Passage-Making and Service Creation in International Migration

CIAO DATE: 3/99

Passage-Making and Service Creation in International Migration _*

California Institute of Technology

International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999

Draft — Comments welcome.

Introduction

This paper is about the initial creation, scope, and policymaking opportunities of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), now known as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The IOM is an intergovernmental organization primarily known for its operational work in moving migrants and providing statistics on migration movements. The study of ICEM/IOM is part of a larger project to examine the policy practices and operational processes of key international and intergovernmental organizations, which have participated in organizing and responding to cross border labor and refugee migration movements since the early post-World War II period. The scope and research of this paper is limited to ICEM in the early 1950s. My focus here is to investigate to what extent ICEM’s operational services or “passage-making” in the early nineteen fifties could be considered an indicator of transnational institutional practices.

The impetus to closely examine the historical practices of international and intergovernmental organizations involved in migration operations comes in part from the burgeoning debates in the fields of migration and citizenship studies about shifting configurations of sovereignty. ₁ Control and implementation of migration and immigration policy implicate a certain level of national sovereignty, but the contemporary extent and substance of that authority have been contested. Scholars have argued that contemporary “immigration can be seen as a strategic research site for the examination of the relation — the distance, the tension — between the idea of sovereignty as control over who enters and the constraints states encounter in making actual policy on the matter. Immigration is thus a sort of wrench one can throw into theories about sovereignty ” (Sassen 1996:63).

The role of international organizations and processes has been drawn into this debate. In addressing the question as to what extent national levels of governance have abdicated, relinquished, shifted, or lost control over migration policies and processes, Sassen (1996, 1998) contended that migration policy is becoming increasingly transnationalized, that the locus of authority has increasingly shifted to levels beyond the national states, and that these trends are relatively recent phenomena. Other scholars counterpose their assertions regarding ongoing national sovereignty against arguments concerning the rise of transnational actors, institutions, and norms. Some of these scholars, while asserting that national states continue to be predominantly in control of the migration policy process, also acknowledge some kind of contemporary transnational phenomena, such as that certain processes in which migration policies and practices take place have shifted beyond the national level. ₂

What is meant by transnational phenomena has varied considerably. The term usually encompasses institutions and actors, policymaking and policies, and norms and discourses. In some works, the term, transnational refers largely to emergent institutional settings, where the locus in which authority resides or policy is formulated or decisions implemented goes beyond the national level. Many of the institutions of the European Union and their associated policy, political, or judicial settings are thus considered transnational. Likewise, transnational actors or policy processes or discourse have emerged in these institutional settings.

In other studies, the term transnational refers to emergent norms, pressures or rationales driving policy decisions or implementation which are decoupled from the sole logic of the national state and territory. Thus, according to this perspective, institutional settings may remain domestic — as in national courts — while the decisions or practice emanating from those settings are indicative of transnational pressures. In response to such definitions, other studies declare that regardless of the institutional setting, if the locus or basis of authority remains the national state, then those policy processes are indicative of the strength and adaptability of the nation-state. Or, they argue that regardless of the origin of norms and policy rationale, if the institutional settings in which these decisions and practices are taking place are domestic in nature, then those processes too are indicative of the continued predominance and adaptability of the national state.

These definitional ambiguities highlight the problems besetting the debate between the rise of transnational factors in migration policy and practice on the one hand and the continued dominance of national sovereignty in these same policy domains on the other. To what extent must transnational factors actually displace or shift national sovereignty over migration matters? Is a state that shifts the burden of policy implementation beyond its borders necessarily dislocating national sovereignty over migration processes? How do transnational practices and policymaking arise? What actually constitutes a transnational process? The locus of authority driving policy or the institutional setting where it takes place? The states mandating the operation or the agency managing and providing the services? Drawing too sharp a dichotomy between national sovereignty and transnational configurations leaves an attenuated picture of the migration process. Studies which aim to demonstrate the emergent significance of transnational policymaking factors and practices often point to one phase of migration processes while those which seek to underscore the resilience of national states point to another phase in the initiation, formulation, authorization, and implementation of the same migration policy practices.

International intergovernmental organizations encompass both elements of state control and transnational configurations. ₃ However, with the exception of the European Union ’s role in EU migration practices, little attention has been paid to most other kinds of international intergovernmental organizations involved in migration or to the historical rise of transnational practices. This paper brings in the historical role of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in the 1950s to examine both the complex interactions between national and intergovernmental institutions and the different phases of international migration policy processes. The historical aspects of intergovernmental migration practices can illuminate the opportunities for and constraints on transnational policymaking and other practices.

In this paper, I argue that the early operational efforts of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration to create new kinds of migration operations, to attain control over migration movements, and to participate in national migration policymaking could be considered indicative of transnational practices. Transnational practices here refers to the initiation, provision, and implementation of services, which shifted management of parts of the migration process from national states and created policy opportunities for the organization. ICEM ’s operations involved relations with its member states and state officials, other international and intergovernmental organizations, including the UNHCR, as well as with non-governmental organizations. At the same time, ICEM ’s operational practices and efforts underscore the complex dynamic between so-called national and transnational institutions or pressures. I show how the intergovernmental processes examined here were at times collusive, at times collaborative, and at time in conflict with state sovereignty. They were neither simply reflective of state control nor clearly beyond state control.

