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The Competitive Effects of Political Homogeneity in International Relations: Social Identity Theory and Systemic Analysis
The University of Virginia
Department of Government and Foreign Affairs
International Studies Association
March 1998
I. Topic
In the study of international relations, international stability is one of the dominant themes. Yet, much of the variance on this variable remains under-explained. Why is it that some systems are crisis-prone, while others are characterized by amicable relations among the great powers? Why at some times are these crises likely to degenerate into war, while at other periods disputes are likely to be resolved peacefully? Finally, why is it that war, if it occurs, is at times fought for limited political objectives, while at others, war takes on a "total" quality, in which the goal is to repudiate the principles or regime type by which the enemy state claims to rule? Although the dominant extant systemic theory of international relations, neo-realism, has to varying degrees tried to answer these questions, it has consciously attempted to do so by limiting its analysis to the material dimensions of the structure of the international system. As is well known, variables such as regime type and defining ideologies of states are excluded from neo-realist analysis. Neo-realists justify this omission on two grounds. First, variables such as these are held to be unit-level in nature, and thus should be excluded from an analysis that claims to restrict itself to the level of the international system. Second, because "considerations of power dominate considerations of ideology," 1 such variables should be excluded from a parsimonious analysis on utilitarian grounds.
In contrast to the neo-realist position, the primary purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that one of the most effective ways of understanding variations in the degree of international stability is to examine the systemic effects of different levels of political homogeneity, coded as the degree to which the leaders of the great powers of a system perceive themselves to be members of the same regime type and dedicated to similar principles. In doing so, however, I must overcome both of the neo-realist objections against such a synthesis.
This paper will be divided into the following sections. First, I will examine how I operationalize both my independent (political homogeneity) and dependent variables (international stability). Second, I will explain both how the variables that constitute political homogeneity can logically be considered a systemic, as opposed to a unit-level, variable, and the importance of doing so. In the third and fourth sections, I will examine the causal logic that explains the relationship between my variables. In these sections, I draw on social identity theory and the competitive effects of systemic theory in order to deduce my hypotheses (which I exposit in the fifth section). Sixth, in order to demonstrate the importance of political homogeneity in understanding key international relations outcomes, I examine two historical eras: Europe during the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and the global international system that witnessed the end of the Cold War. In conclude with a brief examination of the significance of my analysis.
II. The Operationalization of Variables
A. The Independent Variable: Political Homogeneity
I operationalize political homogeneity as the degree to which the leaders of the great powers of a system perceived themselves to be members of a common regime type dedicated to compatible principles 2 . Coding homogeneity in this way has two critical advantages. First, relying on actors' perceptions of homogeneity will allow for a fairer test of the theory presented in this paper. If we want to examine the effects of political community on actor behavior, the actors must obviously believe themselves to be members of this community. It is unfair to test the effects of homogeneity by standards set by scholars centuries after events occurred. If leaders did not perceive themselves to be part of a community, the predictions made by my theory will obviously not be vindicated. These contrary outcomes, however, will not necessarily obtain because the theory is wrong, but because the preconditions for its testing were not met.
Second, relying on actors' perceptions allows me to overcome the methodological difficulty of precisely coding for political homogeneity. 3 As is well known, coding regime types and defining ideologies is an extremely difficult process. Was Germany before WWI a democratic or autocratic state? What about the American Confederacy during the Civil War? Were the principles that defined it liberal or illiberal? In my analysis, if there is not the clear and persistent belief among leaders that they belong to the same regime type dedicated to similar principles, I will not code the system as homogeneous. Once again, whether or not scholars today believe a state to fall into a particular category is irrelevant to the analysis at hand. I am interested in the systemic effects of shared political principles and regime types. If actors did not believe themselves to be participating in common political structures, we should not expect the hypothesized effects of my theory to manifest themselves.
Skeptics might be quick to claim that relying on actors' perceptions of homogeneity will allow for a tautological theory. Because leaders will redefine an enemy state as an "other" and an ally as a member of one's community, bellicose systems will always appear heterogeneous, and peaceful ones will appear homogeneous. This is a valid point. If leaders' perceptions of each others' polities are unstable, and especially if they are recoded after a change in the nature of their relationship, then relying on actors' perceptions to code systemic homogeneity would lead to an unfalsifiable theory. If, however, actors perceptions are stable across time, especially as systems change in their level of stability, then this methodological problem should not obtain.
A final component of my operationalization of political homogeneity is the establishment of minimum criteria for political homogeneity. Not all ideologies, even if shared by the great powers, can be considered the foundation for a homogeneous system. At a minimum, states operating within normative communities cannot view the overthrow of the governments of the other states within that system as a precondition for their own security. In short, states with compatible political systems may be, to use Raymond Aron's terms, "political adversaries," i.e. they may have competing foreign policy objectives, but they are not "enemy states." 4 They do not proclaim the very existence of the other state as a necessary permanent threat to their security. For this reason, if Nazism or Machiavellianism were to be adopted by all the great powers at a particular point in history, this system would nevertheless not be homogeneous one. An examination of the content (and not the international effects) 5 of these ideologies reveals that they advocate the overthrow of the international system in favor of a radical assertion of self-interest. These ideologies, and ones like them, thus preclude the possibility of states defining a part their national interests in terms of maintaining the health of the international system. Without this possibility, no homogeneous system is possible. 6
In sum, I will determine the presence and nature of political homogeneity in a two step process. First, I will try to discern to what degree leaders perceived themselves to be members of the same regime type, dedicated to similar principles. Second, I will ascertain whether these principles allowed sufficient toleration required for homogeneity. 7
B. The Dependent Variable: International Stability
As war has always been the greatest threat to a system's stability, as well as the greatest external threat to state security, I will operationalize the dependent variable as the presence or absence of war among the great powers. In addition to the simple dichotomy of fighting/no fighting, I will also incorporate into the content of this variable the intensity of the war and the political goals in fighting it. Specifically, was the object of any particular war "limited" (i.e. fought for specific and finite goals) or "total" (i.e. the states involved sought the overthrow of the opposing states' existing regime)? I add this dimension to my caused construct because if intersubjective values are important in the definition of state interests, a primary goal of wars among states with antithetical political systems will quite often be to repudiate the principles upon which an enemy state grounds its authority and legitimacy. By contrast, wars in homogeneous systems, if they occur, should by fought over limited material interests, with a concern not to disturb the internal constitutions of the opponent. Finally, to make my theory even easier to falsify, I will operationalize international stability as not only the presence or absence of fighting among the powers, but the presence or absence of major crises among them (defined as the threat, display, or use of force involving a great power).
III. The Effects of Changes in Political Homogeneity when Power is held constant: Why regime types and defining ideologies can be considered systemic, as opposed to unit-level, in nature. 8
There are two means by which I assert that variables that constitute political homogeneity such as regime types and defining ideologies should be considered systemic in nature. First, any variable that can be cast in distributional terms can be considered structural. This claim precisely follows Waltz's logic for the inclusion of capabilities into the definition of structure. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz asserts that although power capability is a characteristic of the units, the distribution of capabilities is not. 9 In other words, what defines this latter variable as systemic is its relational quality. Thus, the relative capabilities of each state is an important systemic factor in the decision-making process of the others. Similarly, by discussing the "distribution" of the political homogeneity across states, i.e. the degree to which the regime type and values intrinsic to a particular state are either hostile or compatible to the defining principles of the other units in the system, we can talk about these ideas as normative components of the international structure. By Waltz's own logic, these variables, when examined in relational terms, must be considered a component of the international system.
On several occasions, Waltz has addressed this claim that normative variables can be cast in distributional terms, thereby making them systemic. 10 In all cases, his response is the same: "considerations of power dominate considerations of ideology." 11 In other words, although logically ideas can be considered structural, their impact is so inconsequential compared to material factors that to include them in one's analysis would only clutter it with auxiliary variables that have no significant analytical impact. 12 Parsimony would be lost without a significant analytical gain.
The second means by which I am able to include regime types and defining ideologies as systemic variables addresses Waltz's objection to the first method. In short, this second means demonstrates the utility of including variations in the degree of political homogeneity into a systemic analysis. The means by which I hope to prove that systems with varying degrees of political homogeneity are qualitatively different from one another in critical respects are, I believe, unique. I intend to use the logic of neo-realism against itself. Neo-realists claim that systemic effects manifest themselves by facilitating state survival. 13 If I can show that the creation of and participation in homogeneous systems increases state security and welfare vis-a-vis participation in heterogeneous systems, the systemic importance of shared values must be admitted. In other words, my paper will demonstrate both deductively and empirically the systemic effects of political homogeneity in precisely the way in which Waltz claims systemic effects manifest themselves: through socialization and competition. 14
IV. The Effects of Changes in Political Homogeneity when Power is held constant: Social Identity Theory and International Stability
In brief, my hypothesized relationship that connects the degree of political homogeneity among the great powers to systemic stability and individual state security is as follows. The more homogeneous the system, in terms of the degree to which leaders of the great powers perceive themselves to belong to the same regime type dedicated to similar principles, the less likely that relations among these powers will be crisis-prone. The less crisis-prone a state's relations with other powers, the greater its individual security and welfare should be. Significantly, however, increasing homogeneity will not necessarily lead to an increase in systemic stability. For reasons that will be articulated shortly, as long as there is not complete unanimity among the great powers in terms of regime type and defining ideologies, there will in all likelihood be significant conflict between the members of the normative and political community and those that stand outside of it. Systemic stability will therefore in all likelihood be low as long as unanimity is lacking.
