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Map of Middle East |
The Viability of the Nation-State: Turkish State and Kurdish Problem
International Studies Association
March 18-21, 1998
The author gratefully thanks to Volkan Aytar of Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.
If you surrender your hand, you can lose your arm.
Turkish proverb.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the 1990's witnessed an era of chaos wherein various ethnic groups bounded in the former nation-states pushed for independence. Beginning in the former Soviet republics and the Eastern European states, this domino effect had gained momentum virtually throughout the world. Parallel to the spread of ethnic resurgence, we observed an increasing scholarly attention on subjects such as 'ethnic conflict', 'ethnic discrimination', and 'nationalism'.
In this era of chaos, to explain the sudden and abundant number of struggles for independence, theories of nationalism were employed. Among these theories and their advocates, some argue that pushing for independence was specific to the conditions of the 1990's, namely, the disappearance of the strong binding power, the communism 1 . Other theories expound this desire with deficiencies of the nation-state, such as insufficient modernization, uneven development, and internal colonialism. Whereas some theories explicated these proceedings as unavoidable due to international and domestic dynamics, others suggested that such groups seized the chance to assert their interests.
The post-Cold War era signaled the dissolution of the artificial congruence of 'people', 'nation', and 'state', dating from the Treaty of Westphalia, often considered the backbone of the modern nation-state system. In this era of "protest against the status quo" 2 , many scholars tried to analyze the current state and to predict the future of many ethnic groups. Besides the former communist societies, the Kurds of the Middle East are within this novel category of ethnic groups whose socio-political trajectory attracts scholarly analysis. Moreover, for the Kurdish case, the 1990's also seemed to be important in the sense that the 'Kurdish Question' became internationally important with the peshmerga exodus to Turkey after the 1991 Gulf War. This conjuncture of rising ethnic movements and the pressure on the Kurdish residents in Iraq has resulted in the plethora of social, cultural and political analyses of the case. Most of the recent books 3 on the so called 'Kurdish problem' in Turkey, thus, are mostly exclusively concentrated on the specific conditions of the 1990's.
In a larger sense, these two specific conditions of the 1990's - the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War- raise two sets of research interest in the Kurdish problem of Turkey: The first one has to do with the explanatory power of the relevant theories. That is, to what extent the theories of nationalism and ethnicity that were used to explain the rise of nationalistic demands in the former Soviet Republics and the Eastern European states help us understand the 'Kurdish problem' in Turkey? The second set of research interests raises other questions: are the 1990's the turning point of the Kurdish nationalism in its struggle with the Turkish state; or is what we are witnessing a breakthrough in the history of the Kurdish nationalism, or are the 1990's imply a phase within the longer Kurdish struggle? What has changed domestically and internationally that brought the Kurdish issue to the focus of contemporary analyses?
My objective in this paper is to discuss the relevance of several theories of nationalism and ethnicity, based on a comparison of the Kurdish nationalist movements of the 1990's with respect to the former communist societies, and with respect to the earlier Kurdish nationalist movements. Thus, I would like, first, to discuss to what extent the 1990's are a specific period in Kurdish history, and then elaborate on how we should incorporate the 1990's into a broader analysis of Kurdish nationalism and whether it may threaten the viability of the Turkish state.
What has changed in the 1990's?
Many authors who have a scholarly interest in Turkey's Kurdish problem agree that the 1990's "is a period when the Kurdish nationalist movement has mounted its biggest challenge to the Turkish state in the twentieth century" 4 . In this period, foreign factors such as the Gulf War, and the accompanying domestic political factors altered the destiny of the Kurds of Turkey.
