CIAO: The Current State of Democracy in Albania

IV. Albanian Society in Macedonia and Montenegro

Summer, 1996

Brian Shott

IREX (Skopje)

I am going to give a couple of perspectives on Albanian national identity in Macedonia. It strikes me that I might be in violation of the note on the front of the program which states that this conference is not about ethnic relations, but I think that in the context, that is, Albanian national identity in Macedonia, it is difficult to side-step those issues. According to the most recent census in Macedonia held in July 1994, Albanians comprise some 22.9% of the total population of the Republic of Macedonia, constituting the republic's largest minority or nationality. The Albanian population is the most vociferous and restive of the various minorities or nationalities in the struggle to locate themselves in the fledgling state. There is not, of course, always agreement on just how that struggle should be carried out. Various crises engendered by national and international political, social, and economic developments have left many Macedonians feeling alienated from what is ostensibly their society, while many Albanians maintain that even the resolution of those crises portends a more fundamental predicament. Amid this uncertainty a particular relationship between the majority population and the sizable Albanian minority is structured, and that relationship becomes the context in which Albanian national identity in Macedonia must be considered.

Definitions of identity include ideas such as "sameness or oneness" and "specificity or individuality." National identities are often rarified, can be multi-faceted, layered, and comprised of various features. They can be analyzed, constructed, or deconstructed until their most fundamental essence is located or their origin, substantiality or insubstantiality of the consistent parts is revealed. Discrete nations and national identities depend immediately on other discrete nations and national identities. In other words, across the river and through the mountains are another people, and it is understood that those people possess their own national identity.

Characteristics of Macedonian national identity include an acknowledgment of contemporary Macedonia as the birthplace of the Cyrillic alphabet, the right to freedom and to their own independent state after 500 years of Ottoman rule and even, for some, direct descent from Alexander the Great. Other aspects would be the distinctiveness of the Macedonian language, but this is muddied by the proliferation of dialects and the fact that even native speakers from one part of Macedonia cannot understand the speech in other regions and religion, namely, the Autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Literally across the river in Skopje are Albanians who, although they suffered the same Ottoman rule, speak a different native language, practice a different religion, and already have an established mother country, Albania, even if they feel little attachment to it. Their language is shared with Albania, their religion with several hundred million people throughout the world, and their history in Macedonia with other peoples, including of course the Macedonian population living in Macedonia. They have a particular relationship with Macedonian society, shared with none of the other nationalities or minorities living in Macedonia. Indeed, without that relationship, the Albanian population might well disintegrate into numerous identities, as alluded to earlier by Mr. Repishti and Mr. Kideckel. At times antagonistic and argumentative, the relationship is rarely conciliatory, and it is characterized above all by the inability to see and understand that the other side may see and understand differently. Rigidly drawn and reinforced, it is this context that conditions Albanian national identity in Macedonia. Albanians in Macedonia are above all - Albanians in Macedonia.

Until quite recently they enjoyed free interaction with Albanians living in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosova, and this took professional and personal forms. With the tenuous relationship between Macedonia and its northern neighbor, communication with Kosova has decreased, but it continues. Some Albanians in fact felt that the implementation of passport control by the Macedonian government was a deliberate and personal attack on familiar relations and an attempt to divide the community. Albanian-language media continue to report regularly on events in Kosova, and the reports often include horrific tales of police brutality, torture, unwarranted arrests, searches and seizures. The Albanian population in Macedonia feels intimately, sometimes almost as if it were happening to them, the repression in Kosova. Some adopt a philosophical view, saying that level of repression, although tragic, can be tolerated, but its transformation into a large-scale slaughter would be intolerable. In that case the Albanian population would be obliged to come to their aid. Rarely, however, do Macedonian-language media report from Kosova at such a personal level, and those images are therefore rarely seen by the Macedonian population. More importantly, they are not seen as part of the way that Albanians in Macedonia see themselves.

The common perception is that collective Albanian action is directed toward jeopardizing either the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia through secession or some sort of autonomy within the present borders, or the status of the Macedonian population. The former is subject to political debate and posturing, and real or imagined influence from neighboring countries, and the latter provokes heated comment. The high birth rate of Albanians in Macedonia alone is sufficient to generate passionate reaction from many Macedonians, who contend that it is decidedly political, actively promoted through religious teaching, and directed toward taking over the country through sheer numbers. Others reflect that children are fine, as long as the conditions for their nurturance and growth are ensured. In the past, the state, of course, was obliged to provide for all children and to a certain extent it still does, which leads to discontent over a disproportionately large share of provisions and funds going to a part of the population that does not contribute proportionally to maintaining those funds. The following comment is often heard: "Why should we support their children through our contributions to social welfare funds?" Some Albanians, however, are suspicious that the care received at the hands of Macedonian doctors is substandard, incompetent, or even harmful, and it may be that many of the Albanian population will not even visit a Macedonian doctor. Consequently, there may in fact be no disproportionality, only supposition based on the fact that Albanians have the highest birth rate in Europe, nourished by the fear that their birth rate will deprive Macedonians of the independent country.

Without doubt, however, the high birth rate and the contemporary disdain that it has created are often interpreted as the result of repression that has backfired. Religion, according to some, became a tool of the state for convincing a large part of the Albanian population to refrain from participating in the broader society by seeking better opportunities for employment or for education. The theory goes that instead of installing as religious leaders educated individuals capable of directing the growth and advancement of the Islamic population, which in this context would necessarily mean creating creating educational and economic opportunities within the framework of Macedonian society, the state, working through national religious leaders, engineered the installation of simple, uneducated teachers who would then teach the local Islamic community that they should, as it were, be satisfied digging ditches and eating bread. The Islam promulgated by those leaders and accepted by a large part of the Albanian population serves not Allah, Mohammed, or the socio-political and religious system that spread throughout much of the world, but majority political interests and the goal of ensuring that the Albanian population in Macedonia was and remained marginalized.

In a country riddled by widespread economic crisis, there are not enough ditches to dig. All Albanians see themselves engaged in a struggle for existence, both individually and collectively. They have been largely excluded from all but the lowest-paying jobs, many of which have subsequently been lost. The struggle unfolds in the streets everyday, with a seemingly ever-increasing number of private, "non-legal" vendors offering a variety of goods. Most overwhelming, at least in Skopje, are the numbers of people, primarily Albanians of all ages, selling cigarettes. Perhaps the most disconcerting thing is the tragedy of old men doing it. Children are involved as well, both male and female. Some would remark, however, that all the money is in the hands of Albanians, and there is no question that there is a number of successful Albanian businessmen, and the display of gold jewelry in shops in the old part of Skopje, mostly owned or run by Albanians, is dazzling, especially at twilight. However, like the goldsmiths, that money is dispersed, creating an image of abundance and no mechanisms for its increased concentration that could become a basis for its increased growth.

