|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 2/99
What’s Fair?—International Justice from an Environmental Perspective *
Department of Politics and Modern History
London Guildhall University
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
(Draft of work in progress.)
This paper proposes a definition of justice or fairness in terms that may be useful for discussions and analyses of international relations and international environmental affairs in particular. 1 Questions of sustainable development, often defined as environmentally benign socioeconomic development that meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, are intimately connected with successful efforts by countries to address adverse changes to the global environment. 2 According to the World Commission on Environment and Development, whose report Our Common Future popularized the notion of sustainable development, sustainability cannot be achieved if development policies do not consider the ramifications of resource accessibility and the distribution of benefits and burdens. Sustainability requires concern for social justice between and within generations. 3 Thus questions of environmental sustainability are closely associated with considerations of fairness and justice. 4 International justice or fairness will be defined here as a fair and just sharing among countries of benefits, burdens and decision making authority associated with international relations. Here I am particularly concerned with this definition (or partial movement toward one) in the context of international environmental issues. I start to elaborate this definition and suggest that environmental changes across the globe are a stimulus for renewed discussions of international justice.
Considerations of international justice have been important parts of international environmental negotiations over the last twenty-odd years, with the London amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances the Deplete the Ozone Layer, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, popularly referred to as the “Earth Summit”), and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), being prominent examples. 5 Alas, my effort to define international justice is doomed to only partial (if that) success. Even for the experts (I am not one), developing a definition that is uncontroversial and widely accepted is at least difficult and probably impossible. However, the process of trying to define international environmental justice may shed light on a concept that has become central to international deliberations that are addressing global environmental change.
This paper has a normative slant: Justice considerations ought to be a part of international environmental deliberations because that is what is morally right. More serious consideration of justice is likely to lead to less poverty and suffering in poor countries. Additionally, serious consideration of justice in international environmental politics may help protect the global natural environment, thereby promoting the well being of all of us—including non-human species.
Global environmental change has a profound effect on interpretations of justice. David Miller points out that for a state of affairs to be just it must result from the actions of persons, or at least be capable of being changed by human actions. He goes on to illustrate this point by example:
Thus although we generally regard rain as burdensome and sunshine as beneficial, a state of affairs in which half of England is drenched by rain while the other half is bathed in sunshine cannot be discussed (except metaphorically) in terms of justice—unless we happen to believe that Divine intervention has caused this state of affairs, or that meteorologists could alter it. 6
It is ironic that such a discussion would be hardly metaphorical today, barely two decades after Miller’s writing! To put it bluntly, industry and over-consumption on this side of the world causes foul weather on that side of the world. 7 Miller’s example of where justice does not apply is precisely where it ought to—and does—in the current and especially future contexts of global environmental change. 8 Climate change and the international collaboration to deal with it and other environmental changes pose profound burdens and potential benefits for almost all countries, thus presenting us with important practical and ethical questions of international justice.
Consequences of international environmental pollution, such as stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean pollution, and climate change, can be limited or prevented only if both economically developed and large developing countries reduce their polluting emissions. Unilateral efforts by the developed industrialized countries, while essential as a first step, will be overwhelmed as the large developing countries use more energy and produce more environmental pollutants. If China burns its vast coal reserves and Brazil cuts its expansive rain forests, greenhouse gas levels will increase beyond the potential control of the industrialized countries. While the developed countries must do much more to reduce their own emissions of greenhouse gases, the developing countries must be persuaded that they should forgo the energy-intensive industrialization enjoyed by the developed countries, and instead develop in a manner that does not rely as heavily on fossil fuels. Such persuasion will require substantial concessions on the part of the developed countries, including redistribution of funds and technology. For example, the climate regime that is evolving from the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) includes requirements and provisions for technology transfers and financial assistance to developing countries. With time these initiatives may spread to other issue areas, perhaps leading to a constructive dialogue about omnipresent and persistent problems of North-South justice. 9 In any case, extent to which there is sustainable development in the developing world is a global concern that will require more serious attention from the developed world—and this will be more true as the South grows and adopts consumption patterns analogous to those in the profligate North.
