Collective Foreign and Security Policy: The Emergence of an ASEANized Regional Order in East Asia?

Collective Foreign and Security Policy: The Emergence of an ASEANized Regional Order in East Asia?

London School of Economics
Department of International Relations

March 1998

ASEAN's principal post-Cold War objective has been to promote and establish a regional order in the Asia-Pacific that, first, accomodates its members diverse, if not partially incongruent politico-security interests and that, second, reflects its own sense of political confidence. In pursuing this goal, the Association has arrogated to itself the role of principal architect for two reasons. ₁ First, ASEAN considered neither China nor the United States, given their mutual distrust and prevailing antagonisms, to be in a position to define a new regional order that would be acceptable to the other. Second, although she has been the predominant source of foreign investment in Southeast Asia, Japan was also not viewed by ASEAN as being able to assume such a prominent managerial politico-security role in East Asia, in part, because of its lack of repentance for the past. ₂ In the immediate post-Cold War environment, such great power leadership was in any case anathema to ASEAN given the purported democratisation of international politics. ₃ Moreover, its member states not only held the view that ASEAN should be treated on an equal par by the regional great powers. They also asserted that ASEAN's record in enhancing regional security by processes of dialogue, conciliation, conflict management and shelving, and the building of national resilience strengthened its credentials for becoming the primary driving force in establishing a new regional order.

More than five years after the Singapore Summit, when ASEAN formally made the way free for discussing security issues with its Dialogue Partners, it is opportune to inquire to what extent ASEAN has succeeded in ASEANizing regional order in East Asia. The paper is divided into three sections. Section One briefly outlines the theoretical premises of the paper and introduces certain theoretical tools that in my opinion help to refine a purely interest-based analysis of ASEAN's collective foreign and security policy. ₄ The second section looks at some aspects of international politics in East Asia that may substantiate the thesis of an emerging ASEANized regional order. This will include a brief inquiry into the degree to which the principles and rules of contemporary Asia-Pacific institutions conform to those advocated by ASEAN. Section Three examines whether external challenges pertain which call the notion of ASEANization into question. Here I will focus on the challenges to an ASEANized order posed by the People's Republic of China and the United States. This discussion is limited to ideas, norms and interests in the politico-security realm. ₅

The Meaning of ASEANization

Epistemological, Methodological, and Theoretical Issues

Approaches and tools for the analysis of foreign and security policy have been increasingly extended and refined over the years. More often than not nowadays, the pursuit of interests is perceived as being constrained by norms. ₆ This paper also assumes that norms exist and that they matter both in the process of formulation and implementation of foreign and security policy, and in our analysis of world politics. As Professor Kratochwil has argued repeatedly, assessing the impact of norms is not to be confused with a causal analysis. ₇ To evaluate their importance, he has instead asked students of international relations to engage in an interpretative inquiry, the purpose of which is to unveil whether particular norms have meaning for the actors concerned and what reasons they have for complying or for not complying with them. While to some this would not be different from "traditional" foreign policy analysis, understanding actors' reasoning becomes a necessary step in any process of judging foreign policy. Apart from this issue, I submit that we also stand to make several further theoretical gains if we invoke what might be called the communicative approach. ₈

For instance, the theoretical question as to why norms are complied with seems to have been persuasively addressed by those adopting a communicative approach. This approach posits that it is communicative acts (speech acts) which underlie the validity of norms. Accordingly, norms stick not because they are salient, or because of looming threats in cases of possible non-compliance, or because of rational expectations of long-run utility. Rather, norms have prescriptive force because validity-claims in their favour can be redeemed or validated discursively. Importantly, a discursive validation is time-bound, and history is of course dynamic. In other words, validity-claims and their acceptance are no constants. The principle of non-intervention is an example of this. ₉ Diplomacy is thus not only about ways of managing conflicting interests, but a continuous dialectical exercise in the elaboration of principles and norms that are deemed fair. Such an exercise cannot be understood solely in terms of instrumental action or instrumental rationality.

Significantly, the communicative approach adds a theory of action to mainstream constructivism. ₁₀ Take for instance the issue of the contestation of and the non-compliance with norms. To merely invoke different interests would amount to overlooking the point that it often takes more than a grammar of interests for norms to be contested. If interests are indivisible from the identity of actors, it makes sense to posit that the non-compliance with norms may be motivated by a sense of grievance which springs from the non-recognition, imagined or actual, of the identities of individuals or communities. In such cases, a moral grammar underlies our action. Importantly, it remains an empirical question whether conflicts are driven by the violation of identity-claims or, say, by economic or survival motives per se. The communicative approach thus does not dispute that state leaders generally seek to maintain national or regime security, or that states are dependent on resources or access to markets to sustain their economic survival.

That a theory of action couched in terms of a struggle for recognition matters in international relations is underscored by the number of empirical analyses that highlight a leadership's sense of entitlement or pursuit of prestige. I submit therefore that the communicative approach helps to theorise concepts such as respect, dignity, or alienation that appear to be underrated or neglected in conventional theories. We can do worse than link up the communicative approach with writings on non-status quo powers. ₁₁ Nevertheless, whether and how such a want for recognition translates into practice, depends on many factors, not least diverse forms and interpretations of structural power. Considerations about the latter may indeed override the impact of the violation of identity-claims.

ASEANization A Struggle for Security and Recognition ₁₂

Building on the communicative approach we can understand by the concept of ASEANization both a milieu-goal and a struggle for the full respect of ASEAN and its member states' identities by the great powers. As regards the first point, the acceptance by the regional powers of principles and norms of international society such as sovereignty, non-intervention, non-interference, the peaceful settlement of conflict promise a better chance to strengthen national resilience, and thus to safeguard ASEAN members' security, political independence and policy autonomy. ₁₃ Historically, the proposal for a so-called Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (later called ZOPFAN) represented such a political rather than strictly legal initiative. National resilience, particularly successful economic and social development would also enhance the legitimacy of regimes. ₁₄ At the same time, ASEAN's attempt to extend its diplomatic and security culture to the wider East Asia represents an attempt to win full recognition of its standing as a successful diplomatic community. The long-standing desire for recognition of ASEAN's form of regionalism, of its different national political and economic systems (in short its members' identity), and for respect in its dealings with outsiders has been reinforced by the impressive economic growth patterns most ASEAN economies achieved in the 1980s and early 1990s. If not always explicitly stated, drawing the regional powers into ASEAN-proposed institutional and normative frameworks appears to be a yardstick by which ASEAN itself assesses the true extent of the recognition of its role in regional diplomacy.

How to evaluate the extent of East Asia's ASEANization in the Post Cold War period

Two criteria appear appropriate to evaluate whether East Asia's regional order is becoming ASEANized:

(1) to what extent have the principles and norms of the ASEAN way become institutionalised in regional institutional structures and processes?