I am reminded of two proverbs, ultimately about Albanians by Albanians. One goes something like this: Jews, when sitting around a table discussing business, social, or other matters disagree heatedly. When they stand, however, they are in tight agreement. Albanians, on the other hand, agree when sitting and discussing, only to disintegrate into disagreement when they rise. The second one goes something like this: an Albanian goes to Heaven, is greeted and asked what he wants. "A tidy house with a yard," he replies, and whoever greets Albanians when they go to Heaven and grants such things considers the request reasonable and grants it. Another Albanian comes along, is greeted, and asked what he wants. His reply is that he wants that house and that yard.

Even the resolution, however, of that widespread economic crisis may not ease the struggle for existence. Indeed it may exacerbate it, engendering a more fundamental crisis insofar as it represents a further institutionalization of exclusion. Privatization is underway, which is widely assumed to mean that directors and managers, largely Macedonians, will benefit greatly, while under-educated, inexperienced people, including Albanians, to the extent that they are included in the subsequent operation of newly-privatized enterprises, will be relegated only to positions of manual labor. The entire society, of course, will feel the pain of privatization, but this interpretation has a particular ethnic coloring. The social and economic gap will continue to widen, even with the tacit approval of the international community, as the conditions for development and of a market economy are created. Capital will flow into the hands of directors and management, while labor will have only the minimum necessary to survive. A feature of the concomitant alienation from the fruits of labor will be at least to a certain extent its ethnic basis. In an attempt to lessen or even forestall the potential impact of such developments, education is receiving an increasingly widespread emphasis as fundamental to improving the position of Albanians in Macedonia. There have of course been for some time classrooms and even entire schools devoted to education in Albanian, and other classrooms and schools are of course open to Albanians. Likewise, it is true that many Albanian children do not continue schooling beyond the mandatory 8th grade, with the reason or justification lying somewhere in the realm of cultural factors including social practices and the aforementioned religious teaching and economic concerns. Girls are taken out of school to stay home, while school-aged boys and occasionally girls are among those pushing cigarettes and other items. To send a child to school requires money for clothing, shoes, and books that often is not available. The frequently expressed view that children are not allowed to continue because their parents want them to earn money is countered by the view that they must earn money. Until each side is able to see how the other sees or at least to understand that neither has a monopoly on the interpretation of a given set of circumstances or issues, there is little chance that a framework encompassing the relationship between the Albanian and majority populations will be established.

Perhaps the most recent expression of that relationship, and the most recent hindrance to establishing such a framework, is the complex of events surrounding the University of Tetovo, where the language of instruction will be Albanian. One of the reasons given for its necessity is the dire lack of qualified teachers. It would be nonsensical, indeed, to try to recap the debate surrounding its proclamation, establishment, and pending operation, simply because there has been no debate. Each side has proceeded as if the other did not exist. The initiative was raised, the government made no response, an insignificant and poorly-attended student protest was organized, some buildings were razed, the initiators were detained on several occasions for discussions lasting as long as fifteen hours. Then, the initiators held discussions with various diplomats in Skopje and with visiting representatives of various international organizations. "This is a fight to the end," Albanians say, and although I have yet to meet any who oppose the university or even think it unnecessary, I have been told that some remarked that they would not send their children there and nevertheless support it. Of course, aside from teaching, just where would any future graduates of the University of Tetovo find employment, at least within the Republic of Macedonia, even if the university follows standards set by the two other universities in Macedonia? As far as I know, no conciliatory moves have been made by either side. The state stands behind the view that such an institution is against the law, while I find nothing either in the law or in the constitution prohibiting higher education in a language other than Macedonian or requiring that it be in Macedonian. Nor have the initiators suggested anything that may allay Macedonian fears that such a university inevitably will lead to Albanian autonomy within Macedonia, or even to secession. One possibility might be mandatory Macedonian language study or proficiency testing. It remains to be seen how these issues will play themselves out. Meanwhile, classes are scheduled to begin next week.

Finally, I would mention that powerful mechanisms reinforce this mutual lack of comprehension. I will mention only one, the media, and illustrate its role in nurturing the relationship between the Albanians and the majority populations by relating briefly an episode that happened in December 1994. In an encounter with police in a suburb of Skopje, an Albanian was shot as he apparently began to run after being detained along with another one. The Macedonian-language media reported it as a case of attempted escape in which the dead man, a merchant operating illegally (a smuggler, in other words), did not stop when ordered to by the police after breaking away from them. The Albanian-language media, on the other hand, reported that the dead man was a legitimate and registered businessman who never had any trouble with the police. The youth who was detained with him reported that he himself was arrested for, and I quote, "three cartons of cigarettes, while the dead man had nothing in his hands." Why he broke away and ran is uncertain, but the youth noted that he had become frightened and disturbed inside the police station. His family added that he had serious hearing problems and often wore a hearing-aid, which he was not wearing on that day, and he may not have been able to hear any warnings, if there were any. The article does note that, according to the youth, not a minute had elapsed between the dead man exiting the police station and the gunshot, and it questions the police report, which reported a prolonged struggle between the police and the victim. It also reports that according to witnesses who saw the body, the man was shot in the back. This is all very skeletal, but it illustrates, I think, the context of separate worlds in which Macedonians and Albanians live. Many Macedonians in fact have not even heard of the shooting, and killings are still relatively rare in Skopje, while the same report incited the Albanian population, according to some sources. The same occurrence is a drastically different event depending on how it is interpreted. For one group, it affirms that Albanians operate outside society with blatant disregard for the law and its instruments. For the other, it is a brutal affirmation that society, the law, and its enforcement operate deliberately against the Albanian population. It is this relationship with the majority population thatdetermines the Albanian identity in Macedonia, and the future of that relationship depends, I would say, on the willingness of each side to engage the other in something that resembles a dialogue.

