III. The Current Political Situation in Kosova and the Changing Social Order

Institute on East Central Europe

Summer, 1996

Dr. Elez Biberaj

Voice of America

Kosova can be described as the forgotten region in the Balkans. While there is recognition of the danger of the outbreak of hostilities in that region, the international community thus far really has been preoccupied with developments in Bosnia, Croatia, and Chechnya. So the focus on Kosova really has been lacking. From time to time we hear Western policy-makers criticize Serbian actions in Kosova. In fact, the Clinton administration, has on several occasions, repeated the warning President Bush sent to Milosevic, warning Serbia against action in Kosova. In his last congressional appearance, Secretary of State Christopher repeated that same message and stated that the United States has a strong commitment to the integrity of Kosova, although it has not really defined what that means. Despite these public pronouncements, the United States and the West European powers seem to have resigned themselves to what, in their view, is seen as low-intensity ethnic conflict in Kosova, particular in comparison to Bosnia. The result is that we have neither war nor peace in Kosova now. There is ethnic cleansing going on, and it has been taking place for at least two or three years. Repression has increased significantly since the withdrawal of CSCE observers last year. And the Serbs have intensified their plans to send in Serbian settlers from other regions of the former Yugoslavia.

The U.S. and the West European nations have exercised a restraining influence over the Albanian self-determination movement, in particular Ibrahim Rugova, the ethnic Albanian leader. The West has denounced the violation of human rights but has rejected Kosova's independence. Western countries have not questioned whether Kosova is part of Serbia. And this leads me to the next point: Western interests do not coincide with those of the Albanians within Kosova or in Albania proper. I was very surprised a couple of days ago to read an interview with a rather serious politician in Albania, who said that it looks like the U.S. has a plan for the national unification of Albania. I think Albanians need to get the message that the interests of the Albanians and the Western powers do not coincide on this issue. The Albanians continue to insist on the right to self-determination, but the main Western objective remains to prevent the spread of conflict from Bosnia into Kosova and then into Macedonia, perhaps involving two NATO members, Greece and Turkey. As far as Albania is concerned, one can always say that Albania has recognized the Republic of Kosova, and actually it is the only country to have done so. It has endorsed Rugova's plans for a neutral state, but has done so in a lukewarm manner. The Albanian government really has not been too enthusiastic about these proposals. President Berisha has called on the Albanians, and in fact on Belgrade, to begin talks with the legitimate representatives of the ethnic Albanians, meaning Rugova, but I believe that the possibility of confederation, not to mention unification, of Kosova and Albania is considered premature or unrealistic by the majority of the Albanians in Albania proper. In my view, Tirana does not seem to have a credible strategy to deal with a potential outbreak of large-scale conflict in Kosova.

For more than five years now, Kosova has been under martial rule. The Albanians have displayed remarkable staying power in the face of severe repression and have pursued their demands for self-determination with passionate intensity. Years of military crackdown by Serbia, economic deprivation, and political marginalization have not succeeded in subduing the Albanians. And I think this is rather remarkable. The Albanians have organized a non-violent political movement, which has no precedent in Albanian history nor for that matter in the history of other Balkan nations. This movement rejects the legitimacy of Serbia's rule over some two million Albanians and relies on non-violent methods to resist what it terms "colonial rule" and Serbian attempts to change the ethnic structure in favor of the Serbian population. The movement has taken steps to establish a shadow government by setting up a government-in-exile headed by Bujar Bukoshi. Attempts have also been made to build parallel institutions in the province itself. We can safely say that the only authority that the majority of the Albanian population there recognizes is that of Ibrahim Rugova. In this respect the close-knit family structure, the unprecedented national solidarity that we have seen in the ranks of the Albanian majority there, and also the critical financial support that has gone into Kosova from Albanians abroad, have made it possible for the Albanians to continue their resistance.

