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Accounting for Success?: Improving Performance Evaluation and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations Engaged in Conflict Resolution

Loramy C. Conradi

University of Notre Dame

International Studies Association
March 18-21, 1998

Introduction:

Peacemakers are readjusting their strategies in light of the changing nature of the violent conflicts plaguing our world today. In place of major wars there has been an increasing number of protracted intermediate and minor intrastate conflicts. 1 Of 101 armed conflicts from 1989-1996, only six were interstate conflicts. 2 Today's world conflicts present unprecedented challenges for actors in the international community who are dedicated to conflict management and resolution. For the most part, the actions of international actors in newly erupted conflicts, especially those of a territorial nature, have centered on containing the conflicts and providing humanitarian aid. States are unlikely to become more heavily embroiled in today's conflicts due to severe economic constraints and domestic problems, which hamper their will to intervene where strategic interests do not suffice. 3 Thus, intervention by non-governmental and inter-governmental actors takes on new dimensions of importance in today's conflicts.

The end of the Cold War has left a heavy burden of peacemaking on the shoulders of the UN, and the UN has sought new sources of help and ingenuity. In a speech to NGOs in 1994, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized three contributions of citizen's groups: "1) preventive diplomacy, because NGOs are familiar with the situation on the ground and are well placed to alert governments to nascent crises and emerging conflicts; 2) peacemaking, where NGOs can give humanitarian and social aid under perilous and difficult conditions; and 3) post-conflict peace-building, where NGOs can help fragile governments and destitute populations to find the confidence and the resources to make peace last." 4 This speech at the 47th Annual Conference of NGOs gave welcome attention to the role of NGOs in peace processes, especially since Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace (1993) focused on intergovernmental military responses to conflict. 5 However, the 1994 speech still emphasizes NGO roles in humanitarian aid and reconstruction to the neglect of NGO work in conflict resolution. Little is known about the structures, operations, challenges and capabilities of NGOs involved in conflict resolution.

This study focuses on the accountability of NGOs working in conflict resolution (CRNGOs). 6 In their edited volume, Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, Edwards and Hulme make an excellent case for the importance of clarifying NGO accountability in a world where NGOs are increasingly relied on as substitutes for the state, and in fact are viewed as preferred channels of state monies for services such as health and education. 7 The broad spectrum of NGOs are growing closer to governments - from the relief and development organizations which are the focus of Edwards and Hulme, to nonprofit organizations in the United States. Because of state reliance on and increased funding for NGO services, accountability is a timely issue for NGOs. Rather than viewing NGOs as "magic bullets", we need sober and transparent accounts of their performance and measures of their effectiveness. Many in the conflict resolution business would argue that the efforts of NGOs are not given enough credit given their accomplishments. 8 However, CRNGOs are gaining recognition, and may gain the "magic bullet" status that other NGOs (such as relief and development organizations) already possess. Accountability of CRNGOs need to be addressed now, in order that their popular image can be properly based in their capabilities to perform. 9

The purpose of this analysis is to examine problems with existing accountability and performance evaluation of CRNGOs, and to explore suggestions for improving these in light of three case organizations. Before further discussing accountability, further delineation of the universe of CRNGOs is needed.

DEFINING THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION NGO:

The last two decades have seen increasing discussion of NGOs involved in humanitarian operations, human rights work, and environmental and women's issues, partly in response to the large growth of NGOs in these fields. 10 Meanwhile, the world of NGOs working in conflict resolution remains ill defined. For my purposes here, it will be helpful to define a theoretical approach to conflict resolution and attempt to delineate a limited world of conflict resolution NGOs based on that understanding.

Theoretical Approach to Conflict Resolution:

My approach to conflict resolution is influenced by the work of Mennonite conflict resolution scholar, John Paul Lederach. He terms his approach to peacemaking "conflict transformation", which he describes not as elimination or control of conflict, but as impacting relationships to interrupt vicious cycles of violence. This occurs by transforming perceptions and expressions of conflict and by reaching a common definition of the conflict situation. 11

Lederach's thoughts on NGO involvement in conflict resolution (transformation) can be summarized as follows:

"I am suggesting that NGO peace advocacy is made up of actors who have ongoing regional connectedness and a desire to support creative, but primarily regional-based solutions, who demonstrate the ability to listen to all sides and create safe space, are willing to act together as a community, and who represent a transnational body rather than particular or national interests." 12

Such an understanding of conflict resolution calls for conflict resolution actors to be deeply embedded in the context of conflict situations, requires long-term and holistic involvement in a society, and calls for accountability to a wide range of societal actors. This understanding provides a rich context in which to ground our understanding of CRNGO accountability. Although not all CRNGOs operate under such a demanding view of conflict transformation, this committed process is ideal, and can at least serve as a template from which to examine potential effectiveness of CRNGO performance.

This theoretical approach to conflict resolution clearly can include a wide range of activities including human rights protection and refugee relief - the domains of NGOs who would not view their primary task as one of conflict resolution. For the purpose of this research, some limits must be placed on the world of CRNGOs.

Delineation of the World of CRNGOs:

NGOs working with refugee populations, monitoring human rights, or involved in election monitoring or truth commissions are likely to operate in conflict situations and to affect the dynamics of conflicts, whether or not conflict resolution is a specific, stated organizational goal. 13 There are also NGOs involved directly in conflict resolution activities, such as negotiations, mediation training, and conflict resolution workshops. Some other examples of conflict resolution activities include: analyzing causes of conflicts, enabling mediation and dialogue, training people in methods of conflict resolution, developing codes of conduct for combatants, and seeking ways to implement early warning systems. Thus, the CRNGO through these activities takes on a variety of roles: service provider, educator, advocate, intermediary, monitor.

The Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia has established a Conflict Resolution Program. They publish an International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution 14 . The list is diverse, including NGOs involved in everything from third-party mediation, construction of conflict resolution centers, conflict monitoring, and conflict resolution training workshops - to arms control projects, human rights advocacy, and fact-finding missions. To be included on this list, organizations must be "nonpartisan, nongovernmental organizations whose main focus is conflict prevention and resolution". In keeping with a Lederachian approach, for my purposes I would add to this definition that the organization must have operations in the situation of conflict which actively engage those involved in or affected by the conflict (i.e. not strictly a donor or research organization).

