CIAO: The Current State of Democracy in Albania

I. The Current State of Democracy in Albania

Summer, 1996

Paula Dobriansky

Senior International Affairs and Trade Advisor

Hutton & Williams

Thank you and good morning. If I may, I'd like to first congratulate the organizing committee for putting this conference together. I know that over a year ago I had a conference with Janet Reineck, who was the catalyst for today's gathering. It was a good idea then and it's an excellent idea now. It's a critical time to be looking at the situation of Albanians in Europe. As you know our panel this morning will take a close look at the current state of democracy in Albania. I cannot help but recall that it was only a few years ago when Albanians in Albania were subjected to very severe repression by a totalitarian regime, and endured hardships that permeated every aspect of society. Looking at the situation today in that context, I think we need to be reminded of how dramatic the political and economic evolution has been.

We have some outstanding panelists this morning. Let me begin by introducing Nicholas Pano, who is the associate dean, as well as a professor of history, at the College of Arts and Sciences at Western Illinois University. Professor Pano will set the tone for this morning's discussion by looking at Albania and Albania's transition, political and economic, over the past five years, and in particular he will highlight some of the concerns and challenges which Albania must tackle in the time ahead in its transition. Our second speaker will be Agim Nesho, who is the director of the Albanian Foundation for European Affairs, a lawyer, who will continue the discussion from an Albanian perspective. Thirdly, we will have Kathleen Imholz, a lawyer and frequent visitor to Albania who has been a long-time activist in Albanian affairs. Kathleen in particular has been very engaged in matters concerning legal procedures and processes in Albania.

Nicholas Pano

Western Illinois University

Thank you. It is a pleasure to be with you this morning to introduce this session, which is of course a very timely one insofar as the history of Albania is concerned. The year 1995 marks the fifth year of the transition of Albania from the communist system to an evolving post-communist democracy. It is very easy to speculate and to assert that Albania indeed has made a successful transition. But one of the things I think we need to be very sensitive to is the fact that from the beginning of this process there have been significant factors and forces at play within Albania that could undermine the prospects for the success of this very significant movement of the 1990s.

I first of all want to just mention a few of the high points of the transition period, beginning in 1990 with the decree of President Ramiz Alia establishing a multi-party system, which then culminated in the elections of March 1991. That period was characterized by a great deal of violence and uncertainty in Albania. The election itself, on the whole, was a fair election insofar as procedures were concerned, but by no means was it an election that was played out on what I would call a level playing field. The decision to establish a multi-party political system came rather rapidly, and given the tremendous advantages in resources which the entrenched Party of Labor in Albania enjoyed, it was not a surprise that the communists won that first election. What is significant in this transitional process, however, is that once the election was over the democratic forces in Albania never fully recognized the results.

One of its by-products was the great general strike that took place in May 1991. The strike resulted basically from two important factors. First, at the very end of the election campaign, when the voting results were being tabulated, four young Democratic Party workers were murdered in the city of Shkodër. Certain elements of the Democratic Party used these murders as an excuse to contest the election results. This is certainly one factor which led to the general strike. The second factor was that there was a gale of unrest in the country due to the economic chaos. Workers wanted an amelioration of their situation and as a result they too were willing to participate in the demonstration against the government for economic as well as sub rosa political reasons. This incident demonstrated that many Albanians were still alienated from the political system; they wanted a federal change, and if that change could not be effected legally, they would use the device of the strike to bring about changes in the political system. The result of this was the establishment of a government of national stability, which remained in power from June to December 1991.

This is a very interesting time in Albanian history. There is a tendency in what there is of Albanian historiography today, which is mainly partisan journalism, to dismiss this period as one of chaos and inefficiency, and one that is merely the prelude to the coming to power of the democrats in the 1992 elections. But one of the things that I find as I go back and revisit this period is that it does need to be reappraised. Indeed, it was a period of chaos, of lawlessness, of mass unemployment. Albania essentially became an orphan of Europe, and the Albanians subsisted through the largess of Italy, the countries of the European Union, and the United States. But at the same time some fundamental infrastructure was being built. Reform legislation was passed, such as the creation of the national privatization agency. The foreign investment agency was created at this time and banking and currency reforms were passed, resulting in the pegging of the Albanian lek to the ECU, the European Currency Unit. It was at this juncture that the national information service replaced the Sigurimi and when the government began to move against the old ruling elite with the corruption trials. It is also interesting to note that, in addition to these developments that are often overlooked and not given sufficient weight in assessing the role of the government of national stability, an interesting development was taking place in the ranks of the Democratic Party. It is during this period for example, in September 1991, that the national conference of the Democratic Party was held. Ultimately this was the triumph of Sali Berisha. He was elected chair by a vote of 449 to 98. But again what is interesting when one reads the accounts of this movement and when one interviews individuals who had knowledge of this development, is the foreshadowing of the problems that were to develop in the Democratic Party revolving around the person of Sali Berisha and his ruling style.