The Kurdish problem became more visible especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are two contradictory yet powerful explanations of the effect of this process on Turkey's Kurdish issue. One views the fall of the USSR as an 'awakening force'. The argument is that the "the transformation of international political balances after the aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise have rekindled some of the long-dormant ethnic tensions around the globe. Turkey is not an exception." 5 The second argument is that the collapse of the Soviet Union inspired Turkish expansionist demands more than the Kurdish separatist claims. In the post-Cold War era, Turkish plans of taking Mosul back were suddenly challenged by the PKK. It is at this point that the Kurdish problem reached its peak 6 since the Kurds were considered to be a 'headache.' The second, yet the most important, foreign factor that affected Kurdish nationalism of the 1990's is the Gulf War. The mass exodus of Iraqi Kurds who were fleeing away from the wrath of Saddam helped internationalize the Kurdish issue. Squeezed between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the Kurds taught the world that unless ethnic groups have a state of their own, they are subject to discrimination, forced migration, and oppression.
The mass exodus of Iraqi Kurds had both positive and negative impacts in terms of resolving the Kurdish problem in Turkey. The Gulf War not only led to the growth of the Kurdish population within Turkey, but also caused a vacuum of authority in Northern Iraq. The absence of authority coupled with the diminishing Soviet threat after the end of the Cold War increased the priority of such separatist claims as the PKK's (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Turkey's political agenda. Coincident with the collapse of authority in Northern Iraq, Turkey started to reassess its policies towards its Kurdish minority due to both increasing separatist claims by the PKK, and the accelerating international attention on the Kurdish issue in the Middle East . Gunter argues that for the Turkish government, "the PKK insurgency itself, the 1991 Gulf War and the ensuing mass exodus of the Iraqi Kurds from the wrath of Saddam acted as a catalysts to" 7 this new policy mentality. This period opened the way for more liberal policies that brought about more cultural autonomy to the Kurds.
"International circumstances have a strong effect on nationalism within states. 8 " The Gulf War, as an international factor that shape the contemporary Kurdish issue, had tremendous impact on the Turkish domestic policy. The Iraqi exodus signaled that Turkey should prevent its Kurdish minority from cooperating with their fellow ethnics in Iraq. Turkey also wanted to use the occasion to be in a controlling position of the 'problematic' regions, while at the same time, to get the sympathy of the West for being the 'caretaker' of the 'indigent' Iraqi Kurds. This intention of the Turkish state resulted in "contradictory policies" on the side of the Turkish government, that is recognizing the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq while denying the same to its own Kurds.
What kind of reassessment in Turkish policies altered Kurdish history which the Gulf War promoted? Many scholars agree that "(i)t was during [Turgut] Özal's tenure 9 that the current Kurdish problem began, slowly escalated, and then exploded" 10 . Besides introducing the language bill of 1991, Özal met with the representatives of the Iraqi Kurds, and granted amnesty, all of which paved the way for opening up a new era in the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Of these new policies, the language bill proved to be the most praise-worthy. The language bill of 1991 legalized the Kurdish language through repealing a 1983 law that has prohibited the use of any languages besides Turkish 11 . At this point the Kurdish case illustrates the significance of language in national formation. One of the basic value orientations of nationalist ideology is the belief in a common destiny through the use of symbolic values or of language, and Kurds are no exception. One cannot disregard the importance of language in raising up the national consciousness in the path to national self-determination. However, in the case of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, the language bill of 1991 should not be thought to give Kurdish equal status since the bill brought about freedom in the private sphere while still preventing the public use of the language in the courts and mass media 12 .
Although the 1990's seems significant in terms of acknowledging the 'Kurdish problem' by the Turkish government, the period was also marked by the suppression of the Kurdish participation in the Turkish politics. According to Gunter, Özal's reforms failed because they were not fully in practice, and from the national security mentality that took precedence over basic human rights concerns 13 . Thus, rather than an improvement in the situation, the mid-1990's witnessed a backlash resulting in the lifting of the immunity of six pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) parliamentarians in March 1994, as well as increasing number of causalties in the South-East Anatolia both from among the ranks of the PKK, and the Turkish military. The six DEP parliamentarians were arrested under the orders from the Constitutional Court, which accused them of disseminating "separatist propaganda" (with the claims that the represenatatives had links with the illegal PKK). Their detention resulted in the exclusion of a significant part of Kurdish representation in the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, the event also degraded Turkish democracy, since it replaced the relative openness of the Turkish democracy of the early 1990's with a more strict political environment 14 . The repeal of the immunities of the six DEP parliamentarians also encouraged the foundation of the 'Kurdish parliament in exile' in the Hague in 1995, which can be evaluated as the consequence of these changing policy orientations.
