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National Discourse and the Formation of Irreconcilable Symbols:
The Case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams
Institute on East Central Europe
Columbia University
March, 1996
As symbols are an important component in maintaining group cohesion 1 or often encapsulate complex struggles over national politics, the understanding of how these symbols are formed and deconstructing their variety of meanings can provide a wealth of information on the debates over a country's identity and future. For example, government-sponsored mega-projects, such as Egypt's Aswan Dam and the U.S. Apollo program, have long been symbols of national pride and an affirmation of a country's modernity, while welfare queens and the Pentagon's $600 screwdrivers symbolize governmental and societal failure. As environmental consciousness and other post-materialist values continue to spread across the globe, ecological issues are increasingly the objects of political symbolism. Brazil's politics of the rainforest and the Northwest Spotted Owl are two examples. The ability of these symbols to bolster or erode government power depends on how they are constructed and who controls their discourse.
This article will examine the symbolism of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam project from 1997 to 1993. The dispute over building this series of dams on the Hungarian-Slovak border became enmeshed in the domestic politics of both countries and developed into a highly-charged political symbol, but one with a very different meaning in each country. In Slovakia, the dams' symbolism has consistently shown similar characteristics to other mega-projects, while in Hungary the dams shifted from an anti-government symbol to an environmental symbol. The complex reasons for this necessitate an extensive historical review of the project. Following this, the construction of the symbol will be considered in light of the issues of political and economic transformation, nationalism, and integration into Europe.
A dam proposal was revived by Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, a time when the countries of Central Europe were battered by the oil shocks of 1973-74 and were seeking alternative sources of energy. In addition, by 1974 the seesaw politics between the conservatives and reformers in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia had tipped away from the reformers. The conservatives were more likely to have backgrounds in heavy industry and the Communist party bureaucracy. Therefore, they were more sympathetic to and garnered support from those important institutions dealing with water management and economic development and from the large enterprises which would benefit from the dam contracts. 2 The conservative wing of the party was also more conscious of large development projects as symbols of the great feats of which communist countries were capable. In 1975, the Hungarian Council of Ministers agreed to the project, and a formal inter-governmental agreement was signed by the two countries on September 16, 1977. According to the treaty, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams, which would be jointly owned and operated, would "strengthen the fraternal relations of the two states and significantly contribute to the bringing about of the socialist integration of the states." 3
The geology and hydrology of the region presented a number of difficulties in harnessing the Danube River for hydropower. The most significant problem is that the area is relatively flat, which also explains its susceptibility to severe flooding. 4 To maximize electricity production, the project was designed as a series of three dams, two hydropower plants, and a power canal. The first dam would be at Dunakeleti on the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. The dam would create the Dunakeleti-Hruöov reservoir, two-thirds of which would be in Hungary and one-third in Slovakia. Water in the reservoir would be funneled into a 20-kilometer side channel down to the eight-turbine Gabcikovo power plant; both the side channel and Gabcikovo were to be built entirely in Czechoslovakia. Through the Dunakeleti Dam, the water flow into Gabcikovo could be increased at times of peak electricity demand. The side channel was also constructed for flood control and improved navigation. Because water would be flowing through the Gabcikovo power plant at varying rates, a final dam was to be built downriver. This was to be at Nagymaros in Hungary, where a constant-flow hydropower station was also to be built. 5 When the project was completed, it would supply 20 percent of Slovakia's power 6 and 2 percent of Hungary's.
Initially there was little public debate in either country on building the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dams. The project, however, was discussed in professional fora where scientists and engineers debated the design and water management issues. Then, in 1981, a Hungarian biologist, János Vargha, wrote an article on the environmental impacts of the dam. When the government forbade the article's publication, Vargha decided to begin public action against the dam. In late 1981 a series of protests, influenced by the increased publicity by Vargha and others. As resentment against the project continued to build, the Hungarian government commissioned a series of studies on the impacts of the dams.
In February 1984 an official of the National Water Management Office agreed to debate Vargha on the dams. When the official canceled at the last moment, Vargha took the opportunity to form the Danube Circle out of those in the audience. 7 He also began collecting signatures on a four-page letter denouncing the project. In addition to detailing the damage to the region's potable water supply and destruction of the local flora and fauna, the letter also addressed the economic irrationality of the project. By June 1984, the letter had 4,000 signatures, including 50 prominent scientists and cultural figures. 8 The government responded by outlawing the organization and harassing its members. The petition had 10,000 signatures by December, and the government began to worry as an unpublished report by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences recommended not building the dams because of the environmental costs. The Danube Circle was bolstered in September 1985 when it won the "Right Livelihood" Award, which is considered an alternative Nobel Peace Prize and carries a $95,000 prize.