Another very interesting development at this time was the decision made by the Democratic Party to abandon the government of stability. It was essentially a power play on the part of the Democrats. Albania was experiencing some very serious problems, the most important of which were a series of riots and demonstrations that broke out in late November and early December, when rumors began to spread throughout the country that there were only four days of food supplies left in Albania. And it was at this point, when the criticism of the democratic government was mounting, that Sali Berisha made the very important political decision to disassociate the Democrats from the coalition, thereby setting the stage for new elections that would take place in March 1992.

The March 1992 elections were of course an important and definitive victory for the Democratic Party, and again when one reviews the developments of this period, it is a tremendous victory all around. Not only was the nation more behind the leaders than it had ever been, but there was a great deal of hope and optimism. This was the period when Sali Berisha talked about Albania moving from the darkness, from the evening of communism to the morning of democracy. And when one looks at Berisha's performance during these first few months, this was, in many respects, probably the high point of his regime. Following the activities of Berisha very closely, one can see that he hit the ground running. Less than a month after his election as president, he went to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, where on the fifth of May he delivered a very impressive address. He essentially outlined the gains that had taken place in Albania, made a plea for assistance from Europe, and also spoke eloquently about the rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosova and Macedonia. It is at this time that he had a meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis where a lot of the problems between Albania and Greece seem to have been papered over. In June he visited Washington, from which he returned with a $60 million aid package to supplement $35 million that had been granted to Albania by the United States following his election in April. This is probably the high point of Sali Berisha, both at home and abroad. His acceptance was probably wider at this time than it would be for a long time in his career.

But in 1992, the year of Berisha's triumph, some setbacks began to emerge which were going to have long-lasting implications and which may in the future affect his ability to continue his program for Albania. Again, I will mention just a few of these. Some of these are well-known to those familiar with Albanian affairs, such as the socialist defeat in the local elections. In July 1992 a journalist from the editorial staff of the newspaper Rilindia Demokratike defected, protesting that this newspaper had fallen from its lofty aspirations to become like the other party newspapers in Albania. And there was the defection of members of the Democratic Party, several of whom were expelled from the party, and the formation of the Democratic Alliance in August of 1992.

One of the things that came to be of great concern to the regime was the struggle between the government and the judicial system. One of the first manifestations of this occurred in September 1992 when the Albanian parliament dismissed Attorney General Maxim Haxhia, who is present at the conference. Then we had the beginning of a major problem -- church-state relations, i.e., the issue of Archbishop Yannoulatos as head of the Orthodox Church. All of these things came to a head in 1992.

Let me make just a few general comments so I can address some of the issues. Despite these problems, we do have significant cause for optimism, including the Gallup U.K. poll that was conducted for the European Commission in November 1992. The poll essentially found that despite these problems appearing on the surface, 77% of the Albanians thought that the country was moving in the right direction; 84% supported the new political system; 71% continued to expect economic improvement, and in general there was a high degree of optimism. There was pessimism in regard to the press and also some of the political figures themselves.

Now let me talk about what I regard as some of the major issues confronting the country today and affecting the prospects for democracy. The first issue that I regard as being one of absolute significance is the issue of the constitution. Albania has been grappling with this problem since 1991 and must come up with a constitution. It is ruled by the ordinance of major constitutional provisions but, especially since the defeat of the new constitution in the November 1994 referendum, it is absolutely essential that the issue be resolved. One of the things that I find painful as I read the Albanian press is the maneuvering that is now taking place among the various parties. On the one hand, the Socialists say that the constitutional revision committee must be comprised on a proportion based on the referendum results, while the Democrats argue that it should be based on representation in parliament, and other groups hold different opinions on the matter. Clearly the constitution must be settled. Some parties, such as the Socialists, seem to be using it as a political issue, but I think the time has come for all parties to rally together to establish a constitution, and have it adopted by referendum, since that seems to be the least objectionable way of handling it.