Teuta Arifi

Women's Studies (Skopje)

I would divide the last five years of the political life of the Albanians in Macedonia into two parts. The first two years represent a period of euphoria, beginning in 1990 when the new, democratic, pluralistic system was set up. The system of political parties, however, was flawed from the start. The first Albanian party, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), was a political movement identical to the Democratic League of Kosova. But why do I call this period euphoric? Because there was a feeling that after the first election, all of the old problems of the Albanians in former Yugoslavia would be solved. After the first election, a pluralistic parliament assembled. This parliament provided perhaps the first lesson for the Albanians in Macedonia, namely, that in political life you can never expect a major change to come quickly.

In 1992, a referendum was organized by the Albanian political party on political autonomy for Albanians in Macedonia. Many commentators are of the opinion that the organization proceeded too quickly, because there was little discussion about the need for this referendum. How did the population approach the referendum? One year later I conducted an interview with the vice-president of the referendum board. To my question "What do you think one year after this?" he replied: "Maybe we will leave this question unanswered, because the situation is not yet close to the practical realization of the idea."

In the same year we saw the formation of a coalition government, comprised of the leftist Macedonian political parties and the Albanian political parties. The general situation in Macedonia was much different than the situation of Albanians in Albania or in Kosova. The functioning of this first Macedonian parliament was very interesting. We had one parliament for four years but very important laws on interethnic relations were not passed. I have in mind especially the law on local government, the law on using other languages, and some other laws that have importance for interethnic relations. Every time ethnic questions came before the parliament, we faced a democratic tyranny of the majority, because the 23 Albanian deputies were outvoted every time by the non-Albanian M.P.s. This led to the end of euphoria, which is perhaps the explanation for the split in the biggest Albanian party, the PDP. After two or three years of work in the parliament, people began to have other political ideas. And, as a result, the Albanian party (the PDP), which was the symbol of the Albanian movement, was split into two branches, the so-called "moderate PDP" and the "radical PDP."

For me this is all related to the characteristics of the Albanian electorate in the second pluralist elections. In the first elections in Macedonia in all districts there was a single Albanian candidate, who was the candidate of all Albanian parties and who was supported by all Albanian voters. In the second election, for example in District 73, which was characteristic of the Albanians in Macedonia, there were eight Albanian candidates, each of whom was very important for the political parties and each of whom campaigned to be a member of parliament. And in those elections the Albanians got only 19 seats in the Macedonian parliament, as opposed to 23 seats in the first elections. This was the price that Albanians payed for a pluralism of ideas, a reduced representation of 19 seats in parliament.

Generally, the differences in Albanian society in Macedonia are very much linked with the past. The Albanians in Macedonia have little political experience, limited to the last five years. And there is a difference between Albanians from Albania, who have state experience, and Albanians from Kosova, who gained political experience during the period of autonomy in Kosova. The Albanians in Macedonia never had political experience because they were never a part of the Macedonian political system. Albanians are still not part of the global system of values in Macedonia and that is one reason why the Albanian community in Macedonia is a more closed, more conservative community than both the Kosovar and Albanian communities. There is a lack of a space, of possibilities to show themselves and to study their own needs.

The current political issue for the Albanians in Macedonia is the question of the university, which has become very politicized. The question of education was paramount for the Albanian political parties in Macedonia. In former Yugoslavia we experienced a reduction in the number of Albanian-language high schools including the pedagogical high school in Skopje. The declaration establishing the Albanian university in Macedonia was signed by the ethnic Albanian members of the government of Macedonia, members of the same government that declared that it is opposed to the opening of the university.

I will conclude with the observation that generally in the Balkans, not only in Macedonia, there seems to be a lack of positive values and energies. I am afraid that when we speak about each other, we speak of stereotypes. I heard one suggestion that perhaps we need more television broadcasts about Albanian culture on Macedonian television in the Macedonian language. We need to create a sensitivity for the other, for that which is different. What we lack now in the Balkans is a sensitivity toward differences. We have suffered much because we are not yet educated to appreciate differences and respect them. We need to think about the affirmation of other values, but I do not believe that these values will be promoted by politicians, because they are interested more in power. There are Albanian-language broadcasts of two or three hours on Macedonian television. But there is never anything about Albania in the Macedonian language. Another worthwhile suggestion was to have a Macedonian journalist writing from the Macedonian perspective in Albanian newspapers, and vice versa. The key to opening the community is to begin to understand the thinking of the other community.

Cafo Boga

Albanian-American Cultural Foundation

In 1989, with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, political pluralism began in Montenegro. Toward the end of 1990, the first multiparty elections were held. The current leadership of Montenegro came to power through the so-called Antibureaucratic Revolution, the intent of which was the destruction of the Yugoslav Federation and the formation of a Greater Serbia. The current leadership and Montenegrin State are considered pawns of President Milosevic, and the republic a satellite of Serbia. Prior to the first multiparty election the Communist Party changed its name to the Socialist Democratic Party - pure camouflage. Foreign observers at the elections of 1990 and 1992 attested to irregularities and falsification by the party.

The Socialist Democratic Party fomented hatred among nationalities, culminating in Montenegrin aggression toward Croatia (bombings, killings and pillage of Dubrovnik, Konavli and Cavtat) and later toward Bosnia. Political parties that denounced this aggression were declared traitors or enemy "collaborators" by the present government.

Fearful of this chaos and the retraction of the rights granted them in the 1974 Constitution, Albanians concentrated in Ulqin, Tivar, Tuz, Plave, Gudci, Roxhaj and some other areas of Montenegro organized themselves into an association called the Democratic Forum of Albanians from which the Democratic League was born in 1990. Contrary to allegations by other Montenegrin political parties, the Democratic League is a multiethnic party.

In the most recent elections, in November 1992, the only active ethnic Albanian political party, the Democratic League of Albanians in Montenegro, failed by 51 votes to reach the 4% threshold of the national vote needed for a party to have parliamentary representation. The prospects for the Democratic League are uncertain, primarily because of policy differences and provincial politics.

However, the two leading opposition parties, the Liberal Alliance and the Social Democratic Party, which espouse a multiethnic policy, indirectly represent Albanians in the Parliament. In the elections, many Albanians voted for those two parties in the belief that they would have more power to represent Albanian interests than the Democratic League. The Liberal Alliance won 13 out of 85 seats in Parliament, and the Social Democratic Party, four seats. One of the Liberal Alliance M.P.s, an Albanian, Xhemal Peri (Dzemal Perovic), from Ulqin district was elected a deputy parliamentary speaker.

Constitutionally, all minorities are meant to be represented in the civil service and parliament. It is thus debatable whether the administration under President Momir Bulatovic is failing to uphold the constitution, or whether the "indirect" representation of the Albanians suffices in a practical sense.

