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Ideas and Foreign Policy: American Vision of Muslims and U.S. Reluctance to Promote Democracy in the Middle East
University of Denver
Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)
International Studies Association
March 1998
Introduction:
Much of the literature on democratization in developing countries in general and in the Middle East (M-E) in particular has focused on the internal attributes of these states. The literature on democracy promotion in the M-E 1 has analyzed the compatibility or incompatibility between Islamic norms and tradition on the one hand, and modern democratic values on the other. These experts, who called in the literature orientalists, neo-orientalists or essentialist, 2 believe that the Islamic conception of the state combined with weak middle class are the major obstacles before political and economic reforms. In this article, that focuses on the post-Cold War era, I argue that the Muslim states in the M-E that show harbingers of democratization are found outside the orbit of the American sphere of influence, such as Yemen, Algeria, Iran and to certain extent Tunisia. While democratic experiments in states that are found within that orbit, such as the oil exporting Gulf states, Egypt and even Jordan, if these experiments ever took place, are less promising. Thus the study examines two issues: First whether the U.S. hegemony in the M-E obstructs democratization? Second, how the American cognition of the Islamic culture orients American policy-makers towards forestalling democratization in the M-E based on the perception that democracy and Islamic culture are two polarized elements.
Without downplaying the contribution of the research that focuses on the internal attributes of the Islamic states, given the intense intervention, however, of the great- and super-powers in the M-E, analyzing the internal attributed and neglecting the role played by external actors that impedes democratization is a misleading argument. The political culture of the M-E was set during the colonial era when the great powers of that time marked artificial borders and installed Kings, Emirs, Sultans etc. 3 During the Cold War era the two superpowers divided the M-E into spheres of influence. The two superpowers had competed on expanding their sphere of influence but they also had cooperated in order to restrain their clients as the situation threatened to go out of control. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. still prefers to cooperate with traditional kings and emirs—the descendants of the rulers from the colonial era—and other autocrats. American policy-makers believe that because of the Islamic culture and the lack of broad middle class, democracy could not and should not be promoted. 4
This article contends that reality is socially constructed—the real world is a reflection of the way we think about it. The ontological reality is not detached from our perception of it. The American comprehension of the lack of congruence between democracy and Islamic culture is not an effect, but it is a major cause for the lack of democratization in the M-E. The Western cognition of the Islamic culture has not been merely shaped by external stimuli, such as the revolution in Iran or the chaos in Algeria after the 1991 elections, but it is based on deeper elements of rejection of the Islamic culture not because of what Muslims do but because of what they are! In this sense the Western vision of Muslims shapes the U.S. foreign policy in the M-E and channels policy-makers’ decisions towards forestalling democratization.
The U.S. has supported, indeed, authoritarian regime across the globe during the Cold War era. Since 1989, however, the U.S. has been released from the structural pressure that limited its behavior during the Cold War. Consequently, it substituted democratization for the containment doctrine. The U.S. has supported, hence, democratization in many developing states in the last decade. It is still reluctant, nonetheless, to promote or at least not to obstruct democratization in the M-E.
We are required, hence, to explain why certain U.S. administrations pursue simultaneously different policy approaches towards different developing countries or regions. What prompts certain administration to adopt one course of policy toward certain country or region and another toward other country or region? Why various American administrations have actively promoted democratization in Latin America and South East Asia, and supported and encouraged democratization in Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era, while these same administrations have impeded democratization in the M-E?
The accusations of Western scholars against the compatibility between Islamic culture and democracy put the Muslim scholars in a defensive position where the latter attempt to prove, without much success, that there are democratic notions in the Islamic culture such as Ijmaa (consensus) and Shurah (consultation). 5 These Islamic scholars, who learned from the experience of Salman Rushdie and Farag Fouda 6 among others, are very cautious not to turn the rage of the Muslim mullahs against themselves. They attempt, however, to go with the vein of the traditional Islam and to demonstrate that Islam can absorb democratic notions. This kind of analysis is likened to a walking in the rain between the drops. They cannot satisfy fundamentalists and at the same time convince essentialists. Arguments in favor of democratic Islam cannot succeed given the small number of Muslim democratic states in our modern era. This lack of empirical foundation leaves the arguments for democratic Islam shaky and with more open questions than answers.
Thus the controversy with democracy in the M-E is that in the absence of authentic empirical foundations about how democracy would settle in Muslim states, the U.S. will adopt the essentialist position that tells American policy-makers that in order to fulfill American interests the U.S. should continue obstructing democracy and supporting authoritarian leaders. According to the essentialists this is the only way to realize American interests in the M-E. Yet with this obstruction it is very difficult to promote democracy in the region. American president who is elected for a period of four years, is interested in stability in the oil market. Essentialists tell him that, under Islamic-democracy, Muslims, as "irrational" people, will elect Islamic fundamentalist groups that will use oil as a weapon against the West. In addition these regimes will introduce absolutist demands towards Israel and will not be satisfied for less than total elimination of the Jewish state. In short, essentialists argue that the U.S. should establish weak Middle Eastern regimes that depend on the West and facilitate its interests, albeit strong enough that can be able to rule their people without major shocks. If the President thinks about being reelected, it apparently seems rational to adopt the essentialist recommendations.
This rationality is based, however, on the relative rationality of the essentialists—it can neither appeal to absolute rationality nor claims for Truth. Four elements cast doubt on the rationality of essentialists and on their predictions. First, supporting authoritarian regimes is not the least costly way to realize the American interests. In the words of two scholars:
"The Pentagon pays out between $30 billion and $60 billion a year for defense of the Gulf (depending how you cost it), a formidable sum for protecting the import into the United States of some $30 billion worth of oil." 7
Second, trade relations between the West and the M-E are in harmony. The M-E exports primary goods, and the West exports in exchange final goods. There is interdependency between the two regions rather than interests that are defined as zero-sum-game. Third, the democratic peace theory argues that democratic and non-democratic states fight like dogs and cats. 8 Thus promoting democratization in the M-E will not make the relations between Israel and the Arab states worse off than their current situation. It can make them only better or at least not worse off. Fourth, essentialists claim that Muslim fundamentalist states define their interests toward the West in abstract ideological terms—holy war against unbelievers. Is this the way nations (or civilizations) define their interests? Are nations ready to sacrifice their material and existential interests in favor of ideological interests?
Given the American costs of defending the Gulf area, is it still rational for the President, from the perspective of the American national interest, to support authoritarian regimes in the Gulf that depend on the American protection? Are the containment policy of "rogue states" and the "stroking" policy of friendly states the best policies to realize the American interests in the region? If the democratic peace theory is correct, is it not rational to promote the peace process in the M-E along with democracy? Are all Muslims fundamentalists? Are there no differences between elected Islamic regime (Khatami--Iran) and revolutionary one (Khomeini)? Do Muslims define their relations with the West as conflictual on the basis of cultural differences between the two civilizations?
In this article I compare four states—Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen and Iran— and show that within states that are found under American influence, such as Bahrain and Egypt, democracy is obstructed even with the active support of the hegemon, i.e. the U.S. While in the cases of Middle Eastern states that are not given to American influence, such as Yemen and Iran, these have embarked upon real democratic process. That does not mean, however, that democracy is already settled in these two states. I argue that these states have accumulated dynamism toward greater pluralism and democracy. This democratic dynamism would strengthen civil society vis-à-vis the state by establishing the institutions, such as political parties, coalition of independent candidates, syndicates and trade unions that bolster democracy. There might be setbacks. The democratic process is irreversible, however.
Realpolitik, Internationalism or Critical Theory in U.S. foreign policy: 9
The realist approach, in brief, focuses on the international distribution of power. In the anarchic world order, rational politics requires the pursuit of national interest defined in terms of power. Realism treats states as black boxes. There is no reference to internal attributes. State A should not be concerned with promoting democracy in state B, since realists do not believe in democratic peace. The Internationalist school, however, implies that the U.S. should be actively involved in promoting democracy in the world based on the conception that democratic states do not fight against each other.
Critical theory, on the contrary, assumes that shared background understanding enables policy-makers to assign meaning. 10 Background consensus in the present is a product of historical practices that orient the parties’ interpretation. Thus what seems to us as an objective reality is a product of inter-subjective meaning. Inter-subjective meaning is not a product of the sum total of separate subjective interpretations. It is derived from the accumulation of historical practices and is not a property of a single person. 11 Critical theory asserts that institutions are made by people, i.e. by collective response to collective perceived problematic source that produces uncertainty. In this sense, uncertainty gives rise to ideas that tell policy-makers how to cope with this uncertain source and how to reduce its risk. Repeated patterns of treatment with that source create certain rules that tell policy-makers how to deal with it. Over time these rules start to be regarded as institutions that orients policy-makers’ behavior. 12
I argue that the critical theory explains the American policy in the M-E in the post-Cold era. Realism depicts the U.S. behavior during the Cold War in general. And internationalism elucidates its policy towards non-Middle Eastern countries in the post-Cold War era. Weighing the American costs of defending the Gulf (between $30-$60 billion annually) against its import of Gulf oil ($30 billion), it does not seem rational to expend so much money for so little gains. 13 Farther, internationalism cannot explain the U.S. behavior in the M-E. If Americans believe that democratic peace can work in East Europe and Latin America but it cannot work in the M-E, then there are cultural cognitive factors that channel Americans in this direction.