The second issue that concerns me are the ethno-political issues that divide the country. And those, of course, relate to the treatment of the Greek minority and the issue of the leadership of the Orthodox Church. We have the Kosova question and Macedonia. These questions can have profound implications, should they get out of hand, for domestic policies in Albania.

The third factor that troubles me is the growing fragmentation within the political parties. I have mentioned the first breakup of the Democratic Party. Subsequently when Petrit Kalakula was ousted as minister of agriculture, he formed another group, now known as the Democratic Party of the Right. There are also several ex-Democrats in the Albanian parliament who sit now as independent members. Since the end of the constitutional referendum in November, the Social Democratic Party has split, and there is now a Social Democratic Party and a Social Democratic Union. There are strains as well within the ranks of the Socialist Party, and the marginalized Republican Party has called now for talks to explore a possible coalition among the various parties of the right. Thus we have a great deal of flux within the political parties, and if this trend continues we could have an extreme multiparty system with the potential to lead to political deadlock.

Economic issues are obviously very important, but I will defer discussion on those. There is also the matter of the formerly politically prosecuted citizens of Albania, who have become a political force and many of whom have been attracted to the right-wing political movements within Albania. Can they be successfully integrated into Albanian society without creating major disruptions? It may be that the Albanians will need to borrow something from the American experience, for example, programs developed after World War II for veterans, as well as the concept of veterans' preference on civil-service examinations.

There is also the very important issue of the free press within Albania. Charting out the appropriate relationships between the government and the pres, and along with this the privatization of the communications media, has been a persistent concern.

Another important factor is going to be the revitalization of the Albanian educational system, and here we have to build in a strong component of civic education. And then finally I think we need to give a good deal of attention in this process of nation-building in Albania to the creation of more independent civic organizations in the country.

As far as I'm concerned, it appears that 1995 will be a critical year for democracy within Albania. A heavy burden of responsibility for the successful transition to a higher stage of democracy will fall upon Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party. He must clean house, he must combat corruption, he must continue his efforts to secure a formula for drafting a constitution, and he must continue to provide adequate leadership in the area of economic policy.

Agim Nesho

Institute on European Studies, Tirana

It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this conference, so well organized and attended by distinguished figures of academia and politics, to discuss our country's transition to a democratic system. While I do not claim that my presentation is the only view on this complicated issue, I hope that my contribution will serve to provide a better knowledge and understanding of the development of democracy in Albania.

It is quite clear that it was the anti-communist movement of 1991 that destroyed the long-standing totalitarian regime of Albania. It was a movement of Albanian students and intellectuals, with a very clear vision for the advancement of Albanian society - freedom and cultural space, as well as hatred of isolation and violence - that brought about the collapse of the old communist system. It was their vision and determination that made Albanian society experience this change of the system without giving way to political revenge that is, psychologically speaking, prevalent in the Balkan community, and even more so in Albania. Emerging as an anti-communist movement, it took over the responsibility of making a new society and its state, as well as coping with the challenges and problems of transition. What problems and phenomena have emerged, and is this an established framework for a completely democratic society? Discussing this is important in order to understand the causes and consequences of this transition toward a democratic society, its successes and failures. We must examine our desire to build something new, our "professional amateurism" and the struggle for power, so that one may realize and finally justify this process, which is giving birth to something very great, namely, democracy.

Let us begin with the democracy movement and its supporters. The democratic process in Albania started as a compromise between, on the one hand, the old political class, which was incapable of running the country and frightened by its historical responsibility for systematic crimes against society, and on the other hand, the people who wanted progress and development. Also involved in these discussions were those who suffered the half-century-long drama of isolation and human rights abuse. This hidden compromise between the potentially defeated forces and the would-be winners was the result of both internal and external factors, and was sealed by the upsetting events in Romania, which they were all watching on television at the time.

In my opinion, the following three issues should be mentioned as the main internal factors of change. First, the country's extreme political and economic isolation and the impossibility of a free exchange of people, culture, and ideas. Second, the prolonged hardship due to the basis of the communist political system, the so-called "class struggle." Third, the need for change and development. The following external factors should also be mentioned. First, the pressure of democratic forces in all the popular movements of Eastern Europe. Second, the reemergence of the national issue and the idea of the unification of Albania, which increased the pressure for changing the political system to provide for this opportunity. Third, the active role of the diaspora and Albanians abroad.

