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Do Institutions Matter? Semi-presidentialism in Comparative Perspective
Institute on East Central Europe
March, 1997
The Central and Eastern European experience with institutional transformation provides new material for the comparative politics discussion about the role of constitutional choices in democratic development. One aspect of this discussion deals with the potential advantages and disadvantages of particular forms of contemporary democratic regimes -- presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential arrangements. 1 Different political institutions thus are an important subject for thorough analysis. Without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, such a discussion attributes a more independent role for political institutions which are described not only as recipients of actors' preferences but also as collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests. 2
The focus of this analysis is the semi-presidential constitutional regime in Ukraine. The main question to be considered is to what extent this system facilitates or impedes the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine. A comparison of the Ukrainian system with the "ideal" French model will make the analysis more illustrative. Another argument in favor of such a comparison is based on a premise about the presence of a model of the new institutional order that is not typically invented on the spot, but rather is "imported" and suitably adapted to domestic needs. In this sense, the example of the French system has had a large impact on the design of political institutions in Ukraine.
While emphasizing the Ukrainian and French cases, this paper will also incorporate the experiences of other Western semi-presidential regimes and new Central and Eastern European democracies to arrive at a set of generalizable conclusions about the nature of semi-presidentialism. Such generalizations can be helpful for our overall understanding of the logic of institutional arrangements and their impacts on the character of political processes in the post-communist countries.
The central argument of this essay is twofold. First, semi-presidentialism does not solve the problems frequently attributed to the presidential system, such as: temporal rigidity associated with the fixed terms in office for both chief executive and legislature; the majoritarian tendency of a political process characterized by winner-take-all outcomes; political outsiders' access to power; and potential authoritarian outcomes. Second, semi-presidential constitutional arrangements lead to further unresolved issues such as an unclear division of power between the three major players -- the president, prime minister, and parliament. These issues have serious consequences for all levels of state administration; foster potential conflict between a president and prime minister who belong to different political coalitions; and can lead to the adverse influence of a supra-party president -- a so-called national arbiter -- on the fragile political party system's development.
The Legal Framework of Semi-presidentialism
A semi-presidential system, in contrast to "pure" presidential or parliamentary systems, has been defined in a variety of ways. It can be found in the literature as a dual executive, a divided executive, a parliamentary presidential republic, or a quasi-parliamentary government. 3 The term used here -- semi-presidential government -- has appeared widely in works dealing with the constitutional arrangement of the Fifth Republic in France. The French case has become a reference point for most research devoted to the dual executive. Maurice Duverger, the distinguished scholar of the French political system, has proposed a very broad definition of the semi-presidential form of government: "the political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it combines three elements: 1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; 2) he possesses quite considerable powers; 3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possesses executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them." 4
Such a system is quite different from the presidential and parliamentarian ideal types of democracy. Semi-presidential government implies more fusion of power than the presidential system, typically providing presidents the right to dissolve the assembly and assemblies the right to censure and dismiss the cabinet and its individual members. A semi-presidential system also assumes more separation of power than parliamentary system does -- it gives the president considerable powers, therefore making him independent from a parliament that has power to influence the destiny of the cabinet, but not of the president.
While meeting the formal requirements mentioned above, semi-presidential regimes can differ widely in their actual performance. The actual functioning of a semi-presidential system can hardly be explained only by a constitutional framework. Duverger proposes to consider four parameters: the actual content of the constitution, a combination of tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority, and the position of the president in relation to this majority. 5 Juan J. Linz even argues that the system of a dual executive -- much more than other types of government -- depends on the functioning of the larger political system, most specifically with regard to the party system and the complex historical situation. 6
Thus, the analysis of each particular case of a semi-presidential system requires complex research for understanding its functioning. The analysis of legal aspects of the dual executive's operation has led Matthew Solberg Shugart and John M. Carey to further classify dual executive systems. 7 The regime that meets Duverger's three criteria is called "premier-presidential" by these authors. A distinction is made between the latter and the "president-parliamentary" system, which has the following features: 1) the popular election of the president; 2) the president appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers; 3) cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence; and 4) the president has the power to dissolve the parliament or legislative powers, or both. 8
The main difference between these two types lies in the president's authority over the cabinet. 9 In short, this difference can be described through an analysis of the procedures for appointment and dismissal. In a premier-presidential regime, whether the president names all cabinet members or only the prime minister, all of these positions are subsequently subject to parliamentary confidence. In president-parliamentary systems, however, the president makes appointments to all cabinet positions without parliamentary confirmation.
As will be analyzed below, the Ukrainian political system resembles the French constitutional design in many aspects and meets Duverger's criteria for a semi-presidential system -- or, in Shugart and Carey's classification, the criteria for a premier-presidential system. For a period of five years after the proclamation of independence in 1991, Ukraine functioned under a semi-presidential framework, providing the possibility to compare the performance of the Ukrainian system with the French model and to consider the implications of such a system under the conditions of consolidating democracy.
The Legal Framework of Semi-presidentialism in France and Ukraine
The main similarities and differences in presidential powers in Ukraine and France can be briefly summarized as follows:
Popular election of the president is an underlying similarity of these two systems. Popular election has a decisive influence on the centrality of the presidents in both political systems, since the legitimacy of popular elections and the substantial powers granted in the constitution make the presidents key figures in the political arrangements maintained in France since 1958 and in Ukraine since December 1, 1991.
