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The Components of Coexistence:
Hungarian Minorities and Interethnic Relations in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
Why did protests over school policy lead to violence between Romanians and Hungarians in Tirgu Mures, Transylvania, in 1990, while relations between Ukrainians and Hungarians remained calm in Transcarpathia, Ukraine -- in spite of a Hungarian region's vote for autonomy? Clearly, the groups of Hungarians that fall within the borders of Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine in post-Trianon Europe 2 maintain quite different relationships with the dominant ethnic groups of the multi-ethnic states that they currently inhabit.
In response to the growing spread of ethnic conflict throughout the world, some theorists and policymakers have begun to advocate the separation of different ethnic groups into distinct territories as the only viable means by which such conflicts may be resolved. 3 While this policy may be the most practical method for achieving an immediate cessation of hostilities in situations where conflicts have escalated to extreme violence, ethnic separation may actually be counterproductive and damaging in situations of extra-war ethnic conflict such as tensions, protests and limited violence between groups. This article argues that an understanding of "nationalism" provides a less productive means for understanding ethnic conflict than does a model that examines the structure of individual communities at the local level, the context within which individuals of various ethnic communities make -- or fail to make -- contact with each other. By attempting to understand the components that promote peaceful coexistence in multiethnic communities such as districts or cities, we can more clearly understand the emergence of ethnic conflict than if we focus merely upon the larger "nation" or "state" alone. 4
In this comparative study, I posit that communities with higher levels of heterogeneity will exhibit lower levels of ethnic conflict than communities with lower levels of heterogeneity. Here I evaluate heterogeneity in two forms: 1) ethnic diversity, or "simple heterogeneity," and 2) the cross-cutting cleavages of ethnic and religious groups, or "multiform heterogeneity." 5 In the first form, a community with several ethnic groups tending toward equal proportions will exhibit a high degree of ethnic diversity. In the second form a community in which religious groups cut across ethnic lines exhibits a high degree of cross-cutting cleavages. I will then evaluate these two forms of heterogeneity in relation to conflict levels 6 between Hungarian minorities and the majority ethnic groups in Transylvania, Romania, Southern Slovakia, and Transcarpathia, Ukraine. These regions were each transferred to other states from Austro-Hungary during this century: Transylvania to Romania, and Southern Slovakia to Czechoslovakia by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, then to Slovakia in 1993. Transcarpathia was transferred to Czechoslovakia in 1920 and the Soviet Union in 1945, then became part of Ukraine in 1991. I will conclude with a brief illustration of the way in which this framework can also be applied to further understanding of the present conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Finally, I will note some alternative explanations for ethnic conflict, and outline some recommendations for arresting interethnic conflicts before violence erupts.
Much of the current political science literature approaches nationalism and ethnic conflict as functions of extra-community factors in an attempt to explain the causal mechanism that produces nationalism. Ethnic conflict, however, is the escalation of tensions between ethnic groups through individual actions. Below, I will briefly outline two schools that propose to address individual mobilization to nationalism and conflict, rational choice and the elite-mobilization model, and then give a brief overview of previous approaches to "community" and nationalism.
In the rational choice camp, Michael Hechter uses a framework of methodological individualism to propose that nations are the result of rational individuals' decisions to cohere, based upon their assumption that they can attain more goods as a collective unit than as individuals. 7 However, a rational choice framework does not adequately address issues of conflict -- while it can explain the motivations for individuals to join groups, it is less successful in explaining the actions of groups as aggregates of individuals. In actuality, ethnic groups often act contrary to their rational interests in situations of ethnic conflict. The explanatory power of the rational-choice framework is primarily useful for explaining ethnic conflict when it is used with a structural component. It is only within a given structural context that the actions of a group can be determined to be "rational." For example, in his study directed at explaining ethnic conflict, James Fearon examines the incentive for minority communities to rebel against the larger state when they feel threatened by its policies. 8 Fearon's approach provides an improvement over the simple rational choice model by implementing it within a structural context, the newly-formed nationalist states of the former Yugoslavia.
Under the elite-mobilization formulation, which emphasizes the role of elites in facilitating individuals' identification with the nation, Eric Hobsbawm proposes that national mobilization occurs as states or elites of national movements activate "proto-national" bonds, or pre-existing "feelings of collective belonging" that are politically salient for individuals. 9 However, political elites cannot construct entirely new identities acceptable to individuals; rather, the identities proposed by elites must be consistent with the identity concepts previously accepted by individuals within the group. In other words, elites "cannot invent and imagine anything they wish" and have it accepted by individuals of the group. 10
Several authors have focused upon the incentives to mobilize along national lines as positive forces inciting action. This analysis makes a different proposal: that nationalism, or the belief system that one's particular nation should have a degree of self-rule, 11 an ideology that emerges if interethnic bonds in a given community are absent. In other words, it is the lack of interethnic ties within a community that can lead individuals to nationalism. In a community that exhibits a high prevalence of such ties, however, individuals will be more likely to resist nationalist rhetoric by elites.
Benedict Anderson and Donald Horowitz have both focused upon the importance of community in ethnic conflict. Anderson uses the term "community" in a broad fashion as "a deep, horizontal comradeship." 12 Anderson thus explains nations as communities of individuals that are "imagined," as the group maintains a community in spite of the fact that they will "never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communication" through the printed media that they share. 13 While Anderson's work provides an insightful study into the collective consciousness of nations, it is of little relevance to this article, which does not examine the origins of nations but rather begins with the assumption that they are preexisting political entities. 14 In contrast to Anderson, I focus upon communities as interacting populations of diverse individuals in a common geographic location. 15 A community is simply a venue where different groups, such as ethnic or religious groups, make contact with each other. This essay also stands in contrast to the beginning point of Horowitz, who proposes that ethnic conflict can be expected as groups closely juxtaposed to each other in a "common environment" compete with each other for resources and status. Horowitz proposes that in Asia and Africa, colonial rule built institutional structures that "sharpen[ed] the contrasts and evaluations that emerged with group disparities. 16 While he presents an insightful framework for the study of ethnic conflict in societies where political institutions were created by the imperial rule of extra-community third parties, it is less appropriate for an analysis of contemporary European societies. While the control of territory has frequently shifted among ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, institutional structures tend to be indigenous to the region and not imposed from "outside." 17 While Horowitz views proximity as increasing conflict, I hypothesize that it is precisely the common environment shared by groups that can decrease conflict.
A local approach
One of the reasons behind the misunderstanding of ethnic conflict has been the continued use of theoretical frameworks appropriate for international wars to the study of local conflicts. Concepts such as the "security dilemma," for example, in which misperceptions and limited information can escalate conflict, are perhaps more useful in situations in which the given parties are nation-states regarding each other from great distances, rather than in situations in which the given parties are proximate members of the same state or community. 18 Government-directed conflicts between states in the international system differ markedly in form and structure from conflicts between groups within a state. A local level of analysis appears to be a more accurate means of understanding ethnic conflicts. 19
The structure of a community, i.e., its demographics, will shape the identities and actions of its individuals. A high level of heterogeneity in a community should facilitate social ties between individuals, making them less likely to respond to external forces (such as elites or neighboring wars) that might incite the individuals of various groups to initiate violence against each other. An examination of the conditions that prevent individuals from responding to pro-nationalist influences can explain why certain communities erupt in interethnic violence while others do not.