The following sections will attempt both to confirm the above assertions empirically, and to elaborate a causal logic that purports to explain these empirical findings. .
IV.1: Quantitative evidence of the effects of political homogeneity on international relations outcomes.
There is significant quantitative evidence that supports the two primary claims of the previous paragraphs. First, states, especially great powers, are much less likely to initiate conflicts against states of their own regime type than against other types of polities. This holds for both democracies and autocratic states, 15 and at all levels of conflict (e.g. the threat, display, and use of force, and war). 16 This result is corroborated by the fact that powers with the same political system are disproportionately likely to ally with one another than with other regime types. 17 Moreover, politically homogeneous systems have been extremely peaceful when compared to heterogeneous systems, regardless of changes in polarity. For example, from 1816 to 1870, the years of the Concert of Europe in which the leaders of all the powers believed themselves to be members of a political community, there were on average 1.7 disputes per year that involved these states. This is less than one half of the disputes for the years that followed (there were 3.8 disputes per year involving the great powers from 1871 to 1976), when the political homogeneity of the Concert was lacking. 18
The second proposition articulated in previous paragraphs is that although homogeneity significantly decreases the level and intensity of conflicts among members of a community, it in all likelihood will not increase the level of international stability unless all the great powers are members of the same community. Quantitative analysis confirms this claim as well. Indeed, the historical data reveals that increasing homogeneity actually leads to an increase in instability at the systemic level. 19 As increasing homogeneity leads to a decrease in disputes among members of a political community, yet an increase in international disputes, increasing homogeneity must imply a disproportionate increase in the number of disputes between members and non-members of the political and ideological community by which homogeneity is defined. 20
The above quantitative indices are contrary to conventional neo-realist logic that asserts that neither political nor ideological homogeneity should have a significant impact on the patterns of international relations outcomes. The next sections will attempt to develop a causal logic that explains these outcomes that defy conventional neo-realist wisdom.
IV.2. Social Identity Theory and International Stability
According to the significant evidence offered by social identity theory, humans have a universal need for a positive conception of themselves that is in large part satisfied through two means, which are as universal as the need that led to them. First, individuals come to identify their sense of self with the fortunes of a group. The psychic insecurity that individualism implies is unbearable, so people take refuge in a common identity and mutual reassurance that define communities. Vamik Volkan, one of America's most distinguished psychologists, describes well both the motivation for identifying with a group and some of the implications of this identification. According to him, "the concept and experience of ethnicity is a kind of healing phenomenon, since it provides emotional buffers that protect the bruised self of the individual. The sense of ethnicity patches [an individual's] sense of self, and links him to his group, which provides him with support and the means of survival." 21 Furthermore, not only does identification with a group assuage feelings of individual insecurity, but group membership also greatly satisfies the desire for achievement. As the material and spiritual potential of a group is exponentially greater than that of an individual, a person who lives vicariously through the accomplishments of the group with which he identifies believes himself to be a participant in projects of great splendor and significance. In sum, it seems "that the forces in our psychological development require us to develop some form of ethnicity and nationality." 22 They do so both for reasons of individual insecurity and the desire for accomplishment, which is satisfied vicariously through identification with a community.
Second, man's need for self-esteem is only partially met by identifying himself with the achievements and possibilities of a particular group. The need must also be met with a favorable comparisons of one's own group to those of others. 23 Indeed, a principal reason for the universal and timeless division of the world into "us" and "them" is "to clarify and affirm the sense of 'us' in a way that strengthens positive self-representation." 24
Two implications necessarily flow out of the above analysis that are critical for our purposes. First, the inevitability of the division of the world into groups, and the need for a favorable comparison of one's own group to all others, necessitates that competition is an inevitable fact of international relations. People have an innate need for a positive social identity that they can only acquire through participation in a dominant or victorious group. As a result, individual members of particular groups are likely to choose to maximize relative gains over other groups, even if this means achieving a smaller absolute gain for themselves. In short, people simply desire their in-group to do better than out-groups. Although the potential exists for this competition to be based on cooperative practices, 24 many psychologists hold that "man's need to identify some people as allies and others as enemies" to be an "inescapable developmental phenomenon." 25 Thus, the psychological need to have an out-group seems to necessitate not only competition among groups, but conflict as well.
Second, although competition and conflict among groups appears to be unavoidable, relations within groups are qualitatively different. As individuals' sense of worth becomes intimately intertwined with the success of their group, individuals become willing to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the community to which they belong. Moreover, and this is the truly critical point for our purposes, not only do the interests of individuals come to be identified with the interests of the immediate collective in which they are members, but also with other groups that share important characteristics with one's own. Although the degree of sacrifice that people are willing to make for similar groups will not nearly be as great as what they make for their own, there should nevertheless be qualitatively different relations between groups with similar defining characteristics than those with different, and especially antithetical, ones. Hermann and Kegley summarize nicely this transition from man's need for communal identification to the favorable treatment of other groups with similar characteristics that is revealed by social identity theory: By ethnocentrically perceiving one's own group in positive terms, members enhance their own sense of self-worth. Self-esteem is further increased by the belief that one's own group is 'better' than another group. Thus, members' self-identity becomes tied to the reference group and to ensuring its importance and worth compared to other groups. Members' views of themselves become threatened by information that calls into question their group's identity and values. As a result, people learn to defend those groups that are important to their definitions of themselves and to differentiate between whom in their environment they should support or avoid. 26
In other words, social identity theory reveals two facts that are critical for understanding international relations. First, relations among groups with different defining characteristics will be particularly hostile and crisis-prone. They will be so not only because wars or crises with those who are different are easier to justify, but because this difference is an important source of threat to each of the different types of communities. 27 Second, relations among groups with similar characteristics will be much more cooperative than we would otherwise expect. Thus, not only should there be more amicable relations among democracies, but autocracies as well. 28 As demonstrated, these patterns of disproportionate cooperation among members of political communities and disproportionate conflict among members of different political communities are precisely the relationships that the empirical data reveal. Significantly, these patterns remain unexplainable to neo-realist, and other purely power-based, theories.
In the following sections, I will apply the insights derived from social identity theory to different types of international systems categorized by political and normative criteria in order to demonstrate the hypothesized relationship between the degree of political homogeneity in a system and international stability.
V.2.A: Nearly Homogeneous Systems 29
According to my schema, the essence of a nearly homogeneous system is that while a majority of the great powers of a system perceive themselves to be members of a political and normative community, the system also contains a significant challenge to this consensus. In short, one or more great powers of the system have adopted a different regime type or espouse an ideology that is, at a minimum, incompatible with (but most likely hostile to) the principles to which the other powers are dedicated. Thus, in this type of system, there is both consensus and a significant challenge to this consensus, as one or more powers has become dedicated to revolutionary political objectives. 30
Social identity theory gives great insights into the nature of the relations that will most likely exist in this type of system. Relations among the conservative powers will most likely be cooperative. As the leaders of these states perceive themselves to be members of the same political type dedicated to similar principles, the national interests of each conservative power will be broadened to take into account the interests of one another. Self-interests will be elongated in such a way, according to social identity theory, because "people learn to defend those groups that are important to their definitions of themselves." 31 Moreover, the presence of one or more powers dedicated to revolutionary principles that challenge the political consensus of the other states will inevitably enhance cooperation among the conservative powers. It will do so for two primary reasons. First, as with all threats, the ideological one posed by the revolutionary power(s) will tend to impel the conservative states into a tighter alliance. Second, the presence of actors with different regime types and dedicated to vastly different principles will serve to highlight to an even greater extent the commonalties that unite the other powers. In short, the clearer the demarcation between in-groups and out-groups, the more closely will the members of the in-group align. This is one of the key tenets of social identity theory.
Although the relations among the conservative powers should be very cooperative, the relations between these states and the revolutionary actors will be extremely hostile. The presence of other actors with opposing regime types and defining ideologies will be very threatening to both types of states. Relations between the two groups should therefore be extremely crisis-prone. Thus, systemic instability in nearly homogeneous systems should be high.
IV.2.B: Homogeneous Systems 32
In homogeneous systems, or systems in which the leaders of all the great powers perceive themselves to belong to the same regime type and dedicated to similar principles, social identity theory predicts very high levels of international stability. Because leaders perceive themselves to be members of the same in-group, relations between powers will acquire dimensions that are qualitatively different than in any other system. Negatively, no power will perceive the very existence of another as a necessary, and thus permanent, threat to its own security. Positively, as members of a group, each power will come to view its own security to be tied to the health and preservation of the other members. National interests thus take on a broader appeal, as self-interests are to some extent elided with the interests of the other powers. 33 This statement does not mean that states stop thinking in terms of self-interest. Even in highly homogeneous systems, shared values cannot eliminate selfishness; they can only mitigate it. Nevertheless, the shared values of a homogeneous system are critical because they: 1) place limits on the extent to which states will try to promote their own interests, i.e. such states will not further their own interests if those actions will reasonably result in a repudiation of the principles upon which all the powers claim to rule, and thus the demise of that particular international society; and 2) shared values provide a prima facie, though not absolute, impetus for compromise and peaceful resolution of disputes. 34
In sum, international stability in homogeneous systems should be higher than in any other type of system. While nearly homogeneous systems exhibit significant cooperation among the conservative powers, between these states and their revolutionary opponents conflicts will be numerous. Aggregate instability will therefore be high. In contrast, in homogeneous systems, no significant out-group exists to stimulate conflict among the established great powers. Therefore, homogeneous systems will not only exhibit significantly lower levels of crises among the conservative powers, but at the systemic level as well. 35
IV.2.C: Heterogeneous Systems 36
In heterogeneous systems, leaders of the great powers perceive themselves to belong to different regime types dedicated to different, if not incompatible, principles. Although some leaders in a heterogeneous system may feel themselves to be members of a group wider than their own state, unlike in nearly homogeneous systems, no one group constitutes a preponderance of power in the system. Moreover, even if leaders do perceive themselves to be of the same regime type dedicated to similar principles, the belief systems to which they are dedicated, such as Nazism or Machiavellianism, do not provide sufficient toleration necessary to create an ideological community. Indeed, these types of value systems exacerbate the interest struggle by legitimizing violence and widening states' perceptions of threat to all other powers. These belief systems thus preclude the possibility of lasting peace among states. 37 As today's friend is believed to be invariably tomorrow's enemy, the world of international relations is necessarily a Hobbesian one. 38
While heterogeneous systems might not generate significantly more disputes among the powers than nearly homogeneous systems at the aggregate level (because these latter systems should demonstrate significant conflict between conservative and revolutionary states), the patterns of cooperation in heterogeneous systems should be less noticeable than in nearly homogeneous ones. Cooperation will, of course, occur. But it will be most often based on a temporary overlapping of interests, instead of being generated by more permanent sympathies flowing out of a shared identity.