The great desire for change united the various social groups and individuals into a single movement including anti-communists, persecuted and suffering people, mercenaries, as well as intellectuals who wanted freedom and democratic space. It also embraced disgruntled communists and those neglected by the communists' plans. Not surprisingly, the movement was interlaced with different interests and therefore could not strike the system at its core nor, therefore, give a clear message of democracy. One of the initial leaders of the anti-communist opposition, Mr. Pashko, later said: "It should be stated that the rebellion of the crowds was directed more at corruption, vanity, and the importance of the leadership than at the system itself." In short, the anti-communist rebellion took the line of a rebellion against the individuals symbolizing communism. Removing the leadership complied with the spirit of rebellion to a certain extent and perhaps forced accord on the need to introduce a new system as soon as possible. The delay in carrying out� *6#�-�4��8�"�tml `*�� 8��P�� ;'�� -�-�0�LL�� p�p��j��U� �tkHTMLines.awkmaryrs[2035]: iconopen: open /mnt/vol5/Shared/.AppleDesktop/8/8BIM.icon: No such file or directoryes were made. For instance, objective conditions for a market economy were nurtured. Free initiative and privatization were established as the bases of the new system. Successful and important changes were also made in the field of legislation. Codes were adjusted to fit the new legal reality, and pluralistic principles were extended into the political, economic, and social life of the country. This included access to a free press. Economic reforms achieved considerable and promising results. However, it required great devotion and continuity to realize the final objective. It is precisely these reforms that will bring about the stability and sustainability of the new political system in Albania. Matters such as the recovery of the national economy, further privatization, and the settlement of the property issue are all of great importance.

Similar changes have also been made in the very important social realm, e.g. freedom of the individual, freedom of the press, and the establishment of social institutions. Regarding the latter, one can surely admit that the transition has caused pain, and has also made it difficult to formulate a clear vision for the future, due to the inheritance of social insurance elements from the old system. Likewise, the reform period has faced numerous problems. Among the most pressing phenomena accompanying the transition are the existence of massive political tension accompanying the reform process and the absence of a philosophy of commitment on the part of all political forces for building a new society. Partisanship cannot produce guarantees without professionalism and devotion to the future. A clan-dominated policy that hinders the march of democracy continues to prevail in Albanian political life. Consequently, the struggle to destroy all structures and institutions appeared to be a political war against certain individuals. The authorities displayed arrogance during the reforms and in the administration of the country.

This authoritarianism sometimes evolved into absurdity. A typical case is the substitution in the court system of 400 new judges, investigators, and prosecutors after they attended a six-month legal course. This demonstrated the strong influence that the state wanted to establish in relations between power on one side and the law on the other. A similar case is the way that the police has managed private property in the privatization commissions. Political background has been taken into consideration when returning property, thus compromising the right of ownership. Another factor is overt corruption, which in the Albanian environment worsens the atmosphere of a poor society, thereby severely impairing the image of transformation.

This entire process is also associated with an identity crisis for Albanian society itself, with a lack of ideas for internal development and a clear legal strategy both on the national issue and in foreign policy. Certainly such phenomena do not cast a shadow on all that has been achieved but suspicions arise about the ruling class and its ability to carry this process through to the end. This gives way to a situation, which William Faulkner characterized as follows: "The past is never dead. It is not even past."

As regards the continuing credibility of the Albanian democratic state, the problems that have arisen during the systemic changes are approximately the same as those experienced by the other ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe. One thing is quite clear--these processes are irreversible. The effort to accomplish the new goals and ideas, as well as the ability to review them as soon as possible, show to some extent the emancipation of the society itself. To realize this growth, Albania's fragile democracy must clarify its position on the following points: first, the independence of the judicial system; second, the observance of human rights; third, privatization and the scope of economic reforms; and lastly, regarding foreign policy, the creation of an Albanian state and stability in the region.

All of these points are dependent on political life as it now exists in Albania, which is characterized by tension and the struggle for power. The relationship between the ruling political party and the opposition is full of conflict. The two groups have excluded each other, violating at times even the most basic democratic ethics. In addition, the authoritarianism of the leadership and the top-down mentality of decision-making from the political parties themselves continue. Consequently, this political tension will lead to the breakdown of independent relations between authorities and interference with each others' powers.