(2) to what extent is ASEAN really gaining acceptance as an equal player in regional diplomacy? In other words, to what extent do great powers visàvis ASEAN apply those principles of restraint, respect and responsibility that Michael Antolik saw as pertinent in intramural relations? ₁₅

The Case for ASEANization

Examining the institutional structures of the Western Pacific, evidence of any ASEANization seems at first sight to be less than pronounced. In the politico-security realm East Asia's institutional architecture consists of bilateral and multilateral, of formal defence ties, various forms of security co-operation ties and consultative arrangements. Its most important component remains the San Francisco Treaty system of formal US alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. Washington also entertains very important security ties with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The Five Power Defence Arrangement provides for the ANZUK presence, aligning regional and extra-regional powers to Malaysia and Singapore. True, multilateral institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum have existed for some years now. However, if ASEANization is to be understood as a struggle for security and recognition, and ASEAN members continue to rely on external powers for the defence of their territorial integrity and for deterrence, one might want to quickly dismiss the notion of an ASEANized regional order. The fact that ASEAN member states are enhancing their security by relying on states from outside Southeast Asia does not per se rule out or contradict that East Asia's regional order has been ASEANized, however. This would make good sense if it were undisputed that "ASEAN is attempting to substitute a regional security order centered on itself for the old order based on a system of bilateral ties with the US". ₁₆ However, ZOPFAN too in practice never designated a milieu goal devoid of the potential resource of (external) countervailing power. ₁₇ Arguably, if ASEANization stands in part for the acceptance by regional powers of ASEAN-proposed principles and norms governing interstate conduct, we shall need to examine in more detail the rules and practices governing the workings of institutions in the Asia-Pacific like the ASEAN Regional Forum. Are these principles those advocated and preferred by ASEAN?

Many of the principles and norms informing the workings of the ARF, which evolved out of the security discussions initiated within the Post Ministerial Conferences, ₁₈ were set by the 1995 ASEAN Concept Paper for the ARF. Having received significant input from officials in Singapore, the Concept Paper was adopted at ARF 2. Significantly, the Concept Paper assigned to ASEAN the role of primary driving force in the ARF since [t]here would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants. ₁₉ ASEAN's proprietary role has most visibly found expression in ASEAN's assumption of the ARF chairmanship on a rotating basis, in parallel to the annual change in chairmanship within ASEAN. In 1996, this arrangement allowed ASEAN sufficient leeway to decide in favour of Myanmar's admission to the ARF.

Moreover, as regards the principles and norms underlying the ARF's working culture, the Concept Paper stipulates that "the rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices." This re-affirmed what had been decided at the inaugural ARF in Bangkok in July 1994. There the ARF member states had agreed to "endorse the purpose and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy and political and security co-operation". ₂₀ In practice, this has amounted to an emphasis on building personal relationships, without an intervening centralised bureaucracy. Plenary ARF meetings take place in a 1+1, and as of 1997, in a 1+2 format. Moreover, decisions are to be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations. "No voting will take place." ₂₁ The Chairman's statement, released after ARF meetings, represents the Chair's view of the common themes running through the discussions; it is not a negotiated document. Equally, the ASEAN Regional Forum has replicated the ASEAN experience of stressing contact over constraining CBMs. Currently security co-operation is proceeding from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, and is supposed to, finally, extend to the elaboration of approaches to conflicts. ₂₂ Further similarities in institutional structure and process between ASEAN and ARF include the institutionalisation of the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF SOM). All these points might be taken to indicate a process of incremental ASEANization.

Such processes appear to have been reinforced by ASEAN's enlargement. The vision of an ASEAN-10, earmarked at one point for the occasion of ASEAN's 30th Anniversary in Kuala Lumpur, may have momentarily suffered a setback due to the removal of Prince Norodom Ranariddh as Cambodia's First Prime Minister. Nevertheless, enlargement to date has been important not merely in terms of the institutional expansion of ASEAN, but also for the further widening of processes of socialisation and acculturation to the ASEAN Way this entails. The case of Vietnam has underscored that worries about the potentially negative impact of differences in political culture, historical experience and foreign policy style on the ability of the Association to cultivate the ASEAN Way have proved largely unfounded. ₂₃

Another feature of what can be seen as the ASEANization of the regional politico-security order is the increasing relevance of so-called Track Two channels in East Asia security co-operation. These channels allow for fairly candid exchanges between academics and various officials from Track One who participate in their private capacity. ₂₄ Some Track Two events are organisationally linked to the ARF framework, others are embedded within the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) process. ₂₅ Their task is not only to provide appropriate forums for informal discussion on regional political and security issues, but also to formulate policy recommendations for regional governments. ₂₆ To see the CSCAP process as further evidence of continuing ASEANization is possible because ASEAN participants wield substantial influence within CSCAP, not least because its Steering Committee is always co-chaired by one ASEAN member committee. The Association's influence has for instance been expressed in CSCAP's adoption of comprehensive security(as against cooperative security even though some of the latter's ideas are incorporated) as the organising concept for managing security in the Asia Pacific Region. ₂₇ Accordingly, CSCAP has become as much part of the legitimisation machinery for norms already in place as it is the harbinger of new ideas. ₂₈

Given the inter-linkages between regional security and economic development in its member states, ASEAN has also succeeded in shaping regional order by influencing economic regionalism. In particular, ASEAN has been able (thus far) to de-legitimate the embrace of the institutional structures and principles characteristically associated with other attempts at economic integration despite officially espousing trade and investment liberalisation. Indeed, given ASEAN's considerable success in extending to APEC principles of the PECC process of consultations, proposals of American policy-makers to transform APEC into a negotiating regime, and to institutionalise rapid free trade deals and a binding contractual approach have foundered. Instead, ASEAN countries faced with actual or potential domestic opposition to liberalisation measures (be they the working class or crony capitalists) managed to promote an approach to this issue involving flexible agreements and a voluntary trade liberalisation agenda. According to insiders, this approach rests on the application of peer pressure. By this is meant that liberalisation has become an issue over which face can be lost or gained, if security considerations are not infringed. Moreover, APEC's rotating chairmanship between developed and developing countries has allowed the concerned ASEAN members to stress the themes of national resilience and to articulate the merits of their models of development. Intergovernmentalism, voluntarism, plus the fact that the APEC Secretariat in Singapore remains a purely administrative unit suggest a strengthening of certain aspects of the ASEAN way in East Asia.

While the outbreak of the financial crisis has led ASEAN's model of development to be severely challenged, this has not yet translated into a debunking of APEC's principles and practices. Indeed, some may see the recent announcement of annual summits between ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian countries -the First (Informal) East Asia Summit (in the EAEC configuration) took place in Kuala Lumpur last December- as yet another indication of an ASEANization of regional order. The point could be further reinforced by pointing to the purpose and current ground rules of the ASEM process, formally suggested by Southeast Asia's Goh Chok Tong following the World Economic Forum's Europe-East Asia Economic Summit in Singapore in October 1994. It has been argued that ASEM signalled that "ASEAN is now in the process of transition from a multilateral framework for the pursuit of unilateral national interests to an intergovernmental organization promoting regional interests visàvis the rest of the world." ₂₉ From ASEAN's perspective, a closer Euro-Asian dialogue marks another effort to win greater recognition from America, with a hope of seeing this translated into a partnership of respect. Among other, ASEM was a response to increasing U.S. unilateralism in its trade policy, and its resort to sanctioning measures. ₃₀

But do these developments warrant the argument of the ASEANization of regional order? Do the present operational ground rules of the aforementioned institutions not continue to be contested, as are some of the basic elements of a code for interstate conduct? And is ASEAN's struggle for status recognition not also challenged? Challenges are associated with two countries in particular: China and the United States. The following section attempts to identify the major elements of their respective challenge and to illustrate the extent to which ASEAN has dealt with and successfully accommodated the challenge by the regional powers. To what extent have the regional powers been drawn into ASEAN's preferred institutional and normative frameworks, even if this has meant rethinking or compromising on some of their underlying principles? Asked differently, to what extent, if any, have the United States and China either internalised the principles and norms promoted by ASEAN or been influenced by them in the formulation and/or implementation of their regional foreign and security policy?