In sum, international relations in heterogeneous system are very similar to the ones neo-realists assert as paradigmatic for all anarchic systems. States have great reason to doubt the intentions of one another. Alliances are based upon temporary overlapping of interests, rather than an indefinite concurrence of them. Survival is best assured by looking after one's own strength, power position, and interests. Peace is a temporary product of an equilibrium of forces that is incapable of being effectively stabilized by either norms or institutions. The international arena is characterized as one of self-help and constant fear. Finally, specialization is low as states fear relative losses and positions of vulnerability brought about by interdependence.
To recapitulate, this section has shown that social identity theory, on its own terms, gives great insight into international relations outcomes for the different types of international systems categorized by various political and normative criteria. Not only does it articulate reasons why the different systems should have varying degrees of international stability, but it also predicts the composition of the conflict dyads, i.e. that crises should be restricted in large part to relations among groups united by different political principles. This latter insight is particularly useful in systems of mixed homogeneity. For although it is a very important insight to realize that aggregate outcomes in a nearly homogeneous system should be characterized by great instability, looking only at aggregate outcomes misses important dynamics that generate these outcomes. Specifically, as relations among powers that perceive themselves to be members of a political community will be amicable, the instability of nearly homogeneous systems must be generated by disproportionate conflict between groups with different regime types and defining ideologies. Theories that only examine aggregate outcomes or base their predictions solely on power relations necessarily miss critical systemic phenomena revealed by the above analysis, such as alliance formation and intra-group patterns of cooperation.
V. Beyond Social Identity Theory: the Competitive Effects of Perceived Homogeneity
It is important to note that the insights of social identity theory described in previous sections are extremely compatible with a systemic analysis. As seen, a principal force that drives state behavior is the perceived distance among groups in terms of regime type and defining ideologies. The closer that groups perceive themselves to be in terms of these characteristics, the more amicable their relations. The farther apart leaders of different groups believe themselves to be in these areas, the more crisis-prone their relations. In short, the distribution of key political and normative attributes among states drives their behavior. And as demonstrated previously, all variables that are described in distributional terms can be considered structural ones.
Conceiving the variables that drive social identity theory in distributional terms only captures part of the systemic importance of this theory, however. The effects of the perceived distance in regime type and defining ideologies among states, though critical, are limited because the variables that drive behavior are conceived by the theory in static terms. The distribution in these political characteristics is held to be motivating state behavior. Any changes in this distribution are held to be exogenous to the theory.
Treating changes in the distribution of political and normative attributes of states as exogenous to social identity theory is not an inevitability, however. Once the insights of this theory are incorporated into a more complete system's theory that looks not only at the distance among groups in terms of defining political characteristics, but also the competitive and socializing effects of this distance, changes in these variables can be understood as endogenous to the theory. In short, the purpose of this section is to incorporate the basic insight of social identity theory, that political distance among states is a critical determinant of their behavior, into a more inclusive systemic theory that looks at the competitive effects of this behavior. There are two principle benefits that this synthesis provides. First, it provides a new understanding by which various political characteristics are socialized throughout the system. Second, it uses the logic of neo-realism to demonstrate the importance of regime type and defining ideologies in affecting the stability of the international system.
The following subsections will show that by incorporating social identity theory with the competitive and socialization effects of a system, my theory acquires a dynamic quality that explains changes in the degree of international stability over time. The following sections will illustrate that because variations in the degree of political homogeneity lead to competitive benefits for particular powers (which, as stated, according to neo-realists is the true indicator of a significant systemic effect), and because the competitive pressures of the system will impel these political advantages to be socialized throughout the system, we should notice systematic changes in the level of political homogeneity over time. In other words, as a direct result of the processes of competition and socialization, the degree of political homogeneity in the system should change over time, with concomitant changes in the patterns of international stability.
My logic for each of the three types of international systems described previously is as follows.
V.1. Nearly Homogeneous Systems
In a nearly homogeneous system, revolutionary states undeniably experience significant competitive disadvantages vis-a-vis their rivals. They do so because the situation facing them will be an extremely hostile one. The conservative powers in the system, united by common principles and values, will view the revolutionary state(s) as a pariah and a permanent threat. Consequently, social, economic, and diplomatic intercourse between the two camps will most often be limited or precarious, or both. Political relations will by highly distrustful, and the tenor of military relations will be very tense. Instead of being admitted into the workings of the balance of power, the revolutionary state(s) will face a united front based upon the principles of collective security. As a result, military preparation for the revolutionary state must be high as it faces the combined might of the other great powers. Civil unrest will be great as the state continually channels more resources away from civilian consumption, and as it represses more forms of internal dissent in order to face the external threat in a united manner. In sum, the revolutionary state's political system provokes various crises, thereby increasing international stability, much to its own detriment. 39
Under such circumstances, states operating within the normative framework defining the nearly homogeneous system undeniably have distinct competitive advantages vis-a-vis the pariah state. Consequently, there is a systemic imperative for the revolutionary state to renounce its hostile ideology and adopt the defining principles and regime type of the system. The system thus has a tendency to make the units alike by socializing revolutionary powers back into the ideological and political community. Significantly, once this socialization occurs, the stability of the system should increase, with a concomitant enhancement in the external security for all states.
V.2. Homogeneous Systems
In a homogeneous system, there are competitive advantages for states to maintain and augment their devotion to the regime type and political principles that define the system as homogeneous. The competitive benefits that members of this type of system experience are the reverse of the negative incentives a revolutionary state confronts in a nearly homogeneous system. These positive incentives include, inter alia, an expectation of stable trading relationships, financial assistance, cultural intercourse, and a decrease in international tensions with a concomitant lowering of military expenditures. If a nation chooses to reject the values and regime type that all the powers espouse, not only does it forgo these benefits, but it consequently induces the series of punishments and competitive disadvantages engendered by a nearly homogeneous system against a revolutionary pariah. In short, for a member of a homogeneous system, there are both systemic benefits to maintain one's political compatibility with the other powers in the system, and also easily foreseen systemic costs if one chooses not to do so. The international structure itself thus helps to maintain the homogeneity of the system. As a result, the system helps to maintain and increase the degree of stability that exists among the powers.
V.3. Heterogeneous Systems
As demonstrated, the structural imperatives generated by heterogeneous systems are very similar to the ones neo-realists assert as paradigmatic for all anarchic systems. However, according to the logic of my theory, great power relations in heterogeneous systems will in all likelihood be even bleaker than the world described by neo-realists. For if the implications for international relations that are generated by my theory are correct, states in heterogeneous systems have an additional systemic reason to go to war other than either to maintain their power position or as a result of spiraling security dilemmas flowing from inherent mistrust. A power will also fight in order to reduce the political heterogeneity of the system by attempting to make other states conform to its political form, in terms of both regime type and defining ideology.
This desire to constitute the system according to certain political principles, i.e. to make the system more homogeneous, must be considered, at least in part, systemic in origin (though unit-level reasons for ideological expansion, such as nationalism, are obviously still critical). The origination of this desire is partially systemic because there are competitive benefits of being the leader of an ideological community. The three most important benefits are the following. First, the winner in such a struggle does not have to go through the psychological pain and dislocation costs that result from the socialization effects of a homogenizing system. Instead, this state defines the normative goals toward which the other states are structurally impelled to move. Second, if a state is viewed as the leader of an ideological community, there is a chance that this power could become the capital of an ideological empire. As the putative vanguard state, others would look to it for guidance and support. If it is viewed as the sine qua non of the revolutionary movement, perhaps others would be willing to subordinate their interests to the honored state for the good of the movement.
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, the logic of social identity theory implies that states in heterogeneous systems should be much more insecure, with all the competitive disadvantages that this insecurity entails, than in any other type of system. States in heterogeneous systems will be more insecure because the number and intensity of conflicts in these systems is likely to be extremely high. Conflicts and wars will be more frequent in heterogeneous systems than in homogeneous ones because there is, by definition, no moral framework to restrain the power struggle among actors. Instead, actors in heterogeneous systems are impelled to try to create an international framework based upon their own particular vision of the truth. Conflicts will be more prevalent than in nearly homogeneous systems because in these latter systems, a preponderant number of powers are already members of a political community. Consequently, only a minority of powers needs to be socialized into this community in order to mitigate international tensions. By contrast, in heterogeneous systems, communal feelings are very limited. And the smaller the perceived in-group, the larger the out-group, with a concomitant increase in the number of enemy states. In short, to the extent that states believe both themselves to be insecure and that the system's heterogeneity is a primary cause of this insecurity, there exists a systemic imperative to try to make the system more homogeneous.