Such interference is reflected in the following examples: the attack on the attorney general in 1992; the recent request to lift the immunity of the head of the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court); the substitution of lawyers on the constitutional commission with officials loyal to the party; and the political influence exerted on the judicial organs. The same situation is reflected in the observance of human rights. It is not enough to insist and compare one's activity to the standard of the totalitarian regime. Democracy implies special standards based on clear principles that are enshrined in international institutions. These absolutely require looking to the future and not back to the past. We must rely on the principle of justice and not on the mentality of particular events. Repeated abuses of human rights used as a pressure to justify the state's weakness demonstrate the lack of a civil and democratic vision in the leadership itself. The fact that the head of the Albanian opposition, Mr. Nano, is currently held in prison on weak accusations at a time when both domestic and international public opinion has called for his release is harmful and unjustifiable. The absence of ideas turns politics into a personal farce. Unleashing personal frustration with intrigues in this way, Albanian political life is being dominated by impending or postponed revenge. The same thing is being used to control and impose restrictions on the freedom of the press in Albania. The most notable case is the detention of the two journalists from the largest independent newspaper. All of these manifestations of the arrogance of state power reduce the authority and the credibility of the Albanian state and diminish the possibility of creating an acceptable standing in the European community. It is no accident that at a time when Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland are associated with the European Union, Albania is treated like Azerbaijan and the other states of the former Soviet Union.

Another aspect of Albanian state policy should be its role as a factor of stability in the region and the establishment of a clear, acceptable foreign policy alliance in order to better integrate Albanian society into Western civilization. Albania's cooperation with NATO, the EU, and the United States has been more successful, while the links established with neighboring countries and other eastern alliances have been vulnerable. Regarding the national issue, five different options have been offered in the last three years. In short, these problems require a greater participation and commitment of the democratic forces of the Albanian state. They also require the complete and continuous application of democratic principles which are indispensable for the performance of the system itself and a guarantee of support for the future.

In conclusion, I would like to make three final points. First, despite all the success achieved in the establishment of a democratic state in Albania, the ruling party has exhausted its mission. At this time, Albanian society needs a larger social group to further promote reforms, based on a wider, multi-party coalition. Second, the vulnerability and compromised position of the new rulers of the country is likely to increase the nationalist tone in the country. This is an instrument for realizing a newly-oriented stability, which carries at the same time the risk of instability in the region. Third, the need for a clear pro-Western orientation and effective cooperation with the EU and the United States will be achieved only by reassessing our alliance and priorities for the benefit of a democratic Albania.

Kathleen Imholz

International Bar Association

I am happy to see so many people here today because one of the things that I truly believe about Albania is that when the world listens to them, they listen back and they can act very well. The first time I went to Albania in April 1991, after the first pluralist elections of which Professor Pano spoke, I was surprised and impressed to learn what a deep legal tradition this country does in fact have. It is true that legal abilities were misused under the party-state, but law is always vulnerable to misuse if it is not understood. There are many good, intelligent lawyers in Albania who can help build a good structure if they get sufficient support from the outside world. At the time of my first visit in April 1991, the private practice of law had just been reestablished after being literally not recognized by law for 20 years. In other countries of the region, there were lawyers, dissident lawyers, who protected people accused of political crimes. In Albania after 1967, there simply were not. When an advocacy law was passed, reestablishing the profession, the dean of the law school said to me: "How do I teach this? What does it mean?" Now Albania has its third advocacy law, effective just last summer, and Maxim Haxhia is the first chairman of the bar association of Tiranë. He grapples with these questions every day.

I would like to highlight just a few very important developments that have occurred in the last few months involving the legal structure of Albania in its progress toward democracy. The defeat of the constitution on November 6 got Albania into the New York Times for the first time I can remember since the summer of 1991. It was a very exciting development. I would like to make it very clear that the transitional constitution of which Dr. Pano spoke is a real constitution. It was adopted by a two-thirds majority of parliament, the way a constitutional law is enacted in many countries. Unlike many other countries, Albania is not operating under an old communist constitution which has just been amended a little bit. It is operating under a transitional constitution that was adopted in April 1991 at the time of the strikes (of which Professor Pano also spoke), when the government was struggling to keep going during that very, very difficult transition year. It was a sketchy law, but it has been amended several times since. In early 1992 it was amended by a chapter on the judiciary, an important point I will mention later. In 1993 it was amended by a charter on fundamental human rights that is currently one of the best in Europe. And as I am proud of saying, Albania already protects the rights of men and women equally. It has an equal rights amendment, which we in the United States could not muster. Again, that is only the beginning, but it exists, so the transitional constitution is not a bad law. It has always been intended to be replaced.

