European Security, NATO and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management

European Security, NATO and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management

Austrian Institute for International Affairs,

March 1998

The dramatic events of 1989/90 have transformed the political landscape globally, especially in Europe but also globally. The main threat on which the defense planning was based during the Cold War has faded away. Consequently, the global and European security requirements are changing. There is no major threat to deter, as in the past. Many of the new dangers tend to be smaller in scale than before, are regional, lay on the periphery or outside of Europe. Security institutions have to adapt. There is a strong tendency towards inertia, however. NATO wants to keep its collective defense commitments which have their roots in the Cold War; so does the Western European Union (WEU). But, both NATO and WEU have created instruments for crisis management and peacekeeping. The enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) of NATO also includes non-members for these missions. All EU members can participate in the so called "Petersberg" tasks of the WEU. I propose that future crisis management missions of NATO and EU (WEU) should be merged and carried out by a new Euro-Atlantic crisis management organization. This also would create a new transatlantic link in the field of security.

An organization focusing on crisis management would avoid the drawbacks of other proposals. Charles A. Kupchan proposed that EU and NATO be merged into an Atlantic Union. ₁ Otherwise they risk coming apart just as they draw withing reach of their historic mission to unite Europe under the banner of democracy and peace. In such an Atlantic Union economic and security issues would be mixed up, creating enormous problems. According to this proposal NATO would have to formally do away with Art. V altogether; NATO shows no intention of doing so, however. A similar proposal for a "new alliance" with global range was made by the Economist in 1992 ₂ which also included Japan. These organizations would have to deal with to numerous issues and would be much too cumbersome.

The Old System

The old system was based on the concept of "balance of power." For Hans Morgenthau ₃ alliances are the "most important manifestation of the balance of power." In this observation members of alliances have common interests based on the fear of other states. Stephen Walt ₄ has since modified this concept. For him alliances are the result of a "balance of threat." He shows that the overwhelming coalition led by the United States against the USSR and its allies was a result not of the power of the USSR but of its perceived threat. In the old system the existence of alliances and a potential threat were inseparable. This model is consistent with the bipolarity of the Cold War.

Security lies at the intersection of threats and capacities. ₅ Increasing military capacities to achieve security dominated the period of the Cold War. In the more benign security environment after the Cold War, in which war is neither serious nor likely, military buildups offer less of a security boost than they would in a more threatening Cold War environment in which defeat can lead to elimination and war is more likely.

The argument made here is that any future European Security Framework should not go back to the realist Cold War model and concentrate on collective defense. The new system should promote cooperation among members; facilitate communication; provide information; develop common principles, norms, and rules; constrain aggressive behavior; provide a basis for joint actions, conflict prevention, management, and resolution. ₆

NATO

NATO provides a good example for the transformation process from the old to the new system.

In the process of the foundation of NATO, US President Truman had two options available. It was the choice between strong or weak commitments:

1.A system with tight security commitments such as the Brussels Union;

2.A loose agreement that linked North America and Europeans; Rather he decided to make a compromise between the two. Truman opposed obligations that implied going to war. The US was not prepared to assume such a commitment. A Canadian proposal stipulated that in case of attack on a member state the other members should consider this an attack on themselves. But instead of becoming immediately involved in war, this compromise provided that each nation would be expected to lend aid to the victim in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In plain language this means there is an obligation to give all aid possible, but depending on the constitutional procedures of each country. The result was a common security umbrella that promised equal protection for an indivisible grouping of states, including the United States. This compromise became, in substance, Art. V of the Washington Treaty calling for a collective response in the case of attack. ₇ Truman's choice was determined by the need to respond to the Soviets, especially after the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin. Without the emergence of the Cold War, NATO would look quite different. It would be an institution that promotes cooperation and consultation, facilitates communication and information exchange, focuses on crisis management, humanitarian action and conflict prevention - just as the enhanced Partnership for Peace does today.