Focus will be given to three organizations representative of the CRNGO field: Search For Common Ground, The Carter Center, and Christian Peacemaker Teams. These NGOs provide a nice cross-section of the CRNGO world. Search for Common Ground works in a broad range of conflict resolution activities, at the grassroots and elite levels, whereas the Carter Center tends to focus on mediation efforts at the elite level. CPT is a religiously affiliated, grassroots advocacy organization. Each of these organizations operates in several conflict situations.

CONCEPTUALIZING NGO ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE :

The few studies that exist on conflict resolution NGOs focus primarily on the attributes of NGOs which equip them as effective third parties to disputes and on the different roles NGOs may play in a conflict resolution process. 15 Only a few studies even begin to examine the dynamics that NGOs or unofficial mediators face in these roles. 16 One can also glean limited information about the conflict resolution NGO world from case studies of NGOs working in conflict resolution. 17 Accountability issues are just beginning to hit the NGO literature at large.

I have suggested that conflict resolution NGOs are growing in importance in the world of international peacemaking. I have also argued that the CRNGO is not well understood. Some would argue that entering a locale like Chechnya and staging conflict resolution training workshops is a futile exercise, or at best a poor use of resources - resources that would better serve the Chechnyans through an improved economy or development of their war-torn infrastructure. If the international community is going to place responsibilities of peacemaking on the CRNGO, then it is important that we have ways of evaluating and measuring the CRNGO's capacity to fulfill these responsibilities. If we put our trust in the ability of CRNGOs to perform peacemaking, then we ought at least to understand the methods by which these CRNGOs might be held accountable to perform well.

According to Edwards and Hulme, "accountability is generally interpreted as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions". 18

"The common perception that somewhere there are organizations that are perfectly accountable must be dismissed. However, there is clearly a level at which the absence of accountability begins to make the likelihood of ineffective or illegitimate actions by an organization much more probable. Effective accountability requires a statement of goals (whether in adherence to certain rules or based on achievement of identified performance levels), transparency of decision making and relationships, honest reporting of resource use and achievements, an appraisal process for the overseeing authorities to judge whether results are satisfactory, and concrete mechanisms for holding accountable (rewarding or penalizing) those responsible for performance." 19

One begins to see how accountability, performance evaluation, and organizational effectiveness interrelate. If an organization is held accountable for its work (its performance evaluated), it is more likely to perform well. Also, the kinds of accountability and the actors to which the organization are held accountable define the criteria of good performance for that organization.

Accountability exists both on informal and formal levels, in long-term time frames and short-term time frames, and can measure efficiency of an organization or effectiveness of an organization. Formal accountability involves the formal or "official" accountability structures possessed by an NGO, such as those inherent to institutional design - relationships set out in by-laws, legal status of an organization, reporting to donors, internal organizational hierarchies (such as between staff and trustees), and formal partner or network relationships. Organizations design ways to evaluate themselves and their progress on their stated objectives both internally and per the requirements of those who sponsor and network with them. An example of a formal accountability structure is the Board of Directors. Most non-membership NGOs are formally accountable to a Board. Good governing structures keep an NGO accountable to its mission, performance toward that mission, and to standards of a good civic institution. 20

Informal accountability is often harder to measure but perhaps more important than formal structures, because the formal structures may not reveal the actual power structures within and around an organization. Informal accountability is unofficial, having to do with personal networks and internal and external power relationships that are perceived but not formally recognized. An example of informal accountability is discussion about CPT's work which occurs between and among CPT workers, residents of Hebron/West Bank, partnering organizations, or local governing bodies which is not instigated by official evaluative requirements.

Another way to divide accountability is between functional (or short-term) and strategic (or long-term). 21 Functional accountability is more easily measured, and has to do with the effective and efficient use of resources or probity, and the immediate impact of the use of those resources. Strategic accountability is extremely difficult to measure, and has to do with the long-term, widespread impact of NGO activities. Very different criteria may be appropriate for determining the short, intermediate, and long term impact of NGO work. In the short term the emphasis is on production, efficiency and satisfaction. Adaptiveness and development become important in the intermediate term. In the long term, one measure of impact is the very survival of the organization. 22 Strategic accountability is nearly impossible in part because NGOs operate in contexts in which so many factors are beyond their control.

A case which illustrates the relationship between these different types of accountability is the Apnalaya project in India. The Apnalaya organization works in the area of community development with India's slum dwellers. 23 This organization is held accountable via formal mechanisms such as an annual report on expenditures given to the Indian Charity Commissioners and a report every three years given to the Income Tax Department. Another formal accountability structure is Apnalaya's Board of Trustees. All of these formal mechanisms are best able to get at the functional aspects of accountability - efficiency of resource use and immediate impacts of the project. The hard part is measuring the strategic impact of Apnalaya's work. Complex goals, other agencies providing duplicate services, and a volatile environment make measuring long-term success difficult.

Another difficulty in measuring impact of the Apnalaya project is that Apnalaya, like many NGOs, is engaged in different types of activities for which different forms of accountability may be required. 24 For example, institutional development is distinguishable from development assistance and delivery of services. NGO and CRNGO work is varied, dynamic in nature, and context dependent. NGOs choose to work across a broad range: social service, institutional development, advocacy - all requiring different funding mechanisms, organizational structures, skills, and time-scales. 25 Accountability structures which can adapt with these variations must be designed.

CRNGO ACCOUNTABILITY IN THREE CASES:

I now turn to my three case study organizations: Search for Common Ground, the Carter Center, and Christian Peacemaker Teams. I collected preliminary 26 data on the accountability structures of these organizations via examination of their annual reports, other publications, and World Wide Web sites.

Search For Common Ground:

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has established a conflict resolution program in the Middle East known as the Middle East Initiative. 27 SFCG's work there is explicitly viewed as track-two diplomacy, in other words a shadow process to peace initiatives by governmental actors. SFCG desires to impact the entire Middle East region - their goal being to promote regional peace and security largely through institution building processes which will enable governments to cooperate and to soothe official negotiations among Middle Eastern power structures. A Core Working Group of roughly 35 persons meets a few times a year to strategically direct all programs of the Initiative. This Core Group of retired generals, ambassadors, parliamentarians, business professionals, and other influential persons might be considered the pinnacle of the Initiative's accountability structure. Also in the accountability matrix would be the Washington DC staff which directs the daily operations of the Initiative, donors, and local partnering organizations in the Middle East with which SFCG cosponsors programs. Ostensibly, though indirectly or informally, SFCG must have some responsibility to governmental bodies given its emphasis on Track II diplomacy.