The best-known opposition parties in Montenegro are the Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party, and the Muslim Democratic Action Party. Albanians in Montenegro are organized around the Democratic League and the Democratic Union Party of Albanians, which was established last year. A number of Albanians participate in Montenegrin opposition parties, whose programs are characterized as democratic or liberal, which attest to the fact that Albanians are not preoccupied with romantic and ultranationalistic ideals but rather are seeking a way to peaceful coexistence.

Since Serbia is in a state of war, a substantial amount of the national budget is allocated to armament, and as a result, economy and social conditions have worsened. The stagnation of private investment (due to complicated laws and heavy taxes), pillage of public property, and especially the international embargo created daily price inflation of as much as 100%. The monetary program introduced last year by Mr. Avramovic, the Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, was labeled by Montenegrin experts as a "last pillage of citizens." Dissatisfaction is displayed by strikes demanding salary hikes to offset the cost of living increases. Today, in Montenegro six minimum salaries are required to care for a family of two persons. At the same time, a work force of only 100 thousand workers must try to support 70 thousand retirees and 110 thousand unemployed.

Albania, and by extension Albanians on the Albanian side of the border, play a crucial economic role for Montenegro by smuggling fuel and commodities across Lake Shköder and the Buna River into Montenegro. Earnings from smuggling are high enough to cover the entire Montenegrin budget deficit. Politically, this places Montenegro in a strong position against Serbia, which until recently has been able to push Montenegro into line by cutting off vital supplies from Belgrade. Thus, in this regard Podgorica no longer has to follow Serbian policy. Tirana is equally satisfied, partly because many Albanians earn large amounts of money from sanction-busting, but also because Tirana wants an independent Montenegro over which Serbia has minimum leverage.

An important but little noticed aspect to Montenegrin - Albanian relations is that several hundred Serbs and Montenegrins who lived in Albania, but who fled after the collapse of communism, have now returned to northern Albania. (Serbia had tried to force them to migrate to Kosova to boost non-Albanian numbers there.) They now play a key role as bilingual entrepreneurs.

Montenegro is rich in natural resources and has a beautiful coast which used to be visited by thousands of tourists every year. However, because of Montenegrin aggression toward its neighbors, this source of revenue is lost. In the 1980s, Montenegro earned over $150 million annually just from tourism along the coast. According to Tourist Bureau of Montenegro, 300 foreign tourists, mainly from Russia, vacationed in Montenegro last year. Even worse, this coastal beauty is threatened by military developments, including the construction of a recently approved military base in Ulqin region. This project would destroy the unique olive groves in Adriatic Coast - approximately 74,000 olive trees, some of them hundreds of years old.

A campaign against intellectuals of all nationalities is currently being waged in Montenegro, particularly against political opponents of the regime. Last January, judges in Montenegro handed down jail sentences totaling over 104 years to two young men from Cetina, the leaders of the Democratic Action Party (the Muslim party). The pretext was that they ridiculed the President of the Republic of Montenegro. A Member of Parliament of the Montenegro, despite his political immunity, was also jailed, because at a parliamentary forum he charged the Government of Montenegro with corruption. The Government of Montenegro, as an arm of Serbia, is integrating Montenegrin cultural heritage with that of Serbia. Montenegro is left without its own church, whereas the Monastery of Cetina, formerly a Montenegrin national symbol, has become headquarters for Serbian nationalists. Cultural and governmental institutions, including radio and television, the newspaper Pobjeda, the periodicals Stvaranje and Ovdje, the university, and the Academy of Science now serve Serbian interests. Directors of the Archeological Institute, Montenegrin Archives, and National Museum, were expelled because they considered themselves Montenegrins, not Serbs. A federal decree prohibited publication of the Encyclopedia of Montenegro. Initiatives by the Montenegrin intellectuals to create a more cosmopolitan atmosphere are either not allowed or are sabotaged by pro-Serbian forces, as was the case in the Bicentennial of Cetina celebration. Traditional Montenegrin celebrations are permitted only by the President of the Serbian Academy.

In Montenegro, where individual rights are denied even to Montenegrins, rights to Albanians are denied to an even greater extent. Albanians are considered second-class citizens. The branch of the Council for Protection of Human Rights for Montenegro in Plave, which has its headquarters in Priötina, a document forwarded to international agencies for the protection of human rights, cites discrimination toward Albanians in employment, education, public information and media. Before the London Peace Conference two years ago, Montenegrin Albanians requested that they be given special status akin to that offered the Krajina Serbs in Croatia. There is now little pressure for such a special status.

Cultural, political and humanitarian associations are finding moral and financial support from some international institutions. For example, the Soros Foundation for Montenegro is helping a number of independent publications (Monitor, Teuta, Fati) and facilitates the publication of books that portray the reality in Montenegro. Some other organizations including the "Art Club" in Ulqin and a similar one in Cetina are organizing cultural events to maintain peace and multinational well-being. Humanitarian organizations such as "Mother Teresa," "Karinas," "Merhamet," "International Red Cross" are helping to ease the situation, even though their activities have been affected by the policies of the Government of Montenegro.

At one time, Albanians and Montenegrins lived together harmoniously, and even fought together against the Ottomans. There was not only respect but also some fondness between the two groups. Until recently, traces of each other's languages could be found in towns and villages such as Ku_i, Fundina, Zeta, Mata-Guzha.

The deterioration of this relationship began when Imperial Russia began an expansion toward the Adriatic through Serbia. This expansionist policy and aggression, which goes back for centuries, is responsible for the present-day turmoil in Kosova. The anti-Albanian campaign also encouraged Montenegrins to repress their Albanian neighbors, resulting in a mass exodus of Albanians.

The future for the remaining Albanian population in Montenegro is difficult to predict. However, they are certainly not a happy people. Albanians in Montenegro are not in a position to shape their own future. In addition to whatever the Montenegrin state decides for them, their fate depends on how the conflict in former Yugoslavia is resolved, on maintenance of peace and stability in the rest of Balkan region, and on the success of the concept of a European community. In my view, one of the following three scenarios will occur.

Should the present government of Serbia and Montenegro be able to maintain its grip on power, repression of the Albanians will continue, worsening still their economic and political position. Emigration of Albanians would continue, and their property would be bought or taken over by new Serbian or Montenegrin settlers. As a social and political group in Montenegro, Albanians would have little influence.