Individuals of different groups will only form acquaintance relationships if a significant probability exists that they will have the opportunity to come into contact with each other. This probability can be understood as the concept of heterogeneity, according to the framework outlined by Peter Blau in his book Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. Blau explains heterogeneity as the likelihood that "two randomly chosen persons [will] not belong to the same group" within a given geographic community. Individuals in communities that have a high degree of heterogeneity are more likely to develop acquaintance relationships with individuals of other ethnic groups than are individuals in communities with a low degree of heterogeneity. 20
As outlined by Mark Granovetter in his analysis of social networks, "strong ties," or close friendships and family bonds between individuals, tend to form within the context of one group (such as an ethnic group), while "weak ties," or acquaintance relationships, may form between individuals of different groups. Weak ties are thus not merely trivial phenomena but rather an important foundation for coexistence in multiethnic societies. These weak ties provide bridges between individuals of different groups, bridges that transfer information. Shared information can serve to decrease conflict by increasing the degree of understanding between individuals of different groups. Because such ties provide a means for information exchange between groups, a community without inter-group ties is more likely to exhibit a high degree of divisiveness between groups. 21 For the purposes of this analysis, I will address the importance of ethnic and religious groups, identities that are particularly salient and more rigid than identities such as party affiliation or club membership. 22
Granovetter's framework of weak ties is useful for understanding the individual foundations, or the micro-level, of multiethnic cooperation. However, in order to create a viable means for evaluating the degree of these ties in various societies, we must turn to a more "macro" theoretical framework, which pertains to groups. This framework will allow for an understanding of the conditions that facilitate the development of weak ties between groups.
Simple heterogeneity
Blau outlines two component means of heterogeneity by which we can evaluate the level of heterogeneity, or the diversity of groups, in a society. The first component, as previously noted, is "simple" heterogeneity, i.e., a society's level of differentiation within one identity category (such as ethnicity or religion, but not both concurrently). 23 With regard to ethnicity, we can observe the degree of simple heterogeneity by assessing the number of ethnic groups present, and then evaluating the degree to which their proportions tend toward equality. For example, a community with two ethnic groups that each comprise 50 percent of the population will exhibit higher heterogeneity than a community with ethnic groups each consisting of 90 percent and 10 percent of the population. As the number of ethnic groups increases, the level of heterogeneity will increase as well -- provided that the groups' proportions tend toward equality. 24
Within a given community, the likelihood that an individual of a minority group will come into contact with an individual of a majority group is greater than the likelihood that an individual of a majority group will come into contact with an individual of a minority group, simply due to the numerical content of the community population. As explained by Blau, "the rate of intergroup associations of the smaller group must exceed that of the larger." 25 Individuals of the larger group will tend to maintain fewer contacts outside their own group than will individuals of a smaller group, thus, "ceteris paribus, the larger of two groups discriminates more than the smaller against associating with members of the other group." 26 This is due not only to the fact that larger groups have a higher capacity to sustain personal contacts without the need to venture outside the group, but also to the fact that because the minority group will tend to hold several inter-group ties, its individuals will absorb a higher degree of information about individuals from the other group, making them seem less "foreign." Following this logic, if each group comprises 50 percent of the population, they will have an equally limited tendency to discriminate, as individuals of each groups will be equally likely to come into contact with each other.
Multiform heterogeneity
The second component of heterogeneity concerns its "multiform" quality, or the degree to which groups of different categories are or are not contiguous. We can understand this concept in terms of ethnic and religious categories. If all members of a particular ethnic group in a given community identify with one religion to which no individuals of other ethnic groups belong, that community will register a low degree of multiform heterogeneity. A community in which members of one ethnic group hold a variety of religious affiliations will exhibit a higher degree of multiform heterogeneity, as will a community in which members of all ethnic groups share one religious affiliation. Multiform heterogeneity may simply be understood as the degree to which "cross-cutting cleavages" reduce the isolation of groups in a community.
The effects of cross-cutting cleavages in promoting or hindering democratic stability in a society have been examined in previous research by Seymour Lipset, Arend Lijphart, Harry Eckstein, Donald Horowitz, and others. 27 However, the potential of cross-cutting cleavages to reduce ethnic conflict has been examined chiefly within the context of political institutions. This study gives priority to societal cleavages as having a direct effect upon levels of conflict. While institutions may serve as intervening variables, I will set them aside for a future study.
It is important to stress that the heterogeneity of a population is not the same as the integration, or assimilation, level of the population -- which occurs as one group is culturally and linguistically absorbed into another. While assimilation is often viewed as an ideal for immigrant groups, it is rarely desired by groups who find themselves drawn into a particular country by treaty-brokered border changes. Such groups may coexist peacefully with the dominant nationalities in their adopted states while maintaining their own cultural identities.
The hypothesis
I propose that communities with high levels of simple heterogeneity among ethnic groups should exhibit lower levels of ethnic conflict than communities with low levels of heterogeneity. Conversely, communities with low levels of heterogeneity should exhibit high levels of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, regions with high levels of multiform heterogeneity among ethnic and religious groups should exhibit lower levels of ethnic conflict than regions with low levels of multiform heterogeneity.
These two variables of heterogeneity are assessed in the case studies of Hungarian minorities in contemporary Transylvania, South Slovakia, and Transcarpathia that follow. For each case, I will 1) evaluate simple heterogeneity on the local, or district, level according to ethnicity; 2) discuss multiform heterogeneity in relation to the cross-cutting ties of ethnicity and religion; and finally, 3) evaluate the levels of conflict between districts within and between the regions under study. While violence is not the only observable form of conflict, it is a useful indicator of high levels of conflict. I evaluate conflict levels on a spectrum in which interethnic cooperation indicates the lowest level of conflict, protests and demonstrations indicate low to moderate levels of conflict, and scattered violence indicates moderate to high levels of conflict. 28
A study of Hungarian minorities in these three regions of East Central Europe provides a degree of control for cultural and regional differences. In addition, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine are stationed at similar points in the process of transition from communist political systems to democratic, market systems: therefore, the differences in political and economic instability between them are minimized. Given the uniformity of the minority group in each case and the similar levels of state instability, one would expect conflict levels between the groups in each state to be similar in comparison. However, as I will show below, conflict levels have been highest in Romania, where inter-group violence has occurred, moderate in Slovakia, where protests and demonstrations have been common, and lowest in Transcarpathia, Ukraine, where the groups have frequently cooperated in political matters.
This article will conclude with a brief examination of the applicability of a heterogeneity framework to a further understanding of two regions in the former Yugoslavia: Vojvodina and Bosnia. As these are cases in which the threat of war between mixed groups is a particularly timely concern, they should provide a challenge to the postulate that heterogeneity can assuage interethnic conflict. However, even in war-torn Bosnia, not all communities have erupted into conflict. The city of Tuzla provides an example of the strength of the components of coexistence even under severe extra-community pressures towards fragmentation.