ICEM’s history underscores why scholars need to qualify claims regarding state control and sovereignty. ₄ ICEM derived its agenda and organizational rationale from its origins as a American cold war creation. But, ICEM ’s shifts in operational practices, policy efforts, and organizational aspirations were not mere products of American state interests or migration policy. ICEM ’s evolution reflected complex negotiations and processes, including its varied relations with the United States, other member states, and other international organizations, its own articulation of its organizational aspirations, and the changing context and processes of international migration. . My presumption in this brief case study is that the examination of ICEM ’s formative operational processes can contribute to a better understanding of shifting components of sovereignty and transnationalism by identifying how and in what ways potential transnational actors and operational levels have historically emerged and calling attention to the dynamics of intergovernmental processes.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first section presents the case study of ICEM in the 1950s while the second section offers an analysis of how ICEM ’s history can contribute to the sovereignty and migration debates. In the first section, I trace the creation of ICEM in 1951, and its subsequent operational practices and aspirations, primarily for the 1950s. The evidence for the case study is drawn largely from archival research as well as from some preliminary background interviews. The archival research included correspondence between ICEM and its member states, ICEM and the UNHCR, and ICEM and non-governmental organizations, internal memos, Council reports and resolutions, and operational files. ₅ In the second section, I discuss how international organizations have been situated in the debates on sovereignty and migration and then reflect on the implications of ICEM ’s pattern of operational activities for understanding the historical opportunities for expanded or restrictive transnational processes.

ICEM and Historicizing Transnational Practices

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) may not be an obvious choice for an analysis of significant policy and operational practices in international migration. A creation of Cold War politics, ICEM was largely dominated by US interests, and has been dismissed by scholars as a significant international actor in its own right (cf. Loescher 1993; Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Loescher and Monahan, 1989). Throughout its existence, in fact, it frequently has been derided as a “travel agency, ” booking passages for all kinds of migrants (including refugees, repatriates, labor migrants, family reunification, etc). Its reputation has largely been of an intergovernmental organization as passage-maker rather than policy-maker. My aim here is not to assert a radically different portrait of ICEM, though I do argue that its role in international migration processes should not be as summarily dismissed as it has been. Even within its parameters, however, ICEM ’s operational activities and policy aspirations were revealing transnational processes, illustrating both the potential and pitfalls for intergovernmental organizations.

From its inception in 1951 as PICME — the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe , the organization underwent several name changes. The name changes reflect the changing aspirations and operations of the organization. ₆ In the organization ’s first year, it was seen as a provisional and not permanent organization, and PICME was its official title. When the extension of its mandate and new constitution passed in 1953, the organization dropped “Provisional” from its title, renaming itself the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). By the late fifties, calls to revise the name and constitution were already being voiced. Nevertheless, it was not until the early 1980s that it became known as the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), dropping “European” from its title to reflect both its more global activities as well as much expanded membership. When the Constitution was finally formally revised in the late eighties, its official title from 1989 was henceforth the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Given that the focus of this paper is the 1950s, I shall refer to the organization primarily as ICEM.

The establishment and funding of ICEM were driven by American interests in the early period of the Cold War. But, the broader context for its founding was World War II and its aftermath in Europe. In 1943, United Nations created the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) to facilitate the resettlement of millions of refugees displaced by the war. In 1947, UNRRA was replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), due to US pressures and in the face of strong opposition by the Eastern Bloc. By the late 1940s, efforts were underway to create a new UN agency responsible for international refugee assistance policy as well as to give to the International Labor Organization new responsibilities for labor migration assistance. U.S. officials strongly opposed funding UN organizations involved in refugee assistance and refugee or labor movements because they thought they would have better control and more influence over the kinds of refugees and programs carried out outside the UN framework (Loescher 1993, Loescher and Scanlan 1986, Skran 1994, Holborn 1978).

Despite American opposition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950. UNHCR was guided by and its authority rooted in international mandates: 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (subsequently modified by a 1967 Protocol). The IRO ’s international responsibility and protection of refugees was to be folded into the UNHCR (Loescher, 1993:46-50; Weiner, 1995: 150). As an international agency with a broad mandate but more narrow operational capacities (at least at its inception), UNHCR constituted in many ways a norm-setting organization.

But, the United States did not turn its attention or support to the new UN organization. When IRO was being disbanded, the implicit assumption of the US was that “the remaining problems were temporary and could be dealt with by a small successor agency to the IRO (Loescher, 1993:53). ” Therefore, the US pushed the establishment of Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICME) during an intergovernmental conference on migration held in Brussels in late November 1951. ₇ PICME ’s establishment was framed as a multilateral effort, comparable to other postwar creations. Besides the United States, 15 other governments were present at the 1951 conference and involved in voting for the founding of PICME: They were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey. The multilateral character of PICME ’s establishment resonated as well with the overall American rhetoric and drive for multilateral arrangements during the early postwar years (cf. Ruggie 1998:122-127).

The importance of an array of international inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies in the migration and refugee process was evident from the start. Besides state representatives, also present at the conference were representatives from the UN, UNHCR, ILO, IRO, Council of Europe, OECE (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), the International Red Cross (Comite Internationale de la Crois Rouge), the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations interested in Migration, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies. From the initial meetings, PICME formally encouraged — in resolutions and council discussions — and gave consideration to its relations with non-governmental organizations (PICME, 1951, PIC/4: p.17-18). This was not surprising. During the interwar, war, and early postwar period, voluntary agencies provided critical support to refugee movements (cf Skran 1994, Junod 1997). Their contributions continued to be sought by both ICEM and UNHCR. For example, starting in the 1950s, voluntary agencies participated in a revolving fund accounts coordinated by the Committee, and carried out much of the logistical and practical work in the movements. As documented in internal documents of both ICEM, and UNHCR, the two organizations engaged in an intense competition for ties with the non-governmental agencies. ₈

In contrast to the UNCHR, PICME ’s mandate was operational and the provisional committee was conceived as a tool to enable national states to manage and structure migration flows. According to the conference session reports of November-December 1951, PICME was created to respond to the major contemporary problems of international migration in Europe. Displaced populations still remained in Europe (some of whom had formerly been moved by the IRO). New refugees needed to be resettled. And the so-called surplus labor populations of several European countries were to be sent to overseas countries. ₉ The overseas countries included the United States, Canada, and Australia, as well as Central and South America, whereby labor migration would be closely linked to the economic development in both sending and receiving countries according to the participants of the conference (PICME, 1952, PIC/4:15-16).