A number of other anti-Nagymaros organizations began emerging, many centered around university students. The most important were the Blues, formed in 1985. The Blues were a younger, more militant group which began a leafleting and mailing strategy aimed at the dams. In a 1986 samizdat publication, one of the leaders of the Blues stated, "Our aims in fact extend beyond environmental protection, for we want to stimulate independent thinking in all aspects of life and to encourage greater autonomy." 9
As the confrontation between the government and the dam opponents continued, the Hungarian government began to face a severe economic crisis. As it did not have enough money to build Nagymaros, it turned to the Austrian government for financing. In April 1986, the Danube Circle took out a full-page ad in the Viennese paper Die Presse, which called on the Austrian parliament not to fund the dam as "a democratic society -- and we regard Austria as such -- must not allow itself to exploit the lack of democracy in another country for its own material advantages." 10 However, the Austrians agreed to finance the project in return for a set quantity of electricity, which was estimated to be two-thirds of Nagymaros' electricity generation for its first twenty years of operation, and 70 percent of the construction contracts. 11
On September 12, 1988, large protests were organized in Hungary against the dams. Between 10,000 and 30,000 people marched in Budapest and another 5,000 marched in Szeged. 12 By the spring of 1989 the Danube Circle had collected 150,000 signatures on its petition against the dams. Finally on May 13, 1989, the day after a government commission released a report recommending that the dam project be canceled, the Hungarian government announced that it was suspending work on Nagymaros. Prime Minister Miklos Németh called the dam "a symbol of an outdated economic model and a dysfunctional decision-making process." 13 A clear motive behind the sharpness of Németh's words was the on-going power struggle between his reform faction of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and the more conservative group led by Party Secretary Károly Grosz.
While there was some nascent independent environmental activity in Czechoslovakia regarding Gabcikovo, it did not approach the level of protest in Hungary. The Bratislava Branch of the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Protectors (SZOPK), the official Slovak environmental organization, published a critical article on the dams in their journal in the early 1980s, and in 1988 it devoted an entire issue to Gabcikovo. The ecological section of the Czech Society of Biologists, headed by Josef Vavrouöek, was the center of anti-dam activity in the Czech Republic. The group published an extensive critique of the project in the journal of the Czech Union of the Defenders of Nature (the Czech counterpart to SZOPK). 14 One of the few other groups at this time to publish a statement against Gabcikovo was Charter 77, of which Václav Havel was a leading member.
After the Czechoslovak Revolution in November 1989, Václav Havel became President and Josef Vavrouöek became Minister of Environment. In light of the new government, the opponents of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dams expected the project to be dismantled and the river and wetlands restored. However, while work on Nagymaros had barely begun, Gabcikovo was largely finished. 15 President Havel and Minister Vavrouöek both stated on numerous occasions that while it was a mistake to have begun the project, Gabcikovo had to be finished. Dismantling it would have been astronomically expensive (total estimates for dismantling the dam and restoring the environment ranged from $1.5 billion to $6 billion), 16 and it would be nearly impossible to recreate the wetlands that had been under cement for a decade. They also argued that merely halting the work would be more environmentally devastating than completion, emphasizing that most of the ecological damage had already been done. Therefore, the official position of Czechoslovakia was to finish Gabcikovo and to mitigate the environmental damages as much as possible. Soon after the new government took office, three commissions were established to examine the ecological issues of the dam and to recommend possible solutions.
Elections took place in Hungary in March and April 1990. Many of the environ- mental activists became advisors to the new political parties, and every major party opposed completion of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project. After the elections, which were won by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, two members of the Danube Circle gained voices in the government (János Gyurka was elected to parliament and given a seat on the environmental committee, and Gyula Kodolanyi became the Prime Minister's Advisor on Foreign Affairs), while an international law expert, Ferenc Madl, was named a Minister without portfolio, and his prime responsibility became the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros controversy.
By summer 1990, it was already clear that the dam dispute could not be solved through bi-lateral negotiations. The Czechoslovaks were prepared to engage in technical discussions with the Hungarians over minimizing the dams' impacts. However, the Hungarians refused to resume work on Nagymaros, without which Gabcikovo could not produce as much electricity as planned, and insisted that the Czechoslovaks had to abandon work on Gabcikovo. At an all-European environmental meeting in June, Vavrouöek proposed that the European Community (EC) prepare an ecological assessment of the entire Danube Region and act as a mediator between the two countries. Neither Hungary, which only wanted to discuss dismantling the dams, nor the EC warmly embraced the suggestion.
Also throughout 1990, the tension between the Czech Republic and Slovakia became more visible. Slovak politicians took advantage of the new political openness to demand more autonomy for Slovakia, and Gabcikovo naturally became part of the debate. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Meciar believed the dams were vital to the future of the country and became one of the project's most vocal supporters. While admitting the ecological damage caused by constructing the dam, Meciar emphasized the economic aspects, particularly the 14 billion crowns in sunk costs and the critical need for energy in Slovakia. 17 On January 1, 1991, as part of the decentralization of the government, the Slovaks took financial responsibility for finishing Gabcikovo.