According to the 1992 Romanian government census, there are 1.6 million Hungarians in Romania. They comprise 7.1 percent of the population and are concentrated in Transylvania. 29 The next largest minority are the Gypsies (Roma) at 1.8 percent, followed by the Germans at .5 percent.
Simple heterogeneity of ethnic groups across districts
The Hungarian composition of selected districts (judeti) of Transylvania, in percentages: 30
| Hungarians | Other Minorities | Orthodox | Catholic | Protestant | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Bucharest City: | .4 | 2.1 | 96.5 | 1.3 | .1 | |
| *Cluj: | 19.8 | 2.6 | 70.1 | 4.4 | 14.0 | |
| *Timis: | 9.1 | 10.9 | 78.2 | 13.1 | 2.3 | |
| *Brasov: | 9.8 | 4.3 | 84.1 | 4.4 | 2.9 | |
| *Bihor: | 28.5 | 5.4 | 59.6 | 10.1 | 19.7 | |
| *Mures: | 41.3 | 6.6 | 51.4 | 10.4 | 28.6 | |
| *Maramures: | 10.2 | 8.8 | 77.4 | 6.9 | 4.5 | |
| Arad: | 12.5 | 7.0 | 73.7 | 11.9 | 3.1 | |
| Sibu: | 4.2 | 8.0 | 87.5 | 1.8 | 2.4 | |
| Satu-Mare: | 35.0 | 6.6 | 49.7 | 18.4 | 19.3 | |
| Harghita: | 84.6 | 1.4 | 13.3 | 65.3 | 12.9 | |
| Salaj: | 23.7 | 4.1 | 67.0 | 2.9 | 20.3 | |
| Covasna: | 75.2 | 1.4 | 21.7 | 36.3 | 34.2 |
* Counties with a population of over 500,000. Counties are ranked in declining order of total population from Bucharest City (2,351,000) and Cluj (735,000) to Covasna (233,000). Romania is divided into 41 such districts.
According to Blau's formulation, the most heterogeneous communities are those in which the percentages of groups tend toward equality. In examining the level of simple heterogeneity of the districts listed above, it is clear that the district with the least level of heterogeneity is Bucharest City, as it has a total minority population of only 2.5 percent (.4 percent Hungarian). Mures and Satu Mare exhibit the highest level of heterogeneity between Hungarians and Romanians, as the population ratios of non-Romanians to Romanians are 47.9 percent and 41.6 percent, respectively. In addition, the presence of other groups in these districts (6.6 percent in each) contributes to the level of heterogeneity because they reduce the "bipolar" ethnic cleavage between Hungarians and Romanians. The proportions of the Timis and Maramures districts are notable because even though their total non-Romanian populations comprise approximately 20 percent, only half of this group is Hungarian. A Romanian is thus as likely to come into contact with a Hungarian as with a member of another minority group in these districts. In contrast, the districts in which Hungarians comprise the majority exhibit a relatively low level of heterogeneity, as the district of Harghita is 84.6 percent Hungarian and the Covasna district is 75.2 percent Hungarian. It is notable that according to a recent Romanian poll, "Romanians in Transylvania have a markedly more positive view of the Hungarian population than those elsewhere in the country." 31
Multiform heterogeneity: ethnicity and religion in Transylvania
According to the 1992 Romanian census data, 86.8 percent of the population is Orthodox, 5.0 percent Roman Catholic, and 3.5 percent Reformist (Calvinist). These distributions are highly correlated with ethnic populations, as shown in the district data above. 32 The Hungarian population tends to be largely Catholic in Central Romania, as indicated by the figures for the Harghita and Covasna counties, and largely Protestant in Northwestern Romania, as indicated by the figures for Bihor, Mures, and Satu Mare. The Romanians tend to adhere to a strong Orthodox identity, a fact visible from the figures for the Bucharest City and Sibu districts. The two ethnic groups are significantly divided along lines of religion, for few Hungarians share the Orthodox faith with Romanians. The Transylvanian region as a whole thus exhibits a low level of multiform heterogeneity -- as well as a moderately high level of conflict, as will be outlined below.
Conflict
One of the most violent instances of Romanian-Hungarian conflict took place in the city of Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely), located in the Mures district, in March 1990. Eight individuals were killed and over 300 injured in incidents of violence which lasted for two to three days. 33 Although these events took place within a highly heterogeneous district, the violence was instigated chiefly by individuals from outside the city community. The arrival of several individuals from Hungary on March 15 to celebrate a Hungarian holiday was viewed with suspicion by several Romanians, particularly in light of a demonstration for Hungarian schools that was held the following day. 34
Then, on March 19, approximately 1,000 peasants from the surrounding mountain villages were transported into Tirgu Mures by Romanian extremists and given axes and clubs. They first held a counterprotest to the previous Hungarian demonstrations, which then evolved into violent acts against Hungarians in the vicinity. The group then surrounded a building containing several ethnic Hungarian leaders, and when the Hungarians finally emerged under dubious promises of protection by the police, they were severely beaten by the crowd, some permanently injured. 35 The following day, ethnic Hungarians sponsored a peaceful demonstration to protest these events which was attended by 20,000 people, notably including several prominent ethnic Romanians from the city who condemned the violence. Once again, the villagers arrived in buses and instigated further violent acts. 36 These individuals were most likely from villages that were less heterogeneous than Tirgu Mures itself (a fact that illustrates that a more complete analysis would require an assessment of individual cities, rather than simply districts). 37
On December 22, 1989, in the course of the Romanian revolutionary events, violent acts by Hungarians against Romanians were reported in the minimally-heterogeneous Harghita and Covasna counties where Hungarians constitute a majority. 38 According to a government hearing, seven people were killed and 4,000 Romanians were reported to have left the area. Those individuals attacked tended to be either 1) local leaders, especially police officials, against whom there was a great deal of political resentment, or 2) individuals that were not from the same city or village as the attackers -- several incidents occurred on or near sites of public transportation between cities such as trains, train stations, and bus stops. In several cases in which officials were targeted for attack, they were assisted in escaping by Hungarian neighbors, friends, or colleagues. 39 These events contrast sharply with those of Timisoara (Temesvár) during the 1989 revolution. It was in Timisoara that the Romanian revolution was sparked by a multi-ethnic demonstration to protest the arrest of an ethnic Hungarian, the Protestant Reverend László Tokés. In Timisoara, a district with a high degree of heterogeneity, Romanians and Hungarians cooperated in the revolutionary process, while in Covasna and Harghita the revolution fostered intergroup conflict.