In carrying out its mandate, PICME would continue the operational activities of the International Refugee Organization and engage in the transport of new state sponsored labor migration. The initial year of PICME ’s existence consisted of initiating and implementing operational activities, including the logistics of IRO movements. IRO ceased operations when PICME began operations in February 1952. At the same time, by including both labor migrants and refugees under its mandate, the establishment of PICME also effectively forestalled and rendered unlikely the creation of a labor migration program at the International Labor Organizations, which had gained strong support by other countries.

PICME’s mandate focused on providing the services needed for migration movements. Thus, the Committee was to provide “facilities for the transport of migrants who could not otherwise be moved . . .make arrangements for the transport of migrants . . . from certain European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration, consistent with the policies of the countries concerned (PICME, 1951, PIC/4: 15-16). ” PICME was to provide services directly to its member-states. PICME ’s operational mandate as a passage-maker was largely delimited. Its services included arranging transports by land, air, sea transportation as required; chartering ships which had operated under IRO auspices, coordinating shipping programs (by utilizing commercial shipping and IRO ships whenever possible). In certain respects, however, PICME ’s mandate could be read broadly. For example, the organization was authorized to “take such actions as may be directly related to these ends, taking account of such national and international services as are available” and to “take such other actions as will be necessary and appropriate to discharge the foregoing functions (Ibid, p. 15). ”

As a postwar provisional agency, PICME was perceived as a wholly American creation, one which “was established outside the United Nations, was administered almost exclusively by American directors, was composed entirely of nations friendly to the United States ” (Loescher, 1993:62; also see Loescher and Scanlan 1986). The political rhetoric surrounding its membership criteria was indicative of the larger politics. Unlike UNHCR, PICME ’s governmental membership was limited to “democratic governments, ” and the countries of immigration were to be those which have “generally accepted international standards of employment and living conditions, with full respect for human rights ” (PICME, 1951, PIC/4: 15).

In formal terms, PICME ’s resources were based on administrative and operational budgets. Member states would all contribute to the general administrative budget, and then would contribute selectively to the Committee ’s operating fund dependent on the services they contracted out or delegated to the organizations. “{A}ny member government making a contribution to the operating fund can stipulate how that money is spent (Ibid, p. 16). ” U.S. financial support was actually crucial to PICME. In the early fifties, the US gave virtually no support to UNHCR and instead funded PICME as well as the United States Escapee Program (USEP) founded in 1952 to resettle communist bloc refugees. The authorization and funding for PICME and USEP came from Mutual Security Act of 1951, and continued with the Mutual Security Act of 1954. From 1952 to 1955, the US contributed 45 million dollars to USEP and ICEM (which carried many USEP programs), while UNHCR struggled to raise 3 million dollars for its initiatives (Loescher, 1993:65). In the 1950s, the US contributed approximately 30% of ICEM ’s administrative expenditures and close to 45% of its operational expenditures, at least of those formally listed (ICEM archives, 1/1/USA, 247).

While no doubt heavily influenced and guided by U.S. policy interests, PICME was not solely defined by the interests of the U.S. state. As a provisional operational organization, PICME officials were immediately confronted with the tasks of justifying and laying plans for extending their operations beyond the envisioned 12-month period. In responding to this challenge, PICME field offices and headquarters sought to initiate collaborative programs with member states, expand their operational activities to programs taking place before embarkation, and promote additional multilateral intergovernmental and non-governmental coordination.

PICME’s operational activities in Italy during the early fifties exemplifies their efforts to extend themselves beyond a provisional status and beyond a solely intergovernmental state agent. The organization ’s plans, concerns, and aspirations were enumerated and laid out in a series of internal memos and letters between the field office or mission and the central administration,. ₁₀ By early January 1953, the head of their mission in Italy articulated the central thrust of their early efforts as trying to create or insist on collaborative activities with the Italian government so that the Committee ’s role would not be defined simply as a “booking agency ”, but one in which Italy ’s migration schemes were “possible only with the assistance of the committee. ” ₁₁ In subsequent internal operations memos during that year, ICEM officials outlined the Committee ’s projected role in migration activities in Italy, suggesting that ICEM “establish a closer and deeper integration of our operations in Italy into the existing Italian administrative machinery. ” ₁₂ The tensions between ICEM ’s management of parts of the migration process and Italian state sovereignty were acknowledged. Another 1953 memo noted that “the Committee ’s activities must have the consent of the Italian government; its organizational structure must pay due regard to the existing Italian machinery and its prerogatives and responsibilities. ” But, the major thrust of that memo discussed extending ICEM ’s activities into “pre-selection, processing, and pre-embarkation ” programs. ₁₃

ICEM’s early efforts to redefine movement services to include preselection and other pre-embarkation operations combined with its other efforts to extend movement services to post-debarkation needs translated into both a broader mandate and greater opportunities to engage in quasi-policymaking. In the 1953 Constitution, ICEM ’s mandate was expanded to cover these kinds of activities. Beyond its specific transport tasks, ICEM was also charged “to promote the volume of migration from Europe by providing at the request and in agreement with governments concerned services in the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants which other international organizations are not in the position to supply. ” ₁₄ Indeed, the influence of ICEM and other international organizations in defining and creating for states the necessary services for organizing migration movements, both in the pre-embarkation and post-debarkation stages was considerable. By the mid-fifties, for example, ICEM was carrying out in Italy pre-selection vocational training, language training, and embarkation assistance activities, all in addition to their transport responsibilities.

