Human Rights in Russia: What Can NGOs Do?

Human Rights in Russia: What Can NGOs Do?

March, 1997

This study addresses a policy issue playing an important role in the strenuous process of democratic transition in Russia: What can human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do to respond to a crisis in the observation of human rights and the hinderance of democratization reforms in the country?

Some observers in Russia, fierce critics and sympathetic observers alike, believe that due to internal incoherence and organizational weaknesses the human rights movement in Russia is not capable of seriously influencing government policies. Others have faith in the movement, and assert that things are not so dire. I claim that human rights NGOs in Russia can come up with an effective response only if they are able to update the movement's mission and take a leadership role in the promotion of democratic values; overcome confusion around the divisive issue of the primacy of political and civil rights vs. economic and social rights, including the role that human rights groups can play in providing remedies to the latter; work out a clear-cut and simple agenda, attractive to the public and responding to its needs; and radically change its strategy by shifting from monitoring and fixing individual cases of violations to policy work and law enforcement by developing an effective public interest law movement.

Indeed, institutional weaknesses do not allow the Russian human rights movement to realize these ambitious strategic goals at this time. It needs to undertake serious organizational development work which breaks down into the following important tasks: strengthening of the movement from within by becoming more professional and involving young people; drawing outside support from professionals such as lawyers, journalists, social workers, the intelligentsia, academia, and celebrities; building alliances with labor unions, mainstream media, and political parties; developing cooperation with religious organizations; clarification of the movement's attitude toward interaction with the government, in particular with the newly-created federal and regional human rights commissions; and finally, building short-term issue-oriented and long-term strategic coalitions with a broad range of NGOs, promoting a stronger civil society, and increasing the role of civic groups in the control of government practices and influencing the development and implementation of coherent human rights policy as an essential part of democratic transition of the country.

New Authoritarianism or a Difficult Road to Democracy?

Current developments in Russia in the seventh year of its post-Soviet history have prompted human rights activists to enter into heated and sometimes uncompromising debates about the role of the movement in democratic transition. The virtual halt of democratic reforms in the country since 1993, and of judicial and legislative reform in particular; a brutal war waged by the Russian government in Chechnya leading to the killing of an estimated 80,000 people on both sides, of whom 90 percent were civilians; ₂ growth of violence, police brutality, and militarization of the society; government-sanctioned discrimination of ethnic minorities; ₃ conditions in prisons and in the army which amount to torture; ₄ the suffering of some 2 million refugees and forced migrants; ₅ outright discrimination against women in the workplace and uncurbed domestic violence; ₆ widespread limitations of the freedom of movement; ₇ growing violations of the freedom of expression, access to and dissemination of information; ₈ continuing discrimination against sexual minorities; ₉ the suffering of millions of people as a result of wage and pension arrears -- all these troubling developments are not only in sharp contrast to the romantic expectations of August 1991 but a retreat from what was actually achieved by 1993.

Looking at this long list of government offenses against human rights, one should not be surprised that 1996 has also witnessed the departure of Sergei Kovalev from all governmental and parliamentary posts. ₁₀ Add to this the minuscule number of democrats in the State Duma, a lack of checks and balances to a non-transparent, unaccountable, and inefficient government run in a medieval manner by new and old elites, the growth of nationalistic and imperial rhetoric -- and you will not be surprised that many people believe that in the seventh year of its post-communist transition Russia is drifting towards a new authoritarianism. ₁₁ Others want to believe that despite painful setbacks the country is still moving ahead on a difficult and uneven road to democracy. ₁₂ "Blessed is he who believes," as a Russian saying goes. Faith alone is not enough, and that is why it is so important to look at what non-governmental organizations can do to change the situation, especially when the government is unable or unwilling to promote democracy and the rule of law.

The Russian human rights movement, consisting of some 250 groups, has resoundingly failed to substantially influence these developments or to mobilize effective public pressure to reverse the course of events. The obvious unpreparedness of the human rights movement and society at large to come up with an adequate response to these new challenges has again posed a famous century-old question: "What is to be done?"

Clarifying a Mission Before Navigating a Further Course

1. Reclaiming human rights and democracy for people. The human rights movement in Russia ought to make a serious effort to dramatically expand its public outreach and try to bring human rights back to the center of public and political discourse. Today very few, if any, political actors, parties, or public figures vocally express their concern about human rights or include them in their agendas. Russian society, unfortunately, has grown disillusioned about democracy and is tired of instability, the unpredictability of the future, crime and economic hardships, lies, arbitrariness, lack of accountability, and the ineptitude of government officials as well as the humiliating wealth of the nouveaux riches as compared with the impoverished life of the majority.

Unfortunately, all or most of the above has come to be directly linked to democracy in public opinion. Many people associate their troubles and the overall crisis in Russia with democracy, since President Yeltsin's government operates under a democratic banner and has given it lip service in all his speeches throughout his presidency. ₁₃ Human rights and democracy in the eyes of many people either remain abstract concepts having nothing to do with their lives, or another political game, a manipulative tool in the hands of greedy and selfish politicians. ₁₄ The hundreds of activists who can be found in almost every town of Russia and who continue to be committed to the ideals of democracy and human rights remain in a decisive minority.

This grim picture is not the fault of the "unenlightened" or backward Russian people. Democratic parties and activists have failed to develop and especially to deliver a democratic vision for a new Russia -- a new national idea based on democracy. It should be a vision attractive to, accepted by, and, most important, owned by people. Democratic leaders in 1992-93 tried to directly transplant Western values and political-economic approaches, not bothering to adapt to a country making a painful transition after centuries of tsarist authoritarian rule and seventy years of communist totalitarian control, both of which based their authority on ideological premises.

While human rights and democratic values undoubtedly have a universal character, concrete mechanisms of democratic institution building should be adapted to the particular situations of countries in transition. Democratic, popularly upheld visions, as well as avenues for participatory democracy, need to be developed in Russia. ₁₅ The demise of the official all-embracing communist ideology and the failure of democrats to develop and deliver a meaningful and attractive national vision of a democratic society have led to a dangerous vacuum which can be easily filled by nationalistic, chauvinistic ideas, followed by an increasing grip on power by radical groups, eventually leading to a fascist-type revenge. ₁₆ These tendencies, blended with a loss of collective identity in Russia, ₁₇ a widespread feeling of social insecurity, the collapse of familiar social institutions which provided mediocre yet more or less stable and comfortable social protection, and the emergence of unfamiliar, aggressive, and psychologically hostile social developments have led to a popular craving for a strong hand which would restore order, get rid of chaos, corruption, and crime and make life "more predictable and stable." ₁₈

In this respect, the task facing Russian democrats in general and human rights activists in particular is not an easy one. They need to develop and present a truly democratic alternative to the country in order to counterbalance the craving for an iron hand and reverse the perverted popular perception of democracy as chaos, corruption, criminalization, and a luxurious life for few and poverty for the rest. Through persistent and long-term efforts, human rights activists should be able to respond to the challenge and explain to their fellow citizens that Russia does not have a real democracy yet; that the concept has been abused; that true democracy in fact does mean order, but order based not on coercion but on the rule of law, government's accountability to the public, and an effective system of checks and balances between the branches of power; that democracy does protect constitutionally enshrined individual rights and freedoms; that an effective democratic system supplies the underprivileged with minimum social security, while market-driven economic growth and development provide equal opportunities, and generate incentives and support for individual entrepreneurship, thus opening opportunities for a more just economic and social system.

The most important and challenging task is to explain to people that it is they who are in charge of building democracy, not only Yeltsin, Lebed', or other members of the elite; that only through consistent popular efforts to exercise influence on government policies at all levels, creation of effective interest groups, viable civil society, and the development of mechanisms of public control and participation in decision-making will Russia, albeit painfully and not all at once, be able to develop democracy. Overcoming the deeply-rooted traditional Russian victim/rescuer mentality of dependency and empowering people for social change is not an easy job, but one which has to be done.

Therefore, the human rights movement should expand its mission to include the goal of reclaiming the notions of democracy and human rights for the people, the rehabilitation of these values from political abuse by the government (which does not respect them) and bringing these notions back to political discourse with the purpose of developing a democratic vision for the country and empowering people to own and realize it.