Very often the U.S. has explained its policy to send troops overseas as a mission in the defense of democracy and human rights. President F. Roosevelt once declared that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitutes the most important guarantee for international peace." 14 In the last fifty years the U.S. has promoted democratization in many states in various regions across the globe. A partial list includes Japan, Greece, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Nicaragua, Haiti etc. Moreover, the defeat of Communism in 1989 has caused the domino theory to operate in reverse, namely, once the Eastern European countries were released from the iron fist of the Soviet Union, these countries started to ‘fall’ one after the other to democracy and capitalism. The spread of democracy into Eastern Europe and Russia symbolizes, more than any other thing, the victory of Western democracy and the capitalist free market system. Further, President Clinton once declared in his first election campaign in 1992 that "countries whose citizens choose their leaders… are most likely than those with other forms of government to be reliable partners in trade and diplomacy, and less likely to threaten the peace." 15 Later Clinton proclaimed that "the promotion of democracy [is] the successor to a doctrine of containment." 16
Since mid-1970’s, democracy has been embraced by many developing countries. 17 In the 1970’s it was adopted in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal and Spain), it scrubbed Latin America in the 1980’s, and it spread to South East Asia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Africa (Benin, Mali, Malawi, Namibia, and South Africa). 18 Democracy has skipped, however, the M-E. Ascribing the lack of democracy to the incongruence between Islam and democracy is a groundless argument because of three reasons. First, those who resist democratization so far in the Arab world are the secular authoritarian regimes that use the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as an alibi for the lack of democracy and political freedom under their rule. Second, we do not have a broad empirical record about how an elected Islamic regime would behave. Therefore a large deal of uncertainty still prevails on the issue. Third, the M-E is not separated from the world political system, external factors can work both ways i.e. they can impede as well as promote democratization.
The first reason is an historical fact that we cannot do much about. The small number of Islamic democracies, however, cannot indicate about the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. This historical fact is more associated with historical conjunctures such as colonialism, the geo-strategic location of the M-E (its proximity to Europe), and the raw material resources of the region that require smooth relations with the West. The second and the third are two interrelated reasons. The uncertainty around Islamic-democracy gives rise to ideas that tell policy-makers in the West how to deal with the M-E. 19 If actors are not certain about the consequences of their actions, then ideas and worldviews shape foreign policy. Since policy makers do not know how to deal with uncertain situation, they tend to resort to the advice of experts. In fact, the U.S. inherited the essentialist ideas from the British Empire, where various U.S. administrations continue to deal with the M-E in the same way that Britain dealt with it during the colonial era. Even a dramatic event such as the end of the Cold War did not shake this policy at the same time when the doctrine of democratization replaced the classical doctrine of containment.
The American empowerment, however, of non-democratic regimes or even of tyrant regimes was conspicuous during the Cold War and it was not unique to the M-E. In addition to the support of the Shah in Iran in 1953 by the CIA and the countercoup against the government of prime-minister Mossadeq, the U.S. has intervened in Guatemala in 1954, Lebanon 1958, Haiti 1959, Chile between 1964-73, Vietnam between 1963-73, Nicaragua 1981 etc. 20 During the Cold War the U.S. provided support to dictators such as Ferdinad Marcos in the Philippines in the 1970’, to Augusto Pinochet in Chile after 1973, Saddam Hussein in Iraq between 1981-88 among many others. In the mid 1980’s, however, the U.S. has shifted its support from dictators in Latin America and East Asia to more popular and democratic movements.
In the post-Cold-War era the U.S. support of authoritarian regimes continues to focus mainly on the Muslim Middle Eastern states (Gulf oil exporting countries, Jordan and Egypt). The American intervention in these countries indicates not only a lack of support for democracy, but also an active American involvement in the obstruction of its evolution. Moreover, the American isolation via containment of what it calls ‘rogue states’ strengthens radicals and impedes democratization in these states as well. 21
Middle Eastern states that show signs of democratization in the last few years are found outside the American sphere of influence such as Yemen, Algeria, and Iran. The latter shows more pluralism especially after the last elections in May 1997 when power was transferred smoothly to the new elected President Muhammad Khatami. Other states in the region that are given to intense American influence, such as Egypt, the rich oil exporting states in the Gulf area, or Jordan, 22 have succeeded to thwart pressure for political and economic reforms. In the case of Egypt, for example, the U.S. has taken an unusual side with the Egyptian government against the pressure from the IMF for more economic openness in the late 1980’s as the ratio of the Egyptian debt to its GNP reached almost 150% level. 23 The U.S. is interested in economic reforms in Egypt, but not at price of the emerging of Islamic (democratic) regime.
In the Gulf area, the U.S. solves the security problems of the oil exporting countries. The Gulf States do not face a security dilemma. States, in general, live in an anarchic environment where each state has to take care of the security needs of its people and territory. States in this sense are found in a self-help situation. Therefore each state seeks to accumulate more power where more power means more security. When state A accumulates more power than states B and/or C, state A automatically increases inadvertently the security dilemma of B and C. The Gulf states, however, are not found in a self help situation since they are confident that the U.S. will protect their territory and regime in any contingency of external invasion or even in an attempt of internal coup. The Gulf States, moreover, do not depend for their existence on their civil society—militarily or economically. Economically they depend on the export of oil that is owned by the government. The people are only recipients of revenues from the government. The lack of dependency on civil society (economically and militarily) does not bolster civil society vis-à-vis the regime.
With the encouragement of the Hegemon democracy could have been promoted in the M-E, albeit not smoothly, as it was promoted in other areas in the world. The Hegemon’s attempts, nonetheless, to hinder it has caused to the weakness of the democratic forces that could have drown power from the democratic momentum that scrubbed the world in the late 1980’s. As many studies about Iran show, the unity of the anti-regime movements under the Islamic wings was not a natural outcome and not the only one. As in the former East Germany, the resistant movements found the church as the only place where they can organize their activity. In many authoritarian Muslim states, the Mosque is the mostly organized social institution where opposition groups can express their opinion against the regime. The mass support to Islamic movements is derived not (or not only) from Islamic ideology that appeals to the masses, but from the mosque as an institution and its ability to organize and mobilize the people. Governments in the M-E can close, dissolve or impede the formation of social institutions except of mosques. In the absence of other strong social institutions, the mosque became the most important one in the life of many Islamic societies.
The political and economic stagnation in several Arab states has weakened the democratic forces and raised the animosity of the population (lower classes) against the regime and united them under the wings of Islamic groups—the main contender to the authoritarian regime in the M-E. Other secular democratic forces, that need now to choose between what seems to be two bad options—a secular non-democratic regime or an elected Islamic one—has preferred to cooperate with the former, ‘the less worse’ . 24
The American reluctance to promote democracy in the M-E is based on their cultural cognition that assumes that democratization will bring to power Islamic fundamentalist groups that will undermine the American interests and might even unite the Arab Islamic world under one united Islamic empire that would emerge as the main challenger in the world against the American hegemony and the West. As long as Islamic groups ‘threaten’ to win elections in the Arab world, the U.S. will employ all necessary means to support the authoritarian states in these countries. It is not secret, especially after the Iranian revolution thus, that the U.S. will use all the military and economic means at its disposal in order to forestall the spread of an Islamic revolution and the emergence of an Islamic regimes let alone an Islamic empire.
Hence, the democratic controversy in the M-E, in my view, is as the following: The U.S. will not modify its reluctance to promote democracy in the M-E, unless several regional states prove their eligibility and maturity to absorb this process and that democracy will not bring to power ‘radical Islamic’ groups. This scenario will not happen, however, because of three reasons. First, democratization will not take place in the M-E unless the U.S. starts encouraging or at least ceases impeding it. Second, democratization is an evolutionary and incremental process that does not develop smoothly once it is adopted. 25 People in infant democracies may elect, in the short run, radical groups not because of the popularity of these groups, but as disapproval against a protracted period of humiliation from without, 26 and of oppression by authoritarian regime from within. Third, as mentioned before, repression leaves the mosque as the only social institution where opposition movements can organize themselves.
In the meantime as long as the U.S. continues to hinder democratization, it strengthens, albeit indirectly, the opposition forces and it unites them under the wings of the Islamic groups. Thus the only outlet for political change in M-E becomes a Blitz-revolution that will shock the whole world overnight as in the case of the 1979 Iranian revolution. The world will not be prepared for such an outcome. The brutality of this revolution is a response to the repressive apparatus employed by the authoritarian regimes and the animosity against the West for its resistance to the general will of the Islamic people. 27 This scenario is based on the Iranian revolution as well as the Algerian political experience after the 1991 elections. Accordingly, the West will not support democratic elections because these will bring to power Islamic groups, and lack of democracy will leave Islamic revolution as the only outlet for change. 28 If revolution takes place in several Arab states simultaneously, 29 then the emergence of an Islamic empire becomes inevitable. These countries that will feel themselves weak and vulnerable against the West, will find that the best way to counter the West is by Pan Arab unification. Thus assuming that the containment policy will be extended to every revolutionary Arab country in the M-E (rogue states), these states may find that integration is the best strategy to protect themselves against the hegemon.