The hypotheses that the analysis of the previous sections yields for each type of system will be analyzed in the next section. As will be seen, my null hypotheses for each type of system will be based on the position of neo-realism, i.e. regardless of the era or the degree of homogeneity, international relations will maintain its fundamental nature of Machiavellian realpolitik. Or, to put it another way, in eras in which I believe that political homogeneity had an ameliorating effect on international relations, my counterfactual will be that international relations for that periods would have been no different even if there had been no homogeneity among the great powers.
VI.: Changing Norms With Power Held Constant--Hypotheses Generated By The Causal Logic
VI.1. Nearly Homogeneous Systems
Hypothesis 1: In nearly homogeneous systems, the conservative powers will not only seek to contain the revolutionary power through a balance of power, but will attempt to stabilize that equilibrium by making the system more homogeneous. In other words, through a variety of coercive measures, including trade sanctions, military threats, subversion, or the outright installment of a new type of a regime after military victory, the great powers of a system will attempt to force the revolutionary state to reject the principles and regime type that constitute it as revolutionary, and instead (re)accept the norms that define the system as homogeneous.
Hypothesis 2: The revolutionary power will constantly fear the threat of ideological conversion. If international systems "shape and shove" 40 their units to act in certain ways, revolutionary actors must be aware of these structurally generated forces. They must feel the pressure impelling them to renounce their values and regime type in order to realize the competitive benefits intrinsic to a homogeneous system. If the revolutionary power perceives no such force or incentive, we may reasonably doubt its existence.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the political distance between the revolutionary and conservative powers, the more likely will be crises and wars between them.
Hypothesis 4: If the system becomes more homogeneous, advances in external security and welfare would have been made for all powers. If the socialization of norms does not increase state security and welfare, then a case could be made that norms are insignificant when compared to power concerns in these crucial areas. (A system's homogeneity will increase when either: 1) the revolutionary power (re)accepts the ideology and regime type of the conservative powers; or, more rarely, 2) the conservative powers accept the ideology and regime type of the revolutionary actor.)
Null Hypotheses: First, the conservative powers will show little concern for the internal constitution of states, but instead will concentrate on capabilities and maintaining an equilibrium of forces. Second, the revolutionary power will perceive threats to itself almost exclusively in terms of power relations, and not ones of political conversion. Third, ideological distance will have little or no effect on the number of crises and wars in the system. Fourth, socialization of norms will have little or no impact on security and welfare for the great powers of the system.
VI.2. Homogeneous systems:
Hypothesis 1: Great powers will be both aware of the common principles that unite them, and will grant them enough importance that they come to define a significant part of their interests in terms of maintaining and augmenting that political kinship. In short, preservation of common principles will to some extent replace the pursuit of power as the defining foreign policy goal for states in this type of system.
Hypothesis 2: States will quite often forgo actions that will increase their power if that action could call into question the viability of the political community of which they are members.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the political affinity among powers (i.e. the smaller the political distance, in terms of regime type and defining ideologies) among states, the less likely there will be crises and wars among them, and the greater the security and welfare of the great powers of the system will be.
Null Hypotheses: First, states will concern themselves predominantly with issues of relative power, and they will be willing to sacrifice political homogeneity to this concern. Second, the degree of political distance will have little or no effect on the number of crises and wars among powers. Third, political affinity will have little or no effect on the security and welfare of the great powers.
VI.3. Heterogeneous Systems:
Hypothesis 1: Because the situation in heterogeneous systems will be so threatening and insecure, i.e. so utterly Hobbesian, the powers will try to escape from this brutish world by trying to make it more politically homogeneous. This imperative, however, creates a paradox (hypothesis 2): Because most or all powers are trying to socialize the others into accepting their political principles and regime type with an intent of making the system more secure, international relations in this system will become more bellicose and destructive. Moreover, hypothesis 3, the greater the political distance among powers, the more bellicose the system will be. Nevertheless, hypothesis 4, my theory predicts that because of the systemic imperatives generated by the great insecurity of heterogeneous systems, states will continue to define their foreign policy goals in terms of ideological conversion despite the costs. Hypothesis 5: If a winner emerges from this struggle and the system is made more homogeneous, international politics will acquire the more stable and secure nature characteristic of homogenous systems.
Null Hypotheses: As the Hobbesian character that I have described for heterogeneous systems is to neo-realists paradigmatic for all international systems, even if the system ultimately becomes more politically homogeneous, there will be no change in the tenor of international relations. Thus, hypothesis 1, the degree of heterogeneity in the system will have little or no effect on state security and welfare. Moreover, as political principles and regime types are in the final analysis unimportant in maximizing state security, leaders who continue to define their interests in terms of creating and maintaining a political community are greatly misguided. They will thus ultimately be selected out, and replaced by individuals who are more aware of what their states' preservation requires. Consequently, hypothesis 2 the historical record should reveal the repeated triumph of Machiavellian realpolitik, rather than (as I predict), the continual search for the establishment of a normative community. Finally, hypothesis 3: Ideological distance among competitors will have little or no effect on the perception of threat, or the level of hostility among powers.
In sum, in the previous sections, I have made two separate, but related arguments demonstrating the systemic importance of shared value systems and regime types. First, I have used social identity theory to demonstrate the varying degrees and patterns of international stability that result from differing levels of perceived community among the powers. The dynamics in inter- and intra-group relations that social identity theory reveals imply that homogeneous systems should be much more stable than heterogeneous ones, and that nearly homogeneous systems, while very unstable at the aggregate level, should exhibit clearly discernible patterns of cooperation among the conservative powers.
Second, I have combined these insights with the competitive and socializing effects of a systemic theory. In short, I have argued that international stability is not only in large part a product of the degree of political affinity among the powers, but the result of competitive incentives that result from a combination of political affinity and the logic of system's theory. In sum, I have shown that there are competitive benefits to augment, maintain, or establish a political community to which all the powers claim allegiance. Furthermore, I have shown that international stability can be viewed in large part resulting from which of these three processes (i.e. communal augmentation, maintenance, or establishment) obtains at any particular time, which will in turn be in large part determined by the degree of political homogeneity that is present at the starting point of one's analysis. The relationship between systemic homogeneity and international stability should thus be clear.
There are two principal benefits of showing the causal connection between political homogeneity and international relations outcomes in the manner I have done so. First, because I have used the logic of neo-realism to arrive at fundamentally antithetical neo-realist conclusions, neo-realists should be more inclined to accept the results of my analysis. By showing the competitive effects of political community on international stability and state security, neo-realists must admit that variables that reveal political homogeneity are both systemic in nature and highly significant to the study of international politics.
Second, I have offered a new mechanism for the socialization of political principles and regime types. Surprisingly, there has been little theoretical attention paid to the diffusion of political principles resulting from systemic phenomena. Even constructivism, which claims to be a systemic theory that treats political identify as the dependent variable, "has yet to develop a theory of norm change." 41 Instead, constructivists rely on historical contingency 42 or fundamentally realist tenets, like coercion. 43 My theory, by combining the insights of social identity theory with the competitive and socialization effects of a system, offers one means of understanding the patterns of socialization of both regime types and political principles from the vantage point of the international system. 44
Section VII. Case Studies: The Socialization Effects in Nearly Homogenous Systems 45
Case 1. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars
As neo-realism would predict, primary concerns for the coalition of powers united against Napoleon from the beginning of the Wars to their conclusion were to prevent French hegemony and to reestablish the balance of power. In 1806, Gentz had warned that "no [state]...must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together." 46 In the Allied Declaration of Frankfurt issued on December 1, 1813, the averred goal of the coalition was not to make war against France, but French preponderance. 47 Thus, the explicit goal of the allied powers had always been to limit, not eliminate, French power so as to recreate the equilibrium of forces that had existed before the wars. As Edward Vose Gulick demonstrates in his insightful book, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, reestablishing the balance of power was preeminent to the allies in both words and deeds. 48
What neo-realism misses or ignores, however, is the way in which the allies attempted to establish and maintain the balance of power. Focusing solely on material forces in order to understand the balance of power in this period leads to a great misunderstanding of the goals of the actors, and the nature of the system in which they operated. 49
To begin with, the European system of states from the French Revolution to the onset of the Concert of Europe was undeniably nearly homogeneous, as I have defined this term. The principal coalition members allied against Napoleon: England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, satisfy both our requirements for being members of a homogeneous system. First, they were all grounded upon similar principles of political legitimacy. Although the degree of power among sovereigns differed (from the constitutional restraints, though limited, of George III, to the more absolute power of Alexander I), all states were of the same regime type. No power viewed the overthrow of a brother monarchy as a necessary precondition for its own security. Indeed, to repudiate the principles upon which one of the other powers was grounded would have undermined the initiator state's security, as it would have called into question the legitimacy, stability, and efficacy of its own regime.