The concept of sustainable development, because it brings together notions of ecology, economic development and poverty, sets the stage for incorporation of justice into international discourse. It is difficult to think about sustainable development, either from the international or national perspectives, without at least implicitly thinking about justice. Maldistribution of social, economic, political and environmental resources is often synonymous with unsustainable development. The poor are concerned about fulfilling their basic needs and, once that is accomplished, raising their living standards. They are unlikely to be concerned with environmental changes whose adverse effects will be experienced or suffered in the relatively distant future, especially when those problems are largely caused by, and especially concern, the wealthy people of the world who the poor often blame for much of their suffering. The people of the developing world believe that it is unfair for the citizens of the developed countries to ask the poor to forgo development so that the North can continue to consume as it has so far. Only if the poor are treated fairly by the rich will they genuinely join in efforts to protect the global environment. Thus, environmental change issues create a situation in which interpretations of justice at the international level have greater salience than they might have without that environmental change. 10
International environmental deliberations have become an important forum for discussions of international justice, at least insofar as considerations of fairness are incorporated into efforts to protect the global environment and to prevent social and economic policies that contribute to its destruction. Provisions for justice in UNCED agreements and related conventions (e.g., the FCCC) include calls for new and additional funds and technology transfers on preferential terms to help developing countries develop in a sustainable fashion, as well as changes to voting arrangements in international environmental funding institutions (e.g., the Global Environment Facility [GEF]) to give developing countries more authority in deciding how to allocate development aid. 11 Other conferences have tackled considerations of international justice (e.g., the 1995 United Nations World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen), but it may be in the environmental issue area that new progress is made, in large measure because so many countries may suffer the consequences of global environmental change, and because the developed countries—which are best equipped to take effective action—are recognizing the degree to which poverty and old-fashioned industrialization in the poor countries can contribute to adverse environmental changes that can affect the developed countries’ environmental security and economic vitality. 12 This still begs the question of what we mean by “justice” and “fairness” in this context.
What is Justice?
The definition of international justice described here is meant to be only the most basic proposal. It may be neither possible nor desirable to have only one definition of justice; governments and individuals may never agree on one and to do so would likely stifle consideration of many inequities which would not fit the strict definition. To seek a single definition of justice may be, according to one observer, a “hopeless and pompous task.” 13 When surveying the literature on justice and social justice, as Bernard Cullen notes,
The dominant impression is of something approaching philosophical pandemonium. When researchers in other disciplines. . . concerned with issues of justice and injustice approach the philosophers in search of a generally accepted definition and analysis of the object of their study, they are faced with a cacophony of discordant philosophical voices. Probably the most apt term to characterize the dozens of theories. . ., when taken together, is “incommensurability.” 14
Hedley Bull said that justice is a term which can ultimately be given only some kind of private or subjective definition. 15 When examining problems of distributive justice, according to Stanley Hoffman, “even within the same ideological camp, one man’s remedy is another man’s poison. We find here the interaction of embattled systems of ethics, intractable political realities, and extraordinary scientific ignorance.” 16 What constitutes justice and fairness even within national societies is subject to profound disagreement. Such is also the case with more widespread applications of justice.
Justice and justice refer to the notion that individuals ought to receive the treatment that is proper and fitting for them; in short, to each his or her due. The subject matter of justice is the manner in which benefits and burdens are distributed among human beings. The discussion here is concerned with social (as opposed to legal) justice or, more specifically, distributive justice, which generally refers to the “fairness” or “rightness” of distributing benefits and burdens within communities. 17 Often the concern is with distributing economic benefits, but frequently the goal is to fairly distribute other things that people care about, such as political power. Justice is not concerned merely with who has how much of what; for one person to have more than another is not intrinsically unjust, at least according to most philosophers. For us to apply conceptions of justice to any given situation there must be some relation between actors that somehow affects the distribution. 18 Thus, social justice is concerned with distributing benefits and burdens that are a result of social relationships and institutions. 19
Beyond the notion of distribution within some sort of social arrangement, what else might we mean by “justice”? We might start by saying that each person ought to receive his or her due, based on rights, equality, fairness, merit (“desert”), need or some other criteria, or that each person ought to receive a share of some good depending on the extent to which that distribution will contribute to some desired consequence (e.g., the utilitarian would seek to promote the greatest overall “happiness”).
Discussions of justice usually involve two general categories of issues: procedural issues (dealing with how decisions are made) and consequentialist issues (the outcomes of decisions). Procedural justice requires that basic rights of actors be respected in decision making, and that those affected by decisions be allowed to participate in the formulation of those decisions. Thus we might say that those affected by pollution ought to have a say in how it will be prevented or mitigated, as well as being involved in deciding who will benefit from efforts to make right past pollution. Fair procedures can lead to unjust outcomes, so we must ask how valuable it is to follow a rule even if it usually results (or did in the past) in a just outcome. Consequentialist justice demands that there be a fair actual distribution of burdens and allocation of benefits. For example, past polluters may be required to pay those who have suffered from their pollution. In the case of procedures or process, the question may be “On what principles should the distribution take place?” In the case of outcomes, we might ask “Who, and how many, should have how much? What would a fair distribution look like? Would it encompass striking inequalities?” 20
What is International Justice?