The consistency in the American foreign policy in the M-E since WWII indicates that American administrations have adopted doctrines of administrations that preceded them. Cultural cognition that shaped the foreign policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations has continued to characterize policy lines of administrations in the post-Cold War era without questioning the credibility of these doctrines. Thus, with well-established institutions, it became very difficult for new administrations to resist existing policies and ideas, that have prevailed for decades, and have shaped policy-makers’ cognition with regard to the M-E. New administrations have taken for granted existing policies that seem to many others as obsolete and irrational policies. 30 These administrations have failed to shape new policy lines that break with old policies even when outdated doctrines have failed such as in the case of Iran.
In contrast to the M-E, other developing regions saw three interrelated reasons that fostered a break with the old American policy lines. First was an external or system level stimulus—the change in the global distribution of power after the end of the Cold War. It is true that the U.S. started to shift support for democratization in developing states even before the end of the Cold War. Yet the shift came after that it was clear that local dictators, that were loyal to the U.S., cannot withstand the internal pressure for political reforms and that these reforms are not pushed by Marxist groups, as in the case of the Philippines and Chile in the mid 1980’s. Second, this external stimulus has spurred an internal or a unit level one—a modification in the American policy-makers’ cognition. In the post Cold War era American policy-makers started to believe that it is possible to develop stable democracies in Latin America and East Asia and to shape regimes in these regions that share the American policy-makers’ opinion about how the relations between the U.S. on the one hand, and these regions on the other, should be conducted. 31 The American policy-makers started to recognize that some states in the Third World are eligible for democracy whereby the U.S. can achieve its interests at least costs. 32
Third was the intensity in globalization and the desire by MNCs to take advantage of the cheap labor force in developing states as wages in the U.S. were high especially when the overvalued dollar had skyrocketed relative to other major currencies in the mid-1980’s. After the experience of the 1960’s and 1970’s, during which the MNCs’ properties were confiscated and national resources were nationalized by authoritarian regimes, the MNCs concluded that it is better to deal with democratic predictable regimes that enjoy large legitimacy. 33
In short, during the Cold War, the competition between the two superpowers covered almost the entire globe. Under these conditions, the U.S. has supported dictators that showed alienation against communism. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. felt more confident in promoting democracy in developing countries without the risk that democracy will bring to power radical groups. The intensity in globalism in the 1980’s has enabled American multinationals to achieve common understanding with elite groups in developing countries thereby to realize the interests of these multinationals without the fear of nationalization of the MNCs’ properties or the need for an active American government’s intervention. The confiscation of the properties of MNCs and the nationalization of raw material resources in the 1960’s and 1970’s have taught these multinationals that they could not rely on the American government to protect their properties. Therefore, these MNCs has preferred to deal with more predictable democratic regimes with solid elite.
In the M-E, despite the structural change after the end of the Cold War, the American policy-makers still perceive that democratization will cause to a loss by the U.S. over the whole situation in case of a rise of fundamentalist regimes. This scenario is also shared by MNCs who believe that it might leave them in worse off situation.
The American Cognition of Muslims:
There are two schools of thought in the U.S. that deal with the issue of Islamic resurgence. One is led by orientalists, or neo-orientalists, (henceforth the essentialist school), and the other is the contingencist or reformist school. 34 While the debate between the two schools is confined to the academic realm, only the essentialist school prevails in the American political system. 35
Basically within the essentialist school both orientalists and neo-orientalists share the conviction that Islam is incompatible with democracy. For orientalists, however, the problem lies in the Islamic religion that promotes political submission and subordination. God is the supreme sovereign and the ruler on earth acts as the practitioner of God’ s will. The obedience to the ruler according to the orientalists is a religious as well as a political obligation. This obedience fiat has given the ruler enormous power and authority. In short, orientalists argue first that there is no separation between the political life and religious life in Islamic society. Second, the ruler and the government was and always will be very strong while civil society was and always will be weak vis-à-vis the state. The absolute obedience coupled with absence of social groups that can challenge the state, such as bourgeoisie, trade unions and syndicates, is the main symptom for the lack of democratization.
Neo-orientalists, on the other hand, argue that along the history of Islam, society was always strong and the regime was weak, where the government has very shaky roots within society. In the words of Sadowski:
"By establishing ideals that are impossible to fulfill, Islam ensures that Muslims will view any from of government, sooner or later, as illegitimate. Sincere Muslims tend to withdraw support from their rulers." 36
This problem of weak regimes has became prominent according to neo-orientalists in the twentieth century when the elite (ruling class) in Muslim nations start to see modernism (secularism and reformism) as a path to economic, social and political success. While the elites want to remove all the obstacles that stand in the way of emulating the West, the masses prefer to implement the laws of the Islamic Sharia’a. 37 Rejecting modernism obstructs the emergence of modern civil society that can cooperate with, and at the same time monitor the regime. The structure of the Islamic society makes it impervious before the penetration of the governmental roots of modern ideas and institutions. Therefore, the strength of Muslim societies forestalls the emergence of a strong state. Fundamentalism, according to this school, offers the masses a shield before Western influence that the elites want to import. The lack of common understanding between the elites and the masses has caused to rift, alienation and consequently to the weakness of Muslim regimes. As a result, the masses wait to the opportunity to topple the regime.
In short, orientalists as well as neo-orientalists argue, however, that there is a unique, ontological reality that has been always part of the Islamic culture, where the role of the scholars is confined merely to observe that reality. This ontological reality has existed independent of essentialist scholars. These scholars decline, nonetheless, to mention how their ideas have inspired American policy-makers, and have been adopted by the U.S. as the official American policy toward the M-E. Thus these ideas are not neutral ideas which explain the world without affecting it. These ideas have constructed reality and formed the rules and the institutions that tell policy-makers how to deal with this region.
The reformist approach, on the contrary, separates extreme fundamentalists from moderate ones and claims that the political conditions in Muslim states are not much different from those that exist in other Third World countries. 38 This school criticizes the authoritarian regimes and their brutal repression (with Western acquiescence) of the political opposition that in their view has contributed to the ascendance of Islamic fundamentalism. They see their rise as a direct consequence of the political reality in the M-E. The reformist school is motivated to understand the political and social dynamics behind fundamentalism, and to demonstrate that long term social and political reforms could be stable.
The essentialist school has entered the political realm and has guided the various American administrations in the way they should deal with the M-E. Essentialists, hence, did not only try to explain reality but their recommendations have told policy makers what is the ‘right’ way to preserve the Western interests in the region. Democratization will cause to a loss over the whole situation with the emergence of anti-American Islamic regimes. The uncertainty regarding democratization in the M-E that stems from the small number of Muslim democracies has given rise to ideas. The acceptance of one school—the essentialist—and the rejection of an another—the reformist—indicates that there is not only one way to deal with the M-E. In short, the man made (orientalist) institutions shape the American policy-makers’ cognition. By the same token, American policy-makers can change these institutions only if they modify their collective orientalist ideas.
The illustration of Islamic movements as radical, anti-Western and anti-modernist is taken for granted and goes unnoticed in the West by ordinary citizens and elite. Dan Quayle, the former vice president of the United States, compares Islamic fundamentalism with Nazism and communism. 39 A similar comparison of Islam with communism is made by Daniel Pipes in the well-respected journal ‘Foreign Affairs’. In a different article Pipes illustrates Muslims as ‘permanent’ anti-democrats and terrorists. 40 In his words:
"Muslim countries [not only] have the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the world, but that they always would." 41
Thus if they "always would", then the anti-democracy in the Islamic world is inherent in the Islamic culture by nature, and it is waste of time, efforts and money for the U.S. to try even to promote it. Promoting democracy is a self-defeating strategy because democratic Islamic states will be less dependent on the hegemon and will adopt Sharia’a laws that define the non-Muslims as infidels and consequently as enemies, the essentialist argument continues. Given the cultural differences, moreover, these states will see their relations with the West through conflictual lens. Finally, essentialists almost sure that elected Islamic regime will dismantle democracy once they win elections, since democracy is not part of the Islamic culture.