The Albanian movement is composed of a wide spectrum of political forces, the most important of which are: Rugova's Democratic League, the Peasant Party, the Parliamentarian Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and several other lesser known parties. There used to be a very strong independent trade union movement. Two human rights organizations exist, one of which is represented by Mr. Pula, and there are other less influential groups. But despite its diversity, the Albanian movement in general has acted cohesively. At least on two crucial issues the Albanians have displayed a remarkable uniformity of views. All of these different political parties and groups demand independence from Serbia, and all of the serious political forces, almost without exception, advocate non-violent resistance. Now, of course there are extremist groups, but I think these are in the minority right now, and they have in fact failed to organize themselves into a coherent political movement. While we all hear, especially in the popular Serbian media, but also in some Western newspapers, about the radicalization of the ethnic Albanians, I think this is premature. I also think it is premature to speak of the danger of radicals taking over the Albanian movement. I believe that Rugova enjoys a popular mandate. Elections were held back in 1992, so he does have legitimacy. Also, what is very important in this respect is that Rugova is recognized by the international community as the legitimate representative of the ethnic Albanians. Having said all this, one has to realize that the Albanian movement for self-determination in Kosova is still in its mobilization stage; we are just seeing the beginning of it. And while there are no open conflicts between the principal actors within the Albanian movement, there is internal dissension. As in the case of political parties in Albania, the ethnic Albanian individual parties are also going through a process of fragmentation. There have been splits within the Democratic League, the Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party, but I think this is natural as is the tendency among some people to exaggerate these splits. The Albanian movement was most active in 1989-91, a period characterized by euphoria. There were massive demonstrations where up to half a million Albanians participated. In fact, during this period most Albanians believed that the day of liberation from Serbia was at hand. There was a meeting of the Albanian deputies in Ka_anik, a referendum later in 1991, and the Republic of Kosova was established, or proclaimed, but those hopes were short-lived. The international community did not support Kosova's separation from Serbia, and even Albania provided only rhetorical support. As a result of internal factors and the balance of power, which was not in favor of the Albanians, Rugova and his Democratic League have failed to assume the responsibilities of a government and of an administration.

Rugova has been the driving force for the last three or four years of the Kosovar struggle, and until very recently his leadership did not come under serious scrutiny. In fact, even his opponents defend the movement, and groups are willing to cut Rugova a bit of slack, mainly because of the extraordinary circumstances under which he is forced to operate. But Rugova now faces growing opposition to his leadership from other emerging political forces, but perhaps even more importantly from broad segments of the Albanian population, and this is something that we need to pay much closer attention to. Rugova's failure to convene the parliament has really kept other political forces outside the decision-making process. The program of non-violent resistance has come under increasing attack, with Rugova often the focus of criticism from those who once pinned their hopes on him. Many critics say that the general situation in Kosova today is much worse than it was back in 1990, when Serbia suspended Kosova's autonomy. Some have been quite vocal in their criticism of Rugova's leadership, and here we can mention Rexhep Qosja. Some claim that the Albanian movement seems to be losing its momentum. For more than two years there has been no resistance to Serbia's ever-increasing repression. The University of Kosova was closed down, the Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Albanian Studies. Adem Demaçi, a human rights activist who served nearly thirty years in prison, organized hunger strike. He was very popular in Kosova, but there was no popular support for his hunger strike, which was taken as a very bad signal by many Kosovars. Not even 200 people gathered in Priötina to offer their support to Demaçi. And that was more or less the last open, organized resistance that was offered to Serbia, which is under no significant pressure from the Albanians to change its behavior. The unarmed Albanian masses find themselves essentially at Serbia's mercy and most of the people in Kosova blame Rugova personally for this sad state of affairs.

If I were to sum up the criticism against Rugova, I think most of his critics would like to see his leadership and that of Bukoshi become more accountable. They would like to see institutions set up, especially the parliament, because as I said earlier, the failure to convene parliament has excluded other forces from the decision-making process. There has also been pressure on Rugova to ensure that professional competence is the primary criterion in the nomination of officials. However, nobody is calling on Rugova for armed resistance, merely a little more active, organized resistance against the Serbs. And finally, there is more and more talk of the need to coordinate a plan on the possibility of holding negotiations with Serbia in the future. Rugova's inability or unwillingness to heed these demands is now likely to exacerbate the dissent among mainstream Albanians. In addition to facing criticism from opposition forces, Rugova has, in the last year or so, also encountered increasing grumbling within the Democratic League's leadership and also at the grass-roots level.

In my view, the greatest challenge to Rugova might be the growing dissatisfaction among mainstream Albanians, rather than from the often more publicized opposition by radicals who, I believe, still remain in the minority. Rugova's reaction thus far suggests a strategy of paying lip-service to their demands, while at the same time resisting taking any measures that would effectively reduce the Democratic League's monopoly on the decision-making level. At the same time he has continued to stress the importance of preserving and consolidating national unity and has called for more cohesion to stand up to the Serbs. In most of his speeches, he has said that this is a time for unity, not disunity. At the same time he has continued to stress that no actions should be taken to provoke the Serbs, which could cause the Albanians to descend into the violence that has consumed Bosnia. Meanwhile, he has reassured his opponents that he will not back off from the main demand - independence from Serbia. The stalemate with Serbia and continued repression will likely heighten the perception among many Albanians that the Rugova leadership is incapable of defending their interests. All of the above could eventually lead to the replacement of the current, rather moderate, Albanian leadership.