In terms of the change in the demographic and socio-economic conditions, the 1990's implied greater tension in relations between the Turkish government and the ethnic Kurds since the change in the conditions signaled a threat to the 'Turkish majority'. After 1991, the Kurds in Turkey increased in number as a result of the Iraqi exodus. Moreover, the Kurdish population as compared to that of the Turks grew faster in numbers as a result of higher fertility rates among the Kurds. This growing Kurdish population had recently been among the biggest concerns of the Turkish government because of the possibility that the Turks would eventually fall to a minority status. At the same time, beginning with the 1980's and exploding in the 1990's, the number of migrants from the countryside of the South-East Anatolia to the big cities increased due to the conflict in the area 15 , resulting in an increase in interaction between ethnic Turks and Kurds in the big cities. It has also been argued that within several years, the Kurdish population in the big cities would outnumber the Turkish population both as a result of migration and high Kurdish fertility rate 16 .
The 1990's: A Breakthrough?
Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey on the ashes of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire in 1923, Kurds revolted against the newly founded, so called 'homogenous' republic. It was made clear that the Turkish Republic meant to be the republic of those who feel themselves as Turk regardless of ethnic bacground 17 . From 1925 to 1939, there were three major revolts: the 1925 revolt led by Sheikh Said, the 1930 Mount Ararat insurrection, and the Dersim rebellion of 1938 18 . Though significant in terms of being the seeds of the 'Kurdish nationalism', these revolts were often described as more religious than nationalist revolts.
After a long period of single-party dominance in Turkey, Kurds began to make their voices heard through the 'conventional participation', especially through leftist parties in the 1960's. However, it is only after the late 1980's that the Kurdish issue became to take its current structure with the rise of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) as the 'defender of the Kurdish rights' through violent means. The 1980's were important in the sense that the new Kurdish nationalism emerged as an ethnically-based, non-religious and challenging force against the 'homogenous' republic, altering the sole religious-based Kurdish nationalism of the 1920's-1930's, and the class-based identity of the late 1970's.
In 1984, the PKK launched a war against the Turkish state, which denoted a breakthrough in the rivalry between the Turkish Republic and its Kurdish ethnic minority. The 1980's were marked with this first non-religious nationalist revolt of the Kurds. It has become increasingly clear that the 'Kurdish issue' does not only have to do with 'reactionary politics of the backward region', or 'the expression of the discontent', but it does involve an ethnic dimension, which might challenge the foundations of the republic. Thus, even though the importance of the 1990's (both in terms of the internationalization of the Kurdish issue, and -relatively speaking- the 'democratization' of the political environment) cannot be ignored, one should be careful not to fall into the trap of myopia in evaluating the developments of the decade. An analysis which traces back to the 1980's, and which evaluates the case in conjunction with the previous events adds more depth to the issue.
The 1990's symbolizes an important era -not a breakthrough- wherein the Kemalist understanding of centralization of the state and the homogenization of the society began to ease with Ozal's efforts of liberalization in the cultural sphere, economic development in the Kurdish-settled regions, and his attempts to engage with the PKK politically. Even though, it is hard to talk about a complete liberalization process in policy making due to what Gurbey 19 calls 'the dual decision making' (namely, the civilian authority, in the form of the Council of Ministers and Parliament; and the military authority) on the policies directed to the Kurdish problem, it was the first time that the military supremacy gave way to the civilian authorities.