To what extent are the creation and provision of services on an intergovernmental level indicative of shifting sovereignty? Scholars have recently become interested in how international organizations “socialize states to accept new political goals and new values (Finnemore 1996:3). ” Studies debate the role of international rights norms and international governmental and non-governmental institutions in influencing domestic policy practices (cf. Donnelly 1986, Sikkink, 1993, Soysal 1994, 1996; Checkel 1995, Niessen 1994). To be sure, services are neither norms nor policies. But, I would suggest here that services — the creation, definition, formulation, and implementation of services and operations — can be significant in shifting configurations of authority and in enabling transnational policy practices. During its initial years of existence, ICEM along with others moved strongly in their political and programmatic rhetoric to internationalize all services related to migration, and to define related problems as ones that can only be resolved and addressed internationally, as the following excerpt from an Italian official ’s speech regarding ICEM suggests:

“. . . {The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration} has internationalized the transport of needy migrants . . . it shows that all the countries of the Free World positively consider the surplus of Italy not as an Italian but as a common problem . . .Italy believes that the functions of ICEM should be extended to cover all the problems concerning migration . . . (Italy) believes in the necessity of a real and proper internationalizing through ICEM, of all the migration services, in the extension of ICEM ’s tasks to all the migratory operations, and in the development and intensification of all the present migration services of the committee . . . Some of these services raise a delicate problem because they might be considered as an interference of one country in the affairs of another country . . . If these services are carried out by one government only, they might give rise to suspicions either in the emigration or in the immigration country, while if these services are assured through an international organization of which the governments concerned are members, (the problem disappears). ”
— Statement read by Ambassador Mascia, the General Director of Emigration, Italy, at an official meeting with ICEM officials in Rome, 8 June 1955.

ICEM’s early successes in defining migration movement services and managing parts of migration flows, however, did not produce permanent policy opportunities. By 1956, the general migration context in Europe was changing and the structure of opportunities for ICEM shifted as well. The 1956 Hungarian uprising lifted UNHCR ’s fortunes, when the organization found itself well positioned to act as the leading organization for the refugees resulting from those events. With contacts in both Eastern and Western Europe, and not part of American Cold War interests, UNHCR ably seized the operational opportunities in the refugee movements to strengthen its organizational standing, mandate, and influence. In writing about the postwar international refugee regime, Gil Loescher in fact foregoes any further discussion of ICEM or its role after 1956. ₁₅ Moreover, the rate of out migration from Europe slowed considerably as most displaced persons were resettled and the postwar reconstruction of European economies alleviated the problems of Europe ’s “surplus labor populations. ”

By the late fifties, with the burgeoning Western European economic boom, the “problem” of surplus labor dissipated, suggesting to some that there would no longer be large international migration flows. ICEM then sought to create alternative needs and opportunities for international migration, including programs for refugees as labor migrants, migration of medical cases, labor migration to new countries (and de-emphasizing its initial European preoccupations), and expanded pre-embarkation and post-debarkation activities. Correspondence between American officials and successive ICEM directors during this period highlights the different perspectives of state officials and international organizations in understanding the potential of transnational activities. At the same time, the correspondence confirms the collusive character of the relationship between ICEM and American officials. The central letter writer in these series of correspondence is George Warren, Advisor on Refugees and Migration Affairs, in the Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Department of State. Over the course of numerous years, Warren engaged successive organization Directors, Deputy Directors, and Budget Chiefs in reflective conversations, budgetary harangues, state department imperatives, and strategy sessions about the future of the organization.

One critical issue for ICEM officials was the organization ’s lifespan, which was not guaranteed. In a letter to Marcus Daly, then Director of ICEM in June 1958, George Warren critiqued the “passive attitude ” of the administration, Executive Committee, and Council ICEM regarding low levels of movement “so low that the future of ICEM might even be threatened by it. ” ₁₆ Warren argues that the last Council meeting was “so preoccupied ” that “no time was devoted, for instance, to seeking out ways and means by which movements might be increased. ” For his own part, Warren suggests a few programs designed to increase ICEM ’s transport of refugees and promoting contributions by multiple states. Director Daly ’s response is not to focus on the kinds of services that Warren suggests. ₁₇ He does “not believe that we can from hereon only gauge the worthwhileness of ICEM by the number of persons moved. ” In fact, he thinks there will be a continued “falling-off in the number of migrants being moved (p. 1). ” Instead, Daly opens up a discussion about the policy and operational potential of an intergovernmental organization like ICEM given existing gaps in the international migration process.

Stressing the need for transnational services underscored another critical issue was the growing tensions between the diverse national interests of its member-states and ICEM ’s interests in expanding its mandate and potential for new services and policy stances. As director, Daly called for the recasting of ICEM ’s organizational objectives. He argued in his letter to Warren that “to make this Committee work as a long range operation . . . it will be necessary that some of the thinking here . . . be directed to the challenge of quality of migrants rather than quantity . . . I think there must be a revaluation of the purpose for which this Committee was established. ” According to Daley, ICEM ’s constitution showed that “the Committee should be looked upon as the ever-ready agency to take care of those problems that arise because of migration difficulties, whatever these difficulties may be. The Committee, without doubt, is supposed to move people but the all-compelling reason does not seem to be simply that (p.2). ” ₁₈

Warren’s initial response to Daly suggests a statist backlash, stressing the service character of the organization in moving populations, its reputation as a “Cook’s Tour Agency, contending that ICEM itself has “interpreted its achievements primarily in those terms. ” ₁₉ But Warren then went on to consider that ICEM “has not with equal vigor, resourcefulness and persistence reported or publicized its activities in removing the roadblocks to migration (p. 1). ”

Warren discussed the ways in which ICEM could bring out the multilateral character of the organization and as importantly the effectively transnational character of migration ’s problems which require transnational solutions. He argued ICEM must convince member states that “volume of movement . . . is not the important criterion, but rather what ICEM has accomplished or may accomplish in removing the roadblocks in the migration process, irrespective of the auspices under which people move (p. 2). ”

Providing Daly with examples, Warren wrote “In 1952, ICEM sensed the need for developing bilateral agreements between emigration and immigration governments and played the role of a promoter in securing the conclusion of a number of agreements which affected movements in later years. In 1952, most of ICEM movements were fully reimbursed by governments. Thereafter, ICEM developed procedures for pooling contributions by governments, voluntary agencies and migrants to subsidize the movements of migrants not in a position to bear immediately the full cost of their transport (p.2). ” Speaking of a program to move 400 migrants with tuberculosis to the US so they can be reunited with their families, Warren contended that “in this situation ICEM is the catalyst which will make things happen . . .the fact that ICEM found the way to remove the roadblock to the movement is the important point, coupled with the humanitarian interest in the reunion of families rather than the numbers moved (pp. 2-3). ” Warren acknowledged that “certainly a reevaluation of experience and a reorientation of objectives are required in the present situation (p. 3). ”