Principles of justice have taken on greater salience in international relations in conjunction with changes in global economic and environmental interdependence. The twentieth century has witnessed increasing disparities in wealth between North and South (and within many national communities). This, coupled with increasing awareness of these disparities from improved communications and information technologies, travel and trade, and, importantly, the increased capacity to redistribute resources around the globe, has given prominence to issues of international justice. It is not possible to deny that hundreds of millions of people (most often) in the poor countries are suffering, nor is it possible to deny that the developed countries are fully capable, given the will, to substantially reduce this suffering. 21
In national communities, justice is concerned with serious consideration of differences between people and their often irreconcilable interests and desires. Justice calls for the differences that are created by social arrangements to be justified. At the international level, differences between countries and people are often the result of international interaction and cooperation. Thus international justice requires that these differences be justified somehow. Conceptions of international justice, according to Chris Brown, “ought to allow us to place relations between rich and poor countries on a footing that recognizes diversity yet meets the obligations people have towards one another—or, at least, tries to perform the same sort of role that notions of justice try to perform in domestic society.” 22
With this in mind, we might define international justice as a fair and just sharing (or distribution) among countries of benefits, burdens and decision making authority associated with international relations, in this case within the context of international environmental issues (what one might want to call “international environmental justice”). Following is a discussion of the various components of this definition. To be sure, this is not a precise definition, but such a discussion can illuminate recent changes in the world—not least environmental changes—that arguably make considerations of international justice increasingly germane to discussions of international relations, global economic disparities, and protection of the natural environment.
“A Fair and Just Sharing”
Why “a” fair and just sharing? “A” (as opposed to “the”) is meant to suggest that many definitions of what is fair and just are part of the political and philosophical debates; on the ground, the content of justice depends on who one is talking to. To deny this might stifle arguments about justice in the non-ideal world. There is no universal definition. We might be able to agree on a few definitions of international justice, but we would be disappointed if we thought that we could boil down the qualities and principles of fairness, justice, and so forth into only one universal concept. The definition presented here is a starting point; it is not the final word. Nevertheless, it may help some of us (laypersons) get our minds around the role of justice in international environmental politics.
What is “fair and just” in international relations? This is the most difficult question. In the final analysis, what is considered fair and just will be subject to the constraints of political bargaining between the actors, still usually nation-states but also other actors like non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. What is accepted by rational persons or governments (or their diplomatic representatives) is usually what is, at that time and in that circumstance, “just.” 23 We cannot separate philosophical principles from politics in the non-ideal world of international politics. But looking at philosophical notions like justice will help us better understand—and can certainly help us make value judgments about—the outcomes of international environmental deliberations like the UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and ongoing negotiations on climate change.
Why “sharing” and not “distribution”? According to the Oxford Dictionary, “share” means to have or use with another or others; to get, have, or give a share of; to participate in; to divide and distribute. Similarly, Webster’s Dictionary defines the word as to separate and parcel out in shares, or apportion; to take part in, use, or have in common, as in share responsibilities; to have or take part, or participate. 24 The word is used here synonymously with “distribution,” which could be substituted in the definition quite easily. But “distribute” suggests (at least to me) formality and a lack of interpersonal feeling and participation. Alternatively, “sharing” suggests at least subtle moral obligation as opposed to systematic distribution, occurring outside the constraints of governmental control if need be. One shares because one feels it is the right thing to do; one distributes out of some perceived or actual sense of imposed obligation. A child who has two pieces of candy is asked to share one with another child who has none; she is not asked to “distribute” half of her candy. One can say that we ought to share what we have with the needy; one can also say that we are obligated to distribute what we have to the needy. While both might be true and, to some degree, such obligation is implicit in the definition of international justice, when it comes to garnering public and political support for such notions in order to have an impact on the real world (i.e., insofar as the concept is developed as a prescriptive one), it might be easier to persuade others if one uses the more subtle word “sharing.” In politics, such nuances may make a difference. Additionally, the definition of “share” includes participation, thereby encompassing the sharing of decision making authority in international institutions.
“Among Countries”
Why “among countries,” as opposed to “between”? Why use the term “international” (as opposed to “transnational,” “North-South,” or some other term)? A definition of international justice should not be restricted to nation-state actors, to be sure. It should also encompass individuals, non-governmental and international organizations, and other groupings of people. The world is in fact made up of various disparate, oftentimes competing actors, much like in domestic society, including nation-states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, corporations and individuals who, acting knowingly or unknowingly in concert, can have great influence on the course of world affairs. These actors relate to one another, again much like in domestic society, in a myriad of complex, cross-cutting, voluntary and involuntary, cooperative or competitive ways. 25 The use of “international” here simply fits with common usage and should not preclude thinking in broader, worldwide terms. The definition is intended to cover relations within national communities that have external effects, relations between states (traditional conceptions of international relations), and relations among and across them (interactions and obligations between non-state actors, including individuals).
What is the scope of international justice? We can begin by combining notions of what might be called community justice (within states), international justice (between and among states), and interpersonal justice (between individuals). We might say that (1) states ought to be fair toward one another; (2) states ought to be fair to individual persons within and outside their jurisdictions, regardless of the individuals’ nationality (this begs the question of whether or not—or, more realistically, to what degree—citizens ought to be treated more or less justly than non-citizens); and (3) citizens ought to be fair to their fellow citizens, visitors from abroad, and citizens in other national jurisdictions.