The Carter Center

The Carter Center is a multi-purpose NGO with a Conflict Resolution Program, although some of the Center's conflict resolution activities fall outside the umbrella of this program. 28 The complexity of this organization made it the most difficult for which to assess accountability structures. Accountability structures will be much more complex in an NGO with multiple programs and complex organizational structure.

Besides the wide range of activities in which it is engaged, the Carter Center also stands out among my three cases in that it has at its head an eminent person, former president Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter's headship of the organization allows for recruitment of high profile donors and board members, and in some ways beneficiaries. Jimmy Carter's status and reputation in conflict resolution skills also allow for unique access privileges to conflict areas. One wonders if the Carter Center had a successful intervention in Haiti because of the Center's extended presence there (as the Center claims) or because of the person of Jimmy Carter. How might the presence of prominent persons affect organizational accountability and performance?

Finally, the Carter Center places a high emphasis on networking. The Carter Center's Conflict Resolution Program includes a 25-member International Negotiation Network (INN) which monitors world conflicts on a weekly basis. The INN is chaired by Carter and includes world leaders and experts in dispute resolution. An example of the Center's work is in Liberia where the Carter Center runs conflict resolution programs involving eminent persons and partnering groups. The LNDP (Liberian Network for Peace and Development) partners with NGOs and other civic groups. Assessment of impact and accountability to project goals might prove especially difficult in the case of such cooperative efforts or with a diverse constituency.

Christian Peacemaker Teams:

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) has a Middle East presence, specifically in Hebron, West Bank. 29 Information about this organization was easily accessible, due in part to my personal experience with them and to the small-scale simplicity of their operation. Because of this greater accessibility, I am able to give a more complete picture of CPT's evaluative processes.

CPT: Keeping Constituents Satisfied:

A unique feature of CPT among my case studies is that CPT is a faith-based organization. Like the Quakers, CPT's motivations are very important in considering any project's potential or actual success. Before entering any project, besides asking the usual questions about likelihood of success (availability of donor support, safety of the team members, expected time frame, presence of a trusted welcoming body on site) CPT also asks if the proposed action is explainable as Christian witness. 30 As a nonviolent advocacy organization, CPT must determine if in a given conflict situation there is space for nonviolent engagement. The faith-based nature of CPT work has certain implications for its accountability structures. The backbone of CPT operations is the constituent churches. Without them, CPT ceases to exist. 31

CPT projects are evaluated by CPT staff and a Steering Committee of about 14 persons. CPT is also accountable to its sending communities (constituent congregations - Brethren, Quaker, and Mennonite churches) through communications like a quarterly newsletter and Internet connections. CPT is fond of using beneficiary testimonies as a means of justifying their work in Hebron to funders and other stakeholders. 32 Testimonies are given of families whom CPT has accompanied. Local affirmation has also arisen from Palestinian residents of Hebron, partnering organizations such as the Hebron Solidarity Committee, and host governing bodies (the mayor of Hebron).

Difficulties in Defining CPT's Successes and Failures:

Christian witness and beneficiary impact are two measures of success for CPT projects. Since CPT is an advocacy organization, measurement of success can be especially difficult. CPT works for justice, which may mean that conflict must be provoked to the surface before things improve. For example, if the team's safety is at risk, it probably means that they are doing a good job at advocating for the oppressed in a conflict. 33 The faith-based nonviolent witness is key to CPT's definitions of success. To operate on these principles is CPT's goal, and as long as actions fall into that approach they can be viewed as successful.

Another difficulty in assessing CPT's work is the grassroots, long-term nature of it. Whereas the Carter Center worked out a concrete agreement with General Cedras in Haiti, CPT worked with the poor in Jeremie, Haiti. It takes a long time to see the fruit of activities like accompanying families, interacting with Israeli soldiers, establishing a presence on a bomb-targeted Jerusalem bus route, and opposing house demolitions of Palestinians. How does one measure such scattered, individual impact? Whereas organizations like SFCG and Carter Center may have more notoriety and ability to reach a broad swath of people, I suggest that CPT may interact with people in a more intimate way. Yet even CPT seems intent on measuring how many people they reach. Numbers are easy to count, such as how many people are involved with CPT work through peace delegations and conferences. The more important and harder to gauge statistic is the depth of the "reach". What is CPT's ability to mobilize the people it reaches to pray or to participate in a fast? Again, the faith commitment of CPT proves central to its work and its evaluations of success. CPT has a commitment to a certain method of peacemaking and conflict resolution. If one disagrees with CPT's faith-based nonviolence philosophy, one would probably also disagree with the effectiveness of CPT's methods. Perhaps nonviolent engagement is the most painstaking of all CRNGO efforts, and the most seemingly insignificant in the short-term.

CPT explicitly states its criteria for judging a project a failure. It is not always possible to prove success conclusively, but there is still value in proving that an organization has not failed in key areas. 34 CPT contemplates termination of a project if a stakeholder wants out (CPT constituent or a welcoming host body), if the project time goal has expired, or if the safety of the CPT team is in question. The most clearly recognized failure is death of the CPT team. As veteran CPT team member Kathleen Kern states, "I wouldn't be a very effective peace witness if we all got killed." 35 However, even at this extreme, good things may result from the tragedy.

DIFFICULTIES IN KEEPING NGOS ACCOUNTABLE TO GOOD PERFORMANCE

As is becoming apparent, there are incredible difficulties in keeping NGOs or CRNGOs accountable. The challenge posed by the difficulties of assessing NGO effectiveness remains the greatest obstacle to further research in this area. 36 Specifically theses difficulties center around the multiple constituencies (or stakeholders) in NGO work, the lack of objective performance standards, and the open-system nature of NGO operations. 37

Multiple Constituencies:

NGOs experience "multiple accountabilities" to the various actors with whom they are networked such as beneficiaries, members, staff, trustees, donors, and governments. "Many of the concerns expressed about the weak accountability of NGOs relate to the difficulties they face in prioritizing and reconciling these multiple accountabilities." 38

Organizational evaluation must serve several functions in order to please all stakeholders. These can be categorized as 1) institutional functions - legitimacy renewal and resource attraction which concern the Board, volunteers, and donors; 2) managerial functions - structure and process of the organization and internal allocation which concern the managers and professionals in the organization; and 3) technical functions - efficiency and quality of services delivered which concern the customers and clients of the organization. 39 There are also stakeholders outside of the organization with which the organization is networked whose interests may need to be considered in organizational evaluation and accountability structures.