Depicting Muslims in these terms obscures the differences between what Muslims are and how the West wants to see them. As Prof. Esposito put it, "it is difficult to know where reality ends and myth begins". 42
The attack of Western scholars is not only directed against fundamentalist Islamic groups as radical and marginal groups in the Middle Eastern society, but also against the entire society. The Middle Eastern society is viewed as a traditional collectivist society, highly religious and consequently irrational that easily drifted after radical religious Islamic slogans. It is illustrated, moreover, by a hierarchic social structure, particularistic society, low level of social mobility, and simple specialization and division of labor. The hierarchical social structure enables the development of patriarchal social relations and effective command by those who sit at the top of the social pyramid. Modern society, on the contrary, is highly universalistic, high degree of social mobility, high division of labor and specialization, and individualistic social structure. As a result the Middle Eastern traditional society is perceived as the antithesis of the Western modern society. 43 These characteristics, however, could be found in many other traditional non-Muslim societies as well. Yet Western scholars proclaim that only Islamic societies are anti-Western, anti-secular and anti-modernist. 44 Thus while developing non-Muslim countries are amenable to change according to the modern discourse, Muslim societies actively reject that discourse. This rejection, therefore leaves no room for compromise between Muslims and Westerners, the argument continues.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is perceived in the West as the primary threat to the stability of the M-E and consequently as a major rising destabilizing element in the world given the vital Western economic and strategic interests in the region. The declaration of Jihad (holly war) against Israel and the public announcements for the elimination of the Jewish State by Hamas groups and Hizb Allah, the call to dismantle the peace treaty with Israel by Gama’at Islamiya in Egypt, the Iranian anti-Western revolution, the hostage taking of Americans in Iran and Lebanon, the slogans "Death to America", and "Islam is the Solution", 45 all are signaling on an inevitable collision between the West and the Muslim civilization. The main fear of the West is from the emergence of an homogenous, Islamic empire that extends from the Atlantic (Morocco and Mauritania) to the Gulf area, and will include more than 250 million Muslims, and will surround Israel let alone declaring war against it. In the words of two experts:
"Second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China, or the United States…. by 2000 it [Arab Empire] would have more people than either of the two superpowers. This state would contain almost two thirds of the world’s oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development." 46
Thus, the emergence of a united Arab empire, according to this line of thought, will inevitably fill the vacuum that was created after the demise of the Soviet Union. Given the interests at stake—the security of Israel and the oil market—collision with the West is inevitable. Essentialists claim, however, that collision is mainly a result of cultural differences and not a result of competition over material resources. 47 Thus their arguments are not based on realist premises. As a prove for their contentions, essentialist scholars go all the way back to when the Islamic culture reached its culmination under the Islamic empire between the seventh and the thirteenth century. These scholars do not comprehend the political events of that period in their historicist circumstances, but assume that what was is what will be and nothing new under the sun. In other words, these scholars generalize from a unique era with unique conditions and extend their generalization into our modern or post-modern time. An example of these generalizations is found in the writings of Prof. Bernard Lewis. In his words:
"In the classic Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam." 48
It is possible that the Muslim Caliphs had had divided the world into two during the Islamic empire that lasted from the seventh century till the thirteenth century as Prof. Lewis asserts. Yet does that mean that we can generalize from that era to ours, while neglecting all the other different circumstances that distinguish and characterize the two separated eras? Do nations define their interests in abstract terms of beliefs, infidelity and fight of non-Muslim nations that are defined as Enemies of God? 49
The illustration of radical Islam is more prominent in the writings of Benjamin Barber. In his words:
"Jihad is, I recognize, a strong term. In its mildest form, it betokens religious struggle on behalf of faith, a kind of Islamic zeal. In its strongest political manifestation, it means bloody holy war on behalf of partisan identity that is metaphysically defined and fanatically defended…Jihad is then a rabid response to colonialism and imperialism and their economic children, capitalism and modernity; it is diversity run amok, multiculturalism turned cancerous so that the cells keep dividing long after their division has ceased to serve the healthy corpus." 50 (emphasis in origin)
Although Barber distinguishes between radical and moderate Jihad, in both cases the outcome is similar: a struggle against capitalism, modernism and the West. Holly war (Jihad) may start in its mildest form— religious struggle—but we cannot know where it may end. Yet the question that is raised again and again: do nations define their interests in terms of religious struggle? 51 If the West succeeded to deter the Soviet Union and China with nuclear weapon in the last fifty years, why it cannot deter Muslims in the future? Are Russians and Chinese rational people while Muslims not? Finally, why Muslims will decide to engage in a war, in the first place, when the balance of power (or the balance of terror in the case of nuclear balance) is not in their favor? Even if Muslims still have the ambition to impose Islam on the Christians, they are aware of their inferiority against the West and their backwardness in the same way that Russians had the ambition to export the communist revolution but were aware of their limits.
Moreover, the problem of Prof. Barber and many other essentialist scholars is that they use the term Jihad in one single interpretation that was only used at the onset history of Islam. Since then the term bears other more useful meanings. The term Jihad, thus, has different interpretations in which the holy war interpretation is only one. The other, more useful meaning of the term Jihad is to be diligent or to strive to improve one’s life conditions or the political and economic conditions of the whole society. These scholars impose one single interpretation and direct their readers toward it. Their readers do not have the autonomy to seek different interpretations.
The declarations of Islamic fundamentalists, who wish to replicate the past, however, strengthen the arguments of essentialists. These movements insist on the unity between religion and politics. The separation of religion from the political realm is alien to the Muslim society and was imposed by Western powers—the argument continues. Fundamentalists declare, moreover, that Arabs were strong only when they obeyed the rules of Islam, and they will "raise their heads" and delete the shame of the 1967 defeat in the Six-Day-War and their weakness vis-à-vis the West only if they employ the rules of Islam. The failure of essentialist scholars is in their view of Islamic fundamentalism as a monolithic movement and their failure to distinguish between Muslims and Islamists or moderate Islamic groups and the radical ones. As Prof. Esposito contends:
"For a number of reasons it [fundamentalism] tells us everything and yet, at the same time, nothing…. All those who call for a return to foundational beliefs or the fundamentalists of a religion may be called fundamentalists…. this could include all practicing Muslims, who accept the literal word of God." 52
Distinguishing between potential Muslim rage against the West on the one hand, and direct threat and conflicting material interests on the other, requires policy-makers in the West to understand how their policy is received by the population in the M-E. Up to date, Western states have been attentive merely to the needs and problems of the local authoritarian regimes and to local dictators. The people are conceived as irrational, traditional, anti-Western, anti-secular, and anti-modernist. 53 In fact there is no conflict over material resources between the M-E and the West. The West export to the M-E non-competitive goods—goods that are not produced locally such as technology and other final goods—and it imports primary goods needed in the industrial process. Thus there is interdependency and commonality in their mutual interests.
The essentialists conclude, however, that the West has nothing in common with the mass population or with popular Islamic regimes that draw their legitimacy from the masses. Therefore, the U.S., the leader of the free world, should channel its efforts in favor of the authoritarian regimes and against popular Islamic movements. In this sense, a regime that founds its legitimacy on mass public support will reflect the same irrational values that are inherent in the Islamic culture. Focusing on a small elite simplifies the deal with the culture, enables the West to realize its interests at a lower cost, and to circumvents confrontation with a united M-E as the West supports authoritarian, divided, and relatively weak regimes that depend on Western aid. Thus the U.S. seeks weak Middle Eastern regimes that, on the one hand, depend on the West and facilitates its interests. On the other hand, it empowers them to be strong enough to be able to rule their people. In short, the talk about an ‘evil Muslim Empire’ is an alibi for the support of non-democratic and repressive regimes. The American policy makers view Islam as a monolithic movement and depicting them "in terms of extremism and terrorism" 54
The illustration, by scholars and journalists and other public servants, of Muslims in general and Arabs in particular as a rising antagonist rival against the West captures public opinion and in many ways distorts the reality of Islam. While, these same figures, marginalize the deeds of the West against the Islamic world and the way these deeds reinforced the Islamic animosity against the West.
The political backwardness of the Middle Eastern states:
The M-E still lags behind the worldwide course of democratization that Prof. Huntington calls the third wave that has started in the mid-1970’s and still continues till our current decade. Several nations in this region, nonetheless, have managed to taste some sorts of democratization that harbingers on progress in this regard. Some Middle Eastern countries have held democratic elections, multiparty system, and semi-independent judicial system. 55 Further openness to world market and globalization have strengthened the status of civil society vis-à-vis the state in some countries. 56
Despite this progress, Middle Eastern countries still far away from the establishment of true stable democracy. In Saudi Arabia the situation is hopeless. This monarchic Islamic country deprives women from driving cars, cut off hands of thieves, flogs alcohol drinkers, stones adulterers and executes criminals in a haphazard way. Elections there are forbidden totally. There is no nominated parliament even. In an interview to one Kuwaiti newspaper King Fahed declared that "the democratic system prevailing in the world does not suit us in this region…. The nature of our people is different…. We have our Islamic ideology. The system of free elections is not part of Islamic ideology." 57 It is not secret that this regime uses Islam as a cover to its attempts to depress democracy and freedom. Despite its anti-democratic regime, Saudi Arabia is the best ally of the U.S. in the Gulf area. There is a consensus between the two nations that democracy stands at odd with the Islamic culture.
The weakness of civil society in the oil exporting states in the Gulf area is due to the socioeconomic structure of these states. The regime’s power in these states is highly dependent on catching the rent from the export of natural resources. The people do not pay taxes, they are recipients of income and other privileges from the government. The private sector is very small and the government is the major employer. By rewarding certain loyal groups and punishing others, the dynastic regimes have succeeded in keeping their rule. 58 Moreover, these regimes are dependent on the U.S. for their protection and security. In exchange for this American ‘service’, the Gulf States provide deference, money, stable oil market at cheap prices and jobs for the employees at the American weapons companies. 59 In the words of one American ambassador:
"When they visit the Gulf, American officials are often more interested in asking for money than in consultation." 60
Despite the anti-democratic record of the Middle Eastern states and despite the various American presidents’ declarations in favor of democratization, the U.S. is still actively involved in preserving the authority of these regimes in Egypt and the Gulf oil exporting countries. The U.S. upheld the cancellation of the democratic election in Algeria after that it was known that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had won the elections there in late 1991. And the Clinton administration is still reluctant from criticizing the Algerian government failure to secure the life of its own citizens despite what we can call today the Algerian civil war and the brutal abuse of human rights that this war exposes. Further the U.S. provides an annual military and civil aid to Egypt that is ranked second after that of Israel. American troops are stationed on Saudi Arabia’s soil in order to protect that regime against invaders from without as well as against other potential political unrest from within. The American involvement in the internal affairs of these countries indicates that the U.S. has the capacity to influence their internal and external policy if it wishes to do so.
Egypt:
In Egypt, one of the most modern states in the Arab world, the party of President Mubarak controls around 80-90% of the parliament’s seats. The parliament does not supervise the activity of the executive body and in the words of two writers the parliament is a rubber stamp for the executive.