After 1989, the political landscape of Europe looks quite different. The main threat on which the balance of power of the Cold War was based has faded away. According to some analysts, alliances can hardly survive without a sufficient threat. Consequently, they concluded: "NATO's days are not numbered but its years are". ₈ Five years after the end of the Cold War, NATO shows no signs of demise, however. In this respect, the prediction that alliances would weaken without threat appears to be wrong. NATO looks like it will be an exception to these rules and cornerstones of alliance theory. How can NATO endure in the absence of a serious opponent? NATO is changing. NATO is redeveloping its structure. The core of the Cold War NATO, (nuclear) deterrence and collective defense (enshrined in Art. V of the Washington Treaty) is getting less and less important. This concept defines the primary purpose of the alliance as defense of NATO territory against a major attack. Simultaneously - and the NATO-led operation in Bosnia is a case in point - the definition of the NATO area (Art. VI) is losing relevance. NATO is focusing on the new areas in the time to come. But old parts will remain: NATO will not give up collective defense; it has become part of NATO's identity.

NATO's activities are therefore less concentrated on collective defense. NATO will not focus on a single mission - collective defense - anymore, as it did during the Cold War. No longer preparing only or primarily for a coalition war on its agenda, it now focuses on crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, andd also peace enforcement. The "new NATO" looks and acts in part quite differently from the old NATO. It will be larger. But its focus is changing as well. But there are still the old elements. Which NATO will be the NATO of the future? The old NATO based on collective defense and balance of power or the new NATO based on the new principles and tasks?

NATO's transformation is marked by a bifurication in which the collective defense now coexists with the more important concept of crisis management. The old concept is not likely to be overcome by the new. More likely, both will endure. They tend to be mutually exclusive, however.

If NATO is to remain a traditional alliance of collective defense as enshrined in Art. V of the Washington Treaty it is likely to die out or deteriorate. If NATO takes on new tasks, its agenda will focus on crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action and peace enforcement. The new NATO's challenges lie beyond its territory: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of Gulf oil supplies and instability along NATO's southern and eastern flanks. These challenges do not represent a direct threat to NATO territory.

US-administration officials agree that the nature of the security threat facing the US has changed. A single, overriding threat originating from a monolithic source has been replaced by a multitude of different threats, including the resurgence of centuries-old ethnic conflicts that were covered up by the Cold War. The new missions of NATO will form the cornerstone of a new system of international security dealing with a much wider array of threats than was the case during the Cold War. Both the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict suggest that future wars involving NATO allies will concern resources in the Third World and ethnic upheavals. The real issue for NATO's future is not territorial defence but rather its structural transformation into a crisis management alliance.

U.S. global military activities will determine the future of NATO. The US wishes to share with its European allies the burden comprised of its own commitments, new security problems and regional crisis management needs. This includes the protection of oil, gas and water resources and sealines through which vital exports and imports pass.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana at the American University in Washington on 24 July 1997 ₉ acknowledged that as Europeans begin to take on greater responsibilities for their own security, they will be in a better position to support the United States in contingencies beyond Europe. In short, a new transatlantic bargain is in the making - a bargain that will reflect the new realities of a new century. At the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels in December 1997 the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, called for NATO to expand its strategic domain deep into the Middle East. ₁₀ She stressed that the Clinton administration viewed the Iraq crisis as a key test of the allies' ability to stand together and defend their vital interests. Mrs. Albright appeared to be creating the right atmosphere for a new appeal for NATO to extend its zone of security.