However, can one argue that the Kurdish nationalist movement followed a similar path to those of the former Soviet republics, and the Eastern European countries especially after the late 1980's? Do the events of the 1990's in Turkey signify more or less a parallel pattern that alerted the vulnerability of many multi-ethnic 'nation-states' of the former communist systems? To make such a comparison, one needs to reflect upon the power of the relevant theories of nationalism as they are espoused in the above mentioned cases. The following section will discuss and compare some of the theories of nationalism and ethnicity as they apply to the dissolution of the 'nation-states'. It will also discuss to what extent they paralell with the Kurdish case of Turkey.
The Kurdish Path: Divergence or Convergence?
There are a number of theories on why ethnic groups revolt against the states in which they reside, and, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these theories attracted more attention due to their apparently increasing relevance. These abundant number of explanations or theories can be divided into two categories: first, those which see the issue as the 'wakening up of the dormant' or the 'opening up of the opportunities', that is, that the ethnonationalism which was long suppressed under authoritarian or communist systems came to the surface when these systems began to collapse or when they opened up some opportunities for ethnic groups to express their dissatisfaction; and second, those which perceive the issue as the explosion as a result of the deadlock of the old 'nation-state' structure. Each of these will be explored as they pertain to the Kurds of Turkey to construct a perspective in the analysis of the recent Kurdish issues.
a) The Opportunity Perspective:
The crux of this perspective is that the authoritarian/communist systems once froze things as they were, that is, they brought about a control which artificially kept things in their places, immobilizing the ethnic groups. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world entered into a new era where there arose the opportunity for those who were kept silent to speak up.
Why were those groups kept silent? One of the major arguments is that the majority of the 'nation-state' structures were unable to bring the ethnic groups within their respective territories under the rule of one single 'culture'. The "opportunity perspective" explains ethnic conflict with this unsuccessful lack of coherence, or with the non-convergence of identity and citizenship under a strong binding force - communism or authoritarianism in this case. Thus, for example, when the Communist systems failed, previously covert and hidden hatreds among the different ethnic groups found a way to come to the surface. From this point of view, the ethno-nationalism of the post-Cold War era is perceived as a "sleeping beauty 20 " or something "deep frozen" for a long while.
Gellner, in his book Nations and Nationalism argues that the modern nation state needs a "monopolized legitimate culture" 21 to bring the separate units together to 'modernize/industrialize' the system. According to Gellner, there is a need for political authority to control from the center in order to execute everything through one pattern of culture, one style of communication, and a centralized educational system. The axial concept in this case is what Gellner calls the 'High Culture' which is crucial for industrialization because the state's economy "depends on mobility and communication between individuals, at a level which can only be achieved if these individuals have been socialized into a high culture." 22 Thus, the imposition of a high culture is the necessary component of a modern state since this would enable the whole society to benefit from the 'fruits of the modernization'.
According to Gellner, the communist systems, rather than creating a high culture, used a monopoly of force and control over their population. Communism held loosely bound nationalities together under its 'harsh rule', and when this fear was gone, there was opportunity to express the discontent. When the system allowed expression of discontent through the policies of glasnost and more open election system, a Pandora's box of ethnic conflict has been opened up. "The overlord has gone, and there is no one to enforce cooperation in a system which is completely interdependent. 23 " The withering away of the state as an 'imposing' and 'controlling' actor, and the collapse of the center also meant a great vacuum created in the system. The most likely candidate to fill this vacuum was rival nationalism since it offered the sense of belonging and the pride that the communist system could not succeed in serving.
