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CIAO DATE: 3/99
Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy *
Department of Sociology
Lincoln University, Pennsylvania
International Studies Association
40th Annual Convention
Washington, D.C.
February 16–20, 1999
Draft Copy
Abstract
This paper examines the issues that Japan faces because of its contradictory policy position on nuclear weapons. Japan’s appeals for the elimination of nuclear weapons, while it remains dependent on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, broadcasts incredulity to other nations. Despite Japan’s historical interest in nuclear disarmament and recent global conditions that have made such a regime achievable, Tokyo has not demonstrated a thoroughgoing commitment to this matter. This paper stresses that Japan can play a leading role in designing a nuclear disarmament process, but to do this it must end its current security alliance with the United States.
Today Japan finds itself in a very unusual political situation relating to its national policy on nuclear weapons. Although one of the most advanced technological societies in the world, Japan has made the decision not to possess, develop or introduce nuclear weapons. Japan, however, remains tied to the security shield of the United States. This means that Japan receives the deterrent benefit provided by America’s nuclear weapons. While it is clear that Tokyo still sees a need to remain under America’s nuclear umbrella, it is equally clear that there is a pervading national abhorrence that relates to the continued existence of nuclear weapons. At present Tokyo legitimates this situation by arguing that because Japan still requires a nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War environment, its decision to maintain the security alliance with the United States and to receive its nuclear protection are not contradictory. Rather, this decision is compatible with Japan’s defense-oriented policy and prohibitions relating to its noninvolvement in the development, possession and introduction of nuclear weapons.
It was much easier for Japan to make this argument during the Cold War. Since the principals involved in the Cold War were nuclear superpowers, Tokyo justified its security alliance with the United States on the basis of political need. Japan, in other words, had no other viable alternative. The end of the Cold War has removed this justification and made Tokyo’s argument that it does not maintain a contradictory nuclear policy an untenable position.
Japan’s Non-Nuclear Sentiment
Two significant historical factors have largely formed Japan’s strong and permanent postwar antipathy to the existence of nuclear weapons. The first factor is that Japan is the only society in the world to have had experienced the immense problems associated with nuclear war. The human and physical devastation imposed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a result of the atomic bombings 1 have created a lasting political animosity toward the existence of nuclear weapons in both of these cities, as well as throughout all of Japan. Tokyo has recently taken the official position that “the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to the spirit of humanity that gives international law its philosophical foundation.” 2 The second factor contributing to Japan’s opposition to the nuclear weapons is its peace constitution. Japan’s peace constitution has enabled it to not only renounce war, but also to deal effectively with domestic and international pressure to develop an active military posture. 3 Influenced by the charter of the United Nations, Japan’s postwar constitution has prevented it from becoming a military power with offensive war-making capability. Because of its peace constitution, Japan has maintained an “exclusively defense-oriented policy” which constrains it from “becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries.” 4
Japan’s first major statement to the international community suggesting its opposition to nuclear weapons came more than four decades ago. In 1956 during a speech admitting Japan to the United Nations, foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu stressed the Japanese position that this organization should be afforded as much authority as necessary to achieve international peace and that this body should work to prohibit the existence of all weapons of mass destruction. 5 Since this time, Tokyo has made it perfectly clear on several occasions that it strongly opposes the existence of nuclear weapons. For example, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969 Japan’s representative stated that the Japanese people believe that “nuclear weapons should be eliminated from the earth.” 6 Most recently, prime minister Keizo Obuchi, stated before the U.N. General Assembly that Japan wants to see the “sincere implementation of nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapons states.” 7
Problems and Impediments
That Japan has long opposed the existence of nuclear weapons is clear. That it has made some effort to achieve nuclear disarmament is also clear. 8 What is problematic is that while Tokyo recognizes the importance of eliminating nuclear weapons it has not made a sustained and vigorous effort to promote and achieve a nuclear disarmed world.
Japan’s security relationship with the United States has been a major reason why it has been reluctant to move assertively forward and take the lead in formulating a viable plan for nuclear disarmament. When Japan was omitted to the United Nations it advocated U.N.-centered diplomacy, seeing this organization as the principal administrator of global peace and security. Constraining Japan’s aspirations for U.N.-centered diplomacy was that it had entered into a security relationship with the United States. Thus Japanese foreign policy throughout the Cold War was largely supportive of the positions taken by the United States. Since Cold War tensions left little room for the United Nations to implement global security, Japan had to abandon its interest in U.N.-centered diplomacy. Because the arms race precluded the United States from seriously looking at nuclear disarmament, it also prevented Japan from doing this.