This fact seems to illustrate the positive effects of simple heterogeneity. While a more detailed analysis of the villages of origin of the instigators of violence in Tirgu Mures would provide a deeper understanding of the effects of heterogeneity in that particular case, it is significant that those Romanians involved in instigating the violence were not from Tirgu Mures itself. Instead, the city's ethnic Romanian leaders rallied with the Hungarians in protest to the violence. The Romanian case generally indicates a moderately high level of conflict among Hungarians and Romanians in Romania. The fact that Hungarians and Romanians are heavily split along religious lines supports the proposal that a low level of cross-cutting cleavages, or multiform heterogeneity, coincides with relatively high levels of conflict.
According to the 1992 census, 567,000 individuals (10.7 percent of the Slovak population of 5.3 million), identify themselves as Hungarian by nationality. The next highest minority group are the Roma. 40 Over 92 percent of the Hungarians reside in a continuous, 345-mile-long strip in the south, where they comprise 61.7 percent of the population, and much of the community (59.3 percent) lives in small villages with populations under 5,000. 41
Simple heterogeneity of ethnic groups across districts
The Hungarian composition of selected districts in Southern Slovakia is as follows, in percentages: 42
| Hungarian nationality |
Hungarian language |
Catholic | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Nitra (Nyitra): | .6 | 10.4 | 98 |
| *Nové Zámky (Érsekujvár): | 42.2 | 45.4 | 98 |
| *Bratislava (Pozsony): | 7.7 | 8.9 | 91 |
| *Galanta: | 46.6 | 48.2 | 94 |
| *Levice (Léva): | 35.7 | 38.5 | 90 |
| *Trebisov (Tokerterebes): | 40.9 | 44.5 | 67 |
| *Komárno (Komárom): | 72.4 | 75.1 | 93 |
| *Kosice (Kassa): | 13.7 | 20.4 | 85 |
| Rimavská Sobota (Rimaszombat): | 48.4 | 49.2 | 80 |
| Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely): | 89.0 | 89.2 | 97 |
| Lucenec (Losonc): | 24.1 | 26.0 | 80 |
| Roznava (Rozsnyó): | 28.0 | 32.1 | 61 |
*Total population of over 100,000 in 1970. Towns ranging from 194,000 (Nitra) to 82,000 (Roznava). Ranked in order of 1970 size. Slovakia is divided into 38 such districts (an issue of current dispute).
According to these figures, it appears that the districts with the highest levels of heterogeneity are Rimavská Sobota and Galanta. 43 The least heterogeneous districts are Bratislava, Nitra, and especially Dunajská Streda, which maintains a Hungarian majority of 89 percent. The Hungarians also hold a clear majority in Komárno, at 72.4 percent.
Multiform heterogeneity: ethnicity and religion in South Slovakia
The general population of Slovakia is approximately 60 percent Roman Catholic, 8 percent Protestant, and 3 percent Greek Catholic. 44 Within the Hungarian minority, 64.9 percent are Roman Catholics and 11.4 percent Protestants. Because there are few Hungarian-speaking bishops, many Hungarians often attend Mass in Slovak. 45 The strong Catholic affiliation of both groups is especially visible in the table above, in which all of the southern districts with the exception of Trebiöov and Roznava (located in the East), maintain a Roman Catholic affiliation of over 80 percent. The religious differences between the Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians are thus minimal in Slovakia. This fact has provided an important contribution to peace in the region; indeed, even the most vocal Slovak group has referred to the Catholic Church as a venue to mediate problems and promote coexistence between the two ethnic groups in the southern region. 46 Approximately 10 percent share the Protestant faith.
Conflict
A 1994 poll by the Slovak Statistical Office demonstrates that both "Hungarians and Slovaks living in southern Slovakia [view] their mutual relations more positively than [do] Slovaks living outside the region." The positive effects of heterogeneity in the southern region are visible from the fact that while approximately two-thirds of Slovaks from non-southern regions responded that they "would not want a Hungarian as a neighbor," only one-fourth of those Slovaks living in the southern region responded that they would not wish a Hungarian neighbor. True to the proposition in Blau's heterogeneity framework that individuals of majority groups are more likely to discriminate against individuals of minority groups than the converse, merely one-tenth of the Hungarians polled asserted they would not want a Slovak neighbor. 47 These results are consistent with previous surveys conducted from 1990 to 1993.
Conflicts between Hungarians and Slovaks have often centered around issues of language use in South Slovakia. Prime Minister Vladimír Meciar's government, which has intermittently held power for most of the last five years, 48 has put forth several policies to reduce the use of the Hungarian language. Beginning in 1992, Hungarian-language locality signs were systematically removed throughout Southern Slovakia. 49 Meciar's administration also continued to enforce communist restrictions on the use of non-Slovak names in birth registers. The government only altered these policies after intervention by the Council of Europe; 50 however, they continued to reduce funding and support for Hungarian education. In response to a government plan to implement bilingual education in Hungarian schools, protests were held by ethnic Hungarians in Roznava and Komárno in March 1995, followed by June demonstrations throughout South Slovakia protesting the removal of several Hungarian school administrators. 51 The language issue is far from resolved -- in November 1995, the parliament passed a new law limiting the use of non-Slovak languages. 52
The question of self-government became a primary issue of contention between Hungarians and Slovaks beginning in late 1993, with the Slovak government's proposal to create five new administrative districts spanning north to south. 53 In early 1994, an assembly of 3,000 ethnic Hungarians in Komárno presented a counterproposal to establish horizontal regions running west to east in order to create a district in which Hungarians would be the majority -- and where they could use their own language for administrative purposes. According to the declaration, this district would maintain "an independent government and public administration and [have] a special legal status." 54 The Slovak government adamantly opposed the proposal, and several Slovak individuals protested a Hungarian district as inappropriate for an ethnically heterogeneous region. 55 The nationalist Slovak organization Matica Slovenska became involved with a series of memoranda issued by ethnic Slovaks from meetings in Surunay, in the Nové Zámky district. The meeting point for the Hungarian protests, Komárno, is a district with a 72.4 percent Hungarian majority and a rather low level of heterogeneity. The meeting point for the Slovak protests, Surunay (Nové Zámky), maintains a moderate level of heterogeneity with a 60-40 ratio of Slovaks to Hungarians. 56
Unlike the Romanian case, while there were several controversial demonstrations concerning ethnic issues in Slovakia during the last few years, they did not lead to violence. This lack of violence seems to indicate the importance of multiform heterogeneity in stemming an increase in conflict. The fact that Slovaks and Hungarians are both highly Catholic indicates the presence of a salient cross-cutting cleavage that decreases the degree of separation between the two groups -- while in the Romanian case, the religious division between Hungarians and Romanians reinforces a sharp distinction between the two groups. However, the effect of simple heterogeneity across districts for Slovakia is less clear, as demonstrations by the two groups have centered in Komárno and in Surunay, districts with low and moderate levels of simple heterogeneity. Perhaps more illustrative are poll results indicating more favorable attitudes towards Hungarians on the part of Slovaks living in the heterogeneous regions than their northern counterparts.