In the long-term, if things continue the way they are, it is likely that we will see a replacement of the current moderate leadership. There are two possible scenarios. First, a more radical wing could over, which would see no way out except by armed struggle; the other option would be a group of people emerging who would be willing to make a deal with Serbia and therefore more or less give up on the demand of self-determination and unification with Albania. Prospects for a peaceful compromise seem rather bleak. Domestic concerns in both Priötina and in Belgrade diminish prospects for any solution in the very near future. Milosevic, as you all know, has staked his reputation on reinforcing Serbian control over Kosova. Rugova has expressed a determination to persist with his peaceful approach, but at the same time he has said that he is equally determined to pursue Kosova's independence. Given these positions, it is going to be very difficult for the two of them to come to an agreement. I believe that armed conflict seems highly probable in the long run.

Where do we go from here? Where is Kosova going to be six months from now? A year from now? I think one possibility is the continuation of the status quo. For Serbia, Kosova right now does not present, in my view, a deep crisis that requires a military solution. From the Serbian point of view the current strategy of repression that they have been applying in Kosova is working, there is no question about it. Kosova has in large part been pacified. And there is increasing emigration of Albanians from the region. This is a safety valve. Most of those people who are emigrating are young men. Western warnings are something that Serbia probably takes very seriously, but in view of what we have seen in Bosnia, even that is very questionable. The Albanians right now are unprepared for an armed struggle. The majority of their leaders seem to be convinced that a national uprising would be tantamount to national suicide. We are, therefore, likely to see a continuation of the current situation - a continuing to deterioration of the Albanian position. But this cannot go on forever.

Another possible scenario would be ethnic cleansing and/or partition, wherein the Serbian leaders come to a decision that this is the time to solve this problem once and for all. They move in, expel hundreds of thousands of Kosovars, and then decide to give a small part of the region to Albania. How can one talk about partition of a region which is dominated - 90% - by one ethnic group? Were it to happen, this would be a fourth partition of the Albanians.

Another possibility would be some sort of a special status or autonomy, but this has been rejected by both the Serbs and the Albanians. This is an option that is being put by the international community, I suppose, because there does not seem to be another option as far as the international community is concerned. International guarantees could serve as a temporary solution, but I am not sure that Rugova can really accept something like this, given his public pronouncements.

As another option, Rugova has suggested a UN protectorate, but that seems to be more or less out of the question because Rugova has been insisting on an independent neutral state. Under this scheme, Kosova would be demilitarized and have close links with both Albania and Serbia. The Serbian presence in the region would be guaranteed internationally. The question here would be the viability of such a state.

Some have suggested a republic within the Yugoslav Federation. Now you have a federation of two states, or two republics, Montenegro and Serbia. I do not see how the Serbs would accept this since they refused to give the Albanians a republic when six republics existed.

More recently Rugova has called for a confederation with Albania. This brings me to the last possible scenario - unification with Albania. In my opinion this is the most likely long-term scenario. As I see it, this is a long-term scenario because Serbian rule is untenable. What the Albanians have to worry about here is the reaction of other Balkan states in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, meaning Greece and Macedonia, which would be hostile to such a development.

Gazmend Pula

Kosova Helsinki Committee (Priötina)

The collapse of the former East European communist regimes that we have witnessed over the last several years, and in particular the ongoing conflicts and bloody war in the former Yugoslavia, seem to vividly indicate that ethnicity, that is nationality, is one of the most enduring and meaningful categories of contemporary societies. This is particularly apparent in the case of regimes that were multinational compositions, such as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, which were built substantially on imperial premises. These regimes thoroughly and systematically suppressed ethnicity, and when I say this, I have in mind of course primarily Albanians in Yugoslavia, simply because Albanians were the weaker ethnic constituent in that complex federation. These intricate national issues have played out on the basis of balance of power. Given this and the lack conflict-resolution mechanisms in the region, future war and territorial shifts seem inevitable.

Of course, within this framework the issue of Kosova and Albanians within the former Yugoslavia, which has served as an initiator and a strong generator of the current Yugoslav crisis, contains a substantial potential for conflict and consequently deserves much more attention by the international community. And in this respect, when I say "international community," I mean primarily the U.S. and the European Union, although the latter has proved to be politically impotent in terms of imposing solutions. And this is why the Kosova Albanians place such a high emphasis on the alliance that Albania should have with the U.S. rather than with the European Union, because for the Albanian national issue, which is very delicate and dangerous, you need a partner that can deliver not only promises and words and commitments. And that is why in Kosova the perception of the socialist opposition in Albania that favors ties with the European Union rather than with the U.S. is not seen in a very favorable light and consequently has not received much supported.