A leading Russian human rights NGO, the Moscow Helsinki Group, revived in May of 1996, draws upon the following reasoning in describing its plans to launch a regular research-analytical seminar "Perspectives of Russian Society's Development":

Expansion of human rights activity is impossible without an understanding of the main direction of development of the society's ideals within a broader social context. Particular difficulties in the strengthening of legal awareness in Russia can be attributed to the lack of ideology and moral values, adapted specifically to our country. Such an ideology has still to be developed. Of course, it is impossible to develop an ideology by order. However, focused efforts may create conditions beneficial for its formation. An independent seminar, uniting the best minds of democratic Russia... and creating a ground for a free discussion, will constitute one of such conditions. ₁₉

2. Working out a clear-cut agenda. Along with an ambitious goal to take a lead in the development of a democracy-based new vision for reforms, more immediate practical work on the mission must be done. The human rights movement needs to work out a clear-cut agenda, breaking it down into smaller pieces and single issues to make it more easily understood and grasped by many people and potential supporters who might better see how it is relevant to their lives and what role they personally could play in promoting this agenda. Examples of such concrete agenda pieces might be calls: to create domestic violence units in police stations; to amend the Criminal Code to make domestic assault a felony; to develop concrete programs of local economic development using the skills and qualifications of forced migrants; to create independent non-military commissions evaluating young men's claims for the right to conscientious objection from military service and in general put the military under civilian control; to provide real conditions for cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities, etc. These and similar mini-agendas could arguably better appeal to people and help generate volunteers, as opposed to what often sounds like abstract moralistic preaching or academic legalistic constructions. ₂₀

3. What rights to protect: life provides an answer? The discussion between proponents of focusing only on protection of classic "first generation" civil and political rights, and advocates of a more broad approach including "subsistence" social, economic, and cultural rights of the "second generation," has been going on for several decades. ₂₁ Russian activists and experts are no exception in this respect. While activities of the dissident movement for human rights in the 1960s-1980s were naturally aimed at the struggle for civil and political rights, which were brutally violated by the Soviet state, discussions about a need for a more inclusive character of human rights work started with the developments of Gorbachev's perestroika which brought, along with an improved record in the area of civil and political rights, serious economic and social problems. ₂₂

After the breakup of the Soviet Union the task of protecting civil and political rights and strengthening positive developments in this field through newly created state institutions and reform of the constitutional and legal system remained very urgent. This determined priorities in the mission and activities of the human rights movement in Russia in the early 1990s. However, Yeltsin's lack of consistent economic reform, government incompetence, massive spending on the war in Chechnya, the enormous burden of subsidies to the military-industrial complex and to inefficient state-run agriculture and obsolete industry, and the failure to stimulate the emergence of small and medium size businesses, etc., have led to the impoverishment of one-third of the population and colossal wage arrears. This situation has been exacerbated by the collapse of the welfare state institutions and health care system, lack of regulations in changing labor relations, and tremendous stratification of society. All of this has advanced social and economic "rights" to the top of the list of popular concerns. ₂₃ Even Yeltsin chose to term these problems not only as social and economic difficulties but as gross violations of human rights. ₂₄

Many NGOs have been unable to react to these developments adequately; a great deal of confusion has arisen around what can be considered "rights" and what human rights NGOs should do in this new situation. This has lead to more heated arguments and even antagonism in the human rights community around the issue of which rights are more important, reproducing a socially taboo discussion about "capitalism versus socialism." ₂₅ Increasingly, leading activists (such as Lyudmila Alexeeva, the new chair of the Moscow Helsinki Group) advocate the primacy of protection of social and economic rights. ₂₆

However, many people believe it should not be "either or" but rather "both," at least for the present when the socioeconomic crisis is acute and human suffering so intense. Activists and experts may argue endlessly whether a right to receive wages or pensions on time or to be laid off with unemployment benefits ₂₇ are indeed full-fledged rights or mere needs, but one thing is clear -- people are suffering and need help, especially when much of the allocated money is embezzled or misused. However, assistance should be provided with an understanding of major differences between the two sets of rights, both in terms of their nature and possible remedies. Some experts make a compelling argument that

unlike civil and political liberties which are generally `cost-free' and involve preventing government from depriving citizens of their rights, social and economic rights require the establishment of government policies and substantial investment of government funds -- whether by confiscation or taxation or printing money... In most wealthy countries of the world economic welfare is generated by a complex combination of government policy, the market and a rich network of religious and secular charities. It is not generated by "rights", constitutional or otherwise. ₂₈

Obviously, Russia has a long way to go, and no federal agencies' urgent efforts or special Presidential decrees can change the situation radically and quickly on a systemic level.

Others equally convincingly say that the two generations of rights are directly related to each other, both in theory and in everyday reality, and one cannot be secure without or at the expense of the other -- one cannot struggle to protect socioeconomic rights if one's political rights to freedom of assembly or freedom of expression are violated. On the other hand, a hungry person does not care much about an independent media or free elections. Human rights NGOs will be simply rejected by their constituencies if they completely ignore the dire situation with respect to socioeconomic needs. Moreover, experience shows that among the most effective human rights groups in Russia are those which try to combine both directions in their programmatic activities, such as the Ryazan chapter of the Memorial Society ₂₉ and the Perm Regional Center for Human Rights. ₃₀ This approach allows NGOs to be responsive to the most pressing needs of their local communities and to enjoy stronger support from their constituencies.

Good intentions and care for the needy are certainly not enough, and whether NGOs can actually achieve much in fighting the Hydra of socioeconomic crisis remains a big question. Actual systemic progress in alleviating this crisis (as opposed to helping individuals on a case-by-case basis) requires drastic changes in government policies and the development of private institutions, rather than writing new laws or protecting "rights."

Ideally, organizations other than human rights NGOs should be in place to respond to the socioeconomic challenge. While eventually these more appropriate types of non-governmental organizations -- such as humanitarian assistance groups, private charities, and churches (providing social protection and assistance) and political parties of a social democratic type and a strong labor movement (pressing for change in policies) -- will emerge and assume this task from the human rights movement, at the moment it is human rights groups who are not only called to do this work in response to popular demand but are probably the only available, albeit inadequate, resource in place. These other structures have yet to develop. It is also possible that some human rights NGOs will develop with time into something else (like the nucleus of new political parties or social protection charities) as they find their mission drifting away from their original one of protection of civil and political rights from government abuse.

Along with social and economic rights, a number of other "non-traditional" rights appear on the agenda of human rights NGOs today, such as the rights of women, consumers, ₃₁ and children, ₃₂ and cultural rights. ₃₃ Many activists and experts argue that while socioeconomic, consumer, labor, and other issues have more potential for public resonance as compared with traditional civil and political rights, it remains questionable whether an effort should be made at all to fold these issues and interests into a broad civil rights movement, or whether human rights NGOs in Russia should instead concentrate on their classic agenda and let new types of larger public movements emerge, such as solidarity or green-type movements. ₃₄ These arguments sound quite convincing, given limited resources and the inability of the Russian human rights movement to generate broad public support, as demonstrated in its efforts to stage opposition to the war Chechnya and discrimination against people of Caucasian origin. However, even with this approach, human rights groups ought to support these movements, recognize a commonality of interests, cooperate with them, and help them develop.

4. Redesigning a strategy: monitoring and fixing violations is not enough. Equally important, the human rights movement should amend its strategy and depart from merely concentrating on important but insufficient monitoring, reporting, protesting and addressing concrete cases of violations. If it wants to have a systemic effect on the national level, it should turn to the development of policy and legislative proposals as well as a public interest law movement. Human rights NGOs should look at the experiences of the environmental movement, which developed a National Program of Sustainable Development of Russia, and at the women's movement, with its National Plan of Action. Both national programs emerged not only from NGO activities but also as a result of the obligations of Russia as a signatory to the declarations of the United Nations conferences in Rio de Janeiro and Beijing. International human rights law and the newly acquired membership of Russia in the Council of Europe provide more than enough grounds for pressing the government on the basis of its international obligations: Russia has signed almost all international human rights declarations and conventions. ₃₅

In fact, a draft national program was developed in June 1994 by then-Chairman of the Presidential Commission Sergei Kovalev and another long-time dissident Vyacheslav Bakhmin, then Director of the Humanitarian Department of the Foreign Ministry. ₃₆ Both have resigned from the government since then, and the document remains a draft never discussed by the government or parliament. While some human rights NGOs will (and should) continue to monitor and expose violations, others need to more actively work on policy analysis and development and work out recommendations on particular aspects of human rights policy, such as the treatment of ethnic minorities, rights of refugees, army reform, prison reform, access to and freedom of information, judicial reform, etc.

Human rights NGOs should take a much more active stand in lobbying the passage of key laws in the State Duma, in particular the Law on the Ombudsman's Office ₃₇ and the Law on Alternative Civil Service, as well as amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedures and actual passage of the Code itself. They should exercise pressure on the State Duma to ratify key European Conventions which have been signed by the President but not ratified by the Duma: the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. They should also institute immediately a legally binding moratorium on the death penalty, in accord with Russia's obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. ₃₈

This, in conjunction with the development of new legislative initiatives and expert public assessment of other draft laws from the perspective of their adherence to human rights standards enshrined in the Russian Constitution and international human rights law, is a task of a paramount importance. Not only will this help to ensure adoption of key legal provisions and the prevention of a further slide toward non-democratic and anti-human rights legislation and policies, but it will also enable the human rights movement to play a more important role in the political process and be more respected. The experience of the women's movement demonstrates that when NGOs take a proactive position in the legislative process and possess a high level of legal expertise, the parliament will invite NGO representatives to serve as experts in drafting committees and include NGO proposals in draft laws. ₃₉ The package of programs of the revived Moscow Helsinki Group, presented in May 1996, gives hope that work in this direction will be developed. ₄₀ However, the efforts of one group, even a leading one, will not be enough to change the overall strategy of the movement. More consistent and concerted efforts in this direction are needed.