According to 1990 statistics, 155,700 Hungarians live in Transcarpathia and comprise 12.5 percent of this district, or oblast, of Ukraine. 57 Transcarpathia's other ethnic groups are Ukrainians, comprising 78.4 percent, 58 Russians 4 percent, Romanians 2.3 percent, Roma, and Slovaks. 59 The largest Hungarian groups reside in four of Transcarpathia's largest cities, Berehovo (Beregszáz), Uzhhorod (Ungvár), 60 Mukachevo (Munkács), and Vinohrady (Nagyszolos). 61 The fact that the remainder of Transcarpathia's geographic area is largely underdeveloped implies that while the Hungarians comprise only 12.5 percent of the oblast population, they tend to be more highly involved in commerce and political activities than the more isolated and self-sustaining mountain people (often of Ruthenian ethnicity). In other words, in an oblast in which a fifth of the region may be considered to be developed, the Hungarians constitute a large presence in that fifth.
Simple heterogeneity of ethnic groups across sub-districts
The largest minority groups in Transcarpathia are Hungarians and Russians. Their proportion of selected sub-districts (raiony) of Transcarpathia is as follows, in percentages: 62
|
|
|
Hungarians |
|
|
Russians |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Uzhhorod (Ungvár): |
|
34.8 |
|
|
14.1 |
| *Mukachevo (Munkács): |
|
44.6 63 |
|
|
11.2 |
| *Vinohrady (Nagyszolos): |
|
24.7 |
|
|
n/a |
| Berehovo (Beregszáz): |
|
66.9 |
|
|
n/a |
*Total population of over 100,000 in 1992. Ranked according to population size, from Uzhhorod (199,000) to Berehovo (85,600).
The Hungarians constitute a majority only in the Berehovo sub-district, or raion, according to the available data. Heterogeneity for Berehovo is moderately low, as Hungarians comprise 66.9 percent of the population (although this heterogeneity level could be higher given the presence of Russians, for which figures were unavailable). Heterogeneity is highest in Uzhhorod, as the primary non-Ukrainian groups comprise 48.9 percent of the population, and moderately high for Mukachevo, in which the primary non-Ukrainian groups comprise 55.8 percent.
Multiform heterogeneity: ethnicity and religion in Transcarpathia
The majority (55 percent) of Hungarians in Western Transcarpathia are Protestant. Approximately 33 percent are Roman Catholic and 11 percent Greek Catholic, or Uniate. 64 In addition, 15 Orthodox (Pravoslavny) Hungarian communities have also been registered 65 and sometimes share church buildings with Ukrainian Uniates. The religious affiliations of the Slavic groups also presents a complex picture. A large number of Ruthenians and Ukrainians are Greek Catholic, and the remainder of Ukrainians tend to be Orthodox, as are the Russians. Before the independence of Ukraine in 1991, only the Russian Orthodox Church was recognized as legitimate by the state. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is now a growing entity, and the two Orthodox groups tend to separate along ethnic Russian and Ukrainian lines. 66 A large number of individuals in Transcarpathia, however, resent this division and prefer to refer themselves as simply "Orthodox."
Conflict, or cooperation?
The fact that individuals of these ethnic groups are rather dispersed among the various religions demonstrates a high level of multiform heterogeneity in Transcarpathia, which corresponds with the low level of interethnic conflict in the region. Remarkably little conflict exists between Hungarians and the Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians) in Transcarpathia. In fact, some Ukrainian and Russian parents send their children to Hungarian schools as a means of learning a language useful for business purposes. There are currently 61 Hungarian schools, 22 Ukrainian-Hungarian schools, and 14 Russian-Hungarian schools in the region, as well as three schools that teach in all three languages. 67
The groups have also tended to cooperate politically. In a 1991 referendum, 78 percent of the Transcarpathian oblast voted for a "special self-governing administrative status" for itself within Ukraine. This move was led largely by Ruthenians, 68 an ethnic group dominant in Transcarpathia that the Ukrainian state considers to be Ukrainian. The Hungarians of Transcarpathia cooperated with this push for greater autonomy from the central state, 69 unlike the Hungarians in Slovakia, who were reluctant to support Slovakia's independence from Czechoslovakia.
During the same vote, however, 81 percent of voters in the Hungarian-populated Berehovo raion within Transcarpathia voted for it to become a Hungarian "national district" within Transcarpathia. 70 While the central Ukrainian government initially supported such moves for autonomy on the part of both the Berehovo raion and the Transcarpathian oblast, the state later eliminated provisions for national-territorial administrative units throughout the state due to a divisive situation elsewhere (the issue of the autonomous republic of Crimea). 71 Instead, Ukraine now simply guarantees non-territorial rights for minority groups in their linguistic, cultural, and educational affairs. 72 While the autonomy movement has lost some momentum, the first thing a visitor to the raion's largest city notices is the presence of only the Hungarian "Beregszáz" labeling the town's main train station. However, unlike the Slovaks, the Slavic groups in Berehovo do not appear to take the autonomy movement very seriously, nor do they view it as a danger to their own group status. 73
The Berehovo raion, with its Hungarian majority and moderately low level of heterogeneity, has exhibited the most "tension" of all the raiony between Hungarians and the Slavic groups, as a result of their vote for autonomy within the Transcarpathian oblast. However, the degree of interethnic tension in Berehovo is definitively lower than in the cases of Romania and Slovakia. While Slovakia and Transcarpathia both exhibit high levels of multiform heterogeneity, as cross-cutting cleavages exist between ethnic and religious groups, Transcarpathia maintains a greater degree of general diversity than does Slovakia. This fact may account for the lower level of interethnic conflict in Transcarpathia, and would suggest the usefulness of a further study into the effects of differing patterns of multiform heterogeneity.
Summary of cases
It appears that ethnic conflict levels tend to be higher in districts with lower levels of heterogeneity, according to the cases outlined above. However, the analysis of simple heterogeneity across districts is less clear. Due to the influence of exogenous factors in Romania and the inconclusive results of districts in Slovakia, it appears that 1) the presence of individuals exogenous to the community can alter conflict levels, as in the case of Tirgu Mures, and 2) a further study utilizing data for specific cities, rather than districts, might prove more conclusive.
The level of multiform heterogeneity does in fact appear to affect the different levels of conflict within Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The strong presence of multiform heterogeneity in a region such as Transcarpathia correlates with low levels of conflict, as demonstrations and protests have been less frequent in Transcarpathia than in either Romanian or Slovakia over the past five years; nor has violence emerged between Hungarians and the Slavic groups there. Conflict levels are greatest in Romania, the region in which multiform heterogeneity is the weakest of the three. The case of Slovakia, which maintains high multiform heterogeneity (though a lower plurality of groups than Transcarpathia), displays a moderate level of interethnic conflict that includes frequent demonstrations and protests but falls short of the violence that appears in Romania. It appears that information-exchanging bridges between ethnic groups in the form of acquaintance ties may indeed develop within heterogeneous contexts, preventing interethnic conflict.