Warren clearly understood the potential tensions which would arose in shifting the managing of migration processes from national states to international organizations. In his letter to Daly, Warren concluded by noting that the US (as well as other states) are only likely to support those kinds services when they are defined as multilateral, in other words, when “it can be demonstrated that the services are of such a nature that they cannot be performed by individual governments (p. 3). ” In subsequent letters in 1958 and 1959, Warren followed up on Daly ’s call to re-envision ICEM as a more innovative operational and transnational organization, even as he continued to prescribe state department strategies for its actual operations. ₂₀ In a critique of the administration ’s draft budget presentation being prepared for the next Council Meeting, Warren argued that their efforts to itemize and delineate cost/benefit of ICEM services for each government detracts from Daly ’s goals. Warren asserted that the cost/benefit presentation runs counter to ICEM ’s aspirations to present its services as international, serving multiple governments, creating in a sense a regime structure from which they all benefit:

“It is not feasible to attempt to assign in dollar terms the benefit received by either the emigration or the immigration country in the movement of a migrant. Both presumably have benefitted, in what degrees it is impossible to say. The contributions of individual emigration and immigration countries are presented as contributions to the movements in which they presumed to be solely interested, to or from their particular countries, rather than to a common international effort to secure migration. This emphasizes the separateness of the interests of member governments at a time when ICEM is desperately trying to emphasize the interdependence and common interests of all governments to be reflected in their participation in ICEM. ”

Of course, American interests during this time period were to cloak the extent of their activities and expenditures through ICEM. Thus, for Warren, shifting migration services to a transnational level coincided with national interests, even as relinquishing authority was framed as enabling internationalism.

The definitional ambiguities between national level management and transnational innovations in migration became apparent as ICEM sought to expand its range of services. Part of the correspondence between Director Daly and Warren in the late fifties also focused on the exact labeling of the “distinctive services ” ICEM could claim it offered. As the state department ’s officer overseeing ICEM ’s activities, Warren sought to review all of ICEM ’s operational proposals to the member-state council. In a response to Daly ’s suggestions to group certain of ICEM activities previously under “International Operations ” into a new category called “Transport Support and Migration Development, Warren argued that ICEM has done a terrible job in distinguishing what it does vis a vis what individual governments do B and it must now do a better job (pp. 2-3). ₂₁ He claimed that “the services listed under “international operations ” are not in fact international in character in themselves because governments also provide similar services unilaterally. A truer description would be >services required to be performed by the international organization to secure plus movement, including the movement of refugees and the reunion of families (p. 3). ” Warren ’s interests in promoting the internationalized character of ICEM was certainly in part budgetary, given that the US consistently pushed the organization to fund other member states to fund programs and pay for ICEM ’s operational services.

The questions about the transformative potential of ICEM and the possibilities for new kinds of organizational programs and capacities raised in the series of letters between Warren and Daly were also reflected in other kinds of internal memos, operational documents, and the growing discussions to further revise the Constitution. In contrast to the UNHCR which began with a broad mandate but sought to expand operationally in order to engage in policymaking stances in the migration process, ICEM had relatively broad operational possibilities, but sought to expand its mandate in order to engage in policymaking stances. Indeed, from the mid-fifties onward, there was periodic internal and Council discussions on revising the Constitution, though a revision would not be successfully completed until the late eighties (approved by Council in 1987, and put into effect in 1989).

In 1959, the chief of the Department of Planning and Liaison, E. Bettini, wrote a memo entitled “Some Ideas for the Modification of ICEM Constitution. ” ₂₂ His memo highlighted the various ways in which ICEM could become a broader transnational organization. It underscores the historical dimensions to contemporary notions of transnational configurations. Bettini commenced by referencing the administration ’s contention during the previous Council Meeting that ICEM should become a truly international organization and that every effort should be made to increase its weight and importance in the political field (p.2). Bettini believed in the need to transform of the Committee into a “permanent organization for overseas migration ,” “strengthen the humanitarian spirit ” and “the political importance and influence ” of ICEM (p. 1, underlined in the original). Beyond changing the name, Bettini claimed that ICEM ’s “purposes” must be made “permanent.” Its goals should be the “promotion of overseas migration from Europe with a view to the economic development and social progress of Member Countries, ” “promotion of the welfare of the migration, ” “promotion of the success of such migration (p. 3). ”

Reflecting on the organization ’s expansion of its operational activities through the decade, Bettini asserted that ICEM ’s “function” must be made permanent and more encompassing, including to “study the ways of promoting overseas migration and welfare of migrants and to take the necessary action/ and/or to recommend to Member Governments appropriate measures; ” transport services; “to provide, at the request of and in agreement with, the Governments concerned, such services as may be necessary to promote the increase in the volume of migration . . . to experiment through pilot projects new techniques and new methods in the migration field . . . to give governments such advice, data, and information as they may request to assist them in the development of their migration plans and plans . . . to make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of non-governmental organizations interested in migration (p. 4). ” In other words, ICEM should be able to shift between operational to policymaking stances in its relations with other participants in the international migration process.