According to Bull, in world politics there are three kinds of justice: justice between states and nations (international or interstate justice); justice between individual persons (individual or human justice); and justice for the whole world (cosmopolitan or world justice). 26 Bull says that the pursuit of justice beyond purely interstate relations might threaten the prevailing international order. But this is questionable regarding conceptions of international justice in the context of global environmental change. Indeed, promotion of international justice, at least in the environmental issue area, may promote order, especially if the alternative is ecological chaos caused by poverty in some countries and regions, and global environmental degradation caused by a few polluting states. Even Bull himself points out that “It can scarcely be doubted that an international society that has reached a consensus not merely about order, but about a wider range of notions of international, human and perhaps world justice, is likely to be in a stronger position to maintain the framework of minimum order or coexistence than one that is not.” 27
Like Bull, Terry Nardin asserts that international order should take primacy over international justice. A just world can be achieved when questions of ends or consequences are subordinated to process and procedures, which are the things that states are able to agree on. 28 Nardin declares that “While it is usual to demand that international law serve as the instrument of some higher purpose such as economic development and redistribution and that the only rules anyone has a duty to observe are those that serve to further these ends, the actual conduct of states suggests widespread recognition that such a doctrine is in fact subversive of a common moral order.” 29 While there is much to support this contention, in the context of global environmental change, especially given potential consequences from climate change in the next century, it seems that such a position could contribute to the subversion it warns of. Just as a domestic society with extreme disparities in wealth, manifested in abject poverty and starvation, and accompanied by severe environmental degradation that exacerbates poverty, is unlikely to be “orderly” (let alone “ethical”) without authoritarian controls, simultaneously addressing international injustice and environmental change can promote international order and justice—a conception of the “common moral order” to supplement Nardin’s. In the context of potential global environmental change that itself threatens order and the security of individuals and communities, not least nation states, 30 substantial efforts to increase international justice may result in a more stable international society.
Defining international justice only in terms of the entitlements and relationships of nation-states will inevitably lead to the neglect of injustices that arise in world affairs, especially in a world that is becoming more interdependent and more connected socially, culturally, economically, and environmentally. 31 Arguments regarding world order should not be seen as an obstacle to applying conceptions of justice to international relations; in fact, after considering the potential consequences of environmental change, they may bolster arguments for such an application. Having said this, while it may be desirable to view justice as operating between various actors, including individual persons, it in fact operates in large measure between states. States are equipped to deal with global environmental and economic problems, and the world is de facto divided into communities that derive much or most of their identity as states. Justice ought to be aimed at individuals, but states are the mediators that act to achieve it. “In other words,” according to Bonanate, “justice is an interindividual fact that is regulated by states.” 32
The world today consists of both rich and poor countries, pristine and polluted areas, persons and communities, and considerations of international justice need to be sensitive to these facts. Over emphasis on community and national autonomy may be something that should be abandoned over time, but for now state communities dominate. 33 While recognizing the lack of justice in international relations, Robert Keohane suggests that international organizations and regimes that are part of the contemporary “Liberal International Economic Order” are a middle ground between state-centered justice (“morality of states”) and international distributive justice (“cosmopolitan morality”), with the former still acting as an obstacle to greater realization of the latter. Successful efforts to promote international justice, in this formulation, would at least require recognition of the continued legitimacy of state interests. 34 States remain preeminent in most issue areas, including the environmental one. Nevertheless, many other actors (individuals, epistemic communities, bureaucracies, businesses, non-governmental organizations, international organizations with independent-minded staffs, etc.) operate across state borders, often outside the constraints of national governments. Hence the term international is used broadly to encompass other relevant actors in “international” affairs. “International justice” is used synonymously with what some might call transnational, world or global justice.
“Benefits, Burdens and Decision Making Authority”
What one means by “benefits and burdens” that are to be shared (distributed) depends on the issue area. Notions of justice in international relations have generally been exemplified by the idea that justice requires a redistribution of economic resources from rich to poor. Regarding global environmental issues, we might be concerned about the benefits and burdens associated with environmental pollution or resource scarcities caused by human-induced environmental changes, changes in consumption (sometimes, but not necessarily, associated with population growth), and social distribution of environmental resources (e.g., clean water, agricultural land, and so forth). 35 Stratospheric ozone depletion provides one good example. Benefits include the protection from harmful ultraviolet light from the sun, which can be disrupted by emissions of ozone-destroying chemicals, and the benefits associated with international agreements (i.e., the Montreal Protocol, as amended 36 , specifically the distribution of (1) financial aid by the Multilateral Fund, (2) technology transfers on preferential terms, and (3) extensions in emissions schedules for ozone destroying chemicals allowed developing countries. Burdens associated with the ozone agreements include (1) the harmful effects of ozone depletion (e.g., skin cancers, immune system suppression, eye damage, damage to agriculture and fisheries), which are more severe in poor countries inordinately dependent on agriculture and less able to deal with health consequences of ozone depletion, (2) direct costs associated with ozone destroying chemical emissions reductions, and (3) restrictions on the beneficial uses of ozone destroying chemicals, such as refrigeration and air conditioning, again inordinately felt by poor countries in need of the least expensive cooling machines. Thus benefits and burdens can be associated with the economic vitality of nations and communities, as well as the health and wealth of individuals (and their ecosystems).