Head of government. The type of relations with the government is the second similarity between these two presidencies. Both constitutional systems are dual executive systems in which the executive powers are divided between the president and the cabinet, which is headed by a prime minister. The prime minister is formally responsible for the everyday duties of the cabinet, although the president controls the nomination and dismissal of members and presides over meetings. He is also the chief of the armed forces. In both systems the president appoints the prime minister subject to parliament's confirmation. The president does not have the right to dismiss the prime minister and cabinet without parliamentary approval in France. The Ukrainian president appoints the prime minister with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine, but can terminate the prime minister's authority and adopt a decision concerning his or her resignation without parliamentary approval (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 106-9). The president also appoints, on the recommendation of the prime minister, members of the cabinet and terminates their authority in these positions (Article 106-10).
Dissolution of assembly. The French constitution provides the president with the right to dissolve the parliament: "The President of the Republic may, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the Assembly, declare the dissolution of the National Assembly "(Article 12). The required consultation with the prime minister and the presidents of the assemblies cannot be regarded as a formidable restriction, since this requirement is not invested with any strict legal formulation. The only real restriction pertains to the frequency of the dissolution -- the president has the right to dissolve parliament only once a year.
The importance of presidential power to dissolve the parliament cannot be overestimated. As Alfred Stepan and Ezra N. Suleiman observe, "the power to dissolve parliament is a key aspect of presidential leadership in France. The threat of dissolution alone affects the political and policy implementation process. It can be used to renew a president's legitimacy. And, finally, it suggests that the president is both head of state and head of the executive." 10
On the contrary, in Ukraine the president has the right to dissolve the parliament only under very limited circumstances -- if plenary meetings fail to commence within thirty days of its scheduled meeting (Article 106-8). The absence of any real provision for parliament's dissolution constitutes a formidable obstacle for the executive to check the legislature, since neither the president nor the prime minister has an effective means to influence the activity of parliament. Thus, the Ukrainian constitution bases the scope of executive actions directed toward the legislature on the principle of the separation of powers, characteristic of pure presidential systems. On the other hand, the legislature is provided with the classical parliamentary device to influence the destiny of the cabinet of ministers -- a motion of censure or vote of no-confidence, which, in its turn, affects the political tactics and behavior of the president (if not his destiny). The system is evidently biased in favor of the legislature, and is crippled, since it tries to simultaneously adopt two distinct and conflicting logics -- a separation and a fusion of powers.
Emergency powers. In both systems, the president is granted significant emergency powers. The granting of these powers is partly explained by similar logic: the president is seen as a guarantor of national independence and state integrity. Emergency powers are conferred to the president when a threat to this independence and integrity exists.
The role of the French president as the guarantor of the state is stressed in Article 16. According to this article, the president is empowered, after consultation with the prime minister and the presidents of the Senate, the National Assembly and the head of Constitutional Council, to take the measures required by circumstances if there is a serious threat to the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the state, the integrity of its territory, and the fulfillment of its international obligations. Again, the provision for consultation does not include any strict legal regulations, and the president is not obliged to follow the advice he receives. The president himself, unchecked, may thus decide when such a threat exists and what is to be done. This measure made the position of the president of the Fifth Republic much stronger than those of the presidents of the Third and Fourth Republics, who did not have such powers. It is difficult to assess precisely the influence of these presidential prerogatives on the functioning of French semi-presidentialism, since they have only been used once, between April and September 1961, during an attempted military coup in Algeria. 11 However, these presidential powers should be considered to be important, since the possibility of their unilateral use by the president increases the scope of his potential powers and influences the behavior of other political actors.
The emergency powers of the Ukrainian president are weaker. He can also declare a state of emergency, but this declaration is subject to subsequent confirmation by parliament (Article 106-20). The president also adopts a decision, in accordance with the law, on general or partial mobilization and the introduction of martial law in Ukraine or in particular areas, in the event of a threat of aggression or danger to the Ukrainian state's independence (Article 106-21). More specifically outlined than in the French constitution, these provisions maintain some ambiguity in the presidential response toward critical situations, creating a space for strategic maneuvering by the chief executive.
Referenda. The French constitution provides one more mechanism that substantially increases the role and influence of the president. He has a right to "submit to a referendum any bill dealing with the organization of the public authorities... which, without being contrary to the constitution might affect the functions of the institutions..." However, this right is more heavily restricted than are other powers of the president due to the necessity to previously secure "the proposal of the Government... or joint motion of the two Assemblies..." (Article 11). This condition was often violated by French presidents who used the referendum both to demonstrate the extent of consent to specific policies and as a plebiscitary confirmation of their own standing. The right to call a referendum has been an important weapon of the president in the French system. The threat to call for direct popular support through this plebiscitary mechanism makes the referendum a powerful source of leverage for a president in his relations with other political actors.
There is no right provided by the constitution of Ukraine for a president to initiate a referendum. He only designates an all-Ukrainian referendum regarding amendments to the constitution after parliament's approval of such a referendum. He also proclaims an all-Ukrainian referendum on popular initiative (Article 106-6). Yet, as will be shown later, the unconstitutional threat to call a referendum and to appeal directly to people is an important source of leverage in the hands of a president confronting the legislative body. The existence of such unconstitutional practices is one reason for going beyond legalistic analysis in comparative research.
An analysis of legal frameworks, even showing substantial differences in powers of presidents, cannot alone explain differences in the functioning the French and Ukrainian political systems. To understand what incentives these legal frameworks give to political actors and how these incentives are influenced by environmental factors in the particular conditions of specific countries, the comparative analysis of real political practice should be added to any legalistic analysis.