The bi-lateral negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which had engendered little progress in 1990, continued in 1991. During a meeting in mid-January, the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks agreed to end the 1977 agreement. This meeting also found Slovakia under considerable pressure from the federal government to compromise with Hungary. Slovakia still hoped that the federal government would provide financial assistance to finish Gabcikovo, but the federal government refused unless an international environmental assessment and a new agreement with Hungary took place. 18 The parties also began to formulate a joint request for arbitration by the EC. Yet, the Hungarians refused to be bound by the EC's recommendation, fearing that the EC would propose some compromise leaving Gabcikovo in place. Instead, the Hungarians proposed that the final agreement between the two countries would be based merely on the EC's decision.
Given the continuing controversy with Hungary over the dams, the Slovak government prepared a number of alternatives, and at the end of January 1991, the Slovak Parliament voted to begin work on Alternative C. Under this alternative, Slovakia would block the Danube at Cunovo, which was five miles up-river from Dunakeleti and entirely on Slovak territory. While Alternate C would allow for the Gabcikovo Hydropower plant to operate, albeit at much lower levels than originally envisioned, the Slovaks called it a "temporary solution" because it was designed to leave open the possibility that the Nagymaros Dam eventually would be completed.
A few months later Meciar was ousted, and Jan Carnogursky became Prime Minister. Jan Carnogursky's brother Ivan simultaneously served as Deputy Chair of Parliament and one of the heads of the construction company building Gabcikovo. Both Carnogurskys were strong supporters of the dams, and, under their leadership the Slovak Parliament announced that while negotiations with Hungary would continue, work on Alternate C would begin on June 15. 19 The Hungarian Parliament responded almost immediately by issuing tenders for the dismantling of Nagymaros. 20 The Slovak government also issued a 19-point environmental directive on Gabcikovo, which set out requirements before the power plant went into operation as well as regulations that the plant had to meet in order to retain its license. 21 In response to this directive, Slovakia's major green movements dropped their opposition to the dam. Protests against Gabcikovo continued, the largest of which were organized by Eurochain, a local environmental group with a number of Hungarian and Austrian members, or by international environmental organizations.
In March 1992, the European Community, which had long shied away from the issue, announced it was prepared to mediate the dispute. The EC cited the association agreements signed with Hungary and Czechoslovakia in December 1991 as a major reason for its willingness to intercede. The two conditions for mediation were that it only would be concerned with the scientific disputes and that neither side could launch irreversible actions. Hungary still refused to participate in a joint environmental committee with the EC and Czechoslovakia unless work was suspended on Gabcikovo until the results of the commission's report were issued. Still, the environmental groups in Hungary began to fear that the Hungarian government was going to strike a deal with Czechoslovakia over Gabcikovo. In March 1992 a number of groups, including Danube Circle, issued a joint statement warning "a compromise is being prepared which, in this issue, would mean a complete surrender and a betrayal of the ecology and Hungarian interests." 22
On March 24, the Hungarian Parliament authorized the abrogation on the 1977 agreement, although there were no provisions in the treaty for one party to revoke it. In an interview, Madl stated that Hungary had "refrained from terminating the agreement immediately for the benefit of European norms and legal procedures," 23 adding that it was an internationally recognized right to revoke contracts in "ecological emergency situations." 24 In addition to authorizing abrogation of the 1977 Agreement, the Hungarian Parliament instructed the Hungarian government to remedy the ecological problems associated with the dams and to turn to the EC, the United Nations, and other international bodies for support in settling the issue. 25 Although Czechoslovakia struggled to find a compromise which would prevent Hungary from unilaterally ending the 1977 agreement, Hungary formally abrogated the treaty on May 25, 1992.
New elections were held in Czechoslovakia in June. With the exception of the ethnic Hungarian parties, all of the major parties in Slovakia supported completion of Gabcikovo. In fact, finishing the dam was considered a major plank in the platform of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), 26 which was headed by Meciar. As Meciar was the victor in Slovakia and more radical reformers won the Czech elections, the stage was set for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, and the Federal government lost any remaining influence over Gabcikovo.
Tensions between Hungary and Slovakia greatly increased at the end of the summer. Not only was the Hungarian government concerned about Gabcikovo, which was nearly finished, but the simmering issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia also began to boil. Rumors about military movements swirled on both sides of the border and Madl raised the possibility that Hungary would impose economic sanctions on Slovakia if Gabcikovo was put into operation. 27 However, few in Hungary believed Slovakia would risk international condemnation and divert the Danube. In Slovakia, Julius Binder, head of the state construction company building Gabcikovo, said the project's Slovak opponents were paid agents of Hungary. 28
On October 12 Slovakia signaled that the diversion of the Danube was imminent by informing the Danube Commission that shipping was going to be suspended for two weeks. Almost immediately, Prime Minister Antall of Hungary sent letters to world leaders asking for their assistance in preventing the Slovak actions. No replies were received. The EC-hosted negotiations in Brussels broke down on October 22. Hungary then announced it would unilaterally submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.