I learned Albanian translating constitutional drafts. This has given me kind of a peculiar vocabulary, but I have seen every single one they have written, and there have been some very good ones. At the end of 1993 there was an excellent draft constitution that the commission had been preparing. It went off the track this year for a lot of reasons. The constitution that went to the popular referendum on November 6 was pretty good, though not that different from the transitional constitution. It would have been alright had it had passed, except that it made the judiciary even weaker than it already is.

I am a private practitioner of corporate law, and when I first went to Albania, I thought that building up the private legal profession was the most important thing, but as things developed it is very, very clear to me that getting that independent judiciary is the key. It is a problem that exists everywhere, of course, and it is very difficult to accomplish. The amendments that were passed in 1992 to the transitional constitution are important because they require - and this is the law in Albania today - that a member of the Court of Cassation, the highest court, and the attorney general and his deputies cannot be removed by parliament unless it is verified that they have committed a serious crime. When Maxim Haxhia was attorney general in 1992, parliament ignored this provision - they removed him in spite of it. Political realities did not make it possible to challenge that any further, despite the fact that the law was on the books.

The draft constitution that went to referendum on November 6 would have removed that provision and parliament could have removed the judge of the highest court or the attorney general without any crime being committed. That, in my view, is its most serious weakness. People have a lot of different ideas concerning the reasons the draft constitution lost. I hope it will be discussed in detail and written about. My sense was that it lost primarily because the people genuinely did not like the way the campaign was conducted. They did not trust the rallies. It reminded them of rallies in Enver Hoxha's time. Some people say, by the way, that a little provision requiring the heads of major religious communities to be Albanian citizens was a great contributing factor, due to the dispute with the present, or acting, archbishop of the Albanian Orthodox Church.

Sejfi Protopapa has copies of a very interesting paper setting out the issues in this case, including both the Albanian position and the position of Archbishop Yannoulatos. Probably some members of the Orthodox faith did vote against the constitution for that reason, but very few of them voted against it because of the real substance of the constitution. These are real subtleties about the judicial system that I do not think many people took notice of. Again, demonstrating the sophisticated legal environment, two of the opposition parties brought complaints to the Constitutional Court of Albania about the legality of the referendum. It was approved in early October to be voted on one month later, and three of the judges of the court (the Constitutional Court, not the Supreme Court - they're separate in Albania as in many Eastern countries) resigned because the cases had been sat on by the chairman of the court. It was a very interesting development. It did not affect the outcome, but it is an example of that legal tradition that I spoke of, and some of the Constitutional Court's decisions have been extremely interesting as they grope with the underlying legal issues of this society in transition.

The second really important development, which just occurred two weeks ago, was parliament's refusal to lift the immunity of the chairman of the Supreme Court. As I said, when Mr. Haxhia was the attorney general he was protected by the same constitutional provision that the supreme court chairman is now, but the parliament ignored it. In the Zef Brozi case, however, the Albanians took their constitution seriously. Again, if the referendum constitution had passed, chairman Brozi, who had some minor quarrels with the president, could have been removed without going through all this.

Because the constitution was defeated, it is still necessary - and it ought to be necessary, in any country - that the executive prove that a serious crime has been committed before the judge is removed. That is why a few weeks after the constitution was defeated, a move began in the executive branch to lift Zef's immunity. At the end of December the attorney general proposed to parliament that they lift his immunity, the first step toward investigating and convicting him of a crime. This involved the release of a prisoner whose case had been reversed, so it was not really a legal violation, but again, as I said, a legal mind often misuses law. In any event, parliament first sent the case back for more investigation. Then, just ten days ago, in a secret vote that broke party lines, (at least so far as the Democratic Party went) they refused to lift the immunity of the chairman of the supreme court by a vote of 54 to 49. That sounds like the United States Congress voting on NAFTA, but it was an extremely important victory for the rule of law in Albania. And as many of you know, just recently a three-judge panel of the Court of Cassation headed by chairman Brozi released the four remaining "Omonia" (Democratic Union of the Greek Ethnic Minority) defendants.