The overall crisis in Kosova stems from the inferior constitutional-political-national status of Kosova and its overwhelmingly Albanian population. This inferior status imposed on Albania by Serbia is aimed, and has largely succeeded, in depriving Albanians of the most elementary political, economic, civil, and human rights. Albanians have been reduced to second-rate citizens subjugated to a genuine Serbian colonial oppression. It has basically taken the form of an ethnically-based apartheid, which is exercised by the Serbian minority over the Albanian population in Kosova. Of course, there are numerous manifestations of this colonial oppression of Albanians by Serbs. You might be familiar with our near-total interethnic separation, domination by the Serbs of all institutions, in all walks of life. The Serbian regime has no political backing, because Albanians have given carte-blanche support to the Albanian political movement led by Dr. Rugova.

The price has been rather heavy. No open conflict has broken out yet, but all vital segments of Albanian life have been hampered by the Serbian oppression. This intolerable situation cannot be sustained for much longer unless political action is taken to reestablish the normal functioning of institutions. This would lead to the consideration of all possible democratic options, including the exercise of the right to self-determination for Albanians in Kosova.

Several facts are relevant to the issue. The population of Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, which lives in a territorially compact area of the Balkans, comes to just about one half of the entire Albanian nation. In the neighboring states of Albania and the former Yugoslavia, the proportion of Albanians is about 1:1, which makes Albanians a clear-cut case of a divided nation. You may remember in this context that West Germans and East Germans had been divided up to their unification several years ago in a proportion of 3:1. In the case of Albanians, the proportion is much higher. It is basically a nation divided in half. Of course, there are over two million Albanians in Kosova, and in this remaining rump entity which is called Yugoslavia, they now comprise over 25% of the population. In Kosova itself, they constitute a majority of over 90%. For purposes of comparison, it might be worthwhile to note that the Serbs in Croatia, who comprise just about 10% of its population, now control over 30% of Croatian territory, and they are supported not only in principle but by force of arms by Belgrade, with the claim that they inhabit Serbian ethnic territory. Of course, this is just an attempt to justify the take-over of Krajina by the Serbs. Besides the Albanians in Kosova, an estimated 800,000 Albanians are believed to live in the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, comprising about 40% of its population. Macedonian authorities acknowledge an estimated Albanian population of about half a million, or about 25% of Macedonia's total population. It is important to note that with the birthrate of Albanians in Yugoslavia at 2.9% annually, which is greater even than in Albania proper, Albanians in the former Yugoslavia are projected in about 20 years time to increase in number to close to 5 million, which would stabilize their number somewhere in the vicinity of 8-9 million people, a figure comparable to the number of Serbs there. A hypothetical conflict, if unresolved, would definitely be much more destructive and could have very great consequences for the region.

That explains the urgency for its solution and an international response to this matter, which so far has been lacking due to the international concerns for not allowing the conflict to spread, while in the meantime sacrificing the short-term political aspirations of Albanians for independence. Given Albanian public opinion, political actors there generally see the solution of the Kosova problem in terms of the right of Albanian Kosovars to self-determination, which has in recent years become a leading and guiding principle of international law and basic human rights, both individual and collective. We can see by the sheer increase of the number of member states of the United Nations, or by the increased number of states in Europe that this principle is being implemented. The CSCE formerly had about 35 states before the collapse of communism, but the number has increased to about 48 or 50. The emergence of all the new states has been principally based on ethnic grounds, the most stable and enduring category on which states are being erected. The principle has been formalized in several international documents, one of which I would like to cite. The quotation is from one of the two international covenants on human rights of 1966. "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status." The other, article 3, says that "The states and parties to the present covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing or trust territories shall respect that right in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations charter."

What makes an Albanian people? There are various definitions and various criteria. I will mention just a few, based on a UNESCO report dated 1990, which defines people according to the following criteria: a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic identity, religious and ideological affinity, territorial ties, and common economic life. All of these features can be found in the Albanian nation. There can hardly be any reason to deny Albanians the status of a people rather than the status of a minority, which is tacitly and in a very compromised way being accepted even by the international community, in order to avoid the responsibilities for a just resolution of a historical issue that has been the cause of major problems in the Balkans.