China's challenge

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War China's challenge to regional order had waned and appeared to be manageable. Complete ASEAN recognition of China in 1991, achieved as Jakarta and Beijing proceeded to restore, and Beijing and Singapore proceeded to establish ties, "symbolize[d] the Association's confidence in its ability to deal with great powers whose motives may still be viewed with suspicion". ₃₁ Since, such confidence has, however, been shaken by what has been perceived as China's creeping assertiveness in the South China Sea. ₃₂ Matters were not helped by the lack of transparency of China's actual defence expenditure. Arguably, it is not only individual events but the embeddedness of Beijing's policy toward Southeast Asia in the context of its overall foreign policy and security agenda that has re-ignited long-standing suspicions of China. That agenda is of course China's own drive for status enhancement. ₃₃ China's struggle for status enhancement must on the one hand be seen against its traditional self-understanding of centrality. ₃₄ On the other hand, it can be viewed as a response to the unceasing violations of its identity-claims through the experience of humiliation and territorial dismemberment suffered since the 19th century. In recent decades various aspects of China's national identity have continued to be repeatedly challenged by the US, the former Soviet Union and again the US (and the West).

The challenge which China's struggle for security and recognition throws up has, in the view of many Southeast Asian elites, at least two dimensions in the contemporary period. ₃₅ One is usually captured in terms of the PRC's hegemonic potential, the other relates to the possibility of its resort to the threat or use of force to impose its will on ASEAN states in relation to its territorial claims. The fear of Chinese hegemonic designs stems not least from the Middle Kingdom's historical interactions with what then was referred to as the Nanyang (literally Southern Seas), particularly during the reign of the Yung-lo Emperor (1403-1424). These historical memories continue to imbue contemporary decision-makers and their advisers with a sense that China has, for centuries, been intent on expanding its influence into Southeast Asia, especially in periods of (imperial) strength. ₃₆ It therefore did not go unnoticed that Hanoi's normalisation of ties with Beijing in 1991 was effected solely on Beijing's terms.

As regards the issue of a resort to force, China's punitive campaign against Vietnam in 1979 has been interpreted as an indication of the extent to which China may go to assert its status as a regional power. China's violent clashes with Vietnam in the South China Sea region to resolve competing territorial claims (Paracels in 1974, Spratlys in 1988) were perceived as less than full an acceptance of the principle that conflict should be settled peacefully. In addition, Southeast Asian elites are unlikely to have been comforted by the view of some Chinese who considered the failure in the years between 1986 and 1988 to oust other claimants from the area for reasons to do with the Sino-Soviet rivalry as a lost chance. ₃₇

Still, the ARF has offered ASEAN the opportunity to implement a strategy towards China which Jusuf Wanandi formulated already during the Cold War:

The People's Republic of China needs to be included in some form of international arrangement so that she can develop a more responsible attitude. This requires the creation of an international structure in which the People's Republic of China can become a responsible member. What we mean by responsibility here is respect for the rules of the game which recognise the sovereignty and independence of countries in determining their own direction of development as well as refrain from attempts to launch a system of political hegemony. ₃₈

What has been achieved in recent years? Has ASEAN succeeded in meaningfully drawing China into the multi-layered regional security architecture that its members have been attempting to construct, and in winning China's acceptance for ASEAN's self-assumed leadership in the ARF? That seemed a particular tall order because China had no prior track record in multilateral security dialogues, discounting its experience in the United Nations and certain non-proliferation regimes. Historically, Chinese leaders have also demonstrated a conspicuous preference for bilateralism, especially in security affairs.

In the event, China's enrolment in regional multilateralism quickly turned out to be quite comprehensive. By 1991, China had accepted an invitation as a guest to the Annual Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers; it then also joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum. In 1994, Beijing and ASEAN entered a consultative partnership, with China becoming a founding member of the ASEAN Regional in the same year. The ASEAN-SOM reached agreement on an upgrading of China's status to that of full dialogue partner, a step executed at the 29th AMM. The first ASEAN-China summit took place in December 1997. Yet does this participation in ASEAN-led or initiated forums imply a commitment to ASEAN-proposed principles and norms? Or are there other reasons for Beijing's involvement in regional multilateralism?

By 1993 China's leadership viewed regional multilateralism in political and security co-operation as an element of a new multipolar era. Significantly, China saw the significance of the security dialogues primarily in the context of the reciprocal relations been the great powers. Beijing's entry into regional multilateralism was accompanied by considerable trepidation because it was feared that the United States might seek to manipulate such dialogues in order to perpetuate American hegemony within the region and to contain China. At the time, Beijing's relations with the United States were at best strained, with a danger of a new Cold War in form of a conflict over international norms. ₃₉ Similarly, China opined that Japan, which Beijing considers a bit of an anomaly in international politics, was finally about to aspire to a position of political power, and that it might, if in the long-term, also utilise the security dialogues in order to smother China. ₄₀ China therefore suspected and dreaded that the USA and Japan might hinder the modernisation of China's armed forces by demanding a greater degree of transparency and confidence-building measures. Moreover, it was feared that Washington would attempt to obligate China to publicly renounce the use of force, to force the admission of Taiwan to the multilateral security dialogues and, if in the long-term, to promote Taiwan's independence. ₄₁

Conversely, regional multilateralism also became viewed as an opportunity because the People's Republic found re-assuring the methods by which the ASEAN Regional Forum would operate. Indeed, she has grown increasingly confident that China's position will not simply be overridden despite repeated attempts to do just that with reference to alleged or actual majority views. In the event, the principle of consensual decision-making has allowed Beijing to co-operate with the United States on the basis of equality. Accordingly, ASEAN-sponsored multilateralism offered a chance to restrict the United States' leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region, to prevent Japan from assuming a military role and to provide Beijing with a forum to refute the theory of the China threat. ₄₂ Beijing still approves of the practice of ending ARF meetings not with declarations or resolutions but with short statements. To China that indicates an appropriate appreciation of the complexity of many (latent) regional conflicts and expresses members' recognition that it is at best long-term solutions which can be found for them. ₄₃ Having completed four plenary sessions, Chinese leaders have hailed the ARF as "an almost ideal forum for security co-operation."

If Beijing primarily joined ASEAN-led multilateralism for reasons not directly related to the Association, this leaves unanswered the question whether ASEAN has been able to defuse China's twofold challenge. First, has ASEAN succeeded in committing China to a process of working out jointly acceptable confidence-building and preventive diplomacy measures in relation to the South China Sea so as to lessen the likelihood of any use of force? Perhaps the best yardstick by which to assess this question is how the People's Republic has responded to the measures proposed in the ARF Concept Paper which, significantly, was endorsed by all ARF members, including China. If such commitments are not forthcoming, to what extent are they subordinated to other concerns? This question should be asked because it would be naive to assume that whatever China agrees to or rejects is a response only to ASEAN's proposals, and otherwise taken in a contextual void.

On transparency, some of Beijing's initiatives have been derided as propaganda. In particular, its first ever white paper on arms control and disarmament generated scorn among Western officials and academics as it provided relatively limited information and failed to provide a complete picture of Chinese defence policy. ₄₄ On the other hand, at the time of publication, the criteria for such defence policy statements were still being drawn up in the CSCAP process (in which China then did not formally participate). For this reason alone, it would have been ingenuous to expect China to match the criteria of comprehensiveness, balance and mutual supportiveness, precision and reliability, consistency and standardisation, and availability that characterise the White Papers of other Asian or even Western countries. Similarly, it is true that China has resisted attempts by Indonesia to upgrade discussions to a formal level in the South China Sea Workshop on confidence-building measures. Notwithstanding their identical claims, it is because of Taiwan's inclusion in this forum that such proposals are not pursued at the formal level. The issue is thus one of sovereignty rather than merely one of transparency and confidence-building.