In a Gellnerian sense, the nation-state is not viable if it is unsuccessful in changing its culturally heterogeneous structure into a homogenous one by imposing a high culture; and if it allows expression of discontent within this period of unsuccessful coherence. How much of this Gellnerian perspective can be applied to the Kurdish case? It is true that the Kemalist ideology of populism was adopted to suppress any identity, but that of Turkish to homogenize and 'modernize' the new republic. Single national education system, single language, and single 'culture' were adopted during the history of the republic (making Turkish the 'high culture') until the language bill of 1991. However, in this respect the language bill does not undermine the legacy of the 'monopolized culture' since it only allows the use of Kurdish in the private sphere, still making Turkish the only means of communication in the public sphere. It is hard to argue that it was the liberal policies of the 1990's that opened up the opportunity for the expression of the discontent. That is, it is difficult to argue that the Kurds began to revolt against this 'monopolized culture' when they found the opportunity to do so. In fact, the Kurdish nationalist movement followed an opposite path: the Kurdish revival began to threaten the very existence of the Turkish state after the military coup of the 1980. The period was marked with extreme restrictions on the expression of the discontent. Thus, it is more suitable to argue that the Kurdish nationalism aroused by challenging the authoritarian rule of the 1980's rather than suddenly showing itself with the democratization of the environment. Moreover, in the Turkish case, even though the policies of Ozal meant the liberalization of the environment, it never meant the 'disappearnce of the overlord." In fact Ozal's liberal policies were followed by a new state of emergency in the Kurdish-populated South-East Anatolia.
On the other hand, the 1990's brought about opportunities to help the Kurds to express their dissatisfaction as well as their request for broader participation. One of these opportunities was the establishment of the pro-Kurdish political party in a more democratic environment. The other was the so called the 'domino effect of nationalist disintegration.' In the post-Cold era where many new entities joined to the global system, Kurds were among these ethnic groups who recognized the fact that "[i]f the world survived the rapid expansion of the number of U.N. member states from 52 in 1946 to 183 today, surely it can survive a more incremental expansion by a dozen or two more." 24 However, the opportunity perspective lacks an explanation on why Kurdish nationalist movement traces back to 1984 -a period marked by the military regime- as opposed to the more democratic environment of the 1990's. As argued before, the 1990's should only be consired as the period that follows a longer Kurdish struggle.
b) The deadlock of the nation-state:
This perspective can be examined within two aspects: the deadlock of nation-state due to uneven development or conflictual modernization, and the deadlock of the nation-state in terms of adopting to the new, changing circumstances of the international arena.
Whereas the students of nationalism talk about the success of the nineteenth century nationalism in terms of bringing together separate parts and homogenizing to develop, they also argue that the nation-state structure of the nineteenth century is liable due to its inefficiencies, and lack of coherence. Nairn, in his book Break up of Britain argues that the nineteenth century nationalism emerged as a reaction to the uneven development of the capitalist system, which traces back to the Industrial Revolution 25 . Military and economic demands of the international system created strong states- the so called 'enlightened absolutes'-to deal with the rapid social transformations of the era. In a Marxian-like dialectic, Nairn argues that nationalism of the nineteenth century, that aimed to 'catch up' the world was the antithesis of the capitalism of the eighteenth century, which created a center - the metropolitan areas-, and a periphery -those who are left behind.
According to Nairn, "nationalism (...) arises naturally from the new developmental conditions. It is not nature." 26 Now that the 18th century states are collapsing because their promise of bringing about national development had collapsed, new reactions -in the form of ethnic nationalism- against 'nation-states' are arising. In the tweentieth century, uneven development process that defined the nation-states generated a reaction by "the politically-driven mobilization of those excluded, left-behind, colonized or sentenced to become heritage-trails". Such a reaction is primarily ethnic "because the heartland-motors of progress have themselves already assumed a powerful ethnic shape." 27 The states of the previous century made ethnic individuals perceive themselves on the basis of their citizenships, by ignoring their ethnic identities. The general process of modernization which created artificial nationalism of the old era only made possible for some nations to build their states. However, even under this imposition, "the number [of the ethnic groups in the nation states] has always been sufficient to keep green the ideal of 'independence' or (at least) of a growth separate enough to contest forms of subjection" 28 .