The second scenario could occur if the current government and political ideology were replaced by progressive, democratic political parties and the rights of every nationality were constitutionally guaranteed. This would bring stability, peaceful coexistence and economic prosperity, which could lead to this area becoming a part of the European Union. In this scenerio, the border between Montenegro and Albanian would become less visible. The focus would be more on economic prosperity and less on political and nationalistic aspirations.

The third scenario would occur if the current ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia worsened and spread to Kosova and Macedonia. This situation undoubtedly would bring into the conflict other countries inside and perhaps even outside the Balkan region. The results would be disastrous. A final settlement of the conflict could lead to another redrawing of the borders. Out of this fire it is possible that a new phoenix would arise, and some of the injustices the Albanians suffered as a result of the Congress of Berlin would be settled. On the other hand, the outcome could be even more devastating for the Albanians.

I would like to conclude my presentation with two quotes from two former Presidents of the United Sates:

*"Only peace between equals can last," President Woodrow Wilson said to the U.S. Senate, in January 22, 1917.

*"Peace, like charity, begins at home," President Franklin D. Roosevelt said on August 14, 1931.

Mirce Tomovski

Editor of Puls (Macedonia)

I feel that the subject of this conference calls for an analysis, yet also demands reflection on the transformation of Albanian society. I would even say that the Albanian paradigm has a Balkan dimension, since the Albanians, like the other ethnic entities - the Macedonians, Greeks, Serbs, Turks - are often found living outside their national homeland. The Albanian national entity today is shaped by a number of political, intellectual, moral and spiritual factors. These include the pressure on the democratic processes to uphold high European standards (in a country which remained the last bastion of communist totalitarianism), the Balkan mind set of Albania (a country full of Balkan frustrations, stereotypes and delusions), the division of the Albanian nation, which, under conditions of a desperate need for national identification begets national romanticism, nationalism and national homogenization. In lexical terms of the Balkan political language, they are identified with the idea of having all Albanians in one state, i.e., the dream for a Greater Albania. I believe that this multi-disciplinary approach has been well chosen, since the Albanian state of being is manifold: tradition and history, culture and customs, mentality and economics, social and political surroundings.

Today, a great conflict is taking place within the Albanian individual - between the Homo Balkanicus and the shock of the processes of civilizing emancipation, between tradition and contemporary life, the resurgence of religion, between memories of Enverism and the explosion of democracy, between grim reality and dreams. The most visible sign of this conflict was the massive exodus of Albanians from Albania to Italy, Greece and the surrounding Balkan states, despite their ties to their country and a highly developed sense of patriotism.

I have no intention of further elaborating on these notions. I have recalled them in order to present some facts which can help us understand the full complexity of the processes of transformation in the national, as well as in the civil, sense and also because they form the framework for the study of the political and social life of the Albanians in Macedonia as well.

The Albanians in Macedonia are an integral part of the Macedonian political, economic and social milieu. There are 442,914 Albanians living in Macedonia (22.9% of the population). Their national body enjoys all the rights and freedoms enjoyed by national minorities according to the highest standards of the international community, i.e., the right to freely express and develop their national identity. These are implemented and protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, as a civic and civil state, as the national state of the Macedonian people and also the state of the Albanians, Turks, Roma, Vlachs and others that live on Macedonian soil.

The Albanians, like all citizens regardless of their national affiliation, have all the political rights and freedoms belonging to the individual. In that sense, they have every constitutional right to realize their national particularity within the institutions of the system, and to use, as citizens, the corpus of individual political rights and freedoms.

With the democratic changes that have occurred in Macedonia, the Albanians, in conditions of political pluralism and a multi-party system, have articulated their own interests by establishing a number of political parties. The most influential are the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Albanian Alliance-Liberal Party, and the Union of Intellectuals. A special Forum for Human Rights was also established as well as the Association of Albanian Women. In a way, the parties became nationally hermetic; no Albanian joined any parties which did not have a Macedonian national program as an ideological platform; nor did Macedonians join these parties.

In the first parliamentary elections in 1990, the PDP and NDP gained 22 representatives in the Macedonian Parliament. One of the three vice-presidents of the Parliament was an Albanian. In the coalition government of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia and the Liberal Party, they obtained 5 ministerial positions, a vice-president in the Government as well as other positions within respective ministries.

The PDP and NDP took part in the second multi-party elections, along with numerous independent candidates from the ranks of the ethnic Albanians. They now hold 19 seats, with 14 belonging to PDP and NDP and five independent representatives. Parliament once again has an Albanian vice-president, and the new government has four Albanian ministers. Participation in the government has opened the process of integration into the new structures of the army of the Republic of Macedonia, the police, the administration, and diplomatic service. Respect for the political reality in Macedonia has fostered openness and conditions enabling communication between the Albanian minority, and the nation and state of Albania. What was once the most closed border in Europe is today the most open border in the Balkans. In the past three years three new border crossings have been opened. Diplomatic efforts in the direction of liberalizing the visa and passport regime and for the Europeanization of communication in general are underway.

In the spiritual, as in the political, sphere there is a tradition by which the realization of national identity merges with the cultural achievements of the Albanians. Literature in the Albanian language has given us world-class authors; the Albanian theater in Skopje rises above local standards. There are about a dozen societies that nurture Albanian folklore. In addition to the daily newspaper Flaka e Vëllazërimit with a circulation of 3,000, the children's magazine Fatosi, and the cultural magazine Jehona, the media in the Albanian language is undergoing a true revival. Dita, a bimonthly magazine aimed at Albanian women, deals with subjects from economic, political and cultural life, as well as information regarding the activities of the PDP. According to data from the Ministry of Information, television and radio programs broadcast from 1991 onwards include cable TV in Tetovo ("KAT") with music, science, education and culture programs; radio "ETER" with commercial and music programs; and "ART," a private TV and radio station in Tetovo. Similar radio and TV stations also exist in other cities where Albanians constitute a considerable part of the population: in Skopje, Gostivar, Debar, Ki_evo, Struga, Kumanovo. In these towns, up to 50% of the programs of the official local radio stations are in Albanian. There are special programs in Albanian shown on official Macedonian television and radio - a special channel broadcasts 6 hours of radio programs and 2 hours of TV programs in Albanian daily, with plans for further expansion.

In the field of education, primary education is guaranteed for all citizens, including the Albanians - in Albanian, of course. Possibilities have been created for Albanian-language learning in secondary education, as well as in two universities: SS. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and St. Clement's in Bitola. We are in the process of finalizing plans for the education of teaching staff for pre-schools, primary and secondary schools. In the past few years, the volume of children in primary and secondary schools, as well as in various faculties, has been on the rise. In addition to the equal opportunity for studying at any of the university faculties, an additional quota of 10% has been established, under which Albanian students, as well as other nationalities can enroll in the universities. Thus, the participation of Albanian students increased 4% in the 1992/93 school year, 6% in 1993/94, and 6.5% in 1995.