That China is not per se opposed to confidence-building in the military sphere was demonstrated (again) by its interest in assuming the joint chairmanship of the ARF Inter-sessional working group on confidence-building measures in 1996/7. Indeed, in May 1996, Beijing signed an agreement on the pre-notification of certain military manoeuvres and on the exchange of military observers. ₄₅ China has stressed as exemplary its lengthy but successful pursuit of confidence-building measures at the bilateral level, demonstrated by the signing of the Shanghai Agreement in April 1996. ₄₆ Irrespective of the potential difficulties of extending such an agreement to the maritime concerns of East Asia, the flurry of high-level visits to ASEAN states (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam), and the establishment of joint Sino-Philippine and Sino-Vietnamese working groups testifies to the significance attributed to bilateral confidence-building. ₄₇ In February 1997, attempts at reconciliation with the Philippines even led to China's Minister of Defence, Chi Haotian, offering Manila a loan of 2-3m US$ for military ends. ₄₈

As regards the principle of the non-use of force, it is true that Beijing has failed to endorse unequivocally ASEAN's South China Sea Declaration of 1992. However, China's initial reluctance to sign this Declaration seems to have been linked to the fact that at the time not all claimants were ASEAN members (Vietnam was not). The occupation of Mischief Reef, which is claimed both by the Philippines and Vietnam, certainly demonstrated that not all within China feel obliged to respect the norm of restraint, but to equate this with the use of force is problematic. Indeed, while the discovery in early 1995 of Chinese structures on Mischief Reef, perhaps gained most public attention, this incident was not the last in a series of actions taken by China to reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. ₄₉ Nevertheless, scholars have noted the way in which China responded to ASEAN's ensuing collective criticism in the wake of the Mischief Reef incident, articulated informally at the ASEAN-China SOM instituted in April 1995. The concerted diplomatic stand taken here by ASEAN apparently had significant psychological and political impact, not least because ASEAN succeeded in allaying remaining fears harboured by the Chinese about the purpose of ASEAN's multilateral venture and in making clear that the Association does not appreciate being exposed as a paper-tiger. ₅₀ Since, the Chinese leadership has exercised greater self-restraint and has sought to dissociate itself from acts of violence in the South China Sea in which Chinese (fishermen) have been involved. At the second ASEAN-China SOM in June 1996 Beijing proposed to initiate an exchange of views among experts regarding questions of maritime law. ₅₁ Nevertheless, such exchanges did not stop the China's National Offshore Oil Corp. from moving an oil and gas exploration ship into disputed seas off the coast of Vietnam in March 1997. The rig was removed only about a month later following an ASEAN ambassadorial meeting in Hanoi. ₅₂ At the third ASEAN-China SOM this again left ASEAN but to reiterate the necessity to abstain from all steps that might impede mutual trust.

Without wanting to justify Chinese action, we should bear in mind that it might be Beijing may have good reasons to less than fully forthcoming as regards its claims to the Spratlys. There are at least three arguments to be made in this context. First, what is at issue is an issue of sovereignty. Secondly, estimates about possible hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea diverge widely, and China is a net importer of oil. And thirdly, the legal bases for territorial claims of certain other claimant states have not been immune to challenge either. ₅₃ Also, and this is not to be underestimated, China's policy-makers and academics have across the board been genuinely engulfed in moral outrage at the policy of island-snatching pursued by some ASEAN countries in the South China Sea. The Chinese have been particularly incensed at the Vietnamese stance given that North Vietnam for more than two decades was perceived as recognising the legitimacy of the long-standing Chinese claims to the Spratlys. Yet by 1997, Vietnam had occupied about 60% of all the islands, reefs and banks in the South China Sea.

One could thus argue that, all in all, China has acted with a greater measure of restraint than she is usually given credit for. This would appear to indicate its awareness of the importance of abiding by norms. To explain this with reference to potential opportunity costs would not be sufficient in my view. Non-compliance would endanger a successful pursuit of recognition as a responsible great power that hopes to lead by example. China's ratification of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in May 1996 is thus probably rightly heralded as a significant step. Beijing thereby seems to have indicated a willingness to square its historical claim line and the Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas with rules on the creation of maritime zones. On the other hand, Beijing attracted strong protests from ASEAN countries when declaring straight baselines (including some surrounding the Paracel Islands) that invoked a principle many consider applicable only by archipelagic states.

Irrespective of the fact that there has not been recourse to armed force in settling competing claims in the South China Sea for some years now, it is action as the above that fails to dispel the uncertainty surrounding China's future actions. An uncertainty that continues to feed on the lack of political will on the part of the claimants, and on the historically informed appreciation about the effects of interdependence on China. ₅₄

Notwithstanding Beijing's continued opposition to institutionalising dialogue on the Spratlys and to internationalising the dispute, ASEAN seems more confident now than in the early mid-1990s that a non-violent solution to the Spratly conflict can be reached. As Jusuf Wanandi put it,

It should be recognised that she [China] has been isolated for so long and therefore needs a lot of understanding and patience. This should not mean kow-towing to her or joining the Chinese bandwagon to secure a relationship with China for the longer future when she becomes a real great power. The problem is how to make her realize when she made mistakes. If it is being done in a friendly way, and not in public, she might listen. This could take some time to have an effect, because it might not be understood by her or her face is at stake or simply due to her cumbersome layers of bureaucracy. ₅₅

This is not to say that ASEAN will not invoke new mechanisms in addition to those structures and processes on which is has hitherto relied (primarily the SOM, international law, and some CBMs). Already, it has agreed, as has China, to examine the possibility of granting the ARF Chair powers in the field of preventive diplomacy. ₅₆ In the meantime, both sides have agreed "to continue to exercise self-restraint and handle relevant differences in a cool and constructive manner". ₅₇

Is ASEAN gaining the recognition it seeks?

As regards the issue of recognition the question, for the time being, is not whether China is already attempting to impose its vision of regional order in East Asia on ASEAN but to what extent she is inclined to wish for the durability of any ASEANization of that order. Is Beijing willing to accept ASEAN in the primary driving seat in relation not only to Southeast but East Asian international politics?

As regards bilateral Sino-ASEAN relations, problems have arisen over the principles governing their interstate conduct. China has endorsed but not associated itself with the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. Instead, China submitted to ASEAN its own draft for a joint declaration of principles. While there appears to be little substantive disagreement - the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence are not that distinct from the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation - there is great reluctance, given the political symbolism, for either side to abandon its preferred formula. Accordingly, at the ASEAN-China summit meeting in December 1997, the parties reaffirmed that the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and universally recognised international law should all serve as basic norms underpinning their relationships. ₅₈ This can be interpreted as being in conformity with the idea of the sovereign equality of states.