During the Cold War Tokyo accepted the deterrence strategy, which was an integral part of the “counterforce” policy of the United States. 9 While on the one hand Tokyo did not support the existence of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, its position was that the world was simply too unsafe for Japan not to remain under America’ nuclear umbrella. When the Cold War ended most observers felt safe arguing that the prospect of nuclear Armageddon had significantly declined. The combination of Japan attaining the status of an economic superpower and the end of the Cold War made Tokyo aware that it had to seek a suitably important international position. Although aware of this, Tokyo has been very hesitant to act, continuing to accept American leadership in international affairs. 10 It is not that Tokyo did not recognize the significant changes in the international environment that emerged because of the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Tokyo quickly became cognizant of the major changes in international security milieu and that the opportunity existed for Japan to begin working to revitalize the United Nations and to assume a leadership position in the designing a nuclear disarmament regime. 11 But rather than design a international position that reflects Japan’s postwar views on the United Nations and nuclear disarmament, Tokyo has thus far chosen to maintain a strong security relationship with the United States, which ostensively includes the retention of a deterrence policy that depends on America’ nuclear arsenal.
Two Forms of Incrementalism
Approved by Washington and Tokyo in September 1997, the new bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation state that: “in order to meet its commitments [to Japan], the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability.” 12 How then does Tokyo resolve the salient contradiction between advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons and continuing to acknowledge the need for the nuclear deterrent provided to Japan by the United States? For many years, Tokyo officially supported an incrementalist approach to nuclear disarmament. Although Tokyo’s position was that nuclear weapons should not exist, it maintained that the gradual movement toward disarmament was the most reasonable course to follow. 13 As in the past, Tokyo still maintains that an expeditious approach to nuclear disarmament, even to the point of identifying a specific time for the elimination of nuclear weapons, should be rejected, since this method “has never had common international acceptance.” Rather, Tokyo’s disarmament efforts and the reduction of nuclear weapons depend upon a “realistic and incremental modus operandi.” 14
By continuing to adhere to this incrementalist policy on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which must allow for the “realities of the international security environment,” Japan remains completely susceptible to domestic forces that want it to assume a bigger security role. More significant is that Japan must face constant pressure from the United States. Washington would like nothing better than to see an expansion of Japanese military responsibilities under the leadership of the United States. Despite the fact that steps have been taken in this direction during the last few years — the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21 st Century, and the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation — Washington still wants Japan to have more defense responsibilities. To support these responsibilities Washington continues to pressure Tokyo to increase its military budget. 15
The recognition that Japan’s anti-militarist culture prevents structural changes in the security relationship has meant that the most prudent way to enlarge Tokyo’s defense responsibilities is to maintain an incrementalist approach, that is, the gradual expansion of the alliance. 16 However, this incrementalist approach to the bilateral security alliance, which in effect is constant prodding by Washington for Tokyo to do more militarily, is directly at odds with Japan’s incremental view relating to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Exactly how Japan could effectively promote nuclear disarmament in a way that is genuinely convincing to other countries while continuing to enhance, even if only symbolically, its security arrangement with the United States is unclear. Promoting an international nuclear disarmament regime requires trust and, at the very most, a minimal amount of suspicion between all nations involved in the disarmament process. The incremental growth of the U.S.-Japan security alliance does not afford Tokyo the chance to build relationships with China or North Korea that rest on these conditions.
The efforts by Washington and Tokyo to strengthen their security alliance in the last few years have made Beijing very uncomfortable. Beijing’s political reading of the recent initiatives by Washington and Tokyo to bolster the bilateral security alliance is that they actually create additional instability in the region. 17 Compounding Beijing’s grave uncertainties with the U.S.-Japan security alliance are two very recent decisions by Tokyo. Not long after Pyongyang launched a projectile over Japan in the summer of 1998, Tokyo announced that it would begin studying a theater missile defense (TMD) system with the United States and that it would build surveillance satellites. Beijing responded that it was troubled by “the political and military connotation” of Tokyo’s decisions, since they created uncertainty in both the international and regional security environments. 18 In particular, Beijing sees the TMD system as possibly counteracting China’s nuclear deterrence, which would give the United States a decided nuclear edge. 19 Given existing conditions and the threat that Beijing perceives as inherent to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it is difficult to see how it would be willing to discuss seriously, let alone implement, a nuclear disarmament regime. Any small step forward that Tokyo would be able to make along the road to nuclear disarmament, at the same time that it remains under America’s nuclear shield and begins to perform research on a TMD system, is very likely to be followed by several steps backward.
Japan’s non-violent approach to security, it has been said, is the result of the societal and political norms that are deeply embedded in Japanese institutions. This non-violent, yet flexible, approach to security has permitted Japan to adapt gradually to the security alliance with the Untied States. 20 It has also been argued that Japan’s anti-militarist culture is very likely to persist but for this to happen it must concede to the incremental growth of its security responsibilities and remain tied to the alliance with the United States. By failing to do this, Tokyo not only jeopardizes the security relationship with the United States, but this also puts Japan in a position where it would be forced to move away from its anti-militarist culture and toward remilitarization. 21
The problem with this argument is that it is based on the assumption that Japan cannot continue to have an anti-militarist culture without maintaining the security alliance with the United States, which must be incrementally enlarged from time to time. This is analogous to the line of reasoning, which at times has been said to be the “unofficial policy” of the United States, that suggests that without the bilateral security alliance Japan would abandon its anti-militarism, completely rearm and, accordingly, become a military threat to its Asian neighbors, some of whom have bad memories of past Japanese aggression. In other words, the security alliance constrains Japanese militaristic impulses and sustains a pacifist culture.