It is important that people stay interested in Albania and support the people who are working hard on the very boring underpinnings of the democratic structure. The country will, I think, succeed. Right now there is a tremendous air of optimism and I hope it continues. As the other panelists said, these two great developments, the defeat of the constitution and the defeat of the removal motion on Justice Brozi, are saying "no." Now Albanians have to learn to say "yes." And the fragmentation of the parties is a disturbing development, although a lot of people seem to think that a coalition government will be the best thing for Albania in the near term. We will see very soon what will happen.

Discussion

Question: Mr. Nesho, could you clarify your point on the multi-party coalition?

Nesho: I tried to explain the real situation in Albania, looking toward the next election. What I wanted to say is that a wider coalition is necessary for Albania, because otherwise the left could win a majority. In the last election, the Democratic Party won 66% or more of the vote, and now the other side could win a similar percentage. This would be very bad for Albania. We need a very wide social representation and a very strong coalition, directed by the party of the center in Albania.

Question: Do you mean a pre-election coalition for campaigning?

Nesho: That depends. Maybe we will create a bloc in the parliament and the new elections will be held in 1995. Many prognoses, including my own, are that the next election will be in 1995.

Pano: I fundamentally agree that if there is to be a coalition, it must be a coalition of the center parties at this particular time. What I am concerned about are some of the movements on the right to pull out some of the right-wing elements from the Democratic Party. I think that could be a disaster. You could have a polarization with a weaker Democratic Party in the senate. I also think that there should be no election in Albania until a constitution has been adopted.

Question: What are your thoughts about a compromise between the two sides?

Nesho: The democratic process began in 1991 with the student movement and President Alia's push to implement a pluralistic system in Albania. That was first. There is a lot of evidence that Alia actively participated in the creation of the opposition party. There are some memoirs by leaders of that time, from Mr. Ceka, Mr. Pashko, from Imami, that are only now becoming available. Even the memoirs of Mr. Alia himself declare that from the first moment, "I invited Sali Berisha to introduce himself to the movement of the students, and after that, after a long discussion until two o'clock in the morning, he came in again to my home and said that they are not in a good condition of mind. I don't appreciate their movement." And after that he reflected on the benefits to Albania.

Question: You said that the movement was wrongly directed against the personalities of the socialists.

Nesho: I think that it would be better that the communist system be attacked directly, and not through focusing on individuals. For example, the vulnerability of a person, that is, corruption of an individual, does not affect the heart of the system. That is the concept that we follow now.

Question: One question I have for Kathleen is whether she thinks that the new elections are necessarily going to be held this year or in a few years. Another question is for Professor Pano: how far have the communists come back already?

Imholz: I can answer very briefly. I do not think that it is appropriate for Americans to say whether there should or will be early elections this year in Albania. But I do want to say one thing. You do not need a new constitution to do it, and the constitution would not have changed things. If it had been approved, the constitution would not have required new elections or led to them, nor will keeping the old constitution have any effect on that. But Albania does have a good constitution, under which it could keep operating for a while.

Pano: If I might just comment on that point, I think from a technical-political point of view, the issue of the constitution does need to be resolved, because it is an ongoing, festering question in Albanian society, and it would be in Albania's best interest if that one issue, along with others - but that one especially - could be put aside, so that it will not be a distraction that will keep Albania from addressing other issues. That is why I would strongly like to see and even recommend an election. Is there a danger of communism in Albania? I do not see a communist system coming to the forefront in Albania, but I do see a possibility of some right-wing movements taking root, anti-democratic perhaps, even somewhat revanchist. I do not say that there is a strong possibility of that happening. But it is something that needs to be recognized and taken into account in election strategy, as well as in analyzing government responses to certain kinds of conditions.

Dobriansky: The next question is, why is the Socialist Party geared more toward the European Union rather than the United States?

Nesho: I would say that both are important, because we are first a European country, but at the same time we wish to have the same level of relations with the United States. Now, after the Cold War, the world has only one focal point: the United States. So, we in Albania are beginning our movement with the integration of Albania into Europe and we have outlines for a society something like that of the U.S. American diplomats initially made some mistakes by favoring certain individuals and parties. But that is not happening any more.