As regards the question of whether China recognises ASEAN as an equal political and military pole in the emergent wider Asia-Pacific security order, ambiguity prevails however. On the one hand, China welcomes ASEAN's (now dented) self-confidence vis-(-vis other regional powers and approved of the Association's proprietary role in the ASEAN Regional Forum. On the other hand, Beijing's as yet largely unspecified plans for a revamped institutionalised structure in the Asia-Pacific appear to run counter to an indefinite support of such a role in the future. China's new mechanism appears designed to overcome the San Francisco Treaty system as this goes "against the trend of multi-polarization in East Asia, the trend of the building-up of equal and cooperative relations among major powers and the trend of the establishment of [a] multilateral security regime" ₅₉ The contours of China's security mechanism are still somewhat hazy, but its proposed elements include a regional multilateral system, a sub-regional multilateral system and a series of ad-hoc but complementary forums involving both government and non-governmental personnel. This security mechanism is to be bolstered through bilateral and multilateral confidence-building, through dialogues on security co-operation, all of which are to be combined with economic and political co-operation. It seems difficult to imagine that ASEAN could preserve its central role in this more encompassing system of multilateral politico-security relations. Beijing considers triangular relations between China, Japan, and the US as the most important factor for regional stability in the coming century. However, this need not entail China's support for the apparent desire of the United States and Japan to solve the structural problem they see in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Indeed, Sino-ASEAN relations remain of importance to Beijing in strategic, political and economic terms as was underlined during the visit by China's Prime Minister Li Peng's to Malaysia and Singapore in August 1997. ₆₀ Still, ASEAN would nevertheless probably be denied the kind of recognition to which some of its members have aspired.

The US challenge

The post-Cold War U.S. challenge to the principles and norms of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture and its role as the primary driving force of multilateral security co-operation is levelled in the context of a changed international strategic environment. The main implication of this new environment is that America no longer needs Asian allies as it did during the Cold War, whereas East Asia, and Southeast Asia especially, still looks to America to provide for its security guarantees, and for access to its market and technology. Here I will focus only on two aspects of the US challenge: the unenthusiastic support for ASEAN-led multilateralism and US recognition of ASEAN's primary role therein. ₆₁

As elaborated, the ARF has served as a forum through which ASEAN could engage the regional powers and through which the Association has sought to secure a more equal partnership in guarding regional peace and stability, and in shaping the region's future. Multilateralism was perceived by ASEAN governments as a vehicle to inculcate a different behaviour on the part of the US, in particular as regards proper consultation on issues affecting ASEAN members' foreign policy and security interests. In other words, this inclusive multilateralism served the purpose of re-asserting ASEAN members' political independence as well as the significance it gives to the principle of respect, irrespective of continuing security fears and an attendant need for the continuation of close defence or security relationships. In individual bilateral relationships between ASEAN members and the US this assertiveness was translated into the concept and practice of places, not bases.

Common political and security interests notwithstanding, ASEAN and US visions for regional order and its ground rules do not appear to be fully congruent. Undoubtedly, the two consecutive Clinton administrations have been more willing to involve the United States in the various forms of Asia-Pacific security multilateralism than previous Republican ones. Yet official endorsement of the ARF as a complement to the system of bilateral alliance and security relationships as expressed in the U.S. National Security Strategy, ₆₂ has not quite been matched in terms of practical support. Indeed, by the mid-1990s the Clinton administration was reaffirming its bilateral security ties rather than focusing on efforts to assist ASEAN in constructing a genuinely new multi-layered multilateral security framework that would institutionalise ASEAN's current leadership role of the ARF.

A number of factors seem to account for the relative disinterest of the US in an ASEAN-led ARF and the CSCAP process. First among these is the importance attached to the survival of the San Francisco system, which comprises the US deterrence strategy, forward basing systems and formal alliance arrangements. As regards maintaining the San Francisco system beyond the end of the Cold War at least four points deserve mention. First, in the opinion of military and political leaders alike, the framework is proven and provides the best guarantee of achieving its political and regional security interests. In Southeast Asia, the latter tend to focus on the protection of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). The continuation of the San Francisco system is also deemed to have the additional benefit of allowing Washington to elicit concessions, for instance in trade disputes, by subtle or not so subtle pressures on the respective security arrangements. Also, because the US reserves the right to intervene when it considers its vital interests or core values to be in jeopardy, any exclusive reliance on ASEAN's diplomatic culture as a guide to interstate conduct might potentially be problematic for the US.

Importantly, the preservation of the San Francisco Treaty System is further testimony to continuing US superpower status. Any major commitment to a new multi-tiered regional order structured around the ARF, ₆₃ in which ASEAN is playing the primary driving force, a fact tolerated for some time, is essentially contrary to American conceptions of the self. For this reason alone are there parallels in the US reaction to ASEAN-led multilateralism of the 1990s and to proposals for a more autonomously managed sub-regional order put forward by ASEAN in the 1970s. ₆₄

In this context, it is noteworthy that when China assailed the United States for continuing to promote its outdated alliance system at the ARF inter-sessional meeting on confidence-building in Beijing in March 1997, ASEAN failed to counter these criticisms. ₆₅ Indeed, it is possible to view ASEAN's rapid push towards enlargement as an indication of its members recognition that it will be difficult to hold on to the driving seat of regional multilateralism. ₆₆ To achieve this objective, ASEAN has been, as will be seen below, fairly accommodating to the US challenge. Yet to remain in the driving seat is difficult given the extent of the disaffection of the US with the ASEAN Regional Forum.

U.S. criticisms of existing mutilateral security dialogues: The ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific have both drawn criticisms in the U.S. for a perceived lack of relevance in addressing the region's core security issues. In 1994, the US administration did not fail to contrast the ARF's lack of action in tackling the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis with its own robust stance towards Pyongyang, the latter resulting in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Still, the US administration has since found the ARF useful to discuss the Korean situation and to request financial and political support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Four Party Peace Talks.

To understand US criticism, we need to appreciate that although the US does have an important strategic interest in maintaining open sea lanes of communication in the whole of East Asia, its overwhelming strategic concern is with Northeast rather than Southeast Asia. Indeed, U.S. elites tend to regard the triangular relationship between the United States, Japan and China as central to regional stability, and to see the U.S.-Japan alliance as the single most important vehicle in sustaining it. This focus is reinforced by public opinion. As has been argued, "Southeast Asia represents the most underrated area of the region in terms of U.S. public perceptions". ₆₇

U.S. policy-makers and their advisers attribute the ARF's failure to recommend itself to US leaders as a forum in which the US is able to achieve American objectives to a leadership problem, a criticism directed squarely at ASEAN. As some put it, "ASEAN follows instead of leads" ₆₈

The evident alienation on the part of the US has further been linked to its view that the ARF has failed to respond adequately to the re-emergence of China. This point is not primarily made with regard to relations between Beijing and Taipei (as will be remembered, the ARF remained conspicuously silent when in March 1996 China resorted to coercive diplomacy in the Taiwan Straits) because ASEAN has for obvious reasons favoured a less ambiguous One-China policy than others. Instead, it concerns the engagement of China more generally. True, Washington has appreciated the ARF's function of easing suspicions through a process of multilateral regional confidence- and norm-building. However, such achievement has tended to be viewed as fairly unspectacular. Accordingly, the United States for instance recommended introducing a number of defence-related transparency measures. This constituted a challenge not merely to the PRC, where Chinese experts registered strong disapproval cloaked in notions of unacceptable infringements of sovereignty, ₆₉ but also to ASEAN experts and politicians. The latter appreciate the argument of Chinese strategists according to which transparency is the friend of the strong and the enemy of the weak. At the time, such arms transparency might have revealed vulnerabilities that would effectively have called a bluff not only to China's repeated warning to integrate Taiwan by force if necessary. For whatever is said about China's recent spate of military modernisation or the PLA's future potential, its military capabilities will probably remain dwarfed by those of the U.S. for still a long time to come. ₇₀ Precisely because ASEAN states have faced similar questions at the sub-regional level, the Association favoured encouraging contact CBMs over those designed to increase military transparency.