Not only is incrementalism not a politically propitious way to maintain Japan’s anti-military culture, as we will see below. But this incrementalist approach is actually perceived by some countries as moving Japan away from anti-militarism and toward increased involvement in security affairs. And this kind political perception does matter, since it perpetuates distrust and misgiving that establish the foundation for military solutions to problems between nations.
Because they anticipated that the end of the Cold War would bring a conclusion to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, Beijing and Pyongyang have become very wary and suspicious of the new initiatives by Washington and Tokyo to strengthen their alliance. Officials in both Beijing and Pyongyang currently perceive the Japanese security alliance with the United States as threat to their countries because they fear incrementalism causes Japan to assume additional security responsibilities. Beijing is particularly concerned with the phrase in the 1997 bilateral guidelines that emphasizes “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan,” 22 since it suggests that Japan now has regional security responsibilities. Beijing fears that the phrase attests to the readiness of the United States, with the support of Japan, to interfere in internal problems between China and Taiwan. 23
Beijing and Pyongyang both worry that the incrementalist approach to the U.S.-Japan security alliance could lead to the remilitarization of Japan. 24 Even worse, Beijing and Pyongyang fear that in time Japan could develop a defense policy that is relatively independent of the United States. Thus rather than incrementalism maintaining Japan’s anti-militarist culture and its commitment to the bilateral security alliance, by continuing to push Tokyo to further develop its defense capabilities and gradually increase its security responsibilities, this approach could in time cause an autonomous Japanese military response to regional disputes. If not this, there is still the more likely possibility that incrementalism is contributing to an increase in Japan’s military assertiveness. Tokyo’s recent decision to build surveillance satellites has officials in Beijing thinking along this line. The development and deployment of surveillance satellites by Japan means less reliance on intelligence information from the United States. Given past Japanese military aggressions against China and Korea, a remilitarized Japan acting on its own initiative is not a pleasant thought for officials in Beijing and Pyongyang.
While much has been made recently of China and North Korea’s growing military strength, officials in both of these countries fully understand that Japan’s defense budget is far from miniscule. Although Japan devotes less than 1 percent of its GDP to defense spending, it is has one of the biggest military budgets in the world. 25 Apart from its security alliance with United States, Beijing and Pyongyang are mindful of the fact that Japanese defense capabilities can be significantly and expeditiously increased because of Japan’s wealth and science and technological capabilities. Despite the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations more than a quarter of a century ago, Japan’s formal expressions of remorse for past military aggression against China, 26 and even promises that Japan will not become a regional military threat, 27 Beijing still remains leery of Tokyo’s intentions and certainly of its security alliance with the United States. 28
No Nukes: Tokyo, Beijing, and Pyongyang
Even though Beijing and Tokyo jointly and officially stressed the importance of eliminating nuclear weapons during president Jiang Zemin’s recent visit to Japan in November 1998, 29 the existence of the Japanese security alliance with the United States is an enormous obstacle standing in the way of beginning a serious disarmament process. In the best case scenario, Beijing would be dragging its feet in any nuclear disarmament effort. The combination of Japan tied to the security treaty with the United States and Tokyo’s policy of incrementally reducing nuclear weapons is not going to make Beijing feel too comfortable about the viability of a nuclear disarmament process. That Tokyo today accepts sub-critical nuclear testing by the United States 30 but reacted quickly to Chinese nuclear testing in 1995 by cutting grant aid to China is a glaring policy inconsistency completely understood by officials in Beijing. Sub-critical nuclear testing — a process of testing stored nuclear weapons that ends before a nuclear chain reaction takes place — gives the United States, because of its capital resources and strengthens in science and technology, a discernible edge in preserving its nuclear arsenal, which is therefore beneficial to Japan.
A major reason why India, along with some other nations, did not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 when it was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations was because the accord did not prohibit sub-critical nuclear testing. India’s nuclear testing in the spring of 1998 made clear that it had not been satisfied with the CTBT and with the nuclear weapons states maintaining “nuclear hegemony.” 31 Similarly, Beijing is unlikely to yield to U.S. nuclear hegemony in a disarmament process. Because the United States and Russia have conducted sub-critical nuclear testing, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing is, at the very least, contemplating working on this procedure. In any case, under present conditions Beijing is likely to balk at Japanese initiatives relating to nuclear disarmament, since apart from America’s formidable nuclear arsenal, its dependence on sub-critical nuclear testing to maintain its stockpile affords it a decided advantage over the long-term period.