I will not go into further theoretical details, but I will say that the Albanian people as such are entitled to the right of self-determination. Of course the model of the right to self-determination would remain to be decided within an international framework, keeping in mind the geopolitical position of the Albanian population in Kosova, which borders of course on Albania. Naturally, the will of the respective states is a factor, and when I say this I mean the will of Albania and the will of Serbia, which are opposed to each other. Their conflict must be resolved by strong binding mechanisms of the international community, which so far have not proven to be very successful. It should be recognized that if a nationality is capable of expressing its own political will, and Albanians have undoubtedly done so, and finds itself in a position of inferiority, it can legitimately claim its right to self-determination. But it should be careful to try to implement its right in ways that are least dangerous. The actual realization of this right largely depends on extralegal factors, primarily political. Of course, there is no legal basis for the right to self-determination; it is basically resolved by the involved parties and the balance of power. And in such cases, international law unfortunately provides only a very general and unreliable framework for the realization of claims.

It is important to note that international law is being implemented by the Albanian political movement, e.g., making immediate and explicit reference to the international law of human rights, seeking to place itself under the international authority of the U.N. or an appropriate regional institution to avoid any use of violence. Moreover, the use of proper instruments such as democracy, negotiations, referenda, elections, etc., respect for all human rights (in particular the rights of minorities), maintaining the threat of potential military action without resorting to arms, and similar practices which have characterized the Albanian political movement.

I will conclude by referring to some of the modalities for the implementation of self-determination by Albanians in a peaceful way. It is important to stress that regardless of the unfavorable balance of power, Albanians have an unshaken commitment to self-determination, which should be seen as an unavoidable development in their quest for obtaining their political and national rights. But within this framework Albanians leave open the possibility for discussion of various kinds of arrangements which would remain in such a case in Kosova. This pertains to the Serbs as well, including allowing for Serbian enclaves or Serbian monuments and monasteries to be administered by Serbs themselves. Of course, they would agree to soften the relationship and even open the borders of Kosova with Serbia as well as with Albania. As you know, the Kosovars have been demanding a transient international administration that would provide for the normalization of life until it brings about conditions for a political expression of the will of the people of Kosova. The only other alternatives to this approach, of course, would be the Chechen model for Kosova, which, as we have seen, has not proven very successful, neither for the Chechen people nor for the international community. There is also the Northern Ireland model for the realization of Albanian aspirations, which of course is another unfortunate approach which would leave open the possibility, as I mentioned, of the partition of Kosova as imposed by Serbia. That would be a very tragic development and would involve ethnic cleansing. And it could endanger stability by bringing about an open conflict in the region.

The other remaining option is for the international community to insist on the inclusion of Kosova within a new internationally sponsored conference on the former Yugoslavia, which has been demanded by the European Union. The general principles adopted at such a conference would be applied to Kosova as well. I think that is the only reasonable solution that the international community should insist on at this time; otherwise, we might see an explosion like the one in Bosnia. However, unlike Bosnia, this explosion would not be contained but definitely spread and involve the whole region, because Albania is not encircled by Croatia and Serbia, but has access to a wide and open sea and allies in the region. That would mean a new Balkan conflagration.

Isa Zymberi

Kosova Information Center (London)

Kosova represents a region where the movement to democracy began earlier than in many Eastern European countries. The demand of the Kosova Albanians in 1981 for full republican status within the Yugoslav federation, raised through widespread demonstrations, was clearly a strong voice heralding change: the movement towards democracy. Such voices at that time could only be heard in Poland. The voice of the people of Kosova was then brutally silenced by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav police and army. This marked the beginning of a painful transition period, though not yet as painful as for some other people of former Yugoslavia. As you probably know, the Kosova Albanians were only asking to become one among equals. What was the status of Kosova then and why the need for the status of a republic?

In everything but name Kosova was a republic. In many aspects, as a federal unit Kosova even exceeded the rights enjoyed by units of other federations. But Kosova had a dual status; that is, although it was a federal unit with equal rights and obligations as other republics, formally it remained an integral part of Serbia, most probably due to the objections of Serbian nationalist forces. This relationship did not in fact suit Serbia, because Kosova could block decisions of the Republic of Serbia. This was also the justification that Serbian authorities used in the case of the first attacks directed against Kosova's autonomy. This type of status for Kosova was ideal as a transitional phase, and had Serbia and other Yugoslav entities found enough force and will to overcome what was merely a formality, the former Yugoslavia might have been spared the tragic events that were to follow.

Events in Kosova during the 1980s, and especially since Milosevic came to power, highlight the contribution, first of all of Serbia, but also of other former Yugoslav republics, to the disintegration of the country. This process virtually began in Kosova with the Serbian attempts to unilaterally revoke Kosova's autonomy. I still cannot understand the calculations of other former Yugoslav republics and the indifference of the international community at that time. We may have to wait another 30 years in order to find out the truth from the reports of Western diplomats based in Belgrade. However, I believe very little was needed then to save the country compared to what is needed now to simply establish peace in the region.