The enforcement of existing laws is one of the most painful problems in Russia. Enforcement through litigation procedures and the development of a strong public interest law movement are arguably the most important and promising directions for the human rights movement. Given the movement's limited resources, the virtual paralysis of an understaffed and underfinanced judicial system in Russia, and the halting of its reform since 1995, it is the litigation of precedent-making court cases and the development of publicity around these cases that appears the most promising and effective direction of strategy development for the human rights movement. ₄₁ Many leading activists have already recognized that the "center of gravity of the work is moving from rallies and demonstrations to court rooms." ₄₂ Given an unreformed judicial system and the fact that "many judges have not yet realized the main idea of the law-abiding state (a priority of human rights), and continue to consider their main task to protect interests of the state and fight crime," ₄₃ it is very important to create broad publicity and share a methodology of managing cases such as the acquittal of the conscientious objector Vadim Gesse, the release (although without dropping charges) of accused spy Alexander Nikitin, the decision of the Constitutional Court to grant a residence permit to newspaper journalist Veronika Kutsyllo, who was denied the permit by Moscow authorities, etc. Although these and a few lesser known cases, are very important landmarks, publicity work and the sharing of successful methodologies among human rights advocates has been inadequate and requires resolute efforts, as many activists agree. ₄₄ The experience of the consumers' rights movement and that of environmental organizations in pursuing public interest lawsuits and publicizing success stories is certainly something to learn from. ₄₅

Strengthening the Movement from Within

1. Building community support and a broader volunteer base. Today many, if not most, human rights NGOs are isolated from their respective communities. Deep-rooted public mistrust for any social activism, coming from the Soviet times of the existence of only officially-sanctioned fake activism, combined with the actual inability of human rights groups to respond to the real needs and concerns of ordinary people (which predominantly lie in the social and economic sphere, violation of labor rights, crime, discrimination against women in the workplace, and domestic violence) often lead to lack of public support, the absence of volunteers beyond a core group of permanent members, and in general a negative public attitude. This results in the absence of broad public support which could serve as leverage for pressing authorities to adopt or change policies. The ordinary person sees human rights groups as crazy or eccentric people, at best, or as people engaging in mysterious activities for their own gain. Coupled with information about Western partners or, even worse, grants, it sometimes leads to suspicion about spying for foreign countries and creates a completely hostile attitude. The massive government propaganda campaign against Sergei Kovalev and other activists made many people accept the thesis that being a human rights advocate means to be unpatriotic, to act against your own country. ₄₆ A slogan of the Russian anti-war movement, "peace is patriotic," borrowed from the U.S. Vietnam-era anti-war movement, was not heard by the public -- largely due to the media boycott of the movement.

We have already discussed the need to depart from the classic narrow mandate of protecting only civil and political rights and turn to the protection of a broad range of rights and needs of people, be they political, social, economic, cultural, or other. Human rights NGOs should be accepted by members of local communities as something they can personally benefit from, rely on, and claim as their own organization. It will not only attract volunteers, but broader popular support which in turn will give NGOs much more credibility with the government and the media. After all, governments increasingly understand that they depend on public support (as Russia seems to stand firmly on the path of popular democratic elections).

2. Closing the generation gap: involving young people. Sadly, most human rights activists come from the older generation of political activists and the dissident movement of the 1970s and 1980s. While they bring wisdom, experience, expertise, commitment, and high moral qualities and values, the movement lacks a new generation of activists, who could provide continuity, contribute their energy and new visions and skills (such as knowledge of computers, the Internet, finance, and management), and spread human rights ideas in their generation and recruit more people. The movement badly needs fresh blood, and poor health and even the passage of some outstanding leaders of the human rights cause in Russia only confirms this. What can be done? In the long-term, we can hope that through development of human rights courses in high schools and universities a new generation of young people committed to these values and willing to make their contribution will emerge. In more immediate terms, however, at least two ways can be discussed.

First, one can look at a possibility of developing relations with and assisting various youth NGOs, which mostly concern themselves now with the social protection of young people, employment issues and cultural activities, and often lack both a coherent mission and organizational expertise. Human rights groups can nurture fans and allies, bringing young people from youth organizations into their own programs and organizations. ₄₇

Secondly, mutually beneficial cooperation with universities should be developed. Human rights NGOs should approach deans' offices of universities with proposals to launch a series of lectures/seminars on human rights, while in exchange a university would agree to organize student internships in human rights groups. The most obvious choice would be law schools, journalism schools, and political science and history departments. ₄₈ Environmental NGOs have already successfully done these sorts of projects in Moscow and other cities. ₄₉ The problems of effective management of internship programs, of paying interns, and other possible concerns do not appear to be insurmountable.

The emergence of a few young leaders in the human rights movement is so far an exception which only proves the rule of a generation gap. Still, the inspirational work of such people as Andrei Blinushov of Ryazan Memorial, Andrei Lukhovitskii of Moscow Memorial's Youth Center, Veronika Marchenko and Lyubov' Alenicheva of the Mother's Right Foundation sets precedents and gives hope that a new generation can carry the torch.

3. Lay people turning professional: training of activists and staff. Many human rights activists, being very motivated and committed to human rights and democratic values, lack necessary skills, such as organizational, management, finance, public relations, legal, coalition building, conflict resolution, advocacy work, human rights violations monitoring, report writing, field work (especially in dangerous situations of conflicts and massive violations of rights), etc. ₅₀ A number of successful training programs were realized in 1995-96 by several NGO development collectives such as the Charities Aid Foundation and the Golubka Center. However, they lack the capacity to respond to existing needs. It is very important to expand existing training programs and make them truly responsive and tailored to the needs of recipients. These programs should not be superficial, standard. three-day long workshops on "NGO development" (as many newly-emerged trainers deliver in Russia these days) but rather a continuous series of training programs, addressing a range of issues and delivering specific needed skills.

Internships in (or exchanges with) other Russian and international organizations which can share their success in a particular area of interest or a campaign have yet to be organized. Unfortunately, most overseas NGO exchanges and training programs have not been successful from the participants' point of view.Their concrete interests are most often not matched with the hosting organization's experience; exchanges quite often turn into mere visits of courtesy, and the really useful contacts are usually established by participants themselves outside of the program . ₅₁ Not surprisingly, knowing all this, many human rights activists do not bother to respond to invitations to take part in such exchanges.

A lack of English skills is another problem often not taken into account by organizers of such exchanges who would in fact do better in hiring an interpreter than bringing in people who are English-speaking but not committed to NGO and democracy work and more interested in tourism, yet sufficient for the organizers' reports about "deliverables." Well-developed, practical manuals and training materials adapted to Russian realities are also very much needed, as opposed to numerous poorly translated standard Western materials full of generalities about democracy, civil society, and fundraising from individuals, which are pouring into Russia these days through the framework of Western technical assistance programs.

4. Strengthening the ranks: involving professionals. Most human rights NGOs are represented by small collectives of overburdened volunteers or part-time workers, eaking a living from several other jobs, and often burned out. While it is important to expand membership and the volunteer base, help from professionals who can do part-time work or assist with particular projects is very important and could make the life of human rights activists easier while adding professionalism and credibility to their work.

These people include lawyers, journalists, employees of public relations agencies, academics who can help write reports and do research and sociological work, doctors, therapists and social workers who can help with assistance to refugees, victims of violence, and prisoners/detainees. Alexander Gorelik, executive director of the Krasnoyarsk-based Legal Protection Foundation, and chair of the department of criminal law at Krasnoyarsk University, testifies: "We should emphasize a high value of involving professional lawyers in human rights work when they fulfill a role of independent experts-consultants, providing their assessment of cases of human rights violations. Further human rights actions (media campaign, protests, etc.) turn out to be more effective when such documents are at hand." ₅₂

Ideally, it should be seen by members of local communities as prestigious to help human rights NGOs. While the public image of NGOs in Russia is far from such an ideal now, developing relations with professionals and recruiting their support should be an important goal. Compensation for their input, given their relatively high wages (especially of lawyers) is a problem. However, the experiences of several NGOs from different regions prove that pro bono work of lawyers is possible, especially as legal consultants to those who are not able to afford a lawyer. ₅₃ Along with pro bono or low-paid work of the most committed people, other avenues for enlisting professionals can be researched, such as earmarking portions of Western grants specifically for their compensation as well as the covering of professionals' work for NGOs by their employers in the form of a for-profit organization's (a law firm, a PR agency, a newspaper) donation.

5. Building a truly effective network within the movement. The human rights movement, once considered a leader in building civil society in the Soviet Union and Russia, ₅₄ has experienced a certain decline in recent years. One of the reasons for this (in addition to confusion surrounding mission and the generation gap) is ongoing strife between human rights groups and an inability to work together, despite common values and years of shared experiences. This most obviously and bitterly manifests itself in Moscow. The human rights movement ought to overcome individual differences between Moscow leaders and their respective organizations and get rid of an unhealthy competition for Western grants that results in a lack of trust, secrecy, control of contacts, struggles for influence, duplication of efforts, and other destructive patterns. ₅₅ One possible remedy could be the organization of a singular or ongoing "round table" of all leading groups with the facilitation of an experienced mediator or conflict resolution expert, where groups could work out common principles and their interaction/cooperation strategy. They do not have to like or agree with each other, but for the sake of the human rights cause they need to learn to talk and listen to each other, exchange information and cooperate. The creation of a Coordination Council of Human Rights Organization of the CIS countries, envisioned at the Moscow Helsinki Group conference in May, ₅₆ could serve such a purpose, if it proves to be inclusive, open to all interested parties, and not dominated by any of the factions. Of course, there are natural differences between different organizations and their leaders, and there will always be conflicts resulting from these differences. It is not that conflicts should be eliminated whatsoever (as if it were possible) but rather that groups learn to manage them in a constructive way and keep communication channels open.