While Tokyo would encounter serious obstacles in working with Beijing to begin a meaningful disarmament process, its problems with Pyongyang would be significantly greater. U.S. and Japanese suspicions concerning nuclear weapons development by North Korea have been running high, despite the 1994 Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang which was designed to end North Korean efforts to build these weapons. 32 Washington is demanding access to sites in North Korea to inspect facilities that its suspects are being used to restart Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Given North Korea’s proven missile technology, Tokyo has been very alarmed by the allegation that Pyongyang may have reneged on the Agreed Framework and has resuscitated its nuclear weapons program. 33
After several months of very poor relations following North Korea’s launching of a missile over Japanese territory, Tokyo and Pyongyang began talking again in January 1999. 34 Still, getting back to the point where Tokyo and Pyongyang are working again to normalize diplomatic relations will take some time. Pyongyang is unrelenting in its belief that Japan is supporting the efforts of the United States to bring down North Korea. Thus in Pyongyang’s eyes the U.S.-Japan security alliance is an unequivocal statement which indicates that Tokyo is prepared to assist the United States in military actions against North Korea. Pyongyang has already announced in the past (March 1993) its intention to abandon its pledge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because of tensions connected to the inspections of sites in North Korea. 35 So the unraveling of the 1994 Agreed Framework would set in motion Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and could easily be the catalyst for serious nuclear problems in the East Asia-Pacific region, as well as elsewhere. At the present time, Japan’s involvement with the United States in a security alliance strains its relationship with North Korea. Should the Agreed Framework fall apart, it will be even more difficult than its has been in recent years for Tokyo to find amicable solutions to the problems it has with North Korea.
The failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT puts Tokyo in a very awkward position vis-à-vis both Beijing and Pyongyang. Like Washington, Beijing has signed but not ratified the CTBT. However, Pyongyang has neither signed nor ratified the accord. For the CTBT to be put in force, 44 specific countries must ratify it, including the United States, Japan, China, and North Korea. Japan is one of only thirteen countries that have both signed and ratified the CTBT. 36 While under America’s nuclear umbrella, and given U.S. procrastination in ratifying the CTBT, Japan cannot make a convincing case to China, North Korea, or countries such as India and Pakistan, to comply with a non-nuclear regime. Cutting financial assistance to countries that appear to have made egregious mistakes with regard to their nuclear polices, as Japan has done with China, India, and Pakistan, although commendable, falls far short of moving the United States in the direction of nuclear disarmament. 37 Thus despite Japan’s genuine desire to see the gradual reduction and eventually the elimination of nuclear weapons, its strategy has yet to impact on U.S. policy.
Deterrence and the Bilateral Security Alliance
The argument that Japan needs the protection afforded to it by its security alliance with the United States, which includes being dependent on America’s nuclear deterrent, is politically lame. Even without a much stronger United Nations and regional security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Japan’s defensive capabilities in and of themselves are not inadequate. Notwithstanding the absence of a bilateral security alliance, the United States, along with other countries, expeditiously came to the assistance of Kuwait when Iraqi forces invaded it in 1990. If Japan were to face a serious external aggression, the chances are quite good that the global community would recognize this and come to its assistance.
Built on the bilateral security treaty, the U.S.-Japan security alliance has not stabilized the Asia-Pacific region in the past (the Vietnam War). This security alliance did not stop Beijing from nuclear testing just a few years ago. Most recently, this security alliance did not stop Pyongyang from lobbing a projectile without warning over Japan. Should a military dispute between the United States and North Korea occur, Japan now knows that it will be a target.
Tokyo’s primary motivation for retaining the bilateral security alliance is the nuclear deterrent provided by the Untied States. Until recently, Tokyo’s argument was that it needed the U.S. nuclear deterrent because there were two nuclear powers in the region, Russia and China, and North Korea could become a nuclear threat to Japan. When India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in the spring of 1998, the deterrence argument showed its inherent weakness. Without a departure from the present course, as time passes more countries are likely to venture into the nuclear weapons arena. The existence of nuclear weapons inevitably increases the prospect that they will be used, either officially by governments or by groups that obtained them illicitly. The more countries that possess nuclear weapons, the greater the chance that they will be used. Thus deterrence has less meaning today than it did a year ago; and under present conditions, its putative value will diminish over time.
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons recently concluded that: “the only apparent utility that remains for nuclear weapons is in deterring their use by others. That utility implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons. It would disappear completely if nuclear weapons were eliminated.” 38 The problem Tokyo faces is that, while it publicly abhors the existence of nuclear weapons, it still accepts the deterrence argument. As things are now, unless somehow Tokyo can envision the United States actively involved in an authentic nuclear disarmament process, it will retain the deterrence argument, which is currently embedded in the bilateral security alliance. Tokyo’s continued failure to adopt a policy that abandons the incremental perspective for the realization of nuclear disarmament unequivocally demonstrates that it supports the existence of nuclear weapons for the “defense” of Japan. For this reason, Tokyo feels that it must maintain the security alliance with the United States. Thus Tokyo’s incremental approach to achieving nuclear disarmament becomes a never-ending political campaign. The principal reason for this is that Tokyo’s position relies on exactly the same spurious reasoning utilized by the more vocal proponents of deterrence, who are accordingly opponents of nuclear disarmament. For them, existing relations between nations must be good enough to permit nuclear disarmament and future conditions must convincingly predict that it will last. 39
A Militarized Japan?