ICEM’s evolution in the 1950s from its initial focus on transport to its diversified programs by the end of the decade probably encouraged such reflections about shifting national authority and policymaking. Indeed, the thrust of ICEM ’s operational memos — memos written by Chiefs of Missions in the various regions as well as those written by administration in headquarters in Geneva — regarding the organization ’s programs in Europe and Latin America was the expansion of its operational activities. At the same time, they were accompanied by suggestions for broader policy orientations. These policy orientations encompassed not only ICEM and its member states, but often the international migration community of other international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The constraints on ICEM ’s potential to extend its activities were numerous. For example, its attempts to move beyond its transport activities to coordinate policy responses among voluntary and international governmental organizations in 1955 were met with harsh criticism by UNHCR. UNHCR consistently challenged ICEM ’s right to engage in such activity and questioned the organization ’s motives. In a June 1955 letter — before the UNHCR attained a stronger footing in directing refugee movements — the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, O.J. van Heuven Goodhart directly critiqued ICEM ’s coordinating activities. ₂₃ Van Heuven Goodhart wrote the letter in response to a statement that came out of a working group meeting, “Statement concerning emigration of foreign refugees in Austria.” The meeting had been arranged by ICEM, and while a UNHCR representative had been present at the meeting, the statement was drafted after the meeting in the representative ’s absence. After challenging ICEM ’s activities on numerous levels, including policy strategy, diplomacy, refugee management, and fund management, van Heuven Goodhart asserted that ICEM ’s interest in the refugees under consideration “is directly the concern of my Office under Article 8 of its Statute, and it really has little or nothing to do with the migration of refugees which is the legitimate concern of ICEM (p. 3). ”

ICEM’s response reflected its organizational priorities to expand their operational services and mandate (though left unaddressed were politics of refugee movements and resettlements). In his response, the Director of ICEM Harold Tittman claimed a large operational mandate for ICEM, which echoed in UNHCR ’s policy responsibilities: there is first “the question of the practical difficulties inherent in parallel action by our two organizations in providing the complementary solutions of emigration and integration, and second the more academic question of mandatory responsibility in respect of the individual refugee (p. 4). ” ₂₄ Tittman suggests “closest cooperation ” between the two organizations to resolve the first problem, given that ICEM too had been “charged with the task of assisting in the emigration of foreign refugees. ” The conflict between the two organization continued throughout the decade.

At the same time, ICEM encountered significant constraints with its operational expansions by its member states. By 1956, for example, the Italian government sought to reconsider the delegation of tasks given to ICEM. In one instance Italian emigration authorities argued that some tasks performed by ICEM “documentation” teams, including pre-selection and vocational training, should in fact be done by Ministry of Labor offices in the field. The compromise reached in that case entailed changing the names of the teams to “embarkation” teams, but more sustained debates among member-states regarding ICEM ’s extension of its operations emerged and would continue through the following decades. ₂₅

Intergovernmental organizations and shifting sovereignty

How does ICEM ’s early history fit into the debates over shifting sovereignty and contemporary migration? For the most part, international and intergovernmental organizations involved in migration, such as the UNHCR or ICEM/IOM have not been a focal point in any of the discussions over migration policy and national sovereignty. The reasons for this are several. First, many immigration scholars limit their analysis to labor and family immigration into states, distinguishing these kinds of immigration them from refugee migration (e.g. Sassen, 1996, 1998; Cornelius, Martin, Hollifield 1995). In explaining her focus on immigrants and not refugees, Sassen stated “ . . . there are separate regimes for refugees in all these countries and an international regime as well, something that can hardly be said for immigration (1996:64). ”

Yet, the historical efforts of state sponsored and structured immigration flows should not ignored. Moreover, the realities of many migrant flows have been that the lines dividing “refugees” and asylum seekers from other migrants are blurred. According to refugee and international organization scholars, the efforts to extend the “international refugee regime ” to broader migration regimes, or to create better transnational networks among international organizations and states involved in migration suggest that immigration analyses must reconsider the connections between immigration and refugee policy practices and between international organizations and states (see Loescher 1993; Goodwin Gill 1983, 1993, Falchi 1993, Appleyard 1991). ₂₆

A second reason for the lack of attention to the array of operation organizations involved in international migration has been that immigration studies — in contrast to works on international organizations or refugee regimes — have focused more on identifying the products of transnational phenomena than assessing the actual processes taking place. With the exception of studies on European Union institutions and some non-governmental associations (e.g. Koslowski 1998; Ugur 1995; Geddes 1998), migration scholars have been less likely to examine the processes by which international organizations may initiate, authorize, or implement migration related programs. Instead, they highlight products, including international treaties, court decision, specific regional policies, and varied immigrant and non-governmental associations. For example, Sassen (1998:6-8)pointed to four sites which feature transnational practices: International agreements, treaties, conventions, and associated discourses, especially human rights talk; international and domestic court cases; non-governmental organizations and actors; and international and intergovernmental organizations or entities, including the European Union or the US-Mexico Binational Immigration Commission . Soysal (1994, 1996) identified “postnational membership ” configurations and described the emergence of trasnational actors, discourses, and policy levels in immigration (also see Checkel 1995, Jacobsen 1995, Baubock 1994; Hammar 1990). In addition, scholars have tended to identify transnational configurations which have assumed a linear progression in the postwar period, including the cumulative effect of the conventions, growing global economy, increased transnational migration, and new postnational discourses and memberships. ₂₇ In contrast, international organizations involved in migration, like IOM or UNHCR, have oscillated in their potential for transnational policymaking and practices, in part due to changing opportunities, politics, and constraints.

Finally, the debate on migration and sovereignty has highlighted broad policy areas traditionally controlled by the state. Less attention has been paid to operational practices or services through which states have long had extensive dealings with intergovernmental, non-govrnmental, and other international organizations (again with the exception of the European Community). Indeed the debate has often featured stances primarily staked around the alleged control or lack of control over migration by the nation-state: “resilient”or besieged nation-states counterposed against global, transnational realities imposing themselves on states. In a landscape drawn of states maintaining or losing control, intergovernmental organizations do not necessarily fall easily on one side or the other.