Slovakia began damming the Danube River on October 24. In an attempt to prevent the international crisis from deepening, the federal government announced on October 26 that 1) it would ask the EC to rule by November 3 whether damming the Danube was an "irreversible step" which violated their conditions for mediation, 2) the Danube would not be dammed until after the EC decision, and 3) the river would not be diverted until an EC-Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission issued a report on the environmental impacts of diversion. The Slovak Foreign Minister reportedly told the federal government, "Decide whatever you want, Slovakia will in any case dam up the Danube." 29 The following day, the Czech members of the federal council threatened to resign over their frustration with Slovakia over Gabcikovo.
However, at an October 28 meeting in London concerning Central Europe's cooperation with the EC, the latter arranged a side meeting devoted to the Gabcikovo dispute. Under strong pressure from the EC, an agreement was finally signed. According to the terms of the agreement, all work on Alternative C would be halted on a date set by the EC and the hydroelectric plant would not be put into operation. A three-member fact-finding team (one each from the EC, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) would be immediately dispatched to Gabcikovo to assess the situation and would report back by October 31. Another five-member working group (three from the EC and one each from Hungary and Czechoslovakia) would be formed to examine the environmental issues and would issue a report no later than November 15. Czechoslovakia also agreed to return 95 percent of the Danube River's volume to its original bed. Finally, both sides agreed to submit the legal issues either to binding arbitration or to the ICJ. 30
The London Agreement was a qualified victory for Hungary. The subsequent EC reports recommended that all work on the project be suspended except for that which related to navigation, flood control, and securing existing structures. However, Slovakia did not abide by the accords. Only 20 percent of the Danube's flow was rediverted and Gabcikovo began producing energy. When Slovakia became independent on January 1, 1993, it announced that it was not bound by the London Agreement, as it had been signed by a country which no longer existed. 31 The EC-sponsored negotiations continued throughout 1993 and focused almost entirely on the division of water between the side channel and the original bed.
The Hungarians and Slovaks finally agreed on the text to be submitted to the ICJ on April 7, 1993. Before it could be negotiated, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had to sort out whether both would be party to the case. The Czech Parliament declared in late Feb- ruary that the Czech Republic was not a legal successor to the 1977 agreement. 32 On March 12 the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for both Hungary and Slovakia to submit the dispute to the ICJ as soon as possible. The parliament also called for Slovakia to be more flexible in finding a solution that would prevent further ecological damage. 33
Hungary and Slovakia have submitted three questions to the ICJ. The first concerns whether Hungary was justified in abrogating the 1977 Treaty for environmental reasons. The second question is, whether in light of Hungary's abrogation, Czechoslovakia had the right to build Alternate C. Finally, the court has been asked to consider the additional effects of the means of Hungary's notification of the abrogation. 34 Much of Hungary's argument deals with the 1920 Treaty of Versailles, which defines the border between Hungary and Czechoslovakia as the navigable part of the Danube River, and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, which reconfirms this border and prohibits Czechoslovakia from any water management actions which would change the supply of water to Hungary without first obtaining Hungary's approval. Hungary claims that since it abrogated the 1977 agreement, Slovakia is violating the 1947 treaty and unilaterally changing the border. Slovakia, on the other hand, claims that it has Hungary's approval because it signed the 1977 agreement, which cannot be revoked. The 1977 agreement also reconfirms the 1920 borders. The ICJ decision is expected in 1997.
Large-scale development projects are characterized by their high costs, long development, and economic and scientific uncertainties. Their transformation into important national symbols usually depends on a country's insecurity in the world order. Because they are tied to the perceived worth of the nation, and hence the worth of the individual, they are exceedingly difficult to stop once they become rooted in the public imagination. In looking for the ability of these development projects to take hold of the public consciousness, it is important to examine the rational justifications, bureaucratic interests, and nationalist debates surrounding the projects. 35
In Slovakia there certainly were economic reasons for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams. As the republic was largely agrarian at the end of World War II, the communists deliberately built large industrial plants in Slovakia, and by the 1970s chemical plants, metal works, and arms factories constituted a significant share of the Slovak economy. This industrial base required an enormous supply of cheap energy, and Slovakia had almost no domestic energy resources. 36 Relying on foreign energy is unpopular because of its cost and unreliability; this applied to Middle East oil after 1973 and also to energy from the former Soviet Union after 1989. After 1992, importing energy also ran counter to the desires for greater independence. When seeking options to increase domestic energy production, building a large hydropower plant on the Danube was an obvious choice. Thus, while the dam could have become a symbol of the Czechs imposing a behemoth on Slovakia, successive Slovak governments strongly believed that the energy from the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dams was critical for the future economic development of the republic. The energy arguments, however, are far less convincing for Alternative C, which will only produce 1800 megawatts (as opposed to the 7200 megawatts of the original design). However, after 1989, the $1 billion in sunk costs was a compelling rationale.