One concern having deep historical roots is that Japan will remilitarize, and perhaps even become a nuclear power. 40 This is not too different from the argument that the bilateral security alliance has kept Japan from rearming itself, 41 and from developing nuclear weapons. The most common possibilities that have been used to make these arguments are as follows:
A closer look at these points reveals their weaknesses. Strong U.S. economic and political interests in the East Asia-Pacific region will not bring an end any time soon to America’s commitment to the security alliance with Japan or to its military presence in the area as a whole. 42 Moreover, it is not logical to conclude that, because Japan is an economic superpower, it inevitably will become a military power. This reasoning assumes that there is no other viable alternative for Japan. Finally, it is implausible to argue that without the bilateral security alliance Japan will rearm and become a nuclear power, having no other choice but to abandon its entrenched anti-nuclear sentiments. 43 This argument suggests an extremely superficial attachment by the Japanese people to the nation’s anti-nuclear norms and only a provisional willingness to maintain their non-nuclear culture.
If Japan does become genuine military power it will be because for the last few decades incrementalism has continued to encourage the gradual expansion of Japanese defense responsibilities. As we have already seen, Japanese defense spending is relatively high by international standards. By continuing to follow the incrementalist course, Tokyo makes Japan increasingly susceptible to the gradual erosion of its cultural pacifism and anti-nuclear sentiment. Technologically speaking, it would not be too difficult for Japan to convert its military system from defensive to offensive capabilities. And, of course, Japan could become a nuclear power very quickly. Because of its very strong science and technology capabilities, including competency in nuclear power, there is the regional concern of Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state. Japan’s nuclear power facilities have created huge stockpiles of plutonium, which could be used to make nuclear weapons, if it so desired. 44
However, it is very unlikely that Japan will make the transition to a militarized society any time in the immediate future. Although incrementalism has pushed Japan to the point where it could make the transition to a militarized society in a rather short period of time, domestic resistance to a remilitarization plan would prevail. Still, big defense budgets, continuous pressure from the United States to do more, and mounting domestic nationalism calling for Japan to become a “normal” country, when coupled with any number of intervening events, such as a conflict with North Korea or China which involves targeting Japanese cities, are ominous conditions that can effect cultural change.
The Disarmament Decision
Because the security alliance with the United States has existed for many years in a society where there exists an evident pacifist, anti-nuclear culture, there is really no way of determining empirically what has prevented Japan from selecting complete rearmament. What is known is that Article 9 has endured, that any attempts to broadened Japan’s security responsibilities have been consistently and significantly opposed, that its military policy remains largely defense, and that the United Nations remains a highly regarded institution for the Japanese people. What is more, if Japan were to consider arming itself with nuclear weapons, the protracted public outcry heard throughout the country would be markedly more significant in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Unlike Tokyo, both Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been demonstrably opposed to the sub-critical testing conducted by the United States, arguing that this activity may have set the international stage for a new nuclear arms race. 45 Both cities have recently called on Tokyo to end Japan’s dependence on the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States. Nagasaki’s mayor requested that Tokyo “pursue a true security independent of the nuclear umbrella,” while Hiroshima’s mayor made it known to the central government that it is now “imperative that all Japanese give serious thought to security policies that are not nuclear dependent.” 46 There has also been some discussion of ending Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrence, while maintaining the bilateral security alliance. The creation of a “nuclear-free zone” in Northeast Asia, some assert, could end Japan’s reliance on America’s nuclear arsenal. But since the potential for conflict still exists in the region, Japan should not seek to abrogate the bilateral security alliance.