What might one mean, when considering international justice, by the sharing of “decision making authority”? Here one might be especially interested in participatory rights, such as the right to participate in decision making regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens. This right, at least insofar as it is realized, is itself a “good” that can be distributed. 37 While it is not necessary that there should be a physical act of distribution in order to implement a distributive principle, 38 in this case it may be easier to envision the distribution of actual seats in a chamber where those seated have the authority to decide an outcome. Thus we might say that the UN General Assembly, where all member states have a full vote, is more (or less, depending on the criteria we use) just than the Security Council, where the five permanent members have veto authority. An example of a relatively just (by historical standards) decision making arrangement in the environmental issue area is participation and voting arrangements of the Multilateral Fund created primarily to help developing countries meet the provisions of the Montreal Protocol. 39 Those provisions give developing countries substantial authority in deciding which countries and programs will receive assistance from the fund. Similarly, the Global Environment Facility was restructured to give developing countries more authority in deciding how and where to allocate its funds for oceans, climate change, biodiversity and ozone protection. 40
“International Relations”
The term “associated with international relations” suggests that obligations associated with international justice derive, at least partly, from the interactions between countries and their citizens, and that such interactions have significant, often profound, influences on the global distribution of benefits and burdens. But, as already suggested, “international” is used loosely (“transnational” might be better) because I mean to include more then relations between nation-states. The world is increasingly characterized by interdependent and often cooperative economic, political, social and environmental relationships. As such, the world, including the inter-state system, is analogous to at least a primitive society. There is controversy among scholars regarding the extent to which contemporary levels of international cooperation and complex interdependence are analogous to “community” as described by many philosophers. 41 For those who cannot be convinced, it may be necessary to assert that while international society is not the same as domestic society, it is sufficiently similar to make considerations of international justice applicable, in the real world, to international environmental politics. R.J. Vincent points out that “if we are to work out principles of social justice for the world as a whole, there is no good reason to begin (and end) with the morality of states—which is founded on a doctrine of state autonomy that is no longer in touch with the facts of international life (if it ever was).” 42
A brief discussion of the (familiar) communitarian-cosmopolitan debate may help to clarify this point, especially if it is conducted with due consideration of the extent to which individuals—regionally and globally—share the natural environment and are being compelled by environmental change to cooperate in efforts to protect it. Discussions of justice frequently take either a cosmopolitan or a communitarian perspective. 43 Each perspective emphasizes different obligations. As the labels suggest, the communitarians would likely say that obligation is close to oneself, to one’s family, neighbors, and to one’s nation, while the cosmopolitans see obligation extending far away, even to people that we might never see or hear about, let alone meet in person or see on television.
According to John Rawls, a society is defined as a “cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” 44 Individuals “pre-exist” in society and cooperate to produce more goods, however defined, than would accrue from non-cooperative behavior. Communitarians emphasize that individuals are constituted, at least in large part, by the communities in which they live, and that their assessments of what is just will derive from their lives within that community. 45 “The root notion of communitarian thought,” according to Brown, “is that value stems from the community, that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership in a political community.” 46 According to this viewpoint, to the extent that people have a moral obligation to one another, they need act only to help people in their own community or at most their own country. To be sure, people in the rich countries may recognize that they can promote their own interests by providing aid to poor countries, or they may choose to be charitable toward them. But a communitarian would argue that the rich countries have no duty of justice toward the governments of poor countries, nor is there any duty toward individuals in those countries. “International society” is not analogous to domestic society, so we should not apply principles of justice to international relations.
While cosmopolitans have different theories and reach different conclusions about what constitutes justice, they share the conviction that any social order must derive its justification from how it affects the welfare of individual persons, assessed apart from the social relationships of those individuals. “Cosmopolitanism is clearly ‘universalist’ and ‘totalizing,’” according to Janna Thompson. 47 The cosmopolitan might argue that every person whose basic needs have been met has some obligation to help those whose basic needs have not been met. Peter Singer said that such obligations extend far and wide: “If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away).” 48 Charles Beitz believes cosmopolitan standards of international distributive justice, specifically egalitarianism, do apply because all persons should be treated fairly regardless of their nationality. 49 As Onora O’Neill points out, “if complex, reasoned communication and association breach boundaries, why should not principles of justice do so too?” 50 At the very least, a cosmopolitan might say, we have an obligation not to deprive people in other countries their basic subsistence needs, because to do so would violate all their other rights for which survival is a prerequisite. 51 Even if governments will not help each other, people ought to. In the words of Hoffman, “To put it bluntly, our obligation of justice toward the Bantus is exactly the same as our obligation of justice toward immediate neighbors.” 52 Even if we are psychologically incapable of fully comprehending the plight of people far away, we still have a moral obligation to assist in their welfare.
The distinctions between communitarian and cosmopolitan perspectives have become less salient as global inequalities and interdependence have increased. In many respects the notions of communitarian and cosmopolitan justice converge in the environmental issue area as they do in few others. For at least two broad reasons we can weave together notions of communitarianism and cosmopolitanism: First, increasing interdependence, interaction and cooperation—political, economic, social and cultural, environmental—are creating an international community analogous to domestic communities. Second, persons, even governments somewhat, do not restrict their loyalties to only one community, with environmental change being one of many catalysts for such multiple sympathies.