However, the US has found it more congenial and meaningful to engage in direct Sino-US security dialogues and confidence-building measures, at levels considered appropriate, including that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ensuing strategic dialogue has entailed visits to the US by Jiang Zemin in October 1997, and by American Secretary of Defence to Beijing in January 1998. ₇₁ With the establishment of what is a relatively better bilateral working relationship with the Chinese than only a few years ago, there now appears to be little or no need for the big powers to manage their relations in the ARF framework. This of course was one of ASEAN's (and in particular Singapore's) ideas in constructing this forum. By implication, ASEAN's managerial role in the ARF is put under increasing pressure. This is not to say that the ARF is in danger of becoming irrelevant, far from it. The US will not want to forego the opportunity to request ARF members to support such issues as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the promotion of democracy and human rights. But it is clear that as the US asks for the ARF to move on, and to move on quickly, the promotion of such issues does challenge some of the norms on which ASEAN's intramural politico-security co-operation has rested and which the Association has difficulties parting with.

An example is the ASEAN's preference for gradualism. Many in the US have for some time favoured moving beyond confidence-building to preventive diplomacy so as to be able to, among other, defuse tensions arising for instance from competing territorial claims to the South China Sea that might, potentially, threaten regional SLOCs. US concerns and doubts about the ARF in this matter were highlighted as recently as 1997 when the U.S. National Security Strategy endorsed the ASEAN Regional Forum's engagement in conflict prevention and resolution, tasks not pursued at the time of its publication. ₇₂ In 1996, the U.S. delegation to the ASEAN Regional Forum also urged fellow members to strongly consider the participation of defence officials to make the security dialogues more meaningful. ₇₃ Such participation has now occurred as of ARF 4. Notably, under the Chairmanship of Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi, ARF 4 also produced a ministerial agreement to endorse recommendations made at the preceding ARF SOM on moving towards preventive diplomacy, and possibly a good offices role for the ARF Chair. However, one may assume that this has not yet settled matters for the US, because, "or preventive diplomacy to work, it must be backed by the credible threat of military force and the willingness to use it". ₇₄ Unsurprisingly, the former US Deputy National Security Advisor and Director of Central Intelligence also holds that for preventive diplomacy to be successful, leadership is required, which in the Asia Pacific region, according to him, the United States is best equipped to provide.

This aspect of the American challenge to the ASEANization of East Asia's regional order is reinforced by the intermittently revived proposal to replace the ARF as the main forum for multilateral security dialogue. U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry for instance spoke out in favour of formal multilateral security discussions in the context of APEC at the forum's 1995 summit meeting in Osaka. Proposals for changing ASEAN Regional Forum to Asian Regional Forum serve a similar purpose because such a name change is meant to signal to ASEAN the end of full US acceptance of ASEAN's chairmanship and some of the underlying principles of ARF plenary meetings. Thus, more than anything else, the US challenge to "the ASEANization of regional order in East Asia" targets ASEAN's self-assumed proprietary role in the emergent multilateralism. Washington has evidently decided that any multilateral elements of a new regional order should really be organised by the great powers, and that, if there is any lasting role, the US should play that part. Since the onset of the Asian financial crisis ASEAN ambitions in gaining recognition as an equal pole of regional order have of course been further weakened. However, even before that crisis broke it was apparent that the US realises that it can continue to afford denying ASEAN the recognition it is seeking because US allies within ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines, have no intention of forsaking America's defensive shield. Other ASEAN members equally favour a US military presence in the region, both to protect the SLOCs on which they depend for their trade, and for other deterrent purposes. ₇₅ This was demonstrated for instance by ASEAN's appreciation of the May 1995 US Statement on the Spratlys issued in response to the occupation of Mischief Reef because it was seen by ASEAN members as having strengthened ASEAN's own diplomatic intervention to help contain Chinese activities.

That questions of identity and security both matter in understanding US opposition to the further ASEANization is, finally, highlighted by its refusal to sign the protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), signed into law in December 1995. In particular, the US objects to the SEANWFZ's inclusion of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, deemed inconsistent with high seas freedoms. These objections are formulated against the backdrop of EEZs and continental shelves not yet even clearly delimited. ₇₆ The principles and rules of the SEANWFZ represent a matter of serious concern in Washington because it potentially impacts on the freedom of movement of the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet to protect sea lanes of communication. Notably, the Treaty can also be seen to challenges the US in its identity as the sole remaining superpower. Significantly, a review of the wording of the protocol to the SEANWFZ is now underway.

Conclusions

For the past few years ASEAN has indeed succeeded in -partially -ASEANizing regional order in East Asia. The use of force to settle unresolved territorial conflicts has been largely averted and further de-legitimated. Also, ASEAN has managed to extend some of the principles of its own intramural model of politico-security co-operation to regional institutions. That led to an emphasis on contact CBMs and norm-elaboration processes in moving toward a new regional order. I have argued, however, that we cannot infer from this development a successfully concluded process of ASEANization. Indeed, at the present time, both the United States and the People's Republic of China challenge a deepening or even continuation of an ASEANized regional order. In some ways the US challenge seems to be even more profound than that of the People's Republic of China. This has not gone unnoticed in the ASEAN region. Maybe this helps to understand why Singapore, the chief author of ARF rules, has committed itself to allow US nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines to use a new naval base in the city-state for port visits and maintenance from the year 2000. ₇₇ However, the jury is still out on this question on whether the process of ASEANizing regional order in East Asia has reached its limits.

A second conclusion is that to the extent regional order has been ASEANized, it is clear that we need to qualify our thinking about the balance of as an organising principle of foreign and security policy in the Western Pacific. Irrespective of the competition for the primary driving seat in the shaping of regional order, we see not only elements of a traditional or Hobbesian, but also those of a Grotian balance of power. In the latter, as Michael Sheehan has argued, " social aspects of the international system...operate, such as international law, mediation, a balance of interests and dignities, and the pursuit of limited foreign policy objectives" ₇₈ Arguably, if one is to make a historical comparison, the current East Asian multilateralism bears some historical resemblance to the Concert of Europe, particularly the congress-system from 1818-1822 with its series of informal ministerial meetings. The principal difference is of course that during the early 1990s it was lesser states rather than the big powers that took the diplomatic lead in shaping regional order. Interestingly, in the early 19th century, Britain withdrew from the concert system because continental conservative elites coalesced to squash liberalism in their respective countries. Although history is not repeating itself, it is equally interesting to note that it has been so-called semi-democracies that deserve much of the credit for establishing and developing the contemporary Grotian elements of the balance of power in East Asia. What significance ideological or cultural considerations play in some of the challenges to and proposals for the further development of this balance of power may be worthwhile questions. However, such an enquiry must be the subject of another paper.

Notes

Note 1: See Opening Remarks by H.E. Ali Alatas, Chair of the Third ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, 23 July 1996. Also see his The Economic and Security Environment in East Asia and the Pacific, a paper presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 18 January 1996. Back.

Note 2: On ASEAN-Japanese relations see for instance Lee Poh Ping, ASEAN and the Japanese Role in Southeast Asia in Alison Broinowski (ed.), ASEAN into the 1990s (Houndsmills, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 162-183. Back.

Note 3: See Jusuf Wanandi, Reshaping the Security of the Asia Pacific, in Wanandi, Asia Pacific After the Cold War (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), pp.1-20 (4). Back.

Note 4: Nothing in this paper is meant to suggest that ASEAN is striving for a common foreign and security policy as is the European Union. There is significant reluctance to cede sovereignty and opposition to infringements of political independence across the ASEAN region. Back.