I believe that Western NGO-partners and donors have a special role in resolving this issue and may even introduce certain conditions on their assistance. At least they should talk with all parties involved and with each other, and gather information and share it, at least in order to avoid duplication of efforts and double funding. Hope exists that provincial groups which are far less prone to leadership struggles and ambition rivalries and able to work simultaneously with all Moscow-based opponents will play a constructive mediation role in this vital process. ₅₇

6. Overcoming a paternalistic legacy: development of partnership relations between Moscow-based groups and regional organizations. Today Moscow-based groups are more experienced, better equipped and exist in a more beneficial environment as compared with provincial organizations, which not only cope with a lack of resources but often work in a rather conservative and even repressive environment. This, combined with better access to Western funding, has lead to inequality between Moscow-based and regional organizations. This has resulted in a paternalistic behavioral pattern of Moscow groups when they act as "elder brothers," or as brokers between Western donors, NGOs, and Russian regional groups. This support from Moscow is indeed needed and motivated by a genuine desire to help, but often Moscow groups exploit the mantra of "regional NGO development," very popular with Western donors, and get their portion of funds without having worked out effective development programs. Almost all Moscow groups now want to develop and educate their provincial colleagues. What is in fact needed is equal cooperation between them on concrete projects and around various issues, and the direct involvement of regional leaders in decisions concerning development of national strategies and programs and distribution of funds. Their representatives should also be more actively used as advisers to Western foundations, which rely too much on their Moscow contacts.

It will be instuctive to turn to the experiences of the environmental and women's movements, which have been able to create effective horizontal networks for the free flow of information exchange and partnership cooperation on a national level around particular issues, where representatives of regional organizations have an equal say in strategic and everyday decision making -- in the Socio-Ecological Union and the Independent Women's Forum, respectively. ₅₈ In a recent report from a field trip to several regions of Russia, Lyudmila Vakhnina of the Russian-American Small Grants Program was impressed with "a non-rigid associated network structure of the Independent Women's Forum, having strong groups in many cities." ₅₉ Many matters could be addressed through the joint efforts of Moscow-based and regional groups, including refugee issues, prison reform, human rights education, mechanisms of interaction with the local authorities, recruiting youth, domestic violence, etc.

On a different note, Moscow-based NGOs need to make special efforts to provide protection to those provincial activists who suffer from local government repression, ₆₀ organize wide publicity of such cases and bring in professional legal support. Special efforts should be made to raise the prestige of provincial activists in their communities through media publicity, talking to the local governments and legislative bodies, and through their inclusion in the regional Commissions on Human Rights. The provision of regional groups with equipment, literature, and funding should be a priority.

Growing Beyond the Limits of the Movement

1. Cooperation with other NGOs: building a stronger "third sector" and civil society. The human rights movement badly needs allies and broad support if it is to play a more influential role in society. Human rights groups have to overcome the notorious separation between "real" human rights people who do serious work, and "newcomers" dealing with broader issues of rights and needs that are seen as less serious and less important. The movement needs to build issue-oriented as well as strategic long-term coalitions and alliances with groups dealing with "other" rights and needs, such as the women's movement, organizations working with refugees, consumers' rights, youth organizations, groups working in support of the disabled and children, environmentalists, gay and lesbian organizations, ethnic minorities' organizations, Afghan and Chechen war veterans, etc. ₆₁ Other parts of the NGO community have already built links with each other in many places and often work together as a united independent civic sector on issues of common interest. ₆₂ Assisting these groups in their development and learning from them will help human rights organizations emerge from a certain isolation, develop a broader view of society and occupy an appropriate place in the Russian NGO community. It will also enable them to expand their human rights outreach and find skillful and credible allies who often have more influence in their communities and on the governments.

While this important process of cross-sectoral cooperation has not yet developed on a large scale, there is some evidence of progress in this sphere. In Perm, the Regional Human Rights Center created a new organization called the Civic Chamber in April 1996, specifically aimed at providing consultative and training support to and cooperation with other NGOs. In Ryazan the local Memorial chapter, in cooperation with other human rights groups and an independent trade union, established an Open Society Center in October 1995, which, among other activities, provides consultations and training for NGOs and assists in the formation of a club of local NGOs. ₆₃ The Lipetsk Human Rights Society actively participated in the creation of a regional NGO association in 1996. ₆₄

The anti-war movement to stop the massacre in Chechnya was one of the rare examples of successful cooperation between human rights groups and a broad range of other NGOs. ₆₅ Lyudmila Vakhnina of the Human Rights Small Grants Program observed in her report that in places where different types of groups working with various rights and needs have understood the complementary character of their efforts, good prospects for the creation of "multi-functional" human rights centers may develop. ₆₆

Building strong local public interest coalitions with less obvious NGO allies, such as social protection groups and health issues NGOs (which together comprises about 90 percent of all NGOs in Russia) will provide the human rights movement with effective leverage on the government. Creating joint NGO mechanisms of public control of the government, lobbying government together, working on policy issues, legislation, law enforcement, and in general promoting stronger civil society, rule of law, and public participation in the political process and decision making could bring the human rights movement to a whole new level of development. In addition to the practical value of such cooperation, human rights groups can be driven by a belief that observation of human rights and development of a dynamic independent civic sector are both indispensable parts of and prerequisites to a democratic society.

Effective cooperation with ethnic minority organizations, while certainly not a new idea, ₆₇ remains to be developed. It can become another important source of mutual strengthening and recruitment of a large number of supporters, as violation of the rights of minorities is one of the most acute problems in Russia, and often their members are left alone in their struggle for human dignity and security.

2. Creation of an alliance with the independent labor unions. Labor unions appear to be major potential allies of the human rights NGOs, as their mission is to protect the rights and interests of workers. Lyudmila Alexeeva, who worked for several years with the Free Trade Unions Institute, is the most vocal proponent of strategic cooperation with labor unions. In Russia, where social and economic rights have come to be the most violated "rights," the role of trade unions as a democratic mechanism for the protection of workers' interests will grow. Their role will possibly also increase due to unavoidable massive lay-offs expected in 1997-98, and as a result of increasing labor problems in the private sector which occur under conditions of underdeveloped contract law allowing for massive violations of workers' rights.

The fall of 1996 witnessed an unprecedented increase of workers' strikes and rallies in protest of wage arrears. An estimated 15 million workers, including members of the 3 million-strong independent unions, took part in protest actions after several years of relative passivity. Human rights NGOs now have a unique chance to join with this powerful force to both advance their own agenda and support the formation of a broad and politically well-articulated labor movement, which will then be better able to advance the protection of workers' social and economic interests.

Human rights advocates have already missed a similar opportunity to use a wave of workers' protests in the late 1980s when massive miners' strikes shook the government of Gorbachev's Prime Minister Ryzhkov. Andrei Blinushov, chair of the Ryazan Memorial, reflects on this experience:

A movement similar to Polish Solidarity could have emerged in Russia then. Powerful, democratic, popular, headed by labor activists and liberal politicians. But, alas, KGB agents succeeded in their dirty work, fulfilling their task to prevent the unification of the workers' movement with the democratic one by all possible means. And, most important, leaders of democratic movements, former dissidents didn't realize a need to unite with labor activists, a need for a long-term and laborious work on creation of truly independent trade unions of democratic orientation. The result is self-evident (elections in 1993 and 1995). ₆₈

It is very likely that by supporting unions in their struggle for economic and labor rights, human rights groups will be able to convert union members into active civil liberties proponents. There are already some inspiring examples of fruitful cooperation on the regional level between human rights groups and trade unions, in particular a two-year old alliance of the Ryazan Memorial and the strongest local independent union of river sailors. In 1996, their Open Society Center organized a training program for 18 leaders of free trade unions from all over Russia,with the aid of Polish "Solidarity." ₆₉ "A time has come to unite," believes Blinushov. "We are sure that through joint efforts we will be able to create effective system of non-governmental protection of fundamental rights of our fellow citizens, make our contribution to the building of a normal civil society in Russia." ₇₀

Independent labor unions may well be able to share some of their own successful experiences with human rights groups, making this cooperation a two-way street. Labor unions in some areas have successfully used litigation procedures, changing their strategy from street protest actions to procedures in the court rooms. ₇₁

Another aspect of importance, coalition building with labor unions is preventing a co-optation of labor by the Communists or the most radical nationalist groups who are trying to use workers' anger and exhausted patience to win them over. In fact, the openly fascist Russian National Unity party tried to build a nationalistic workers' movement jointly with an independent union. ₇₂

3. Developing relationships with religious organizations. Yet another major potential and still unembraced opportunity for the human rights movement to build alliances are religious organizations and leaders, including liberal priests in the Russian Orthodox Church. There are many success stories of spiritually-based human rights and non-violence movements, such as the movement for civil rights in the United States led by Martin Luther King, Jr., or the non-violent resistance of Quakers. Orthodox priests could play a big role in spreading the message of human rights and dignity among ethnic Russians, who constitute 80 percent of the country's population. However, the Russian Orthodox Church remains a rather conservative institution, not having gone through a badly needed process of repentance for cooperation with the Soviet government, or a purification of KGB-associated priests, and is largely seen by the public as a semi-government agency. It has lost the traditions of public service, and support for the cause of human rights among its priests is very rare and needs to be widely publicized. ₇₃

Several human rights NGOs were formed by Christian believers who base their activity on spiritual values. ₇₄ Minority Christian churches such as Evangelical Protestants as well as mullahs and rabbis appear more active than the Russian Orthodox Church in addressing human rights and social service issues as well as their public opposition to war and violence. This is not surprising, given the decades of their struggle for freedom of religion in Russia under conditions of domination by the Russian Orthodox Church, which is notorious for its intolerance of minority Christian churches and foreign confessions. Representatives of foreign confessions have turned out to be the most active in providing assistance to and in some cases even taking a lead in human rights and anti-war actions. ₇₅

4. Addressing society through the mainstream media. While it may sound trivial, effective work with the media is one of the central issues on which human rights groups should concentrate in order to reach out to the society and acquire some measure of influence with the government. The mainstream media currently pays very little attention to human rights. ₇₆ At the same time, people in Russia still read newspapers and journals and watch television, considering them independent from the government. Human rights groups make some outreach efforts through their newsletters and journals aimed primarily at fellow activists, ₇₇ occasional articles in mainstream journals and newspapers ₇₈ (which have lately proven to be more difficult to publish), ₇₉ a radio program here and a TV show there. ₈₀ All in all, human rights issues are not even close to the center of public attention and are not seen as important news by the mass media.