Political Practice
Political practice involves recurrent patterns of interactions based on stable sets of rules provided by the legal system. In our case it is important to understand the logic of the relations produced by the institutional framework: between president and political parties, president and parliament, president and cabinet, and cabinet and parliament.
President and Political Parties
France and its institutions are an interesting subject for research because of the surprising stability of the French political system. One of the sources of this stability was a special regime of political parties. This regime has almost always secured the majority of one or another party and provided broad political support for a president: "political parties, in effect, become machines for nominating, supporting and helping elect presidential candidates." 12 In the event that the president does not have majority support in parliament, the system works as a parliamentary regime in which the party or party coalition that secured the majority of seats in parliament forms the government. Most of the time, however, the majorities coincide and the French system works as a presidential one.
The emergence of majority parties, which were practically unknown to the political system of the Fourth Republic, 13 was very much due to the electoral system. The electoral law of 1958 introduced a two-ballot "first past the post" system. Under this system, any candidate who got above a certain minimal proportion of the vote could stand in the second ballot. The second ballot, with one possible winner, discouraged party fragmentation.
A less fragmented party system was also encouraged by the presidential elections, which are conducted on a two-round majoritarian basis. The political struggle for the presidential post has become the central feature. While in the first round different parties nominated their own candidates, the necessity of a second round with only two candidates forced the regrouping and formation of bipolar coalitions contesting for the presidency. The presidential candidates in France are always the leaders of political parties or party coalitions. The elected president also becomes a leader of his party or party coalition's majority in the parliament. It is this role of the president that determines his relations with parliament, on whose support he can rely in most of his initiatives if his party or party coalition enjoys the majority in parliament. The functioning of parliament, in its turn, is characterized "by the existence of [a] party capable of securing a majority of seats in the National Assembly." 14
The Ukrainian political system has significant difficulties in producing majority parties. Some basic reasons for this can be considered: First, the weak and fragmented character of the post-Soviet party system; second, the heterogeneous nature of Ukrainian society; and, finally, the above-party character of the Ukrainian presidency.
1. The character of the Ukrainian political party system. The necessary precondition for a developed party system is the structuralization of society and the formation of parti-cular interests among different population groups. This process in Ukraine is now in its ini-tial phase. 10 years have passed since perestroika in the former USSR, but changes in the uniform nature of the overwhelming majority of society remain very limited. This is due to many factors, primarily the delay of radical economic and social reforms that has plagued Ukraine, in contrast to Russia. This deprives the party system of the necessary popular basis. With the exception of traditional parties, such as the national-oriented Rukh (founded during perestroika as a social movement), and the Communists, parties remain small, support specific leaders, and are without real popular appeal. They are active mainly in the capital and the largest regional centers, lacking serious political influence in the periphery.
Independent candidacy was the direct result of a majoritarian electoral system in the Ukrainian context. While the majoritarian electoral system is a crucial factor that helps to produce a stable majority in the French parliament, giving most seats to the representative of one or another party (and thus allowing semi-presidentialism to function effectively), a similar electoral system has become a real obstacle for the consolidation of democratic society in Ukraine. The law was adopted by the communist majority in parliament in hopes that those "strong" individuals on the local level that were mainly represented by former communist party leaders and influential managers of state factories and collective farms would gain support and receive seats in the parliament as independent candidates. In fact, this electoral system has slowed down the development of a new political system by depriving its main actors -- political parties -- of an active role in elections. While systems that combine single-member districts and proportional representation or pure proportional representation exist in most post-communist countries, Ukrainian law ignores the new reality of political transformation. 15
2. The heterogeneous nature of Ukrainian society. One of the characteristics of modern Ukraine is its heterogeneous population. There are several minority groups, the largest of which is Russian. Ethnic Russians comprise 11.4 million, or 22 percent of the population. The "titular" nation, Ukrainians, represents 72 percent of the population, but it is not homogeneous either. As a result, three main cultural groups can be identified: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (51 percent), Russian-speaking Ukrainians (21 percent), and Russians (22 percent). Other minorities include Jews, Poles, Belarusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Romanians, each numbering at least 100,000. The total population of Ukraine is about 52 million. 16
The society holds many different religious affiliations. The three primary and conflicting churches are: the Ukrainian (Uniate) Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (formerly an Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church).
Such a division of society along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and ideological lines significantly complicates the development of a majority party in Ukraine. Each of these cleavages is deeply rooted and cannot be easily compromised. As a result, it becomes difficult to maintain a majority even when the party system matures and develops.
3. Supra-party president. While the French presidents are the leaders of large national political parties, the positions of the first two Ukrainian presidents were quite opposite: neither of them possessed the backing of an organized political party.
To understand how this influences the development of a party system, an argument elaborated by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan can be applied. According to them, those positive features in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the transitional period turned out to be an obstacle to the development of political society. Political society is different from civic society and can be understood as a system of institutions: i.e., political parties, competitive elections, and political leadership. It demands special attention in order to develop. Now, in the very important moment of democratic consolidation, the presidents do not want to spend their political capital and influence for strengthening and developing political institutions. They prefer to stand above all these "troubles" that are, in fact, the essence of a democratically functioning political system. 17
President and Parliament
The French president has the majority in parliament in most cases; he builds his relationship with the legislature on the principle that he plays the leading role in executive-legislative interaction. This has the effect of concentrating political power and activity out-side of the parliament. 18 In this way, the constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic tried to safeguard the political system from the destructive effect that powerful semi-autonomous committees of parliament played in the political life of the Third and Fourth Republics. As Stepan and Suleiman argue, the combination of the Organic Law on Parliamentary Procedure, constitutional changes, and increased party discipline have resulted in an entirely new framework of executive-legislative relations. 19 Parliamentary committees ceased to be all-powerful, and they have lost most of their power to initiate fiscal bills. Parliamentary supremacy, so characteristic for the legislatures of the Third and Fourth Republics, has been ended.