This is not a well-thought-out proposal, since it ignores empirical reality. In the late 1960s Japan adopted the Three Non-nuclear Principles. These principles prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear power by prohibiting it from owing, manufacturing, or introducing nuclear weapons in the country. Despite these principles, U.S. nuclear weapons have found their way to Japanese territory. 47 Moreover, because targets could be hit anywhere in the world, American nuclear weapons located in the continental United States, in Hawaii and Alaska, or at sea, minimize the importance of a nuclear-free zone. Thus a formal declaration maintaining that Japan was no longer under America’s nuclear umbrella and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia, or anywhere in Japan, 48 would not be very convincing, especially to China, and North Korea. The existence of America’s nuclear arsenal and the bilateral security alliance are sufficient to keep the suspicion alive in Beijing, Pyongyang, as well as elsewhere, that Japan remains, de facto , under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The recent announcement by the United States that if the Anti-Ballistic Missile is not changed it may withdrawal from the accord places still another major concern in the equation. 49 There is, for example, little reason for Beijing to think that the United States would permanently honor a nuclear-free zone if it threatens to withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
An Initiative by Japan
Although sentiment remains strong in Japan for the elimination of nuclear weapons and a strengthened United Nations, there currently is uncertainty among the public concerning the need for the U.S-Japan security arrangement. A recent survey of the Japanese public sponsored by the prime minister office reported the following: about 26 percent felt that bilateral treaty was helpful to Japan’s security, while about 12 percent believed that it was not helpful; the largest proportion, almost 44 percent, thought that that treaty was somewhat helpful, and approximately 15 percent said that they were unsure. 50 Understand that the primary concern of the Japanese people is a lasting peace. So the fact that such a large proportion of Japanese people see the U.S.-Japan security treaty as somewhat helpful might indeed only mean that because Japan has been at peace throughout the postwar years, and since the security treaty has existed for nearly five decades, the two have the appearance of interconnectedness. In any case, what is true is that the Japanese public does recognize that the bilateral security treaty is not the only way to maintain the security of Japan. More than half of the respondents of a survey indicated that they felt that Tokyo should phase out the bilateral security treaty. 51
Article X of the security treaty between Japan and the United States supports the termination of the agreement when “there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance and security in the Japan area.” 52 The Japanese public remains committed to the international security mechanisms of the United Nations. More than 60 percent of the respondents participating in a recent poll sponsored by the prime minister’s office felt that the best way that Japan could actively cooperate with the United Nations is through the “maintenance of international peace and stability.” Nearly a third of the respondents also felt that Japan should actively cooperate with the United Nations by working on “disarmament and non-proliferation.” 53
The bilateral security treaty and the broadened security alliance that evolved from it, are products of the Cold War. Formed at the beginning of the Cold War, the purpose of the U.S.-Japan security alliance was to protect Japan from the Soviet Union and to keep it aligned with the western world. Thus the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that the raison d’être of the bilateral security treaty and the alliance no longer existed. But by insisting that the East Asia-Pacific region still lacks stability, Washington and Tokyo have not only managed to maintain the security alliance, but they have also demonstrated that there is a need to strengthen it.
Tokyo’s insistence for the continued need for the bilateral security alliance has caused it to turn its back on the enduring Japanese desire to have a nuclear disarmed world and a strong United Nations capable of providing global security. In its search for a significant international role, Japan has two major options: (1) it can continue on its present course, which is to say that it largely supports the foreign policy objectives of the United States, as it did throughout the entire Cold War; or (2) it can begin working on a somewhat autonomous foreign policy agenda that reflects the pacifist and anti-nuclear concerns of a significant proportion of the Japanese population. Should Tokyo decide that the second option is viable, it will need to abandon its incremental position on nuclear disarmament and adopt instead one that seeks, with the active support of other countries, the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonably expeditious period of time. Japan’s continuing interest in seeing a nuclear free world must therefore move from words to actions that can be applied to a workable global disarmament program. 54
But it must be made clear that Japan’s security alliance with the United States will stand in the way of implementing a disarmament process. It very unlikely that Japan will be able to gain the trust of all nations to commit to a disarmament process while it is still a party to the security alliance with the Untied States. As long as Japan continues to accept the bilateral security arrangement and the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States, its work to eliminate nuclear weapons and to strengthen the security mechanisms of the United Nations and regional institutions, such as ARF, will encounter major, if not insurmountable, barriers. 55 Besides providing the autonomy to construct and institute a paradigm centered on global nuclear disarmament, the end of the bilateral security relationship will have another benefit for Japan. Since Japan’s security dependence has put it in a position where it has been susceptible to American trade and economic demands, a more autonomous foreign policy will diminish the amount of importance that Tokyo currently must give to this kind of pressure from the United States.
Conclusion
Japan’s desire to see a nuclear free world has been constrained by its long security relationship with the United States. By declaring that it intends to end to this security relationship, Japan would be sending the positive signal that the Cold War is finally over. Relative to the majority of countries in the world, Japan’s domestic military capabilities are strong, so it need not worry about being completely defenseless. Japan will lose the U.S. nuclear deterrent. But it is hardly likely that China will use its nuclear weapons against Japan just because it is no longer under America’s nuclear umbrella. Japan could even help allay some of the current problems between Washington and Pyongyang. If Japan were to announce an end to its security relationship with the United States and take visible steps to design a global disarmament agenda through multilateral and regional institutions, Pyongyang would feel less threatened than it does at the present time. Tokyo could resume its efforts to normalize relations with Pyongyang and could use it foreign aid program to encourage North Korea, which presently is facing serious economic crisis and famine, to abandon its military interests and to seek membership in ARF. Japan could also use its foreign aid program to get Beijing to turn its attention to a serious nuclear disarmament process. Similarly, Tokyo could use financial assistance and technological support to prod Moscow to participate in a verifiable nuclear disarmament process. During all of this time, Tokyo must constantly encourage the United States to participate actively in the process and to demonstrate responsible leadership. The more countries that make a genuine commitment to a sound nuclear disarmament process, the more difficult it will be for any one nation to ignore its importance.