Secondly, not only was there ideological toleration among the allies, but also there was an increasing awareness among each of the four allies that realizing one's own state interests and maximizing one's security was intimately connected with both maintaining international stability and deliberately promoting the security of the other members of the system. According to Metternich, "isolated states exist only as the abstractions of so-called philosophers. In the society of states each state has interests...which connect it with the others. The great axioms of political science derive from the recognition of the true interests of all states; it is in the general interests that the guarantee of existence is to be found, while particular interests...have only a secondary importance." 50 Alexander was willing to sacrifice Russian expansion into the Balkans for the sake of maintaining European unity and general international stability. "I could have permitted myself to be swept along by the enthusiasm for the Greeks, but I have never forgotten the...danger of my intervention for my allies. Egotism is no longer the basis of policy." 51 And to Castlereagh, true security for all powers was grounded upon the continued devotion to the principles of collective security. "These arguments about...strategic boundaries are pushed too far. Real defense and security comes from the guarantee which is given by the fact that they cannot touch you without declaring war on all those interested in maintaining things as they are." 52
In sum, the great powers of Europe were conscious of the fact that they were not only participants in a system of states, but a society of states. 53 They perceived themselves to be bound by sets of rules, which though limiting individual state action, helped to maximize individual security. These rules did so in a number of ways. First, they reduced the security dilemma as states bypassed chances for individual aggrandizement if such actions could reasonably lead to greater insecurity for the other powers in the system. (Witness, for example, Alexander's refusal to support the Greek insurrection against the Ottoman Empire.) Secondly, these rules impelled states to solve serious international problems on the basis of the principles of collective security, as opposed to ad hoc individual responses. Consequently, security for Concert members was enhanced. 54
Just as the coalition members were clearly participants in a homogeneous international system, France, especially after 1792 and the execution of Louis XVI, was just as evidently a revolutionary power in both self proclamation and international perception. Republican France's very existence represented a serious threat to the security of the remaining powers. It did so because the principles of liberalism and nationalism upon which the Republic was grounded and to which it was dedicated were intrinsically hostile to the ideals upon which the other powers were founded. The threat of liberalism to the autocratic governments was both obvious and explicit. The threats made by the Girondin, Maximin Isnard, were all too typical for the period. "If the cabinets try to raise up against France a war of kings, we shall raise up a war of peoples against kings...At the moment that the enemy armies begin to fight with ours, the daylight of philosophy will open their eyes and the peoples will embrace each other in the face of their dethroned tyrants." Thus a war with France would ultimately result, according to fellow Girondin leader Jean-Pierre Brissot, in "a crusade for universal liberty." 55
Even England, which was relatively secure in the viability and stability of its institutions, perceived France as a threat as leaders began to fear the possibility of ideological contagion. According to Prime Minister William Pitt, "the unexpected turn of events in France is but too much likely to give encouragement to the forces of disorder in every part of the world." And Home Secretary Henry Dundas warned that "if the spirit of liberty and equality continues to spread with the same rapidity...it must soon break out in open sedition." 56
Furthermore, the principle of liberalism was not the only ideal championed by France that threatened the other powers. The principle of nationalism, if universally accepted throughout Europe, would have undeniably sounded the death knell for both the Austrian and Russian Empires. A movement for national independence was fundamentally incompatible with a union of nations held together by a devotion to a transnational principle (in combination, of course, with brute force).
In sum, the introduction of Republican France into the eighteenth and early nineteenth century European system made it one of near homogeneity. All the great powers but one were grounded upon similar principles, and all but one perceived their state interests to be connected with the stability and welfare of the international system. The remaining power was undeniably revolutionary. France's principles were explicitly hostile to the welfare of the other states. And France openly rejected the rules and values by which the other powers considered themselves to be united, and upon which the basis of their international society was built. 57
Now that I have established that the European system after 1792 was one of near homogeneity, my next, and most important, task is to determine if this system generated the normative-systemic imperatives that my theory predicts. In short, were there systemic forces impelling not only a reconstitution of an equilibrium of forces (which as we have seen, there undeniably was), but also a reconstitution of the principles which grounded France--from ones of hostility, to ones of compatibility, synergy, and mutual security?
Upon examination of the historical record, it is clear that all of the members of the coalition believed that there could be no lasting security with Republican France. For as Metternich asserted, "no peace is possible with a revolutionary system, whether with a Robespierre...or a Napoleon." 58 The great powers of Europe thus did not define security as the limitation of French power alone. Such limitation had to have occurred, but it had to have taken place in conjunction with an ideological transformation of France--from hostile to compatible grounding principles. This was a sentiment universally held by the great powers. Even England, whose historic role as a balancer necessitated prevention of continental hegemony, but traditionally pursued this goal with a policy of non-interference in the internal constitutions of states, came to view "the restoration of the monarchy as an essential strategic objective." 59 Similarly, leaders in France, both proponents and opponents of the Revolution, recognized the necessity for continual war between the two sets of regime types. According to Committee on Public Safety leader Bertrand Barere: "There is neither peace nor truce, nor armistice, nor any treaty to make with the despots until the Republic is consolidated, triumphant, and dictating peace to the nations." 60
To view such statements (and there were many of them) as mere posturing is to misunderstand the structural forces acting against France. As Burke prophesied, the French Revolution, to be truly successful, must have ultimately culminated with a Napoleon. This necessity did not derive merely from a need to restore order to a fragmenting state. The need for universal conquest derived from the ideals of the Revolution, and their antithetical relationship to the dominant principles of the system. As there can be no durable peace with the conservative powers of a nearly homogeneous system, a revolutionary state must destroy the system that precludes for it any reasonable level of security. The revolutionary power must then create a new system grounded upon more agreeable principles. According to Kyung-Won Kim, "the reason for the emergence of a system-destructive policy...is that the system fails to function adequately to guarantee the minimum security of an ideologically revolutionary actor. It is because of such failure that a revolutionary state is most likely to reject the system...". 61 As the imperatives of a nearly homogeneous system precluded the chance of a durable peace with the conservative powers, either France had to destroy the system, or the system would ultimately destroy Republican France.
If France, however, renounced her revolutionary ideology and restored the Bourbons, she would, according to Talleyrand, "once again [possess] a government whose principles [would] guarantee...the maintenance of peace" and "thus offer to Europe a pledge of security and stability." 62 In other words, Talleyrand understood that to enjoy the competitive benefits of a homogeneous system, France must first renounce its revolutionary ideals. Until that time, France would stand "alone in Europe without being in good relations with any one single power." But once the principles that defined the system were reaccepted, France would "be in concert with all the States which are guided by other than revolutionary principles and maxims." 63 It is reasonable to assume that Talleyrand felt the imperatives of a homogeneous system dictating the terms by which France could maximize its security.
In conclusion, the belief that increased ideological homogeneity was a precondition for establishing a reasonable degree of security was universally accepted by all the actors in the system. In other words, neither France nor its enemies viewed the international system solely in terms of power relations. Instead, all the great powers of Europe believed that there was an intimate connection between maximizing their security and welfare, and repudiating the ideals of the Revolution by restoring the Bourbon dynasty. The French understood this fact. That is why they were almost paranoid about a counter-revolutionary crusade, even when it was not immanent. 64 This is also one of the reasons why the Revolution ultimately degenerated into a crusade to destroy the European system that threatened the ideals upon which the Revolution was originally grounded.
The coalition powers also acted upon this belief. After both banishments of Napoleon, their policy was one of relative leniency (in terms of stripping France of its power potential), as long as this leniency was coupled with a Bourbon restoration. Making the system more ideologically homogeneous helped to guarantee security for the other powers, just as did eliminating French preponderance.
Significantly, once the goals engendered by the above belief were realized and the French monarchy was restored, the security of the great powers was undeniably augmented. 65 For the above reasons, the statements made by the leaders of the coalition asserting the importance of a normative community for state welfare cannot be dismissed as either tactical or misconceived. They acted upon their beliefs, and their security was enhanced. In other words, efficacious behavior concerning welfare maximization was socialized among all the units that comprised the system. By Waltz's own logic, then, it is reasonable to assume that the belief in the importance of ideological homogeneity was systemically driven.
Case 2. The 1980s and the End of the Cold War
The socialization and competitive effects of a nearly homogeneous system were just as evident, if not more so, in the period leading up to the end of the Cold War. The empirical evidence for this period is highly consonant with what my theory would predict. To begin with, the Reagan administration did not just define its goals vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of power capabilities. If it had, then this period would lend further support to the viability of neo-realist theory. Instead, official U.S. policy, as articulated in the confidential National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-75, was both to force a rollback of Soviet power around the globe and to change the internal constitution of the Soviet polity. According to National Security Council member and the author of the Directive, Richard Pipes, "NSDD-75 said our goal was no longer to coexist with the Soviet Union but to change the Soviet system. At its root was the belief that we had it in our power to alter the Soviet system through the use of external pressure." 66
Throughout his memoirs, former Secretary of State George Shultz explained that although the U.S. could reach a mutually beneficial accord with the Soviets on any particular issue, the differences in ideology between the two states precluded the establishment of a "normal" relationship, i.e. one in which often overt hostility and mistrust bordering on the paranoid were the exception, not the norm. 67 Or as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock, phrased it: "The crux of the problem was that the Soviet Union would have to change before the U.S.-Soviet relationship could improve fundamentally. If the Soviet Union stayed as it was, we could hope only to manage the mutual hostility, not to harmonize policies...I thought that a U.S. strategy that encouraged internal Soviet change [therefore] made sense." 68
Because the Americans perceived the threat from the USSR largely (but not exclusively) in terms of ideology, the inevitable policy prescription was to try to change the Soviet belief system. According to James Baker, Secretary of State during the Bush Administration, "all along, containment had been premised on the notion that the more leverage we could exert on the Soviets, the more we could pressure them to make the hard choice in favor of internal change." 69 American leverage manifested itself in the form of significant benefits to the Soviets if they renounced their ideology, and severe threats if they did not. The nature of these benefits and threats must be considered structural in nature. They were so because their goal was to reduce the gulf that separated the American and Soviet political systems. Just as Waltz would consider threats and benefits that resulted in the narrowing of the gap in the distribution of capabilities across states as systemically driven, so, too, must actions that eliminate threats originating from a "distribution," i.e. the incompatibility, of ideologies and regime types.
Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry have identified the systemic benefits offered to the Soviets in the 1980s. Among these were: increased and stabilized trade with the highly productive and technologically advanced capitalist economies; participation in a variety of international organizations; social and cultural interaction; and a potential end to the constant criticisms over human rights abuses. In order to realize these benefits, though, the Soviets had to take the major step of "abandoning confrontation and joining the mainstream of Western-dominated international society." 70 Or, to use the terminology of this paper, a nearly homogeneous international system offered significant positive incentives to a revolutionary power. But realizing these benefits was contingent upon the Soviets first renouncing their hostile ideology, and adopting the dominant principles that defined the international society.
Deudney and Ikenberry ignore or discount, however, the fact that the international system of the 1980s generated more than just systemic rewards and positive incentives for the Soviets to become socialized into the system. The international structure also offered significant systemic threats to the Soviets if some level of conversion did not take place. Such actions taken included, among others: restricting high technology exports to the Soviet Union; persuading the Saudis to lower world oil prices to reduce Soviet earnings of hard currency; causing a delay in the building of the Siberian natural gas pipeline by two years, and reducing it planned size by one half; and engaging in a massive and technologically sophisticated American military buildup to induce the Soviets to spend themselves into "bankruptcy." 71 Indeed, Gorbachev accused the U.S. of trying to "wear down and weaken the USSR economically" by "lowering an iron curtain to seal itself off from the USSR...Contacts between the two countries have been curtailed...Technology can be transferred only with the express approval of the president. Trade is not permitted." 72
Although a primary goal of these activities was to rollback Soviet global influence and diminish its power potential, these actions also offered powerful systemic incentives for ideological conversion. Proof that these threats were targeted towards ideological repudiation is found in the fact in how quickly the threats ended once Gorbachev explicitly renounced most of the tenets fundamental to Marxism-Leninism and traditional Soviet communism. 73 Indeed, once the Soviets were socialized into the normative community of the system, the polices of Reagan and later Bush switched from overt hostility, to verbal and material aid. This conversion from hostility to support happened even though Soviet power capabilities, especially nuclear, remained virtually the same (especially during the Reagan administration). 74 As Shultz would relate in his memoirs: "I could sense that a new era in East-West relations was possible...because of the changes we were inducing in the Soviet Union." 74
The second variety of empirical evidence that tends to confirm my theory is based on the Soviet perspective of the international system. In order for political homogeneity to be labeled as a systemic variable, the Soviets had to have been aware both of the forces impelling them to change their political system, and the competitive benefits of doing so. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is quite clear in his assertion that a primary source and inspiration for Gorbachev's "new thinking" were the series of threats and benefits offered to the Soviet Union by the West. According to him, the new thinking was advanced on account of the need to avoid the threats of a "nuclear and conventional arms race, poor economic performance, and ecological disasters," and to realize the benefits of "economic integration" and "[political] rapprochement" with the West. 75
Significantly, the only way to remove the threats and achieve the benefits, i.e. to move from confrontation to cooperation with the West, was not simply to "deideologize" Soviet foreign policy. Such an admission would tend to confirm the neo-realist definition of socialization, in which a foreign policy based on ideological concerns is replaced, for competitive reasons, with one better guided by the dictates of realpolitik. Instead, Shevardnadze asserted that "in reality, any country's policy is based on ideology. The only question is what kind?" 76 To the Soviet Foreign Minister, the "sine qua non of an escape from our current plight" was to reject Marxism-Leninism, 77 and replace it with the political and moral principles espoused by the West. Only in such a conversion could Soviet external security be maximized. 78 The perception from the Soviet view of the competitive benefits of being socialized into the normative community that defined the West is thus clear.
Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly Dobrynin, offers a similar description of the end of the Cold War. According to him, "unflagging ideological confrontation between the two nations [America and the USSR] remained the main obstacle to any dramatic improvement in their relations." 79 What allowed the Soviet Union to escape from its highly costly political and economic isolation was not merely a withdrawal of Soviet power from the world (though this helped). The decisive factor in ending the Cold war was Gorbachev's "policy of convergence of socialism with capitalism." 80 Ideology "kept undermining our relations until the middle of the 1980s, when they were stabilized in part by significant breakthroughs in agreements to control nuclear and conventional arms, but mostly through the change in the internal politics of the Soviet Union." 81
Perhaps the most straightforward account about the nature of the USSR's ideological shift and the international forces impelling its creation and progress is offered by an opponent of the process: Politburo member Yegor Ligachev. According to him, "after decades, we are returning the country to what the October Revolution eliminated. Translated into language accessible to everyone: Instead of renewing and improving socialism, the system was to be replaced. Why did they raise this age-old and bloody conflict and make it so acutely political at the height of perestroika?" Ligachev then proceeds to answer his own question: "One can assume that the dragging in private ownership is a concession to the West, to get economic and political aid. Even though plenty of declarations that this is not the case have been made to placate society, the West clearly is counting on the introduction of private ownership to lead our country to a rejection of socialism. With this prospect in mind, it [the West] is even agreeing to some political 'sacrifices.'" 82
In sum, the combination of systemic benefits and threats that were manifest in the international system of the 1980s impelled Gorbachev to renounce explicitly the tenets that had shaped Soviet political life. Just as my theory would predict, a revolutionary power in a nearly homogeneous system, which suffered from competitive disadvantages resulting from its grounding principles, had a huge structural incentive to renounce those principles and adopt the ones that defined and maintained the international system. Through socialization units were made more alike, and state security was enhanced. 83
Section VIII: The Significance of My Proposal
Implications of my theory are significant. The three most important ones are the following.
First, if principles and regime types constitute one of the components of the international system, and if shared values and political structures help both to maintain international stability and to facilitate cooperation, then attempts to build a normative community, democratic or otherwise, are not nearly as misguided as neo-realists depict. 84
Second, in terms of methodology, my proposal offers one mechanism for combining the insights of neo-realism with domestic level variables. By integrating regime types and defining ideologies into a systemic analysis, I offer a theory that is significantly more accurate in terms of both description and prescription than is neo-realism, while still maintaining neo-realism's analytical rigor.
Third (and related to number two), my theory will help to rescue neo-realists from their own reductionist tendencies. Quite often, neo-realists attempt to reconcile their theory with reality by introducing into their analysis unit level variables, yet without formally incorporating them into their theory. 85 In other words, their theory still maintains the relative insignificance of the very attributes that are now used to explain an event. My theory attempts to avoid this problem by introducing a variable that is unit-level in content, but systemic in form. In short, by looking at the distribution of political systems, in terms of regime types and defining ideologies, I am able to incorporate formally into a systemic analysis many of the unit-level phenomena that neo-realists often rely upon to explain empirical events.
Notes
Note 1: Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory," Journal of International Affairs (Spring/Summer 1990), 31. Back.
Note 2: The reliance on perceptions to code regime and defining ideologies follows John Owen's schema for coding liberal democracies (see John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," International Security,Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), 96-97). Back.
Note 3: Using a continuous variable to code homogeneity (i.e. the degree to which leader perceive themselves to be members of a political community) performs a similar task. Furthermore, using a continuous variable allows for the generation of more accurate hypotheses. As there are mixed systems, a variable that accounts for these imprecisions will make much better predictions than one that makes precise cutoffs. (I am grateful to Dale Copeland for this suggestion. See Dale Copeland, "Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability: Toward a New Dynamic realist Theory of Major War," Security Studies(Spring 1996), fn. 75.) Back.
Note 4: Raymond Aron, Peace and War, a Theory of International Relations (Malabar, FL: Robert Krieger Publishing Co., 1981), p. 100. Back.
Note 5: If the potential for ideologies to become the foundation of a homogenous system were determined by an examination of their effects, as opposed to their content, we would be making the mistake of measuring the independent by the dependent variable. Back.
Note 6: The necessity of toleration in forming a homogeneous system seems to also preclude (once again through content analysis) those ideologies that claim to know perfectly the laws of history, such as Marxism-Leninism. Because perfect transcendence is beyond man's abilities, different societies, even while proclaiming allegiance to the same internationalist philosophy in principle, in actuality corrupt this ideology with contingencies specific to their own cultures, histories, and states. These contingencies necessarily effect profoundly the means by which the philosophy is understood and applied. Because the ideology, however, proclaims perfect access to the truth, states embodying these ideas cannot accept the validity of different interpretations of this truth, lest they call into question the status of their own society. As a result, no state can tolerate a rival interpretation of a perfectionist ideology. There can be only one true interpreter of a faith; the rest are perceived as heretics. Paradoxically in these cases, participants in a homogeneous system in theory become participants in a heterogeneous one in reality. True homogeneous systems must to some degree allow for pluralistic interpretations of the nature, meaning, and destination of history. Back.
Note 7: This second step may seem superfluous. If states' political systems promote intolerance, it will be unlikely that leaders will believe themselves to be members of a community. Nevertheless, it is possible that states could perceive each other as fellow Nazi states, for example, dedicated to each others' destruction. In such a scenario, content analysis of the political systems is needed to determine homogeneity. Back.