Additionally, in Slovakia little scientific evidence was produced to show that Gabcikovo would cause an ecological disaster. While this was partly due to the narrower political space that existed in the republic, which limited the ability of scientists to circulate works highly critical of government projects, an ecological cost-benefit analysis in Slovakia also produced very different results than in Hungary. Czech and Slovak supporters of Gabcikovo could even cast the project as beneficial to the environment. Many politicians put forward the notion that if Gabcikovo was completed, the country would burn less low-grade coal and might be able to shut down some of the reactors at Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant. Air pollution from coal-burning is considered the most significant environmental issue in the Czech and Slovak Republics and spurred far more protests, both before and after 1989, than Gabcikovo. Bohunice also generated more environmental concern than Gabcikovo, and Slovakia has been under strong pressure from Austria to shut it down. So, given the problems of other energy sources, the Slovak public viewed hydropower as comparatively benign.
As in Hungary, the big ecological question about Gabcikovo was its effect on the region's drinking water and wetlands. Currently, most of Slovakia's drinking water comes from surface water, but 30 percent of the reserves are from the aquifers around Gabcikovo. 37 While the impact on the drinking water reserves remains unclear, many of the Slovak scientific studies showed that the dam would have a positive impact on the wetlands. One recent report claims that 58 percent of the area of the complex improved after the Danube was dammed, 36 percent remained the same, and only 6 percent declined. 38 Slovakia is on the upstream side of the dam, where many of the region's wetlands have been re-flooded. 39 This would also explain why the water tables on the Slovak side have reportedly risen. Finally, one should keep in mind that in the end, almost 20 percent of Slovak construction costs were for environmental protection measures. 40 Given the problems with alternative energy sources, the inconclusive scientific evidence, and the (at least) minimal efforts to alleviate the environmental damage to the dams, the articles by SZOPK and the Czech Society of Biologists, as well as the actions of more radical environmental groups, have never struck an extremely responsive chord among the general population.
The political situation in Czechoslovakia before 1989 was also very different than it was in Hungary. The experiences of 1968 had taught the Czechoslovak government the dangers of loosening the restrictions on freedom of expression. Under this regime, groups such as Danube Circle and the Blues simply would not have been tolerated, so the Czech and Slovak opponents of the dam were never able to effectively organize. The communist government was also relatively successful in communicating the economic rationale for the dam and portraying it as a symbol of national pride.
After the revolution of 1989, the new Slovak government continued this line of reasoning. The economic justifications for Gabcikovo played well to a Slovak population that was cautious about economic reform and worried about losing their jobs. The new Slovak government was also closely tied to heavy industry, which maintained considerable political influence because of its large share of the economy. The position of Ivan Carnogursky as both Deputy Chair of Parliament and one of the heads of the construction company building Gabcikovo illustrates this relationship.
The issue of nationalism also became intertwined in the dispute. Julius Binder called Gabcikovo "shining proof of [our] national culture" and said it "will go down in history as an achievement of the Slovak construction industry." 41 Both Meciar and Carnogursky claimed that the Gabcikovo controversy was technical and should not become emotional, 42 but in reality they both fueled the flames of nationalism with the project. Czechoslovak President Havel complained that the room for compromise was limited because Slovaks believed that the dam was magnificent and a matter of pride and honor. 43 The tepid support of the Czechs for the project probably increased its backing in Slovakia. It was another example of the Czechs trying to keep Slovakia poor and dependent.
The issue of nationalism turned rather ugly when Slovakia diverted the Danube. About this same time, the documents creating Slovak independence were being finalized and in Hungary, István Csurka, a deputy chair of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum, was making increasingly radical appeals to Hungarian nationalists. In the days after the diversion, Meciar made explicit connections between Gabcikovo, Hungarian designs on Slovak territory, and Hungarian attempts to dominate Slovakia. 44 After the conclusion of the London Agreement, he stated:
Brown shirts have not been worn in the squares of Europe for a long time. This is the key factor in the demonstrations of Hungarian policy, and Gabcikovo is only a vent through which steam is let out from a boiler in Budapest...What is at issue is that nationalism as a demonstration of political views is grabbing whatever it can. Gabcikovo is a means for them, not an end. If Gabcikovo was their objective, we would have reached agreement long ago, but because it is a means we are unable to strike an agreement. 45
The last sentence could have been said by either side.
While economic justifications could be found in Slovakia for building and completing Gabcikovo, such rationale was difficult to find in Hungary for Nagymaros. Although Hungary was also hit hard by the oil shocks of the 1970s, because its economy was less energy intensive than Slovakia's, the economic crisis was mainly felt in a series of negative impacts on its external debt. Thus, Hungary's major economic concern over Nagymaros was how to pay for it. Also unlike Slovakia, the large Hungarian construction enterprises, which are less influential in Hungary, were not solid supporters of the project after 1986 because, as part of the financing agreement with Austria, Hungary had to give 70 percent of the construction contracts to Austrian firms.