Demonstrating accountability for NGOs is a process of promoting, bargaining, and negotiating among the various stakeholders in the NGO work. Different actors to whom the NGO ought to be accountable might have different and even conflicting bottom lines. In research on how beneficiaries of Third World NGO work felt about the results of empowerment oriented projects, it became clear that donors and beneficiaries were using different definitions of impact and performance. Donor NGOs tended to overemphasize financial management and short-term material outputs (functional accountability) whereas beneficiaries tended to look for modest changes in organizations over long time periods (strategic accountability). 40 Often in NGO work the donors (mostly Northern NGOs) are more able to wield accountability influence over an organization than are beneficiaries of the NGO work (often persons from the South or Third World). Edwards and Hulme call accountability to members and beneficiaries downward accountability. Because many NGOs do not have democratic organizational structures and are most likely to be accountable to their sources of funding, downward accountability is difficult to come by. 41 NGOs are in themselves problematic organizations. They are accountable to trustees in one country and work with communities in others. They are committed to fundamental reforms but are funded by donors who demand short-term results. 42 Given such situations, the multiple accountabilities of the NGO can be a real challenge. 43

Any methodology of CRNGO accountability should consider the need to identify stakeholders, their interests, and their relative power and influence.

Lack of Objective Performance Standards:

Because of these multiple constituencies and due to the complexity of NGO operations, there are few agreed on performance standards for NGO work. There are few indicators with which to evaluate NGO work. How is success defined? Success is dependent on the goals of the organization and may vary for each stakeholder. What kind of change is the organization trying to provoke? Is the desire to bring new knowledge, to change attitudes, or to change actions? 44 The definition of success is something which in itself needs to be questioned as part of an organization's evaluative process.

The lack of objective performance standards makes keeping NGOs accountable difficult. As Edwards and Hulme State, there is no "bottom line" by which to measure progress. 45 The bottom line shifts depending on the operating context (or often with CRNGOs, the phase of the conflict). In a given situation, formal accountability may become more important than informal, or strategic more important than functional. Thus, the relevant ingredients of accountability are dynamic and context dependent. 46

Open-System Context of NGO Operations:

The final difficulty in measuring NGO performance through accountability is the "open-system" nature of NGO operations. What is the context of evaluation? Are we measuring a small-scale isolated project or the overall work of an NGO in a wider context and its ability to mobilize other actors and forces? 47 The second is obviously more challenging. How do we measure the impact of an NGO on the life of a local group or on a national context? How do we account for positive and negative side effects (externalities) in evaluating NGO work? How do we account for other programs which impact the program being evaluated?

Having shown the difficulties in defining and measuring success and performance of NGO and CRNGO work, I now turn to explore how CRNGOs may manage these difficulties through improved accountability.

IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY OF CRNGOS:

The Carter Center, Search for Common Ground and Christian Peacemaker Teams have accountability structures which evaluate their organizational performance. Less clear is whether their accountability adequately evaluates their work and promotes good performance. The point of Edwards and Hulme is to draw attention to the need for greater accountability for relief and development NGOs in a world where governments are increasingly funding them and relying on them as magic bullet provisions for international needs. There is no evidence indicating that our concern should be any less for the conflict resolution NGO. Rather, based on this study, there seems to be much room for improvement in accountability for CRNGOs, while at the same time a recognition of great difficulties in making such improvements.

If current accountability for CRNGOs is inadequate, where do theories and methodologies of organizational evaluation suggest that we make improvements? What are some ways around the dilemmas of performance evaluation for CRNGO work? Perhaps a good way to approach these questions is with another series of questions about what must be included in a methodology of accountability for CRNGOs.

Towards a Methodology of Accountability:

First, why are we evaluating? Why should we be concerned about organizational evaluation? What are the assumptions behind our evaluation, what are the purposes and goals of a given evaluation study? Who will use the results and how will they be used? 48 There is no incentive to make changes to improve an organization if there is no accountability to do well. If donors keep donating no matter the performance, there will be less concern for sound evaluation. 49 Just as different stakeholders may have different measures of organizational success, they may also have different reasons for evaluating an organization, such as wise use of their charity funds, desire to improve their own situation, etc. For example, the Ford Foundation, a donor to the work of Search for Common Ground is primarily interested in how its contributed funds are being put to calculable use toward their broad goal of contributing to world peace. A conflict resolution trainer working with Common Ground's Middle East Initiative will have much more specific goals for evaluating, such as determining whether or not a specific workshop was a valuable use of time.

A second question to consider is who is evaluating the organization. It is debatable whether an impartial or partial party is the best evaluator of an organization. An evaluator must be close enough to a project in order to have access to all stakeholders and a good understanding of the project and its process. There should also be trust between the evaluator and all of the stakeholders in order for information to be gathered and analyzed accurately and efficiently. 50 Clearly all possible stakeholders must be part of the who who is evaluating (not just the board, donors, or staff). An objective party might serve a role in compiling these diverse opinions lest any one stakeholder play a primary role. For an organization like CPT, this means that at some level, evaluation must be filtered through constituent congregations, CPT staff and steering committee, residents of Hebron, partnering organizations, and host governing bodies in the Middle East. This may be as simple as asking questions of an Israeli soldier that has witnessed CPT demonstrations, or as complicated as sending a questionnaire to constituent churches to evaluate CPT's mission and activities.

The question at the heart of NGO evaluative dilemmas concerns what is being evaluated. Is progress toward a goal being measured or the values of the goals themselves? 51 For all three case organizations, conflict resolution workshops illustrate this difference. One can measure whether a certain number of workshops have taken place with a certain number of people, and even whether or not participants in those workshops felt that they gained valuable conflict resolution skills and perspectives. This measures progress toward a goal. It is another thing to assess whether an organization, given its context, best uses its limited time and resources on workshops as a means of peacebuilding. Either approach could be used, depending on organizational needs. When we ask what we are evaluating, we ask whose progress toward what goal where and when? Various "cuts" through an organization can be made that are most appropriate for measuring effectiveness. 52 In other words, depending on the organization, its activities, and its context, what is measured will vary.