61
The president is elected in a public referendum where he is the only candidate. The government controls the media thereby it affects the parliamentary elections’ outcome. The elections in Egypt do not stand any standard of democracy: "they are not free, not fair and not open".
62
Let alone the abuse of human rights and the haphazard execution of political dissenters who criticize and resist the government’s policy.
Egypt is the natural leader of the Arab world. The Egyptian political culture is a barometer for the political culture and reforms of the entire Arab world. It is not surprising that Egypt was the first Arab State to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Although Egypt was condemned for that by the Arab world, other Arab states, such as Jordan and Morocco in addition of course to the PLO, have followed its footsteps in this regard. The economic backwardness of Egypt stands inversely, however, to its political significance. We cannot find another example in the world of a political and economic backward nation that has such regional importance like Egypt. Therefore it is not surprising that the U.S. is very much attentive to its economic and political problems.
Since late 1970’s, Egypt has received an annual American aid as a reward for its courage to sign a peace treaty with Israel and as a compensation for its loss of aid from the Arab oil exporting countries in the Gulf. Egypt has received an annual amount of $2.1 billion that includes a security and civil aid. Almost half of the Egyptian security budget is covered by the American aid. By 1997, the U.S. aid to Egypt totaled at $49 billion. 63 If, on the one hand, the formation of peace with Israel was the only reason to reward Egypt foreign aid, then we would expect a cessation of this aid long time ago. If, on the other hand, economic reforms are the stimulus to support Egypt to modernize its economy, then the failure of the Egyptian government to reform its economy should have brought about the termination of the American aid in the mid 1980’s. One would expect, moreover, that the U.S. would use foreign aid and the dependency of Egypt on it in order to liberalize the Egyptian economy, and to promote democratization and human rights conditions. Yet reality shows a different outcome. The question is what is the aim behind the American policy to award Egypt so much aid every year especially when we do not see any signal on the American side to terminate this aid?
Apart from rewarding Egypt for recognizing the Jewish State and denouncing the state of war against it, the purpose of the American foreign aid was to develop, liberalize and modernize the Egyptian economy. 64 The U.S. has not managed to reform the Egyptian economy, 65 however, and it does not threat to cut the foreign aid either. While the Egyptian foreign debts in the early 1970’s stood at $2 billion or 22% of its GNP, in 1988 it stood at $45 billion or 126% of the country’s GNP. Much of this debt was accumulated in the early 1980’s. Egypt managed to reduce its foreign debts after the U.S. wrote off $7 billion of Egypt’s debts as a reward for Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War in 1991, and as other European states decided to reschedule the Egyptian debt and write off parts of it. In mid 1990’s the Egyptian per capita income stood at $600, and unemployment at a rate of 20%. Not only the American aid did not modernize the Egyptian economy, this aid is also perceived by opposition movements in Egypt as an infusion in the ill body of the Egyptian economy that holds the ruling party in power. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all the opposition parties in Egypt are anti-American.
It is not that the Egyptian government is not interested in reforming its economy. On the contrary, it is eager to liberalize and modernize it. Yet the weakness of the Egyptian regime and the experience of mid 1970’s make small steps towards liberalization a very hard task. 66 In the mid 1970’s the Infitah policy or openness of President Sadat has raised the price of subsidized basic goods and had ignited mass demonstrations in this country. Sadat at that time prepared a plane to flee his family to Iran in case of collapse to his regime.
In the late 1980’s, three external institutions—IMF, Wold Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (AID)—worked closely with the Egyptian regime in order to modernize the economy. 67 Although the three external institutions were eager to modernize it, the IMF was the least sensitive to the internal political problems of Egypt. The IMF wanted to use the dependency of Egypt on the influx of hard currency and the reschedule of its foreign debts as a leverage to open the economy and reduce the role of the Egyptian government in the market. When the World Bank and the IMF had tried to impose neoclassical economic reforms 68 on the Egyptian government these institutions faced not only resistance from Mubarak’s Regime, but also from the American administration. As a result one IMF official, who negotiated with Egypt, had resigned as protest for the American double standard policy. 69
Egypt used, thus, its internal weakness in order to mobilize the U.S. as a counterbalance to the IMF. The weakness of the Egyptian regime does not allow it to take harmful economic reforms in order to modernize and liberalize the economy in the short run. The fear that cut in subsidies for basic goods would cause to mass demonstrations and probably to a revolution has convinced the American officials that strong pressure will cause to a loss over the whole situation in Egypt. The U.S. is interested in economic reforms, yet it is not willing to go far to an extent that these reforms would bring about the demise of the Egyptian regime. The lessons that Mubarak’s regime learnt from the Infitah policy is that economic reforms that take place abruptly in a short period, may ignite demonstrations and direct the animosity of the masses against the government. Thus the Egyptian government wants to extend reforms over a long period that people would not feel abrupt changes. 70 Yet in the mean time new problems emerge and population grows that void the initial economic reforms.
The main aim of the Egyptian regime is not to reform the economy in the first place, but to keep the ruling party in power. If the U.S. cut its aid, two scenarios might emerge: at minimum the U.S. will lose influence over the current Egyptian regime. At maximum, Egypt may face sever economic problems that will cause either to a revolution, or to sweeping political reforms by Mubarak’s regime. Keeping the supply of aid to the current regime will keep the latter alive, but without any hope for major economic or political reforms. The aim of the United State should be to modernize Egypt economically and politically, to bolster the peace process and to prevent an Islamic revolution. Its aim is not to help the current Egyptian regime to stay in power. Based on the Iranian and Algerian experience, however, Americans predict that revolution will bring to power radical anti-American group, so will free democratic elections. Therefore, American assume that at any rate, the current regime is better in two fold: it is secular and it is loyal to the West. Here we see a commonality in the interests between the two states. Foreign aid to Egypt not only increases Egypt’s dependency on the U.S., but also the American dependency on Egypt. If the cut of foreign aid may topple the regime and disrupt the peace process, then the U.S. would prefer to continue its supply of aid. Yet a prediction that is based on two cases cannot be precise. First because the Egyptian people learn from the experience of the Algerians. Second nations in the M-E have many unique political, economical and cultural notions that distinguish them from each other. The fact that most of the Middle Eastern states are Muslim-Arabs does not make their political trends identical.
From the analysis above it seems that the U.S. does not distinguish, moreover, between radical revolutionary Islam and a moderate elected one. Even in Iran we cannot claim that the elected president Khatami or even Rafsanjani have the same attitude towards modernism and the West like Khomeini. Further, the experience of Algeria may have positive and negative implications. One negative implication is that the ruling elite may prefer a secular non-democratic regime over elected religious one. The positive implication is that the mass people in elections will prefer to vote to a secular regime that promises order rather than chaos such the one that took place in Algeria following the elections in late 1991.
Bahrain:
Bahrain is an island state in the Gulf with around 600,000 residents of which 62% are native nationals and the rest are foreign workers from South East Asia. Of Bahrain’s nationals, 70% are Muslim Shi’a, and the rest are Sunni Muslims. Bahrain was ruled by al-Khalifa (Sunni) family and the Sunni minority since late 18th century. In 1971 the island received its independence after that the British had withdrew from the Gulf. Elections were held in 1973 for the 44 seats of the national assembly. Thirty of these members were elected by all mails that have the right to vote. The remaining 14 were appointed by the Emir. As a result of power politics between the national assembly and the Emir about the authorities of the former, the Emir decided to dissolve the assembly in August 1975.
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Bahrain is a paternal dynastic emirate that has very limited democratic institutions and lacks political participation, especially after 1975. Since then the actions of the Emir- Sheikh Isa Bin Sulman al-Khalifa, his brother, who is the prime minister, the Emir’s son, who is the Crown Prince, and an appointed cabinet of ministers, are not given to any supervision.
Under the State Security Act of 1974, individuals can be detained for up to three years without trial for engaging in activities or making statements regarded officially as a threat to the national security and public order. This law is broadly employed to arrest people who are engaged in activities against the regime. Since 1991 there were increasingly calls for restoring the national assembly and democracy in the country. Bahrain’s citizens drew their aspiration from the emergence of political reform movement in Kuwait following the Gulf War. Since late 1994, however, Bahrain has experienced political riots that were not known before in the history of Bahrain. Almost thirty-five people were killed in clashes between the demonstrators and the security forces in addition to an unknown number of injuries and detainees.
< In 1994, leading figures of the democratic movement prepared a petition signed by 25,000 citizens requesting the regime to restore the national assembly.
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Yet many of the prominent figures who signed the petition, such as well respected Shi’a clerics, were arrested and were told that they could be released if they agree to remove their names from the petition. Public employees, who signed the petition, were dismissed from their jobs.
74
In order to accumulate internal and external public support, the government attributes the riots to Iranian elements that support a group called "Hizb Allah Bahrain". It is true that most of the riots’ participants are Shi’a, yet the rebels have not used firearms against the security forces. Many Westerners who watch events in Bahrain contend that the reason for the riots is the Shi’a’s discontentment with their economic situation, and their political marginalization.