Adopting Nairn's dialectical approach, it can be argued that this 'new wave of nationalism' of the 1990's is a new synthesis of capitalist development and the nationalism of the old era, which "has wasted a lot of ethnic communities, but provoked others into continuing protest at being silenced. The most valuable parts of modern culture derive from the resultant culture-clash - that is, from antagonisms and syntheses dependent not upon the museum-conservation of variety, but upon the latter's political will to exist." 29
Similar to Nairn, Hechter talks about the deadlock of the nation-states in his book Internal Colonialism, where he argues that national development required economic and political integration as well as cultural integration. In contradistinction to Gellnerian type of cultural diffusion theory, Hechter's argument analyzes the nation-states on the basis of how well different cultural groups within one political unit distribute the natural resources among each other. If this proccess is uneven (based on cultural identity), the outcome will be the resistance of the discriminated. If the system "assigns individuals to specific roles in the social structure on the basis of objective cultural distinction", then in such a circumstance where core is dominating politically, and exploiting the periphery materially, "there is always the possibility that the disadvantaged group in time will reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the advantaged group." 30
In this center-periphery model where one culture dominates the other, individuals define themselves as 'us' and 'the other' on the basis of roles they have to play in the social, economic, and political life. Thus, according to Hechter, rival nationalism arises as a result of an uneven development between the center and the periphery 31 , and the crystallization of this unequal distribution.
When the Kurdish nationalism of the 1970's is examined, one can see a parallel pattern to Hechter's center-periphery approach. Kurds, at that period, seem to be backward both in geographical and socio-economic terms. According to Gurr, the birth of the PKK can be considered as the sign of this uneven distribution: "Discontent arising from the perception of relative distribution is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence 32 " among the Kurds. Similarly, Martin van Bruinessen argues that "PKK was the only organization whose members were drawn always exclusively from the lowest social classes- the uprooted, half-educated village and small-youth" 33 . However, in the late 1980's this center-periphery model gave way to a more complicated Turkish social structure as a result of migration from the periphery (South-East Anatolia) to the center (big cities) and increasing state intenvention in the periphery. Especially in the 1990's, it is hard to argue that "what lies at the root of the Kurdish question is regional underdevelopment" 34 , since the region - the South-East Anatolia- is no longer considered to be the Kurdish 'periphery'. As of today, Istanbul is the biggest Kurdish city in terms of Kurdish population, as a result of massive migration from the South-East Anatolia.
Another problem with this notion of uneven development/regional underdevelopment is the tacit implication that the ethnic problem can disappear as states increase their investments in the periphery. In fact, the Turkish domestic policy has always been to perceive the problem as 'regional backwardness' (or as it is labeled, 'the South-East problem') rather than an ethnic one. Followingly, the solution always seemed to invest more. However, despite the efforts to 'modernize' the region to 'catch up with the center' 35 , and to suppress the possible Kurdish challenge to the unitary nature of the country, Kurdish identity was re-created as a reaction of social and political changes of the era.
It is obvious that Kurdish issue cannot be reduced to a single dimension. "Those who associate the rise or fall of ethnic nationalism with a specific economic stage ("industrial" or "postindustrial") or with "modernization" also make ethnic nationalism subservenient to material conditions." 36 Explanations solely based on material conditions cannot generate the sense of 'Kurdish' distinction nor can they explain why such a sense turned into a powerful Kurdish nationalism. It also fails to explicate the internal solidarity and the external differentiation of the group as they act to sharpen this distinction, leading the way for ethnic separatism.