Energetic efforts to get the message to the public in a creative, non-didactic, and non-moralistic way through the mainstream media is a task of key importance. The help of professional journalists and public relations specialists is crucial both for the development of aggressive media outreach campaigns and for their actual realization. Activists need to learn how to create a newsworthy event and press-conferences, and to engage in the more challenging job of patient cultivation of relationships with journalists, editors, and producers over long periods of time to address human rights concerns in a more sustained way and be regarded authoritatively. These steps will result in the media's coming to human rights activists for information and quotes on particular topics.

Lately, some promising developments have given hope for change in this vital area. The independent news Agency for Social Information (ASI), well-known for its detailed and professional coverage of human rights issues in weekly news releases sent to over 100 mainstream media and information agencies, struck an agreement with the liberal Obshchaya gazeta in July 1996. It allows ASI to have a weekly column covering the activities of NGOs.

Several young, popular journalists committed to human rights have been promoted recently in the media: Masha Gessen has a regular page in the very popular, respected, and liberal journal Itogi, Nadezhda Azhgikhina has her own column in the liberal Nezavisimaya gazeta, while Leya Lyubomirskaya, formerly of ASI, has recently joined the most popular Moscow radio station, Ekho Moskvy. All these developments should be fully exploited.

5. Recruiting support from leading intellectuals, creative intelligentsia, and celebrities. The dissident human rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s and opposition to the Soviet regime was led by intellectuals, writers, and scholars. While one may argue that intellectuals in Russia today have ceased to be seen as prophets while society drifts toward consumerist values, these people remain largely an untapped resource. Many leading intellectuals who were public figures and quite vocal during glasnost' and perestroika are not speaking out today, probably being confused and disillusioned themselves and not wanting to criticize the government for fear of undermining its position vis-à-vis the communists. Recruiting the older generation of intellectuals (such as the writer Fazil Iskander and the poet Bulat Okudzhava) as well as younger popular TV, cinema, and musical figures (such as rock stars Yuri Shevchuk and Andrei Makarevich or TV show host Yulia Men'shova) is important for public outreach and increased credibility.

6. Development of educational programs on a national scale. Experience as well as sociological data show disappointingly low levels of general public awareness of legal issues and human rights as well as a frightening ignorance among the police, the military, prison workers, social workers, government officials and even court workers. ₈₁ The human rights movement has been talking for a long time about the need to engage actively in educational efforts. There has been some success in developing high school programs, especially in cooperation with youth groups. ₈₂ However, serious work on the national scale has yet to be done. Recently, several organizations have tried to fill the gap. ₈₃ While education takes a lot of resources and will bear fruit only in the distant future, it is a very important and worthy part of human rights agenda.

7. Working with political parties. Today most human rights NGOs avoid cooperation with political parties, driven by a suspicion of the possibility of co-optation and manipulation and sharing public disgust over political corruption. In turn, parties do not appear much interested in cooperation with NGOs, as they do not see NGOs as an influential political force. However, as some observers argue, democratic parties and the human rights movement not only have common values and goals (protection of citizens' rights and interests and public control of the government), but also need each other. Democratic political parties lack programs of concrete action that would appeal to voters and restore their credibility after the shameful compromise of supporting Yeltsin in the presidential elections, while NGOs need a more effective leverage to influence political processes in the parliament and government. ₈₄ While NGO activists should not necessarily become professional politicians, bringing human rights back into the public agenda requires a closer interaction with parties.

Among parties currently represented in the parliament, only the Yabloko party of Grigorii Yavlinskii consistently speaks of human rights protection as its political priority, although regular and effective interaction with human rights NGOs has not actually taken place. ₈₅ Yegor Gaidar's Democratic Choice of Russia, a liberal group that just three years ago was the most popular democratic party, co-chaired by the champion of human rights Sergei Kovalev, has lost considerable influence and is not represented in parliament.

8. Developing international cooperation. The last but not least venue through which Russian human rights NGOs can increase their role and influence is international cooperation, with intergovernmental organizations in particular. Russian groups currently communicate with European and U.N. structures mostly through their international NGO counterparts such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Currently no Russian NGOs have a status with the United Nations. ₈₆ Having developed regular professional relations with the human rights agencies of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, providing comments on periodic reports of the Russian government, Russian NGOs will undoubtedly increase their role and authority both on the international arena and at home.

Social Partnership versus Confrontation: Dilemma of Interaction with the Government

The efforts described above may help human rights movement develop effective leverage for influencing the government. Stronger from within, cooperating with other NGOs and labor unions, enjoying wider public support, reinforced by young people, covered by the media, having influential allies among intelligentsia, celebrities, political parties and abroad, the human rights movement will much more likely be able to influence the government and overcome the barrier separating grassroots activities from the political life of the elites." How exactly this influence can be exercised and in what forms, and how closely NGOs should get involved in interaction with the government, are controversial questions being actively debated in the Russian non-governmental community.

It has become quite popular lately in Russia to use the term "social partnership" referring to a desirable collaboration between NGOs and the government, and there have been many theoretical discussions about possible effective models of such cooperation based on the experiences of different countries. ₈₇ However, whatever interesting theoretical findings will emerge as a result of these discussions, it appears that the term itself may be misleading as in Russia, where no strong civil society has developed yet, a truly equal cooperation between these two sectors cannot exist. If NGOs, especially human rights groups, which lack effective leverage and resources, choose to work as "partners" with the government then they will inevitably lose their independence and end up being controlled, used, and manipulated by the government, if not merged with government agencies,. At the very best, government structures will not hesitate to dump the laborious and unrewarding social work they are charged with on the shoulders of already overworked NGOs without any compensation, as has already happened in various places around Russia.

A new law proposed by NGOs on bidding procedures between NGOs, state agencies, and private companies competing for state budget money allocated for social programs is an innovative approach to imposing objective and transparent competitive mechanisms for government support to NGOs implementing social programs on a professional level. While State Duma members still have to discuss a draft proposal sitting on their desks since the spring of 1995, the Moscow City Duma has already adopted its own law, and Ekaterinburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Novosibirsk seem to be determined to follow Moscow's example. ₈₈

Too often, it seems, the discussion centers around NGOs' need to receive support or, as it is more politically correctly referred to, "resources from the government," and what NGOs would have to give up in exchange for such "resources." Indeed, most NGOs operate in very difficult conditions, having to pay often the same amounts as businesses for rent and utilities. Given a virtual absence of local charity and an inability of impoverished people to make individual donations, exacerbated by a lack of laws on tax incentives for donors, NGOs indeed appear to be heavily dependent on the mercy of governments which can arbitrarily grant them certain tax exemptions or free or discounted office space. This dire situation naturally pushes many NGOs to approach the government for support -- and straight intothe trap of complete dependency, where they act as beggars ready for almost any sort of compromise, thus virtually eliminating any basis for independence. ₈₉

NGOs need to act from a completely different perspective, appearing (and being!) an equal but independent party in a dialogue with the government and using various leverages which would make the government either interested in providing resources in exchange for unique professional expertise and skills (this may work only for service-type social protection NGOs which serve a particular group of "clients" and have a certain "technology" which the government does not have) ₉₀ or give in to coordinated NGO and public pressure to create favorable legal conditions for NGO activity, eliminating the basis for dependency on the arbitrary will of officials and favoritism. This approach seems to be less a kind of "social partnership" but rather one of a difficult interaction with changing levels of involvement at different times on different issues, often from a position of strength and employing technology, public support and negative media exposure of the govern-ment's abusive practices or inconsistent policies. At any rate, NGOs oriented toward social transformation through changing, preventing, or enforcing certain policies of the government (classic human rights NGOs are exactly of this kind), as opposed to service-type NGOs, by definition often happen to be in opposition to the government on certain issues. What kind of equal "social partnership" with the government can there be on such issues as stopping massive violations of human rights in Chechnya, or in the case of a government-sponsored and coordinated policy of discrimination against people from the Caucasus and Central Asia? In such cases the term acquires a cynical and dubious quality.

There should not be a complete withdrawal from communication with the government, ₉₁ however, as some suggest, after the bitter experiences of Sergei Kovalev. His experience created for many activists a moral and practical dilemma concerning interaction with the government, be it on the federal or regional level. Many call for non-cooperation with government as a matter of principle. However, despite Kovalev's painful moral compromises and violation of his personal integrity, he must be admired for what he was able to do for human rights in Russia by staying in the government for almost three years. There is no choice, argue others -- we have to cooperate with the government if we want to change the situation. A practical and realistic solution that would not undermine important moral principles, as opposed to an "all-or-nothing" approach is possible.. Communication channels should in any case stay open, otherwise NGOs will simply not be able even to state their position to the government, not to speak of influencing policy. There are forms of interaction which do not require compromises over principal issues. Petitioning the government, lobbying for new laws, presenting the results of monitoring and analysis, exposing government abuses, and providing policy recommendations and expert assessment are all various forms of a dialogue ranging from a strong opposition to the government policies to "constructive cooperation" on certain questions that would allow NGOs to maintain their independence and critical stance. ₉₂

Concrete possible avenues of interaction or engagement with the government have been actively discussed at various fora. Relationships with the newly-formed Presidential Commission on Ruman Rights, now headed by Professor Vladimir Kartashkin, a scholar and former legal advisor to the United Nations human rights program, ₉₃ pose a dilemma for many NGO leaders. ₉₄ Kartashkin, unlike Kovalev, has never been active in non-governmental organizations. Many activists believe he is manipulated by the government and do not trust him, because he served in the U.N. for many years in the Soviet times representing and defending the official line since 1965. Mistrust grew especially strong after Kartashkin announced in early November that the Commission's primary goal would be the protection of rights of ethnic Russians in the "near abroad," or CIS countries (a popular theme of nationalist parties and, for the last three years, of the government, denounced by many activists as a pretext to avoid promoting changes in Russia). ₉₅ However morally difficult and inefficient it may prove, it is still important to lobby and interact with Kartashkin's commission, since it is the main (and virtually the only) federal government office now in charge of human rights.