There are, however, a few components that must be present in what is evaluated. Evaluation should include all phases of a program: planning, implementation, and follow-up. 53 Evaluation should include the goals (what kind of change is desired - what is our definition of success?), the means by which the goals are to be accomplished (who is being targeted and how?), and the signs by which success is recognized. 54 Based on our discussion of multiple stakeholders, it should also be apparent that these questions about goals and process should be asked of as many stakeholders as possible.

CRNGO work is also impacted by its environmental context. Evaluation should include the networked NGO. If NGOs are only evaluated as a set of clearly defined inputs and outputs (in a project mentality), then the complex historical, political, economic, and cultural processes and power structures at work will be ignored. NGOs are strengthened by their collaborations with other organizations and must be examined in the context of their informal and formal networks and coalitions with other NGOs, government agencies, and private businesses. 55 The Carter Center ideally should evaluate its programs in Liberia in a manner that considers the contributions of partner NGOs and civic groups, and how the work of the networked organizations complements, duplicates, and facilitates.

The final question for a methodology of accountability is how will evaluation be carried out? How should an organization with limited resources of time and money manage an evaluation program as part of its overall operation? Evaluation is often useless precisely because it is tagged on the end of a program, or evaluates goals that were set before the realities of the program set in. Organizations end up reporting back to funders on goals that have been changed. Rather, evaluation should be a continuous process, occurring over the short, medium, and long-term of an organization or program. One should also caution that a measurement system or measurement demands should not define an organization's purpose. 56 Evaluation should not be a burden that in itself defines what an organization is about.

Applicability of the Methodology of Accountability to CRNGOs: Where to Go From Here?:

Burdensome is how many organizations view evaluative processes. Given the challenges of accountability and the requirements of good evaluation, it is no surprise that organizations dread evaluative reporting. So how do we begin to transform these general recommendations about the need for improved accountability to actual improvements?

ARIA associates, a consulting group, has done just this as they have developed a plan for evaluating conflict resolution programs. ARIA employs a methodology in which evaluation is part of the work of conflict resolution, not an extra burden tagged on the end of a project and unlikely to be put to use.

The ARIA associates call their approach action-evaluation. Others in the field of NGO evaluation talk about a similar process with different language. Edwards and Hulme talk about "accompanied evaluation": permanent dialogue and examination of common problems that arise between partners or stakeholders in an organization. Like action-evaluation, the accompaniment approach does not wait until after a project is finished in order to evaluate it. Rather, the most important questions are confronted from the beginning. 57 Other key aspects of this kind of evaluation process are transparency and participation by beneficiaries. Transparency and participatory evaluation are buzzwords in the development and relief NGO world. The ARIA approach seems to embody what we "all know" to be sensible in development work: planning, implementation, and monitoring of projects must include continuous grassroots involvement. "Members are involved at every stage of the project formulation from inception onward, so that all programs reflect and fulfill their needs. Participatory decision-making processes ensure transparency and honest reporting about resource allocation and objective appraisal of achievements." 58 Transparent, dialogical goal formulation is key. So is the downward accountability that seems to be so lacking in many NGOs, including CRNGOs. Another new term for this kind of evaluation is the "social audit". 59 A social audit requires that stakeholders and their aims be identified as part of evaluation. These approaches make interpretation of events more objective by allowing multiple perspectives and contribute to cost-effectiveness by combining performance monitoring with participatory capacity building of all stakeholders or staff and beneficiaries. 60

Can these action-evaluation, accompaniment, transparent, social-audit methodologies contribute to improved CRNGO accountability? Can they really make an organization more accountable by improving performance evaluation? Though perhaps not extensively tested, the theories make sense. Evaluation in itself is a conflict resolving process in that goal setting and evaluation require bargaining among multiple stakeholders. Many organizations never reach agreement even on the fundamental questions of their definitions of success and the goals that they should pursue. 61 These are methodologies that "…allow all interested parties to have a say in defining means and ends. Causes and effects are negotiated, monitored, and evaluated from the perspectives of the actors who can be reasonably assumed to have an influence on both progress and impact." When "…goals, objectives, existing context, and processes to be used are discussed with the stakeholders [over a period of time] differences in motivations and perceptions underpinning what is to be achieved, who is likely to benefit, and how they will benefit become apparent early on, so that compromises can be negotiated." Conflicts identified early on allow for the viability of an initiative to be more adequately assessed, and ultimately have more chance of being successful. 62

This process is preferable to a linear approach that evaluates the inputs and outputs at the end of a project. The ARIA approach provides a way for evaluation to be contextually appropriate to the work of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution, especially as understood in Lederachian transformative terms, is not easily assessed as a neat package of inputs, effective use of inputs, and outputs. The Lederachian ideal of conflict transformation occurs with continuous involvement by conflict resolution actors that are accountable to a wide range of societal actors in a given community. Thus with ARIA, the performance of CRNGOs can be evaluated in a manner that holds them accountable to the very values of the conflict resolution field, not to those of business organizations or donor organizations. 63

This method gives direction to head in order to reach a higher state of NGO accountability. It begins to address some of the current difficulties and shortcomings of CRNGO accountability. It attempts to involve all stakeholders in evaluation, and to give all stakeholders bargaining power to define what success is and whether success is being reached as the project progresses. Further research might tell us exactly how this method can be tailored to the particular needs of individual CRNGOs. 64

The three case organizations examined in this study already incorporate certain ideas from our methodology. They conduct feasibility studies for projects before committing to them and make sure that common goals are shared among donors, participants, and staff. Yet these processes can be more purposeful, thorough, and continuous. They can be more systematic, and thus more reliable than the anecdotal evidence too often used to gauge success of conflict resolution initiatives. In short, some informal accountability measures can be formalized, thus making them more rigorous. 65

The ARIA consultants utilize computer database technology to analyze how goals overlap and differ among principle stakeholders in a project. The same or similar process could be adopted by Christian Peacemaker Teams. When planning an intervention, CPT could systematically evaluate their goals, the motivations behind those goals, and the processes desired by which to reach those goals. 66 This information would be gathered for the principle stakeholders in a project. Dialogue will occur at the planning stage about the overlapping and contrasting goals, motivations, and processes. Evaluation of goals, motivations, and processes will repeatedly occur as the project is implemented and runs its course. CPT can improve its project planning by systematizing it in this way. Search For Common Ground, with its emphasis on convening roundtable discussions and conflict resolution workshops, will find the ARIA approach easy to adapt. Workshop convenors, participants, and funders can all be identified and their goals compared and assessed by an evaluator. The Carter Center's intensive networking efforts would require some hefty international coordinating. Yet for partnering organizations to most effectively complement efforts, a systematic evaluation of their common goals, motivations, and processes as well as dialogue about them as they adapt and alter is key to success and knowing how success is to be recognized.