75
Unemployment stands at 30% level and is more common among Shi’a young men. The strength of the regime in Bahrain rests on three pillars. First is Bahrain’s security services that were initially constructed by the British rule and latter were expanded as the regime hired British and Egyptian security advisers. Second, the regime has illustrated the Shi’a unrest as an ethnic conflict that has been ignited by Iran, thereby the regime has succeeded to mobilize the Sunni population as a counterbalance against the Shi’a. Third is the external support that Bahrain enjoys from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are very allergic to democratic reforms that take place in the Gulf area. They are very sensitive, moreover, to the exportation of Islamic revolution from the house of Iran.
76
The Saudis have provided financial support to the al- Khalifa regime to depress the rebellion. Finally is the American support. Since 1948 Bahrain has been a base for American naval forces in the Gulf area. Since 1995, these forces have given a status of fleet that is called the U.S. Fifth Fleet. From the American point of view, a revolutionary Shi'i regime in the Gulf that is given to Iranian influence constitutes a threat to the American interest. Therefore in response to the riots in Bahrain, the U.S. issued statements of support to the local regime. The U.S. fears that if a Shi’a movement would succeed in Bahrain, this country might end up with a regime similar to that of Iran. The U.S. so far has refused to criticize the human rights abuses by the government, and the suspension of the elected national assembly. Critique by U.S. officials was made by low level diplomats, such as the American ambassador to Bahrain, who called for the need to "maintain order…in a manner consistent with international standards of human rights."
77
The Clinton administration, however, still sees the riots in the large context of the containment of the Iranian revolution. General John Shalikashvili, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Manama and released this statement: The American obsession to fight and contain the Iranian revolution makes it blind of riots that are aimed to improve human rights and restore democracy. The United States has preferred to take its traditional position in such events that sees any change as a threat to its allies and its influence in the Gulf area. The problem is not confined only to Bahrain, however. If anti-regime riots may succeed in tiny Bahrain, that may encourage similar ‘revolutionary’ elements in Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and in Saudi Arabia. In short a domino theory for the Gulf area.
Yemen:
In addition, the two Yemeni states have experienced a protracted period of violence that in the eyes of many observers was the cause for the emergence of democracy. In 1962 a military group seized power from the royal regime in Northern Yemen and established the YAR. This coup was followed by civil war in the North that was backed on the one hand by Egyptian support to the military group and on the other hand by Saudi support to the Imam’s family. Southern Yemen, however, received its independence from the British in 1967 and established a communist state— the PRDY—with an authoritarian regime. The two Yemens experienced border clashes during the 1970’s and the 1980’s where the YAR was supported by Saudi Arabia that was motivated by the containment of communism in the Arab peninsula and the PDRY was backed by the Soviet Union. In 1986, President Ali Nasser Muhammad of the PDRY initiated a brutal strike against opposition factions within his country during which he was defeated and removed from power. His removal set the stage toward the introduction of more political liberalization and openness especially in an era of glasnost in the Soviet Union. Democratization in the South before it proceeded into unification had spilled over into Northern Yemen where the popularity ruling party the General People Congress (GPC) and its president started to erode. In the 1990, thus, Yemen has experienced two revolutions: unity and democratization. In fact with unity came more democratization and pluralism as a result of the formation of a new constitution that ensured democracy. The united Yemen has a multiparty system and has held national free elections in April 1993 and in May 1997. Both were announced as free and fair by outside observers.
80
The new constitution has guaranteed free expression and freedom for social organizations and the formation of parties within the limits of law. Women in Yemen have the right to vote where the Islamic party (Islah) is in favor of this right.
81
Today one can find a variety of newspapers that reflect the political spectrum in Yemen. The elected parliament enjoys several authorities that we find them in stable Western democracies such as: vote of confidence or non-confidence in the council of ministers, approval of the budget, and override vetoes by the president.
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In 1993 three main parties won the elections: the GPC won 122 seats, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP represents the South) won 56 and the Islah Islamic party won 62 seats. Other parties won 61 seats. Total seats in parliament are 301. Democracy has not developed in Yemen without setbacks. In the 1997 elections the GPC won 187, Islah 56 and others 58. The YSP was outlawed as a result of the civil war between May-June in 1994 and the defeat of the South. After the civil war Yemen was reunified under the leadership of the GPC-Islah coalition. Most of the YSP leaders were expelled, detained, assassinated, or simply fled the country. The state was unified and democracy was restored at a high price—the elimination of the YSP and its cadres from the South who played a major role in establishing democracy. Even though it is still very early to assess how democracy will develop in the absence of the YSP, some scholars argue that this will not be the same democracy as with the YSP presence.
83
The YSP prior to unification in 1990 has initiated many democratic reforms in the South that paved the way toward more democratization in the united Yemen. The internal strife in Yemen, however, involves external intervention. Saudi Arabia was neither pleased in the late 1960’s with the establishment of a communist state in its southern neighbor, nor with the emergence of a democratic state in mid 1990’s. The Saudi regime has been concerned that pressure for democratization might spill over into its territory and to be translated into riots against the feudal regime in Riyadh. As a headline in the Los Angeles Times put it:
Iran:
Since 1979, however, Iran held several quasi-democratic experiments. It held a referendum in March 1979 to uphold the establishment of the Islamic revolution. In July an Assembly of Experts was elected. In December an another referendum was held to approve the new constitution of the Islamic Republic.
86
In January 1980 Iran experienced its first presidential elections when Bani-Sadr, who represent the liberals, defeated the candidate of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP). Since 1980 Iran has undergone regular elections for the parliament (Majlis) every four years, where liberal independent deputies were always part of it.
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In the 1989 presidential elections Hashemi Rafsanjani won an overwhelming majority. Finally, in May 1997 presidential elections Muhammad Khatami was elected as a president. The dramatic unexpected victory of Khatami in the presidential elections still does not indicate about the settlement of democracy in Iran. Yet there is a major change that may be translated in Iran’s foreign and internal policy. The drama in Khatami’s victory is in his defeat of Ali Nateq Nuri—the candidate who enjoys the support of the conservative clergies and the supreme leader of Iran Ali Khamenei. The victory of Khatami apparently presumes that elections were free, fair and open. Yet to say that the elections were free, fair and open is a misleading argument. The elections were free fair and open in the sense that both candidates competed on the heart of the voters and the candidate who received the majority of the votes is the one who also won the elections. Khatami received around 20 million votes out of 29 million or almost 70% of the votes. Yet the elections were not free, fair and open in the sense that the presidential and parliamentary (Majlis) candidates should be approved by the supreme leader Khamenei and the Council of Guardians. Members of this Council are clerics who are appointed for life and are not accountable to the parliament or any other body.
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In addition there is an unofficial ban on the formation of political parties. Candidates can run as independents. In the 1997 elections the Council rejected 234 candidates out of 238. In other words only four candidates were allowed to run in these elections. Women are not allowed to run according to article 115 of the Constitution that states that the president must be a man. Yet women in Iran are allowed to vote and to compete in the parliamentary elections (there are several females deputies in Iran’s parliament). The rejection of the female candidates by the conservative Council has mobilized women in favor of Khatami against the Guardians Council’s candidate. In short, Iran is far from being called a democratic state. The dynamism for more democratization and openness is already there, however. The 1997 elections paved the way toward more democracy and pluralism. Constitutional provision allows the formation of parties, albeit they are effectively banned.
89
More openness could be a stage for the formation of political parties in Iran. In addition there are various newspapers that reflect the limited political spectrum in Iran. Iran does not have, moreover, the traditional dynastic system that prevails in the Arab Monarchies in the Gulf, where the supreme leader is not given to any supervision and does not stand to any sort of democratic elections. In Iran even the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can be removed with two thirds of the votes of the Assembly of Experts. Members of the parliament are of course elected in popular elections. And the President needs his cabinet to be approved by the parliament. The absolute majority in the elections that was given to Khatami indicates that the Iranian people are thirsty for a change. The conservative clergy, moreover, cannot ignore 70% majority and cannot block a change. They may be able to impede but not to block it. At home Khatami is expected by his constituents to relax restrictions on women such as on their dress and movement.
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Khatami may face here a strong opposition from the clergies who are in favor of imposing the laws of the Islamic Sharia'a that restricts women’s activities. In order to approve his policy President Khatami needs the consent of the parliament and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In foreign relations, Khatami already expressed his inclination in a CNN interview to relax relation with the West and especially with the U.S. Here too Khatami may face a strong ideological resistance by clerics who still see America as the ‘Great Satan’. The current U.S. policy toward Iran does not help Khatami to overcome the conservatives’ resistance. The U.S. has imposed unilateral sanctions against Iran and it leads a worldwide campaign to isolate it. Iran is mentioned in the American Middle Eastern lexicon as a ‘rogue state’ together with Libya and Iraq. Iran can find other sources to trade with and to minimize the impact of the U.S. economic sanctions. These sanctions, however, have a very significant psychological effect. The deteriorating economic situation in Iran and the increasing unemployment intensifies the ideological debate between the radicals and the moderates in favor of the former. The hard-liners can use the sanctions in order to illustrate the U.S. as a scapegoat for the economic problems of Iran.
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The origin of the animosity of Iranians against the U.S. is not because Iranians are anti-Westerns by nature, but because of the U.S. support of the Shah. In 1953 the CIA has organized a coup against the elected parliament and Prime Minister Musadeq who overthrew the Shah. The CIA managed to bring the Shah back to power. The Shah then declared that he owes his rule to Allah and the head of the CIA. Would not Iran escaped the American sphere of influence, it would still under the tyrant rule of the Shah. Iran does not have friends in the American Congress or in the State Department. Many in the Clinton’s administration are calling for imposing more sanctions on Iran. The hard-liners in the U.S. include the Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, Bruce Riedel, the National Security Council’s top Middle East expert, among others. These are calling for strict sanctions against Iran. There are others that call for waiving the sanctions. These include the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Stuart Eisenstat, and other top officials such as Strobe Talbott and Thomas Pickering a former ambassador to Israel.