Meanwhile, the relationship between president and parliament in Ukraine can be characterized as one in which a very powerful legislature attempts to dominate the entire political process, in contrast to the new, immature institution of the presidency, whose powers are still contested and somewhat unclear even after the adoption of a new constitution.
The power of the Ukrainian parliament stems from the power and legitimacy of the Soviets of People's Deputies from the communist period. Paradoxically, while concentrating the real mechanisms of power in the hands of the Communist Party, the regime created and installed in mass consciousness the myth that the communist system represented rule by the people through Soviets. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was perhaps the most memorized by many generations of Soviet people. The system of Soviets combined the executive and legislative functions on all levels of the state system (from local to national), and symbolized the embodiment and expression of popular will. After the breakdown of the communist regime, the legitimacy of the Soviets and their claims for a hybrid combination of powers were preserved. There is a fierce opposition on the part of Soviets' deputies, Soviet executive committees' functionaries, and Communist Party activists to any attempts at reforming this system.
This left its mark on the functioning of the Verkhovna Rada, which is now the official name of the Ukrainian parliament. Deputies, especially of the left orientation, consider themselves all-powerful delegates of the people, empowered to make decisions in any sphere of state functioning without heed to any principles of the separation of powers. Parliament's actions are seen as superseding any restrictions or constraints imposed by other state institutions. In practice, this means that parliament can pass laws and regulations on any subject. Its ruling body, the presidium, whose role is intended to be limited to managing legislative powers, issued over 200 decisions of an executive character in 1993 alone. The parliament continues to issue "regulations" with supposed executive force, numbering over 50 in 1993. 20
The parliament's perception of its own powers as ultimate and all-embracing also has appeared in the process of amending the constitution, as all attempts by the executive to gain additional powers have met with resolute opposition in the parliament. Naturally, such a parliament could not accept the possibility of its own dissolution by the president. The conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government cannot be solved legally in Ukraine.
The existence of so-called "competing legitimacies" -- presidential and parliamentarian -- is a serious problem for any semi-presidential system. In France, the executive-legislative deadlock that appears when the majority in parliament is hostile to the president can be solved by the president through the dissolution of the parliament and new elections. The Ukrainian president, however, does not have such a right, and therefore the crisis becomes permanent. Being assured of its own invulnerability, parliament does not have any incentive to work together with the president. This can be described as a core problem of executive-legislative relations in Ukraine.
The problem of parliamentary majority. Many problems in the relations between president and parliament, as well as in the functioning of parliament itself, are caused by the absence of a stable, disciplined, and cohesive majority in parliament. As was shown above, the main cause of this absence is the inability of the Ukrainian political system to generate majority parties. As a result, the parliament is dominated by opposing factions that have very different ideological and economic positions and interests. They are practically unable to form a majority coalition in government.
Neither in the parliament of 1990-94 nor in the current one has the president enjoyed the support of a majority. Kravchuk's support in parliament during 1990-94 was composed of different groups: national communists, the so-called "party of power"(consisting of the representatives of central and local structures, managers of state industries, and collective farmers), and members of the national-democratic bloc. This support was formed around separate questions important for one or another group, rather than around a politically defined general policy. 21
After parliamentary elections in 1994, the situation in parliament changed slightly. A new reality of the political system -- the existence and development of political parties -- forced most parliamentary factions to organize along the party principle. However, this change will not help to produce a majority because a large number of party factions represent different, often opposite, parts of the political spectrum. No one party faction in parliament is large enough to produce a stable majority. Leftist parties, however, were successful in blocking many pro-reform legislative initiatives. 22
President and Prime Minister
The relationship between president and prime minister is seen by many specialists as the root of "the main theoretical and political worry about semi-presidentialism" 23 -- the possibility of conflict within the dual executive. Returning to the French experience, we can see that semi-presidentialism in France in general, and president-prime minister relations in particular, have followed one of two patterns. First, when the president has a majority in parliament (which is usually the case), the system works under the general leadership of the president. He heads the government de jure and de facto. The prime minister, appointed by the president with the parliament's approval, is in a subordinate position with respect to the president. He exercises administrative and technical management of the cabinet under the general leadership of president.
The second pattern emerges when the president faces a majority in parliament that is opposed to him. In this situation, he is forced to appoint the leader of the parliamentary majority as prime minister. In this case, the French system functions in the parliamentary variant. The real political leadership over the cabinet shifts to the prime minister, who is responsible for current policy and who enjoys the support of the majority. The president has to step back in his claims on power over the cabinet. This practice of relations between president and prime minister has been termed "cohabitation"in the literature on France. In the recent history of France, the president has twice been faced with a prime minister backed by a majority in opposition to the president.