One important but mostly ignored component of Kurdish issue is the 'Kurdish ethnic identity' as opposed to 'Turkish citizenship' which aims to replace the former either through popularist tactics (as in the case of the first years of the Republic) or through liberal policies which neglect a distinct culture. The attempt of 'homogenizing' the Turkish society after the foundation of the Turkish republic is a sign of Turkish attempts to 'catch up' with the world through challenging any internal, ethnic forces that might hinder this process. However, in the 1990's what we have witnessed is a Kurdish challenge against this 'enligtened absolutism'. Kylimcka argues that "the violence in Kurdistan -one of the longest-running nationalist conflicts in the world - is not ethnic exclusion, but the forcible inclusion of a national minority into a larger national group." 37 . However, it seems that Turkish nationalism could not in practice really transcend Kurdish ethnic or national sentiments. The results of a recent survey by Dogu Ergil show that ethnic identity is still the most dominant type of identification among the Kurds 38 . 40.3 percent of the Kurds define themselves on the basis of ethnic identity, 22.3 percent on the basis of national identity, 10.5 percent and 3.2 percent on the bases of religious and tribal identities, respectively. Ergil's report shows that even under the strict Kemalist ideology, 'Kurdishness' as an ethnic identity survives among the rural Kurds 39 .
Conclusion:
This paper has attempted to investigate to what extent the 1990's is a new period in the longer Kurdish struggle against the Turkish state, and how Kurdish nationalism of the period should be examined as part of the global nationalism. In contrast to many claims, this paper argued that 1990's should be examined with a broder perspective that traces back to the 1980's, and in some cases further back to the establishment of the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the paper did not dismiss the fact the global factors such as the the wave of ethnonationalism following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War have reshaped the Kurdish nationalist movement. "Social and economic conditions (...) contributed to a new awareness of Kurdish identity, providing a context receptive to new global ideas." 40 In general, what the 1990's taught was that looking at the Kurdish issue within the paradigm of state survival no longer helps us, neither can it introduce any feasible solution. It is the conjuncture of the global impacts following the Gulf War; the vulnerability of the nation-state, which highly expressed itself proceding the collapse of the Soviet Union; the legacy of the Turkish Republic; and the changing characteristics of the Kurdish national movement that have shaped the Kurdish nationalism of the decade, and will affect the future of the issue in the following decades.
Notes:
Note 1: See, for example, Jowitt, Ken (1992). New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction, Berkeley: University of California Press. Back.
Note 2: Hobsbawn, E. J. (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Back.
Note 3: See, for example, Ciment, James (1996). The Kurds: State and Minority in Iraq and Iran. New York : Facts on File, Inc., Gunter, Michael M.(1997). The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. New York: St. Martin's Press., Olson Robert, ed. (1996). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Back.
Note 4: Olson Robert, ed. (1996). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, p.2. Back.
Note 5: Barkey, Henri J. (1996). "Under the Gun: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question" in Robert Olson, ed. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Back.
Note 6: Ciment, James (1996). The Kurds: State and Minority in Iraq and Iran. New York : Facts on File, Inc Back.
Note 7: Gunter, Michael M.(1997). The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. New York: St. Martin's Press., Olson Robert, ed. (1996)., p.62. Back.
Note 8: Kellas, James G. (1991). The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, New York: St. Martin's Press. Back.
Note 9: Ozal's presidency lasted from 1989 to April 1993 (when he died of a heart attack). Back.
Note 10: Gunter (1997), p.11. Back.
Note 11: The Kurdish language was also previously forbidden in public places in 1924, as a result of Kemalist populism. Back.
Note 12: Although the law prohibited the use of Kurdish in public sphere, the author saw books published in Kurdish. The line that seperates the legal from illegal seems to be on the basis of whether the book is commercial or political. Back.
Note 13: Gunter, Michael (1997). Back.
Note 14: In June 1990, the first pro-Kurdish political party, People's Labor Party (HEP) was formed by ten MPs. The party, then, was replaced by DEP after its banning in 1991. DEP was banned by the Constitutional Court in Jume 1994, making People's Democracy Party (HADEP) its successor prior to the 1995 elections. Back.