The heterogeneity framework may be expanded beyond the cases of Hungarian minorities presented above, and can provide several insights into the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia that have not been addressed by previous approaches. For example, the fact of intermarriage between the currently-warring groups in Yugoslavia has been presented as one of the puzzles of the conflict. However, contrary to the myth that intermarriage increased under communism, empirical research has demonstrated that intermarriage rates in the former Yugoslavia in fact remained a steady 11 to 13 percent over the last 30 years. 74 Rather than focusing upon marriage ties, or "strong" ties, an examination of acquaintance relationships may provide a better explanation of this conflict's origin. The following section will briefly outline the way in which the heterogeneity approach may be used to understand selected communities in Vojvodina and Bosnia. One would expect these two regions to be especially difficult for the heterogeneity framework, given the presence of full-scale violence between ethnic groups throughout the former Yugoslavia. However, the continued existence of communities that have resisted the ethnic fragmentation there actually illustrates that heterogeneity may be quite useful for understanding elements of the current conflict.
Heterogeneity and Vojvodina
Vojvodina is a sizable region in the north of Serbia which maintains a diverse ethnic population: 57 percent Serbian, 22 percent Hungarian, 7 percent Croatian, and 14 percent "other," such as Romanians, Slovaks, and Ruthenians as of 1993. Five languages were recognized by local authorities in the province, 75 which had an autonomous political status in the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia before 1989. 76
Several communities in Vojvodina manifest a high level of simple heterogeneity. Two examples of such cities are Subotica and Sombor, below: 77
|
| Hungarians | Croatians | Serbs | "Yugoslavs" | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subotica: |
|
42.8 | 22.5 | 15.0 | 15.0 |
| Sombor: |
|
16.1 | 13.1 | 51.4 | 15.5 |
The central government in Belgrade, directed by Slobodan Milosevic, has had little success in gaining total control of Vojvodina through nationalist appeals -- even after it resorted to "paying groups of unemployed people, usually youths from Serbia proper, to travel to the provinces and take part in nationalist rallies" there. Several communities in Vojvodina have instead demonstrated a strong desire to retain their peaceful, multi-ethnic character. Many of the Vojvodina Serbs have been opposed to the policies of Belgrade, including the Serbian-Croatian war. 78
It is true that anti-Hungarian incidents in Vojvodina have increased over the past few years. 79 Some Hungarians who had established temporary residence in other states have recently returned to their homes to find them occupied by arriving Serbian refugees. 80 However, several local elites, including the mayor of Subotica (an ethnic Hungarian), believe that tension has been imported from central Serbia and is not indigenous to the Vojvodina region itself. 81 It remains to be seen whether the multi-ethnic communities of Vojvodina can continue to resist external nationalist forces. Their demographic proportions are rapidly changing with the continued influx of refugees from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.
The Community of Tuzla and Bosnia
In 1990, before the war, the Bosnian population was 43 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian, and 17 percent Croatian. 82 However, the Bosnian situation is one in which the degree of simple heterogeneity across ethnic groups varies greatly between communities. A primary example of a highly heterogeneous community is Tuzla, in northeastern Bosnia. This city, which before the war was 44 percent Muslim, 16 percent Serb, 16 percent Croat, and 24 percent "other," has provided a strong example of community coexistence. Not one of the national parties of the three groups obtained a majority there in the 1990 elections, unlike other cities in the former Yugoslavia. Rather, the primary cleavage has been between the "non-nationalists versus nationalists." In fact, when some non-Muslim families were evicted by a Muslim group of soldiers, their neighbors successfully protested for their return. The situation may change, however, as the war and an influx of refugees has changed the city's demographics -- it is now 72 percent Muslim, 9 percent Serb, 16 percent Croatian, and 3 percent "other." In addition, the Muslim government of Bosnia is becoming increasingly nationalist and less secular. 83
Multiform heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity and religion is remarkably low in Bosnia as a whole. The category of "Muslim" denotes a religious category that is considered to be contiguous with an ethnic category, even though the Muslim population is comprised of South Slavs. The other populations are also divided along largely contiguous ethnic/religious lines: the Serbian population is primarily Orthodox, and the Croatian population primarily Roman Catholic. 84 It appears that a further application of the heterogeneity framework to the former Yugoslavia should enlighten our understanding of this conflict.
Alternative explanations
As with any study, explanations that give priority to a single cause such as heterogeneity must also recognize the influences of other factors. Below I present some alternative explanations to be considered, which may provide venues for further research into heterogeneity.
1) Economic crisis as provoking conflict: This explanation is not relevant to the cases presented above, as Ukraine, which demonstrates the lowest level of conflict in this study, has experienced more severe economic hardship than either Romania or Slovakia for the past several years. Ukraine's inflation rate, an indicator that strongly affects individual living standards, was 1,210 percent in 1992 and 4,735 percent in 1993. 85 Wages currently stand around $30 per month, an amount which will usually buy only a month's supply of bread.
2) Geographic placement: Interestingly, the areas of highest conflict, Romania and Bosnia, involve concentrated minority groups in central regions of the state. In Slovakia and Transcarpathia, the minority group is located near the border. However, the effects of territory can be inconclusive, as a concentrated minority group along a border territory can increase the fear of irredentism and thus worsen a conflict.
3) Memory of past conflict: Transcarpathia experienced little internal conflict during the Second World War, in comparison to Romania, Slovakia, and especially Bosnia. It may be possible to factor the influence of "remembered conflict" into future heterogeneity studies.
4) Elites and international factors: Both of these issues, while exogenous to this study, are important in the development of ethnic tensions. A future study of heterogeneity should approach the levels of influence of elites and international factors as functions of levels of community cohesiveness.
Recommendations
Because heterogeneity can facilitate peaceful relations between ethnic groups, it should be maximized wherever and whenever possible. However, a movement of populations to increase the level of heterogeneity throughout states would be neither possible nor desirable. State governments can instead enact policies to promote programs that facilitate more interethnic contacts for individuals that reside in homogeneous communities, particularly young people. Such programs might take the character of school trips, camps, and residence programs.
The problem of language will remain a central and difficult issue in multi-ethnic communities. The fact that the majority of intergroup communication takes place in the state's dominant language may provide a barrier to contacts. Future policy research on means to increase heterogeneity in bilingual social contexts would make a significant contribution toward placating interethnic conflicts before they can erupt into full-scale violence.
NOTES
Note 1: I would like to thank Dr. Lisa Anderson, Dr. Douglas Chalmers, Matt Nelson, John Schiemann, Dr. Jack Snyder, and Katarzyna Stanclik for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the Carnegie Project on Political Order and Change in the Former Soviet Union and the Harriman Institute for their support of a related research project which spawned initial interest in this subject Back.
Note 2: The 1920 Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary 's territory to one-third its former size and resulted in large groups of ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Back.
Note 3: Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring, 1996), 136-75. Back.
Note 4: It is crucial that identification with a nation, or an ethnic group that maintains a political identity, not be confused with identification with a state, an administrative apparatus. The unfortunate term "nation-state" has conflated these two concepts in much of the literature on nationalism. See Uri Ra'anan, "The Nation-State Fallacy," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Joseph Montville, ed. (New York: Lexington Books/Macmillan, Inc., 1991), 5-20, and Walker Connor, "Terminological Chaos ('A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...')," in Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 89-117. Back.