The Carter Center especially illustrates some of the limitations regarding the ARIA approach to evaluation. When stakeholders conflict, should there be a system of weighting their different views? Should some stakeholders be given more power than others? For example, should eminent persons like Carter in the Carter Center be given more bargaining power? How does one define precisely who all of the stakeholders are, especially in a heavily networked NGO? In an open system, where does one draw the line of accountability? What should happen when some stakeholders are hard to access for their input? Dialogical, transparent processes are often time and space intensive - luxuries not easily available to the harried NGO.

Perhaps these limitations are dilemmas that can be overcome. Two larger concerns remain. First is that even with all of the innovation in evaluating performance there still seems to be nothing that gets at the problem of causality. How do we establish that CRNGOs contribute to conflict resolution in cause-effect terms, or is that not an important thing for which to strive?

The problem of establishing causal impact is not solved by an ARIA-like approach to evaluation. But I do believe that causal impact is more likely to be appropriately assessed when the value of goals and definitions of success are being carefully considered prior to and during a project's functioning. There is greater consensus on what causal impact entails in a given context, and more monitoring of progress toward that impact. The ARIA approach is better suited to strategic (long-term) accountability than are more traditional evaluation methods.

The second problem takes us back to what should be included in accountability (see p.9): we've addressed the identification of goals, the processes of reaching them, and reporting on progress, but have failed to develop a system of rewards and penalties. It might be argued that all an ARIA approach accomplishes is "to make information available about what has happened in relation to those who are most affected by the organization's activities". 67 Everyone involved knows more about what is going on, but success still depends mostly on the receptivity of those in charge of the NGO. If the NGO really wants to be accountable to stakeholders, it can be through these processes. Does this mean that we are left with the unsatisfactory answer that NGOs will be accountable only when they have the will to self-regulate? Are we left with having nothing to rely on as far as structures of accountability and reward and punishment except for those which rely in some fundamental sense on the goodwill of the NGO? Is there any point in holding an organization accountable if it is unwilling to hold itself accountable? What kind of accountability is this?

This dilemma has the same answer as the first. Again, the multiple stakeholder involvement, well-bargained definitions of "success", and transparent, continuous dialogue evaluating progress all serve to create an atmosphere in which it is hard to fudge or hide. At least harder than it would be with traditional methods. Thus, we can say that the ARIA-like methods are indeed improvements.

Finally, is there anything unique to the world of CRNGOs in establishing a methodology of accountability? What are some features unique to CRNGOs which might require special consideration in designing accountability structures?

Expectations About the Uniqueness of CRNGOs:

Specific attributes of conflict resolution NGOs are likely to impact their accountability. The research of Edwards and Hulme speaks specifically to the world of relief and development NGOs. Accountability for human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, and women's NGOs might look different.

First, whereas Edwards and Hulme hypothesize that NGOs serve as surrogates to the state, it is possible that CRNGOs serve more as complements to state diplomacy efforts than as substitutes for it. 68 Search for Common Ground and Carter Center clearly fall into this category. It is possible that CRNGOs are especially accountable to the state since conflict resolution is an issue in which segments of the state are highly likely to be involved. Is the state the primary stakeholder of CRNGO work? Is the state the primary beneficiary of CRNGO work? If so, CRNGOs might not have a problem with downward accountability, because the beneficiaries of their work are usually powerful actors. This would, of course, depend on the level at which the CRNGO operates. CPT works on the level of community conflict whereas Search for Common Ground works as Track II Diplomats for regional peace in the Middle East. More research is needed to determine the relationship between NGO and state interventions in situations of conflict.

Another feature at play in CRNGOs is the need for confidentiality. 698 In delicate negotiation processes transparency might prove dangerous, and use of "head persons" might contribute to a personal, free-reigns conflict resolution process without much accountability. 708 Special accountability structures may be needed for organizations requiring secrecy.

Finally, one can imagine CRNGOs as brokers "inbetween" stakeholders as opposed to service providers for stakeholder clients. 71 This is an important distinction, demanding different types of accountability structures. Without question, all NGO work involves complicated matrices of multiple stakeholders. A unique feature of the CRNGO is that by the very nature of being a conflict resolver, the CRNGO is involved in a situation of conflict. Whereas with development, human rights, and relief NGOs issues are inherently conflictual, the CRNGO begins with or enters into the middle of a situation of conflict. Assuming this reality, CRNGOs may be more needful of an evaluation process capable of reconciling conflicts between stakeholders (such as the ARIA approach) than other NGOs.

SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Rothman, of ARIA, asks some of the basic questions that motivated this paper in his study of action-evaluation and conflict resolution.

"When the Pew Foundation funds projects in Eastern Europe, what is it seeking to achieve? Why? What values and priorities drive its funding decisions? When the Conflict Management Group in Cambridge intervenes in the former Soviet Union, what is it seeking to do and why? How does it articulate its own objectives and how does it track their evolution though the life of the project? If funded by Pew to do this project, how do their respective goals and priorities line up with one another? How about the participants' goals? How do they overlap and differ? When a given mediator participates in a series of initiatives in the Basque region of Spain what are his or her objectives and why have they been selected for this intervention? When 40 community leaders from the two sides of Cyprus participate in a 10-day AID-sponsored conflict resolution training workshop, what are their objectives and how do they evolve? What are the objectives of the interveners and funders in this initiative?" 72

The ARIA approach, which seeks to address these kinds of questions, seems applicable to organizations like CPT, SFCG, and the Carter Center. Yet, for those who want to see cause and effect empirically proved between the Carter Center's convening of the Great Lakes Heads of State Meetings in Africa and peace in Burundi, hope is far away. In an open-system there will always be limitations for the social scientist. But even if we achieve nothing else than greater awareness of our failures, this too is sobering improvement.