Partnership for Peace

Partnership for Peace (PfP) has already been designed according to the new security model. Cooperation of the partners with NATO can be organized on an individual level (through peace-keeping exercises, military-to-military contacts, etc.). IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia was NATO's first joint operation with PfP and other non-NATO states. In Madrid in July 1997, NATO formally launched an enhanced form of PfP. It widened the range of participation. Military exercises will cover the whole spectrum of possible crisis interventions. Partners will be involved in planning and preparing for contingency operations, building on the success of the common experience in Bosnia. The Partnership for Peace will be more operational. Military exercises will become more complex and robust. Partners will have a stronger presence at NATO Headquarters and will be involved more deeply in decision-making and planning. All in all, the Partnership for Peace will facilitate NATO's ability to integrate Partner forces in future operations. The experience in Bosnia, where 16 NATO countries are cooperating in the NATO-led peacekeeping force SFOR having no less than 20 non-NATO countries, is the model for the future. Without the Partnership for Peace, such a broad yet highly effective military coalition would not have been possible.

The new, enhanced Partnership for Peace will intensify political consultations. As a vital part of this enhancement, the agreed fields of military missions within PfP will be expanded to the full range of the Alliance's new missions. They will include the more demanding category of peace support operations ₁₁ , with a resulting expansion in the range of PfP exercises. Partners will have greater opportunities to participate in the planning and execution of PfP activities. Partners who join future NATO-led PfP operations should also have greater opportunities to contribute to the development of political guidance for, and to the oversight of, such operations. Partners will be involved more substantively and actively in PfP-related parts of the regular peacetime work of the NATO Military Authorities, and will also be offered an enhanced role in shaping the overall PfP program. The Planning and Review Process will be expanded and made more like the NATO force planning system in order to increase its overall effectiveness and also to provide a better basis for Partners to participate in PfP operations.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will provide a mechanism for productive consultation and more meaningful communication among Partners as well as a framework in which the enhanced PfP can develop. There will also be possibilities for closer political dialogue and consultations. There will be greater scope for joint decision-making and coordination. With the creation the EAPC, NATO carries forward its transformation on the basis of a broad, cooperative approach to security. The EAPC is the forum in which new patterns of cooperation, and new possibilities for consultation and joint action, will be developed and brought to fruition. Indeed, the initiative to create the EAPC and to enhance PfP has been developed in close consultation with Partners. Partners will have new opportunities to consult with the Alliance more regularly and more substantively. The EAPC is thus the logical political complement to a stronger, more operational Partnership for Peace.

The Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of May 30, 1997 states:

In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.

The EAPC will oversee development of an enhanced Partnership for Peace. Through the enhanced Partnership for Peace, NATO intends to expand the scope of PfP exercises and involve Partners in the planning and execution of PfP activities; Partners will be involved in various Alliance Headquarters.

Specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult, in the framework of the EAPC, might include but not be limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defense issues; international terrorism; defense planning and budgets and defense policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments. The scope will include consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defense related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations.

In summary, most of the new challenges will not be threats to NATO territory requiring an Art. V (collective defense) response. Rather they can be described as more broad security approach. They will not only be military but also economic, political, societal and environmental. And they will also be global, regional and local simultaneously. They will be non-Art. V contingencies which will be addressed by "coalitions of the willing." As in Bosnia, these coalitions will include NATO members as well as non-members.

The NATO's new instruments and tasks will blur the differences between members and non-members. PfP/EAPC offers almost everything except the security guarantee articulated in Art. V of the Washington Treaty obliging members to collectively respond to territorial security threats against member nations. As the former U. S. Defense Minister Perry already expressed in December 1996 during the meeting of the NATO defense ministers in Bergen: The difference between membership and non-membership in NATO would be paper-thin."