Kosova was sacrificed and conflict soon broke out, but not in Kosova as some expected. Albanians, through their political parties, first and foremost the LDK and its president, Dr. Rugova, had some hard decisions to make. The madness of Serbian nationalism was obvious - so was its readiness for an open conflict. The LDK had to find a way to avoid conflict and this they managed to do through a combination of patience, endurance and non-violent resistance, that is, by peaceful policy.

Non-violent resistance in the Balkans as a strategy may have surprised many people, including Albanians, who have always been described as quick-tempered and wild in their behavior. This strategy definitely confused the Serbian authorities. Personally, I am extremely hopeful that this peaceful, non-violent approach succeeds by being crowned with an independent Kosova. It is something new in the Balkans, and it could set a good example.

When I said Albanian political parties and the people of Kosova had difficult decisions to make, I meant that when conflict began they had to choose whether to join Serbia in its adventures, or go their own way. They chose the latter. Ignoring the presence of Serbian police and army, they began setting the foundation of an independent Kosova, first by organizing a referendum as an act of self-determination, which was and is vested in the people of Kosova, and then by organizing free, open multi-party elections, not clandestine or illegal ones, as some like to refer to them.

Let me now come to what may be considered as the main point of my presentation, which is why Kosova fulfills the conditions for independence, and how this can be achieved. The justifiability of an independent Kosova rests on the following arguments:

•Albanian territories in the former Yugoslavia were originally illegally annexed by way of occupation. Albanians never freely gave their consent to remain within any state of the Southern Slavs, an experimental state that has already failed twice to stand the test of time.

•Every Yugoslav government failed to safeguard the rights of the Albanians: their culture, and economic and political interests.

•Kosova, as a geographically identifiable region, has an identifiable population, an identifiable language, culture, and tradition, and now also has a democratically elected government.

•Kosova is a viable territory. As a sovereign state would equal or be greater than over 40 different existing sovereign states, both in terms of territory and population.

•As it is now, Kosova represents a serious threat to stability and peace. A democratic Kosova would serve as a factor for peace and stability.

•Albanians of Kosova have proved, both in the past and now, that they are capable of self-rule. All the Serbs have proved is that they cannot live together with non-Serbs, or not, at least, in equality.

•The demand for an independent Kosova is a reasonable compromise, when compared to the demand for the unification of all Albanians in former Yugoslavia with Albania. However, this would of course bring about other complications, especially with respect to the independence of Macedonia.

•We must remember that the former sovereign power has collapsed, that the country disintegrated through tragic events and amongst an uncivilized wave of Serbian acts of war and aggression.

Faced with a brutal and repressive Serbian regime, the leadership of Kosova has acted with restraint and moderation. It has tried to get the attention of international organizations and institutions of democratic and Western countries, seeking dialogue and negotiation through mediation. Kosova welcomes whatever support comes from the international community and democratic Western countries, although the issue of Kosova is mainly dealt with as a human rights violation issue with the aim of restoring some kind of autonomy.

The support for autonomy is worrisome, but does not disturb the Kosova leadership much. It is seen as part of an inadequate approach of the international community to the Yugoslav crisis in general. Kosova's sovereignty is seen as a process. The Albanians of Kosova, despite their peaceful approach, are determined to achieve independence, but they are also determined to avoid bloodshed and conflict.

Finally, let me say that Albanians will inevitably move closer to one another, despite the differences due to imposed divisions.

Jonathan Moore

U.S. State Department

First let me start off by saying that my remarks are strictly personal. They are not meant to represent the views of the U.S. government or the State Department.

Kosova Albanians play a very important political role in the former Yugoslavia. We have already seen Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, to a greater or lesser extent, come to grief over their nationalist sentiments and goals, often by violent means and at great cost. Despite the removal of their political rights in 1989, the Kosova Albanians have shown their unity, strength, and intelligence by concentrating their efforts on non-violent resistance. In this way they are unique in the Balkans. The international community has recognized both the importance and the difficulty of pursuing such a policy in the face of Serb repression. For example, the United States has come to better understand, over the past few years, the singular merit of this approach. And though personified by Dr. Rugova as chairman of the LDK, I believe that the Kosova Albanians understand that there is no other path to the resolution of Kosova's problems other than that of non-violence. Clearly, they see the futility of opposing Serbian police and armed forces. But much more importantly, I believe they see their patience, resolve, and pledge of non-violence as a badge of honor and distinction, as indeed they should.