Note 8: As indicated by the heading of this section, in order to best accomplish my goal of examining the effects of political homogeneity on international stability, it would be quite helpful if power relations were held constant. To accomplish this, I will use two methods of analysis. First, I will compare different types of normative systems with the same polarity. In short, if power is the only key systemic independent variable for understanding international outcomes, all multipolar systems, for example, should have similar features, regardless of political homogeneity. Second, where possible, I will use the same system as a control for itself in a future period (this is Stephen Walt's method in his book, Revolution and War). Often in history, states acquire different identities and value systems despite the relative constancy of power in material terms. For example, at the level of foreign policy, we can compare France before and after the Revolution to see if its behavior changed significantly due to changes in both regime type and defining ideologies despite very little changes in its objective power capacity. I will try to use similar logic at the systemic level to ascertain the importance of changes in the degree to which leader perceived themselves to belong to the same regime type dedicated to similar principles. Specifically, I will attempt to ascertain if there was a significant shift in the dynamics of a particular international system, in terms of international stability and unit welfare, after the system became more or less politically homogeneous. If so, this is significant prima facie evidence of the structural importance of political community. Back.
Note 9: Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 98. Back.
Note 10: Waltz, "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory," p. 31; Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert Keohane ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 329. Back.
Note 11: Waltz, "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory," p. 31. Back.
Note 12: Waltz, "Realist Thought, Neorealist Theory," p. 32; Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," p. 239. Back.
Note 13: Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics , pp. 72, 74. Back.
Note 14: Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 76. Back.
Note 15: For quantitative analysis confirming this position, see, for example, Margaret Hermann and Charles Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1995), 549; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March: 1989), 22,23; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?," International Interactions, Vol. 17 (1992), 245-267. Back.
Note 16: Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," 22. Back.
Note 17: Randolph Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June: 1991) 285-306; Randolph Siverson and Harvey Starr, "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 1 (February: 1994), 154-155. Back.
Note 18: Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December: 1984), 596. Back.
Note 19: Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," 22. Back.
Note 20: It should be noted that although political homogeneity (except unanimity) does not affect the level of international stability in the aggregate (in terms of the number of disputes among the powers), increasing homogeneity does lead to less war (Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," 22.) Therefore, while the number of disputes among powers does not seem to vary with the degree of political homogeneity, the seriousness of the disputes does. This finding has important implications for unit welfare. If wars, the greatest external threat to individual state security, are fewer in homogeneous systems, states have a systemic imperative to try to create a more homogeneous system, even if complete unanimity is impossible. Back.
Note 21: Vamik Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1985), 243. Back.
Note 22: Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," 243. Back.
Note 23: Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring: 1995), 241; Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," 241. Back.
Note 24: Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," 241. Back.
Note 25: Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," 243. Back.
Note 26: Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," 219, 221, 225. Back.
Note 27: Margaret Hermann and Charles Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1995), 517. Back.
Note 28: According to Hermann and Kegley, "wars should be fought between states with different types of political systems because these are the out-groups and 'not like us.' Those in nondemocratic governments are likely to perceive their own way of life threatened by those prescribing democratic norms and/or market economies. Leaders of nondemocratic governments respond to the psychological need to support political systems of their own, too" (Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," 518). Back.
Note 29: It should therefore be clear that the theory I am describing at least in part subsumes democratic peace theory. Democracies may have particularly peaceful norms and strong institutions that lead to peace, but the identity-driven aspect of the democratic peace is similar to that of an autocratic peace. Back.
Note 30: Prominent examples of nearly homogeneous systems include that of Europe during the Napoleonic Wars and the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Back.
Note 31: As will be seen, a key difference of this type of system from a heterogeneous one is that a clear preponderance of power is possessed by the states who believe themselves to be members of a political community. Back.
Note 32: Hermann and Kegley, "Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology," p. 517. Back.
Note 33: Prominent examples of homogeneous systems include the Concert of Europe and the Post-Cold War world. Back.
Note 34: In their article "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," Charles and Clifford Kupchan phrase this point nicely: "Elites must share an awareness of an international community, the preservation of which furthers long-term national interests. It is not sufficient for the major powers simply to share compatible views of a desirable international order; they must also believe that efforts to protect and promote political solidarity are needed to bring this vision of order to fruition. In this sense, national self-interest becomes equated with, but not subjugated to, the welfare and stability of that international community." Charles Kupchan and Clifford. Kupchan "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," in America's Strategy in a Changing World, ed. Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 161-62.
As Robert Jervis explains in his analysis of the Concert of Europe, states belonging to the same political community in this period did not stop placing "primary value on [their] own security and welfare...What is crucial...is that 'self-interest' was broader than usual, in that statesmen believed that they would be more secure if the other major powers were also more secure. Others were seen as partners in a joint endeavor as well as rivals...There was a sense that the fates of the major powers were linked, that Europe would thrive or suffer together. The self-interest followed was also longer-run that usual. Much of the restraint adopted was dependent on each statesman's belief that if he moderated his demands or forbore to take advantage of other's temporary weakness, they would reciprocate." "Security Regimes" in International Regimes, ed. Krasner, Stephen, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 180. Back.
Note 35: Although in homogeneous systems no significant out-group exists at the level of a great power state, it does not mean, however, that no out-group exists at any other level (indeed, as demonstrated, people seem to need enemies in order to add dynamism and worth to their own community). Political homogeneity as I have defined it implies that out-groups will be restricted to sub-state actors (e.g. the Concert of Europe leaders feared revolution, not the policies of a particular state) or rising (though not yet great) powers . Even though out-groups in politically homogeneous systems are restricted to these types of actors, this fact does not necessitate that the threat generated by these actors will be significantly less than other types of enemies. The two primary forces that impel in-groups to cooperate, i.e. common principles and a common enemy, will still, in all likelihood, obtain in homogeneous systems. Back.
Note 36: Examples of heterogeneous systems include Europe during the period of the Thirty Years' War and Europe from the time of Bismarck to the end of the Second World War (after which the international system becomes one of near homogeneity). Back.
Note 37: Machiavelli offers the paradigmatic advice for leaders who believe themselves to be operating in such a hostile environment. According to him, "war cannot be avoided but can only be put off to the advantage of others." (Machiavelli, The Prince, in Bondanella, Peter, and Musa, Mark, ed. The Portable Machiavelli, (Penguin Books: New York, 1983), 85.) Back.
Note 38: This view parallels the work of Iain Johnston in his analysis of "cultural realpolitik." According to him, China has consistently followed a Machiavellian strategy throughout the centuries, not because of systemic imperatives in an anarchic system, but because its political ideology has impelled its leaders to believe that the world is Hobbesian. Consequently, Chinese leaders behave in a realpolitik manner, not because it is objectively necessary, but because their cultural lenses impel them to believe that this in the only strategy that can be effective in what is believed to be a very hostile environment. (Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216-270.) Back.
Note 39: According to Stephen Walt, after an examination of the foreign policies desires and outcomes of seven revolutionary states, "[A] commitment to avowedly revolutionary objectives kept these regimes isolated and beleaguered..." Revolution and War, p. 340. Back.
Note 40: Waltz, Kenneth, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert Keohane ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 336. Back.
Note 41: Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1996), 363. Back.
Note 42: According to Kowert and Legro, in order to understand change "constructivists...appeal to exogenous historical conditions. While historical contingency is undoubtedly central to understanding specific events, it does not easily lend itself to theoretical generalization" (Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise," in Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 489. Back.
Note 43: For example, according to Nicholas Onuf, rules make social structures, and resources make these into structures of domination. Thus normative socialization is explained via acts of imposition from the strong to the weak. (Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (1989), 63). Power, not functional competitive advantages or normative superiority, is what more often than not socializes values throughout the system. Back.
Note 44: It should be noted that there have been several attempts to understand the systemic forces promoting the diffusion of political phenomena, such as regime type and defining ideologies. All of them, however, are in important ways different from the theory I have offered here. For example, Wade Huntley claims that because democracies experience competitive advantages vis-a-vis non-democratic states (in terms of popular legitimacy, the ability to extract resources, the ability to be trusted, and an increased moral authority (Wade Huntley, "Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1996), 57, 58, 69), the competitive arena of international relations impels the socialization of this regime type throughout the system (Ibid., 56, 57-58).
There are several critical problems with this theory, however. To begin with, democracies may suffer significant disadvantages in a competitive arena (see, for example, Tocqueville's famous critique of the weaknesses of the foreign policies of democracies). This criticism is corroborated by the empirical fact that democratic great powers arose in the least competitive environments. More importantly for the purposes of to theoreticalthis paper, Huntley's argument is not as structural as he claims it to be. His socialization mechanism relies on the competitive advantages that result from the intrinsic merits of a particular type of polity. Because democratic states are believed to be advantaged in particular ways, the other states have a competitive incentive to emulate their form of government. This logic is certainly in keeping with an important dimension of systemic theory. A more inclusive structural theory, however, would utilize a variable that incorporates a distributional quality to explain regime socialization. This comparative quality is an important dimension of structural theories because it explains the strength and direction of the incentives that encourage socialization. In other words, the greater the political distance among states, the greater will be sense of threat that is created by this distance. And the greater the sense of threat a state experiences, the greater the importance of adopting the advantages of others. Furthermore, to the extent that a distributional variable includes not only the distance between rival groups, but the relative strength of each side, it becomes clear that isolated regimes will suffer greater competitive disadvantages because of their regime type than states that are members of a political community. Thus Revolutionary France, even though it was dedicated to democratic principles, suffered significant competitive disadvantages because it was the only one of its kind that existed in the European system. A structural theory that looks only at the intrinsic merits of a regime, without systematic attention to political distance or systemic homogeneity, misses these important phenomena.