I chose this statistical and factual approach, since it best illustrates the position of the Albanians in Macedonia. However, the dissatisfaction expressed by the Albanian political parties continues. Their disillusionment with the political treatment of the Albanians manifested itself in a boycott of key state decisions related to the process of constituting the independent position of Macedonia and its international recognition, following the separation from the former Yugoslavia. Thus, we take note of the boycott of the referendum for the independence of Macedonia, the adoption of the Constitution, and the 1991 census.

The central demands of the Albanian political elite in Macedonia are to obtain the status of a nation for the Albanian nationality (nationality is a constitutional term by which we denote national minorities), territorial and political autonomy of the western part of the Macedonian state where the majority of the Albanians live, federalization or cantonization which is to replace the unitary state. Moreover, they want the Albanian language, together with the Macedonian language, to be recongnised as official languages and seek the creation of a parallel system of education in the Albanian language.

This political and ideological fixation on national identity has been accompanied by an illegal proclamation of the so-called ILIRIDA that demands political and territorial autonomy, the establishment of paramilitary formations, the establishment of irregular Albanian schools outside of the system. At the end of last year, there was an attempt to form an Albanian university in Tetovo - a small town in the western part of the country - without regard for constitutional and legal provisions. This political and exclusively nationalistic landscape is seen by the Macedonians as a fulfillment of the dream for a Greater Albania. And this generates Albanophobia.

Macedonia has not attained the ideal in finding solutions for these very subtle minority and national issues, especially in light of Macedonian nationalism, irritating in its restrictive attitude towards the non-Macedonian population. However, Macedonia is searching for a formula for a multi-ethnic democracy based on the principle of coexistence, regardless of nationality, religion, sex, or race. In Macedonia, the long historical tradition of living together lies at the core of the everyday life of the people. The vitality of this tradition was verified in recent times when conflicts regarding the most delicate and sensitive issues were avoided by proclaiming dialogue, tolerance, and consideration of arguments as the supreme guidelines.

In the sphere of ethnic relations there are areas that are still open - in policy, economics, culture and education, and in the functioning of the institutions of the system and of state mechanisms, which are a cause for dissatisfaction among the Albanians, provoking aggressive nationalism. But many of the problems do not relate to the Albanians as a national entity, but to the category of citizens, and problems that cannot be solved due to general poverty and economic collapse. Macedonia has found itself between a rock and a hard place - the process of transition and blockades to the north, resulting from measures undertaken by the UN and the Greek embargo on the south. The direct damages alone amount to $3 billion. The resolution of the social problems under these circumstances result in an absurdity of its own kind - insistence on high world standards under conditions of economic and social devastation.

The disintegrative processes among the Albanians in Macedonia are not an expression of major problems which could be viewed as the basis for dissatisfaction among the population. The development of democratic relationships, the impact of liberalized economic initiatives, business ability, the change in life styles, and the erosion of patriarchal traditions have segmented the political, general and the individual interests of Albanians. This is reflected in the party monolith and in ideological, nationalistic axioms. The individual is faced with present-day reality, which obliterates traditionalism, the family, the private and intimate bounds which served as a perfect framework for all kinds of political manipulation. National, family and party obedience are slowly descending into history. The processes of emancipation are taking their toll.

The PDP, the largest and most influential party, there was a narrow democratic outlet for the divergent standpoints and interests which could not be articulated in a democratic fashion, and so it split into two parties - the PDP and the Tachi-Xhaferi fraction. In the most recent elections there were many more independent Albanian representatives, which was not the case in the first elections. The parties that are losing their influence are seeking new ground for national homogenization. They are seeking a new monolith which they can shape politically, by raising national particularity to the level of a separate, parallel life which cannot be molded without various institutions, however illegal, unsustainable or irrational. In a word, they are seen as political capital, even at the cost of a historical comeback.

The democratic changes in the Albanian national being are a process that is transpiring under very complex circumstances. Two things are vital: support for the democratic development of Albania and support for the process of transition with adequate social and economic measures. This is of key importance, since Albania has still a large, if not decisive, influence on the state of being of the Albanians in Macedonia, and even in other states where they live. The insistence on the nationalistic basis of the Albanian issue on the Balkans will inevitably lead to war, because the Balkans and each Balkan state is at the same time "big" and "small" by way of its own minorities without or other minorities within, by the romantic dreams of Great States, by the illusions of lost territories that now have to be regained. This is still the Balkans. Regretfully it has remained primitive, savage and unpredictable. The way out is civilization, not national or ethnic, but one founded on civic principles.

QUESTIONS

Question: Do you think that the census figure of 22% can be trusted, since it was heavily contested both inside and outside the country?

Tomovski: The last census in Macedonia was under the international control of the European Community and the census law was written in accordance with European standards. The international commission which monitored the census reported that 442,914 Albanians, 22.9%, live in Macedonia.

Question: The New York Times wrote that the census was not conducted properly and most of the villages and other remote regions were not even in the sample. So the huge Albanian population that lives outside of the main centers was not even sampled in the census. What is your response to that?

Shott: It is in fact the case that there was difficulty reaching a lot of people. But let me go back. The truth, I suppose, lies somewhere between the 22% and the 40%. That 150,000 Albanians were not able to participate in the census is a reflection of the citizenship laws that apply in the case of Macedonia, which state that someone that was not born there and cannot prove that he or she was born there has to prove that he or she has lived there for the past fifteen years or is married to someone from there. It is in fact easier for a Macedonian born outside of Macedonia of Macedonian parents to receive Macedonian citizenship than it is for people that have lived in Macedonia for a number of years. I think the numbers should be accepted for what they are, with the obvious qualification that they are contested.

To the question about actually implementing the census, there were in fact problems and some localities were reached only at the very end, if they were reached at all. It is an exaggeration, however, to say that the vast majority of the Albanian population was not counted.

Question: Another aspect is that most of the census forms were not even in Albanian. When they were translated, they were not translated properly. And the population received the forms quite late in the census and therefore a few of them were not even counted. So basically, the census of 1994 might not even be correct.

Shott: You are right, those numbers are contested. You can interpret as you wish the international community's support for those numbers.