In Ukraine, semi-presidentialism works on a third model, in which neither president nor prime minister has a stable and coherent majority in parliament. This does not influence the destiny of the president very much, in the sense that it does not injure his legitimacy because the source of the latter are popular elections. But this situation is very unfavorable for the prime minister, since his government is a minority government or a government of unstable coalition. It makes the prime minister refrain from active policy and stay in the shadow of the president. This only strengthens the position of the president as the actual head of the government who is alone responsible for the politics of the cabinet.
In practice, the main consequence of this situation is that the argument about the crucial advantage of semi-presidentialism, as a system in which the president occupies the position of arbiter between the parliament and cabinet, does not work. The president is perceived by majorities in parliament and among the public not as an arbiter but as an organic, inalienable, and, most importantly, entirely responsible part of the executive. Initially, in the beginning of the transition a president could sustain the role of arbiter and could use prime ministers, in Stephen Holmes' expression, as "fenders that must absorb the electoral resentment the process of transformation inevitably creates." 24 But such a situation could not last indefinitely because the president is not only a figurehead, but the most powerful state official possessing very significant powers and, in the long run, bearing the main responsibility for the results of the executive's activity. The repeated failures in the course of reforms and a persistent decline in living standards shift the arrows of accusation from the prime minister to the president. This tendency can be traced in the experience of many post-communist semi-presidential systems: Ukraine, Poland, Russia, and Belarus.
Another factor that contributed to the dissolution of illusion about the arbitrary character of the Ukrainian presidency was the character of Ukrainian premiership. In Ukraine, as in most other republics of the former Soviet Union that have faced the problem of an immature party system, the post of prime minister is perennially occupied not by leaders of political parties and coalitions, but by non-affiliated technocrats. They gain the support of a significant part of the deputies in parliament, but they are not politically influential leaders. In practice, this means that all political responsibility for the actions of the executive is borne by the president.
The numerous accusations from different sides considering the two Ukrainian presidents' personal responsibility for political and economic failures led both of them to claim more powers in order to be able to conduct reforms and to perform effectively in general. On the other hand, both parliaments have tried to use these accusations as legitimate grounds for their attempts to reduce the powers of the president, since in their opinion the presidents already possess considerable powers and have proved unable to use them effectively. The constant bargaining and struggle for power has become a very characteristic feature of relations between the president and parliament.
Cabinet and Legislature
The absence of a stable majority in parliament makes relations between president, cabinet, and parliament even more complicated than they would be if a prime minister backed by a majority in parliament opposed the president. The prime minister, in fact, is sandwiched between two opposing forces -- president and parliament. He has dual subordination and dual responsibility, before the president and before the parliament, since he is dependent on both for his nomination to office. This dual subordination makes his position relatively independent of both the president and the parliament but not powerful enough to resolutely conduct policy. Theoretically, while in office, the prime minister should be more interested in cooperation with parliament since his survival in office depends on the confidence of the latter. Following this logic, the best choice for a prime minister facing a fragmented parliament is not to adopt any radical policies, since this is the best way to sustain the parliament's confidence. Any resolute stance taken by the prime minister can automatically lead to a vote of no confidence.
The policy of parliament can also be restrained by its relations with the government. The fact that these relations are very important for the successful functioning of the system is well illustrated by the French case, where special government powers to pass legislation without parliament's approval are regarded as one of the main factors that contribute to the stability of the system. 25
Another French provision allows the government to attempt to altogether avoid a detailed discussion of potentially contentious matters. Article 44 of the constitution enables the government to insist that a draft law should be taken as a whole when it comes to a vote, along with such amendments that the government chooses to accept, rather than being discussed and amended paragraph by paragraph. 26
The Ukrainian cabinet has practically no mechanisms to avoid the detailed consideration of a law by parliament in general or by its committees. These committees, unlike the French ones, have significant power that is based on the principle of practically unlimited parliamentary sovereignty. The committees can demand the account of any state official in their meetings. The leaders of committees sometimes try to act as alternative ministers in the field of their responsibilities. 27
The Potential Disadvantages of Semi-presidentialism
The importance of political institutions for the success or failure of democratic consolidation is accepted by many researchers analyzing the politics of democratic transition. Much of the literature in the field is devoted to criticism of the presidential constitutional arrangement, which for this group of authors seems less conducive to the democratic functioning of a political system. 28
The semi-presidential model offers an alternative that is often seen as an advantageous intermediate model with the potential to mitigate some problems of presidentialism while enjoying some advantages of parliamentarism. Being theoretically plausible, such a proposition should be empirically tested. In practice, as the Ukrainian case shows, this constitutional model is not without serious flaws. The possible disadvantages and potential problems are numerous and can create very serious obstacles to democratic consolidation for some post-communist countries that have adopted this model.
1. The problem of parliamentary majority. It is useful again to make some com-parative observations with the French "ideal type," often regarded as the most successful case of semi-presidentialism. Many authors see one of the main reasons for this success in the ability of semi-presidentialism to alternate between parliamentarian and presidential phases in the process of the system. This can be regarded as a key feature of the system as well as the main drawback of semi-presidentialism because it works well in conditions where pure presidential and pure parliamentarian systems can work effectively -- when there is a majority that supports a president in a presidential system or supports a prime minister in a parliamentarian one. But it is often the case in new democracies that there are neither stable presidential nor parliamentarian majorities in the assembly. Neither president nor parliament can rely on a stable, coherent majority in the parliament, and the factors that contribute to their absence in new democracies are numerous and require special con-sideration. The key point for this analysis is that in such a situation semi-presidentialism produces a vacuum of power. While the absence of a stable majority is a serious obstacle for the functioning of any political system, in the context of a semi-presidential framework, this can seriously aggravate the situation. It is especially inappropriate under conditions of transition that require strong executive power for carrying out economic and political reforms. In this situation the government does not enjoy the support of the parliamentarian majority. At the same time, the parliament as a whole has formidable blocking power. It cannot make decisions in the absence of a majority, but it can prevent the executive from making decisions. A president who does not enjoy the support of the government is not powerful enough, as he does not have the means to act in place of the cabinet.