Secondly, regional human rights commissions are to be formed jointly by Kartashkin and regional administrations. In his May 1996 decree in support of human rights NGOs, President Yeltsin encouraged regional authorities to consult with human rights groups during the formation of these commissions. ₉₆ This may be very important, given the increased autonomy in the regions through the process of decentralization of power in Russia and large scale violations of human rights in the provinces. As Lyudmila Alexeeva has said, the further from Moscow, the more human rights abuses there are. ₉₇ Some provincial groups have already embarked on interaction with regional administrations in establishment of regional human rights commissions, such as in Lipetsk. ₉₈ Some regional leaders, in particular in Tomsk and Perm, have been recommended by the Moscow Helsinki Group as chairs of their respective regional commissions. ₉₉ However, controversy surrounding the creation of the regional commissions has recently been mounting as many activists are afraid of total control by administrators and a resulting loss of independence and credibility in the eyes of the public. The process of the establishment of the Moscow city commission has been the most controversial, as Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov's administration is notorious for its control of the city newspapers and TV, outright discrimination of ethnic minorities, and police brutality. ₁₀₀

The growing power of Anatoly Chubais may be another possible avenue to lobby human rights interests in the federal government. Despite controversy amidst alleged corruption in the course of unpopular non-transparent and clientelist privatization, in the current government he remains the only democrat of the first post-Soviet reform team and a leading member of the Democratic Choice of Russia party.

On the regional level, in addition to the newly created human rights commissions, Public Chambers may be a possible tool for lobbying authorities. Created in 1994 by President Yeltsin with a consultative status as a counterbalance to the conservative parliament, the Public Chamber on the federal level has virtually no role because of irreconcilable differences among its members -- political parties not elected to the Duma. However, in quite a few regions Public Chambers have been able to become politically influential, in particular in Ekaterinburg, Omsk, Novosibirsk, and other places. Yet another tool has been invented by active NGOs in some regions, such as Tomsk and Nizhnii Novgorod, namely an NGO council with a consultative status with the governor. ₁₀₁ Every opportunity of this sort should be used to pressure the government and build coalitions.

Conclusion

The slide into authoritarianism in Russia, the deterioration of human rights there since 1993, and the virtual paralysis of all federal institutions responsible for the protection of human rights represent serious challenges in Russia. However, if the human rights movement is able to respond by vigorously increasing its organizational capacity and in- fluence on government policy and practices, it will have good prospects for turning into an influential public and political force, not only improving the situation of human rights in Russia but also playing an important role in the overall democratic transition of the country.

Footnotes

Note 1: An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Columbia University in November 1996, co-sponsored by the Harriman and East Central European Institutes and the Center for the Study of Human Rights. I would like to thank the following people with whom I discussed the paper and who shared with me their insights and friendly critique: Edward Kline, Gwynne Oosterbaan, Dr. Peter Juviler, and Natalia Taubina. Very special thanks should go to Cathy Fitzpatrick with whom I have had an enriching series of discussions on the subject and who provided very thoughtful and timely comments to the paper. I am also deeply grateful to fellow human rights activists in Russia whose dedication, commitment, and hard work serve as a source of inspiration and hope. Back.

Note 2: Sergei Kovalev, a leading Russian human rights advocate and formerly the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, called massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law by the Russian government in Chechnya "unprecedented since the times of Stalin's repressions." Presidentskaya Komissiya po pravam cheloveka, O sobludenii prav cheloveka i grazhdanina v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1994-96 gg. (Moscow: Presidentskaya Komissiya po pravam cheloveka, February 1996), Chapter 2. This report of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights is often referred to as the "Kovalev Report." An English translation can be found at: http://www.wdn.com/asf/hrrepi.html. Back.

Note 3: See Kovalev Report, Chapter 4; Human Rights Watch, Crime or Simply Punishment? Racist Attacks by Moscow Law Enforcement (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 1995); Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Torture and Ill-Treatment in Detention, the Police, the Prison, and the Army (London: Amnesty International, October 1996). Back.

Note 4: On the situation in Russian prisons see Kovalev Report, Chapter 6; Moscow Center for Prison Reform, In Search of Solution: Crime, Criminal Policy and Prison Facilities in the FSU (Moscow: Moscow Center for Prison Reform, 1996); Report of special rapporteur Nigel S.Radley in Prava cheloveka v Rossii -- Mezhdunarodnoe izmerenie no. 1 (1995), 305; Andrei Blinushov, Does Russian Prison Fit the "European House" on the Internet, in glas.hrights e-mail conference, entry of June 19, 1996, in glasnet.ru network. On violation of human rights in the Russian army see Kovalev Report, Chapter 5; Veronika Marchenko, Takaya armiya.... (St. Petersburg: Norma, 1995); Amnesty International. Back.

Note 5: See Kovalev Report, Chapter 9; home page of the Committee for Civic Assistance: http: //www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/; Human Rights Watch, Refugees and Internally Dispossessed Persons in the CIS (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1996); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Commitment without Compliance: Refugees in RF (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, May 1996); Protecting Eurasia's Dispossessed (New York: Soros Foundation, 1996). Back.

Note 6: See Human Rights Watch, Neither Job, nor Justice: State Discrimination against Women in Russia (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1996); U.S. Department of State, Report on Observance of Human Rights in Russia, 1996; various publications by Anastasiya Posadskaya, a leading activist and expert in the Russian women's movement. Back.

Note 7: See Kovalev Report, Chapter 8. Back.

Note 8: See Joseph Dzyaloshinskii, ed., Rossiiskaya zhurnalistika: svoboda dostupa k informatsii (Moscow: Judicial Chamber on Information Disputes, 1996); Glasnost' Defense Foundation materials; Committee to Protect Journalists, Briefing on Press Freedom in Russia before the Presidential Elections (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, June 1996); Kovalev Report, Chapter 3; Michael R. Gordon, "In Russia, Whistle-Blowing Can Still Be a Treason," New York Times, November 28, 1996. Back.

Note 9: Masha Gessen, The Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men in the Russian Federation (San Francisco: International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, 1994); "Dlya nachala nas zapretili," Newsletter of the Triangle Center, no. 1 (Fall 1995). Back.

Note 10: Kovalev's letter of resignation, addressed to Yeltsin, provides not only an emotional testimony of Kovalev's disappointment in Yeltsin but an eloquent yet succinct analysis of changes in government policy in recent years. An English translation of the letter can be found on the home page of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation: http://www.wdn.com/asf/. Back.

Note 11: Among many documents and statements, see the letter of resignation by Kovalev, ibid. Back.

Note 12: See, for example, Juviler, Freedom's Ordeal: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in the Post-Soviet States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming). Back.

Note 13: See, for example, "Obrashenie Presidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii k Federal'nomu Sobraniyu: Rossia za kotoruyu my v otvete," Rossiiskie Vesti, February 24, 1996. Russian original and English translation, "Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly: Russia We Are Responsible For," can be found on the home page of the Russian Presidential Administration, http://www.maindir.gov.ru/KOI8/Default.htm. There have been many other occasions when President Yeltsin pledged a commitment to human rights and praised the government's achievements in this field. See, inter alia, Address of Mr. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, to the 49th session of the United Nations' General Assembly, on September 26, 1994, in the Official Records of the 49th GA session, A/48/PV.5. "Our desire to gain full membership of the Council of Europe is a logical consequence of our current policy aimed at establishing the rule of law, strengthening democracy and genuinely securing human rights in Russia. We have succeeded in obtaining substantial results in this regard." Message of representatives of Russia to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, January 18, 1995 in Prava cheloveka v Rossii -- mezhdunarodnoe izmerenie no. 1 (1995), 142. Back.

Note 14: While I have no sociological data on this subject at my disposal, my conclusions are based on numerous contacts with activists and journalists during trips to many regions of Russia in 1995-96. Back.

Note 15: For a discussion of disadvantages of a direct mechanical "implantation" of Western-type institutions of democracy in Russia and other nations in transition, see Juviler. Back.

Note 16: Many rightly complain today that Post-Soviet States (Philadenumerous grim predictions of the troubled future of Russia based on scenarios of the inevitable coming to power of a nationalistic and/or military dictatorship have become quite annoying, being often presented in an alarmist and hysterical manner, lacking coherent analysis, argumentation, and policy recommendations, and eventually leading to "the boy who cried wolf" reaction. However, this problem should not obscure the real threat of radical nationalistic revenge. Alexander Yanov is a rare, inspiring exception among authors writing on the subject, and provides detailed analyses of the centuries-long opposition between liberal and far-right nationalistic traditions and "reform-counter reform" cycles in Russian history, substantiating the threat of the "Russian New Rights" coming to power. See, inter alia, Yanov, The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 17: Yuri Slezkine's work on the phenomenon of national identity in the Soviet Union appears to be the most intriguing and thought-provoking. See Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994). A recently published non-fiction book by Russian emigre writers provides an eloquent testimony of the sense of belonging to the Soviet community experienced by many citizens of the country -- see Pyotr Vail' and Alexander Genis, 60-e: mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 1996). Back.