There are those who would try to force open violent conflict against the Serbs, thereby becoming victims of basic urges to fight. It is particularly worrisome that many of these forces are outside Kosova, and as a result their pragmatism is somewhat limited by being detached from the problem that the people of Kosova have to go through every day. The people of Kosova know better. They know that non-violence is the true path, and their cause is not helped by those who would sacrifice them for political gain or principle. The idea of Kosova as a sovereign state admittedly is a very attractive one to the region's population. They voted for it in a democratic election a few years ago. In a political vacuum, independence would be all the more attractive. But there are political realities with which the Kosova Albanians must contend. As Elez Biberaj noted, the international community sees Kosova as part of Serbia and does not support Kosovar independence. It is important to note that despite continued Serb repression over the years, this policy and approach has not changed. There is almost universal support, however, for the return of autonomous rights. There is absolutely no excuse for Albanians in Kosova being denied employment, education and medical care, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture, harassment, and death at the hands of Serbs. Again, however, I would note that the restoration of these basic rights and freedoms does not require independence. Nor is it necessarily guaranteed by independence. Of equal importance is the restoration of the belief that such rights would be protected in an autonomous Kosova. Clearly, this will take the involvement and assistance of the international community. Non-political humanitarian assistance programs, many of which are now in place, do not touch the lives of all Kosovars, but are a part of the vital framework for a later, more comprehensive involvement on the behalf of the international community. Hopefully such efforts will grow in scope and in funding and can offer opportunities for greater social understanding among all of the people in Kosova. When possible, the OSCE, U.N., European Union, and other multinational organizations will hopefully step in to further roles.

Are there signs of hope? Very few. But there are some positive aspects which we cannot ignore. First and foremost is the continued existence and unity of the LDK. Not just a movement of politicians as we have seen elsewhere in the Balkans too many times, it provides many basic services through parallel institutions, otherwise denied to Kosovar Albanians. Most of their work in this sphere is not obstructed by the Serbs. Dr. Rugova and others in the LDK presidency travel in and out of Kosova and are allowed to keep offices there. In itself this is no consolation to a repressed population. However, it is of critical importance. If they so chose, the Serbs could have easily shut down the LDK, arresting and exiling its leadership. Whether for good or bad reasons, Belgrade has not done this. I have no doubt that should they do so, the response of the international community would be swift. It would be pedantic and insulting for us to expect the Kosova Albanians' patience to be infinite; it is not. But the Albanian community has continually made the right and honorable choice by making non-violence essential. This is not only the approach which sets Kosova apart from the other Balkan crises; it is this approach, I believe, which will lead to a Kosova characterized by exemplary political rights. The people of Kosova deserve no less.

QUESTIONS

Question: Does Kosova need the West? Under what circumstances do Kosova's interests and the West's interests coincide? The second question is related to the first one. Mr. Moore said two things that are a little contradictory. The first is that Kosova is choosing the right path with non-resistance. And then he also said that there is little hope that that path will take Kosova anywhere. My question is that if there is little hope and non-resistance is not leading anywhere, why is that the right path?

Biberaj: I think any self-determination movement needs international recognition, international support, so the short answer to your question is yes, Kosova does need the West.

Moore: As far as the aspect of there being little hope, I apologize that my remarks were ambiguous in some way. I think non-violence is the best path, and as far as independence being the primary goal, that is where there is significantly less hope. What non-violence will lead to, and, again, patience cannot be infinite, is hard to say.

I have been given a second question here stating "Albania is the only country in Europe completely surrounded by a population that shares its ethnic identity. Please comment." This session focuses particularly on the situation in Kosova, to step back and look in a broader context, I would have to say that it is true that the case of the Serbian nation, which is spread throughout the former Yugoslavia, the international community has made a clear decision that that nation will not be in a position to unify itself. I recognize that the individual arguments and histories are extremely different, the conduct of the Serb authorities throughout the former Yugoslavia has been reprehensible, but from the perspective of the international community, and I will not try to argue the merits of this perspective, these situations are very similar. It is going to be extremely difficult for the international community, on the one hand, to conceive of the unification of a people and, on the other hand, to keep a people separate. My personal view is that if the circumstances are such that Kosova could be separate from Serbia or the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it would ultimately choose the path of independence. We have seen elsewhere in Central Europe that Moldova, which was part of Romania before 1940, has for a variety of reasons in a separate political development chosen to take a second direction. Thus from the perspective of the international community, I do not think there can be support for the unification of all Albanian people in one country.

Question : Does the U.S. government have any interests in Albania?

Moore: Again, these are my personal remarks, but I would say that the United States has, and that is precisely why President Bush in the previous administration, President Clinton in this administration, have stressed that in the event of Serb-incited violence the United States would be prepared to respond. I like using the metaphor that we have drawn a line in the sand in that respect and we are very firmly committed to full rights for the people of Kosova, and I think we have shown that, perhaps not in the way that all people would like us to show that, but we will continue to follow that issue very closely. Kosova has lots of friends on Capitol Hill with whom we work very closely, and will continue to do so.