Note 5: I recognise that other political or economic challenges to the ASEAN way exist which may also have security implications. However, since the concept of the ASEAN way usually refers to co-operation in the politico-security realm, I intend to focus only on this dimension. Back.

Note 6: For a recent overview of the literature that deems norms to be relevant, see Gregory A. Raymond, Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.41(1997), pp. 205-245. Back.

Note 7: See Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Back.

Note 8: For present purposes, I associate the communicative approach with those scholars who explicitly or intuitively draw on Jurgen Habermas Theory of Communicative Action, or the sources of this work and its immanent critiques. See Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol I: Reason and Rationalization of Society (London: Heinemann Education, 1984) and Vol.II: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Transl. by Thomas Mc Carthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1987) Back.

Note 9: John Vincent argued many years ago that the principle of non-intervention was formulated and applied because it was considered justified. See Raymond John Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.141-42. In later years, he thoughtfully problematised this viewpoint. R J Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Published in assocociation with the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Cambridge University Press, 1986). Back.

Note 10: See for instance Eric Ringmar, Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History, in Iver B. Neumann and Ole W(ver (eds), The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 269-289. Back.

Note 11: For one of the classic statements on status and non-status quo powers, see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the study of international relations. Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1946). Back.

Note 12: Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), chapter 5. Back.

Note 13: In fact, the building of national resilience and the winning of respect were complementary aspects of a coherent and comprehensive strategy. As regards the former, emphasis was put on building resilient political, economic and social institutions at home to guard against internal but possibly externally sponsored security threats. See Pierre Liz(e, Linking Security and Development: Patterns of Regional Security and Dynamics of Development in the Asia-Pacific Area, Paper (draft) prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 17-22 March 1997, Toronto, Cannada. Also see Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison, The Political Economy of South-East Asia: An Introduction (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997). Back.

Note 14: See the various essays in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 15: Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, N.Y. and London: Sharpe, 1990) Back.

Note 16: Donald Crone, New Political Roles for ASEAN, in: David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds) Southeast Asia in the New World Order. The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region (Houndmills, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 46 (my emphasis). Back.

Note 17: On the development of ZOPFAN, see Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN & the New Security Order in the Asia-Pacific Region (Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsau, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1992) Back.

Note 18: For accounts of the events leading to the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum, see for example Pauline Kerr, The Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific, The Pacific Review, Vol.7, No.4. (1994), pp. 397-409. Back.

Note 19: The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, p.1. Back.

Note 20: Chairman's Statement: The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 25 July 1994, Bangkok, p.2. Back.

Note 21: The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, p. 6 Back.

Note 22: For further details see Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, February 1997), pp.10-14. Back.

Note 23: It is possible of course that the cultivation of the ASEAN way will meet more obstacles after the admission of Myanmar and Laos. Back.

Note 24: Thus, because participants do not represent their respective state or government, any conclusions as might be reached will not be binding upon governments. Indeed, the government is entirely free to disown or dismiss any statement or conclusion of which it disapproves, just as it is free to pursue any ideas or proposals which might transpire. Back.

Note 25: On the origins of CSCAP, see Paul M. Evans, Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), The Pacific Review, Vol.7, No.2, (1994), pp. 125-139. The founding strategic institutes were the ASEAN-ISIS, Pacific Forum CSIS, the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, the Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Canada and the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan. Also see Desmond Ball, CSCAP-A Milestone in Institutionalized Dialogue, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition (December1993/January 1994), pp. 20-23. Current member committees come from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States, New Zealand, Russia, North Korea, People's Republic of China, Vietnam and Mongolia. European CSCAP and IDSA (India) are associate members. Back.

Note 26: On the objectives of CSCAP, see Article II of the CSCAP Charter. Back.

Note 27: See Mohamad Jawhar Hassan and Thangam Ramnath (eds), Conceptualising Asia-Pacific Security (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malayasia, 1996). The principles underpinning the concept of comprehensive security are those of comprehensiveness, of mutual dependence, of cooperative peace and shared security, of self-reliance, of inclusiveness, of peaceful engagement and the principle of good citizenship. AUS-CSCAP Newsletter No.2, January 1996, p. 5-6. Back.

Note 28: On the latter theme, see Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building, pp.7-8. Back.

Note 29: See M.C. Abad, Jr., Re-engineering ASEAN, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.18, No.3 (December 1996), pp. 250. Back.

Note 30: European interest stemmed from concerns about its residual role in ARF and its unsuccessful bid to become an associate member of APEC. ASEAN has led the Asian side of the dialogue not least because Japan's initial support proved rather lacklustre, although this now seems to be changing. Tokyo's reservations and lack of genuine interest arose in the context of suspicions centering on ASEM as a possible threat to Japan's ties with Washington, especially if ASEM were to enter the trade and security arena. See Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Reshaping the US-Japan-EU Triangle, Paper presented at the IISS/Yomiuri Shimbun Conference, The New Balance of Power in Asia, 11-13 December 1996, pp. 10-13.

Note 31: Sheldon W. Simon, The United States and Conflict Reduction in Southeast Asia, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.12, No.2, (September 1990), pp. 87. Back.

Note 32: See Nayan Chanda, Rigobarto Tiglao and John McBeth, Territorial Imperative, FEER, 23.2.1995, p. 14-16; and Michael Leifer, Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection, Survival, Vol. 37, No.2 (Summer 1995), p.51. Also see Mark J. Valencia, The Spratly Imbroglio in the Post-Cold War Era, in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds), Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region (Houndsmill, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 244-269 and John W. Garver, China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests, The China Quarterly, No.132 (December 1992), pp. 999-1028. Back.

Note 33: On the significance of the struggle for recognition in China's foreign policy, see Sheng Lijun, China's Foreign Policy Under Status Discrepancy, Status Enhancement, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 17, No.2 (September 1995), pp. 101-125. Back.

Note 34: William C. Kirby, Traditions of Centrality, Authority and Management in Modern China's Relations, in: Thomas W. Robinson/David Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.13-29. Back.

Note 35: For an analysis of the problem China posed for Southeast Asia and of Beijing's policy toward the region, see Michael Yahuda, The China Threat, ISIS Seminar Paper (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), 1986). Back.

Note 36: Less acknowledged in this context is that at times tribute missions were the only legal channel by which trade could be conducted. For an account of the discontinuities of private trade and political intervention, see Anthony Reid, Flows and Seepages in the Long-term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia, in Anthony Reid (ed.) Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp.15-50. Back.

Note 37: See Sheng Lijun, China's Policy Towards the Spratly Islands in the 1990s, Working Paper No.287 (Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, June 1995), p.12. Back.

Note 38: See Jusuf Wanandi, Security Dimensions of the Asia-Pacific Region in the 1990s (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1979), p. 29. Back.

Note 39: See Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 282. And Chen Peiyao, Big-Power Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region, IISS Journal (Shanghai), Vol.1, No.3 (1995), pp. 1-11. Back.

Note 40: See Tian Zhongqing, An Analysis of the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dialogue, SIIS Journal (Shanghai), Vol 1, No.3 (1995), p.47. Also see Edward Friedman, Goodwill Lost in Translation, FEER, 1.8.1996, p.27. Back.

Note 41: See Tian Zhongqing, An Analysis of the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dialogue, p.51. Back.

Note 42: See Tian Zhongqing, An Analysis of the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dialogue, p.50. Also see Gao Jiquan, China Holds High the Banner of Peace, in Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 27.6.1996, cited in SWB, FE/2651 G/5-G/6, 29.6.1996, and Zhang Jialin, China Threat- A New Breed of the Old Myth, SIIS Journal, Vol.1, No.1 (1994), pp. 63-87. Back.