The dynamics over the environmental debate were also very different in Hungary. Whereas dam supporters largely controlled the environmental discourse in Slovakia, the Hungarian water management experts and other pro-Nagymaros factions were overwhelmed by the scenarios of apocalyptic ecological disaster painted by most Hungarian scientists. While the damage to the area by the actual construction of the dams was clear, most Hungarian scientists believed the dams also would destroy both the Szigetköz, a region of wetlands in northwestern Hungary which was comparatively pristine and had some historic value, and the aquifers below it. 46 Although none of the scientists in the whole debate had been very good at communicating the ecological uncertainties over the project, the greater freedom of Hungarian research institutions allowed them to publish relatively objective reports, which could be construed as opposing government policies, as well as reports which were more directly critical. Furthermore, the great scientific uncertainty surrounding the ecological impacts of Gabcikovo and Nagymaros was important because it helped make the dams such malleable symbols.
In 1994 groundwater levels did fall and the wetlands seemed to be drying up. It appears that some of these problems might be alleviated by building submerged dams to re-flood parts of the Szigetköz. The Hungarian government suggested this in spring 1993, and the Slovak government indicated that it might provide assistance. 47 The Hungarian environmental movement responded with outrage, viewing it as another attempt to artificially control the river and as accepting the Slovak position on Gabcikovo. The Slovaks have responded to Hungary's environmental claims by either simply disputing them, producing counter-studies, or explaining why ecological damage in Hungary is unrelated to the dam. For example, the Hungarian water tables have been dropping for at least a decade, and may simply be caused by erosion and sedimentation in the Danube. 48 The region has also suffered a prolonged drought. Finally, the Slovaks contend that the Hungarians are deliberately maximizing damages to the region's wetlands in order to gain international support. 49
Since the early 1970s, the political situation in Hungary has been considerably more open than Slovakia's. The internal legitimacy of the Hungarian socialists rested largely on their ability to maintain the economy and to supply consumer goods. When a recession hit Hungary in the early 1980s, the Hungarian government launched a new wave of economic reforms and slowly began to widen the political space. In other words, since the government could not satisfy the country's material desires, it tried to compensate by trying to satisfy other non-materialist values. It was against this backdrop that the Hungarian opposition first took hold of the dam and turned it into a symbol of government failure. However, the opposition surrounding the dam snowballed beyond government expectations throughout the 1980s, and the larger it became, the harder it was for the government to suppress it. The government thus did not crack down severely on the Danube Circle nor on the more militant Blues, because the government's own environmental studies were inconclusive at best. In addition, the government also lacked the political will for such a move and did not have any money to build Nagymaros anyway.
By 1988, only the issue of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania generated larger protests than Nagymaros. The government knew that Nagymaros was an enormous political liability, and, realizing that their hold on power was increasingly a function of domestic support, it had little choice but to abandon the dam in the spring of 1989. Furthermore, the ascendent political elite seized the environmental aspects of the debate and recast the symbol from one of government failure into a more typical environmental symbol. The central facet of environmental symbols is that while economics are an important aspect of the debate, much of the discourse is in non-materialist terms because of the difficulty in assigning monetary value to the environment (How much is a darter snail worth?).
When the opposition won the elections in 1990, the environmental symbolism became entrenched and dismantling the dam complex was the only politically viable option. As the Hungarian Minister of the Environment said about Gabcikovo and Nagymaros, "No one in Hungary would dare to elaborate some kind of compromise solution, because they would immediately be labeled a traitor." 50 Another factor in the new Hungarian government's inflexibility is the change in the environmental movement after the 1990 elections. Many leaders of the independent environmental organizations of the 1980s either joined one of the major political parties or set up new environmental groups. This splintering has led to the absence of any major umbrella environmental organizations in Hungary, which are needed to channel the new ecological consciousness to the many problems that exist in addition to the dams. Therefore, the government's policy towards Gabcikovo and Nagymaros remains the defining environmental issue in Hungary. 51
The deeper meanings of the "mega-project" symbolism in Slovakia and the "environmental" symbolism in Hungary are also clear in their relations with Western Europe. Hungary, by espousing the post-materialistic values which were becoming the norm in Western Europe, was increasingly successful in using the dispute to gain international support and to demonstrate that it was European. As part of this, Hungary has frequently invoked both the Stockholm Declaration and the agreement at Rio to further support its case. The two documents state that countries have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environments of other states." 52 Hungary's appeals to the leaders and legislative bodies of the OSCE countries, to the United Nations, and to the EC also reflect its interest in a "European, civilized solution." 53 The fact that it would not submit to binding arbitration by the EC does not counter this argument, as the EC specifically stated that it would only offer its good offices to solve the conflict. Hungary's ultimate success with the EC is illustrated by the provisions of the London Agreement.