Japan has recognized for many years that its peace constitution is unique and that, given its unfortunate experience with the devastation caused by nuclear weapons, it has the responsibility to help eliminate them from the plant. The longer Japan procrastinates in designing a nuclear disarmament process, the more difficult it will be to take positive action. By relying on the principles found within its constitution, a determined Japan could devise a comprehensive strategy that efficaciously infuses the global community with an anti-militarist culture, an integral part of which is made up of anti-nuclear norms.
Endnotes
*: Prepared for presentation at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 16–20 February 1999. Panel SA07 New Thinking About Nuclear Weapons. Back.
Note 1: As a result of the atomic bomb, about 75,000 people were killed in Hiroshima. Thousands more were injured, missing, and became homeless. The bomb destroyed about 60 percent of Hiroshima. In Nagasaki, the bomb killed about 75,000 people, and destroyed approximately one third to one half of the city. Back.
Note 2: See Statement by Takekazu Kawamura, Japan’s official representative to the World Court in 1995 concerning the issue of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Kawamura also stated before the World Court that: “Japan, based on the tragic suffering of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, considers the [ sic] nuclear weapons must never be used.” See Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons , October 30 – November 15, 1995. Back.
Note 3: See, for example, Koichi Hamada, “The Pacifist Constitution in Post-War Japan — Economic Dividends or Political Burdens,” Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations , vol. XIX, no. 3, 1996, pp. 46-62. Back.
Note 4: Defense Agency, Japanese Defense Policies , Tokyo, accessed on the worldwide web at the following address: http://www.jda.go.jp. Back.
Note 5: Yasushi Akashi, “Problems of Japan’s United Nation’s Diplomacy,” Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan , vol. IV, no. 1, April 1966, p. 15. Back.
Note 6: See “Statement by the Japanese Representative (Asakai) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, July 3, 1969,” in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1970), p. 307. Back.
Note 7: See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Mr. Keizo Obuchi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations , September 21, 1998. Also see similar comments in the Statement by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at the 51 st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations , September 24, 1996. Back.
Note 8: See, for example, a discussion of the “Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” presented by Japan to the United Nations, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1996 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). Also see Anthony DiFilippo, “Creating Global Security: Japan as a Potential Catalyst,” in Economics of Conflict and Peace , eds. Jurgen Brauer and William Gissy, (Aldershot, Great Britain: Avebury, 1997), pp. 376-396. Back.
Note 9: See Anthony DiFilippo , Cracks in the Alliance: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of U.S.-Japan Relations (Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 259-260; and Anthony DiFilippo, “Arms Control Versus Disarmament,” Briefing Paper , National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament, Washington, D.C., May 1991. Back.
Note 10: See Masaru Tamamoto, “Japan’s Search for Recognition and Status,” in Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect , ed. Warren Hunsberger (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 3-14. Back.
Note 11: See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1992 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993), pp. 48-49, 59, 65. Back.
Note 12: Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation , New York, New York, September 23, 1997. Back.
Note 13: United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook , vol. 4, 1979 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1980), p. 98. Back.
Note 14: Statement by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Sapporo , July 22, 1997. Back.
Note 15: Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 1998). Back.
Note 16: Michael Green, “Interests, Asymmetries, and Strategic Choices,” in The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the 21 st Century (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 1-24; and Michael Green “State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy ,” Access Asia Review , vol. 2, no. 1, September 1998. For a discussion that sees shortcomings in the incrementalist approach, that is, without it Japan would be encouraged to be more actively involved in the bilateral security alliance, see Mike Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” in Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations , ed. Mike Mochizuki (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 17-23. Back.
Note 17: See Charles Morrison, ed. Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1998 (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), pp. 43-44; Ni Feng, “Enhanced US-Japanese Security Alliance: Cause for Concern,” Beijing Review , vol. 40, no. 24, June 16-22, 1997; and “Guarded Efforts on Defense Ties ,” Asahi Evening News , November 25, 1998. Back.
Note 18: “China Expresses Concern About Japan’s TMD Program,” Kyodo News , December 30, 1998. Back.
Note 19: Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, “Against Us or with Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea,” Stanford University, Asia/Pacific Research Center, May 1998, p. 33. Back.
Note 20: Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 21: Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security , vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993. Reprinted in East Asian Security , eds. Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1996), pp. 300-331. Back.
Note 22: Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation , September 23, 1997. Back.
Note 23: Chinese premier Li Peng said to former Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto when he visited China in early September 1997 that: “The Chinese government and the Chinese people can never accept any activity directly proposing or hinting obliquely at including Taiwan in the scope of Japan-US security cooperation.” See “Japan Urged to Learn from Past,” Beijing Review , vol. 40, no. 38, September 22-28, 1997. Back.
Note 24: For the Chinese military perspective, see Ronald Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, “PLA Views on Asia Pacific Security in the 21 st Century,” Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum , June 1997. For the view from Pyongyang, see “Dangerous Moves on the Part of Japan,” Korean Central News Agency , January 2, 1999. The Korean Central News Agency is the official news agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Back.
Note 25: According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Japan has the fourth biggest military budget in the world. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, Washington, D.C., U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Department of Defense identifies Japan as having the third largest military budget among allies of the United States. See Department of Defense, Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense. Back.