Note 15: While the migration rates from the East and South-East Anatolia were 5.0% and 2.3% respectively during the period of 1980-85, the numbers shifted to 9.3% and 3.3% in the 1985-1990; and the population of the cities in the South-East Anatolia grew a little between 1990 and 1994 (Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow 1997. A Translation of The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, London: Frank Cass). Back.
Note 16: Martin van Bruinessen (1997). Excerpts from a talk delivered at Binghamton University. Back.
Note 17: For example, the sayings of the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, signify the overemphasis of Turkish identity at the expense of the other ethnic identities of the country: "Happy is a man who says I am a Turk". However, "given the inchoate fluidity of ethnic consciousness in the Islamic world and the perceived need of political unity, one could argue that such a definition of 'Turkish' made sense and was not unreasonable." Gunter, Michael (1990). The Kurds inTurkey. Boulder: Westview Press. Back.
Note 18: Gunter, Michael (1990). Back.
Note 19: Gurbey, Gulistan (1997). "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey Since the 1980's" in Robert Olson (ed) The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. Back.
Note 20: John Hall, in his article "Natioanalism: Classified and Explained" in Daedalus, 1993, Vol.122. defines sleeping beauty view as "nationalism is the awakening of something extant which had merely been dormant." (p.4). Back.
Note 21: Gellner, Ernest (1983). Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.140. Back.
Note 22: Gellner, Ernest (1983). p.140. Back.
Note 23: Gellner, Ernest (1993). "Homeland of Unrevolution", Daedalus, Vol. 122, p.151. Back.
Note 24: Lindt, Michael (1994). "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 87-99. Back.
Note 25: Nairn, Tom (1977). The Break up of Britain, London. Back.
Note 26: Nairn, Tom (1977). p.334.v Back.
Note 27: Nairn, Tom (1990). p.30. Back.
Note 28: Nairn, Tom (1990). "Beyond Big Brother", New Statesman and Society, V.5, June 15, p. 30. Back.
Note 29: Nairn, Yom (1990). p.32. Back.
Note 30: Hechter calls this 'dicrimination based on objective cultural disctinction' as 'cultural labor theory', and argues that such a system is problematic since "high status occupations tend to be reserved for those of metropolitan culture, while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the stratification system." See Michael Hechter (1975). Internal Colonialism, Berkeley: University of California Press. Back.
Note 31: In 'conflictual modernization' approach, the concepts center and periphery are used to mean either "cultural division of labor" as Hechter uses, or it implies a structural unevenness between the cities (occupied by the dominant group) and the countryside (occupied by the ethnic group/s). The author uses both meanings of the concepts. Back.
Note 32: Gurr, Ted (1993). Minorities at Risk, Washington: D.C. : United States Institute of Peace. Back.
Note 33: van Bruinessen (1992). Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan, London: Zed Books Ltd. Back.
Note 34: Ergil, Dogu ( 1995). Dogu Sorunu, Teshisler ve Tespitler (The Problem of South-East, Diagnosis, and Findings), Ozel Arastirma Raporu, Stratejik Arastirmalar Dizisi, TOBB, July. Back.
Note 35: To develop the region, the Turkish government built the biggest dam in the region (Ataturk Dam) as a part of the big South-East Anatolia Development Project. Government also claims that it invests more than it extracts from the region. Back.
Note 36: Connor, Walker (1994). Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.62 Back.
Note 37: Kymlicka, Will (1995). "Misunderstanding Nationalism", Dissent, Winter, pp. 130-137. Back.
Note 38: Ergil, Dogu (1995). Back.
Note 39: The author used the word rural since the survey was undertaken in the three relatively poor South-Eastern cities (Diyarbakir, Batman, and Mardin) and three relatively well-off Medittereanean cities which are among the highest receivers of the Kurdish immigrants (Adana, Mersin, and Antalya). Back.
Note 40: Sakallioglu, Umit Cizre (1996). p.16 Back.
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