This situation has often appeared in countries that experienced radical changes in the past. For example, Duverger analyzes the experience of Weimar Germany, Portugal, and Finland. 29 The case of the Weimar Republic is especially illustrative for countries in transition. Under the conditions of underdeveloped democratic constitutional mechanisms and the absence of long-established techniques and practices that could secure the stable functioning of democracy, there is a situation of "power without powers." The absence of strong executive power headed either by the president or prime minister is very unfavorable to solving the problems of complex transformation. Thus, the functioning of the semi-presidential system can be problematic in a very typical situation for post-communist countries, i.e., in the entire range of cases where there is no stable majority supporting the president or prime minister in the parliament.
The absence of a stable majority in parliament makes the position of government weak and unstable. In such a situation, the government repeatedly demands extraordinary powers in order to avoid dependency on this changing majority and in order to manage effectively. It creates another crisis that the French system successfully avoids: the conflict of three distinct legitimacies (presidential, legislative, and executive), one of which -- legitimacy of government -- depends on the legislature's composition.
2. "Cohabitation." Another serious problem of the semi-presidential arrangement appears when a majority that is in opposition to the president is formed in the parliament. The French system managed to cope with this problem by the successful practice of "cohabitation," in which the prime minister holds a parliamentary majority in opposition to the president. 30 In this situation power shifts from president to prime minister, who becomes the real head of government. The system has alternated from the presidential "phase" to the parliamentary one.
However, the French case in no way implies that such coexistence will be peaceful and successful everywhere. Much depends on the willingness of the president to tolerate the power of prime minister and accept his own subordinate position. When such a willingness is absent, there is no guarantee that the system will work effectively in the parliamentary phase. The president will try to oppose the functioning of the regime in the parliamentary "phase," employing constitutional and unconstitutional measures. This can lead to a stalemate between the president and the legislature. The dissolution of parliament by the president does not necessarily mean that the conflict will be solved, since there is no guarantee that the new majority in parliament will support the president.
Generally, semi-presidentialism can hardly be described as a system which alternates between the presidential and parliamentarian variants, since in either there may be an actor whose role is not characteristic for pure presidential or parliamentarian systems and whose particular influence on the functioning of political system cannot be neutralized.
3. Temporal rigidity. The semi-presidential arrangement can also lead to temporal rigidity, which is one of the main drawbacks of presidentialism. The presidential model is characterized by the fact that both the president and parliament are elected for fixed terms in office. Some of the new semi-presidential regimes (for example in Ukraine and Belarus), while taking much of the French semi-presidential pattern, also adopted the principle of a fixed term for parliament that cannot be dissolved by the president. This is a characteristic feature of presidential regimes, but it does not appear in most Western semi-presidential systems. This particular institutional arrangement is especially conducive to executive-legislative deadlock, since the president has no institutionalized means to dissolve the parliament and resolve an undesirable (from his perspective) coexistence.
The same arrangement greatly influences the logic of parliament's behavior. Being assured of its own invulnerability, parliament does not have any institutional incentive to work together with the president. The situation is reinforced by the specific nature of post-Soviet parliaments. The deeply-rooted tradition of elected local and supreme Soviets as the legitimate "expression of the people's will" has also contributed to the development of the idea of parliament not only as a body that has legislative functions, but also as one that can control and interfere with the executive system.
The problem of rigidity can exist even when the president has a right to dissolve the parliament. As was already stated, the dissolution does not necessarily mean that the majority in the newly elected parliament will support the president. Much depends on the timing of the elections. When the presidential and parliamentarian elections are close together in time, there is a greater chance for a president to enjoy the support of the majority in parliament than is the case when the parliamentary elections are in the middle of the presidential term. 31 But even if a presidential majority appears in the parliament as a result of subsequent elections of president and parliament, there is no guarantee that the union of the president and the parliamentary majority will be preserved. 32
4. Political outsider. The new semi-presidential regimes face some other problems characteristic for the presidential system. One of them is the possibility that the post of president can be won and then occupied by a political outsider. The example of Belarusian president Lukashenko is very illustrative in this sense. He started his political activity only a few years ago when he was elected as a people's deputy and headed the parliamentary commission on problems of corruption. He won the elections employing mainly the slogans of fighting corruption and the restoration of the USSR. 33
The disadvantages that can be caused by the presidency of a politically inexperienced person are numerous. The most essential one is that such a person is usually not connected with any large politically organized interests, usually represented by political parties. Such a president is not backed by organized political support but rather in a spontaneous fashion. He can thus have serious problems with the formulation of his own policy and in employing the mechanisms of political society for reaching his goals. Unbounded by any political obligations or commitments towards institutions of political society, he can try to pursue the voluntaristic policy that is expressed in Latin American terms as "decretismo." In conditions of dual democratic legitimacy, when both president and parliament are popularly elected, executive-legislative deadlock may be more probable.
