates twelve moral arguments for secession, at least three of which resonated in Slovenia and Slovakia. Many of Slovenia's arguments were based on "escaping discriminatory redistribution" and "rectificatory justice:" it was wrong for Belgrade to transfer funds from Slovenia's more advanced economy to support the poorer southern republics. Even more persuasive was Slovenia's use of Buchanan's "limited goals of political association" argument. Under this reasoning, Slovenia had "voluntarily ceded its sovereignty to Yugoslavia [in 1943] and could voluntarily withdraw it." 18 Now that the federation had become asymmetrical, the terms of the original agreement had changed to such an extent that Slovenia could nullify the contract. For Slovakia, autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak federation was initially sought over outright secession. While Slovene leaders proclaimed and fought for their country's independence, Slovakia gained sovereignty almost by default. The federation became unwieldy and defunct, and independent Slovakia sprang forth, thus qualifying for Buchanan's "enhancing efficiency" category.
Economical : Milica Zarkovic Bookman 19 has explored secession from the perspective of economics. She argues that economic considerations cannot be separated from political ones, as the viability of the new entity will be heavily influenced by its economic capacities. Current economic conditions may or may not encourage secessionist tendencies. Bookman points out that E.J. Hobsbawm suggests that underdeveloped regions would be wise to stay aligned with more advanced economies, while Immanuel Wallerstein implies that wealth encourages regions to secede. 20 Bookman sees a three-stage process for the economics of secession: reevaluation, redefinition, and re-equilibration -- roughly the before, during, and after. For Slovenia, the decision was pure rational choice based on economics: "In its economic cost-benefit analysis, Slovenia had clearly determined that the ties to the center, such as the use of Yugoslav markets for inputs and outputs, were a benefit too low relative to the costs of union." 21
This article examines the emergence of two Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak federation successor states: Slovenia and Slovakia. That Slovakia and Slovenia were secessionist states is not in question. 22 Both states undeniably broke "connections between an administrative unit and the state to which it was joined," as the Oxford Companion to Politics of the World defines secession. 23 Instead of focusing exclusively on the reasons and mechanisms for separation, secession here will be treated as a means to an end, a path to political development. 24 What is more important and interesting to examine is the resulting process of state-building. Federalism undermines loyalty to the central government. In times of stress, federal components can readily secede and launch new, independent states. The Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak federations will be analyzed on the basis of five components: policies, culture, structure, groups, and leadership. 25
Both the Slovene and Slovak divorces were grounded in spousal mistreatment. Although the initial complaints concerned the distribution of wealth, they soon took on ethnic overtones, because the federal units were defined on geo-ethnic grounds. To differing degrees, nationalism served a "political organizing function" in Slovakia and Slovenia. 26
Slovenia: First-class Economy, Second-class Citizens
Throughout Yugoslavia's existence, Slovenia frequently complained that federal policies had a negative effect on its own economy. Resentment among Slovenes dated almost to the beginning of Yugoslavia. "In Yugoslavia it is thus: the Serbs rule, the Croats debate, and the Slovenes work" became a popular sentiment, first voiced by Slovene leader Anton Koroöec in 1927. 27 A primary source of irritation was FADURK, the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo. The Fund was created in 1965 as a mechanism to redistribute economic resources throughout the country, but Slovenia viewed its contribution as highly inequitable. In 1988, Slovenia contributed 404.7 billion dinars to the fund (20 percent of the year's total), generated 18 percent of Yugoslav total GNP, 21 percent of its industrial production, and 23 percent of its export volume, yet comprised only 8 percent of Yugoslavia's total population. 28
Slovenia led contributions to FADURK because its economy was much stronger than those of other Yugoslav republics. Slovenia's economy was more oriented toward Western Europe, thanks largely to its historic ties and geographic proximity to Austria. Under Habsburg rule, Slovenia had developed a transportation network that was integrated with its northern neighbors, and the emerging Slovene middle class had sent its sons to be educated in West European universities. 29 Slovenia was an active participant in the Alpe-Adria trade and tourism organization, whose members included Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Italy. 30 Under Tito, the decentralized economic structure allowed Slovenia to become the federation's main source of industrial goods and foreign currency. 31
By 1980, political leaders in Slovenia decided that not only was their republic being economically exploited by the rest of Yugoslavia, but that Belgrade's policies were retarding its further growth. Tito's death that year triggered many questions about the socialist system he had left behind, particularly as the economy had begun to sour. 32 Slovene nationalists began to argue that their region's high standard of living was threatened by federal taxes. Leaders in Ljubljana declared the federal "trickle down orthodoxy" to be a form of national exploitation and announced a new interpretation of the constitution giving Slovenia control of the factors of production located within its borders. In 1990, Slovenia announced that it would stop paying federal taxes, keep its considerable foreign exchange, and secretly printed new currency. 33 Slovenia has experienced some consequences of the Balkan war: for example, damage during its brief war with Yugoslavia is estimated at $2.7 billion, it has been cut off from its former inter-republican markets, and there has been a considerable refugee influx. 34 Regional instability from the ongoing Yugoslav war has also been a serious disincentive for foreign investors. 35
Although it was struggling during its first few years, independent Slovenia's economy shows signs of strength. Slovenia's high export levels reassured its European and international creditors, allowing the new country to readily assume its portion of the Yugoslav federal debt ($1.4 billion). This move eliminated a potential source of conflict with Serbia, which had become the dominant republic in post-Tito Yugoslavia. 36 Privatization has begun with a plan noted for its flexibility, lack of corruption, and slow but steady pace. 37 By 1993, Slovenia had curbed inflation and begun to show positive growth trends in production and employment, leading PlanEcon to designate it as a "strong candidate for joining an East European `tiger club.'" 38 Despite some initial difficulty in adjusting to independence, Slovenia has built a successful economy.