Arifi: When I prepared myself for this conference I spent more time on the discussion and interviews with the political leaders, because the program mentioned that the subject is not interethnic relations but more the social-dynamic processes in Albanian society. The question of the census was very sensitive in discussion between the Albanian political parties - the 1994 census was boycotted by the Albanians. The European Community invested some 1 million ECU in this census. There were discussions as to whether Albanian parties will vote in the parliament for the census law or not. And after this the Albanian deputies voted for the law of the census following which they organized press conferences, which I attended. The question posed by journalists was: "Why did you accept it?" That is, the census law, considering the situation with citizenship. And they said that it was not the decision of only one Albanian party, but of all Albanian parties. But even the radical branch of the PDP denied that it was part of these discussions of all Albanians before this census law. One week before the census Mr. Berisha declared that the Albanians in Macedonia need to be included in the census. After this the moderate PDP said that "We vote because of what Mr. Berisha said." It was a big dilemma to the Albanians in Macedonia, as I explained earlier. They cannot copy completely Kosova because the circumstances are not the same.

Question: How can Macedonia call itself a democratic state when it is bulldozing university buildings?

Shott: There has not been, and I do not expect there will be, any sort of legal challenge to the razing of those buildings. There do not seem to be any avenues for legal action for these matters. As far as letting the university start, yes in fact the buildings that comprise the university are dispersed throughout Tetovo and the surrounding area. As I mentioned in my paper, a large part of the Albanian population sees this as a fight to the end, and it is not about education or getting degrees from the university, it is about ensuring opportunities for the future. Those buildings were a couple of new structures and were to serve, partially, for the purposes of the university. Some of the political parties have donated space as well, and it is likely, in fact, that some classes will be held in private houses.

Question: I am afraid we are seeing signs that Albanians in Macedonia are moving toward Kosovization, of being alienated from political life.

Shott: In response to that, I would point out that because of the alignments going into the most recent elections and their outcome, Albanians are not alone in feeling excluded from the political process. One-party rule has been reestablished in Macedonia.

Question: What kind of a future can Albanians expect in Macedonia?

Tomovski: I think that Albanians have a future in Macedonia because we have a tradition of living together, and I think that because the Albanian is an integral part of Macedonian life, that Albanian development in the framework of the Macedonian state, integration into organizations, the army, the diplomatic service, and elsewhere, will work.

Question: The numbers are proving you wrong. Albanians are leaving the country everyday. We can talk history all night here.

Shott: The Macedonian youth want to leave as well.

Question: My impression from living in Macedonia, twelve years ago now, was the sense of separate worlds, and the sense that Albanians do not know any more about Macedonians than Macedonians know about Albanians. I am interested not just in informal discussion but in what formal mechanisms there are to overcome this, and particularly in what I see as real prejudice on a popular level, long-term prejudice and perhaps racism.

Arifi: I think that one of the problems in Macedonia is that the formal statutes to regulate this multicultural reality are lacking. When you have a multicultural reality but one monistic system of values, you will have problems. We went to the high schools with the idea of fostering the learning of each other's language. The Albanian kids learn the Macedonian language from the first classes in primary school. And when we went to the Albanian classes, we asked the pupils "Do you want to learn Macedonian?" And they said, "Yes, we do, but it is too much, maybe we need to start later." It was a sensitive issue. When we went to the Macedonian classes and asked, "Do you want to learn the Albanian language as a foreign language?" They replied, "Why should we want to learn Albanian? This is Macedonia."

Question: Why do you say that there is no law or constitution or anything saying that it is against the law to have a university? The gentleman said that the university is open in Tetovo against the law. Second, how are Macedonians going to live ten years from now when the Albanians will become the majority in Macedonia because the birth rate is rising? How do they expect to live with Albanians? Isn't it time now to act to resolve the problems rather than come to something later?

Shott: What I said was that I could not find anything in either the constitution or the law prohibiting the opening of a university using a language other than Macedonian. Likewise the constitution guarantees - I do not recall exactly - something like access, freedom to open private universities and the like. Now the operative thing here is a fundamental difference in how laws are conceived. In other words, laws are not articles that prohibit things, but rather articles that describe just how far something can go. In other words, because it is not stated in the law that it is in fact legal to have higher education in Albanian, it is therefore assumed that it is not legal to have higher education in Albanian. In a nutshell that is the difference in the dispute. As far as the other question is concerned, my colleagues will have to answer that one.

Huttenbach: Let me end on an observer's note. We exist in an age which perhaps could be caricatured or characterized as the polarization of ethno-conflict, whether it is the problem of Albanians or whether it is the problem of other ethnicities which are divided by international borders. What is missing, first of all, is a technique, and this was asked again and again: how can one cut the Gordian knot, how can one bridge the gap between a majority and a minority, if I may use that word, or a government of one ethnicity and a population of another ethnicity. We have at present from a practical point of view, diplomatic or otherwise, no tried and tested methodology of resolving ethno-conflicts. The international order is an amateur at best in the problematics of how one can bridge the gaps between ethnic groups that are clearly polarizing in their views, and the end result has been violence, and it has been predicted in this context that there might be violence. I posit one suggestion: the Albanian situation, or the situation of the Albanian communities, is not that unique. One need only look at the map and see that Hungarians experience a variation of exactly the same problem. Serbs experience the same problem.

For Russians it has suddenly become a reality that 25 million ethnic Russians find themselves abroad. This is therefore an international problem, and I would posit that as we discuss the Albanian problem, perhaps a comparative approach be employed. An attempt should be made to bring in diplomats, non-governmental agencies, and representatives of the parties to search for a methodology to ethno-conflict resolution. This is in the interest of the entire world. It certainly is in the interest of the United States, whose attention so many ethnic groups are trying to attract. I suggest that to get the attention of the United States government and its people, the approach must not be from one ethnic group's point of view: they are too small on the diplomatic map of the United States. But if they can get together and present a common front of common interests, common concerns and the major problems in searching for a solution, that perhaps might be a beginning.

REMARKS BY THE VERY REVEREND ARTHUR E. LIOLIN

Chancellor, Albanian Orthodox Archdiocese in America

The words "transformation, change, and transition" permeate the themes of nearly all deliberations purporting to determine the course of Albanian society today. This indicates the intention to focus on a social order in ferment. That is to say, it is a process which is no longer static but in a state of flux and affecting most aspects of daily life wherever Albanians live in the Balkans.