Indeed, in some cases non-NATO members may play an even more important role in the new operations than NATO members. NATO's focus would gradually shift away from Art. V missions (territorial defense) to non-Art. V missions (crisis management). The Alliance would be less oriented toward defending against a major outside attack on its territory and more focused on dealing with threats on Europe's periphery and beyond Europe's borders. ₁₂

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)

CJTFs are designed to operate with the participation of non-NATO countries. CJTF was designed for both non-Art. V contingencies outside Alliance territory, and it should also be used for Art. V tasks. The concept builds on NATO's practice of multinational, multiservice operations and, therefore, could involve humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The CJTF concept would also facilitate the use of NATO's collective assets by the WEU, as well as provide a mechanism for involving non-NATO PfP Partners in NATO-led operations. Finally, as not all allies may be engaged in every non-Art. V contingency, the concept must therefore deal flexibly with the ad hoc nature of participation without sacrificing cohesion, effectiveness and reaction time. ₁₃

The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)

The WEU is characterized by a similar bifurication. The origins of Art. V of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 can also be found in the Cold War. ₁₄ Since the so called "Petersberg declaration" of 1992 the WEU will also focus on the missions that include crisis management, peace keeping, humanitarian action, and peace enforcement. If the above observation of shifting challenges and tasks is right the "Petersberg missions" will become more important than Article V.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of the European Union of June 1997 included the "Petersberg tasks." It states that "the Union can avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU on the tasks referred to ...." These are "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

Based on a Swedish-Finish proposal, the Treaty allows "all (EU) Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully on an equal footing in planning and decision-taking in the WEU." Membership in the WEU is not necessary to participate in the "Petersberg" tasks.

The Treaty did not merge the WEU and EU. It simply states that "the WEU is integral part of the development of the EU ... The EU shall ... foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union ...". Precondition is a European Council decision and the Member States would adopt such a decision only "in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." For the time being, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will emphasize crisis management measures rather than collective defense.

The federal approach still aims to merge the EU and WEU, which would lead to the creation of a new military alliance unless the WEU changes dramatically and abandons Art. V. The cost of a new military alliance along side to NATO would be tremendous. Estimates to build up an independent European defense vary hugely, but all are high. The Royal United Services Institute in London has estemated that this policy might require the European countries to raise the proportion of GDP they spend on defense now (2,2 on average) by 1,5 percentage points - $107 billion a year at current prices - and sustain that figure at least for the rest of the decade. ₁₅ According to a 1993 RAND study, equipping a European intervention force of around 50.000 troops would require extra equipment at a cost of $18 billion-$49 billion dollars over 25 years (depending on the amount of capability deemed necessary) as well as satellite intelligence systems that would cost between $9 billion-25 billion over the same period. ₁₆

The WEU-Treaty prohibits such a development, however. Art IV states that "recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."

"PfP and Petersberg"

We have bifurication within NATO and EU (WEU). We have collective defense on the one hand and crisis management on the other. We have the Amsterdam Treaty with the inclusion of the "Petersberg" tasks here and the new NATO with PfP and EAPC there. We have crisis management here and crisis management there. We have non-Art. V of the WEU here and Art. V of NATO there. Clearly, there is a great deal of overlapping. Why not combine some of the new elements. Rather than merge WEU and EU, it would be more logical to merge the non-Art. V missions, to combine "Petersberg" and PfP.

Europeans and Americans face the same challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of world energy resources, international terrorism, ethnic conflicts etc. All affect US as well as European interests. ₁₇ Because of social tensions, religious extremism in North Africa, arms exports to the Middle East (nearly half of the world exports), rogue states, ethnic hatred in the Balkans, nationalist rivalries in the Transcaucasus region, etc. US commitments to European security are shifting to the Mediterranean and beyond - with growing demands to protect air and sea superiority and thus defuse any future crisis before they endanger vital Western interests. The next war could grow out of any number of explosive factors: economic difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, immigration etc. The Mediterranean region supports the world's busiest shipping lanes (oil and commercial goods). Any conflict in the region, whether triggered by territorial disputes, political revolutions or ethnic rivalries, would have serious consequences for the NATO allies.