A Slovene national awakening in the 1980s further distanced the region psychologically from Belgrade. According to University of Ljubljana history professor Peter Vodopivec, federal attempts to crack down on intellectuals and to centralize educational, scientific, and cultural policies "did more to mobilize public opinion than did the economic problems." 39 The defining moment of the "Slovene Spring" came in June 1988, when four young Slovene journalists were arrested for publishing reports of a Yugoslav Army plan to forcibly halt Slovenia's moves towards sovereignty, an event known as the Mladina case. Although Slovene was an official state language, the trial was conducted in the Ljubljana Military Court in Serbo-Croatian. When the Yugoslav collective presidency approved this decision, "it was a straight line from this ruling to Slovenia's 1990 declaration that its own legislation took priority over federal laws." 40 In the words of Slovene communist party leader Milan Kucan, "Slovenes cannot regard as their own any state that does not secure the use of their mother tongue." 41
Since independence, Slovenia has been fairly successful in avoiding the minority problems seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This is partly attributable to the high level of homogeneity in Slovenia -- the population is about 91 percent Slovene -- and to the fact that minorities were not seeking self-rule. Ljubljana has negotiated a reciprocal agreement with Budapest to respect the rights of Slovenes and Hungarians located on the "wrong" side of the border, and granted the Italian community autochthonous status. 42 An August 1992 poll showed that Slovenes either saw no nationalism problem or dismissed it as a normal part of the transition process, and thus 43
Slovakia: Second-class citizens and distorted economy
Furthermore, according to the Slovaks, Prague's industrial development program distorted the Slovak economy and caused tremendous ecological damage. Because the region was located near the Soviet border -- and therefore far from any Cold War conflict -- Slovakia became the site of major weapons factories. 47 Built with antiquated Soviet technology and few regulations, the factories created an environmental nightmare that was left for the Slovaks to clean up. 48 Following independence, Slovakia overturned Václav Havel's ban on the export of Czechoslovak-made weapons to counter rising unemployment. Nevertheless, as military hardware had once comprised some 60 percent of Slovak industrial production, the economic prospects remain bleak. Slovak-model weapons had been of Soviet design, intended mainly for the Warsaw Pact countries, which are now shrinking their militaries and retooling toward NATO specifications. 49
The dispute over relative economic development is but one manifestation of the mutual dislike between Czechs and Slovaks, which came to a head in 1968 when Slovaks demanded equal institutional structures and equal representation in the national government. Czechs could not understand Slovak arguments of national discrimination, seeing the true problem to be "a persistent Slovak tendency for self-dramatization." Once the federation was constitutionally mandated in 1969, Czechs began to believe that Slovaks were reaping greater benefits from "normalization" as the new federal leader, Gustav Husák, was a Slovak, though Slovaks "perceived everything federal as being essentially Czech," since the capital is in Prague. 50 When the issue was revived in 1990, Czechs again misunderstood:
We always assumed that, basically, the priority for Czechs was economic reform and the priority for Slovaks their national identity... we have been interpreting this as something that is simply irrational, viewing Slovakia as a country going through something that is long behind us: a nation's growing pains. That was wrong. What is involved in Slovakia are, basically, different priorities. 51
Slovaks tend to place a greater emphasis on state involvement in economics, which proved to be irreconcilable with Czech preferences for less involvement. Following the velvet revolution, Czechs moved toward creating a democratic, market-oriented state, while Slovaks clung to socialism, whose industrialization program had raised their standard of living. 52 When asked if they preferred a government-controlled or free economy, Slovaks preferred controlled (58 percent) while Czechs opted for free (54 percent); more Slovaks (39 percent) preferred working for state enterprises than for a private company (20 percent). 53 Part of this opinion must be explained by the fact that the market transition was more painful for Slovaks than Czechs. 54 Unemployment was much higher for Slovaks; with one-third of the country's population, Slovakia accounted for nearly one-half of the federal unemployment levels. 55
After federal responsibilities were relocated to the republics in 1990, differing economic priorities took on an ethnic overtone. Czechs liked the rapid pace of marketization, but Slovaks thought the speed was harmful to workers. "Slovaks would rather be a bit worse off than see differences between individual people become too deep," federal deputy prime minister Jozef Mikloöo (a Slovak) commented, "They say 'yes' to the market economy but to one with strong social and ecological aspects." 56 The Czech government, the Slovak Academy of Sciences, and the Slovak National Council all issued reports in 1991 arguing that splitting the country would harm both economies, but Slovakia's the most. 57
Slovakia has begun to see its economy strengthen, but at a pace slower than Slovenia's. Unemployment and inflation are dropping, and hard currency reserves are slowly rising. 58 The turnaround began, however, while Prime Minister Vladimír Meciar was out of office. As will be discussed below, his return to power in late 1994 could dampen the economy, as foreigners are wary of his tendency for autocratic politics and his desire to hold all economic portfolios. 59
As an independent country, Slovakia is instituting chauvinistic policies against its own minorities. Slovakia is comprised of Slovaks (85.6 percent), Hungarians (10.8 percent), and Gypsies (1.5 percent). The constitution implemented in 1992 begins "We the Slovak nation," instead of the originally suggested "We the citizens of the Slovak Republic," and little provision is made for protecting ethnic minorities. 60 Meciar has blamed the gypsy population for "most crimes" and has repeatedly insulted Hungarians. 61 Bratislava initiated legislation in 1990 to designate Slovak as the official language of Slovakia, but since the communist-era constitution already granted such status, the move was seen as directed against Hungarians, and led to massive protests and even hunger strikes. 62 A subsequent language law restricting the use of Hungarian has already caused problems in Bratislava's relations with Budapest. 63
Regions may decide to separate because they lose a sense of common reference with their parent state. Regional solidarity need not be based on ethnic criteria; a sense of "otherness," of not belonging, will suffice. In the United States, the Confederacy was formed on cultural and economic grounds. 64 West Virginia seceded from Virginia in 1861 because it saw no connection with these new "southern" citizens. 65 Anthropologist Paul Bohannan 66 has written that the divorce process begins with "emotional divorce" whereby spouses may still act as a team, but begin to withhold emotion from each other. While still members of federations, Slovaks and Slovenes began to lose emotional attachment to their political partners, as mentioned above. Slovaks saw their distinctiveness as a nation threatened by the Czechs and sought to create a predominantly Slovak state. Slovenes, while valuing their own culture and history, came to see themselves as Europeans, with little in common with the South Slavs, particularly Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic
Perhaps because Slovaks suffered forced Magyarization while Czechs enjoyed relative cultural freedom under the Austro-Hungarian empire, Slovaks deeply value nationalism while Czechs view it as just a bit provincial. 67 Czechs were more inclined to see themselves as "Czechoslovaks" (71 percent), while Slovaks saw themselves as primarily Slovak (74 percent). 68 Slovak collective identity received a tremendous boost from the Slovak state -- the first ever -- which existed during World War II. 69 In the post-1968 communist era, Slovak national identity benefitted from the existence of Slovak national educational and cultural institutions, eliminating a previous source of discontent.