Question: Can the right to self-determination be applied to the Albanian minorities in the former Yugoslavia?

Zymberi: First, Albanians are not a minority in former Yugoslavia. They are a divided people and the use of the term "minority" can cause all sorts of problems. I can only tell you that I have been after a definition of that word for years, and even asked some U.N. officials - nobody knows the definition of a minority. However, linguistically "minority" implies something smaller, Albanians are not smaller either in terms of numbers of Albanians in Kosova or in terms of the number of different peoples in former Yugoslavia. In fact, in terms of numbers they came in third after Serbs and Croats. Their language came second after Serbo-Croatian, now Serbian and Croatian.

The circumstances in former Yugoslavia are such that the country has disintegrated, it is not there anymore, and no Serbian regime of any kind can ever force the Albanians to remain within Serbia against their will. And we also expect that regimes such as Milosevic's are not permanent.

Biberaj: I think the issue is not whether the Albanians have the right of self-determination or not. I think that is more or less a given. The issue is how do you achieve that self-determination, given Serbia's position and the balance of forces in the Balkans. The Serbian argument, at least after World War II, was that the Albanians became part of Serbia by exercising their right to self-determination. They go back to the 1945 assembly of which Dr. Repishti has written quite a lot, and the question is, how can you achieve it given Serbia's position? It is not really the issue of whether you have that right or not as a nation of two million. And if you take into account the Albanians in Montenegro and in Macedonia, of course they should have the right to self-determination. In a federation such as the former Yugoslavia, how can that right be denied to the ethnic Albanians, given their numbers, when the Macedonians, who are less numerous than the Albanians, or the Montenegrins had that right.

Moore: I would say that self-determination falls in the same category as another word that was used today, namely, "confederation," which means many things to many people. The difficulty is that if every ethnic group within a certain geographical area had the right to be an independent country, again - to use a global term - the international community would be very upset. In this particular context, is there a right to self-determination, to autonomy, to control of their own fate - I do not think anyone on this panel would disagree with that.

Question: What are the chances for violence in Kosova?

Pula: There might be various tactical compromises, some aspirations and objectives may be given up at certain points, but one thing is sure and that is that the people of Kosova have matured and there is no reason for them to be run by another state, by another people. And it is just a matter of technique, of implementation, of rationality - how are you going to let people be their own, so to say, lords. There is no reason in the world why half of the Albanian people should be run by the Serbian state, by the Serbian people. And of course compromises will have to be made, but in the long run it will have to be people running and administering themselves, not being run and being administered by other people.

Moore: Again, speaking very personally, this is obviously an extremely sensitive issue. For example, I do not think the United States is in a position or could be in a position to prevent a war from happening in Kosova or would necessarily be able to stop that war once it had begun. But the interest that I feel the people of the United States have in preventing the conditions in Kosova from coming to a conflict is very great. Having been in Belgrade and Bosnia, working on aspects of the rest of that crisis, I also recognize that there are limitations to what even the most interested country can do in terms of ending a conflict or bringing justice, and I am afraid I cannot offer you much encouragement.

Biberaj: But a commitment has been made: the Secretary of State of the United States appeared before Congress and he said "We are committed." My only problem is that I am not sure that we really know what would trigger a U.S. response. Milosevic can go on pursuing this policy for several more months or years, and it is possible that he may get the same result that he would have gotten had he gone to war.

Question: How would the Albanians feel about the possibility of U.N. troops being sent to Kosova?

Pula: There is no great dilemma about how Albanians feel about it, they have called for installation of U.N. peace-keeping and other international forces, for the deployment of NATO troops in Kosova. Of course, they would have to have permission from the authorities in Kosova. Given that Kosova is occupied by Serbian police and military forces, the Serbs are not likely at this time to be ready to accept such an offer and they have stated vehemently that they would consider such a deployment an act of aggression, which could trigger a conflict. We believe that there will be an evolution in this respect as well, and that the international community will be able to develop mechanisms to impose the presence of international forces, whether it be in a monitoring mission, a peace-keeping mission or, let us hope that there will not be a necessity for this, a peace making mission, in Kosova. The problem will be resolved politically based on the democratically expressed will of the people there. No doubt about it, Albanians have called for them and are very glad that U.N. forces are in Macedonia and are looking forward to a time when a peaceful solution will be achieved in Bosnia and the deployment of U.N., U.S. and NATO forces will come still closer in the region and will practically encircle Kosova as well.