The diversion of the Danube has clearly damaged Slovakia's international standing. Slovakia hoped that the European Community would focus on the contract aspects of the issue and view its actions as an illustration that it was a reliable partner. However, the Europeans seemed more taken with the dam as a sign that Slovak thinking was similar to that of underdeveloped countries searching for prestigious projects which no longer impressed the rest of the world. This rejection by the international community has certainly heightened nationalism in some Slovak circles, who view it as another example of Slovakia's victimization. This is similar to the dynamics between the Czechs and Slovaks between 1989 and 1992. The Czechs took an extremely pragmatic approach, ended up frustrated, and washed their hands of the entire issue.
In Hungary, Németh put it well when he said that by 1989 Nagymaros had become a "symbol of an outdated economic model and a dysfunctional decision-making process." After 1989 the symbol shed its anti-governmentalism, and became a more traditional environmental symbol. The opponents of the dam, which included elites both inside and outside the establishment, could control the discourse during this entire period because they were also espousing other post-materialist values such as freedom of speech and independent thinking. This set of values tapped into a public consciousness that desperately wanted to be recognized as European and that understood what it meant in the 1980s and early 1990s to be European.
These were never the central values in the Gabcikovo debate, partly because the environmental groups and other anti-government circles were never able to effectively organize. By 1990, Gabcikovo was nearly finished and its symbolism was entrenched. An official of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry once said, "Any Slovak environmentalist who protested against the project used to be called an enemy of socialism. Now he is an enemy of the Slovak nation." 54 One could eliminate the word "environmentalist" and it would still ring true. Hard-line communists of the 1970s and 80s and many Slovak leaders of the 1990s tied their country's prestige, as well as their own legitimacy, to industrial development. To a populace with an historic sense of oppression, economically tied to heavy industry, and wary of bewildering changes, it is not too terribly difficult to accept Gabcikovo as a symbol of national strength and modernity. This symbolism also ties into a materialist and state-oriented vision of the future that no longer recalls Soviet Union of the 1930s as it does the Asian tigers of the 1980s.
NOTES
Note 1: For a psychological explanation, see Vamik Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (London: Aronson, 1994), especially 90-95. Back.
Note 2: Tamás Fleischer, "Jaws on the Danube: Water Management, Regime Change and the Movement Against the Middle Danube Hydroelectric Dam," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17, no3, (September 1993), 431. Back.
Note 3: Treaty between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, quoted in Sharon Fisher, "The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Controversy Continues,"RFE/RL Research Report (RFE/RL), September 17, 1993, 7-8. Back.
Note 4: For detailed information on the geology and hydrology of the area, see Pál Liebe and György Tóth, "Hydrological and Hydrogeological Problems of the 'Sziketköz' in Relation to the Bös/Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Hydropower Scheme," Lecture at the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, DC, October 21, 1993. Back.
Note 5: Ibid., 9, and Fleischer, 430-431. Back.
Note 6: Even in the 1970s, the Czech and Slovak Republics were on two power grids, so the dams would only supply electricity to Slovakia. Back.
Note 8: Judith Patakai, "Ecological Protests Against Danube Dam," Radio Free Europe, Hungary SR/17, June 1, 1984, item 4, 13-14. Back.
Note 9: Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, East European Fault Lines (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 215. Back.
Note 10: Herbert Reed, "Hungarian Greens Petition Austrian Parliament," Radio Free Europe, RAD 96, July 11, 1986, 3. Back.
Note 11: Fisher, 8 When Hungary canceled Nagymaros, it had to pay damages to Austrian firms for breaking the contracts. Back.
Note 12: "Rallies Protest Bös-Nagymaros Water Project," Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU ), September 13, 1988, 25-28. Although two months earlier there was a significantly larger demonstration in Budapest over the Romanian government's treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, that protest was sanctioned by the Hungarian government, while this one was not. Back.
Note 13: Edith Markos-Oltay, "The Government Suspends Work on the Nagymaros Hydroelectric Project," Radio Free Europe, Hungary SR/18, May 30, 1989, item 4, 21-22. Back.
Note 14: Duncan Fisher, "The Emergence of the Environmental Movement in Eastern Europe and Its Role in the Revolutions of 1989," in Barbara Jancar-Webster, ed., Environmental Action in Eastern Europe: Response to Crisis (London: M.E Sharp, 1993) , 96. Back.
Note 15: The usual numbers cited are that in November 1989, Gabcikovo was 70-90 percent complete and Nagymaros was only 10 percent complete. Some estimates for Nagymaros are as high as 30 percent, but this may include work on the Dunakeleti dam. Back.
Note 16: Sharon Fisher, 10. Back.
Note 17: "Meciar 'Determined' to Complete Dam," FBIS-EEU, August, 10, 1990, 10 The total spent on the dams has been estimated at between $700 million and $3.5 billionThe lower estimate is for Gabcikovo aloneThe higher estimate certainly inclu des money spent on Nagymaros, but as considerably more was spent on Gabcikovo than Nagymaros, this would suggest that the Gabcikovo figure could be far higher than $700 million. See Sharon Fisher, 12, and Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension: Brat islava Diverts the Danube," RFE/RL, December 11, 1992, 51 Back.