Slovenes never quite accepted the idea of Yugoslavism, preferring to see themselves as Europeans. When asked if their country should develop along West European or national lines, 65 percent of Slovenes favored "Western Europe," far above the East European mean response of 43 percent. 70 In the 1980s, an increasing feeling of differentness emerged in Slovenia, culminating in the 1988 Mladina trial already mentioned. Intolerable policies from the Serbian leadership under Milocevic convinced Slovenian leaders that a continued relationship with Belgrade would retard its accession to the European Community (EC). Serbia's suppression of human rights in Kosovo increasingly drew international rebuke in the early 1980s, and Slovenia feared it would be tainted by Serbian actions. "We don't want to fall behind in including ourselves in the new Europe," Slovene foreign ministry spokesman Iztok Simoniti said in 1990, "We don't have the time to wait for all of Yugoslavia to come up to Europe's standards in terms of human rights, democratic reforms, and introduction of market economic principles." 71 The rallying cry "Europe Now!" became a key campaign slogan in the plebiscitary election of December 1990. 72
International law defines states as having four key characteristics: 1) a permanent population; 2) defined territory; 3); a government; and 4) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 73 Slovenia and Slovakia easily met the first two criteria by virtue of their history and their finite republican jurisdictions. The last two criteria were met by generating new institutions from existing federative bodies. Governments are defined as "some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in international relations." 74 A confederation in form if not name, each Yugoslav republic had its own administration, legislature, communist party, and central bank. Both halves of Czechoslovakia had their own educational, cultural, and administrative bodies as well.
The post-1968 structure of Czechoslovakia contributed to its downfall. The Federal Assembly was composed of two chambers: the Chamber of the People (seats based on population) and the Chamber of Nations (divided into two bodies, one each for the Czech and Slovak Republics). In practice, however, the Assembly might behave as a unicameral, bicameral, or even tricameral body. 75 When the Federal Assembly was merely a rubber-stamp body, its careful weighing of Czech and Slovak representation mattered little, but republican-level institutions gained increasing prominence after the power-sharing agreement of December 1990. 76 The June 1992 parliamentary elections paralyzed the Federal Assembly: the Chamber of the People became predominantly leftist and Slovak nationalist; the Chamber of Nations split into mainly center-right (Czech branch) and nationalist/center-left (Slovak branch). Since legislation required a majority among the three chambers (and three-fifths within each chamber for constitutional amendments), deadlock seemed inevitable. 77
Tito left behind a clunky system of rule by a collective presidency. Each republic and autonomous region supplied one member, with the chair rotating each year. When Slobodan Milocevic became president of Serbia in 1987, he emerged as a new, charismatic leader in Yugoslavia, whose Serbo-centric policies contradicted democratic pluralism. 78 By controlling the votes of Vojvodina and Kosovo, Serbia created a bloc of three votes, thus usually blocking legislation it did not like and taking effective control of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), technically commanded by the collective presidency. Slovenia, whose own communist party was promoting pluralism, was especially wary about developments in Belgrade. Slovene leaders increasingly clashed with Milosevic particularly over the latter's treatment of Kosovo. "This Stalinist concept of `democratic centralism,'" Slovene president Janez Stanovnik said in a 1988 interview about Serbia and Milosevic"unavoidably leads to extolling the central figure into a living god. When you start worshiping a leader you no longer have a population that is able to act democratically." 79
Federal officials offered little balance against Milosevic Although Prime Minister Ante Markovic had been somewhat successful with his economic reform program, he was not a popular figure, and Slovenia especially disliked the federal character of his reform package. 80 Like Gorbachev in his final days, Markovic was much more popular abroad than at home.note 81 Finally, when Serbia announced it would ignore any directive from the federal presidency, the federal system effectively ended. Structural problems in the design of the presidency were to blame, according to Vasil Tupurkovski, Macedonia's last delegate to the federal presidency, because "the legal and constitutional system do not foresee the possibility of a vacuum of a blockade" of the presidency. 82
The two respective federations had constitutionally granted power to local communist parties, which exercised substantial local authority. Since its founding in 1939, the Communist Party of Slovakia had voiced Slovak demands, particularly during the 1968 reform discussions. 83 The Czech lands, in contrast, had no independent party but had to make do with a bureau within the national Central Committee. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia was designed as a collective of regional political parties, and as the post-Tito political arrangements transferred most decision-making to the regional level, the local parties gained considerable influence, effectively creating a multi-party system in Yugoslavia. 84
Rather than starting from scratch, Slovakia and Slovenia were able to convert their republic-era bodies into new, independent institutions. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution had granted each republic the right to establish an international relations bureau, which soon came in handy. 85 In 1990, the Slovene Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrij Rupel, dispatched high-ranking officials to Austria, Italy, Hungary, and the United States to explain "that life inside Yugoslavia was unbearable to us." 86 Following the independence referendum, Rupel began training his own diplomatic corps, while new customs agents, patent examiners, air traffic controllers, and other bureaucrats were readied to assume responsibility for Slovene affairs. 87 Much to the consternation of Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister Jirí Dienstbier, Slovakia launched its own Ministry of International Affairs in 1991. One motive for this move was Bratislava's concern that Prague was antagonizing Moscow, and Slovakia needed to maintain warm relations with its neighbor to the east. Another reason was to raise Slovakia's international visibility, especially as the world media had a habit of referring to all federal citizens as "Czechs." 88
The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak political systems had one major difference: the military was constitutionally guaranteed a role in Yugoslav politics, but not in Czecho-Slovak political life. 89 After watching Soviet and Yugoslav leaders suppress nationalist uprisings by force, Václav Havel pointedly stated that the military would have no role in solving the Czech-Slovak dispute. 90 A proposal to create a Slovak militia was quickly defeated in 1991. 91 Yugoslavia, in contrast, had a history of sending the YPA to quell unrest. 92 Slovene leaders had walked out of the January 1991 federal summit meetings to protest military involvement in politics, while legislation was proposed to ban political activities by the military. 93 On March 19, 1991, the YPA Supreme Command issued a statement vowing that it would not let interethnic conflict occur in Yugoslavia. 94
Fearing it would have to fight for independence, Slovenia created its own republican militia in September 1990. The Slovene National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment transferring control of its Territorial Defense Forces from Belgrade to Ljubljana, which became a major point of contention when central authorities declared the forces to be "illegal paramilitary units." 95 The Slovene minister of defense, Janez Jansa -- a defendant in the Mladina case -- began to form groups of pro-Slovene officers and conscripts within the YPA and to purchase arms from abroad. 96 The Slovene war of independence ended when the EC negotiated a three-month cooling-off period after which control of customs posts would revert to Slovenia. "We have been waiting for centuries," noted Prime Minister Lojze Peterle, "We can wait another three months." 97 The YPA left Slovenia alone afterwards, preferring to concentrate on Croatia, which had a larger Serb population.