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Restricting the sanctions strengthen the radical clergies, waiving them bolster Khatami and other moderate figures. The ball is in the American side right now.
Conclusion:
In this article I tried to show that neither structural factors, nor personality explain the American foreign policy in the M-E. It is the essentialist discourse that channels policy-makers’ behavior. A president who is elected to office for a four-year term, and who seeks to be reelected for a second term, is persuaded by essentialists that if and only if the U.S. cooperates with authoritarian regimes it can realize the American interests in the M-E without major shocks. If this policy worked in the past, then there is no reason that it may not work in the future. The question is at what cost? An American president, who thinks about winning a second term or supports the vice president to be elected, adopts the essentialist rationality. This rationality, however, is based on the relative rationality of the essentialists. It is neither necessarily deemed to be true nor can appeal to an absolute rationality or Truth. There could be other ways to realize the American interests in the M-E at lower costs. The long-term American interests—stable oil market and stable peace process—require 180 degrees change in the U.S. foreign policy in the M-E. There is no conflict between the West and the M-E over material resources. On the contrary, the material interests of the two supplement each other. Essentialists draw a conflict that is based on abstract ideological interests that is usually regarded by political scientists as marginal interests that are not suppose to bring about a major conflict. Therefore, the conflict does not exist in reality and it is a creation of our mind. Weighing the American costs of defending the Gulf states against its gains from exporting cheap oil indicates that the U.S. should change its policy towards actively encouraging democratization in the M-E that lowers its costs. Based on the assumption that democratic states do not fight each other, the U.S. can kill two birds in one shot: it promotes stable peace process with Israel, and it reduces its defense costs in the Gulf. It is not the purpose of this article to indicate how the democratization strategy should be implemented—it could be implemented gradually. The purpose is to show that reality in the M-E is socially constructed and there may be other less costly ways to realize the American interests.
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Notes:
Note 1:
Although the article refers to the Islamic culture in general, it focuses on the Muslim Middle Eastern countries only. The Middle East in my definition includes also the Arab states in North Africa. In the M-E of our era only two countries are regarded as democratic states: Israel and Turkey. The latter still however not regarded as fully democratic state because of the human rights abuse in this country, the depression of the Kurds minority and the role of the military in keeping the state secular. Back.
Note 2:
The differences between orientalists and neo-orientalists is elaborated below under the section "American Cognition of Muslims". I will use the term essentialists to refer to both schools. Back.
Note 3:
See Barnett, 1995. Back.
Note 4:
Essentialists argue that in Islam culture there is no separation between the religious realm and the political realm, Islam rejects modernism, secularism and Westernism, therefore Muslims reject also democratic values. Yet there is no unanimous agreement on these issues among scholars. See Sami Zubaida, 1989. Back.
Note 5:
For explanation about how moderate and radical Muslims interpret these terms see Moussalli 1995. Back.
Note 6:
Sayyid 1995, 270. Back.
Note 7:
Fuller and Lesser, 1997: 43. Back.
Note 8:
The democratic peace theory claims that democratic states do not fight against each other, while democratic and non-democratic states fight more often than two non-democratic states. See Oneal and Russett, 1997. Israel is a democratic state while its neighbors are not. Despite the Cold Peace between Egypt and Israel, the US has rewarded Egypt with billions of dollars for signing the Camp David accord. Probably this aid is the only factor that still holds this peace alive. Back.
Note 9:
Realists claim that promoting democracy may bring to power radical dangerous groups such as the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930’s. Thus the US should be concerned about realizing its interests at the least costly way without giving attention to moral aspects. For explaining the differences between realism and internationalism see Krauthammer, 1986. See also Mearsheimer, 1994/95. Back.
Note 10:
Cox, 1996; Rosenau, 1990; Ashley, 1989; Neufeld, 1995; Vertzberger, 1990. Back.
Note 11:
Robert Cox, 1996: chap. 4. Back.
Note 13:
It may seem rational to pursue such policy with the same costs during the Cold War, since the gains of one superpower were the losses of the other. We need to calculate gains within the context of the global competition. In the post-Cold War era, the US is released from global competition, however. Back.
Note 14:
Quoted in Talbott, 1996: fn. 2. Back.
Note 15:
Quoted in Talbott, 1996: 47. Back.
Note 16:
Quoted in Carothers, 1997: 86. Back.
Note 17:
Samuel Huntington identifies three waves of democratization: The first wave lasted from 1828 to 1926; the second wave from 1943 to 1964; the current expansion of democratization in the world since 1974 is the third wave. See Huntington, 1991: 16. Back.
Note 18:
Thomas Carothers, 1997, 87. Back.
Note 19:
Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: chap. 1. Back.
Note 21:
The rogue states in the M-E are Iran, Iraq and Libya. Back.
Note 22:
Although Jordan has experienced elections for the parliament in the last several years, King Hussein still enjoys a lot of support from Israel and the West and he is regarded as the supreme sovereign of the country. The King has the power to dissolve the parliament at any time he wishes and he decides upon whom will be the Prime Minister. The latter is subordinated to the King and not to the parliament. In the last elections in 1997 the Islamic Party boycotted the elections as protest for the lack of authority for the parliament. Back.
Note 23:
See Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 225; see also Niblock, 1993: 58-71. The Egyptian regime is afraid that with the experience of 1977-Infitah policy, economic reforms will cause to political turmoil as a result of a rise in prices of basic goods and consequently a demand for political reforms. Back.
Note 24:
Assuming that the scenario of Algeria will be iterated in other states in the M-E that will hold elections. Even though that this prediction, that is based on the past experience of one or two countries, might be too simple and of course not true. The civil war in Algeria might prompt Arab people in other Arab states that hold elections not to vote for the Islamic religious parties in order to avoid the Algerian chaos. Back.
Note 25:
Democracy was not developed smoothly in the West either. The US experienced civil war in 1860’s several decades after that democracy was introduced in America one of the bloodiest in history up to that time. The UK has also experienced a civil war. France has experienced a bloody violent revolution. See Barrington Moore, 1966. In Germany, democracy brought to power in the early 1930’s one of the most radical and racist regimes that history ever known. Italy was ruled by a Fascist regime for more than two decades till it was defeated in WWII by the allies. The external intervention in Italy has installed democracy in this country that was threaten by communism in its first decade after W.W.II. Back.
Note 26:
Cases of humiliation by the US against the Arab world are: support of Israel in finance, diplomacy (vetoes in the UN security council in favor of Israel) as well as in military aid as the latter oppressed the Palestinian people, and violated the international law in its settlement policy and confiscation of Arab land; intervention in Lebanon beside the Christian Maronites; the sanctions against Libya; and last but not least the American lack of sensitivity for the starvation of the Iraqi people since 1991. In general the US builds good relations with the regimes in the M-E but not with the people. Back.
Note 27:
The will of the Islamic people is not necessarily the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic regime. Even in Iran the unification of different social stratum under the Islamic wings was not natural, but it a result of the circumstances in which the mosque was the only institution within which opposition groups can gather and express their resistance against the regime. And of course the mosque is the ‘yard’ of Islamic clerics. See Parsa 1989: chaps. 6 &7. Back.
Note 28:
Essentialist scholars perceive Islamic groups as one monolith. They do not distinguish between moderate Muslims and radical ones. In my view, elected Islamic movements are more moderate in their interpretation of the Koran. For a distinction between moderate and radical Islamic groups see Moussalli 1995. See also Abu Khalil, 1994. For the illustration of Muslims as a monolithic movements see Lewis, 1990; Pipes, 1986, 1990. Back.
Note 29:
A domino theory for the M-E with contagious effects from one country to another. Revolution in one country will cause to unrest and consequently to a revolution in its neighboring country. Back.
Note 30:
The sanctions against Iraq are an example of irrational policy by the US. This policy has been criticized by France and Russia for not giving Saddam any tempt in exchange for his compliance with UN resolution that calls for the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The sanctions against Iran and Libya by the US are another examples. Notice that Libya asked that the trial for the suspected terrorists in the explosion of the Pan Am plane above Scotland in 1988 to take place in a neutral state in order to secure objective trial for them, but the US and Britain refused. This coercive policy against Libya that is accompanied by humiliation seems irrational. Rational policy is more concerned about the ends and less about the employed instruments what Max Weber calls instrumental rationality. Back.
Note 31:
I found my contentions about the establishment of democratic regimes in Latin America on the hegemonic theory of Gramsci who claims that through democracy and market economy it is possible to develop consensus and common understanding between the elites in both the hegemonic country and the developing countries and consequently a domination by the hegemon. Gramsci develops his theory on a bourgeois society where the bourgeois class dominates the working class. Cox and other scholars have extended his theory to the international system. Through a coalition between elite groups in the hegemonic state and the periphery state(s), the former can realize their interests without the need to resort to coercive means. See Cox, 1983, 1994; Robinson 1996. Back.
Note 33:
The US did not supported the American MNCs after that the properties of the these were confiscated. As Prof. Krasner claims, the American government saw the nationalization of national resources as a legitimate action. Moreover, the US government has interests that goes beyond the narrow interests of American MNCs. See Krasner, 1978: 15. Back.