Note 5: These categories are presented and outlined in Peter Blau, Inequality and Heterogeneity : A Primitive Theory of Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1977) Back.
Note 6: While ethnic conflicts do not necessarily involve violence, violence may be a useful indicator of the intensity of conflict. "Conflict" here denotes a spectrum between cooperation (lowest conflict), protests and demonstrations (low-moderate conflict), scattered violence (moderate-high conflict) and full-scale violence (high conflict). Back.
Note 7: Michael Hechter, "Nationalism as Group Solidarity," Ethnic and Racial Studies 10, no. 4 (October 1987) Back.
Note 8: James Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," unpublished manuscript, 1993. Back.
Note 9: Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990), 46. Back.
Note 10: Alexander Motyl, "Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity Formation," manuscript, June 1995, 7. In addition, Motyl notes that if an elite can only propose an identity from pre-existing propositions, the extent to which elites could or would need to construct identities becomes questionable. Back.
Note 11: Mark Hagopian, in Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics (New York: Longman, 1985) outlines the feature of nationalism as an ideology, or a belief system that attempts to follow its own logic in order to achieve stated goals. According to Hagopian, nations are groups that believe they share a common political identity on the basis of other shared characteristics (2, 64). The influence of the ideology of self-determination (the idea that national groups should achieve self-government) on ethnic groups is discussed in Charles Tilly, "National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us," Daedelus 122 (Summer 1993), 29-36. Here I define a "nation" as a mobilized group that shares the "originally ascriptive trait" of ethnicity. See Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 1-3. Back.
Note 12: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983), 7. Back.
Note 14: For a discussion of the politicization of ethnicity that leads to the political formation of nations, see Rothschild. Back.
Note 15: Definition paraphrased from Webster. Back.
Note 16: Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 48-49. Future research could examine the institutionalized hierarchy of groups in relation to which group holds the state, along the lines of the "inequality" framework outlined by Blau in Inequality and Heterogeneity . Back.
Note 17: An exception to this may be the increasing influence of the Council of Europe and other West European institutions in the region, especially in issues of human rights and minority affairs. For example, it is unlikely that the controversial Council recommendation 1201 which proposes minority self-rule would have ever been considered by Romania and Slovakia had it not been for their desire for cooperation with the West. Back.
Note 18: The security dilemma is cited by Kaufmann as the primary justification for separation of ethnic groups. However, while misperceptions do occur between ethnic groups, the security dilemma model is problematic for multiethnic communities because individuals sharing a common geographic space may more readily exchange information through communication with and observation of the "other;" while such information exchange is less likely between distant states. Back.
Note 19: I define an ethnic group as a "primordial" category, while a nation is an ethnic group that has a degree of political mobilization. Back.
Note 21: Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," The American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973), 1360-1380, and "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," in Randall Collins, ed., Sociological Theory 1983 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983), 201-33. Back.
Note 22: Although I disagree with his conclusions, Kaufmann makes an interesting argument for the "hardness" of ethnic and religious identities (141). Benedict Anderson alludes that the salience of ethnic identity may be related to the fact that it is not a feature of choice, and that fungible identities may be less salient: "Dying for one's country [or nation], which usually one does not choose, assumes a moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or perhaps even Amnesty International cannot rival, for these are all bodies one can join or leave at easy will" (144). Back.
Note 27: See: Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960) Chapter 3; Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: a Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); and Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Back.
Note 28: The highest level of conflict would be full-scale violence, as in the case of war. Back.
Note 29: Romanian National Commission for Statistics, Population and Housing Census: Preliminary Results (Bucharest, 1992), 5-6. The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation lists a number of 2.5 million Hungarians in Romania, in Hungarians in Europe: 75 Years of Trianon (New York: Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, 1995), 11. Back.
Note 30: Compiled from figures in the Population and Housing Census, 20-25; 26-31. Back.
Note 31: Poll cited in Sandra Pralong, "Romanian Nationalism-Double Problem, Double Talk?," Chapter 5 of this volume. Back.
Note 32: Religious statistics from Romanian National Commission for Statistics, 26-31. Back.
Note 33: Quoted from MTI Bucharest, in Vladimir Socor, "Forces of Old Resurface in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu-Mures;" RFE/RL Research Report (Report on Eastern Europe), April 13, 1990, 36-43. Back.
Note 34: Socor, 37-38. During Ceausescu's oppressive regime, he had created joint Romanian-Hungarian schools from formerly Hungarian ones. After his overthrow, many Hungarians actively demonstrated for the reestablishment of Hungarian-only schools. Back.
Note 37: It may also be the case that individuals are more inclined to be hostile toward members of a different ethnic group if they are from a geographic community other than their own. Back.
Note 38: The report on these events, though disputed and controversial, was presented in hearings before the Romanian parliament: Report of the Parliament's Hearing Commission for Persons Forced, after December 22, 1989, to Abandon their Jobs and Residence in Counties Harghita and Covasna (Bucharest, 1991). Back.
Note 39: Report, especially 11, 31, 34, 36, 45. Back.
Note 40: Stätatistická Rocenka Slovenskej Republiky, 1993 (Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1994), 125. Back.
Note 41: "From Minority Status to Partnership: Hungarians in Czechoslovakia / Slovakia, 1918-1992," an analysis by the Coexistence Party (Bratislava, 1993), 6. Back.
Note 42: "A magyarok aránya Dél-Szlovákia járásiban" table in Szlovákiai jelentés: a magyar kisebbség állapotáról (Paris: Magyar FŸzetek, Könyv 4, 1982), 74. Religion statistics from Statistická Rocenka, 499. Back.
Note 43: Information on other minority groups according to district was not available. I am using somewhat dated figures (1970), as population statistics by district were not available in the 1993 Slovak statistical yearbook. However, according to sources, population movement in these districts has been rather minimal since that time. Back.
Note 44: Statistická Rocenka, 437. Approximately 17 percent in this survey remained "undeclared." Back.
Note 45: Coexistence Party, "From Minority Status to Partnership," 8. Back.
Note 46: "II Memorandum, Slovákov z juzného Slovenska," in Republika, April 6, 1993. Back.
Note 47: Poll results given in Sharon Fisher, "Treaty Fails to End Squabbles over Hungarian Relations," Transition, June 9, 1995, 7. Back.
Note 48: Meciar's government took office again in December 1994, after a several-month absence due to its second no-confidence vote in a five-year period. Back.
Note 49: Alfred Reisch, "Slovakia's Minority Policy under International Scrutiny," RFE/RL Research Report, December 10, 1993, 37, 41. Back.
Note 50: Ibid. , 38-42. The name law was subsequently adjusted by parliament on July 7, 1993. However, the signpost law was not altered until one year later. Back.
Note 51: Sharon Fisher, "An Education System in Chaos," Transition, September 8, 1995, 44-49. Back.