Slovenia took legal measures to defend its stance on sovereignty. On December 23, 1990, Slovenia held a plebescite to determine popular support for independence. Based on the plebescite's overwhelmingly positive results, the republic began a six-month agenda of "disassociation;" namely, assuming control of military, foreign, and economic policies. Some 88 percent of the votes favored independence. 98 Despite the newly-diverse parliament, all sitting parties agreed to present a united front in campaigning for the referendum. 99
Slovakia, however, never held such an official opinion poll; the dissolution was an elite affair, and popular support for remaining in a federal arrangement appears to have been high (See Figure 1). Legislation was passed in July 1991 providing a framework for a referendum on federation or independence, but Meciar demurred from setting a date. An Institute for Public Opinion Research poll showed that 74 percent of Czechoslovakia's population thought the issue should be determined by a referendum. 100 Such a vote would have been too risky for Meciar and other politicians whose platforms were pro-autonomy or pro-independence. 101 After the 1992 elections, divorce seemed inevitable and referendum irrelevant. Republican leaders were committed to the divorce, the paperwork had begun, and politicians feared the results might prove inconclusive, leaving the issue in a state of suspension, a situation much like Quebec now faces following its referendum. 102 According to leading Slovak sociologists, "the creation of an independent Slovak republic was more an unintended outcome of post-communist panic and confusion exploited by ambitious politicians than the culmination of Slovak national emancipation." 103
Figure 1: Czech and Slovak Support for Separate States
(in percentages)
Hospodarske Noviny, (August 30, 1990), 1, as cited in Sharon Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter, 1991), 125; January 1991: CTK January 31, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU (February 5, 1991), 16; all others: Institute for Public Opinion Research, November 15, 1991, December 4-11, 1991 and July, 1992, as cited in Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," East European Politics and Societies 8, no. 1 (Winter 1994), 153-88.
Adopting new constitutions would effectively break the formal ties with the previous regime. Slovenia worked with its communist-era constitution, methodically rewriting its republican constitution to grant additional powers to its own government and regularly challenged the constitutionality of federal actions. 104 Slovak leaders, both Meciar and Christian Democrat Ján Carnogursky, insisted on a new constitution prior to concluding any federative agreement with the Czech lands. In their view, Slovak sovereignty had to be established before they would cede any powers to a federation. 105 Havel thought this was ludicrous, "To dissolve the common state and then to reform it again is impossible technically, politically, and psychologically." 106 Slovenia passed a series of constitutional amendments in late 1990 and annulled many federal laws, giving the region greater autonomy. 107 Slovakia declared its sovereignty in July 1992 and adopted a new constitution on September 1. Federal president Havel immediately resigned, saying he did not care to serve as a "decorative president." 108 Slovenia did not promulgate a new constitution until December 23, 1991; Serbia was in fact the first to formally break with the federal structure, adopting a new constitution on September 28, 1990. 109 Slovenia seated a new two-chambered National Assembly in 1992, replacing the Yugoslav-era tricameral body with its outmoded Chamber of Associated [enterprise] Leaders, which had blocked earlier privatization plans. 110
In addition to institutions, Bratislava and Ljubljana had trained staff experienced in political and economic management. Decentralized economies should facilitate secession, because they give regional leaders experience in managing their assets, which promotes self-sufficiency -- certainly a requirement for setting up a new state. 111 The 1974 Yugoslav constitution had granted regions considerable leeway in economic relations, so that "republics and even the municipalities began to develop as independent economies, without links to each other." 112
Neither Slovenia nor Slovakia had strong minority groups protesting that their homeland was being left behind. Slovenia is 91 percent Slovene; no minority groups were organized enough or numerous enough to block the independence drive. In contrast, Croatia, which declared its independence at the same time as Slovenia, faced resistance from its Serb population. Aided by the Serb government in Belgrade, Croatian Serbs established their own "republic," Krajina, and refused to leave. Similarly, Bosnian Serbs declared the Republika Srpska and resisted separation from greater Yugoslavia. In both cases, civil war resulted. Minorities in Slovakia have formed political parties, but the largest group, the Hungarians, would prefer joining Budapest than staying with Prague. The Czech population in Slovakia is insignificant -- only 1.1 percent, about 60,000 people out of 5.4 million -- and they did not campaign to remain with the Czech lands.
Robert Young's prediction that "the process of secession . . . generates internal unity" 113 held true in these two cases. Post-communist Slovenia and Slovakia were led by broad coalition governments. From the outset, Slovenia's DEMOS 114 coalition had one goal in mind: independence. Once that goal had been realized, DEMOS fragmented into political parties representing a wide spectrum of interests and bickering over economic reform. In Czecho-Slovakia, the Public Against Violence (PAV) coalition joined Civic Forum to successfully oust the communists, but then diverged on what direction post-1989 Slovakia should take. In March 1991, Meciar announced that Public Against Violence/For a Democratic Slovakia 115 had split from PAV and announced that Slovak national concerns would be its priority. This opportunistic move followed public opinion polls and local elections showing that the Slovak Christian Democratic Party, which advocated a confederation of two strong republics, had passed PAV in popularity. "Future historians will have to work hard to find valid proof that top representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MFDS) were politically or intellectually involved in the `Slovak issue' before November 1989." 116 The PAV split and the resulting discord led to Meciar's being replaced as prime minister by Carnogursky. Within a year, however, the Christian Democratic party faced its own division over the question of loose federation or outright independence. 117
Neither country remained a one-party system. In Slovenia, multi-party elections were initiated by the communist leadership. The Slovene parliament passed a package of electoral reforms on December 27, 1989, legalizing non-communist associations. 118 The 1990 election, then, became a means of regional protest against federal policies, another refusal to participate in the structures dictated by Belgrade. 119 The League of Communists of Slovenia seceded from the LCY in 1990, renaming itself the Party for Democratic Renewal (PDR), and has managed to keep a dozen or so seats in parliament. 120 The new parties took on a largely nationalist hue, and the Socialist Party of Slovenia and the Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia began to push for a plebiscite on independence. As predicted by Wood's model, new parties emerged along republic lines in post-communist Czechoslovakia; no cross-republic trends emerged, foreshadowing the eventual split. 121
The political spectrum in both countries has emerged along similar lines. The economy, particularly its pace and popular dissatisfaction with hardship, continues to be a major electoral issue, and party identification is fluid. 122 In May 1992, Slovene Christian Democratic leader Janez Drnovöek successfully ousted Liberal Democratic Prime Minister Lojze Peterle over the latter's economic policies. 123 Both countries have seen the rise of Christian Democratic and nationalist parties as political forces. The Slovenian National Party (SNS) won 10 percent of the votes in the 1992 parliamentary elections largely due to its anti-foreigner/anti-refugee stance. 124 Much as Meciar has spoken out against Slovakia's minorities, SNS leader Zmágo Jelíncichas called for the deportation of Bosnian refugees from Slovenia. 125
Slovakia has not been very successful in producing a stable government. In late 1994, Meciar was chosen prime minister for the third time in less than five years. First elected prime minister in June 1990, he was ousted in April 1991, returned in June 1992, removed again in March 1994, and was back in office by October 1994. 126 In the past year, Meciar has engaged in regular battle with the Slovak president, Michal Kovác, culminating in a bizarre plot in September 1995 whereby Meciar's security forces were accused of kidnapping Kovác's son. Kovác, Jr. was abducted just days before Kovác, Sr. was to deliver his "state of the union" address, which in 1994 had presaged Meciar's ouster. 127 Such instability and intrigue discredit "democracy, threaten to tarnish Slovakia's image abroad, and put off foreign investors." 128
In Slovenia, the reform movement began within the communist party and gained legitimacy through its rational, peaceful character. President Milan Kucan had gained widespread respect by encouraging the Slovene Spring movement and has been termed both "Slovenia's Dubcek" and "the father of Slovenia." Like Boris Yeltsin, Kucan rose through the communist party ranks, only to eventually break with the system and advocate pluralism. As foreign minister Rupel described his colleague, "Kucan skillfully maneuvered between the hard-liners and the liberals within the party and slowly prepared for the break with Belgrade."