Certainly the absence of such organizations like ICEM and other international governmental organization in the analysis renders a historical discussion about migration and sovereignty incomplete. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the growing numbers and increasing strength of international and intergovernmental organizations have been substantial. Studies in international relations and international law have examined how international cooperation, multinational agreements, and multilateral processes have been on the rise since World War II from a multitude of perspectives (cf. Ruggie 1982, 1998; Haas 1980; Gowa 1980, Keohane 1985, Krasner 1983; Waltz 1979; Donnelly, 1986; Chen 1989; Plender 1988). Studies have extensively documented the historical emergence and more recent postwar proliferation of international governmental organizations (IGO ’s) as well as international non-governmental organizations or INGOs (Murphy 1994, Jacobson 1979, Feld, Jordan, and Hurwitz 1983, Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996, Boli and Thomas 1997). The total number of IGOs and INGOs “has grown tremendously since World War II. ” (Feld, Jordan, and Hurwitz, 1983:9) According to one source, from approximately 70 IGOs in 1940, the number increased to “more than 1,000” in 1980 (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996:598). These scholars also have explored the implications of such changes both in order to qualify traditional understandings of national sovereignty and to delimit sovereignty ’s changing composition (cf Krasner 1986, 1993; Ruggie 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Rosneau 1992). Likewise, the study of the European Union itself has spawn a growth industry. Much attention has been paid to the European Union either as a “polity in formation ” or a product of inter-state determinations, evidence of post-national potential or national state maintenance (e.g. Schmitter 1996, Marks, Scharpf, and Schmitter 1996, Shaw 1997; Hooghe and Marks 1996, Pierson 1996).

According to scholars, the rise of these different sites can shift existing configurations of nation-state sovereignty through their displacement of elements of sovereignty onto supranational, and intergovernmental levels, and non-governmental and private bodies. The argument follows that such dislocation increases transnational processes and at the same time diminishes national sovereignty: “The sustained growth of international governmental organizations reflects not merely the increasing vigor of transnational interaction but also the shared participation of participants that many of their preferred values can be obtained only through or in conjunction with collaborative transnational action . . . such organizations dilute the importance of historic, somewhat arbitrary and unnatural, national boundaries. They may gradually provide alternatives to the overweening power of nation-state officials . . . (Chen 1989:58). Similarly, Sassen has argued that the “relocation of various components of sovereignty . . . brings with it a potential strengthening of alternative subjects of international law and actors in international relations, for example, the growing voice of nongovernmental organizations and minorities in international fora (Sassen 1998: 92; also see Jacobson 1995, Soysal 1994). ”

Many immigration studies assert the dynamics between international and national levels, while their primary focus remains on domestic policy processes. Sassen, for example, argued that “all these (international and transnational) institutions constrain the autonomy of national states; states operating under the rule of law are caught in a web of obligations they can not disregard easily (1996:29). ” But, the main thrust of her argument assumed the conflict between the two arenas and focused on the imposition of globalization on national sovereignty, on “the impact of global forces that challenge the authority of the nation-state (1996:35). ” In part, a lack of attention on process has provided the critics of transnational arguments with space to argue the continued overall control by nation-states (Joppke 1997, 1998; Lahav 1998; Lahav and Guiradon 1997; Freeman 1992, 1995; Brubaker 1995). In discussing the development of asylum policy in Germany, Britain, and the United States in the postwar period, Joppke argues that the “capacity of states to control immigration ” is not declining and that there is “an increased willingness and insistence of states to maintain their sovereignty (1997:260-261). ” His arguments rested in part on the assumption that the processes engendering change in these countries are under state control. Likewise, Lahav examines services and operational practices delegated, “contracted out, ” or enforced by “remote control ” by states to counter arguments that states are “losing control ” of migration flows and immigration policy (Lahav 1998:14-29 ).

But, the actual processes by which international organizations develop transnational interactions or enable the displacement of components of sovereignty, such as authority over the initiation, formulation, and implementation of policies and practices have been sparsely addressed. On the one hand, works on international law, international organizations and refugee regimes have analyzed the relationship between nation-states and such organizations (cf Chen 1989; Plender 1988; Goodwin-Gill; Loescher 1993; also see studies of migration policy within the European Union). States have long sought to delegate authority and empower international organizations, while struggling with issues of authority and breadth (cf Chen 1989, Murphy 1994). Historical studies of migration and refugee organizations exist as well as extensive analyses about the emergence of international refugee law and “regimes,” (for historical studies, see Holborn 1975 on the UNHCR; Junod 1997 on the ICRC; on the interwar period, see Skran 1994; on the postwar period, see Loescher 1993; Loescher and Scanlan 1986, Loescher and Monahan 1989; Goodwin-Gill 1978, 1993; Gordenker, 1987; Weiner 1995). On the other hand, less attention has been paid to the actual ways in which organizations became or sought to become policymakers, initiators, implementors of programs, or mediators in the international migration policy process.

A closer look at operational processes raises questions about the conflation of different kinds of transnational processes and the assumption that processes are to some degree under state control. ICEM ’s efforts to move from passage-making to service-making if not policymaking provides insights into the operational processes of international migration. To what extent are intergovernmental organizations or other non-state actors de facto “agents” of the state if the locus of authority remains the state, but operations move beyond it? Does the process itself shift the significance of national sovereignty? The examination of the policy and operation processes of international governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in migration forces us to reconsider the (false) dichotomy between states controlling migration and state losing control of the policy process.

ICEM’s expanding operational activities, most often with the collusion and collaboration of its member states, enabled the building of new processes associated with the extension of operations and led the organization to subsequently seek to formulate new policy stances or policy orientations. ICEM ’s service-making (like norm setting and policy-making) —- the definition, formulation, provision, and implementation of services — should be considered as part of the historical emergence of transnational practices. The internationalization and multilateralism of migration processes and policy were highlighted in numerous ways at ICEM during the 1950 ’s — by speeches, letters, memos, operational efforts, and inter-organizational negotiations. International policy processes and transnational negotiations were in fact developing in the early post-war period even if much of the attention has been paid to more recent phenomena.

At the same time, it is evident that ICEM ’s attempts to transform operational successes into policy and program initiatives did not succeed in the long term. Despite its numerous substantive programs, when one looks at IOM today, the organization is not the model of an international organization that has effectively enabled transnational interactions or realized its own potential. ₂₈ As shown in this paper, ICEM ’s growing operational activities and services in the 1950 ’s did provide the organization opportunities to formulate new stances and led them to engage in varied kinds of transnational processes. Simultaneously, ICEM ’s primary dependence on operational processes, its institutional mandate as a passage-maker, and its political opportunity constraints also laid the groundwork for its diminished possibilities as a transnational policymaking organization in the following decades.