Note 18: "Talks on Danube Project End on Positive Note," FBIS-EEU, January 14, 1991, 30. Back.
Note 19: "Slovak Government Decides to Complete Dam," FBIS-EEU, May 22, 1991, 12-13. Back.
Note 20: "Dam Project with Czechoslovakia to be Dismantled," FBIS-EEU, May 30, 1991, 12. Back.
Note 21: In 1993 the World Wildlife Fund-Austria released documents from the Slovak Ministry of Environment revealing that the Gabcikovo hydropower plant was ordered into operation without fulfilling these requirements See "Minister Denies Saying Diversion Unl awful," FBIS-EEU, February 19, 1993, 14 Back.
Note 22: "Environmental Groups Protest Danube Dam System," FBIS-EEU, March 12, 1992, 18. Back.
Note 23: "Termination of Dam Contract Said Justified," FBIS-EEU, March 31, 1992, 11. Back.
Note 25: "Government Authorized to Abrogate Dam Program," FBIS-EEU, March 26, 1992, 13. Back.
Note 26: Okolicsanyi, 50. Back.
Note 27: "No Military Action Against Slovakia Foreseen," FBIS-EEU, October 5, 1992, 10. Back.
Note 28: "Official Calls Gabcikovo Opponents Paid Agents," FBIS-EEU, September 28, 1992, 8. Back.
Note 29: "Czech Republic May be Jeopardized Over Dam," FBIS-EEU, October 26, 1992, 7. Back.
Note 30: "Trilateral Memorandum Issued on Dam Project," FBIS-EEU, November 2, 1992, 9; also see Okolicsanyi, 53. Back.
Note 31: Sharon Fisher, 9. Back.
Note 33: Ibid. See also, "Slovakia Blamed for Gabcikovo Deadlock," FBIS-EEU, March 17, 1993, 1. Back.
Note 34: "Minister Moravcik Discusses Gabcikovo Dispute," FBIS-EEU, April 7, 1993, 20. Back.
Note 35: Gerald Steinberg, "Large-Scale National Projects as Political Symbols," Comparative Politics 19, no3 (April 1987), 331. Back.
Note 36: In the fall of 1991, Slovakia supplied 14 percent of its own energy needs, 18 percent came from the Czech Republic, and the rest from abroad See Sharon Fisher, 11. Back.
Note 37: Jan Obrman, ed., "Roundtable: Relations with the Czech Republic and Hungary," RFE/RL, December 11, 1992, 37. Back.
Note 38: Sharon Fisher, 10. Sharon Fisher, 10. Back.
Note 39: Ibid.. See also Stephen Deets, ed., NAS-Czech/Slovak Young Investigator Program on Health Impacts of Environmental Degradation: 1993 Summary Report, (Washington: National Academy Press, 1994), 23. Back.
Note 40: Okolicsanyi, 51. Back.
Note 41: Quoted in Okolicsanyi, 50. Back.
Note 42: See for example, "Carnogursky Interviewed on Current Slovak Issues," FBIS-EEU, June 6, 1991, 21. Back.
Note 43: "Havel Discusses Dam, Screenings, German Treaty," FBIS-EEU, May 26, 1992, 11. Back.
Note 44: See, for example, "Meciar: Hungary Threatening European Stability," and "Meciar: Construction Could Halt if Costs are Paid," FBIS-EEU, November 2, 1992, 7-10. Back.
Note 45: "Meciar, Klaus Statements on EC Talks," FBIS-EEU, October 30, 1992, 5-6. Back.
Note 46: While the Hungarians do not currently use a significant portion of the ground water for drinking, it is considered an important reserve. Back.
Note 47: "Solution to Water Problems Proposed," FBIS-EEU, June 21, 1993, 10. Back.
Note 48: "Slovaks, Hungarians Hold Talks on Power Proposals," FBIS-EEU, February 18, 1993, 5 See also Sharon Fisher, 11. Back.
Note 49: "Issues Resolution on Gabcikovo," FBIS-EEU, March 30, 1993, 15-16. Back.
Note 50: "Environmental Minister on Conflicts, Nagymaros," FBIS-EEU, December 19, 1990, 38. Back.
Note 51: See Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Hungary: Antall's Government Proves Less than Green," RFE/RL, August 21, 1993, 65-69. Back.
Note 52: Quoted in Phillippe Sands, "Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenge of Compliance with International Obligations," Journal of International Affairs, 46, no2 (Winter 1993), 371. Back.
Note 53: The full quote by a representative of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, in reference to another EC-sponsored discussion on Gabcikovo, is: "The trilateral talks in Brussels marked another step towards a European, civilized solution.""CSFR's Unwillingness to Compromise," FBIS-EEU, November 30, 1992, 22. Back.
Note 54: Sharon Fisher, 12. Back.
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