5. Danger of authoritarianism. Semi-presidentialism does not decrease the potential danger of a usurpation of power by the president. Feeling himself to be more legitimate than the parliament, members of which were elected by small constituencies, the president may try to bypass parliament, the cabinet, or any other government institution in case of conflict, claiming that he is backed by the people's support. Viewing himself as a savior of the nation, he may act as if he is the only representative and embodiment of the nation, with the right to disregard any other institution and appeal directly to the people in the case of institutional resistance. This can lead to the establishment of a regime that Guillermo O'Donnell defines as a "delegative democracy." 34 This is an unconsolidated but sometimes enduring democracy in which a president is "above" all political institutions.
6. Disadvantages caused by the ambiguity of the constitutional framework. Semi-presidentialism can also be especially disadvantageous in the transitional period because transition implies that the legal system and patterns of political practice are in flux. By definition, some kinds of power in semi-presidentialism are not given explicitly to any of the branches of power, but rather are implied. Even in the long-established French system, it is often difficult to define where the limits of different branches of government lie. It is primarily self-restraint on the part of political actors, primarily the president, which is grounded in developed democratic practice, that keeps the system functioning free of crisis.
Under the conditions of a fluid political system, this absence of clear limits on the powers of president and parliament makes the bargaining game between these two actors permanent. Both try to cut or reduce the powers of the other and devote much time and energy to this task. Thus, in real conditions of democratic transition, the constant flux in powers of the president, seen as an advantageous factor by the designers of some post-communist institutional arrangements, creates not room for maneuver that can facilitate solving urgent problems, but rather space for vehement struggle between legislative and executive authorities. While in France the semi-presidential arrangement is a basis for stability, in the post-communist world it can constantly reproduce a system that will be far from stable. Such an arrangement is dangerous in the sense that it does not provide clear mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts between the president and the assembly.
7. The effect of a semi-presidential arrangement on the development of the political system as a whole. This effect is complex and multifaceted, depending on a number of other factors not directly or necessarily associated with this system, primarily the design of the electoral system. However, it remains possible to discern some potential problems of semi-presidentialism as such. This system, like the presidential one, can also have a majoritarian tendency. It may lead to a winner-take-all system, which hands executive authority over to a single party, and potentially excludes the losers from any influence on crucial public decisions, turning them into spoilers. 35 This possibility is especially dangerous in heterogeneous societies that have cleavages along ideological, ethnic, religious, cultural, or linguistic lines. In such societies, the president, if he is not the candidate of consensus, can become only a majority leader. This can produce a very strong feeling of alienation in one or more minorities in the population. This feeling, in turn, can raise the question of legitimacy, not only of the current government or regime, but of the political community as such. 36
In such complex societies the struggle for the presidency may turn out to be one in which the unity of a political community is at stake. In this sense, the presidential post has great potential for promoting heterogeneity, inconciliatory practice, and splitting society.
The influence of presidents in semi-presidential systems on the development of the political party system in transitional societies is also important. It has been argued that popularly-elected presidents are the most appropriate figures to lead their countries through the ambiguities of a transitional period, but we can see that the results of presidential leadership for democracy are not very successful. In fact, semi-presidentialism slows down the development of advanced political institutions. What was a positive feature in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the transitional period, when presidents were civil society leaders who represented the courage and decency of anti-communist dissidents or the break with hated federations, 37 turned out to be an obstacle to the development of political society. Now, in the very important moment of democratic consolidation, presidents do not want to spend their political capital and influence on the strengthening and development of different political institutions -- above all, political parties. 38
This is in contrast with the successful French model, in which the president stands as a leader of a political party or party coalition. Such a status for the president disciplines his activity as well as the activity of other actors in the political system. The main stake in the French political game are the presidential elections. Through such an arrangement of presidential status, the main political actors -- political parties -- receive very powerful incentives not to act autonomously but to join either the presidential or the opposite block to compete for the presidency.
The above analysis attempts to outline the potential dangers that can be caused by a semi-presidential arrangement. Some of these problems have already been faced by post-communist countries that have adopted this system, while other problems have been successfully avoided. All of these obstacles may not appear in new democracies, but an awareness of such problems can contribute much to our understanding of the particular incentives produced by the constitutional arrangement, and consequently may facilitate the process of appropriate institutional design in each particular case.
Footnotes
Note 1: Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?," in Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), and Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skatch, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism," World Politics 46 (October 1993), 1-22. Back.
Note 2: A seminal article on the new institutionalism is James G. March and John P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (June 1984), 734-49. Back.
Note 3: For discussion of different terms for defining dual executive systems, see Arend Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 139-203. Back.
Note 4: Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8, no.1 (June 1980), 166. Back.
Note 7: Matthew Solberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23-7. Back.
Note 9: While essential for defining the different types of dual executive regimes, this distinction does not alter Duverger's main principles. Although Shugart and Carey argue that only the premier-presidential system is a semi-presidential one, the president-parliamentary type can also be regarded as a subtype of semi-presidential systems, since a president-parliamentary system meets all basic requirements of Duverger's definition. The conditions that are needed for defining the regime as semi-presidential do not contradict any of Duverger's principles. Independently from the question of whether the president-parliamentary regime is semi-presidential, the theoretical distinction between premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regime types offered by these two authors is useful for this analysis. Although according to this classification both the French and Ukrainian systems should be regarded as premier-presidential types, an awareness of the president-parliamentary variant is particularly useful for an analysis of the potential developments of the constitutional framework in Ukraine. Back.