Directions for Further Research:"A representative of a leading NGO currently involved in sensitive conflict resolution activities in Sri Lanka, the Koreas and El Salvador stated that some of the best and most factual accounts on mediation are written about 10 or 20 years later." 73

Due to the wide variety of CRNGOs and CRNGO activities, several cases are needed to analyze organizational accountability. Existing case studies of CRNGOs need to be mined, controlling for and representing a diverse sample of organizational types, organizational activities, types of conflict, and stages of conflict resolution. Beyond and in relation to CRNGO accountability, a whole world of questions about CRNGOs is open for exploration.

Notes:

Note 1: Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-1994," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1995), p. 346. Back.

Note 2: Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1997), p. 339. Back.

Note 3: Farouk Mawlawi, "New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for Non-Governmental Actors," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, (2) (1993), p. 391. Back.

Note 4: John Sankey, "Conclusions" in Peter Willetts, ed. The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN System (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), p. 275. Appendix C of this book contains the text of the entire speech by the former Secretary General. Back.

Note 5: Kumar Rupesinghe, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the "Agenda for Peace," Ecumenical Review, Vol. 47 (3) (July 1995), p. 325. Back.

Note 6: NGO is not an ideal term as it is defines an organization negatively (non-governmental). NGOs can thus include everything from terrorist groups to foundations and multinational corporations. Many have dealt with the problem of defining NGOs, a.k.a. PVOs (private voluntary organizations),TSMOs (transnational social movement organizations) and the Third Sector. In the world of conflict resolution, non-governmental actors have been called unofficial diplomats or Track II diplomats. I will use "NGO", which I (somewhat loosely) define as: private, voluntary, largely non-profit organizations which operate for public purposes. NGOs may be local, national, international, and vary in their functions, resources, and ideological orientation. Back.

Note 7: Michael Edwards and David Hulme, "Introduction" in Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World. (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996), p. 2. Back.

Note 8: Even though Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledges NGO contributions to conflict resolution, he defines NGO roles in a rather traditional sense - secondary to state efforts. Back.

Note 9: Edwards and Hulme suggest that there is "evidence that NGOs do not perform as effectively as had been assumed in terms of poverty reach, cost-effectiveness, sustainability, popular participation (including gender), flexibility, and innovation." Edwards and Hulme, p. 5. It should also be noted that the concept of accountability is becoming generally more accepted in International Relations research. One example of this is the focus on accountability in Seyom Brown's International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polity. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). Back.

Note 10: For examples see Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996) and Michael Edwards and David Hulme, eds., Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996). Also see Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, The Emerging Sector: An Overview (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies, 1994). Back.

Note 11: John Paul Lederach, "Conflict Transformation: The Case for Peace Advocacy," in Menno Wiebe, ed., NGOs and Peacemaking: A Prospect for the Horn, Horn of Africa Project, Institution of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Canada, 16-18 December, 1989, p. 7. Back.

Note 12: Lederach (1989), p. 15. Back.

Note 13: See Farouk Mawlawi, "New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for Non-Governmental Actors," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, (2) (1993), pp. 391-413. Back.

Note 14: Available from Carter Center; One Copenhill; Atlanta, GA 30307. The December 1996 International Guide to NGO Activities in Conflict Prevention and Resolution indexes CRNGO activities into the following categories: consultation, information exchange, mediation, publications, research/analysis/policy development, seminars/workshops/dialogue, and training/education. Back.

Note 15: For examples see Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds. Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1994); Mawlawi; Adam Curle, In the Middle: Non-Official Mediation in Violent Situations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Kumar Rupesinghe, "The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Early Warning and Conflict Resolution," An International Alert Paper (1993); Lederach (1989); and Beverley McGee, NGOs as 'Unofficial Mediators': The Role of the Quakers in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70 and The World Council of Churches in the Sudan Civil War, 1970-72." Unpublished paper. Back.

Note 16: For examples see Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Lederach (1989); and Curle (1986). Back.

Note 17: For examples see McGee; Lederach (1989); Johnston and Sampson (1994); Princen (1992); and Violeta Petroska Beska, "Non-governmental Organizations, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy - The Case of Macedonia" (Skopje, Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict Resolution Project). Back.

Note 18: Edwards and Hulme, p. 8. Back.

Note 19: Edwards and Hulme, p. 8. Back.

Note 20: Much has been written on what makes for an effective board. See Rajesh Tandon, "Board Games: Governance and Accountability in NGOs," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 53-64. Also, Melissa Middleton, "Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond the Governance Function" in Walter W. Powell, ed. The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 141 - 153. Back.

Note 21: See Table I.1, Edwards and Hulme, p. 10. Back.

Note 22: Rosabeth Moss Kanter and David V. Summers, "Doing Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach," in The Nonprofit Sector, pp. 154-166, p. 156. Back.

Note 23: This case taken from Vandana Desai and Mick Howes, "Accountability and Participation: A Case Study from Bombay," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 101-113, p.108. Back.

Note 24: Desai and Howes, p. 112. Back.

Note 25: Edwards and Hulme, "Beyond the Magic Bullet? Lessons and Conclusions," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 254-266, p. 260. Back.

Note 26: A more sophisticated look at their accountability structures would require interviews, questionnaires, and site visits which were not feasible for this study. One thing I hope this preliminary research accomplishes is some ideas on how to proceed investigating the current state of CRNGO accountability more thoroughly. In other words, even discovering how to measure how these organizations are held accountable is a valuable research goal. Back.

Note 27: This is only one of Search for Common Ground's many conflict resolution programs. Back.

Note 28: Carter Center At a Glance, p. 10. Back.

Note 29: CPT, like my other cases, is operative in a variety of conflicts across the globe. Back.

Note 30: Hebron CPT Mission Statement. (CPTNET: 12/10/95) Back.

Note 31: One might similarly ask if without Jimmy Carter the Carter Center ceases to exist. Back.

Note 32: This seems to be the most popular way of justifying support of CRNGO work (and any kind of NGO work?) Back.

Note 33: the Hebron team has had experience with physical attacks by Jewish settlers as well as problems with access. Most recently (January 1998), there have even been death threats against the team. Back.

Note 34: "Christian Wants a Peace of the Action," Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, NY, Wed. 12/8 1993). Back.