Global “Community.”
It would be wrong to limit the application of contractarian interpretations of justice to national communities, according to Beitz. Rather, these principles should be applied globally. 53 There is arguably little moral distinction between domestic and international obligations. The world is not made up of self-sufficient states; states are part of complex international economic, cultural and political relationships that “suggest the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation.” 54 A “society” of states does exist, and therefore we can apply community-based formulations of justice to the world. International relations is taking on the attributes of domestic society in ways that are relevant to considerations of justice. International interdependence in the forms of international communications, travel, trade, aid, and foreign investment is increasing. Beitz notes that for some countries’ involvement in the international economy can exacerbate economic and political inequalities between states and can adversely affect domestic economies, including domestic income distribution. In addition to the pattern of benefits and burdens that accompany global economic interdependence, there is now a global regulative structure involving financial and monetary institutions that regulate global economic transactions. “Taken together,” according to Beitz, “these institutions and practices can be considered as the constitutional structure of the world economy; their activities have important distributive implications.” 55
These economic institutions that characterize global interdependence are supplemented by political and legal institutions—including international environmental institutions—that affect the distribution of global economic benefits and burdens. According to Beitz, “In an interdependent world, confining principles of social justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benefit from living in ‘just’ regimes.” 56 We live in a world in which social cooperation has broken through state boundaries. International interdependence is characterized by complex patterns of social interaction that produce benefits and burdens that would not exist if states were self-sufficient. 57 Thus, according to this cosmopolitan perspective, people in the developed countries have an obligation to aid people in poor countries adversely affected by social cooperation at the international level. O’Neill may have it right: “In a world in which action affects distant others, justice cannot be stopped at local or national boundaries: there is no such thing as social justice in one country.” 58
The important question, then, is what is the fairest distribution of the benefits and burdens that result from international relations. Like economic interdependence, environmental changes (much of it arguably the result of economic interactions between states) thrust states and individuals into interaction and interdependence through the benefits and burdens inherent in its consequences, and through the necessity for international cooperation to limit and cope with its adverse effects. Climate change, for example, is caused to some degree by actions of individuals all across the globe. Similarly, the consequences of those changes will be felt, again to varying degrees, by people almost everywhere. As Matthew Paterson points out, “the interdependence between countries is undeniable, both in terms of the degree of interdependence (how dependent each country is on the actions of others for its welfare) and of the meaning of that interdependence (how this constitutes each country’s relationship to climate change).” 59
Multiple Community Loyalties
We are products of our communities, but this fact need not preclude us from having communal sentiments and even strong loyalties to more than one “community.” We can have strong loyalties to family members and to a larger community (e.g., neighborhood, town, nationality, state). We can have loyalties toward both our national state and the “global community.” While we may be more likely to assist fellow family members or fellow citizens of our national community, it does not follow that we would be willing to do so—or ought to do so morally—regardless of the cost of doing so to others. 60 Today we are increasingly the products of international society; young people especially are immersed in, shaped by, and identify with ideas and ideals, personalities, styles and other forms of popular culture that have no boundaries. Insofar as these things shape people’s identities, how can they not be sympathetic in some way to the larger world community?
Common threats such as global environmental change may accelerate the expansion and multiplication of community sentiments. If the United States had been attacked by the Soviet Union, Americans’ loyalties would no doubt be with the United States. If this planet were attacked by Martians, I suspect that the sense of community among Americans would be much broader, indeed worldwide. Climate change (and perhaps some other as yet unidentified environmental menace, such as increasing levels of toxic chemicals in the global biosphere) may be, albeit in slow motion, analogous to an attack from Mars. A sense of local community loyalty may be expanded to a sense of global community when focused by menaces that remind us that we all live in one world.
Alternatively, research by David Lumsdaine and others show that sympathies to a larger community—a sense of altruism toward people in other countries, especially the poor—can be a byproduct of specific types of domestic communities. 61 In short, countries that have generous arrangements for domestic social welfare (e.g., the Nordic states) are especially generous with their official development assistance. Their foreign aid tends not to be tied, tends to go toward multilateral institutions, and tends to be directed toward meeting peoples most basic needs. It also tends to be a much larger percentage of their national budgets and a larger percentage per capita than is the case with the more stingy developed countries. Not coincidentally, these are the same countries that have been most forthcoming with regard to efforts to help less affluent countries develop in an environmentally sustainable fashion. Countries that are generous at home are generous abroad. We may be a product of the domestic communities in which we were raised, but this does not mean that we will not have a feeling of obligation to other people far away; one’s domestic community can even cultivate such sentiments.
According to Hoffman, the scope of obligation regarding international justice falls between pure communitarianism (what he calls the “minimalist” position) and pure cosmopolitanism (the “maximalist” position).