Note 18: Among many publications on this subject see, in particular, "The Strong Man Russians Crave For," New York Times Magazine, September 15, 1996. While the article describes General Lebed' in this capacity, it would be a mistake to associate all the dangers of possible dictatorship only with his personality. Many observers attribute Yeltsin's drifting towards authoritarianism partly as a response to the "popular demand" for a strong hand, as well as the fact that he was so receptive to proponents of the force-based solution of the "Chechen problem." Back.

Note 19: Moskovskaya Helsinkskaya Gruppa, "Paket proektov-96," on the NGO home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 20: I am thankful to Cathy Fitzpatrick for discussions on this subject. Back.

Note 21: The best developed arguments of both sides are presented in the works of Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 13-64, and Maurice Cranston, "Are There Any Human Rights?," Daedalus, Fall 1983, 1-17. Back.

Note 22: See minutes of the First Inter-Republican Discussion on Human Rights on March 12-13, 1991, in Moscow, Russian Bulletin on Human Rights no. 1 (1991), 22-25. Back.

Note 23: Social and economic rights ranked first in importance among all constitutionally guaranteed rights in the eyes of respondents in a poll conducted in 1994 by Dr. Inga Mikhailovskaya. Not surprisingly, it was these very rights that respondents believed to be violated most of all. See Mikhailovskaya, ed., Prava cheloveka v massovom soznanii (Moscow: Russian-American Human Rights Project Group, 1995). An adapted English translation can be found on the home page of the Sakharov Foundation: http://www.wdn.com/asf/. Back.

Note 24: See "Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly: The Russia We Are Responsible For." Back.

Note 25: At least twice in recent months the dichotomy of political vs. socioeconomic rights was actively debated at major nation-wide conferences bringing together activists from many regions of the country: in a May 1996 conference commemorating the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the Moscow Helsinki Group -- see L. Ashkenazi, "Slovo predostavili vsem zapisavshimsya," Pravo-zashitnik no. 2 (1996), 65-67 -- and in a September 1996 conference of human rights organizations in Moscow organized by the Ford Foundation. Back.

Note 26: See, for example, Laura Belin, "... While Watchdog Groups Concerned about Problems at Home," OMRI Daily Digest, November 5, 1996. Back.

Note 27: This as opposed to being kept indefinitely long on the payroll without actual payment and eventually being forced to resign "voluntarily" without any unemployment benefits. Back.

Note 28: Cathy Fitzpatrick, unpublished paper. Back.

Note 29: Personal communications from the chair of the group Andrei Blinushov. Also, for a description of activities see the Ryazan Memorial's home page: www.glasnet.ru/~hronline. Back.

Note 30: Personal communications from the Center's deputy director Andrei Isaev. Also, for a description of the Perm Center's activities, see Biulleten' prava cheloveka v Rossii: informatsionnaya set' no. 19 (1996). Back.

Note 31: While consumers' rights organizations have established successful cooperation with human rights groups in many places, the women's movement and human rights NGOs in Russia have yet to approach each other. Human rights groups have to overcome their stereotypes of the women's movement as comprised of either old-style organizations with a communist legacy or as eccentric groups driven by Western feminist ideas, "foreign" to Russian culture. In their turn, independent women's groups should more clearly articulate their human rights agenda and draw parallels between their particular struggles and those of the "traditional" human rights movement. Back.

Note 32: The work of the Ekaterinburg-based NGO Children's Rights Protection Foundation "Chance" represents a good example of activity for the protection of the rights of children through regional legal reform and policy development rather than only by fixing individual cases of violations. Back.

Note 33: Viktor Lozinskii, a chair of the Ryazan Helsinki Group, has recently posted an appeal on the Internet to launch a campaign to protect cultural rights in Russia. See entry #178 in glas.hrights conference on glasnet.ru network. Back.

Note 34: Personal communication from Cathy Fitzpatrick. Back.

Note 35: The same approach was successfully used by the "moral opposition" of the dissidents in the second half of 1970's, lead by Yuri Orlov's Moscow Helsinki Group. The Helsinki Group, unexpectedly for the Soviet government, took seriously its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and used it as a basis for its advocacy work. Back.

Note 36: "Federal'naya programma deistviy v oblasti prav cheloveka (proekt)," Prava cheloveka v Rossii -- mezhdunarodnoe izmerenie no. 1 (1995), 250-281. Back.

Note 37: While lobbying for the passage of the law, human rights NGOs have to identify and campaign for a joint candidate for the post of the Ombudsman, as the communist-dominated parliament can either pick one from its own ranks or collaborate with the government in the appointment of a convenient candidate. Back.

Note 38: See Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, A Review of the Compliance of the Russian Federation with the Council of Europe Commitments and Other Human Rights Obligations on the First Anniversary of its Accession to the Council of Europe (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, February 1997). Back.

Note 39: Since 1995, women's groups have run a project on gender expertise of draft laws and proposed several recommendations to the State Duma. Representatives of women's organizations have been invited as experts to several drafting committees, and their proposals have been included in draft laws on Family and on Reproductive Rights. Nezavisimyi Zhenskiy Forum, Report of Activities in 1995 and Description of Programs in 1996 (Moscow: Nezavisimyi Zhenskiy Forum, 1996). Back.

Note 40: On May 11-13 a conference of representatives of some 40 Russian human rights NGOs, meeting on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Group, adopted an ambitious package of projects that includes, among other proposals, the creation of a legal council that will undertake expert assessment of draft laws and develop legislative initiatives, and a Research-Analytical Seminar that will discuss policy issues. Back.

Note 41: I am thankful to Cathy Fitzpatrick for arguments and insights on this subject. Back.

Note 42: Quote from Mark Goldman, chair of the Lipetsk Human Rights Society, Information Bulletin of the Society on the NGO home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 43: Alexander Gorelik, Human Rights Work in the Field of Criminal Justice, on the NGO home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 44: "A unique experience, gained by a human rights organization in a given region of Russia, is not known even in neighboring regions, not speaking of the whole country," said the Moscow Helsinki Group May conference resolution. See Moskovskaya Helsinkskaya Gruppa, "Paket proektov-96," on the NGO home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 45: Among important examples is the work of Ecojuris, a leading Moscow-based environmental public law organization which is involved in several dozen public lawsuits annually. Another example are activities of several grassroots organizations grouping around the Movement for Nuclear Safety in Chelyabinsk oblast'. Tens of thousands of people were exposed to the radiation fallout resulting from a nuclear accident larger than Chernobyl at the Mayak nuclear facility in 1957. They have been denied compensation, the status of victims, adequate medical treatment and (some of them) even resettlement, all in violation of legal provisions. These groups in Chelyabinsk have staged innovative legal public education and mobilization work, litigation efforts to counter government failure to enforce laws, and an aggressive publicity and lobbying campaign. Back.

Note 46: While many people believed that the government campaign against the human rights movement would end with the termination of the war in Chechnya, a new assault on the movement was recently undertaken in the government newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta. A February 20, 1997, article by Alexei Kiva, "Blesk i nisheta pravozashitnikov," represents a classic mixture of false accusations and misinformation. Back.

Note 47: Such developments have occurred in Perm, where a student association cooperates with the Perm Center for Human Rights, and in Obninsk, where a joint project of Obninsk Regional Human Rights Group and two Youth Centers of Role Games in the field of interactive education in human rights is implemented. Back.

Note 48: These questions were discussed, among many others, at the May conference of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Such issues as incentives for universities and prospective interns as well as creating effective follow-up opportunities to enable further cooperation with interns, remain to be researched. Back.

Note 49: Personal communication from Oleg Stakhanov, former press-secretary of the Socio-Ecological Union. Back.

Note 50: Many years of my experience as a trainer for NGOs have demonstrated a dire need to raise the professionalism of activists and for high-quality training programs. In personal communications many activists, including very experienced ones, such as Oleg Orlov, Tatyana Kasatkina from Moscow Memorial Human Rights Center, Andrei Blinushov from Ryazan Memorial, Tatyana Kotlyar from Obninsk regional human rights group, and Ella Polyakova from the St. Petersburg Soldiers' Mothers Committee, expressed interest and need in hands-on practical training for members of their and other groups. Back.

Note 51: Numerous conversations with participants of exchange programs in 1994-96. Back.

Note 52: Gorelik, "Pravozashitnaya rabota v sfere ugolovnogo pravosudiya" on the home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 53: Several professors from the Krasnoyarsk University work regularly as consultants in a local NGO "Legal Protection." See ibid. Back.

Note 54: Elsewhere I referred to the human rights movement in Russia as "the first wave" of independent civic activism, being virtually the only independent movement in the 1960s-early 1980s and revived as a leader of social movements in the late 1980s, while the environmental movement emerged as "the second wave" in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and the women's movement became "the third wave" of civic activism in 1994-95. Back.

Note 55: See Sergei Smirnov, "Trebuite knigu otzyvov i predlozheniy!," Biulleten' prava cheloveka v Rossii: Informatsionnaya set' no. 22 (August-September 1996). Back.