Note 35: McGee, p. 38. Back.

Note 36: Pat Bradshaw, etal. "Do Nonprofit Boards Make a Difference: An Exploration of the Relationships Among Board Structure, Process, and Effectiveness," Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly , Vol. 21, (3) (Fall 1992), pp. 227-249, p. 228. Competing goals of multiple stakeholders (Kanter and Summers, 1987); complex contingencies that may influence performance (Miller and Weiss, 1987)( same as open system); and multiple indicators such as survival, constituent satisfaction, reputation, financial viability, and outcome (Herman, 1990) ( lack of objective performance standards) are all considered in assessing effectiveness in the voluntary sector. Back.

Note 37: Edwards and Hulme, p. 9. Keep in mind that their focus is on relief and development NGOs. Back.

Note 38: Kanter and Summers, p. 159. Back.

Note 39: Kees Biekart, "European NGOs and Democratization in Central America: Assessing Performance in Light of Changing Priorities," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 80-90, p. 84. Back.

Note 40: This lack of downward accountability is of special concern in Edwards and Hulme because of the New Policy Agenda whereby many NGOs are receiving increasing amounts of funds from governmental sources. This could increase their accountability to governments, and also to the agenda of governments. Back.

Note 41: Edwards and Hulme, p. 260. Back.

Note 42: Multiple accountabilities can also be advantageous. Stakeholders are called as such because they have a "stake" in an organization, meaning they may benefit or gain from their involvement with an NGO. If the NGO is able to run a positive-sum game among its network of stakeholders, then all might seek to gain, creating what Uphoff calls positive externalities, "benefits (greater than costs) that extend beyond the project, community, or enterprise at hand." (Norman Uphoff, "Why NGOs Are Not A Third Sector: A Sectoral Analysis with Some Thoughts on Accountability, Sustainability, and Evaluation," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 23-39, p. 33). Often such externalities are hard to measure and might be overlooked in formal accountability and performance measurements. Back.

Note 43: Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967), p. 39. Back.

Note 44: Edwards and Hulme, p. 9 and Alan F. Fowler, "Assessing NGO Performance: Difficulties, Dilemmas, and a Way Ahead," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 169-186, p. 174. Back.

Note 45: Such complexity in measuring organizational performance has been acknowledged before by organizational analysts (as reviewed by Fowler in Edwards and Hulme, p. 175). Rosabeth Moss Kanter stated that nonprofit effectiveness should be measured in relation to a particular context and life stage of an organization, and rather than using universal measures, there is a need to identify appropriate questions that reflect multiple criteria by which to measure performance. (Kanter, "The Measurement of Organizational Effectiveness, Productivity, Performance and Success: Issues and Dilemmas in Service and Non-Profit Organizations." PONPO Working Paper, No. 8 New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1979, p. 36 ). P. Drucker (Drucker, "Managing the Nonprofit Organization: Principles and Practices." New York: Harper Collins, 1990) reaches similar conclusions, also stating that standards must derive from the various constituencies served by an organization. Back.

Note 46: Hector Bejar and Peter Oakley, "From Accountability to Shared Responsibility: NGO Evaluation in Latin America," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 91-100, p. 95. Back.

Note 47: These questions on the utility of evaluation are highly emphasized in Marvin C. Alkin, A Guide for Evaluation Decision Makers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985). Back.

Note 48: Kanter and Summers, p. 155. Back.

Note 49: Deborah Bing, Action Evaluation in Progress: Lessons Learned Over the Past Five Months. Paper presented at the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (Pittsburgh: May 1997), p. 9. Back.

Note 50: Suchman, pp. 27-45. Back.

Note 51: Kanter and Summers, p. 156. Back.

Note 52: Suchman, p. 145. Back.

Note 53: Suchman, p. 38. Back.

Note 54: Stephen D. Biggs and Arthur D. Neame, "Negotiating Room to Maneuver: Reflections Concerning NGO Autonomy and Accountability within the New Policy Agenda," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 40-52, p. 49. Back.

Note 55: Kanter and Summers, p. 156 and a common theme in Edwards and Hulme. Back.

Note 56: Bejar and Oakley, p. 98. Back.

Note 57: Janaki Ramesh, "Strategies for Monitoring and Accountability: The Working Women's Forum Model," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 114-122, p. 117. Back.

Note 58: Simon Zadek and Murdoch Gatward, "Transforming the Transnational NGOs: Social Auditing or Bust?," in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 226-240, p. 234. Back.

Note 59: Fowler, p. 178. Back.

Note 60: Jay Rothman, Action Evaluation and Conflict Resolution: In Theory and Practice. Paper presented at the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (Pittsburgh: May 1997), pp. 4, 6, 7. Back.

Note 61: Fowler, p. 177. Back.

Note 62: Donors may have to be educated on new methods of accountability that don't emphasize inputs/outputs and short-term results. Overall, however, donors should appreciate increased rigor in evaluating performance of CRNGOs. Back.

Note 63: ARIA's action-evaluation is extremely adaptable to various organizational needs and limitations. This paper isn't capable of addressing the varieties possible. Back.

Note 64: And thus more acceptable to donors (see footnote 63). Also, the formal evaluation deadline is likely to be the most pressing one on the NGO, thus the one most likely to be accomplished, no matter the relative utility for improving performance. Back.

Note 65: Rothman, pp. 8-10. Back.

Note 66: Zadek and Gatward, p. 238. Back.

Note 67: This is the word Boutros Boutros-Ghali used (see p. 2): "the role of NGOs in complementing UN initiatives." Back.

Note 68: Edwards and Hulme, p. 11 and McGee pp. 35-36. Many NGO activities are deliberately kept low profile and records are confidential. NGOs often must downplay the significance of their own accomplishments. Back.

Note 69: An Example of such a "head person" is Jimmy Carter. Back.

Note 70: Princen uses this term "inbetween" to describe intermediaries in conflict. A need for an exploration of the nature of inbetweeness is most clearly expressed by Princen. His book is an attempt to "characterize the peculiarities of this position and to lay out what is distinctive about intermediary intervention as a method of international conflict management, and more generally as a decision-making process." (Princen, p. 6). Back.

Note 71: Rothman, p. 8. Back.

Note 72: Mawlawi, p. 406, note 45. Back.

Note 73: PAGE 33 Back.

References