Each view stands on strong moral grounds; neither one is acceptable if one insists on excluding consideration of the other. And therefore I end up somewhat inevitably with the philosophically untidy and politically elastic notion that the scope of our obligation to individuals in other societies varies in time and in space. There was none of it perhaps sixty or fifty years ago (or rather, very few people acknowledged one). There is some now, more widely recognized. If all goes well, and statesmen, writers, and so on, press on, it may grow in future. Our sense of obligation is of course strongest in our own community, but it also exists within larger groups, communities intermediate between the national one and mankind (let us say, the European community, for West Europeans), and it gets weaker as one goes farther away. 62
In short, our obligations of justice and mutual aid extend beyond our local or national communities to people in other countries, especially the poorest people in other countries. But the specific scope of our duties to these other persons is still evolving, both temporally and geographically, with the exception of situations in which the most elementary rights of other persons have been violated. 63 “We are dealing with something inconclusive,” according to Hoffman, “because it is of an intermediate and complex nature. Our duty is partly to states, partly to individuals. And our state of conscience is somewhere in-between the argument that we owe nothing, except a dole, outside of our community and the argument that we owe the same thing, full justice, to all mankind. So it is not shocking to find that the foundations of obligation are still shaky. It does not mean that we should not work at making them stronger and firmer.” 64 The potential consequences of global environmental changes mean that we may have no desirable choice but to work toward fulfilling Hoffman’s suggestion. This characterizes ongoing international environmental deliberations and goes a long way toward explaining provisions for international justice in nascent international environmental instruments dealing with ozone depletion, biodiversity, climate change, and other ecological issues.
Conclusion
While the notion of sustainable development is used so often and in so many contexts as to make its utility questionable, insofar as it brings together notions of development, poverty and environmental change it is germane to scholarly examinations and real-world discussions of international environmental relations and international justice or fairness. Effective measures to address adverse global environmental change require near universal participation. That participation is largely a function of international justice because developing countries are unlikely to join in international cooperative efforts to protect the global environment if those arrangements are viewed by them as being unfair or unjust. Thus international environmental justice, defined here as a fair and just sharing among countries of the benefits, burdens, and decision making authority associated with international relations, will have to be given serious consideration in ongoing and future international environmental deliberations. Politicians will grapple with the specific details and principles of international justice, but they ought to at least agree generally that their relations with one another must be fair. Without this assumption, agreements to protect the global environment and promote sustainable development will be more difficult to arrive at, and less effective in achieving their objectives.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 16–20 February 1999. Back.
Note 1: Justice in the context of environmental issues encompasses international, intergenerational and interspecies considerations. This paper emphasizes the first perspective and largely ignores the last one, reflecting in part the attention they receive in international environmental negotiations. For discussions of all three approaches, see David E. Cooper and Joy A. Palmer, Just Environments (New York: Routledge, 1995). Back.
Note 2: World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). The notion of sustainable development is subject to widespread dispute. See, for example, Sharachandra M. Lee, “Sustainable Development: A Critical Review,” World Development 19, 6 (June 1991), pp. 607–21. Back.
Note 4: One reason for the present effort to start elaborating a definition of international justice in the environmental context is that I have failed to do so adequately in the past. See Paul G. Harris, “Environmental Security and International Equity: Burdens of America and Other Great Powers,” Pacifica Review (forthcoming 1999); Understanding America’s Climate Change Policy: Realpolitik, Pluralism, and Ethical Norms, OCEES Research Paper No. 15 (Oxford: Oxford Centre for the Environment, Ethics and Society, 1998); “Affluence, Poverty and Ecology: Obligation, International Relations and Sustainable Development,” Ethics and the Environment 2, 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 121–38; “Environment, History and International Justice,” Journal of International Studies 40 (July 1997), pp. 1–33; “Considerations of Equity and International Environmental Institutions,” Environmental Politics 5, 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 274–301; “Global Equity and Sustainable Development,” Peace Review 6, 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 267–73. Back.
Note 5: Harris, “Environment, History and International Justice.” Back.
Note 6: David Miller, Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 18. Back.
Note 7: “Foul” weather in England may mean rain; in sub-Saharan Africa it may mean lack of rain. In both cases it may be caused by what people do half-way round the world. For the most respected analyses of climate change and the potential human causes of it, see J.J. Houghton et al., eds., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) Back.
Note 8: Assuming the scientists are correct in their dire—and increasingly well informed—predictions. I will operate under the assumption that the scientists’ forecasts are essentially accurate. Back.
Note 9: Cf. Oran Young, International Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 50. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 50. Back.
Note 10: See Harris, “Considerations of Equity and International Environmental Institutions.” Back.
Note 11: Harris, “Environment, History and International Justice.” Back.
Note 12: Harris, “Environmental Security and International Equity” and Understanding America’s Climate Change Policy Back.
Note 13: Kjell Tornblom, “The Social Psychology of Distributive Justice,” in Klaus R. Sherer, ed., Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 177. Back.
Note 14: Bernard Cullen, “Philosophical Theories of Justice,” in Sherer, p. 60. Back.