Note 34:
See Salla, 1997: 729-31; Sadowski, 1993. Back.
Note 35:
As Orientalist scholars I can mention Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington and Eli Kadouri; as Neo-orientalists Daniel Pipes, Patricia Clone among others. Sadowski, 1993. Back.
Note 36:
Sadowski, 1993: 18. Back.
Note 37:
Pipes 1986: 942-3. Back.
Note 38:
Advocates of the reformist school are: John Esposito, James Piscatori, Edward Said among others. Back.
Note 39:
Quoted in Esposito, 1992: 168. Back.
Note 40:
Can we categorize the resistance by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation as terrorism? If Denmark were the Holy Land of Jews and the latter would occupy it, then the people in Denmark would resist in the same way that the Palestinians has resisted. The Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation is not different from any other resistance against colonialism or any other sort of occupation. In the case of the Palestinians the problem is much more acute, since Israel expelled Palestinians, confiscated their lands, and built settlements for Jewish residents on Palestinian land. Wouldn’t the Palestinians rebelled against Israeli occupation, Israel would not recognize their rights as a people and sign the Oslo accord. Thus there was no other way to compel Israel to come into terms with the Palestinians without the latter resort to violence. Back.
Note 41:
Pipes, 1990: 29. Quoted in Sadowski, 1993: 14. Back.
Note 42:
Esposito, 1992: 168. Back.
Note 43:
See Huntington, 1976: 28. Back.
Note 44:
See Lewis, 1990: 48. Back.
Note 45:
The slogan "Islam is the solution" indicates that there are acute problems in the Arab world that need an immediate solution. All agree about the existence of the problems, such as the Palestinian problem, the weakness against the West, inequality in the distribution of wealth, moral and social devaluation etc., where Islam proclaimed by fundamentalists as the best solution. Yet of course not the only one. Back.
Note 46:
Drysdale and Blake; Quoted in Lustick, 1997: 653. Back.
Note 47:
See Huntington, 1992. Back.
Note 48:
See Lewis, 1990: 49. Back.
Note 49:
Lewis, 1990, 48. To prophesy a behavior of an empire, that does not exist, on the basis of verses from the Koran, that are given to different interoperation like the task that Bernard Lewis tries to do, is too ambitious and unscientific task. Positivist Weberian theories in social science adopt the term instrumental rationality. Accordingly, people are perceived as rational agents who have defined preferences and employ the most efficient means that help them to realize their interests. Form this perspective, even evil regimes such as the Nazi regime is considered rational. A scholar that employs this method of research should put himself in the shoes of the decision-maker and to analyze from the latter point of view the rationales behind his behavior. See Max Weber, 1993. Back.
Note 50
Barber, 1996: 9, 11. Back.
Note 51:
In the First Gulf War, it was not Khomeini who declared war against Iraq, on the contrary, it was Saddam who initiated this war with the encouragement of Israel and the US that supplied him with weapon. Back.
Note 52:
Esposito, 1992: 7. In Israel, since the establishment of the Jewish State, religious Jewish parties have been always part of the government’s coalition. Parties like Agodat Yesrael and the National Religious Party (NRP) were only once not part of the coalition government under prime minister Rabin in 1992 because of the secular ideology of this government, and its peace initiation that was fraught with withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Radical religious elements unofficially announced "Rodef" fiat against Rabin, which means that according to the Jewish religion this man betrayed his people and he should be killed. Supporters of these parties illustrated Rabin in Nazi SS uniforms in one of their demonstrations against the government peaceful policy in 1994 in Jerusalem. These parties are not only percieved as modest, but they are part of the Israeli political center and they are members of the coalition again in Natanyahu’s government. While Arab parties and secular Jewish parties from the left such as Meretz party are not accepted as part of the Israeli center. Notice that Jewish and Muslim fundamentalist movements call for a similar, yet opposite outcome—both claim that the whole Holly Land belongs to them and they exclude the other side totally. Extremist Jews, however, are part of the government and are not condemned by the West, the way extremist or even moderate Arabs are condemned. Back.
Note 53:
See Huntington 1976: 28-31. Barber: 1995: 9. Back.
Note 54:
Esposito, 1992: 5. Back.
Note 55:
See Hudson, 1991; Norton 1995. Back.
Note 56:
See Norton 1995. Back.
Note 57:
Quoted in Moore 1994: 46-7. Back.
Note 58:
See Ghabra, 1997. Back.
Note 59:
Middle Eastern states are the major importers of weapon in the world. If states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cannot protect themselves and they rely on the US in this regard, then why these states import so much weapon! In 1985 Saudi Arabia spent $24.5 billion on military expenditures or %20 of its GDP. In 1995 it spent $13.2 billion. See Gregory Gause III, 1997. Back.
Note 60:
William Rugh was former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Rugh, 1997: 50. Back.
Note 61:
Goodson and Radwan, 1997: 8. Back.
Note 62:
According to Hudson, during the parliamentary elections in 1990 only 44% of the registered voters voted, and only one third of the eligible voters were registered. Hudson, 1991: 413; see also Goodson and Radwan 1997: 12. Back.
Note 63:
Clarke, 1997: 201. Back.
Note 64:
Clarke, 1997: 202; Sadowski, 1990; Liberalization of the Egyptian economy should not be different from the liberalization of economies of other developing country according to the IMF structural adjustment program. There are strategic reasons why the U. S. gives Egypt a special treatment and mitigates the IMF pressure for more liberalization. Back.
Note 65:
Sadowski, 1990: chap. 1. Niblock, 1992: 58-71. Back.
Note 66:
Sadowski, 1990: chap. 5. Back.
Note 67:
Sadowski, 1990: chap. 1. Back.
Note 68:
Neoclassical economic adjustment according to the IMF include: reduction in the role of the government in the market as an employer, reduction in the government’s budget by cutting subsidies, privatization, openness of the market before foreign competition, devaluation of the currency, stabilizing the interest rate etc. See Bird, 1996. Back.
Note 69:
Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 28/3/1987. Back.
Note 70:
Sadowski, 1991: chap. 5. Back.
Note 71:
Bahry, 1997: 43. Back.
Note 72:
Murphy and Gause, 1997, 65. See also Stork, 1997, 33. Murphy and Gause claim that between late 1994 and early 1997, 25 people were killed. Stork contend that since June 1997, 9 people were killed. Back.
Note 73:
An estimated number; see Bahry, 1997: 47. Back.
Note 74:
Strok, 1997: 33. Back.
Note 75:
Bahry, 1997: 50. Back.
Note 76:
Notice that the riots in Bahrain were not ignited as a result of encouragement by Iran, but spontaneous riots as a result of the internal political exclusion of the Shi’a population and their economic distress. Back.
Note 77:
Quoted in Stork, 1997: 33. Back.
Note 78:
Quoted in Stork, 1996: 46. Back.
Note 79:
Quoted in Stork, 1996: 46. Back.
Note 80:
Middle East Report, (July/September) 1997: 24. Back.
Note 82:
see Hudson, 1991: 421. Back.
Note 83:
See Parodi, et al, 1994. Back.
Note 84:
Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1992. Quoted in Parodi et al, 1994: 71. Back.
Note 85:
Parodi, 1994: 66. Back.
Note 86:
Articles 107-110 of the constitution gave the supreme religious leader the authority to veto all government’s decisions, and to dismiss the president. The constitution upholds in addition the formation of political parties, political associations and to uproot poverty. See Parsa, 1989: 254. Back.
Note 87:
See Ehteshami, 1995: 62. Back.
Note 88:
See Baktiari, 1997: 23. Back.
Note 89:
See Fairbanks, 1997: 56. Back.
Note 90:
Iranian women who travel in the streets need permission for that from their husbands or other close relatives if they are not married. Back.
Note 91:
See Baktiari, 1996:50. Back.
Note 92:
See Time magazine, Jan. 19, 1998: 35-36. Back.
Bahrain is an island state in the Gulf with/a>
72
"We support Bahrain’s efforts to ensure its stability, and we continue to accuse Iran as a threat to the stability of the region."
78
In a statement released by the Bahrain’s government, President Clinton declared:"The United States fully supports your government and the sovereignty and safety of Bahrain’s territories."
79
Yemen was united in May 1990 with the merger of the People Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY—South) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR—North). Yemen is interesting in two fold: First as a very poor state with income per capita of around $600. Second, Yemeni society is composed of many traditional tribes especially in the northern part of the country. "Arabia watches warily as Yemen marches toward democracy."
84
The U.S. was not ready to intervene in Yemen in 1994 during the civil war to help restore democracy. In the words of Parodi, et al,: "In the name of prosperity, the U.S. has turned its back on a fledging democracy in Yemen and formed an exclusive partnership with one of the last democratic states in the world, Saudi Arabia."
85
Since 1979, Iran ceased to be an American satellite in the M-E and it moved to an independent orbit. Because Iran became a source of inspiration for other Muslim societies, the U.S. wanted to circumscribe its revolutionary influence from spreading especially into its Arab neighbors. Therefore, the U.S. had supplied Saddam Hussein with weapon in his attack against Iran in the First Gulf War. Before the revolution, the U.S. had supported the conservative Shah and furnished him with weapon and military training. In 1953 the U.S. took side with the Shah against the liberal Prime Minister Mossadeq and the elected parliament.
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