As with my theory, Ann Florini's also examines the competitive effects of political principles. To explain norm selection, she uses an evolutionary argument in which particular norms result in competitive advantages, which favor the adoption of that norm in a particular state. Her examination of the socialization of norms across states, as opposed to the adoption of norms in a particular state, is problematic, however. It is so for two reasons. First, she explicitly rejects the idea that norms result in competitive advantages for the states who adopt them. She instead claims that advantages are restricted to the level of the norm itself (Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1996), 373). Second, even if particular norms do result in competitive advantages for the states that adopt them, Florini claims that it is too difficult for others to know which norms give particular states their advantages. Emulation therefore becomes impossible (Ibid., 378, 380). Florini's mechanism by which norms are socialized throughout the system thus remains somewhat obscure. Moreover, to the extent that socialization is not driven by competitive pressures for the principal units of the system (i.e. states), the structural origins of this process must be questioned.
Finally, Ikenberry and Kupchan examine the socialization of political principles, or "substantive beliefs" through the use of hegemonic power. Their examination of socialization is different from mine in two critical respects. First, to them, socialization results from use of coercion on behalf of a hegemonic power. It does not result, as in my theory, from the interests of individual states to conform to the principles that best assure survival in a competitive arena. In this sense, their argument is not really a systemic one (in the sense that all states are affected by particular competitive pressures), but an examination of various bilateral relationships between a hegemon and secondary states (though these relationships do have systemic effects, such as patterns of alliance formation). Second, because in their argument socialization results from the coercive power of a particular state, regime change is necessarily restricted to secondary states. In contrast, as my theory examines the systemic effects of particular political principles, all states should be subject to the forces generated by the structures of the system. (G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization, 44, 3 (Summer: 1990), 284-315. Back.
Note 45: For reasons of space, the empirical evidence of this paper will be limited to the examination of the socialization effects in nearly homogeneous systems only. Back.
Note 46: Gulick, Edward Vose, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York, WW Norton and Co., 1955), p. 98. Back.
Note 47: Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power , p. 140. Back.
Note 48: Witness, for example, the mathematical approach to exchanging territory among powers so as not to create a population, and thus a power, imbalance. (Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, pp. 244-250). Back.
Note 49: For example, according to Gulick, "there is quite an explicit connection between balance of power analysis and the policy of restoring the Bourbons" (Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 169). Back.
Note 50: Quoted in Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 13. Back.
Note 51: Quoted in Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 308. Back.
Note 52: Quoted in Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 142-43. Back.
Note 53: I use the term society of states as Hedley Bull does: "A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" The Anarchical Society, (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 13). Metternich's famous quote: "for a long time now, Europe has had for me the quality of a fatherland" (quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 86) is indicative of this internationalist sentiment.a href="#txt53"> Back.
Note 54: For an examination of the theoretical relationship between collective security and states' welfare, see Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe." For an empirical analysis demonstrating how the stability and security of the Concert of Europe was enhanced by collective security principles, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes." Back.
Note 55: Quoted in Walt, Revolution and War, p. 67. Back.
Note 56: Quoted in Walt, Revolution and War, p. 84. Burke, of course, warned against ideological contagion from the beginning. "Never shall I think any country in Europe to be secure, whilst there is established, in the very center of it, a state...founded upon principles of anarchy, and which is, in reality, a college of armed fanatics, for the propagation of the principles of assassination, robbery, rebellion, fraud, faction, oppression, and impiety...[Other powers] may be tolerably safe at present, because the comparative power of France for the present is little. But times and occasions make dangers...There is a power always on the watch...to establish its own principles and modes of mischief, wherever it can hope for success. What mercy would these usurpers have on other sovereigns, and on other nations, when they treat their own king with such unparalleled indignities, and so cruelly oppress their own countrymen?" Reflections on the Revolution in France, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 263-64). Back.
Note 57: Cf. Burke: "The new school of murder and barbarism, set up in Paris, having destroyed (so far as in it lies) all the other manners and principles which have hitherto civilized Europe, will destroy also the mode of civilized war, which more than any thing else, had distinguished the Christian world." (Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 277). Back.
Note 58: Quoted in Kissinger, A World Restored , p. 12. Or as Castlereagh put it Napoleon's return "was incompatible with the peace and security of Europe." All the great powers agreed in the Treaty of Paris, of March, 1813, that "Napoleon Bonaparte has place himself outside of civil and social relations..." (Quoted in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 263). Back.
Note 59: Walt, Revolution and War, p. 98. For example, the commissioners in Toulon were informed that "the acknowledgment of an hereditary monarchy...affords the only probable ground for restoring regular government in France.' In 1794, Pitt proclaimed that he "had no idea of any peace being secure, unless France returned to a monarchical system." (Quoted in Walt, Revolution and War, p. 98). And Castlereagh wrote to the tsar that the Bourbons would "likely...be addicted to peace." (Quoted in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 170). Back.
Note 60: Quoted in Walt, Revolution and War, p. 97. Back.
Note 61: Kim, Revolution and International System, p. 129. Back.
Note 62: Quoted in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power p. 172. Back.
Note 63: Quoted in Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power p. 240. Back.
Note 64: Cf. Walt, Revolution and War, especially pp. 88, 124. Back.
Note 65: According to Kissinger: "the period of stability which [followed Napoleon's final defeat] was the best proof that a 'legitimate' order had been constructed, an order accepted by all the major powers, so that henceforth they sought adjustment within its framework rather than in its, overthrow" ( A World Restored , p. 5). See also Jervis, "Security Regimes." Back.
Note 66: Schweizer, Peter, Victory (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 131. Back.
Note 67: Shultz, George P., Turmoil and Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), especially pp. 398, 528, 574, 582, 586, 762, 888, 1012, 1132. Back.
Note 68: Matlock, Jack F. Jr., Autopsy on an Empire (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 80-81. Back.
Note 69: James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992 (New York: George Putnam's Sons, 1995), p. 41. Back.
Note 70: Deudney, Daniel, and Ikenberry, G. John, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security, Vol. 16 (Winter 1991-92), p. 114. Back.
Note 71: Cf. Schweizer, Peter, Victory . Back.
Note 72: Quoted in Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State , p. 530. Back.
Note 73: According to Allen Lynch, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" may be summarized as follows:
"1.) Nuclear war cannot under any circumstance be won; therefore, nuclear weapons cannot be an instrument of policy.
2.) Security cannot be obtained through military means alone; furthermore, security in the nuclear age is mutual in character and must rely strongly on political means.
3.) Nuclear deterrence as a durable guarantor of peace is rejected. Strategic parity, seen as a historical success for socialism, could cease to be a factor of stability in the face of an unconstrained arms race.
4.) Peaceful coexistence as a concept is seen less as a form of class struggle and increasingly as a long-lasting condition in which states with different social and political systems will have to learn how to live with each other for the indefinite future.
5.) The multipolar and interdependent character of contemporary international relations is increasingly recognized.
6.) Even conventional war, fought in Europe with contemporary military technology, would be catastrophic and must be prevented." (The Cold War is Over--Again, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 25, emphasis added). Back.
Note 74: For an in-depth description of the end of the Cold War and the changes in American Policies, see Oberdorfer, Don, The Turn, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); and Beschloss, Michael and Talbott, Strobe, At the Highest Levels (Boston: Little Brown and Co, 1994). Back.
Note 75: Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State , p. 506. Or as Ambassador Matlock explained, the Soviet acceptance (even partial) of the political freedoms defining the West at the 1988 Party Conference meant "what had passed for 'socialism' in Soviet parlance had dropped from sight. What the [Conference] described was something closer to European social democracy." As a consequence, Matlock believed that "the Soviet Union could never again be what it had been in the past" (Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 122). Even if militarily strong, it would no longer be a threat to the U.S. (Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 16, 17). According to Secretary of State Baker, the Bush Administration "believed that the defeat of communism and the rise of the democrats created an unprecedented opportunity. We hoped to build our relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the other new independent states on the basis of democracy and free markets: what we came to call 'democratic peace,' the type of peace we enjoyed with Germany and Japan. This peace would be based on shared democratic values, not just converging interests" (Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992 ), p. 654, emphasis added). Back.
Note 76: Shevardnadze, Eduard, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 128. Back.
Note 77: Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom , p. 63. Back.
Note 78: Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom , p. 48. Back.
Note 79: Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom , p. 26. Back.
Note 80: Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 113. Back.
Note 81: Dobrynin, In Confidence , p. 636. Back.
Note 82: Ligachev, Yegor, Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin, The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Michele A. Berdy, and Dobrochna Dyrcz-Freeman (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 320, 321. Back.
Note 83: It must be reiterated that even Russian external security was augmented by their normative conversion. Not only do the West and NATO no longer view Russia as an immediate threat, but they also could become in the future both a partner and benefactor of Russia. See Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom , p. 26. (By Russia, I am of course referring to democratic Russia. Before Russia could enjoy the competitive benefits already discussed, communist Russia had to cease to exist.) Back.
Note 84: For criticisms of the democratic peace theory, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19 (Fall 1994); See also John Mearsheimer "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19 (Winter 1994-95). Back.
Note 85: According to Alexander Wendt, "in order to get from anarchy and material forces to power politics and war...neorealists have been forced to make additional, ad hoc assumptions about the social structure of the international system. We see this in Mearsheimer's interest in "hyper-nationalism," Stephen Walt's emphasis on ideology in the 'balance of threat,' [and] Randall Schweller's focus on the status quo-revisionist distinction...Incorporating these assumptions generates more explanatory power, but how? In these cases the crucial causal work is done by social, not material, factors" (Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20 (Summer 1995), p. 78.) For the sources of Wendt's criticisms, see: John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Randall Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73-103.) Back.
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