129
Kucan was first elected president in April 1990 (with 57.7 percent) and reelected in December 1991 (64 percent). Czech leader Václav Havel has enjoyed great moral legitimacy and international prestige. Slovakia's nearest equivalent to Havel was Alexander Dubcek, the father of the unsuccessful "socialism with a human face" campaign of 1968. Easily the best-known Slovak abroad, Dubcek counseled against breaking up the federation and was considered the front-runner for Slovakia's newly created presidency. Dubcek served as chair of the Federal Assembly in 1990, joined the Slovak Social Democrats in 1992 and generally opposed the nationalist tone of Slovak politics. His opportunity to serve as a moderating influence was cut short when he died from injuries sustained in an automobile accident during the course of the separation talks.
130
Vladimír Meciar, however, is more quirky, inconsistent, and less well-respected abroad. Miklos Duray of the Hungarian Coexistence Party has labeled Meciar illegitimate and out-of-touch: "He is not part of the stream which should bring Czechoslovakia back to Europe."
131
Meciar has proved more of an opportunist than a national leader. His split from the Party Against Violence occurred after he realized that an anti-Prague/anti-federal stance would be more politically advantageous.
132
Egon Lansky, Slovak spokesman for the CSFR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted of Meciar: "During his very short political career, he has already held all the possible standpoints on all the possible issues. He'll follow any position that will bring him to power."
133
Meciar appears to be somewhat of a shady character and has demonstrated autocratic tendencies. Like Kucan, he rose through the ranks of the communist party, but when Prague launched its lustration policy against incumbent communists, Meciar had reason to worry -- and to distance himself from the Czechs. In his New Year's 1993 address, Meciar renounced both lustration and free-market economics for the new Slovak state.
134
In February 1994, Meciar kicked several of his opponents out of the government and party, "then asked the public prosecutor whether leaving the party was a criminal act."
135
n late 1992, Meciar made a grab to control Slovak media, seeking to censor journalists critical of his policies. Upon assuming power in November 1994, he immediately replaced the heads of Slovak radio, television, and the broadcasting board and state news agency.
136
Meciar's actions may impair Slovakia's international acceptance. Both the European Union and the United States have sent diplomatic notes to Bratislava, strongly urging Meciar to adopt "toleration for diverse opinions... and the operation of government in a transparent manner." On November 16, 1995, the European parliament passed a resolution calling on Slovakia to respect democratic principles, and threatened to withdraw its representatives in Bratislava.
137
The cases of Slovakia and Slovenia confirm that prior existence as a component of a federation will facilitate state-building. Federalism, however, is not a sufficient cause; timing and regional consensus are also important. Existing regional solidarity may be augmented by the federal structure and further strengthened by discriminatory federal policies. Pre-existing regional structures and leaders can readily transform into the nucleus of a separatist movement, identifiable within and outside the region. The method of separation does matter in so far as a destructive war will destroy the existing infrastructure, necessitating more extensive development. Federalism may be a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for survival following a split from a parent state. Political union, like marriage, is a serious event, not to be entered into lightly or without reflection. Unlike marriage, however, in politics it is much easier to put aside romanticism and consider the possibilities that the union may fail. If there is the slightest bit of reservation, maintaining a source of separate identity -- and finance -- may be valuable for the uncertain years ahead.
NOTES
Note 1: I would like to thank Sharon Wolchik, John Lis, and Karen Zietlow for their comments and suggestions. Back.
Note 2: Quoted in Bruce Wallace, "The Lessons of Prague," Maclean's, October 16, 1995, 26-27. Back.
Note 3: Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 449, 513; Peter Vodopivec, "Slovenes and Yugoslavia, 1918-1991," East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall 1992), 224; Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 124-25; Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Back.
Note 4: Press, 1974), 76-86; Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 218-19. Back.
Note 5: Slovenia's war with Yugoslavia hardly compares to the subsequent bloodbath there. According to the Slovene Red Cross, in the ten-day war Slovenia suffered casualties of only seventeen dead and 161 wounded. See Tanjug July 11, 1991, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Eastern Europe [hereafter FBIS-EEU], July 12, 1991, 37. Back.
Note 6: Quoted in "Slovenia Needs a New Set of Friends," Economist, November 18, 1995, S20. For an overview, see Milan Andrejevich, "Slovenia: Politics and the Economy in the Year One," RFE/RL Research Report, September 11, 1992, 15-23. Back.
Note 7: A relevant case study is Holly A. Osterland, "National Self-Determination and Secession: The Slovak Model," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 25 (Summer 1993), 655-701. Back.
Note 8: Harry Eckstein, "Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964), 3-6. Back.
Note 9: Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 1. Back.
Note 10: John R. Wood, "Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework," Canadian Journal of Political Science 14, no. 1 (March 1981), 134. Back.
Note 11: Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of `Peripheral Nationalisms:' Some Comparative Speculation on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 3 (July 1979), 303-22.Ibid., 107. Back.
Note 12: Michael Hechter, "The Dynamics of Secession," Acta Sociologica 35, no. 4 (December 1992), 267. Back.
Note 14: Robert A. Young, "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?" Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (December 1994), 773-92. Back.
Note 16: Ibid., 783-84, n. 37. Back.
Note 17: Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview, 1991). Back.
Note 18: Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), 202. Back.
Note 19: Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Economics of Secession (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). Back.
Note 20: Ibid., 36-37, commenting on E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence (New York: Vintage, 1968), 88. Back.
Note 22: Although he has questioned whether the Slovak case meets his earlier model for a secessionist movement, Michael Hechter has not pursued this research. Correspondence from Hechter to Robertson, November 13, 1995. Back.
Note 23: Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 818. Back.
Note 24: In discussing how to analyze the Soviet successor states, William Odom commented that, "the `political development' tribe strikes me as the proper choice... and the appropriate questions are the traditional ones: how democracies and dictatorships come to be, what institutions make them stable, and how they change." In "Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts," World Politics 45 (October 1992), 93. Back.
Note 25: .These systemic components are suggested in Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics 3, no. 3 (April 1971), 316. Back.