Note 43: Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's model of regional security (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp.40,42. Back.

Note 44: See Kang Choi and Panitan Wattanayagon, Development of Defence White Papers in the Asia-Pacific Region, in Bates Gill and J.N. Mak (eds), Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia, SIPRI Research Report No.13 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 84 and China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing 1995). Back.

Note 45: See FEER, 23.5.1996, p. 15. Back.

Note 46: The Agreement was signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic. For an overview of China's particiption in confidence- and security building since the end of the Cold War, see Kay M(ller, Sicherheitspartner Peking? Die Beteiligung der Volksrepublik China an Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildenden Ma(nahmen seit Ende des Kalten Krieges (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998). Back.

Note 47: Agreement was reached with both the Philippines and Vietnam on a code of conduct in maritime territory with overlapping claims. This includes a pledge to resolve the Spratly Islands dispute peacefully. Philippine President acknowledged at the time of the signing that it remained unclear precisely how the agreement could be implemented as the question of sovereignty had not been dealt with. See Ramos, Li Agree to Keep Naval Forces at Bay in Spratlys, Agence France Presse Internationale, 3.3.1996, in FT-Profile. President Ramos also affirmed that China had pledged to abide by ASEAN's Declaration on the South China Sea. Radio Filipinas, engl. 5.3.1996, in SWB, FE/2554 B/5, 7.3.1996. Back.

Note 48: CHINA aktuell, February 1997, 8. Back.

Note 49: For instance, later that year 1000 tons of cement were reportedly transported to other areas of the South China Sea for the probable further fortification of Chinese occupied reefs.See FEER, 21.12.1995, p.14. More recently, the Philippines reported the sighting of three PLA(N)-frigates around the Philippines-claimed Kota and Panata islands and the discovery of a hut-like structure built over a reef northeast of Kota island. Financial Times, 1.5.1997, p. 6. Back.

Note 50: See Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, pp. 38, 55. More recently, Leifer has characterised these events as a defining diplomatic moment for China in ordering its priorities with the states of Southeast Asia. See Michael Leifer, China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accomodation, in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence (Routledge: London and New York, 1997), pp. 168. Back.

Note 51: Agence France Presse Internationale, China, ASEAN See Progress in South China Sea Dispute, Says Official, 10.6.1996, in FT-Profile. Back.

Note 52: Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam was reported as having said that Chinese negotiators, during 3-day expert-level talks in Beijing (9.4.-11.4.97) on this issue, had refused to discuss the core issue of sovereignty and produced no evidence to back their claim to the area. Reuter, 14.4. 1997, RTRAS3996. Back.

Note 53: The Vietnamese claim is based on claims of discovery and occupation. The Philippine claim to Kalayaan is based on their 1956 discovery. The Malaysian claim is based on its continental shelf claim. The Bruneian claim is based on a straight-line projection of its EEZ. For details see Sheng Lijun, China's Policy Towards the Spratly Islands in the 1990s, pp. 2-6. Back.

Note 54: See Michael Yahuda, How much has China learned about Interdependence, in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, pp. 6-23. Back.

Note 55: Jusuf Wanandi, Reshaping the Security of the Asia Pacific, in: Wanandi, Asia Pacific After the Cold War, pp. 13-14. Back.

Note 56: There have been strong statements of support by the Chinese delegation for an ARF role in regional preventive diplomacy See Stuart Harris, ARF Track Two Seminars on Preventive Diplomacy, AUS-CSCAP Newsletter No.4, March 1997. Internet edition. Back.

Note 57: See Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1997, para 8. Back.

Note 58: See Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People's Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1997, para 2 Back.

Note 59: Chen Peiyao, East Asia Security: Situation, Concept & Mechanism, SIIS Journal, Vol.3, No.2, July 1997, p. 4 Back.

Note 59: Five principles of China's policy towards Southeast Asia have been put (mutual respect and equality; no interference in the domestic affairs; increased level of dialogues and consultations including summit meetings; mutually beneficial economic development; enhanced cooperation in forums such as UN, APEC, ASEM, ARF). CHINA aktuell, Oktober 1997, p.986. Back.

Note 60: Five principles of China's policy towards Southeast Asia have been put (mutual respect and equality; no interference in the domestic affairs; increased level of dialogues and consultations including summit meetings; mutually beneficial economic development; enhanced cooperation in forums such as UN, APEC, ASEM, ARF). CHINA aktuell, Oktober 1997, p.986. Back.

Note 61: I shall therefore not deal with the wider US political and economic challenge over such issues as Myanmar, human rights and Asian values; or structural economic reforms. Back.

Note 62: Statement of Ambassador Winston Lord before the House International Relations Committee, Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, 30/5/96. Released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, 11 June 1996. Internet edition. Back.

Note 63: Some argue that the US does not appreciate the labour-intensive nature of multilateralism, and that it is not committed to invest time in careful and consultation. See James A. Kelly,U.S. Security Policies in East Asia: Fighting Erosion and Finding a New Balance, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.18 No.3, p 23. Back.

Note 64: On the unconscious resentment of the US at the ZOPFAN proposal, see Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p.106. Back.

Note 65: I owe this point to Michael Yahuda. Back.

Note 66: Such a step is presented as necessary given expectations that the constraints on the US defence budget will render a continued forward deployment unlikely to remain at the present level. Back.

Note 67: Winston Lord, U.S. -ASIAN and Pacific Relations: Stability or Turmoil? The Second Angier Biddle Duke Lecture, April 7, 1997, National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Back.

Note 68: See Patrick M. Cronin and Emily T. Metzgar, ASEAN and Regional Security, Strategic Forum No.85, October 1996, p.4. Back.

Note 69: Robert G. Sutter, Asian-Pacific Security Arrangements: The U.S.-Japanese Alliance and China's Strategic View, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress 97-375 P(check), 21 March 1997, esp. pp. 9-10. Back.

Note 70: Joseph S. Nye, China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific, Survival, No.4, Winter 1997-98, esp. pp.68-70. Back.

Note 71: At the time, the Secretary of Defence was invited to an unprecedented visit in Beijing of what is apparently an important air defence command centre. Back.

Note 72: United States National Security Strategy, May 1997, p.24. Back.

Note 73: Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the ASEAN Regional Forum, Jakarta, Indonesia, 23 July 1996, cited in U.S. Information & Texts, 24 July 1996, pp. 4-6. Back.

Note 74: See Robert M. Gates, Preventive Diplomacy: Concept and Reality, PACNET Newsletter, No. 39, 27 September 1996, Internet edition. Back.

Note 75: Singapore receives 80-90 navy visits a year and hosts the periodic stationing of U.S. airforce contingents. It is a key part of USCINCPAC's swing strategy between Northeast Asia and the Middle East. See Statement of Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House International Relations Committee, Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, 30 May 1996. Back.

Note 76: Other concerns relate to the precise nature of the legally binding negative security assurances from protocol parties, the ambiguity of language concerning the permissibility of port calls by ships which may carry nuclear weapons, and the procedural rights of protocol parties to be represented before the various executive bodies set up by the treaty to ensure its implementation. Back.

Note 77: Financial Times, 16.1.1998, p.6. This compares with an arms deal that Singapore signed with Russia on short- range surface to air missiles recently. See FEER, 30 October 1997, p.13. Interestingly, the resumption of port calls in the Philippines, which ended with the pull-out from US bases in 1992, was also agreed during the visit to Southeast Asia by the US Secretary of Defence in early 1998. Back.

Note 78: Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History & Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p.200. Back.