Note 15: Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 78. Back.
Note 16: Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 143. Back.
Note 17: This, of course, begs the question of precisely what is fair and right, to which I turn very briefly later, without coming to any resolution. In short, what attributes are attached to “justice” is the result of political bargaining among influential interested actors. Back.
Note 18: John Arthur and William H. Shaw, Justice and Economic Distribution (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 2–8. Back.
Note 20: Brenda Almond, “Rights and Justice in the Environment Debate,” in Cooper and Palmer, p. 12. Back.
Note 21: Cf. McElroy’s description of how the norm of international famine relief developed: Before the late 19th century, famines were considered acts of nature that required local remediation. But with advances in agriculture and the development of sophisticated international commodity networks in the latter half of the nineteenth century, famine became something that was eliminated in the developed countries. Famine was no longer viewed as a consequence of the cycles of nature, but rather as a terrible phenomenon that should be made rare by outside aid. The obligation to provide aid in times of famine accompanied these developments, and by the end of World War I the principle that governments have a moral obligation to help other countries that have experienced natural disasters became widely accepted. Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 58–59. Back.
Note 22: Chris Brown, International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 171. Back.
Note 23: This of course begs the question of whether the procedures by which such decisions are made are fair. Frequently in contemporary world politics they are not. See Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order (New York: Routledge, 1992). Back.
Note 24: The Oxford Dictionary and Usage Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 516; Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), p. 1071. Back.
Note 25: Cf. James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Back.
Note 26: Bull, pp. 81–86. Back.
Note 27: Ibid., p. 95. Understandably, Bull finds that the present international system is incompatible with world justice. Back.
Note 28: Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Back.
Note 29: Terry Nardin, “Justice in the International Society of States,” in Edward Weisband, ed., Poverty Amidst Plenty: World Political Economy and Distributive Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 208. Back.
Note 30: Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes and Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, 2 (1991), pp. 76–116; Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19, 1 (1994), pp. 5–40. Back.
Note 31: Cf. Thompson, p. 13. Back.
Note 32: Luigi Bonanate, Ethics and International Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 118. Back.
Note 33: Cf. Brown, pp. 170–71. Back.
Note 34: Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), chapter 11. Back.
Note 35: Cf. Homer-Dixon. Back.
Note 36: See London Revisions to the Montreal Protocol, June 1990, Article 10. Back.
Note 37: Including “decision making authority” in this way is also an effort to address some of the concerns of those who reject notions of common international standards of distributive justice and instead prefer to stress the process of interaction. See, for example, Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of State Back.
Note 39: The ethical implications of the Multilateral Fund are examined in Jay Shulkin and Paul Kleindorfer, “Justice Decisions: Economic Development and Environmental Prudence,” Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995), pp. 382–89. Back.
Note 40: See GEF, “Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility,” Report of the GEF Participants Meeting, Geneva, 14–16 March 1994 (31 March 1994), reprinted in Environmental Policy and Law 24, 4 (1994), pp. 192–200 Back.
Note 41: Notions of “international society” and “international community” are examined in Chris Brown, “International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 90–109 Back.
Note 42: R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 119 Back.
Note 43: Justice is but one of the issues encompassed by the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate. For a more comprehensive discussion of communitarian versus cosmopolitan conceptions of justice, see Thompson. Back.
Note 44: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 4 Back.
Note 45: Thompson, pp. 21–22 Back.
Note 46: Brown, International Relations, p. 55 Back.
Note 47: Thompson, p. 21 Back.
Note 48: Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, World Hunger and Morality (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. 28 Back.
Note 49: Charles Beitz, “Global Egalitarianism: Can We Make Out a Case?” Dissent, 26, 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 59–68 Back.
Note 50: Onora O’Neill, Faces of Hunger (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 282 Back.
Note 51: Cf. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2 nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 52: Hoffman, p. 153. (This is not the general view that Hoffman takes in the book.) Back.
Note 53: Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 128. Beitz argues that there is such a thing as an international “community,” in large measure a consequence of increasing global economic interdependence, thereby allowing him to apply community-based definitions of distributive justice to international relations. The interdependence inherent in global environmental change gives additional support to Beitz’s thesis. Beitz has changed his views since. See, for example, Beitz, “Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs,” in David Held, ed., Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). Back.
Note 56: Ibid., pp. 14–50. Back.
Note 58: Onora O’Neill, “Ending World Hunger,” in Aiken and LaFollette, p. 149. Back.
Note 59: Matthew Paterson, “International Justice and Global Warming,” paper for Conference on Ethics and Global Change, Reading University, 29 October 1994, pp. 10–11. Back.
Note 60: Brown, International Relations p. 186. According to Singer (p. 28), “The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.” Back.
Note 62: David H. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Alain Noel and Jean-Philippe Therien, “From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid,” International Organization 49, 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 52–53. Back.
Note 63: The latter might include fairly firmly established obligations, such as prohibitions against genocide or the requirement that countries with a food surplus aid communities suffering from famine. Back.
Note 64: Hoffman, p. 164 Back.
Email this citation