Note 26: Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 280. Back.
Note 27: Quoted in Vodopivec, 229. Back.
Note 28: Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), 150-61; Bogomil Ferfila provides statistics based on Yugoslav federal reports in "Yugoslavia: Confederation or Disintegration?" Problems of Communism 40, no. 4 (July/August 1991), 18-30. See also Joseph T. Bombelles, "Federal Aid to the Less Developed Areas of Yugoslavia," East European Politics and Societies 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991), 439-65. Back.
Note 29: Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 54. Back.
Note 30: Viktor Meier, "Yugoslavia: Worsening Economic and Nationalist Crisis," in William E. Griffith, ed., The Opening Curtain? (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 271; Woodward , 29, 72, 159, 267-68; Patrick Moore, "New Dimensions for the Alpine-Adria Project," Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe, March 2, 1990, 53-56. Back.
Note 31: Bookman, Economics, 60. Back.
Note 32: Zarko Lazarevic, "Economic History of Twentieth-Century Slovenia," in Jill Benderly and Evan Kraft, eds., Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 47-48. Back.
Note 33: Woodward, 69-70, 130, 228; Evan Kraft, Milan Vodopivec, and Milan Cvikl, "On Its Own: The Economy of Independent Slovenia," in Benderly and Kraft, 207. Back.
Note 34: Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network, July 5, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU, July 8, 1991, 41. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees estimated that as of May 12, 1992, some 41,000 refugees had flocked to Slovenia, a country of only 2 million people. See "Yugoslavia's Refugees: The Tide of Misery," Economist, May 23, 1992, 53. Back.
Note 35: Franjo D. Stiblar, "Slovenia: A Country Study," in John Hardt and Richard F. Kaufman, eds., East-Central European Economies in Transition (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 605. Back.
Note 36: Woodward, 268; Celestine Bohlen, "Slovenia is Moving to Independence," New York Times, June 6, 1991, A14. Back.
Note 37: Kenneth Zapp, "Compromise in Slovenia Produces a Unique Privatization Process," Problems of Post-Communism 43, no. 3 (May/June 1996). Back.
Note 38: PlanEcon Report 11, no. 15-16 (June 30, 1995), 2. Also see PlanEcon Report 10, no. 23-24 (August 18, 1994), and Kraft et al. Back.
Note 40: Ramet, Nationalism, 210-11; and Sabrina Ramet, "Slovenia's Road to Democracy," in Sabrina Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich, eds., Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 191. Back.
Note 41: Tanjug July 28, 1988, reprinted in FBIS-EEU, July 28, 1988, 32. Back.
Note 42: Woodward, 207, 340. Back.
Note 43: Delo [Ljubljana], August 29, 1992, as reported in FBIS-EEU, September 16, 1992, 26. Back.
Note 44: New York Times, March 22, 1968, A16; quoted in Leff, National Conflict, 161. Back.
Note 45: H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 52, 164; Sharon L. Wolchik, Czechoslovakia in Transition: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Pinter, 1991), 30; Milica Zarkovic Bookman, "War and Peace: The Divergent Breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia," Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 2 (May 1994), 178; Eugen Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 129-38. Back.
Note 46: Leff, National Conflict, 157-60, 237-40. Archie Brown and Gordon Wightman, "Czechoslovakia: Revival and Retreat," in. Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 167-68. Back.
Note 47: J.F. Brown, Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe after Communism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 136-37. Slovenia housed several Yugoslav weapons factories, employing 8,000 and, in combination with Croatia, produced $2 billion worth of munitions annually. See Milan Andrejevich, "Hard Times Ahead for Croatia and Slovenia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe , July 26, 1991, 42-48. Back.
Note 48: Bookman, Economics, 120; Mary Battiata, "Slovaks of Two Minds Over Separation From Big Czech Brother," Washington Post, September 10, 1992, A22. Back.
Note 49: Colin Woodard, "To Keep Jobs, Slovakia Revives Arms Production," Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1994, 10. Back.
Note 50: Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, 37, 192-93. Interview with federal deputy prime minister Jozef Mikloöo, Mladá fronta dnes, December 28, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, "Mentality Behind Czech-Slovak Frictions Viewed," January 3, 1991, 24-25; Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," East European Politics and Societies 8, no. 1 (Winter 1994), 153-88. Back.
Note 51: Mladá fronta dnes, February 23, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU, March 6, 1991, 25-26. Back.
Note 52: Otto Ulc, "The Bumpy Road of Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution," Problems of Communism 41, no. 3 (May/June 1992), 28. Back.
Note 53: Richard Rose, "Czechs and Slovaks Compared: A Survey of Economic and Political Behavior." Studies in Public Policy no. 198, (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1992), questions nos. 60 and 88. Back.
Note 54: See comments by Michal Kovác, economic advisor to Meciar, in Francine S. Kiefer, "Deep Economic Disparities Fuel Calls for Sovereignty in Slovakia," Christian Science Monitor, June 11, 1992, 3. See comments by Jan Carnogursky, Slovak prime minister 1991-92, in Michael Dobbs, "Czechoslovak Feuds Put Crinkles in `Velvet Revolution,'" Washington Post, October 1, 1991, A12. Back.
Note 55: Josef C. Brada, "The Slovak Economy after One Year of Independence," in Hardt and Kaufman, 523-24. Back.
Note 56: Interview with Mikloöo, FBIS-EEU, "Mentality Behind Czech-Slovak Frictions Viewed," January 3, 1991, 24-25. Polls mentioned in Peter Martin, "Economic Reform and Slovakia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, July 5, 1991, 6-13; Jiri Pehe, "Opinion Poll on Economic Reform, RFE Report on Eastern Europe, January 25, 1991, 4-6. Also see Wolchik, "Politics," 165-86. Back.
Note 57: Peter Martin summarizes these reports in "Slovakia: Calculating the Cost of Independence," RFE/RL Research Report, March 20, 1992, 33-38. Back.
Note 58: Jonathan D. Kimball, "East-Central European Economies in Transition: A Survey of Data," in Hardt and Kaufman, 678. Back.
Note 59: Christine Spolar, "Feuds Test Slovakia's Democracy," Washington Post, September 30, 1995, A18; Sharon Fisher, "Turning Back?" Transition, January 30, 1995, 60-63; PlanEcon Report nos. 5-6, (March 21, 1995); "Splitter Splat," Economist, February 19, 1994, 58. Back.
Note 60: See Pavel Mates, "The New Slovak Constitution," RFE/RL Research Report, October 30, 1992, 39-42. Back.
Note 61: CTK, September 23, 1990. As reported in "Slovak Premier Blames Romanies for `Most Crimes,'" FBIS-EEU, September 25, 1990, 25. The Democratic Association of Hungarians in Slovakia (CSEMADOK) is profiled in Edith Oltay, "Hungarians in Slovakia Organize to Press for Ethnic Rights," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, June 1, 1990, 21-27. Back.