Note 56: Moskovskaya Helsinkskaya Gruppa, "Paket proektov-96." Back.

Note 57: See Blinushov, "Vtoroe dykhanie MHG", Biulleten' prava cheloveka v Rossii: Informatsionnaya set' no. 22 (August-September 1996). Back.

Note 58: The Socio-Ecological Union has been in existence since the late 1980s and unites more than 200 groups in a non-hierarchical network. The Independent Women's Forum was established in 1995 and includes about 50 member groups in a loose association. Back.

Note 59: Lyudmila Vakhnina, "Nekotorye novye tendentsii v pravozashitnom dvizhenii v regionakh," Karta no. 12 (Winter 1996); also on Karta's home page: http://www.openweb.ru/koi8/hr/. Back.

Note 60: One example of such repressions is ongoing harrasment by local authorities of Stanislav Velikoredchanin, chairman of the Rostov-on-Don-based NGO "Christians against Tortures and Children Slavery." Back.

Note 61: Two potential issue-oriented NGO coalitions which could involve human rights groups have been discussed for some time by other, non-human rights NGOs. One of them is the creation of a broad coalition against discrimination which could involve, along with "traditional" human rights organizations, such groups as the women's movement, ethnic minorities, the disabled, patients' associations, AIDS awareness groups, gay and lesbian groups, etc. Another project has already been launched by a coalition of the Independent Women's Forum and a recently established Center for Legal and Judicial Reform, on the legal education of citizens and social workers as well as the training of court staff. Back.

Note 62: In several cities of Russia, informal coalitions of "third sector" groups have been established during the last two years, which share resources, engage in joint lobbying efforts, and organize joint outreach campaigns. This type of coalitions and networks have been established in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, and other regions. Unfortunately, human rights groups rarely get involved in such efforts. Back.

Note 63: Blinushov, "My vmeste: pravozashitnye organizatsii i svobodnye profsoyuzy Ryazani," Karta no. 12 (Winter 1996); also on Karta's home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 64: Lipetsk Human Rights Society home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 65: The anti-war movement, while it did not become a mass phenomenon in Russia, raised a vocal public protest, recruited new activists, and provided many NGOs with valuable experience in public outreach and cooperation with other groups (personal participation in Moscow and communication from various regions). Also, see Katherine E. Young, "Growing a Democracy: Russian Non-Profit Sector Takes Roots," Russian Life, September 1996, 12-15; and Vakhnina, "Est' li v Rossii antivoennoe dvizhenie?" Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 1996. Back.

Note 66: Vakhnina, "Nekotorye novye tendentsii..." Back.

Note 67: Moscow-based groups have cooperated, among others, with the Foundation for the Development of Muslim Peoples and with the Association of Ingush Women. Back.

Note 68: Blinushov, "My vmeste..." Back.

Note 69: Ibid. Back.

Note 70: Ibid. Back.

Note 71: Nick Allen, "Frustrated Workers Take to the Courts," St. Petersburg Times, November 6, 1996. Back.

Note 72: In the spring of 1995, Russian National Unity held a press conference in Moscow, announcing the creation of an alliance with the workers' movement, represented by an independent union. Back.

Note 73: Father Alexander Borisov from the Moscow Church of SS. Cosma and Damian is the most notable representative of liberal circles of Orthodox priesthood, active in their support to opposing violence and violation of rights. A few other priests in the provinces have provided support to the anti-war movement and in combating ethnic conflicts and hatred. Back.

Note 74: The Moscow-based Christian-Democratic Union, Rostov-on-Don's Christians against Tortures and Child Slavery and St. Petersburg's Organization of Soldiers' Mothers are the most well-known spiritual-based organizations. Back.

Note 75: The British group Quaker Peace and Service has been very active in non-violence work, conflict resolution, and anti-war activities for the last several years in Russia and established a Peace Center in Moscow serving as a clearinghouse on non-violence and conflict resolution. Together with a group of Buddhists, British and Russian Quakers joined Soldiers' Mothers Committees in the famous March of Peace and Motherly Compassion which went from Moscow to Grozny in Chechnya through the war zone in the winter of 1995. Back.

Note 76: Only 16 percent of the participants of the May conference of the Moscow Helsinki Group considered media coverage of human rights issues to be satisfactory, while 79 percent believed it was unsatisfactory. See M. Savin, "Old and New Problems," Pravozashitnik no. 2 (1996), 64. Back.

Note 77: The most important of them are the journal Karta published in Ryazan by a coalition of local groups; Pravozashitnik, published in Moscow by Human Rights Publishing House; the weekly newspaper Express-Chronicle; Russian Bulletin on Human Rights published by the Russian-American Human Rights Project Group; the newsletter Biulleten' prava cheloveka v Rossii: Informatsionnaya set', published by the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights; the Memorial-Aspekt newsletter of Memorial Society in Moscow; and the recently revived legendary Chronicle of Current Events (the main publication of the dissident human rights movement of the 1970s). There is also a number of smaller regional newsletters and publications, in particular in Tomsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, Perm, Ryazan, and Novosibirsk. Back.

Note 78: Among the mainstream publications, Novoe vremya was certainly a leader in the field before the tragic passage of its deputy editor-in-chief, prominent human rights leader Kronid Lyubarskii in May 1996. Izvestiya, Nezavisimaya gazeta, and Ogonyok occasionally publish materials on human rights but do not maintain this theme as part of their editorial portfolio. Back.

Note 79: During the presidential election campaign in spring and summer of 1996, this was especially obvious as editors of generally independent and liberal media sources made a joint decision to avoid publications critical of the government. This agreement was publicly acknowledged by the editors themselves. This tendency seems to remain, albeit less strong, even after the elections. Back.

Note 80: While a talk-show on human rights hosted by the popular Vladimir Pozner is a rare exception on national TV, two radio programs run by human rights groups have been a big success: a weekly "Choice" program by Memorial's Tatyana Kasatkina aimed at raising legal awareness, and the weekly "Clouds" program of Vladimir Abramkin of the Moscow Center for Prison Reform, aimed specifically at prisoners, their families, and workers of penitentiary institutions. Back.

Note 81: See Mikhailovskaya's report. Back.

Note 82: Training seminars for young people and a manual for trainers have been developed and delivered by the Youth Center of Memorial in Moscow. In the Ryazan Free Lyceum a human rights program is in its second successfulyear. Evgeniya Romanova, "Human Rights in the Ryazan Free Lyceum," on the NGO home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 83: Sergei Kovalev, after leaving his post as a Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights in January 1996, announced plans to establish an Institute of Human Rights. The Moscow Helsinki Group included the creation of its own School of Human Rights in its program for 1996. Back.

Note 84: Leonid Radzhikhovskii, "Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo na ruinakh imperii," Pravozashitnik no. 2 (1996), 4-6. Back.

Note 85: In March-April of 1996 Yabloko joined a dozen NGOs in the All-Russian Committee for Anti-War Actions and actively cooperated in the organization of the national days of anti-war actions, which culminated with a rally on Pushkinskaya square in Moscow on April 6, gathering the largest audience of some three thousand people. The rally was addressed, among other speakers, by three presidential candidates: Yavlinskii, Lebed', and Gorbachev. However, after it had become clear that the media largely ignores anti-war actions, Yabloko ceased taking any active part in cooperation with human rights groups and other anti-war NGOs. Back.

Note 86: Savin, 64. Back.

Note 87: Interesting analytical work on NGO-government interaction is being done by a group of NGO experts who have worked extensively with many NGOs in several regions of Russia as consultants and trainers under the auspices of the Raduga Educational Association, the Independent Women's Forum, and IREX. Three members of the group -- Marina Liborakina, Mikhail Flyamer, and Vladimir Yakimets -- are working on a book on "social partnership." Back.

Note 88: Gosudarstvennyi sotsial'nyi zakaz: ot teorii -- k praktike (Moscow: NAN Foundation, 1995). Back.

Note 89: Flyamer refers to a few examples of NGOs having to give up their independence completely in exchange of governmental support. Back.

Note 90: In his paper, Flyamer provides an insightful analysis of how NGOs can use this approach. Back.

Note 91: With the exception of specific and rare situations when campaigns of civil disobedience and boycott are exercised as tools for mounting pressure on the government. Here we discuss a less extreme situation. Back.

Note 92: See discussion at the conference of the Moscow Helsinki group, in particular statements by V. Abramkin and I. Averkiev, in Ashkenazi. Back.

Note 93: President Yeltsin re-created the Commission and appointed Dr. Kartashkin as its head in May 1996, in the middle of his re-election campaign. Back.

Note 94: Belin, "Two Views on Regional Human Rights Commissions," OMRI Russian Regions Digest, November 13, 1996. Back.

Note 95: Belin, "Presidential Commission to Focus on Problems Abroad...," OMRI Daily Digest, November 5, 1996. Back.

Note 96: Text of the decree can be found on the NGOs' home page: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 97: Belin, "Presidential..." Back.

Note 98: Lipetsk Human Rights Society materials at: http://www.glasnet.ru/~hronline/. Back.

Note 99: Personal communication from Cathy Fitzpatrick. Back.

Note 100: Uncompromising debates surrouinding the creation of the Moscow city commission have led to yet another split among Moscow-based groups. See the series of articles and interviews in Express-Khronika Human Rights Agency Weekly Digest, February 18, 1997, on the agency's home page: http://www.online.ru/mlists/expchronicle/chronicle-weekly-e/. Back.

Note 101: Personal communications from NGO activists. Back.