Note 10: Stepan and Ezra N. Suleiman, "The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil," in H.E. Chehabi and Stepan, eds., Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 395. Back.
Note 11: Anne Stevens, The Government and Politics of France (Houndmills, England: Macmillan, 1992), 67. Back.
Note 12: Suleiman, "Presidentialism and Political Stability in France," in Linz and Valenzuela, eds. Back.
Note 13: The fragmentation of the political system of the Fourth Republic was compounded by the rejection of the entire nature of the regime by two major political groupings: the communists and the Gaullists. This issue is discussed in Stevens, 24-30. Back.
Note 15: Shugart and Carey also stress the importance of the timing of elections. When parliamentarian and presidential elections are held concurrently, the chances that the president will have considerable support in the assembly are much greater than in the case when the parliament is elected in the middle of a presidential term. If parliamentary elections are to be held concurrently or soon after the president is elected, one may expect political parties to organize into two major blocks and the president to have a majority, or at least enough seats to lead a governmental coalition. In this case, presidential popularity may contribute to the victory of his party, which otherwise would probably gain a smaller number of votes. The sequencing of elections in Ukraine has been quite the opposite -- both presidential elections in 1991 and 1994 were held after the parliamentary. This tendency can be preserved since the official term of the presidential office is five years, but four years for parliament. Back.
Note 16: A. Lytvyn, Politychna arena Ukrainy: Diyovi osoby ta vykonavtsi (Kyiv: Lybid', 1993). Back.
Note 17: The discussion of these problems is elaborated in Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 19: Stepan and Suleiman, 398. Back.
Note 20: Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine: Two Presidents, but No Settled Powers," unpublished paper, 23. Back.
Note 21: Although in the former parliament the majority defined by the number of seats (the group of 239) and the opposition (the national democratic block Narodna Rada) existed, the majority did not represent a coherent entity in relation to the president. It was composed of rather different interest groups formerly united by their affiliation with the Communist Party. Back.
Note 22: After the election of 1994 the leftist bloc consisted of members of the Communist Party (86 deputies), the Socialist Party (14), and the Peasant Party (18). It has about 120 deputies in a 450-seat parliament. The majority that can produce this parliament can only be an unstable and fragmented coalition.Wilson argues that in the beginning of his term, L. Kuchma's position in parliament was even weaker then L. Kravchuk's. Only his own "Interregional Group" and the "Unity" faction were his unambiguous supporters, but they only controlled 50 deputies (14.8 percent) out of 338 elected in spring 1994 (Wilson, 25). Now the position of the president in parliament is much stronger, partly due to the fact that subsequent by-elections brought supporters of the president into the parliament. Another reason for the strengthening of his support was the president's firm adherence to the policy of economic and political reforms. This position gave him the support of different groups of centrists and a significant part of the national democratic block in parliament. However, this support is far from enough to give him the stable support of majority in parliament. Most of the president's decrees and legislative initiatives in the sphere of reform of the economy are simply blocked by the left. Back.
Note 23: Stepan and Suleiman, 399. Back.
Note 24: Stephen Holmes, "The Postcommunist Presidency," East European Constitutional Review 2 (Fall 1993/Winter 1994), 39. Back.
Note 25: Stepan and Suleiman, 397. Back.
Note 28: Linz, 51-60; Stepan and Skatch, 1-22. Back.
Note 29: Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government," in Lijphart, ed., 143-149. Back.
Note 30: Stevens, 53-60. Back.
Note 31: Shugart and Carey, 123-27. Back.
Note 32: As it often appears in post-communist countries, the parliamentary majority that supports the president during his electoral campaign may turn against the president when the latter begins to act after election. Both Ukrainian presidents have encountered this problem. L. Kravchuk faced the hostile communist majority in the parliament, although during his electoral campaign the same majority represented his main organized support. L. Kuchma won the presidential election mainly due to the support of Eastern and Southern regions, but deputies from these regions now constitute his main opposition. Back.
Note 33: Ustina Markus, "Belarus Elects Its First President," RFE/RL Research Report (July 29, 1994), 1-7. Back.
Note 34: Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy (January 1994), 1-22. Back.
Note 36: The means by which the presidency can become a bone of contention for different parts of a society can be illustrated with the example of Ukraine. The presidential elections in Ukraine that were held in June 1994 had two rounds and seven candidates for the seat of president. After the first round of elections, two major candidates, L. Kravchuk and L. Kuchma, received 37.7 percent and 31.2 percent of votes respecitvely. The second round showed that the country was split by the presidential elections. One part of Ukraine -- territorially defined as the East -- voted only for L. Kuchma (here L. Kuchma received 79.0 percent, L. Kravchuk: 18.5 percent). The Western part of Ukraine voted predominantly for L. Kravchuk (L. Kravchuk: 87 percent, L. Kuchma: 10.9 percent). The general results were L. Kuchma: 52.1 percent, L. Kravchuk: 45.1 percent. As a result, the president represents one part of the population's interests and preferences. These are entirely opposite to those of the other group. It is not difficult to extrapolate that a president who has only a slight majority of supporters will have serious difficulties in performing his duties effectively in a country with no majoritarian tradition of the alteration of power. Fortunately, L. Kuchma has managed to gain support in the Western part of Ukraine. In the case of a Kravchuk victory, it would have been much more difficult for him to become a figure resting on much broader political support than only that of his own constituency. Back.
Note 38: Linz and Stepan, 255-93. Back.
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