Note 62: Jan Obrman, "Language Law Stirs Controversy in Slovakia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, November 16, 1990, 15; Lidové noviny October 26, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, October 31, 1990, 27-28; CTK October 26, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, October 31, 1990, 28-29. Back.
Note 63: CTK, September 26, 1990. As reported in "Hungarian Minority Roundtable Assails Meciar," FBIS-EEU, September 28, 1990, 25; Magyar Hirlap (Budapest) October 10, 1990. As reported in "Hungarian Slovak Official on Minority Problems," FBIS-EEU, October 19, 1990, 24-25; CTK, August 14, 1993. As reported in "Removal of Bilingual Signs Controversy Viewed," FBIS-EEU, August 18, 1993, 21-22; OMRI Daily Digest, October 25, 1995; October 27, 1995; November 6, 1995, November 17, 1995; and November 20, 1995. Back.
Note 64: Gourevitch, 305. Back.
Note 65: Otis K. Rice, West Virginia: A History (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1985). Back.
Note 66: Paul Bohannan, "The Six Stations of Divorce," in Paul Bohannan. ed., Divorce and After (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 29-30. Back.
Note 68: Rose, question no. #78. Back.
Note 69: Leff, National Conflict, 89-91, 277. Back.
Note 70: New Democracies Barometer III data reported in Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "Democracy and Enlarging the European Union Eastward," Journal of Common Market Studies 33, no. 3 (September 1995), 447. Back.
Note 71: Chuck Sudetic, "Slovenia Hopes to Find New Role in Yugoslavia," New York Times, July 16, 1992, A7. Back.
Note 72: Carole Rogel, "Slovenia's Independence: A Reversal of History," Problems of Communism 40, no. 4 (July/August 1991), 35-36; Ferfila, 26. Back.
Note 73: As determined by the Montivideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933. For detailed discussion on how Slovakia meets these criteria, see Osterland, 676-80. Back.
Note 74: Osterland, 693, citing the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 201 (1987). Back.
Note 75: David M. Olson, "The Sundered State: Federalism and Parliament in Czechoslovakia," in Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe, ed. Thomas F. Remington (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 101-103. Back.
Note 76: Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, 69-74. Back.
Note 77: See the sidebar "Czechoslovak Elections Create Deadlock" in Jiri Pehe, "Czechoslovakia's Political Balance Sheet, 1990 to 1992," RFE/RL Research Report, June 19, 1992, 26-27. Also, Jan Obrman, "The Czechoslovak Elections," RFE/RL Research Report, June 26, 1992, 12-19; Wolchik, "Politics," 155-58. Back.
Note 78: See in particular, Ramet, Nationalism, Chapter 11 and the chart in Singleton, 263. Also, Patrick Moore, "Where is Yugoslavia Headed?," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, September 6, 1991, 30-35; Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," Current History, November 1992, 369-75. Back.
Note 79: Quoted in Henry Kamm, "In Yugoslavia, a Charge of `Stalinist!'" New York Times, October 15, 1988, A4. Back.
Note 80: Woodward, 126-29. Back.
Note 81: Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslav Premier in Plea to Republics," New York Times, June 25, 1991, A16; Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1993), 87-89. Back.
Note 82: Tanjug March 18, 1991, as reported in "Tupurkovski Says Presidency Favors Negotiation," FBIS-EEU, March 19, 1991, 55-58. Back.
Note 83: Wolchik, Czechoslovakia, 86-87. See also Skilling, especially Chapter 15, and Vladimir V. Kusin, "Czechs and Slovaks: The Road to the Current Divide," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, October 5, 1990, 4-13. Back.
Note 84: Ferfila, 21-22; Ramet, Nationalism, 71. Back.
Note 85: Patrick Moore, "The New Europe's 'Humpty Dumpty' on the International Stage," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, December 20, 1991, 34. Back.
Note 86: Dimitrij Rupel, "Slovenia's Shift from the Balkans to Central Europe," in Benderly and Kraft, 190. Back.
Note 87: Blaine Harden, "Slovenia Takes Steps to Quit Yugoslavia," Washington Post, January 21, 1991, A5. Back.
Note 88: Dienstbier interview in Národná obroda (Bratislava) March 15, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU, March 22, 1991, 12-13. Jan Obrman, "After the Split: Challenges for Czech Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, November 13, 1992, 26-31 and "Uncertain Prospects for Independent Slovakia," RFE/RL Research Report, December 11, 1992, 43-48. Back.
Note 90: Bratislava Domestic Service, March 14, 1991 as reported in "Havel Addresses Slovak Military; Stresses Unity," FBIS-EEU, March 15, 1991, 15-16. Back.
Note 91: Jan Obrman, "Yugoslav Crisis Has Little Impact on Czechoslovak Domestic Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, August 9, 1991, 31-32. Back.
Note 92: Ramet, Nationalism, 38. Back.
Note 93: Milan Andrejevich, "The Yugoslav Crisis: No Solution in Sight," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, February 22, 1991, 34, 39. Back.
Note 94: Tanjug, March 20, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU , March 20, 1991, 50. Back.
Note 95: Blaine Harden, "Yugoslav Aide Threatens Separatist Republics," Washington Post, December 14, 1990, A4; Milan Andrejevich, "Crisis in Croatia and Slovenia: Proposal for a Confederal Yugoslavia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, November 2, 1990, 28-33; Andrejevich, "Yugoslav Crisis," 34-42. Back.
Note 96: Woodward 137, 166. Back.
Note 97: Quoted in Chuck Sudetic, "A Wary Slovenia Accepts Europe-Backed Accord," New York Times, July 11, 1991, A6; John Tagliabue, "Yugoslavs Reach Slovenian Accord on Border Posts," New York Times, July 8, 1991, A1. Back.
Note 98: Jim Fish, "Slovenia Set to Secede from Yugoslavia," Washington Post, December 24, 1990, A10; Kucan's address to the Slovene Assembly was reported by Radio Slovenia Network, June 25, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU, June 27, 1991, 38-43. Back.
Note 99: Brendan Fowler, "Slovenes Vote Decisively for Independence from Yugoslavia," New York Times, December 24, 1990, A6. Back.
Note 100: CSTK, November 15, 1991, as reported in FBIS-EEU, November 18, 1991, 13-14. Back.
Note 101: Jiri Pehe, "Controversy over the Referendum on the Future of Czechoslovakia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, August 30, 1991, 27-31. See especially Michael J. Deis, "A Study of Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," RFE/RL Research Report, January 31, 1992, 8-13. A referendum on dissolving the federation was seen as the only legal method of divorce, see Jiri Pehe, "Scenarios for Disintegration," RFE/RL Research Report, July 31, 1992, 30-33. Back.