To be sure, Albanians are not alone on this roller coaster ride which not only touches their economic well-being, but shapes their political outlook, moral perspective, familial cohesion and even international posture. Furthermore, they share this societal realignment with most of the globe, either as a direct result of being a "culture in reform" or as a vicarious reaction to the impact of that reform. In many ways, too, those outside the maelstrom hold a certain responsibility for having initiated, if not encouraged, the movement away from prior bondage.

What strikes me most about the task of appraising the phenomenon is, however, not the broad sweep of the transitions and the temptation to formulate abstract theories and analyses, or even to project pre-conceived conclusions on them. Neat prescriptions for contemporary Albanian society - as with similar others - have fallen by the wayside. Just seeing the big picture, let alone providing directions, has proven to be somewhat elusive. What stands out to me is a very tangible perception that interested scholars and experts are now looking at concrete realities. There is an attempt to make sense of specific needs and perhaps offer parameters of growth rather than menus: guidelines rather than instructions which would be resisted in any case by the very nature of their inflexibility. Indeed, there is reorientation occurring for which there is no exact precedent and which defies precise formulas.

This is altogether appropriate, the more so because the word "democracy" also appears frequently on the prospectus and because any transformation cannot, I believe, come superimposed from above. Instinctively, if not subconsciously, Albanians know this, having just emerged from a discredited and enforced weltanschauung. To be authentic, lasting and pervasive, whatever must be done should spring from their own experience and invigorating struggle; it must be earned, tilled and nurtured before its fruits can be harvested. To this end, there is a daunting caveat: a hazardous gauntlet must be traversed and there is no time machine that can breathlessly fast-forward the process.

Following the fall of the walls, moreover, the inclination to imitate other economic, political, social, juridical and even religious prototypes was - and often still is - a prevalent seduction for a quick fix. And while it is true that imitation in cultures, as with adolescents, is part of learning, it is only a first part, requiring an indigenous evolution before it is uniformly owned.

It is also increasingly apparent that authentic cultural reformation, which is precisely what is happening in Albanian societies, is not purely a mechanical matter of a change from one economic system to another, or from one political authority to another, or from one set of social values to another, grafted onto an old stump. While the will to adapt is there, and the points of reference are identified, the vision has not yet come into focus. Indeed, it requires a change of heart. We are talking, clearly, about a wholesale rediscovery of what it means to be a human being, living in concert with others. How to go about attaining that ideal is still an imperceptible goal. We are going from a clearly defined, albeit flawed, idea of what the "new socialist man" and his world view were thought to be, with all its pernicious implications, to a trek through the wilderness in search of a new identity with a new compass.

I am not the first to suggest the metaphor of a Sinai Syndrome to describe this trying period of exploration, uncertainty, retrogression and impetus which amply describes the feelings of those undergoing the journey. Multifaceted rites-of-passage for whole civilizations have been a useful image of social maturation for over a century, since Oswald Spengler first analyzed eighteen societies in his study, The Decline of the West.

Embarkation into the unknown perforce requires logistic preparations, supply lines, and organization. These provisions are as much a frame of mind as an attention to details. These are aspects for which many Albanians have, as they put it, an inbred allergy, because it reminds them of the type of planned system that failed them in the recent past. Overcoming this aversion will be a necessary precondition for a successful cultural transformation. This also is a mode which must organically develop from within rather than be articulated from an exterior context.

In the meantime, while today's Albanian searches for a new concept of self and society, he still needs a job, is fearful of his son's attraction to consumer goods which he is sore to provide, wants an education, preferably abroad, for his daughter, and wonders if his wife will make it home through the car-clogged streets in one piece.

He knows well, theoretically at least, what a free market is all about, but "accounts receivable" is still a mystery. He lights candles, prostrates in worship and erects a chapel containing every sacred object imaginable. But he has yet to fathom the question, let alone the answer to "who is God?" and what the deity has to do with him. He generously permits his spouse to seek employment and a career, yet cannot bring himself to wash a dish, let alone discuss even remotely the possibility of abuse. Initially enthralled and then bewildered by the plethora of newspapers, he has gradually grown mistrustful of the printed word. One symptom of this cynicism is that for many, gossip has become the reliable currency of exchange: a kind of oral Albanian samizdat, born of distrust in anything "official." The multiplicity of choice seems to take getting used to. When voting, he knows what he is against, but not yet what he is for.

In the numerous letters I receive, the word "disillusioned" is the most recurring and the most haunting. An insistence on entitlement and expectation run a close second. Rarely to be found is an expression of accountability or responsibility. The latter are certainly among the most necessary ingredients for healthy societal development after the elementary freedoms to attain it have been secured.

Despite the obstacles, there are numerous social indicators pointing to an optimistic transformation in the future. First, there is an evident tone of eagerness in the populace to get on with change, however long it takes. Second, trial and error, in many enterprising ways, reveals an adventurous spirit which is so vital to any form of discovery. Third, the current preoccupation with personal needs, while self-directed and isolating for the moment, is heightening a keen vigilance for and sensitivity to the interrelatedness of components, even in a free society. Finally, cultural experimentation in the arts, in thought and in religion, denotes flexibility and ingenuity in adapting to new conditions as they present themselves. All these are not only signs of metamorphosis and "ferment," but harbingers of a new Albanian reality on the brink of emergence. Discovery, experimentation, adventure: concepts which may characterize Albanian societies today have, in the past, been associated with renaissance in other civilizations. May the same be said for this people in this point in time?

The social dilemmas faced by Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Kosova and in Montenegro bring with each of them differing postulates. A fledgling middle-class in Macedonia and vibrant commercial ventures in Montenegro afford a certain exposure to and confidence in western lifestyles. A patriotic, intellectual stratum and oppressed rural component in Kosova offer a specter of fear, but also of courage, and of opportunity. A sizable, awakening, and somewhat stable Albanian presence in Greece and in Turkey add further interesting possibilities. Competing ideologies of regional, religious, national or even personal interests, some sincere, and some self-serving, do, of course, complicate the picture. These factors add to the impulse and the challenge for a unified approach by a people sharing common origins.

In the Republic of Albania itself, the period of misplaced idealism and the expectation of immediate fulfillment is over. Also departing the scene, gratefully, is confusion. One has the sense that a threshold is about to be crossed and that the hard tasks which lie ahead will soon come into view. It remains for us to examine the forms and to encourage directions that this new chapter will take as today's Albanian aspires to enter the promised land.

For once in a long, long time, the Albanian has the freedom of choice and the opportunity to exercise it. That, after all, is what democracy is all about and what makes the voyage so vibrant, so terrifying, so complex, and so full of hope.