Note 26: The most recent occurred during Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in late November 1998. See Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development , Tokyo, November 26, 1998. Back.
Note 27: See, for example, “Japan Urged to Learn from the Past,” Beijing Review Back.
Note 28: Anthony DiFilippo, “China’s Side of the History Equation, The Japan Times , December 10, 1998. Back.
Note 29: See Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development Back.
Note 30: See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by the Press Secretary , October 2, 1998 (accessed on the worldwide web). Back.
Note 31: See Statement on the CTBT by the Minister of External Affairs of India , Mr. I.K. Gujral, August 22, 1996 at http://www.igc.org/disarm/ctbt.html#Statement on CTBT. Back.
Note 32: See “North Korea Site an A-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say,” The New York Times , August 17, 1998; and “Cohen, Norota Discuss Pyongyang, Defense Guidelines,” The Japan Times On-Line , January 13, 1999. Also see Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 1998), p. 23; and Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1997 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 1997), p. 37. Back.
Note 33: Pyongyang states that it has not violated the Agreed Framework, that it has not been performing work on nuclear weapons development, and that it is the United States that has violated the accord by not fulfilling its part of the agreement. See “U.S. Urged to Pay Dlrs 300 Million for Inspectio[n],” Korean Central News Agency , January 11, 1999. Back.
Note 34: See “Japan, N. Korea Begin Informal Contact, Tokyo Says,” Kyodo News , January 18, 1999; “Govt to Resume Talks with North Korea,” Daily Yomiuri On-Line , January 18, 1999; and “Japan Attempting Fresh Dialogue with North Korea,” The Japan Times On-Line , January 18, 1999. Back.
Note 35: U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: North Korea, June 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1996). Back.
Note 36: Japan was the first nation to ratify the CTBT on July 8, 1997. See the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (Vienna) at http://www.ctbto.org. for detailed information on the CTBT. Back.
Note 37: Anthony DiFilippo, “Hikaku sekai ni muketa Nihon no koken” (“The Japanese Contribution Toward an Anti-Nuclear World”), Asahi Shimbun , September 25, 1998. Back.
Note 38: The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons , August 14, 1996. The Canberra Commission’s Report on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was presented to the Conference on Disarmament, Canberra, Australia, January 30, 1997. Accessed on the worldwide web at http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.html. Back.
Note 39: For example, see Charles Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Survival, vol. 40, no. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 112-128. Back.
Note 40: Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Masao Kunihiro, “The Decline and Fall of Pacifism,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 53, no. 1, January/February 1997, pp. 35-39. Back.
Note 41: Rajan Menon, “The Once and Future Superpower, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 53, no. 1, January/February 1997, pp. 29-34; and Andrew Mack, “Japan and the Bomb: A Cause for Concern?” Asia-Pacific Magazine , no. 3, June 1996, pp. 5-9. Back.
Note 42: Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region , November 1998. Back.
Note 43: Matake Kamiya, “Japan, Nuclear Weapons, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Paper prepared for presentation at the Washington Conference on U.S. Japan Security Relations, Washington, D.C., May 2, 1996. Back.
Note 44: Mack, “Japan and the Bomb: A Cause for Concern?”; and Eiichi Katahara, “Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Consequences or Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review , vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1997. Back.
Note 45: “Warnings of a New Nuclear Arms Race,” The Washington Post , July 22, 1997. Back.
Note 46: “Hiroshima and Nagasaki Seek Security Without U.S. Nuclear Umbrella,” Asahi Evening News , August 16, 1998. Back.
Note 47: A 1969 declassified document from the U.S. National Archives bearing the title “National Security Study Memorandum 5,” a report mainly produced by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Defense Department states that: “Japan now acquiesces in transit by naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons. This right would extend automatically to Okinawa.” See “U.S. Report: Japan Allowed N-Arms in Territorial Waters .” The Yomiuri Shimbun On-Line , May 15, 1997. Back.
Note 48: In March 1975 the city of Kobe, Japan declared its port to be a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The formal resolution is that: “We, Kobe City Council, reject the visit of all nuclear-armed warships into Kobe Port.” Back.
Note 49: The Canberra Commission concluded that: “It will be extremely important for the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons to protect fully the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.” The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Back.
Note 50: Foreign Press Center , Facts and Figures on Japan (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1998), p. 23. Back.
Note 51: See Takubo Tadae, “The Okinawan Threat to the Security Treaty,” Japan Echo , Autumn 1996, p. 52. Back.
Note 52: Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America , January 19, 1960. Back.
Note 53: Prime Minister’s Office, Public Relations Office, Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs , January 1998. Back.
Note 54: See Imai Ryukichi, “Renewed Effort to Limit Nuclear Weapons,” Japan Quarterly , vol. 45. no. 4, October-December 1998, pp. 23-28. Back.
Note 55: See Anthony DiFilippo, “Why Japan Should Redirect Its Security Policy ,” Japan Quarterly , vol. 45, no. 2, April-June 1998, pp. 24-31. Back.
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