Note 52: "Slovaks Further Curb Use of Hungarian Language," New York Times, November 16, 1995. According to the law, all public ceremonies are to be held in Slovak and public employees are required to speak only Slovak, in contrast to a current law allowing second languages to be used in communities with a minority group of larger than 20 percent. Slovak nationalists had been bused to Bratislava from other parts of Slovakia to support the law. An appeal before the Council of Europe is pending. Back.
Note 53: "Slovakia's Ethnic Hungarian Leader on Autonomy," RFE/RL Daily Report, January 4, 1994. Back.
Note 54: Sharon Fisher, "Meeting of Slovakia's Hungarian Causes Stir," RFE/RL Research Report, January 28, 1994, 42. The meeting was sponsored by the Association of the Zitny Ostrov (Czallokos) Towns and Villages, an "assembly of some 100 ethnic Hungarian mayors and local officials." The proposed region would involve 511 towns and villages, 825,000 citizens, and would be 61.5 percent Hungarian. They also proposed an alternative: that three small districts could be established along the south in which Hungarians would be the majority ("Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia Are Demanding Self-Government," Washington Post, January 10, 1994). While some Hungarians have pressed for autonomy because they are sincerely worried about their future in an independent Slovak state, Hungarian party elites appear to be using the autonomy issue as a bargaining chip with the Slovak government to get concessions in areas of language, education, and subsidies. Back.
Note 55: This was a point to which some ethnic Hungarian leaders finally acquiesced. "Council of Europe Experts End Visit to Slovakia," RFE/RL Daily Report, January 19, 1994, and Fisher, "Meeting," 45. Béla Bugar of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement admitted that due to the mixed composition of South Slovakia, it was "not possible to create ethnic borders." Back.
Note 56: Again, it must be noted that more precise research would require recent city population statistics for both Surunay and Komárno. Back.
Note 57: Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, Hungarians in Europe, 17. They also note that church registers indicate a Hungarian population of 200,00 Back.
Note 58: Ruthenians are not a legally recognized ethnic group and are included in the Ukrainian statistic. Back.
Note 59: Zakarpatcka Oblastni Rada, Informatsinii Byuleten' (Transcarpathian Regional Council, Information Bulletin), on minority statistics for 1989. As with Romania and Slovakia, the statistic for Roma is rather low, and the region's Minister for Minority Affairs is among those who notes that some of these statistics are problematic: interview with Petro Vasilovitch Tokar, Minister for Minority Affairs for the Transcarpathian Regional Council, Uzhhorod, August 1995. Back.
Note 60: Known as "Beregovo" and "Uzhgorod" in Russian. Back.
Note 61: V. A. Bespaly, et al., National'ni Vidnosyny na Ukraini (Kyiv: Ukraina, 1991), 36-37. Back.
Note 62: Informatsinii Byuleten'. Total population information from László Szabó, Kárpátaljai Demográfiai Adatok (Ungvár/Uzhhorod and Budapest: Intermix, 1993), 17. Back.
Note 63: The statistic for Mukachevo was not listed but was derived by taking the remaining population of Hungarians (45,500) minus the number living outside of Transcarpathia (5,000), and dividing from the total population of the Mukachevo county (90,800). The result is 44 percent for Mukachevo. Even if approximately 5,000 Hungarians live outside of the four counties listed (a high estimation), the percentage would be 38.5 percent, which remains a substantial number. Back.
Note 64: The Greek Catholic, or Uniate church maintains the rites of the Orthodox church, but holds its allegiance to the Vatican. Statistics from Hungarians in Europe, 18. Back.
Note 65: The statistics in Bespaly, et al. include 88 Protestant groups, 41 Catholic, and 4 Evangelical churches (including Baptist), 37. Back.
Note 66: As the religious spectrum within the Slavic groups is currently undergoing change, precise statistics on religious affiliation are unavailable. References to the religious situation from "Will Transcarpathia Follow its Own Path?," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 31, 1993, and "By Any Name, L'viv Has Hard Times," New York Times,January 19, 1992. Back.
Note 67: V. V. Rosul, "National'na Shkola na Zakarpatti ta Shlyachi ii Vdoskonalennya" in Materiali Naukovo-Praktichnoi Konferentsii Mizhetnichni Vidnosini v Zakarpatti: Istoriya, Suchasni Problemi (Uzhhorod: Patent, 1994), 32-36. Back.
Note 68: Alfred Reisch, "Transcarpathia's Hungarian Minority and the Autonomy Issue," RFE/RL Research Report, February 7, 1992, 17-23. Back.
Note 71: Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," Europe-Asia Studies 46, no. 1 (1994), 65. Back.
Note 72: Alexander Konovalov and Dimitri Evstafiev, "Minority Rights Protection in the NIS" in Ian Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz, eds., Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue (New York: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1993), 168. Back.
Note 73: Most events in the Hungarian community -- church services, meetings, etc., take place according to "Hungarian time," that is, one hour behind "Kyiv time." However, this fact seems to be readily accepted by the majority of their Slav neighbors and there is a remarkable amount of mixing between the groups. Mixed groups of friends and intermarried pairs tend to communicate in Russian. Back.
Note 74: Nikolai Botev, "Where East Meets West: Ethnic Intermarriage in the Former Yugoslavia, 1962 to 1989," American Sociological Review (June 1994), 461-8 Back.
Note 75: Stan Markotich, "Vojvodina: a Potential Powder Keg," RFE/RL Report, November 19, 1993, 13-14. These population figures, while current at the time of Markotich's article, may be changing due to an influx of refugees from the Bosnian war (particularly Serbs). While the region was under Austro-Hungarian rule, the Hapsburgs increased its population by bringing in other peoples such as Croatians, Germans, Slovaks, and Ruthenians. Most of the Germans were expelled by Tito after World War II. Back.
Note 76: Edith Oltay, "Hungarians under Political Pressure in Vojvodina," RFE/RL Research Report, December 3, 1993, 43. Back.
Note 77: Ethnic Map of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (including parts of Vojvodina), according to the 1991 census (Zagreb: Croatian Information Center). Data on further major cities was unavailable from this map. Back.
Note 78: Markotich, 14-15. Back.
Note 80: Dr. László Józsa of the Democratic Community of Hungarians of Vojvodina, presentation at the conference "Promoting European Security and Integration: the Role of National Minorities," November 3, 1995, Washington, D.C. Conference sponsored by the Hungarian-American Coalition and the Potomac Foundation. Back.
Note 81: Markotich, 17-18. Back.
Note 82: Aleksa Djilas, "Fear Thy Neighbor: the Breakup of Yugoslavia" in Charles Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 93-94. Back.
Note 83: Julia Glyn-Pickett, "A Last Bastion of Ethnic Tolerance," Transition, June 9, 1995, 18-19. Back.
Note 84: Djilas. The fact that ethnic affiliation became increasingly salient for party identification during the late 1980s and early 1990s not only deepened these divisive lines, but led to the initial disintegration of the Yugoslav state. Back.
Note 85: Paul Terpeluk, American-Ukrainian Advisory Council, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Back.
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