NATO's command structure is still focused on the defense of Europe and its territorial waters, however. ₁₈ Designed for the now obsolete task of blocking of Soviet military power, it is not appropriate for the new challenges. These crisis management missions would require the members to rapidly deploy forces far from Europe's borders - in overwhelming strength if necessary. To date, only the United States has that capability. If Europe is given a major stake in the power projection enterprise it would have to share the burden as well. The Economist ₁₉ concludes: "If America is to remain willingly engaged in Europe, increasingly Europeans must be willing to do their bit elsewhere".

A new Crisis Management Organization

A new organization could be created dealing exclusively with non-Art. V operations. Such a Euro-Atlantic Crisis Management Organization (EACMO) would be based on both NATO and WEU. They would provide the infrastructure and experience indispensable for these new missions. The first task would be to establish a new command structure. A political "coordination group" could discuss and plan the crisis management tasks. The command should be headed alternately by an American and a European. Member states would assign special trained forces. It could be based on the concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that focuses on non-Art operations. The CJTF has become a tool for NATO crisis management as well as satisfied demands for a European identity.

Europeans and Americans can cooperate, as Bosnia shows. Kosovo may be emerging as the new Bosnia and could be a more common European-American undertaking. The Europeans and Americans would have to share burdens, risks and responsibilities in non-Art. V areas. The Americans would remain in Europe but the Europeans would support the U.S. beyond Europe. It would meet U.S. requirements. Besides, the US wishes to share with its European allies the burden stemming from its own commitments, new security problems and regional crisis-management needs. Of course, European states will have to improve their ability to contribute militarily to the protection of common interests.

The old part of NATO and WEU - the collective defense - would remain unscathed even though with reduced capacity. The traditional function and obligations would not be diluted and the cohesion would not be diminished as many fear. On the other hand it would permit PfP to demonstrate that it has its own role and rationale and is not just a waiting room for membership.

Non-members of NATO and WEU (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland) could participate in the new organization, since only Art. V commitments are inconsistent with their non-aligned or neutral status. As in the Gulf War and Bosnia, international coalitions responding to crisis in or out of Europe may include non-members. This arrangement would include non-members in decision-making and those countries not covered by Art. V. IFOR in Bosnia is an important precedent. The PfP and EAPC are important steps in this direction. Not all EU members need to be NATO-members to participate in the decision-making process.

This new organization would be non-threatening to Russia. It could even include Russia at a later stage. It would also facilitate EU enlargement in the field of security to include non-members of the EU that are participants in PfP. Present NATO-members can but need not become members of the new organization. Those who do not want to take part in the new missions can limit themselves to traditional collective defense tasks.

This new organization would be consistent with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Berlin in June 1996 ₂₀ where NATO Foreign Ministers tasked the development of a visible European arrangement within the structure, which could be used for WEU-led operations. The structure should be streamlined and more flexible. According to this document it is also possible that some operations, by virtue of their size or location, might be best launched by the WEU with NATO's help. NATO plans to create that additional option - a European-led, WEU-directed operation. The new concept should be based on "the ability to provide for increased participation of Partner countries and to integrate new members into the Alliance's military structure; the ability to mount NATO non-Article V operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions." The CJTF concept is central to this approach. The document also stresses the objective of preserving the transatlantic link.

If the WEU used NATO assets and infrastructure for its own operations - in which the U.S. does not want to take part - and got into trouble, the US eventually would have to come to its aid. A common crisis management organization could avoid this problem. The Americans would be part of the operation from the beginning. A UN or OSCE mandate for such operations would be preferable.

The new orgnization could also help to close the technological gap beween the U.S. and Europe, and could oversee the creation of a transatlantic armaments market. NATO's Secretary General stressed at the "Wehrkunde Tagung" in Munich in February 1998 that a transatlantic dialogue on technology-sharing could help forestall a growing technology gap and thus keep the transatlantic relationship healthy. These decisions and initiatives constitute elements of the new bargain between North America and Europe. Together, they constitute the new parameters of burden-sharing for the next century.

Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global Partner the US seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from "too much United States," as some still claim, but from "too little Europe". That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe's own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well. ₂₁

The Economist ₂₂ called for a new high-level forum that could promote a transatlantic market by drawing up common rules on exports, technology transfer, state aid and shareholdings. The new organization could fulfill this desire. It should encourage some division of labor among the allies. Non-NATO countries with advanced defense industries and reliable democracies (e.g. Sweden) could join in. Even Russia may qualify.

An organization focusing on crisis management would avoid the drawbacks of other proposals. Charles A. Kupchan proposed that EU and NATO be merged into an Atlantic Union. ₂₃Otherwise they risk coming apart just as they draw withing reach of their historic mission to unite Europe under the banner of democracy and peace. In such an Atlantic Union economic and security issues would be mixed up, creating enormous problems. According to this proposal NATO would have to formally do away with Art. V altogether; NATO shows no intention of doing so, however. A similar proposal for a "new alliance" with global range was made by the Economist in 1992 which also included Japan. These organizations would have to deal with to numerous issues and would be much too cumbersome.

The new Euro-Atlantic crisis management organization would create a transatlantic link in the field of security and avoid competition. It would be a security instrument for the 21^st century.

Note 1: Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West: For an Atlantic Union," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3, (May/June 1996), 92-104. Back.

Note 2: Breaking free, A Survey of Defense in the 21st Century, The Economist September 5th 1992. Back.

Note 3: Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, New York, 1985, sixth edition, 205-206. Back.

Note 4: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, 1987. Back.

Note 5: Daniel N. Nelson, "Threats and Capacities, and Germany," International Politics 34, No 1 (March 1997), p. 63-78. Back.

Note 6: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge, 1993, p. 2. Back.

Note 7: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952, Volume Two, (Doubleday & Company, Inc.) Garen City, N.Y. 1956, p. 249. Back.

Note 8: Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 75-76. Similar John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), 52. Back.

Note 9: Speech by the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana American University, Washington, 24 July 1997. Back.

Note 10: International Herald Tribune, December 17, 1997. Back.

Note 11: Peace Support Operations are conducted in a different environment to traditional military operations, and involve operations and objectives different from those which characerize traditional armed conflicts. They include conflict prevention, peace keeping, peace building, peace making, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. See NATO-SACLANT, Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11 December 1995. These are tasks that are covered here by the expression crisis management. Back.

Note 12: F. Stephen Larrabee, NATO Enlargement and the Post-Madrid Agenda, RAND, Santa Monica 1997. Back.

Note 13: John Barrett, "NATO Reform: Alliance Policy and Cooperative Security,"in: Ingo Peters (ed.), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions, Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989, New York, 1996, pp. 123-152, here 136. Back.

Note 14: Art V of the 1948 Brussels Treaty states: "I any of the High Contracting Parties should be object of an armed attack in Europe ... the other High Contracting Parties will ... afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." Back.

Note 15: The Economist, February 25th 1995. Back.

Note 16: M.B. Berman/G.M. Carter, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence, Santa Monica, 1993. See also Philip H. Gordon, "Does the WEU Have a Role?" The Washington Quarterly 20, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 132. Back.

Note 17: David C. Gombert/F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), America and Europe, A Partnership for a New Era, Cambridge 1997, p. 237.

Back.

Note 18: James A. Thomson, "A New Command for NATO's New Mission", in: David C. Gombert/F. Stephen Larrabee (ed.), America and Europe, A Partnership for a New Era, Cambridge 1997, 79-103. Back.

Note 19: The Economist, July 12th, 1997. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996, Final Communiqué. Back.

Note 20: Speech by the Secretary General at the XXXIV Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich 7th/8th February 1998. Back.

Note 21: A survey of the global defense industry, in: The Economist, June 14th, 1997, p. 17. Back.

Note 22: Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West: For an Atlantic Union," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3, (May/June 1996), 92-104. Back.

Note 23: Breaking free, A Survey of Defense in the 21st Century, The Economist September 5th 1992. Back.