Note 102: Jiri Pehe, "The Referendum Controversy in Czechoslovakia," RFE/RL Research Report, October 30, 1992, 35-38. Dan De Luce, "Czechoslovak Parliament Sets Split of Country Dec. 31," Washington Post, November 26, 1992, A47; and Rita Klimova, "'The End of Czechoslovakia:' An Exchange," New York Review of Books, April 8, 1993, 50-51. Secession in the Quebec referendum was rejected by less than 1 percent. Back.
Note 103: Martin Bútora and Zora Bútorová. "Slovakia: The Identity Challenges of the Newly Born State," Social Research 60, no. 4 (Winter 1993), 720. Back.
Note 104: These actions are summarized in Milan Andrejevich, "Croatia and Slovenia Propose Separation of Yugoslav Republic," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, March 15, 1991, 25-29. Back.
Note 105: Jiri Pehe, "The State Treaty between the Czech and the Slovak Republics," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, June 7, 1991, 11-15. Back.
Note 106: Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Czechoslovak Feuds Puts Crinkles in `Velvet Revolution,'" Washington Post, October 1, 1991, A12. Back.
Note 107: Andrejevich, "Crisis," 28-33; Rupel, 189-90. Back.
Note 108: Quoted in Jonathan Kaufman, "Havel Steps off Stage," Boston Globe, July 21, 1992, A1. Back.
Note 109: Ramet, "Slovenia's Road," 194. Back.
Note 110: Ramet, "Slovenia's Road," 199; Andrejevich, "Slovenia: Politics," 15-23. Back.
Note 111: Bookman, Economics, 49. Back.
Note 114: DEMOS (Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia) consisted of seven diverse parties: Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Peasants, Greens, Liberals and others. The grouping controlled slightly more than half of the 1990 parliament. Back.
Note 115: Later renamed Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS). Back.
Note 116: Bútora and Bútorová, 705-36; Jiri Pehe, "Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to Federation," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, March 22, 1991, 1-10 and "Czechoslovakia's Political Balance Sheet, 1990 to 1992," RFE/RL Research Report, June 19, 1992, 24-31. Back.
Note 117: Jiri Pehe, "Political Conflict in Slovakia," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, May 10, 1991, 1-6 and "Slovak Nationalism Splits Christian Democratic Ranks," RFE/RL Research Report , March 27, 1992, 13-16. Back.
Note 118: Ramet, "Slovenia's Road," 192. Back.
Note 119: Woodward, 117. Back.
Note 120: Ramet, Nationalism, 70. Back.
Note 121: Wood, 119. Even the 1989 Civic Forum and PAV movements were split on republic lines (Olson, 110-12). Also, Carol Skalnik Leff and Susan Mikula, "Institutionalizing Party Systems in Multiethnic States: Integration and Ethnic Segmentation in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1995). Back.
Note 122: For Slovakia, see Duöan Leöká and Viera Koganová, "The Elections 1994 and Crystallization of the Political Parties and Movements in Slovakia" in Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections 1994: Causes, Consequences, Prospects, ed. Sona Szomolányi and Grigorji Meseznikov (Bratislava: Slovak Political Science Association and Friedrich Ebert Foundation), 86-102. Back.
Note 123: See Milan Andrejevich, "Slovenia: Politics and the Economy in the Year One," RFE/RL Research Report, September 11, 1992, 15-23 and "Elections in Slovenia Maintain Status Quo," RFE/RL Research Report, December 18, 1992, 28-31. Back.
Note 124: Milan Andrejevich,"Elections." Back.
Note 125: Stan Markotich, "Stable Support for Extremism?," Transition, March 29, 1995, 31-32. Back.
Note 126: Sharon Fisher, "New Slovak Government Formed after Meciar's Fall," RFE/RL Research Report, April 1, 1994, 7-13 and "Tottering in the Aftermath of Elections," Transition, March 29, 1995, 20-25. Back.
Note 127: "Abduction in High Places," Transition, October 20, 1995, 39. Also see OMRI Daily Reports September 1995 through February 1996 for daily developments, and Sharon Fisher, "Austrian Court Releases Kovác, Jr." available on the World Wide Web at www.omri.cz. Back.
Note 128: Christine Spolar, "Feuds Test Slovakia's Democracy," Washington Post, September 30, 1995, A18; Sharon Fisher, "Turning Back?" Transition, January 30, 1995, 60-63. Back.
Note 130: See Jan Obrman, "Dubcek Joins the Social Democrats in Slovakia," RFE/RL Research Report, April 3, 1992, 16-19 and "Alexander Dubcek, Symbol of the Prague Spring, Has Died," RFE/RL Research Report, November 13, 1992, 12-14, CTK, October 5, 1992 as reported in "Havel, Dubcek Favored for Czech, Slovak Presidencies," FBIS-EEU (October 8, 1992), 10. CTK, November 26, 1993, as reported in "Dubcek Accident Reportedly `Planned in Advance,'" FBIS-EEU, December 1, 1993, 18; and Bratislava Television, May 16, 1995, as reported in "Call for Probe of Dubcek's Fatal Car Crash," FBIS-EEU, May 17, 1995, 10. Back.
Note 131: CTK September 26, 1990, as reported in "Hungarian Minority Roundtable Assails Meciar," FBIS-EEU, September 28, 1990, 25. Back.
Note 132: Jiri Pehe, "Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to Federation," RFE Report on Eastern Europe, March 22, 1991, 1-10. Back.
Note 133: Quoted in Francine S. Kiefer, "Future of Czechoslovak Union Turns on Prospects for Economy," Christian Science Monitor, February 19, 1992, 1. Back.
Note 134: "Ready for Divorce," Economist, November 2, 1991, 46-47; Stephen Engelberg, "In a New Slovakia, Fears Are Both New and Old," New York Times, January 22, 1993, A3; CSTK, November 21, 1991, reported as "Secret Report' Claims Meciar KGB Connections," FBIS-EEU, November 13, 1991, 14. Back.
Note 135: "Splitter Splat," Economist, February 19, 1994, 58. Back.
Note 136: See Jiri Pehe, "Czechoslovakia: Toward Dissolution," RFE/RL Research Report, January 1, 1993, 84-88; Adele Kalniczky, "The Slovak Government's First Six Months in Office," RFE/RL Research Report, February 5, 1993, 18-25; Jan Obrman, "The Slovak Government versus the Media," RFE/RL Research Report, February 5, 1993; Adele Kalniczky, "Slovak Television: Back to State Control?" RFE/RL Research Report, November 13, 1992; Slovak Radio, November 6, 1992; CSTK, November 30, 1992; Slovak Radio. January 22, 1993; and Fisher, "Tottering." Back.
Note 137: OMRI Daily Digest, October 30 and November 17, 1995. Back.
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