Endnotes

*: Paper Prepared for presentation on the panel, “International Actors in Immigration Policy-Making: Contributions to the Sovereignty Debate in International Relations,” International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC, February 16–20, 1999 Back.

Note 1: Clearly the debates about sovereignty also take place in many fields besides immigration and citizenship studies. Back.

Note 2: For immigration studies which identify the emergence of transnational or postnational factors and/or identify shifting and diminishing configurations of state sovereignty, see for example Sassen 1996, 1998, Soysal 1994, 1996, Jacobson 1995, Checkl 1995, Hollifield 1992 Cornelius, Hollifield, and Martin, 1995, and Baubock 1994. For studies which assert that the continued, strengthened, or adapted state sovereignty and control are primary, see Freeman 1992, 1995, Brubaker 1995, Joppke 1997, 1998, Lahav 1998, and Guiradon 1999. Back.

Note 3: There is a burgeoning literature on new configurations of sovereignty and the changing roles of international and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. See, for example, Risse-Kappen (1995), Keohane and Milner (1996), Ruggie (1993, 1998), McNeely and Meyer (1995), Weiss, Gordenker, and Watson (1996), Paolini and Jarvis (1998), Martin (1996), and Diehl (1996). Back.

Note 4: Often, scholars need less to qualify their own arguments than to acknowledge the nuances of other arguments. Back.

Note 5: I conducted the archival research at IOM/ICEM headquarters in Geneva from June 17-24, 1998. I also conducted several background interviews in March 1997 and June 1998. Back.

Note 6: For example, the 1989 Amendment (adopted in May 1987 by only entered into force on November 14, 1989) eliminated all geographic limitations and broadened the range of activities of the organizations. Back.

Note 7: 1951 Creation of PICME; Migration Conference — Brussels, 26 November — 5 Dec. 1951 “Resolution to Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe. ” PIC/22; pp. 13-18 Back.

Note 8: As a non-operational organization in the 1950s, the UNHCR was dependent on agencies to carry out its activities (Loescher 1993). Back.

Note 9: Reasons given in conference documents included economic concerns for weak economies and surplus labor coupled with security concerns that such populations would be vulnerable to Communist efforts. Back.

Note 10: Information for this section comes from IOM ’s Archives in files containing operational memos and correspondence with Italy. Where documents were assigned file numbers, they are noted in brackets. Back.

Note 11: Letter by G. Pesci, Acting Chief of Mission to the Director of the Migration Committee, 8 January 1953 {OP/256/885}. Back.

Note 12: Memo from Jean Wiazensky, Office of Operations, to C.K. Grierson Rickford, Chief, Office of Operations, Suggestions on Proposed Reorganization in Italy, 16 November 1953, 5 pages {1/1/ITA}. Back.

Note 13: Memo from Pierre Jacobson, for the Director of the Committee to G. Pesci, Acting Chief of Mission, Rome, 30 November 1953. Back.

Note 14: Intergovernmental Committe for Migration. Annual Report of the Director for 1953. 27 February 1954, MC/61, Geneva, 7^th Session, 31 pp, pp. 3-4. Back.

Note 15: Loescher asserted that “(S)ince 1951, an international refugee regime composed of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and a network of other international agencies, national governments, and voluntary or non-governmental organizations has developed a response strategy ” to deal with refugees, asylum, resettlement, and repatriation (1993:33). Back.

Note 16: Letter from George L. Warren to Marcus Daly, June 10, 1958: 4 pp.; 1/1/USA. 298. Back.

Note 17: Letter from Marcus Daly to George L. Warren, July 4, 1958, 3 pp. 1/1/USA. 306A. Back.

Note 18: Interestingly, Daly ’s comments resonate with arguments made by members of the administration regarding their efforts to recast the organization during the 1980s and 1990s (Interviews with members of the IOM Administration, 1997, 1998). Back.

Note 19: Letter from George Warren to Marcus Daly, July 11, 1958, 3 pp. 1/1/USA. 311. Back.

Note 20: Letter from George Warren to Marcus Daly, August 14, 1958, 4 pp. 1/1/USA. 326. Back.

Note 21: Letter from Marcus Daly to George Warren, 14 September 1959, 2 pp.; Letter from Warren to Daly, 21 September, 1959, 4 pp. Back.

Note 22: Memo from E. Bettini, chief, Department of Planning and Liaison to Director, ICEM, Subject: ASome Ideas for the Modification of ICEM Constitution. ” 24 March 1959, 2 page cover letter, 13 page Memo. Back.

Note 23: Letter from O.J. van Heuven Goodhart, UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Harold Tittman, Director, ICEM , 6 June 1955, 5 pp. Back.

Note 24: Letter from Harold Tittman, Director, ICEM to O.J. van Heuven Goodhart, June 15, 1955, 5 pp. Back.

Note 25: Memo from Mr. Travers, Chief of Mission, Italy to Mr. Tittman, Director, ICEM, October 25, 1956. 017/01163. Back.

Note 26: In the past decade, there have been numerous efforts and recommendations to better coordinate national and international migration regimes (for an array of operational perspectives, see Widgren 1993; Goodwin-Gill 1993, Appleyard 1991, Falchi 1993, Loescher 1993) Back.

Note 27: This tendency when identifying transnational discourses and norms (such as human rights) may also be linked to scholars ’ methodological and analytical frameworks. Martha Finnemore has noted that certain institutionalist models place their emphasis on Athe mutually reinforcing and expansive nature of (Western cultural) norms . . . Institutionalists specify no sources of instability, conflict, or opposition to the progressive expansion of world culture (1996:343). ” While the institutionalist scholar Yasemin Soysal explicitly discusses a conflicted dialectic between national sovereignty and human rights norms, her conclusions still suggest a progressive and mostly linear expansion of transnational and postnational configurations (1996) Back.

Note 28: One international functionary called IOM the Acase study for what an IO should not do. ” Back.